HL Deb 13 June 1842 vol 63 cc1468-89
Lord Campbell

rose, in pursuance of notice, to submit to the notice of the House the circumstances which took place on the trial of James Henry, at the late Spring Assizes for the county of Stirling, respecting the examination of William Simpson, as witness, as to his religious opinions. It was a subject of the greatest importance to the liberty of conscience, and the due administration of justice. If there had been no departure from the law of Scotland on the occasion to which he referred, it would be indispensably necessary for their Lordships, in their legislative capacity, to remedy the law. But on this subject their Lordships judicially had no jurisdiction. The determination of the courts of Scotland was final and conclusive. Not only the High Court of Justiciary, but if any of the circuit courts gave a decision, unless the point was specially reserved, that decision was final. He would first lay before their Lordships the facts as they occurred on the trial, according to the most authentic information he bad been able to obtain, and he believed that information might be entirely relied upon. A person of the name of Samuel Henry was indicted for an assault on a constable in the discharge of his duty. The constable's name was William Simpson. The man was likewise indicted for a common assault upon a person of the name of Smart, and the only witness who could prove the assault upon Simpson was Simpson himself. He was accordingly called as a witness on the part of the prosecution. An objection was made to Simpson being a witness, which, if duly established, was certainly a good objection. An oath, was necessary before a witness could give his evidence, and an oath could be of no binding authority unless the party taking it believed in the existence of an overruling Providence. The evidence of Simpson was objected to on the ground that he was an Atheist, and if this objection had been properly established the witness must have been rejected. But what was the proper mode of taking that objection? How was the objection to be ascertained? By the examination of the witness himself upon his belief. Instead, however, of that course being pursued, Simpson was at once put on his trial for blasphemy. Without one question being put to him, four witnesses were successively examined to prove that he had made statements which, if true, were very much to be condemned, as to his not believing in a God—as to his not believing in the Christian Revelation—as to some doctrines of the Church of England and the church of Scotland, and also respecting his having in his possession some books of Volney and Voltaire. These four witnesses made statements of which he had had no notice, and which he could not be expected by the help of other testimony to rebut or contradict. The witness was himself afterwards examined. He then declared that he believed in the existence of a God, in a future state of rewards and punishments, in a God by whom he was created, and to whom he was accountable. The oath was then administered to him, and he ought to have been examined in causâ. Instead of that, however, he was again examined with the sanction of the judge, as to his religious opinions; and in answer to the questions put to him, he again stated that he believed in the existence of God, in a future state of rewards and punishments, and in Divine Revelation. He stated, in addition, that he went to church regularly, but that he did not partake of the holy communion because he was under scandal; that is to say, that he had committed some irregularity for which he had not made the necessary atonement. He stated, however, that if that scandal were removed. he should very gladly partake again of the rites of the church. He denied that he had in his possession the works of Volney or Voltaire. The examination was then undertaken by the judge himself. But that judge, instead of protecting the witness, though no doubt the judge believed he was acting according to the law of Scotland, and with the most conscientious feeling, asked him if he belived in the scheme of Christianity as disclosed in the Scriptures? He said he did. The judge was not satisfied, bat asked him if he believed in the doctrine of the Atonement? The witness said that he did. He then said that he did not believe in the whole of the Scriptures. The judge having asked him in what part of the Scriptures he did not believe, he replied that there were parts of them which he could not comprehend. After that examination, the judge did not, as had been stated in the public journals, reject the evidence of the witness, but he did what was more fatal to his reputation—he intimated an opinion that, under the circumstances, the witness could not be believed, and he recommended the counsel for the prosecution not to proceed to examine him. The Advocate-Depute adopted the suggestion of the judge; that part of the prosecution which was to be supported by his testimony was withdrawn, and the prosecution was proceeded with only as regarded the assault upon Smart. Now he found fault with the proceedings thus taken, in three main particulars. He complained, first, that extraneous evidence was given respecting the religious belief of the witness; secondly, that the witness himself was not examined in the first instance; and, thirdly, that the judge, instead of rejecting or admitting the evidence, had taken upon himself to intimate that the witness could not be believed. He had taken considerable pains to ascertain what was the law of Scotland upon the subject of the reception of evidence, under such circumstances as he had detailed. So far as he could learn, the law of Scotland upon the subject coincided with the law of this country, and ought to be the law of every civilized country. He believed that according to the law of Scotland, as well as according to the law of this country, the evidence as to the belief of a witness ought to be confined to the examination of the party himself. The question to be determined was, not what the witness believed in past times, but what he believed at the time of his examination. If he had entertained the most heterodox and sceptical opinions at any past time, this would not have disqualified him if he had come at last to a right understanding. Then who could tell what his belief was at this time, except himself? If any evidence was to be received upon that point, all must be taken, and a malicious party, against whom a respectable and unexceptionable witness might be called, might produce evidence of what the witness had said forty or fifty years before, which might be true or might be false, and which, if true, the opinion had been long since changed, and which, if false, he would have no power of disproving. For these reasons he believed the law of Scotland, and certainly the law of Eng- land, had made it the invariable practice, with regard to questions of religious belief, to confine the examination to the party. who was to be a witness. He was now speaking in the presence of judges of great learning and experience, and he appealed to them whether they knew of any instance in their practice, either in Westminster Hall, or on circuit, where witnesses were called to prove the religious belief of the party about to give evidence. It was laid down in a book of great authority, Phillips on Evidence, that The only means of ascertaining the competency of a witness, with reference to his religious principles, was by examining the party himself. During all his time, and under every chief justice from Lord Kenyon down to his noble Friend who now presided with such advantage to the country over the Court of Queen's Bench, any attempt to do more had been invariably discountenanced. What was done in the present case? W. Simpson was called, and instead of being asked whether he had a belief in the Godhead and a future state of rewards and punishments, was at once, and in a moment, put upon his own trial for blasphemy. Their Lordships were aware of the extreme caution of the law of Scotland to enable a party to prepare for his trial. He must for forty days have a copy of the indictment, and a list of all the witnesses. Here, however, this witness was put upon his trial, for an offence which, if he were guilty, would render him, not only in his own country, but all over the world, altogether in famous. Here the party had no notice of his trial, and four witnesses were examined, who were asked whether he had not denied the doctrine of the Trinity? — whether he had not spoken irreverently of the Holy Scriptures? —and whether he had not lent one witness (named Ray) a copy of Volney and Voltaire? Not only was this contrary to the existing law in this country, but contrary to the law of all countries in which due attention was paid to the character of witnesses, such was the care taken in England of the character of witnesses, that if a witness were asked whether he had committed any offence, or whether he had not said something, if he denied the truth of the charge no evidence could be called upon it. And did not all the reasoning on which this case was founded apply, it fortiori, with regard to the religious opinions of a witness, who ought himself alone to be examined, and his examination ought to be taken as conclusive? He now came to another matter, which was if possible more serious, in reference to the examination that took place with regard to the religious opinions of the witness. If this examination were according to the law of Scotland, there was nothing like it in Europe since the inquisition; for witnesses were called, not only to prove the belief as to the being of a God, and also a future state of rewards and punishments, but also as to all his peculiar doctrines on disputed points of theology. He held that this examination was wholly unnecessary} and if it were unnecessary it was entirely wrong. The court must ascertain whether an oath is binding on the conscience of a witness, and the proper mode of administering an oath that would be binding, but beyond that the judge ought not to proceed. As it was laid down upon a great heathen authority.— Nullum vinculum stringendam fidem jurejurando arctius, An appeal to the Supreme Being was not only justifiable but necessary. It was an appeal calling the Deity to witness; and to know whether a witness believed in him, and that he enjoined truth and prohibited falsehood, was required; but if this examination were to be extended, a witness would have to state, not merely that he believed in the Christian religion, but whether he was a Calvinist or an Ar-minian—a Unitarian, Trinitarian, or So-cinian—a Tractarian or Puseyite; or whether he disliked the doctrine which was now so much in vogue. It was laid down, not only in England, but in Scotland, that a person need not even be a Christian to be examined. By the English law a Jew might be sworn by Jehovah upon the Old Testament; a Turk might be sworn on the Alcoran, and so was a Gentoo on his own mode of oath, so that it was binding upon his conscience, as it had been held by Lord Hard wick, who called to his assistance the different chief justices. Since that period every one might be examined on taking the oath most binding on his conscience. On reference to the authorities he found the law laid down so far back as the year 1712, in the case of Menzies v. Morrison: — It being objected against a Jew, who was adduced as a witness in a cause, that Jews bear a rooted hatred against all Christians; the Lords thought, that if a Jew were a witness in a cause betwixt a Christian and a Jew, there might be reason in that case to suspect him; but it being betwixt two Christians, his disowning Jesus Christ for the Messias did no more incapacitate him than it would do a Socinian, our formula jurandi mentioning only God in the general; and though a Jew did not swear on the New Testament, yet he will swear by Jehovah or the law of Moses. Nay, which is more, a Turk or a Pagan is capable, for in Captain Green's case of piracy, two heathen boys were admitted; and if in criminal, why not in civil cases? It was also remembered that the Queen had knighted Sir Solomon de Medina, a Jew, and if capable of honours, why not of bearing testimony? And we allow Quakers to declare in their own way; the Lords, therefore, admitted him sine nota." And in the case afterwards, in 1770, of Nicholson v. Nicholson, it was said,— A negro slave, not a Christian, but who believed in a God and a future state, was admitted as a witness in a civil case, and this was affirmed on appeal By the House of Lords. It was laid down by Bankton, b. iv., s. 30, that— An Atheist-infidel cannot be a witness, but a Jew or a Mahometan may, because he owns the being of God, to whom alone appeal is made in an oath. And, therefore, if one declares his acknowledgment of God, the objection is removed, though he does not believe the blessed Trinity of persons, or even denies revealed religion. And Burnet, p. 395, said,— A witness is not set aside because he is not of the Christian persuasion. If he believe in a Supreme Being, and understand the obligation of a solemn appeal to the Deity, he will be admitted to give evidence after making such appeal. It is now held," (said Tait on Evidence, p. 347,) "although less liberal ideas seem to have been at one time entertained, that all persons are admissible as witnesses, whatever their religious principles may be, provided they believe in a God and a future state of retribution, in which falsehood will be punished. And since that period all other examinations into the character of a witness was overruled. In the case of the King v. Taylor, in 1790, Peake, p. 11, in a trial which took place before that eminent judge, Mr. Justice Buller, he stopped the examination as to particular religious opinions, and asked him,— Whether he believed in God, the obligation of an oath, and a future state of rewards and punishments? The witness answered in the affirmative, and was admitted. The late Lord Chief Justice, Lord Tenterden, then Mr. Chief Justice Abbott, in the year 1S20, in the Queen's case, laid down the law, saying,— I conceive that if a witness says he considers the oath as binding on his conscience, he does in effect affirm that, in taking that oath, he has called his God to witness that what he shall say will be the truth, and that he has imprecated the Divine vengeance if what he shall afterwards say is false; and having done that, it is perfectly unnecessary and irrelevant to ask any further questions. All the authorities had subsequently adopted this as the law; and Philips, p. 910, in his work on evidence, to which he had already referred, thus summed up the rule: — If such issues were permitted, judicial investigations would be interminable; the expense might be enormous; and the character of persons called as witnesses might be unjustly assailed by evidence which they would not be prepared to reps', The proper mode," (he said,)" of examination for this purpose, is not to question the witness as to his particular religious opinion:-, but to inquire generally whether he believes in the existence of a God and in a future state. If that were the rule, how had it been acted upon in the case to which he had referred? The witness had declared his solemn belief in the existence of God, and in a future state of rewards and punishments; and further, that he was accountable to that God which had created him. He was asked also, not only whether he believed in divine revelation, but his opinion with regard to disputed points of Christian theology. The judge himself had asked him if he believed in the Atonement, and questioned him as to the particular parts of the New Testament which he did not believe. Four witnesses were called, who were asked whether he had not denied the Trinity, and whether he had not in his possession books which were said to be profane, written by Volney and Voltaire. If this precedent were suffered to remain, and if it were to be acted upon, in what situation would a person be who was subpœnaed to give evidence in a court of justice? In the first place, he would have to be examined himself as to any doubts he might have entertained at any former period of his life. Their Lordships must recollect that some of the most conscientious members of the Church of England had at some periods of their lives doubted; that some had even gone over to the church of Rome; and then, having repented of their errors, had come back to the church in which they had been baptized. Was a person who had been subpoenaed to dread an examination into all the doubts he had entertained and into all he had said at a period of time long passed? Let them take the case of the greatest philosopher— the most profound reasoner, Sir Isaac Newton himself. It was well known that, he held peculiar doctrines as to some points of Christian theology: ought he to have been examined as to his part in Arian controversy? It would be committing a most monstrous injustice if such questions were allowed to be asked. But let them see how the mischief would be aggravated if they were to examine witnesses as to what had been said upon this point or other points at any former period of the witness's life. If the evidence were true ought such facts to be revealed, and blazoned, and discussed in a court of justice? Suppose a Prelate of great piety and learning, who was an ornament to his church, should be called as a witness, should it be permitted for any malicious person to give evidence of what he had said in his schoolboy or college days? They must receive all evidence if they receive any, and was there not great danger that false evidence would be brought? How could a person be prepared to refute and contradict on the instant a perjured witness, brought to swear most distinctly to supposed facts? Would they not possibly thus lose the evidence of a most pious roan, and an ornament to society? The English law, therefore, wisely said that a witness was to give his own account of his opinions, and that his statement was to be received as conclusive; because he could not be called upon to vindicate every act of his former life, and could not be prepared on the instant to produce evidence to contradict false testimony. If such examinations were allowed, the trial would be infinite., The party might call witnesses to prove that the witnesses against himself were wholly irreligious, and so they might go on, witness to witness, into an endless examination. For these reasons, the law said, that this evidence should not be permitted, and most melancholy would it be to see any further attempt made to change it. The witness Simpson was asked if he had Volney and Voltaire in his library? He denied that he had; but supposing that he had admitted the fact. They were works full of error, but it did not follow, because a man had them in his library that he believed the doctrines they inculcated. All would recollect the time of Algernon Sydney, who was illegally convicted because he had in his closet a manuscript work on the Government, which no eye had seen but his own. Another instance not so well known was quite apposite. It occurred on the trial of Archbishop Laud. One of the articles exhibited against him was that he had favoured the Papists, and that he had in his possession the Papist liturgies, and other works on the Romish faith. His anwer was, True, I have such books in my library, and I have them to refute the errors of Popery, and to reclaim to the Church of England those who have erred. Moreover, I have the Greek liturgy, and I have a dozen copies of the Alcoran, which I have deliberately read; and shall it be said that because I have the Alcoran in my possession. I am a Mahometan? What right had they to ask the contents of this man's library? and how could they draw a fair inference that he was an infidel even if he had possessed that which he denied, the works of Volney and Voltaire? He now came to what he considered the third deviation from correctness in this trial. He had heard it said, that the objection was removed, if it was shown that Simpson was not rejected as a witness, and because the Lord Justice Clerk had only intimated to the counsel for the Crown that he ought not to press for a conviction. He considered that that was the worst part of the case. If the judge had found, that the rule of law was imperative, and that the evidence could not be received, he was bound to reject the witness; no stigma would then have been fixed on the witness. He apprehended, that the office of the judge was to determine whether the witness were competent or not; and if he were competent, it was the office of the jury to determine whether he were entitled to credit. After stating that he was a member of the Church, and would participate in the Lord's Supper if he could, an intimation was given by the judge to the counsel that, as the witness could not be believed, it would be better not to press the charge. William Simpson must, therefore, have been considered guilty of blasphemy, and from the religious feelings of his native county, which he honoured and respected, when W. Simpson retired into the country, he would be considered a degraded and disgraced man, and when he died, it would be thought that he ought to be buried in the sand of the sea shore. He had seen it stated, in a forced argument on this subject, that the witness had a remedy, because he might bring actions against the four witnesses if they had given false evidence. These four witnesses ought never to have been examined, and as they spoke to conversations with Simpson, he was wholly without evidence to contradict—he was without any remedy, and must submit to the degradation and infamy that rested upon him. He humbly argued, that the judges ought to have determined either that the evidence of the witness could not be received according to the law of Scotland, in which case the law would have been to blame, or they ought to have permitted him to be examined, and have left it for the consideration of the jury whether he was to be believed. Neither course had been followed, but a recommendation was made to the Advocate-Depute, a young gentleman who could not be supposed to be willing to resist the recommendation of the learned judge. This part of the case was withdrawn, and Simpson retired from the court as a person on whose oath there could not be the slightest reliance. It might be thought, that the mode of proceeding tended to promote religion. His humble opinion was, that it had a directly contrary tendency, and that on every account it ought to be condemned. It was not by this mode of proceeding that they could punish the individual entertaining heteredox opinions. Let them see by this rejection what injury they did to the parties deprived of the evidence. Their Lordships might experience it— they might have evidence rejected with regard to the execution of a will, because the opinions of one of the witnesses were not orthodox. Again, in another case, was a murderer to be allowed to give evidence to cause a witness to be rejected— that the murderer might escape with impunity? It seemed to him, on every account, to be of the last importance that this, which he would call a great constitutional question, should be settled. According to the best inquiries which he had been able to make, he did not believe that this was the law of Scotland; but if it were the law of that country, it was a defective law, and ought, as soon as possible, to be removed. He would conclude by moving for a copy of the record of the last assizes for the circuit of Stirling, on the trial of James Henry for an assault upon William Simpson. He confessed, however, that his main object was to obtain the opinion of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, whether this were the law of Scotland; for if it were the law, he would give notice of a bill by which it should be altered. He wished to cast no blame upon the judge. If he had erred, it was through mistaken views of the law; but that he had erred was his decided opinion.

The Lord Chancellor

said, that the motion with which his noble and learned Friend had concluded, was quite irregular. It was, indeed, in the extremest degree irregular. The noble Lord had given no notice of the motion. It was not his intention to follow the noble and learned Lord into his discursive comments on the law of evidence in England. He acceded to everything the noble and learned Lord had stated; there was no doubt about it. They were not, however, speaking of the law of England— they were now referring to the law of Scotland, and the question, and the only question was, what was the law of Scotland on this point? He much regretted the course which his noble and learned Friend had pursued. If his noble and learned Friend had reason, or thought he had reason to complain of the law of Scotland, he was perfectly capable by giving notice of a motion, or a resolution, or by introducing a bill, to apply a remedy. If, on the other band, his noble and learned Friend complained of the administration of the law, he ought not to have acted upon light rumour— he ought to have communicated directly with the learned judges themselves. The course which his noble and learned Friend had taken was calculated in the highest degree to impair the due administration of justice. It was not his noble and learned Friend's intention to make any motion as to the conduct or character of the learned judges; but, without having that view, he had brought their conduct and character under consideration for the purpose of subjecting them to comment and controversy in that House. The statement made by the noble and learned Lord he would undertake to say, upon the authority of the learned judge presiding at this trial, was wholly unfounded, and without any warrant whatever. He should not discharge his duty to the learned judge of Scotland, and to the Lord Justice Clerk, who presided at the trial, without stating shortly and concisely what the circumstances of the case were. Their Lordships would see, after that statement, that there was no reason for the extraordinary, perverted, and exaggerated statement of his noble and learned Friend. Two learned judges had presided on that occasion— one of those judges had been in practice at the bar in Scotland, with great reputation and credit to himself, for a long series of years. He had held the office of Solicitor-general for fourteen or fifteen years— he was more practised in the criminal law of Scotland than any individual now living. The other judge was Lord Medwin, a person of great learning and of irreproachable character, who had sat upon the bench administering justice for many years. Was it likely that two such individuals should mistake the law which they were administering in so important a case? Was it probable that the statement of his noble and learned Friend could be correct? The case was a prosecution for an assault— the witness called to prove that the defendant had committed the assault was the chief constable of Kinross. It was objected by the counsel, on the part of the prisoner, that he was not a competent witness, because he did not believe in the existence of a Deity, or in a future state of rewards and punishments. That, his noble and learned Friend had said, was a good and valid objection to the competency of a witness according to the law of England. That objection was admitted to be valid by the judges, and the counsel for the prisoner proceeded to do that which he stated, on the authority of the learned judges themselves, was according to the Jaw of Scotland, and according to the practice of the courts there—the counsel for the prisoner called witnesses. If the Lord Justice Clerk and the other learned Lords were satistied that this was the law of Scotland, what right had they to prevent this examination? Two witnesses were sworn, who deposed to the fact of conversations with the prosecutor, in which he had not only denied the existence of a God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, but had endeavoured to inculcate these doctrines upon the witnesses themselves, who were young men little more than twenty years of age. Two other witnesses were called who did not state the same facts, and, as their Lordships knew it was extremely difficult to prevent witnesses, in such examinations from stating facts not immediately relevant to the objection, and not in strictness referable to it. The counsel for the prisoner, Mr. Logan, had conducted the examination with great propriety. He had endeavoured to exclude everything which was not strictly in point, and both the learned judges had interfered for the same purpose, but had felt the difficulty of so restraining the witnesses as to prevent circumstances from coming out, which in strictness were not applicable to the immediate subject matter of inquiry. It had come out that the prosecutor ridiculed the Christian religion— spoke contemptuously of the person of our Saviour— and had used other expressions too shocking for him to repeat there or anywhere, and unfit for the public ear. What was the course then taken by the judges? It was directly opposite to that stated by his noble and learned Friend. The counsel for the Crown insisted upon cross-examining these witnesses. He had a perfect right to do so; but the learned judges did that which by the law of Scotland they were bound to do — the oath was administered. It was preceded by the question, "Do you believe in the Deity, and in a future state of rewards and punishments?" The answer was, "I do." The oath was administered, and the party was examined as a witness by the Advocate Depute. Not one question was put by the judges— the whole examination was conducted by the Advocate Depute. The judges had no right to interfere— it would have been improper for them to do so; but in the course of the examination, when the inquiry was made whether the party was willing to communicate, the Lord Justice Clerk did observe, "Surely you do not mean to communicate, when you do not believe those passages of Scripture which relate to the life of Christ?" The witness hesitated a moment, and then said, "I do not understand." The learned judges then consulted together, and were of opinion that the objection to the competence of the witness should be over-ruled. Such, however, was the impression of the judges, and he believed upon every one present in court, that one of the judges did say to the counsel for the Crown, "Do you press this case?" The Advocate Depute said, "I have already made up my mind not to do so." Other evidence was given against the prisoner for another assault, and he was convicted. That was the real case. There was no examination by the judge. The judges presided whose names he had mentioned, and when he mentioned their names he was sure that every one would pay the greatest respect to them, and they concurred in their statement of the proceeding. If the law of Scotland, taking the facts from the judges, was such as he had stated, was there any blame to be imputed to the judges? He was sure their Lordships would say there was not. They had acted in conformity to their duty, and to what they considered to be the law of Scotland. It was the law of Scotland; and were their Lordships to sit there to hear appeals against the administration of that law? As the noble and learned Lord entertained some doubt as to what the law of Scotland was, he had under the hands of the learned judges a statement of what the law of Scotland was—of the practice under the law, and various arguments in its support. He would not enter upon that question—he would not enter into a consideration whether the law of England or the law of Scotland were better in criminal or civil matters—he would not permit himself to have his attention withdrawn from what he considered to be an attack upon the learned judges, which ought not to have been made without a communication to those learned individuals, and if there had been any communication, he was satisfied that the subject would never have been brought forward in that House. It was the law of Scotland. He found it so laid down by Stair and by Erskine, but he would not enter upon that, because he would not argue as to the law. It was not competent for him to say, that the authorities were not correct. The Lord Justice Clerk stated, that this was the law of Scotland, and that it always was so; and Lord Medwin asserted that it had been the law throughout the whole of his career: nay more, he had the authority to the same effect of the present Lord President, who had presided so many years over the highest criminal court in Scot land-— the High Court of Justiciary. Then what was the charge against these individuals? A person was brought to trial, an objection was made, which they were bound to investigate; and how was it made? It was made according to the law of Scotland. The judges stated it now to be the law. He would not be driven into an argument ad inconvenientem as to whether this law was bad, or whether it ought to be altered. If his noble and learned Friend would bring in the measure which he had threatened, he would consider the merits of the two systems. He had not, in the present case, considered them, because such a consideration would not be in accordance with his views of the present discussion. When any bill was before the House, he would consult the eminent lawyers of Scotland. He would contrast their opinions with the opinions of those who advocated the law of England, and he would then say whether he would support a change. But this was for the future. All he would now say was, that no imputation rested upon the character of these learned judges. He would put it to his noble and learned Friend himself—recollecting that he had recently held a high judicial situation— that he might be again called upon to fill one equally high—whether, without any communication with these learned judges, their conduct ought to be brought forward for attack, and through his noble and learned Friend, for he was not the authority, such charges should be made for the purpose of calumniating and attacking these eminent individuals.

Lord Denman

would bear testimony to the correctness of what his noble and learned Friend had said with respect to the law of England. The practice of Westminster Hall, in which he had been not a few years, independently of the time he had occupied a judicial situation, had been uniform. These questions were not put to any other individual than the witness himself; there was no other authority appealed to than his own account. With regard to which course was best, the subject was not then under discussion, but he thought that the English mode of proceeding had been founded, in a great degree, on the strong sense which the judges entertained of the great inconvenience of discussion upon these points; of the impropriety of having religious doctrines buffetted about in courts of justice; and of the extreme scandal which might arise from such a course. He would not venture to give an opinion as to what the law of Scotland was, or as to what the law ought to be; but with regard to the law of evidence generally, it would hardly be thought that a rule was right in one country which was not admitted generally to be right in all. If the law in this country were admitted to be right, it would be well worthy of consideration whether they should not revise a law by which an indi- vidual, coming as a witness to inculpate others, might be suddenly put upon his own trial.

Lord Wynford

said, that the law of England had been correctly stated by his noble and learned Friend; but this was the case of judges sitting in Scotch courts, who were bound to proceed according to the law of Scotland.

Lord Abinger

did not think that he was called upon to state his opinion at the present time as to what was the law of England. He had his opinion upon that subject, though he did not believe himself to be then called upon to state it; but he did venture to state to their Lordships his opinion that they ought not to assent to the passing of any censure upon the Scottish or Irish judges merely for some miscarriage, as they found it stated in the newspapers. Their Lordships sat in that House for two purposes; they sat as a legislative body, and they sat also judicially to hear appeals. If this were to be the subject of an appeal, that would be the right time to consider it. They might be called upon to join in an address to remove these judges, and what would be the situation in which they would be placed if, when they were so called upon, they had already passed a vote of censure? The judges of Scotland and Ireland would not be fairly dealt with if they were to be censured upon some representation in the newspapers, or on some private communication made to a noble Lord. Whether those judges were right or not, he would not then determine or debate; he would only enter his protest against a practice which was becoming too common in that and the other House of Parliament, of attacking individuals who were not present to defend themselves. What right had they to pass a censure on these judges? Any coffee-house politician might do that. They did not sit in that House as a debating society to pass censure here and there. Till the bill announced by the noble Lord were before the House, he would not even consider whether the law was right or wrong, he would merely protest against these discussions.

Lord Brougham

wholly differed from his noble and learned Friend, for he did not think that any charge was made against the judges. His noble and learned Friend near him had merely stated, that his opinion leant against the practice and the course taken at the Scotch trial; and he had stated, that if this was the law, and if the course taken were according to the law, his noble and learned Friend gave a general notice of his intention to proceed legislatively for the purpose of altering the law. There was no one who was disposed to hold higher than he the sacredness of the judicial office, there was no man who had more constantly and habitually discountenanced any light attacks upon a judicial tribunal, and he would have been the first to reprobate the course of his noble and learned Friend, if he considered that he had attacked the judges who had tried the cause. He held that their conduct stood unimpeached and also unassailed upon the present occasion. They had not mistaken the law, they had not miscarried; their Lordships had had it declared, that the law was in conformity with this proceeding. Of the law of England there was no doubt, all were agreed upon that; they might have a preference for this law over the law of Scotland, but that was not now the question. Their Lordships had the deliberate statement by the judges who had presided at the trial of what the law was, and they had appealed to their brethren on the bench, who were out of the scope of the present inquiry, who agreed in stating, that they had rightly apprehended the law, and truly and properly administered it. This was the opinion of the Lord President, who for thirty years had presided in the High Court of Justiciary. He spoke with great doubt when he hesitated to think that this was the law of Scotland, because he had necessarily had no experience of what the law was, because there was no appeal to that House from Scotland in matters criminal. Their Lordships were supreme in matters civil, but in the criminal law they had no jurisdiction. His doubt would arise because the practice might not be clearly defined, the objections might be so rarely made, that they could hardly have formed a precedent, and the practice was totally irreconcileable with his ideas of what the course of proceeding ought to be, arising probably from his own practice: but even if there was any foundation for his doubt, even if the law were not so clear as it had been declared to be, he would only observe, in fairness to the judges, that the counsel for the prisoner tendered the witnesses. Whose place was it to object to this evidence? The counsel for the Crown? The coun- sel for the Crown had allowed the examination to pass as a matter, of course. Therefore, if the law was to the contrary —at all events, if the matter only remained doubtful, and if, upon the whole, reconsidering their judgment, they should consider that there had been a miscarriage, anything less venial than to allow the examination to proceed, when there was no objection, he could not conceive. Not only was nothing affixed to the conduct of the judges, but they were not assailed. No blame attached to them from the beginning to the end. If, on further inquiry, the law of Scotland should be found so different from our own, as no doubt it would, it would be time to consider whether an alteration in that law was not advisable. When the proper time came he was ready to give this subject his best attention—that great attention which it deserved from the high interests involved, and the great delicacy which he freely admitted there was in adopting a proposition for an alteration of the established law of Scotland. He recollected that when he was abroad some years ago with a learned Friend presiding in one of our courts, he was struck, on attending a trial, to find that though a child, who did not understand the obligation of an oath, could not be examined; yet the evidence of two adults was received, to whom the child had told her story not upon oath. He, with the full authority of Lord Ellen-borough, had made a representation, which he hoped had, ere this, led to an alteration of the law. It was not many years before, that the law of England was thought to assimilate to this very state. In the year 1779, Mr. Justice Buller, on a trial for a rape on a child seven years of age, who could not be examined, had admitted the evidence of the mother and another adult, who had heard in conversation with the child the facts, and a conviction was had upon that evidence. It was true, that upon the matter afterwards coming before the twelve judges they were unanimously of opinion, that the conviction ought not to have been had, and a free pardon was granted. This showed the danger of saying that anything was not the law of Scotland because it was different from our own. It also showed the danger of stating, that our own was so much better a system than any other. He had only to add his satisfaction that the result of that inquiry would be to place, not only beyond assault, but also beyond the possibility of suspicion, these learned judges; and if upon inquiry the law should be found in the state in which he had no doubt upon their authority it would be found, he would willingly consider whether a law to which he was not prepared to give any approbation, should continue.

Lord Campbell

did not regret that he had brought forward the subject, not withstanding the remarks of the noble and learned Lord. It was gratifying to find that all the noble and learned Lords who had spoken had agreed as to what the law in England was, and although the noble and learned Chief Baron had declined to give his opinion of the law, he had not stated, that the other noble Lords were in error, or expressed any doubt of the correctness of their statements. He could not say with his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham), that he considered the law of Scotland to be as laid down by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, on the authority of the judges of Scotland. He had used his own reason and research to find out what the law of Scotland was. He sat four days in the week by the side of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham), to hear appeals from the courts in Scotland, and he had again and again agreed with his noble and learned Friend in overruling the decisions of the Court of Session, ay, and that too when the judges had been unanimous in favour of that decision. It was upon no light ground that he said so, but he must declare, that his opinion was, that those two learned judges were mistaken. He had read Bankton, and he had read Stair, and he found no authority, no text, no report, of any decision which would justify any such law as had been delivered by those learned judges. But he did not speak from his own researches only; he had inquired from those who had great experience in the law of Scotland, and they had told him, that the proceeding at the trial in question was quite new, and had caused the greatest surprise and consternation.

The Lord Chancellor

said, that in justice to the learned judges he must repeat, that it was difficult to restrain the witnesses from stating things that had no direct bearing on the case before the court, and that the judges were constantly obliged to interpose to stop them. Mr. Logan, who was counsel for the prisoner, did the same.

Lord Campbell

would ask their Lord ships whether it was likely, that without any question being put, the witness (Mr. Simpson) would say, that he believed in the Atonement, and in the doctrine of the Trinity, 'and that he had never said, that he disbelieved that doctrine, and that he went to church every Sunday? Did their Lordships believe, that all this was said by the witness without any questions being put to him? It followed inevitably—whether the questions were put by the judges or by the counsel—that those questions were put, and that it was in answer to them that these statements were categorically made. He believed that all this was contrary to the law of Scotland, and that the law of Scotland was free from the reproach of subjecting a witness to have his conscience tried as if he were before an Italian inquisition, and of putting a witness to the torture as to all the doubts and difficulties that might have passed through his mind, during a long life, on religious subjects.

The Lord Chancellor

must again state, that the learned judge at the trial frequently interposed, and said, that it was no objection to the competency of the witness that he did not believe in the Christian religion. The only question was, did he believe in a Deity and in a future state?

Lord Campbell:

The case thus became worse and worse, for if there was no objection to the competency of the witness, why were the questions put, and why did not the judges interpose?

The Lord Chancellor

What the judges stated to him was, that it was extremely difficult for the court to prevent the other witnesses from saying things that were not evidence; and it was in consequence of those irrelevant statements that the judges interposed, and not on account of questions being put, for none were put, leading to those statements.

Lord Campbell

was not speaking of what other witnesses said; he was speaking of what William Simpson himself said. Did their Lordships believe, that Simpson, without any questions being put to him, would have said, that he believed in the scheme of Christianity as disclosed by the Scriptures? Did their Lordships believe, that he of his own accord, would have said that he believed in the Atone- ment? Questions must have been put, and if not by the court, they were put with the sanction of the court, and the judges had, therefore, in his opinion, neglected their duty in not immediately interposing, as Lord Den man would have done, as Chief Justice Tindal would have done, and as the Lord Chief Baron would have done, to protect the witness from such improper inquiries. But, then, said his noble and learned Friend, their Lordships had no jurisdiction. He begged leave to differ from that opinion. Besides their judicial and legislatorial functions, they had a function of a corresponding nature with that which was possessed by the House of Commons. The House of Commons was called the grand inquest of the nation; and at the beginning of every Parliament that House appointed a grand committee of justice. It was true their Lordships did not go through that form, but they exercised a general jurisdiction in seeing that justice was properly administered, and it was one of the most important and beneficial functions belonging to their Lordships. It was only by a mode such as the one he was now adopting that matters of this description could be brought before their Lordships and animadverted upon. He knew nothing of the witness Simpson; he might be a very profligate person; but what was law for him would be law for every one of their Lordships, and law for the right rev. Prelates if they were called upon to be witnesses in a court of justice: the precedent, therefore, which this case would set would be productive of the worst consequences if it were allowed to pass without animadversion. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had complained of the irregularity of the present motion without notice. He had concluded with the motion that he might not be subjected to the charge of making a long speech, and not submitting any motion whatever. However, if his noble and learned Friend persisted in his objection, he would not press his motion. [The Lord Chancellor certainly should object to it.] He would, then, with the permission of the House withdraw the motion: but he trusted it would not be forgotten that it was the unanimous opinion of all their Lordships who had taken part in this debate that all the proceedings which took place at Stirling would have been stopped by the Jaw of England, and that there was every reason to believe that the law of the two countries was the same. For the Lord Chief Justice Clerk, Lord Medwin, and the Lord President, the three judges who had decided this case, he entertained the most sincere respect; but he continued in the belief that they, though with most excellent motives, fell into a great mistake, and were guilty of miscarriage on the trial to which he had referred. He trusted their decision would not be found to be the law of Scotland; but if there should be any doubt upon the subject, or if a declaratory act were necessary, he would pledge himself to bring in such a bill as should remove all doubt, and make the law of Scotland as clear and certain as was the law of England on this important question.

The Earl of Haddington

said, that as neither his noble and. learned Friend on the Woolsack, nor the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Brougham) could persuade the noble and learned Lord (Lord Campbell) that the law of Scotland was as it had been laid down by them, with the authority of the Scotch judges themselves, it was not likely that anything an unlearned person could say would have any effect. But with respect to the facts of the case, the noble and learned Lord (Lord Campbell) was in error when he said that questions had been put to the witness Simpson for the purpose of eliciting certain answers upon the various doctrines of the Christian religion. The fact was, that the witnesses who were examined before the examination of Simpson stated things calculated to impugn Mr. Simpson's credit as a Christian, and even as a believer in a Supreme Being. Simpson was afterwards called, and, having been sworn, was examined by the counsel for the Crown, who brought him forward, and it seemed but justice to the witness that certain questions should be put to him, with a view to set himself right. He thought that was a circumstance which sufficiently accounted for the learned judges having allowed that species of inquiry to go on.

Motion withdrawn.

Their Lordships adjourned.