HL Deb 04 March 1842 vol 61 cc9-41
Lord Monteagle

rose in consequence of the notice which he had given; and he trusted that the proposition which he was about to make would not be prejudiced in any respect by the delay which had occurred —a delay of which he did not complain, but which the noble Duke (Duke of Wel- lington) would do him the justice to admit was one for which he was not responsible; for at the very earliest period of the Session, consistent with the forms of the House, namely, on the second day of the meeting of Parliament, in accordance with a communication he had made to the Government, in the previous month of November, he gave notice that it was his desire to bring this subject under the consideration of the House. His motion had been, from time to time, and from various circumstances, postponed by the desire of the noble Duke, and undoubtedly on the last occasion, the night previous, when it had been again put off, in order to permit the discussion elsewhere upon the same subject, he had not the least notion what the proposition was, which was about to be made by the Government, nor did he know what it would be until he learnt it, in common with the whole public, from the ordinary channels of information. Had he known before-hand the nature of that proposition, he should then have hesitated with respect to the further postponement of his motion. He only prefaced the observations which he had to make by these remarks, for the purpose of appealing to their Lordships and to the noble Duke, not to allow the proposition which he was about to bring forward to be prejudiced in any degree by that debate, but to consider the question as if he now stood in the very same position as that in which he would have been placed, had he been permitted to address the House upon the day for which he had originally given him notice. In undertaking to bring this question before their Lordships, he desired to separate it altogether from the case of those parties who were the unfortunate holders of the forged Exchequer bills. With their case he did not wish that the present proposition should be mixed up; as their Lordships knew that their case was to be inquired into in another manner, according to the provisions of a bill now under the consideration of the other House of Parliament, he did not seek by his argument to prejudge or in any way to affect their claims, whatever they might be. The proposition which he felt it his duty to submit to their Lordships was for an inquiry, with a view to other circumstances. Their Lordships were aware that the office which he had the honour to hold was one of a very peculiar nature— it was an office, of great and serious re- sponsibility—a responsibility of which the public at the present moment had lost sight. He was not surprised that when a casualty happened of the description which had recently occurred, or a crime had been committed, for so it might more properly be called, the public attention should be directed to those functions of his office which were connected with the Exchequer-bill department. But the duty of making out and issuing Exchequer-bills was by no means the principal, and still less was it the only duty which the Comptroller-general was called upon to perform. Entrusted to him were functions much more serious and important in their constituted character; because in him was invested the absolute power and discretion, and responsibility, of judging of the legality of all money payments out of the Exchequer for the public service, as well as of the legality of the receipts which came into the Exchequer. He was appointed to the discharge of those functions altogether independently of the Government of the day; his office was consequently granted during good behaviour, and only subject to removal by the Crown, in case of abuse, in pursuance of an Address agreed upon by both Houses of Parliament. He was therefore most peculiarly an officer responsible to Parliament; and it was essential that this should be understood to be not a barren and nominal responsibility, but that it should be felt to be a responsibility actually enforced whenever any causes should call for inquiry, or should excite the suspicion of either House of Parliament. He had pressed this part of the subject upon their Lordships' attention, for the purpose of showing, that in inviting the House to the consideration of this question, he was not bringing under their consideration the conduct of an officer responsible to the Crown only, and removable at her Majesty's will and pleasure, but he was asking them to institute an inquiry into the conduct of a public officer, who was exclusively responsible to Parliament, if guilty of any neglect or oversight, or of any act which was in itself censurable. The proposition which he saw, by the votes of the other House of Parliament, had been last night carried, was that a parliamentary commission should be appointed to enquire as to the issue, receipt, circulation, and possession of certain forged Exchequer-bills. The proper time to discuss the subjects involved in the inquiry by this commission would be undoubtedly when the bill, by which the views of the House of Commons were to be carried into effect, was introduced into their Lordships' House; but he could not even allude to it in passing, without stating that he thought that the course taken by the Government was not only the best and most expedient, but that it was the only course of which the nature of a most difficult case admitted. The Government was not only perfectly justified in adopting it, but he thought that it was the course which was the best calculated to sift to the bottom the justice of those claims made upon the Government by the holders of the repudiated bills, and to show how far they ought to be admitted or refused. But he doubted very much,—and it was to this point that he wished to draw the attention of the noble Duke,—he doubted whether this commission, wise and just as it was, would attain the object which he confessed he had most in view by the present motion. If it were only a commission to examine into the cases of the owners and holders of forged Exchequer-bills, and to decide what, in each of these cases, it might behove the Government to recommend, and Parliament to carry into effect, it was an admirable course to take. It was appropriate and complete in respect to the special matter of inquiry; but what he asked their Lordships to do, was to inquire not into the claims of the holders of these forged bills, but to consider the question which he had put on the Notice Paper of the House, to decide the issue which he had pledged himself to bring to trial, and which he had endeavoured to bring before their Lordships, long before the motion of the previous night had been agreed to in the House of Commons. That issue was, not whether they would pay these Exchequer-bills, but whether there was any neglect—any misfeasance, attributable to himself or to the administration of the office of which he was the head: that was the question he asked of their Lordships, and he asked it in the name of that responsibility which was created in him by statute, and which, as a public officer, he was entitled to invoke. He wished, therefore, to state, that if his object could be attained in a manner more convenient, but equally certain, with that which he proposed; if he could secure a strict inquiry into the conduct of his office; if the question whether the frauds and forgeries which had taken place were in any respect attributable to the neglect or misfeasance of those at the head of the Comptroller General's department, that office could be better determined than by a Committee of their Lordships— if the noble Duke told him that it was more expedient and convenient that the inquiry should take place, in any way rather than in the way which he proposed, he should be ready to leave it in the hands of the noble Duke, prepared to await the event. He would now proceed to present to their Lordships, as shortly as he could, the view which he took of this case. He feared that in defending himself at all he might expose himself to the imputation, of needlessly putting himself on his trial; but he cared nothing for that. Though he had found none among their Lordships, who, with the facts before them in the Report of the Commissioners, had brought forward any charge of neglect against him, there yet had been busy tongues and busy pens elsewhere, to which he should not reply in that House in which he had the honour of a seat, but whose statements and insinuations rendered it necessary to the public interest that this question should be discussed and disposed of. Millions of money, in the shape of the public securities of the country, passed through his hands; public confidence in those securities depended upon the confidence which was felt in the correct performance of those duties which regulated the issuing of those securities, and unless it were generally and fully believed that there had been no relaxation on his part of the ancient rules of the Exchequer, unless it were believed that the bills issued from his office were carefully signed and regularly issued to the public, the value of those securities might be endangered, and the greatest inconvenience felt by the commercial world. He took it upon himself to assert, and to invite any contradiction, that there had been no change whatever—no relaxation in any one of the rules which had been laid down for the management of the office of Comptroller-general, whether those rules depended on usage, statute, or Treasury minute. He had heard much of the supposed carelessness with which the stationery of the office and the forms of Exchequer-bills were kept. Nothing, perhaps, could be easier, when any particular fraud was discovered, than by giving attention to that fraud, to devise a very excellent remedy against its recurrence. But he took it upon himself to say, that in this instanee there had been no deviation from the course which had been always invariably adopted with respect to these articles of public property. Confidence had been always placed in the senior clerk of the Comptroller-general's office, and full powers were confided to him for the custody of those materials out of which the public securities were manufactured. Undoubtedly, as the commissioners stated, it was unfortunate that a remedy was not found for the evil which exhibited itself in this case in sufficient time to prevent its occurrence. But he could not help thinking, that whatever care might have been taken, it was still possible where the principal officer failed in integrity, that these frauds might have been still committed. He begged the attention of their Lordships to this supposed relaxation of the rule, or carelessness as it was more indulgently called; if there had been such a relaxation, some degree of culpable carelessness must be presumed to be implied. This relaxation, must, of course, be taken to mean a relaxation of rules which existed antecedently, and it must be taken as a relaxation alleged to be of recent date. This is wholly untrue. There was not one of the rules of practice in the Exchequer which had not been repeatedly the subject of Parliamentary notice, of reports made to the Treasury, and to officers of the very highest distinction, there was not one of these rules so complained of which was not of a date anterior to the last century. He hoped that their Lordships had taken the trouble to refer to this point, as stated in the Report of the Commissioners: he might say, that the same degree of confidence reposed in the senior clerk of the Exchequer-bill office from 1696 down to the Administration of Lord Grenville. The whole subject was brought under the inquiry of the commission of accounts which originated in Mr. Burke's celebrated speech upon Economical Reform. It was again brought before the Finance Committee in 1797. It was once more brought before Lord Granville Somerset's commission in 1829, and before that which was presided over by his noble Friend, whom he did not now see present (Lord Congleton), then Sir H. Parnell. It was brought before the Treasury upon several other occasions, and the result of the whole was the system which was given to the Comptroller-general to administer. Upon the construction of the office of Comptroller-general in 1834, the Legislature had before it all the information upon the subject; but no alteration was made or recommended in the practice of the department. Both Houses had before them all the circumstances under which Exchequer-bills were issued; they knew the degree of confidence placed in the senior clerk of the office. The Treasury, proceeding to carry into effect the act which had then passed, directed the Comptroller-general to adhere to the practice of his department, and to report further on the subject to the Treasury at the end of twelve months. That report was made, and was favourable to the continuance of the usages of the office; that report specifically stated the trust and confidence placed in the chief clerk. The Treasury acquiesced in the suggestion then made in favour of which the continuance of the existing system. He must say, even after late events, that he did not think that the Treasury was to blame for this judgment; because they had before them an unbroken chain of evidence demonstrating the success of the existing system, in a practice of 140 years, during which there had been no mistake, no fraud, no inaccuracy of any kind, he did not think, therefore, that the Treasury were bound, to vary a practice which had been so long successful. He must call the attention of their Lordships to the establishment of the office of Comptroller-general, and to the steps taken subsequently to the passing, of the act by which that office was constituted. It might, perhaps, be said, that if all that was required, was to carry on the business of an old office, the Treasury might be considered right in adhering to the old rules of practice; but that where a new office was established, with new officers to perform new duties, such inexperienced persons could not safely be trusted, but that new and more stringent regulations ought to have been determined on and enforced. But no new officers were so appointed. In making a selection of the persons who were to act in this department, the Government selected the clerks, not from persons without experience, but from the ancient officers of the ancient Exchequer-office, and solely on reference to their acknowledged services, Mr. Arthur Eden, who had been appointed Assistant-comptroller of the Exchequer, at the time of his nomination to that office had been thirty years in the public service; and he might say, from his own experience, that a more cautious, a more anxious, or a more experienced or able public servant could not be found. All the clerks were selected from their age and services; with one single exception; in the case of a young man, chosen in deference to the recommendation of Lord Camden, a nobleman who, from the splendid pecuniary sacrifices which he had made on behalf of his country, might well be deemed by the first lord of the Treasury, to be entitled to introduce a gentleman to such a situation. In respect to Mr. Beaumont Smith, he had been for many years at the head of this very department, he had first been appointed, and afterwards had been entrusted by Lord Grenville with the same duties, which he performed to the time of his detection. He was a man of a high, honourable, and distinguished family, a nephew of the late gallant Sir Sidney Smith, and a relation, he believed, of Lady Grenville. At the time of his selection in 1834, he had been twenty-five years in the public service— he continued in the discharge of the same duties which he had before performed—those duties remained unaltered, and no greater trust was reposed in him in 1834, than had always been confided to him and his predecessors. He might be allowed to say, in passing, that the change in the law, with respect to the Exchequer, was productive of very great benefit to the country, and secured great simplicity of arrangement. It was contemplated by the Government of the noble Duke, and had been carried into effect by that Government, of which he had had the honour to be a Member. Undoubtedly he should hardly have felt very much surprise, had a change so great as that which was effected in 1834 produced some degree of irregularity, or had some want of precision arisen on its first application to the purposes for which it was designed. The effect of the change was to substitute one single office in which there were twenty-three persons engaged, including the very messengers and watchmen maintained, at an expense of 8000l. per annum, for six offices, consisting of eighty-one persons maintained, at an expense of 45,600l.; thus effecting a saving of upwards of 30,000l. per annum. But no irregularities took place, with the exception of the frauds of Smith, and the whole course of the administration of the duties of the reduced office had been as regular under the new system as under that more expensive administration which had formerly existed. He would now advert to the fraud itself. He had no knowledge at all, either of the fraud or of any circumstances of suspicion relating to the department, until the morning of Monday, the 25th October. Whatever suspicion might have arisen in other quarters, it had not been communicated to him. On the day which he had named he had been early to his office, but finding that there was no business pressing, he had quitted it intending to return in a few hours. In the course of the day he received a communication from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, requesting his immediate attendance, and when, in obedience to this call, he arrived in Downing-street, he found that the issuing-clerk was in custody, charged with forgery. The officers of the Government placed every confidence in the Comptroller-general; they sought his assistance; they sked his opinion, and he hoped the noble Duke had learned from his colleagues that his aid was earnestly given, and that whatever assistance was required at his hands had been tendered with zeal and readiness. In such a situation, any party differences would have been unworthy of him, or of those individuals with whom, as members of the Government, he was called upon to act. They had one common public duty to per-form, and he believed that it was discharged both by him and by those who were associated with him with earnestness, and with a desire to promote the public interest. He mentioned this, incidentally, because he had seen, and he must confess that he had seen—with some astonishment and indignation—he had seen it proclaimed to the world, that he was called up by the Government to be "roundly rated"—to be cross-questioned and subjected-to all manner of disrespect, from those very gentlemen who had asked for his advice and counsel, and who had taken that advice and approved of it. Upon the discovery of the fraud Mr. Beaumont Smith's keys were lpaced in his hands, and he was desired to open the places of deposit which belonged to him, and to make an inventory of what he found. In the execution of these duties, very few things had given him more pain, than, on opening the desk of this unfortunate man, to find that the very first object which presented itself to his notice was the sword of Sir Sidney Smith, bequeathed by that gallant individual to the man who was then in custody upon a criminal charge. This sword was a proof of the trust and confidence which his gallant relative placed in him, and the affection which he considered him to merit. He mentioned this, not merely as a circumstance calculated to produce sympathy and commiseration, but as showing how highly the character of this unfortunate prisoner was estimated by his deceased relative, it was not then surprising, and did not argue any carelessness on the part of those in office, that their confidence was given to this man after twenty-nine years' service, without suspicion or reproach The next step was the examination of the bills. The Government required that all the bills should be examined by the Comptroller-General. It was a work in which the energies of those gentlemen who were employed under his authority were called for, and they had exhibited the most successful zeal in the discharge of their difficult and responsible duties. It was gratifying to him to think that securities to the amount of 18,900,000l. should have passed through the office, and should have been examined, stamped, returned, or accounted for to the owners, without a delay of a single day, or an irregularity of any sort whatever. Pending the inquiry, he had been directed to withhold from the parties the forged and fraudulent bills produced before him. The Government had been much censured for adopting this course, and he had had his full share of the abuse. So far as it was necessary, he was willing to undergo his portion of the responsibility, because if ever there was an act called for by the circumstances of the case, it was the retention of these bills. This resolution was one which it was the duty of the Government to adopt, to save the public from the consequences of these frauds, and to prevent the holders of these spurious bills from passing them off as genuine documents upon the more credulous part of the community. But, at the same time that the bills were withheld from their owners, not only was no objection raised at any time to giving the parties the use of them for the purposes of justice, but an obligation was entered into by the Government that the bills should be at all times forthcoming for the purpose of enabling any innocent holders to recover upon them from those persons from whom the forgeries had been received. Mr. Beaumont Smith, upon being placed upon his trial, pleaded guilty, and his accomplice Rapallo was admitted Queen's evidence. With the conduct of the trial he had had nothing to do; but he had no doubt that the Crown had acted under the advice of its legal officers. He repeated, that with this part of the case he had no possible connection; and up to the very morning of the trial, though summoned as a witness, he was neither aware of the probability of Mr. Smith's pleading guilty, nor of the fact that Rapallo had been received as Queen's evidence. Why did he say this? Because it had been stated, again and again, that Mr. Beaumont Smith had pleaded guilty in consequence of consultations repeatedly had between him (Lord Monteagle), and Sir Thomas Wilde, who was Mr. Smith's legal adviser. Anything so absurd and so derogatory to the character of Sir T. Wilde, as well as to his own, could hardly be thought of; but at the same time, these were assertions which, however false, were calculated to make some impression in the public mind; and he, therefore, felt bound to state, that with Sir T. Wilde he had never had any communication upon this case, and that until the morning of the trial he had had no suspicion of the course about to be taken. Upon the close of this trial, the Government had taken a course which he thought was a very wise one. They undoubtedly had notice from him that he intended to bring the case before Parliament, but on that account they bad not relaxed any exertions of their own in reference to the question, but they bad issued a commission, the report of which he now held in his hand. The selection of the gentlemen who formed that commission was characterised by the same discretion which had been apparent in the resolution to issue the commission itself; he did not think that four men could have been chosen who, for their independence and impartiality, were more fitting for the office conferred upon them. In all essential matters he considered that the report of the commission would very much supersede the necessity of his motion, but there were a few points left in doubt, to which it was necessary to call their Lordships' attention. The whole case had been submitted to these gentlemen, and they went into it with energy, and acted on the principles of justice and impartiality. If they had erred on one or two points—in which he thought that he should be able to show that they had fallen into some mistake—he could only refer it to a want of experience, not to a want of care; and in the comments which he should offer upon their report, he begged their Lordships to believe that he meant no disrespect to them, nor did he at all undervalue the result of their labours. After going through the whole of the evidence with respect to his office, and stating the changes which had occurred, the commissioners said, We have been unable to trace, during the progress of these changes, or within the last fifty years, the relaxation of any precaution which had been previously enforced, or the departure from any useful practice which had formerly existed, except in five instances." This, then, was the report of the commissioners, and if he should be able to show their Lordships, as he thought he could do so, that the distinction drawn with reference to these five excepted cases was unfounded, as far as he was concerned, he should, he thought, make out his assertion, that there had been no relaxation at all of the ancient practice of the Exchequer. The commissioners also said in reference to the alleged defects in the internal arrangements of the office, that they had For nearly a century escaped observation and correction, and had led to no injury to the public. It is not then very surprising, though it is much to be regretted, that these defects should not have been noticed and supplied at the re-modelling of the Exchequer. He would apply himself now to the five excepted cases to which he had adverted, because if he was able to convince their Lordships that there had been no departure from anterior usage, and no mismanagement in the office of which he was the head; no blame and no responsibility could then attach to him, and the object of his motion would then be fully answered. The first of these five cases is stated to be, The abandonment, about the beginning of the present century, of a second counterfoil, which was deposited with the Bank of England. He should explain that the duplicate of an Exchequer bill was called the counterfoil; and that formerly two of these had been always retained, one for the Exchequer-office, and the other for the Bank of England; but that now only one of these, for the Exchequer-office, was kept. The change spoken of took place upwards of forty years ago, but it could only have been done under the orders of the Board of the Treasury, and the alteration in the system in this respect was in no degree connected with his office, nor with the act of 1834. The second point was, The neglect of comparing their bills with their counterfoils at the Paymaster's office, at the exchanging, paying off, or funding of the bills." No doubt, the precaution thus neglected, was more necessary and important than the last, and undoubtedly it had been neglected in the Paymaster's office; but that office was not under the authority of the Comptroller-general; he was not responsible for it, and had now no power to issue any orders for regulating its administration. He would pass over to the fifth point, which was, The destruction of the counterfoils, without the authority of the Treasury." Now, if this is to be considered a neglect in his office, it has dated from the year 1828, since which time the present system has been constantly pursued. But in practising this, no precaution has been omitted of any importance whatever. There may have been a slight official irregularity, but no more. When Exchequer bills are paid off, the counterfoils are sent back to the Exchequer, and on the final payment of the bills, and the audit of the Paymaster's accounts, these counterfoils are directed to be destroyed by Treasury warrant. The omission in this case had been the neglect of procuring the Treasury warrant. Counterfoils had been destroyed without Treasury warrant, but the destruction of the counterfoils after the payment of the bilk and the close of the accounts could not be the cause of loss or inconvenience to the public The irregularity, however, such as it was, commenced in the year 1828, long before he was Comptroller-general, and even before the forma- tion of the office. The third relaxation complained of was, The signing of bills of the same issue by more than one person, and the omission of a notification in the Gazette when any person other than the principal was authorised to sign." As to the signing of the Exchequer bills by more than one person, he admitted that when Lord Grenville was Comptroller-general no one signed but him and his attorney. Sir John Newport, signed but 5,000 bills out of 240,000; more than one half of these had, however, been of the same issue with those signed at the same time by Mr. Eden. In his own time the work had been more equally distributed, and if there had been any irregularity on his (Lord Monteagle's) part, it consisted in his desire to discharge the duties of his office. He had undertaken a larger portion of labour, and had signed a larger portion of bills than Mr. Eden and Mr. Perceval combined. But the commissioners seemed to infer that this was not consonant to the act of Parliament. In this they were wholly mistaken. He knew that a case upon this point had been submitted to the principal law-officers of the Crown, and as the noble Duke was aware, they had given an opinion that the practice of the Exchequer had been strictly conformable to the act of Parliament. The next point was the notification in the Gazette. This was not required by the present act; there had been an alteration made in the law as it now stood, as compared with the former law. Lord Grenville was required to give notice in the Gazette because he signed by his deputy or his attorney, but neither Mr. Eden nor Mr. Perceval was the deputy or attorney for the comptroller. They were both appointed by the Treasury, and, therefore, the law did not require the notice. What was put down as the fourth charge by the commissioners, which he had reserved for the last, was The occasional signature of bills, without the presence of a clerk, or of the signing-book, elsewhere than in the office." He confessed that he might be liable to some censure on the part of their Lord-ships upon this point for some disrespect to them (but he did not think that he was censurable on any other ground. It was true that, whilst attending their Lordships' House upon a Scotch appeal, he was guilty, of the grievous disrespect towards their Lordships whilst acting in their judicial capacity, of believing that his attendance was merely formal; his mind not being very profitably engaged by the learned arguments carried on at the bar, he had been vain and foolish enough to think that his time in the interval might be turned to good account in transacting the public business. He had, therefore, sent for the regular messenger of the office, who had brought the unsigned bills in a box carefully locked up. He had signed those at their Lordships' Table, and had returned them by the same messenger, still locked in a box, to the Exchequer, where they were duly counted by the proper officer, who gave a receipt either that night, or at latest, the next morning. He might thus, he admitted, have been guilty of some disrespect to their Lordships, but he was satisfied that he could not be considered to have grievously violated the duties of his office. He believed that in two other cases he had signed bills in committees of their Lordships' House, and once also when attending the committee of the Privy Council. In 12 out of the 137 days, after discharging the duties of his office, because he had never omitted to attend at the office on those days, he had signed bills out of it. He was now talking in the presence of persons well acquainted with official duties, and of long experience, and he would ask them what would have become of the public business of the great departments of the state, if public documents were never signed except within the four walls of the public offices? Public business could not be carried on for a week if this rule were strictly observed. He had not neglected to attend at the public office on any one of the twelve days referred to, but when there had been a pressure of business he had devoted a portion of his extra official time to his public duties elsewhere than in the office. Of the five excepted cases this was the only one which remained after the explanation he had given, and he did not suspect that for this over zeal in the public service their Lord-ships could attach any blame to him. An impression had gone abroad that the business of his department had been carelessly conducted, and that there had been a relaxation of the ancient practice observed there. It was on this ground that he now asked their Lordships to institute an inquiry into the conduct of that office. He might be told that a commission was about to issue. If the noble Duke might, perhaps, tell him that the inquiries before this parliamentary commission would embrace his proposition, and that the commissioners would, as a distinct proposition, inquire whether there had been any relaxation of the rules of his office, he would be content. But a mere collateral examination would not satisfy him. He wished the public to be informed distinctly, aye or no, whether these charges were true or false. Before he sat down he wished to correct a mistake, which had crept into his evidence as given in the report of the commission, and which had given pain to two persons for whom he entertained sincere regard. In the 74th page of the report, where he had given an account of certain changes he had made, and which were changes all made for the better, referring to his predecessors in office, the following sentence appeared: The next change was, that when any treasury authority of an important character is brought before the Comptroller-general, he does not act upon it without considering its legality. It is now initialed by him as evidence of this consideration." The correction of this was very slight, but it was material, because it affected the character of the officers who preceded him in the Exchequer. The inference drawn from these words was, that Sir John Newport and Mr. Eden had never considered the legality of any order sent to them from the Treasury, and, therefore, that their duty in controlling the Treasury had been neglected; and that he had acted with more strictness and propriety. One word ought to have been inserted, and the sentence ought to have stood—"The next change was, that 'as' whenever any Treasury authority of an important character is brought before the Comptroller-general, he does not act upon it without first considering its legality, it is now initialed by him as evidence of this consideration." He did not mean to say, that the consideration of the legality of a warrant had been a practice first introduced by him; but the record of that consideration by evidence was the change referred to. He wished to state distinctly, that in the evidence he gave, nothing was more foreign to his thought than to attribute any neglect of duty to the late Comptroller-general, or to Mr. Eden. He now trusted, that their Lord- ships would offer no objection to the appointment of the committee, unless the substantial object he aimed at could be obtained by some other means. He must take the liberty of saying, that painful as it was to speak of himself, or to occupy their Lordships' attention with any matters relating to himself, it would not have been fitting or proper, to have omitted bringing this question forward. It was essential to his own authority and weight in performing his functions hereafter. How could he have been permitted to stop a treasury warrant on the ground of its legality, and thus to exercise a control over the executive Government if he had rested contented and had remained silent under the many imputations that had been cast upon him. He must add, that nothing was further from his intention or wish to be upon the committee himself; of course their Lordships would not acquiesce in such a proposal, even if he had had the foolishness and temerity to make it. If he proposed the appointment of a committee, he wished the enquiry to be both stringent and effectual; therefore he thought that the nomination ought to rest with the noble Duke, than whom no one was better qualified to make the selection. He wished to redeem the pledge he had given to the government, that if no one else asked for an inquiry, he would; he had done it at the earliest possible moment, he had asked it with all sincerity, and he also asked it with all earnestness. He desired to have the question determined in the most solemn manner whether there had been any neglect in his discharge of official duties, and he, therefore, moved that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the late forgeries of Exchequer-bills; the mode in which the preparing, making out, signing, and issuing Exchequer-bills, are now and have been heretofore conducted; and to report whether there has been any neglect or violation of the established usage of the Exchequer, which either produced or facilitated forgery or other fraud."

Lord Brougham

was sure that their Lordships would think no part of the clear, candid, and satisfactory statement of his noble Friend at all superfluous or liable to exception, save the apology for detaining their Lordships upon the subject. Placed in the position in which the noble Lord was; exposed to attacks which, without thinking lightly of their malignity, he (Lord Brougham) held to le still more ridiculous than malignant; standing in a predicament and occupying a post in which the anxious attention of the public was unavoidably directed towards him, he could not do otherwise than take the course which he had taken, at the earliest convenient opportunity of bringing the matter before the House, and of calling for the most searching inquiry. His noble Friend's object was, to call for the appointment of a committee of that House, having a power not possessed by the other House, of examining all persons upon oath touching the whole matter under investigation. It was also a part of his noble Friend's plan not to place himself upon this committee, and not to suggest the names of its members or be a party to the suggestion. His intention was to leave to the noble Duke the suggestion of the committee. Nothing could be more candid, and nothing more honourable or fair than the proposal of his noble Friend, but he might be permitted to say, that the course taken by the Government was more satisfactory; for it was not liable to the objection of pursuing in that House an investigation which might possibly lead to charges of a criminal nature against some parties, and to proceedings of a civil nature against others, so that their Lordships might ultimately be called upon to sit in judgment [upon the questions raised. This, he thought, was a sufficient reason why the House should not conduct the inquiry, which might be carried on by other persons invested by statute with the same powers. When he talked of criminal proceedings, be did not at all contemplate the possibility that they would affect any party now connected with the office of the Comptroller-general. One person connected with that office had been found guilty, having entirely forfeited the high character which it appeared he had formerly enjoyed. There was, however, no reason to apprehend that any others in the office were implicated in his proceedings, though other parties in other quarters of this great city might be so implicated. Proceedings against them were at all events possible, and the possibility of charges being made, and the proceedings coming in the end before their Lordships as a court of justice required them to abstain from instituting the inquiry proposed by his noble Friend. His noble Friend had referred to the statements made against him, which, if unrebutted, appeared extremely trifling, light; but the greater part of the charges had been fully ex- plained by his noble Friend; and the explanation given had justified all his noble Friend's proceedings except one deviation from the practice of the office, and from the course prescribed by the law. His noble Friend admitted that the course of regularly signing the Exchequer-bills in the public office had been departed from; but on examination, this appeared as slight a deviation in point of importance as could well be imagined. His noble Friend had referred to the statement that he had upon several occasions signed Exchequer-bills in other places than in his office: he had signed them in that House, he had signed them in a committee, and he had signed them in the Privy Council. The noble Lord had said, however, either in his evidence or in a letter laid upon the Table of the other House, that Sir J. Newport had upon one or two occasions, when absent from indisposition, signed the bills at his own house. He had a great anxiety to defend Sir John Newport from any imputation brought against him even by inference, and he was sure that his noble Friend did not intend to make any directly, but in Sir John Newport's absence he felt a reluctance to leaving any one thing unexplained from which an inference, painful to that excellent individual might be drawn. His noble Friend would permit him to say, that there was a great difference between signing those bills away from the office which Sir John Newport had signed, and those which his noble Friend had signed. The bills signed by Sir John Newport were deficiency bills, and none others. The bills which the Comptroller-general had lately signed were supply bills. The deficiency bills, he must remind their Lordships, were Exchequer-bills issued, payable out of the growing surplus of the consolidated fund. The supply bills were issued payable to the bearer, the deficiency bills payable only to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or their order. Let them observe the material difference. The deficiency bills, if they miscarried on their way between the place where they were signed and the Exchequer, on their return from the place of signature, which act made them complete instruments, would be utterly and absolutely useless to the person into whose hands they might fall, because they were only payable to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or their order, and unless the person could get the forged indorsement of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, the bills could not be used. Besides the deficiency bills were for 40,000ll. 20,000l, and 10,000l.; there were hardly any lower than 10,000l., unless there happened to be a balance; in which case perhaps one bill of an issue might be for a fractional sum; but the bulk of the bills were for sums of a large amount. Therefore, from the large amount, even if they were payable to bearer, it was almost impossible, if they were seized, or fraudulently got hold of, they could be turned by the parties to their own use or profit. Not so with the supply bills. The supply bills were, in the first place, payable to the bearer, so that any person without forgery could receive payment as the holder. In the next place, the bills were drawn for sums of 100l., 200l., 500l., and 1,000l. The consequence was, that the person who got hold of a supply bill, when completed, had the power, but for the circumstances to which he was about to refer, of making use of the bill and instantly obtaing payment. Suppose that all possible care were taken by locks and keys, with his noble Friend signing in the House, though he might have signed the book, yet let the box be ever so well locked, let the bills be ever so well counted, let the bills be ever so duly entered in a book, let the clerks in the Exchequer be ever so ready to count them immediately they received the book, let the locks be ever so numerous, still the proceeding Was liable to the objection that, in the interval between the signing and the arrival at the Exchequer, the messenger, instead of going along from Charing-cross to the Exchequer-office, might turn along the Strand into the City; he might not even take the trouble to unlock the box; he might break it open; he might abstract the million of bills; and getting ten thousand pounds, or fifty thousand pounds, or one hundred thousand pounds in the City, he might step into a boat and sail away for Calais. That was the state, as it appeared to be left by the report of the commissioners; but when you examined the matter more closely, it turned out that there was not this danger in fact, for it was impossible that one bill could be put in circulation except among persons who did not look at the date, because all the bills were completed before the date of the issue, so that all the possible risk the public could really run was very small; the door which seemed to give the widest possible aperture, left only the smallest chink; in reality the risk run was the least possible. Some persons might take a few bills for a few hundreds or thousands, if they did not look at the date; but the public service ran no risk, because till the day for the issue came— say the 16th of March—the bills were never issued, and the moment the messenger deviated from the right course, payment of the bills would be stopped before the date of the issue. Although, however, there was the smallest possible risk, he hoped his noble Friend would see that it was better not to incur even that. Yet, slight as the risk was in his noble Friend's case, it did not exist at all in the case of Sir John Newport. His noble Friend had done away with one part of the evidence, which, if left unexplained, would have cast an imputation on Sir John Newport. The evidence as published stood thus:— The new charge was, that whenever any Treasury authority of an important character is brought before the Comptroller-General, he does not act upon it without first considering its legality. It is now initialed by him. The word "now" was used as if the consideration were now given for the first time, and as if Sir John Newport did not do the only thing of any importance which was required of him — compare the orders brought to him from the Treasury with the statutory authority for their issue. It appeared that the evidence, by leaving out the word "as" at the beginning, and making a pause after the word "legality," and then beginning a new sentence, in so many words made a distinct charge that his venerable friend had never once discharged the only important duty for which he was appointed. His noble Friend merely meant to say, that whereas no part of the duty had previously been omitted, yet that his noble Friend had made an addition;— which he valued at more than it was worth, as persons who were the authors of inventions set greater store by them than he (Lord Brougham) might be disposed to do; in addition to comparing the Treasury orders with the statutory authorities, it seems he put his initials, as a test that he had made the comparison, as a memorandum that the duty had been performed, and that all that was required had been done. That Sir John Newport, when he made the comparison, did not put his initials on the warrant or order was of no kind of importance, nor was it even a portion of his duty. nor could the operation give the least additional security to the public. The explanation given was therefore compleat. It showed that the statement of Lord Monteagle had been totally altered as much as if a "not" had been omitted. But his noble Friend ought to have gone on to give some such contradiction to what next followed, which he (Lord Brougham) held to make a charge against Sir John Newport that required explanation, or, as he would say, retractation. As no explanation, and at all events, no retractation, had been made, it became his duty to give to the charge a peremptory contradiction, and to accompany it with such an explanation as would satisfy their Lordships that there was not the shadow of pretence for any such charge against Sir John Newport. No one would suppose that his noble Friend intended to make a charge against Sir John Newport; he had wished only to defend himself, and not to attack any one else; nevertheless his statement of his own improvements did convey a serious charge. In giving an account of his new changes the noble Lord made the same indirect charge against his predecessor as he had done in the first point of the passage which he had so satisfactorily explained, and which arose from a misprint, and was as real an alteration of his evidence as if the word "not" had been put in where he had left it out, or as if they had left out the word "not" where he had put it in. This other charge, which still stood as a charge by implication against Sir John Newport, amounted to this: the Comptroller-general now initials the documents as evidence of his having considered the authorities, and then another use of the initials pointed out, when it is added:— It also prevents the possibility of a fraud taking place by producing the same document twice over. It would have been possible previously to this regulation, if there had bean a fraudulent chief clerk, to bring the same Treasury authority twice over, and get a double issue made; but that cannot now take place." That is to say, the business of Sir John Newport had been carried on in so slovenly, so bungling, and so negligent a way, that there had been no care taken to prevent the most facile of all frauds, a party bringing an order one day, getting the money for it, and the next day bringing the same order and getting the money over again. When he (Lord Brougham) saw this he was quite astonished; he said to himself, "Can it be possible that business is thus carelessly conducted?" It was exactly like a banker's clerk paying a check without crossing it, giving it up to the party he paid, and then another person coming the next day with the same check, and, unless the clerk recollected the payment, procuring a second payment, or procuring that payment from another clerk. That was the state of the charge as it there stood, and as if that were not sufficient, what followed made it impossible for any one who was responsible for the passing of the act, or for the appointment of Sir John Newport—and he (Lord Brougham) was jointly responsible as well for the act as for the appointment with his noble Friend, and the noble Viscount near him (Lord Melbourne)—not to feel the greatest anxiety till there was an explanation, and not to wonder that no greater fraud had, before this, been committed. The noble Lord (Lord Monteagle) said, This improvement was introduced by me about two years ago, and I have thus guarded the issue of public money against a fraud somewhat analogous to that of Mr. Smith." In justice to the department, in justice to those who had appointed Sir John Newport, in justice to those who passed the act under which he was appointed, and in justice to the Treasury by which the act was worked, he was bound at once to destroy, as he could in an instant destroy the whole of this strange accusation. He should be able to show, first, that no order or warrant could be issued twice by any fraudulent clerk; and, secondly, that to put initials upon a paper in the way that his noble Friend had done could give no security. He was prepared to establish the first of these propositions, not by any official inquiry, though he had made such, not by any inference to be drawn in favour of himself or others who had appointed Sir John Newport, but by the very words of the statute, the 4 and 5 William 4th, cap. 15, sections 10, 11, 12, and 13. He grounded himself upon each and all of these sections, and required no extrinsic evidence, no official learning, no result of private inquiry; and by these sections of the act he pledged himself utterly to destroy the foundation of any charge to be inferred against Sir John Newport from the statement of his noble Friend. To show that the statement made by his noble Friend could not be supported, he regarded as due both to Sir J. Newport and the Government who had framed the act under which the office of Comptroller- general was created, and who were responsible for Sir J. Newport's appointment. Now, the effect of these clauses, which embraced the whole subject of the issue of money to the different departments of the public service, was, that this money, when issued from the Exchequer, was to be issued for a given and specified purpose; that there should be a royal order, passed under the sign manual, and delivered to the Comptroller-general; that next there should be a treasury order or warrant, countersigned by three of the commissioners of the Treasury, also delivered to the Comptroller-general, as his authority for the issue. This was in the case of all sums granted to the Crown by act of Parliament, or vote of the House of Commons; but if the money were charged on the consolidated fund, then the treasury warrant only was wanted, and not the royal order; but whether the issue were of money granted by act or vote requiring a royal order and treasury warrant, or whether it were to come out of the consolidated fund under the 13th section, which required a treasury warrant only, in either case there was a treasury letter also, without which no order or warrant for the issue of whatever sum of money, for whatever service, found its way to the Comptroller-General of the Exchequer, that Treasury letter containing what were called the directions of the Lords of the Treasury to that officer. Now, observe, the person who could be in a condition, and alone able, to avail himself of this order, or warrant, accompanied by this treasury letter, would be some one of the paymasters—suppose the Paymaster of the Civil Service; this was according to the supposition contained in the evidence of his noble Friend before the commissioners; but the fact was, that these orders were never, and never had been, issued either to the Paymaster of the Civil Service, or to the Paymaster of the Ordnance, or to the Paymaster of the Navy or the Paymaster of the Forces—all which three, by the by, were now consolidated—without both the order under the sign manual and the treasury warrant, specifying the paymaster to whom they were to be issued, and for what purpose; then the letters of the Lords of the Treasury specified how much of the sum on the order, or warrant, was to be issued to the paymaster, and notified this to the Comptroller-general. But, after all this, not only was the money not paid by the Comptroller-general upon this warrant and order, as in the case of a check, as the evidence of his noble Friend would leave to be inferred, but all the Comp- troller could do was to send his warrant to the Bank of England, calling upon the Bank to transfer a credit to the account of the specified paymaster for the given sum, and all the Bank did was to obey the warrant and put the proper credit to the account of the proper paymaster. And what did the paymaster do? He operated on the credit so transferred to his account, and he obtained money by so operating. In fact, he drew checks on that credit. But how did he do that? At the same time that the treasury letter was issued to the Comptroller-general, another treasury letter went to the paymaster, notifying to him the proceeding which had previously taken place, and warning the paymaster that the order, or warrant, and treasury letter, had gone to the Comptroller-general's office, and that a credit to the given amount would be passed to his account by the Bank of England. Upon this the paymaster drew his check by virtue of that authority. But then there was another point. The first thing done with the treasury letter at the paymaster's office was to record it in the books of the office; moreover, every check issued from the paymaster's office was signed by the paymaster himself, then countersigned by the cashier, and presented by the accountant, and unless both names were found by the Bank to be signed to a check, it was altogether unavailable with them—it was a barren and fruitless document, and it was impossible by means of it to obtain a farthing of the money from the Bank, even when backed by the authority of the warrant of the Comptroller-general. Their Lordships would see, therefore, how many persons must concur—what a complication of fraudulent intentions must take place before, under the practice of the office as carried on in Sir John Newport's time, the public could have been damnified to the amount of one farthing. It appeared, then, that not only the chief clerk, as his noble Friend in his evidence stated, but a number of other persons, and even the paymaster himself, must have concurred to commit the fraud of which his noble Friend spoke in that evidence. Nor was this all, but there must be, in addition, the treasury letter to the Comptroller-general forged; nor was this all, for there must be another forgery of the treasury letter to the paymaster, in order to afford the means of committing the fraud in question; so that, in fact, the Treasury, or some one there, must be accomplices in the crime and take a part in the fraud. Then another felony must be committed by the Paymaster of Civil Services, another by his cashier, and another by his accountant. These parties must all concur in the fraud before the public could be injured, and this was what his noble Friend in his evidence called "a fraud somewhat analogous to that of Mr. Smith," and spoke of it as being not impossible to occur! Why, this was the fraud of Smith —that he, without co-operation, without a human being helping him, could, and did, obtain money to almost any amount. The charge was, that whereas in that office great and salutary precautions had been taken in all other departments, yet in the department of the senior clerk there was a chink left unstopped, through which it was possible to commit a fraud to the amount of 400,000l. or 500,000l But there was another branch of the subject, on which a great deal had been said. All the paper intended for the Exchequer-bills was intrusted to the care and custody of Smith, and that he had nothing to do, if he was fraudulently disposed, but to open the chest and take out the quantity of paper he wanted. But he had no accomplices, it was said. Why, who would have said there was any harm in the mode in which business was conducted in the Comptroller-general's office, if Smith could not have compassed this fraud without the assistance of accomplices out of it? Nobody would have said so; because all the security that man has in the ordinary business of life was less than that involved in the process he had described, to commit a fraud, in spite of which not only the paymaster and two other persons in the paymaster's office, but also some one in the Treasury, must conspire. There must be a league between them all; yet this was what his noble Friend, in his zeal to defend the office of which he was the head, or rather, in his desire to extol his own improvements, had ventured to call, in his evidence, "a fraud somewhat analogous to that of Mr. Smith;" to which he would say that, so far from being analogous, it stood contrasted and opposed in the strongest forms of contrast and opposition. But now as to the effect of placing the initials on these documents, which, as his noble Friend said, had not been done by Sir J. Newport; he would let their Lord-ships see how far the second proposition which he had stated was borne out, namely, that not only had the placing the initials no effect to prevent fraud, but that they had not even a tendency to prevent it; that they were put on the wrong paper. For what was the noble Lord's course? He put his initials on the orders and Treasury war-ants to prevent, as he said, the money being drawn upon them a second time. But he (Lord Brougham) contended, and he should show, that this placing of initials had no effect at all; because, by the act of Parliament, these orders and Treasury warrants must be kept in the Comptroller-general's office, and must be used again and again until the sum mentioned in them was exhausted by repeated letters from the Lords of the Treasury, directing the issue of such sums from time to time. The only effect of putting the initials must be to prevent the document being brought a second time before his noble Friend. Striking the pen through a banker's check was analogous in this point of view, though the banker generally took the precaution to keep the check besides. But these orders and warrants were what are called running orders for money, and the effect of them was this:— Suppose the order was for 5,000l., but the Treasury letter said that only 1,000l. was to be issued upon it at that time, then there could only be got upon it 1,000l., but the order itself remained on the Comptroller's office as his warrant for the issue of the next 1,000l., or whatever sum might be contained in the successive Treasury letters, until the whole amount in the order was exhausted; and it was obvious that whether such warrants or orders were marked with the initials "J. N." or not was of no importance, inasmuch as they were meant to remain in the Comptroller-general's office. But it was very far different with the Treasury letter. His noble Friend did not put his initials on that document; no, he put his initials on the running orders, on which it was useless to put them; and he did not put them on the Treasury letter, on which alone, if the initials could be of any use at all, it was desirable to put them; but whether they were placed on the Treasury letter or not was quite immaterial, because as the act of Parliament proved, there were so many individuals who must conspire in different offices before a fraud could be committed, many of whom could have no interest in conspiring, that it was next to an impossibility that any fraud should take place in the way he had described. In point of fact, he believed that the letter of the Lords of the Treasury had sometimes had "considered" written upon it in Sir John Newport's time: but whether it had that or the initials was immaterial, since, as he had shown, at this stage of the pro- ceedings relative to the issue of Exchequer-bills, fraud was next to impossible. However, he perfectly agreed with his noble Friend that no blame was attributable to the department on the ground that the quires of Exchequer-bill paper had been left with the chief clerk. His noble Friend had justly said that all his predecessors, for upwards of a century, had adopted the same practice; but not only had his noble Friend's predecessors been aware of and sanctioned the practice (for that would be no great excuse), but the Legislature and the Government, and the public, had been aware of the state of the case. The subject, and particularly this part of it, had been again and again brought most fully under public notice: first, in the report of Sir A. Pigott's commission of public accounts in 1782; then in the report of the finance committee, presided over by Mr. Abbott, afterwards Lord Colchester, in 1797; then in Lord Grenville's able report to the Treasury in 1823; next in Lord Granville Somerset's report of evidence in 1830; again by those who framed the act of 1834, to which he had referred; and, lastly, the matter was brought forward by Sir John Newport himself, in a communication which he made to the Treasury, and which it was but justice to his right hon. Friend to refer to particularly. When Sir John Newport was appointed Comptroller-general, the Treasury, most properly, as he (Lord Brougham) thought, instead of proceeding immediately to exercise the powers vested in them under the act, of making rules for the greater security of the public, determined to delay for a time until they should have a report from the office what was fittest to be done. The act called upon them to take such steps with respect to the regulation of the new office under their warrant as might be thought most effectual for the further convenience and security of the public; but they thought it better to wait until they got a report from the head of the office as to what alterations ought to be made in it. Accordingly they directed Sir John Newport to report to them, at the end of twelve months, on the subject of his office, and the mode of transacting business in it. Well, that report was made, and their Lordships would find distinctly stated in it at that time—it was dated the 10th of October, 1835—that the senior clerk had the custody of the paper, and kept a regular account of its consumption. Now, what was meant by paper was Exchequer-bills, stamped, and in all respects but signature ready for issue. Hence the Treasury knew at this time—namely, in 1835, that the custody of the paper was in the senior clerk, and that he, if he liked to commit a fraud, had ample opportunity. Such was Sir J. Newport's report, but Sir J. Newport had no power to alter the course of the office; his noble Friend (Lord Monteagle) had no power to do so, but only to suggest to the Treasury, No doubt, if either Sir J. Newport or his noble Friend had entertained an idea that anything of the sort was likely to take place, they would have mentioned the matter more in detail to the Treasury, and he quite agreed with his noble Friend, that after the lapse of 150 years, during which succeeding auditors and Comptrollers-general had filled the office, it was most natural and a venial error in his noble Friend, as it was in Lord Grenville, to be unsuspicious that any fraud could take place in this process. Experience had not then shown the risk that was run, and it was quite sufficient to suggest the means of amendment when they saw that the long course of proceeding adopted in the office had led to the perpetration of this crime. He should say that it was a very slight charge to have overlooked what so accurate and practical a man of business as Sir J. Newport had overlooked, with the scrupulous exactness with which he always reviewed all that was done by his subordinates, or by himself, in reference to the authorities under which he was acting, and the terms of the Treasury orders and warrants, and with the scrupulous and extreme care which he used in comparing his authorities with the statute, and what Lord Grenville himself overlooked, Lord Grenville, of all men of business the most accurate, he should say, the most punctiliously accurate, who was much more likely to err from over-scrupulous care than from anything approaching to negligence. He (Lord Brougham) did think that it was a want of common candour and fairness to charge his noble Friend with negligence for not having attended more accurately, more punctiliously, more over-scrupulously to business than his right hon. Friend Sir John Newport and than Lord Grenville. He therefore must say, that nothing could be more triumphant than the vindication his noble Friend had offered to the charges made against him, and he hoped he had satisfied their Lordships that the vindication of his right hon. Friend Sir J. Newport—against charges not brought by his noble Friend, but which appeared in the report by implication and inference— had been equally satisfactory. That vindication, however, had become absolutely necessary. Next to integrity, which no one dreamt of questioning either on Sir J. Newport's part or that of his noble Friend, there was nothing so important as accuracy in a department having such momentous interests confided to its cares; and dishonesty itself could hardly do worse mischief than might be the result of neglect.

Lord Monteagle

rose for the purpose of disclaiming entirely any intention of making the slightest imputation against his right hon. friend Sir John Newport. His noble and learned Friend who had just sat down had anticipated this assertion on his part, by saying that the imputation rested upon inferences to be drawn from a sentence contained in the report now lying on their Lordships' Table. If there was a single living being to whom he was under the greatest personal obligation, that being was his right hon. Friend Sir John Newport. He had known him from a child; indeed, he had been, as it were, the child of his political adoption, and he had acted with him for twenty years, and he had been during that long period under indescribable obligations to him in the House of Commons. However, all that he had asserted was, that he had taken a little additional precaution—that of initiating the papers brought to him — a course which had not before been practised The object of this was to prevent the same paper being laid before him twice without his at once discovering it. His noble and learned Friend had gone with minute accuracy through all the details of the Comptroller-general's office, and had said that a fraud could not be practised, except by an extensive conspiracy among many parties. All he had done had been put in force for the protection of the public, and if it had not turned out as well as he expected, he was sure his right hon. Friend {Sir J. Newport) would be the last man in the world who would ever dream, that under any personal circumstance, either as a witness, as a Member of Parliament, or as a private individual, it could have entered into his brain to throw any imputation upon him. His whole defence was, that Sir John Newport had done right, and that he also had done right.

Lord Brougham

said, he too was sure that if Sir John Newport had seen the evidence, he would not consider the imputation to have been intended, but merely the effect of inference, such as he (Lord Brougham) had stated.

The Duke of Wellington

was glad his noble and learned Friend opposite had made the speech he had just delivered in defence of Sir John Newport, because it must have shown the noble Lord who had brought forward the present motion that while he, through inadvertence, had made a charge against an individual for whom he entertained the highest respect and regard, the noble Lord and the House would remember that by a similar inadvertence a charge had been brought against the noble Lord himself, though the commissioners had never intended to make any such charge at all. He stated this for the satisfaction of the mind of the noble Lord, convinced as he was that no such thing had ever been intended, and, most particularly, not on the part of her Majesty's Government. He was not at all surprised that the noble Lord should have been anxious to bring the question forward with a view to his own justification. The matter now stood in a situation which rendered a discussion upon it necessary, that the whole matter should be sifted to the bottom, and it was seen whether or not blame did attach to the office at the head of which the noble Lord was placed. But he (the Duke of Wellington) must say again, that he had never heard of any blame charged against the noble Lord by any authority. Nothing of the kind had ever passed in their Lordships' House or in another place, and under these circumstances be had felt from the commencement of the Session it would be better to postpone any motion for inquiry until some steps were taken in the other House of Parliament (where such an inquiry ought properly to originate), and until the Government came forward with some measure upon the subject. Such a measure had been submitted to Parliament, and of that measure the noble Lord himself had expressed his approval, but said he was desirous that the inquiry which that measure would put in motion should be extended, and in a more pointed manner directed to his own department. He did not know whether in this House it would be possible for the noble Lord to move an amendment to the bill to extend the inquiry when it came up from the Commons. Probably not; but the noble Lord, of course, must have friends in the other House who could there make such a motion; but if the noble Lord would be kind enough to put down on paper what he wished to be done, and furnish it to him (the Duke of Wellington) to-morrow, he would between this and Monday speak to others on the subject and give the noble Lord a distinct answer upon it. It appeared that these frauds had been in the course of being carried on since the month of April, 1836, and that several persons had a knowledge of them; some amounting only to suspicion—some with a supposed guilty knowledge, and it was supposed, that although there were many innocent sufferers from the effects of these frauds, yet a great number of the holders of these fraudulent Exchequer bills were believed to have a knowledge that they had been issued under fraudulent circumstances. In this state of things it was absolutely necessary that the Government should make a searching inquiry into the matter, in order to do justice between the parties and the State—to protect the fair holders of the bills, and to support the credit of those securities for the future. With these views, he trusted their Lord-ships would approve of the measure introduced elsewhere, when it came before them, and that in the meantime they would not attempt to interrupt or throw any impediment in its way, by establishing an inquiry in that House, which after all would be liable to objections, some of which had been pointed out by his noble and learned Friend opposite—namely, that from the inquiry to be carried on by commissioners under the operation of the bill which had been proposed by his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and which the Government hoped to have passed, various questions of law might arise, which might come by way of appeal or writs of error before their Lordships, sitting in their judicial capacity. Under such circumstances, he was always desirous that no movement should be made in that House which might be avoided, until it regularly came up in the shape of a legislative measure, or by way of appeal to its judicial character. Until that happened, he was anxious their Lordships should take no step, and, above all, that they should not pledge themselves to anything. He had read the report with great attention, and he agreed in much that had been stated by his noble and learned Friend, that there was no charge made against the Comptroller-general's office— though there might be many things in it which required amendment, especially under the act of William 4th, which did not ap- pear to him a very wise arrangement. On the contrary, he thought the former arrangement better. However, he did not wish to give any further opinion at present, because he felt it would be his duty to sustain matters as they were until the existing evils were brought to a close, until it was settled what was to become of the holders of these fraudulent securities, and then to amend the system, and take care that such a misfortune should not happen again. He need scarcely repeat, that he should wish the noble Lord to withdraw his motion; and if he would be so kind as to send him in writing the words he wished to have inserted in the bill now before the other House, he would let him know between this and Monday what could be done.

Lord Monteagle

said, their Lordships would easily imagine the course he should follow on the present occasion. His noble and learned Friend lent his countenance to the proposition that there should be brought before the commissioners the effects of any amendments in the Comptroller-general's office. That was entirely his object, but he should be most ungrateful were he to sit down without expressing his acknowledgments that, except for the little by-matter between his noble and learned Friend and himself, he had been led to know that on his part, as well as on the part of the noble Duke, there was no charge on the face of the documents against the conduct of the Comptroller-general's office. With respect to his own feelings, such an expression of these opinions would be sufficient; but this was a matter which concerned the public, and would survive the noble Duke and all who now heard him, and therefore it was proper all doubts should be solved by the inquiry about to be instituted. Thanking their Lordships for the extent of the indulgence they had shown him, he begged to withdraw his motion.

Motion withdrawn.

Adjourned.