THE LAW OF MARRIAGE.

HL Deb 14 May 1841 vol 58 cc394-409

Lord Wharncliffe

had several petitions to present on the subject of which he had given notice a few nights ago, namely, the law relating to marriages within the prohibited degree. The first was from Leeds, and was signed by the bankers, professional gentlemen, and a great number of the inhabitants of that town, and, as it contained in fact the whole case to which he was about to call their Lordships' attention, he begged to be permitted to read it to the House. The noble Lord then proceeded to read the petition. It stated, that the petitioners considered it important to society, that the laws relating to marriage should be certain and defined, and that no restriction should be imposed on marriage unless it were ordained by the laws of God and nature; that by the Act of the 5th and 6th of William 4th, it was enacted, that all existing marriages within the prohibited degree of consanguinity or affinity should be valid, but that all such marriages subsequent to that me should be void; that they were of opinion, that the restriction of marriages within some of those degrees which were considered as degrees of consanguinity, where no ties of blood consisted between the parties, were unnecessarily severe, and not sanctioned by divine law, or necessary to the well-being of society; that the present law was calculated to produce a great deal of affliction, and likely to lead in many cases to a total disregard of the institution of marriage and the bastardy of innocent offspring; that great doubt also existed as to the validity here of marriages within the prohibited degrees solemnised in any country where such restrictions did not exist; and they therefore prayed, that the act might be so far amended as to allow marriages to take place between parties who were not connected by consanguinity or lineal affinity. The petition was signed by the greater part of the solicitors of the town— a class of persons the most likely to be cognisant of the evils arising from the present state of the law. The noble Lord also presented petitions from Liverpool, Manchester, Maldon, Leicester, Birmingham, Hereford, Macclesfield, Rochford, Bristol, Bath, Cirencester, Norwich, Ashford, Worcester, Devonport, and Exeter, to the same effect; also, several petitions signed exclusively by Protestant Dissenting ministers, and others signed exclusively by solicitors to the same effect. Having now presented these petitions to the House, and submitted the statements which they contained to their Lordships' consideration, he should next endeavour to bring before the House the existing state of the law, and at the same time make some attempt to induce them to consent to an alteration in that law. It appeared to him, that the subject which he was about to bring under their consideration was one of unusual importance. It was one which deeply interested their countrymen and likewise their countrywomen. He did not hesitate to say, that he thought the existing laws a great deal too stringent, and, whatever might be done, he did not think, that the law in its present form could be allowed to stand. He begged to remind their Lordships, that antecedently to the time of Henry 8th, while the Catholic faith prevailed in this country, the canon law was the only law of marriage. It was true, that that law embraced a variety of cases, but it was equally true, that the powers of dispensation exercised by the see of Rome, in some degree obviated the objections to so strict a code, though no doubt all men must condemn the abuse of those powers which then prevailed. The first English statute upon the subject was enacted in the reign of Henry 8th, but, as their Lordships were aware, he had his own reasons for causing laws to be passed on the subject. From the reign of that monarch, there was no law on the subject of marriage till the 4th and 5th of William 4ih; and, notwithstanding the provisions of that statute, he must be allowed to say, that the existing state of the law was anything but defensible. On religious grounds, at all events, it was without the least support. He had spoken to many men upon the subject, and he never met with one who for a moment attempted to defend it upon religious grounds. After much reflection upon the subject, he did think, that the most just and the most expedient course would be to prohibit no marriages which did not shock the moral feelings of society at large, and which did not evidently appear contrary to the law of nature. He was as ready as any man to say, that the existing prohibitions affecting degrees of consanguinity ought to continue; but lineal affinity and collateral affinity were totally different matters. He admitted, that strong prejudices existed upon the subject, but he trusted, that noble Lords would exert a sound and dispassionate judgement upon a question of such high importance. Amongst the various cases to which the law of marriage referred, none excited more interest than that of a man marrying the sister of his deceased wife; and, if the restriction respecting that were once removed, there would be no difficulty about the others. In the first place, he might be permitted to observe, that in this case there was no consanguinity, and if a man had several children, clearly no one could so properly fill the place of their deceased parent as the sister of that parent. It was said, that the removal of such a restriction might probably be productive of jealousy in families; he doubted, that that ought to be considered a valid objection. They had heard of men base enough to seduce their sisters-in-law, and of women whose minds were so depraved, that they readily yielded to the arts of seduction; but, in his judgment, occurrences so rare, found no sufficient ground for general legislation. He thought, that in considering enactments upon a subject so delicate and important as this, the House should look at the position in which parties were placed who stood towards each other in the relation of brother and sister-in-law. A man might be left a widower with a large family— the sister of his deceased wife might undertake the care of his children, and might live in his house for that purpose. Much worse consequences generally ensued from the law as it stood, than could possibly arise from its alteration. There was another matter which he thought should be provided for in any new law upon the subject, and that was the case of marriages contracted abroad within the degrees of consanguinity prohibited in this country. He had received a statement from Manchester, by which it appeared, that since the year 1835 no less than 91 marriages, in violation of the law, had taken place within the prohibitory degrees of affinity. Although it was declared a crime for a man to marry his deceased wife's sister, society appeared to think otherwise, for the parties who contracted such marriages were admitted into society, and were not thought to have acted improperly. The law on this subject was full of inconsistencies, for the list of prohibited marriages in the reign of Queen Anne, varied very much from that put forth by Archbishop Parker. Upon the continent these prohibitions were for the most part unknown, and even in those countries where marriages within certain degrees were forbidden, dispensations under particular circumstances were easily procured. In America, where the tone of society was far more moral than elsewhere' no such prohibition was known. The noble Lord read a letter from an American judge, a gentleman well acquainted with that country, in which it was stated that such marriages were common in the United States, where no evil consequences resulted. He earnestly hoped, that their Lordships would consider the subject. All he asked for was inquiry. He was prepared, with the sanction of the House, to bring in a bill embodying his views on the subject. If he were permitted to do so, he pledged himself to prove satisfactorily to their Lordships, that not hundreds, but thousands of marriages within the degree of affinity, had taken place since the year 1835.

The Bishop of London

My Lords, it is not my intention to oppose the petitions being laid on the Table, nor have I any reason to complain of the manner in which the noble Lord has pleaded the cause of those who have entrusted him with these petitions. On the contrary, the temper and good feeling with which the noble Lord has discussed the subject, deserves my sincere acknowledgements; but, as a minister of that Church, whose laws are now impeached, and which I believe in my conscience, if they arc overturned, will suffer materially, I feel myself bound to offer a few remarks on this occasion.

My Lords,

one word before I enter on the subject matter of the petitions, as to the manner in which the petitions themselves have been obtained. It appears that a very large number of signatures, attached to these petitions, are the signatures of solicitors, a circumstance to which the noble Lord seemed to attach considerable weight, because they were described by him, to be the signatures of persons who were likely to be conversant with the evils which flowed from the present state of the law. My Lords, the fact is, that I believe there are persons who have contracted illegal marriages of the description to which the petitions refer, or who are placed in circumstances which make them desirous of contracting them, and they have determined to make a united effort to procure a repeal of the law to which these petitions advert. They have employed highly respectable solicitors to collect evidence, to procure petitions on their behalf, and they have also signed them; and the result is the roll of petitions which the noble Lord has this day laid before the House. But, my Lords, it is obvious that this statement (which I know to be true, because it was made to me by a person engaged by these parties in procuring these petitions) somewhat lessens the weight which is to be attached to the signatures to these petitions. And I may be permitted to remark, that although that respectable body of men may be very competent judges of the effect produced by the law to which the petitioners refer, upon matters relating to property, they are not so well qualified to judge of its religious bearings as the clergy.

Then, my Lords, as to the signatures of the clergymen, which come, I believe, from two or three dioceses, they are, after all, not more than about 300 out of a body of 15,000; it cannot therefore be urged, that the clergy in general, or anything like a majority of them, are in favour of the abolition of these laws. I have looked at the signatures, my Lords, and I am quite sure that some of them have been attached without a clear understanding of the object which the petitioners had in view. But, my Lords, this in no way affects the merits of the case itself, to which I shall now shortly advert. My Lords, I must notice one or two points in the noble Lord's address, which I must say do not evince a very accurate acquaintance with the law, as it relates to marriage. The noble Lord has spoken of the old canon law of the Romish Church. It is true, my Lords, that these prohibitions, and others, were contained in the canon law of the Romish Church; but the prohibitions which we still have in the Church, and which it is the object of these petitioners to abolish, are of a much earlier date than what is commonly understood by the term Canon law.' My Lords, the most important of them, and especially that, the removal of which, after all, is the object in view— for it is not to be dissembled from your Lordships, that the object in view is to legalise the marriage of a husband with a deceased wife's sister— that was prohibited by the Church from a very early date, a date long prior to the formation of what is, in the language of lawyers understood by the 'Canon law.' My Lords, it was, if not prohibited, at least condemned by implication in that very early body of Constitutions called the Apostolic Canons. It was forbidden by the Council of Eliberis early in the fourth century, a date long prior to that of the Decretals and other laws compiled by Gratian. So that, my Lords, when we stand up for these prohibitions, we do not stand up for prohibitions merely adopted by our own Church from that of Rome. We think we are acting in conformity with the demands which the Church makes upon us, if we pause before we concede so important a point as the abolition of laws relating to the holy institution of marriage, which have been in force in the Christian Church almost since the time of the Apostles.

My Lords, the noble Lord spoke of the facility with which dispensations from these prohibitory laws are obtained in the Roman Church. Why, my Lords, if the restrictions themselves are right, the facility with which these dispensations may or might be obtained, is only a proof of what we consider to be the corrupt state of the Rotnan Church, and cannot be used against the restrictions themselves. The noble Lord spoke of restrictions of this kind as tending to demoralise the people, the same might be said of all prohibitory laws touching questions of morality or religion. A question might in every case be raised, how far you shall censure or disapprove of a law, because it may be said, in this sense to demoralise a country. The people who commit an improper act which is not forbidden by law, commit an illegal act so soon as it is forbidden by law. And in this sense "the law is the strength of sin." But certainly that cannot be used as an argument, for repealing a law when it is founded on principles of morality or justice.

This leads me to call your Lordships' attention to the difference between repealing a law which is of recent enactment, and the abrogation of a law which dates almost from the Church's foundation. My Lords, the question whether we shall repeal, or retain an ancient law, is a question of very serious consideration; and we cannot be accused of prejudice (indeed, I must do the noble Lord the justice to say, that he no sooner uttered the word than he retracted it), if we pause before we relinquish a long established constitution of the Church, and allow marriages within the forbidden degrees.

Now, my Lords, with reference to the foundation of these laws, I must advert to a position of the noble Lord, who said, that he had never met with a person of whatever profession, who defended these laws upon the ground of their being founded upon any basis of moral principle.— [Lord Wharncliffe: Religious principle.] Religious principle. My Lords, I am not in the habit of separating the two; with me, whatever is moral is religious, and whatever is religious is moral. The noble Lord said, he found nobody who defended them on the ground of religious principle. I am afraid the noble Lord has not embraced the opportunities which he has had of conversing with the great body of the clergy of this country, for, whatever may be the sentiments of the 300 or 360 clergymen, who have signed those petitions, I venture to say, that a large majority of the 15,000 who now minister in the temples of God in this country, would hold, that these marriages are virtually prohibited in the Levitical law. My Lords, this perhaps is hardly an occasion for entering on the discussion of that difficult question, as to whether or not these marriages are in point of fact prohibited by the Levitical law, and I admit, that as to some of them a doubt may be entertained on that question, but I am convinced, that the great body of the clergy of this country do hold, that as marriages within the degrees of consanguinity are expressly forbidden by the Levitical law, so marriages of the same degree of affinity, are by parity of reasoning, also prohibited. Now, my Lords, this ma}' or may not be a just and legitimate mode of argument; but this, I must say, that the principle of parity of reasoning on this question has been held good, not only by divines, but by the most eminent lawyers of our own country and others. I am unwilling to trespass on your Lordships' time, but I may state, that it has always been held by the courts of law. An eminent judge, Lord Chief Justice Raymond, has said (a dictum in which I am afraid the noble Lord near me will not concur), that divines know better how to expound the law of marriage than the common lawyers, and though sometimes prohibitions have been granted in causes matrimonial, if it were res Integra, they would not be granted. Bishop Jewel, who is a great authority on such a subject, speaks of this principle of parity of reasoning, and says, Albeit, I am not forbidden by plain words, to marry my wife's sister, yet I am forbidden to do so by other words, which, by exposition, are plain enough. For, when God commands me, I shall not marry my brother's wife, it follows directly by the same, that he forbids me to marry my wife's sister. For, between one man and two sisters, and one woman and two brothers, is like analogy or proportion. But I understand, my Lords, that the petitioners desire to carry this principle of parity of reasoning in an opposite direction, and in contravention of an express prohibition; I understand from the noble Lord, that the restriction is to be removed, not only from the wife's sister, but from the husband's brother. I believe I may say with great confidence, that this is a proposition that will be most revolting to the feelings of clergy and laity, and will be in opposition to the sense of the country at large.

My Lords, I am ready to admit, that the same arguments do not all apply to cases of affinity, which are generally applied to those of consanguinity; and that the case of a deceased wife's sister does not come under the latter description, as the term consanguinity is commonly understood. But there is one argument which has some weight with the clergy, and I think with those who have considered the religious nature of marriage; we hold upon the authority of God's word, that man and wife are one flesh, and that to a certain extent it may be said, in a sense, metaphorical indeed, and mysterious, but confirmed by our Lord himself, they do contract a certain kind of consanguinity, which we hold to constitute an objection to such alliances as it is now sought to legalise. This notion of spiritual or mystical consanguinity, is not to be supposed to be a fancy of ecclesiastics and religionists; it was held in some sense by the Roman jurists and law-givers, as stated by the historian of the Roman empire, which at least, to a certain extent, will shew, that the clergy of the Church of England in maintaining this principle, are not so bigoted, nor so prejudiced, as it has been of late years the fashion to represent. My Lords, with respect to this particular case, the following are the words of Gibbon; he is speaking of Rome before it became the Rome of Christendom:— The profane law-givers of Rome were never tempted by interest or superstition to multiply the forbidden degrees, but inflexibly condemned the marriage of sisters and brothers, hesitated whether first cousins should be touched by the same interdict, revered the parental character of aunts and uncles, and treated affinity as a just imitation of the ties of blood. Now, my Lords, looking at the relation of marriage as having to a certain extent, the spiritual character attributed to it by the Divine law-giver of our Church, to that doctrine of the Roman law-givers I must confess that I am very much disposed to accede. At all events I think we should pause well, before we take another step in the path which has been trodden with unreflecting haste within the last few years, which has done much to impair the sacred estimation of the marriage vow, and to undermine the foundation of domestic morality and fidelity in this country.

My Lords, the law passed a few years ago, in my opinion, has very materially injured the morals of this country; and, I have no doubt, your Lordships would find, if you had the means of instituting an investigation, that a great part of the marriages which have taken place within the prohibited degrees, have taken place since the 4th and 5th William the 4th, and have taken 'place under the sanction of that law in the office of the Registrars in different parts of the country. I do not believe that a clergyman, except through inadvertence, can have solemnized such a marriage. My Lords, whatever may be the effect of the statute law of marriage, the canon law is still unchanged. The noble Lord seems to suppose that the act, commonly called Lord Lyndhurst's Act, made valid these marriages to which it referred. No such thing; it only declared that those marriages, which had been solemnized, should not be impeached by any suit in the Ecclesiastical Court, and, as far as the rights of property are concerned, and the interests of inheritance, so far those marriages became valid; but they are not declared valid for any other purpose. And, my Lords, there are many on this bench who, if any such proposition had been made, I have no doubt, would strenuously have resisted it. My Lords, it is worthy of remark, that this subject has been noticed by the present learned judge of the Arches, who says,— Although the statute has prohibited the Ecclesiastical Courts from annulling marriages for affinity contracted before the 31st of August, 1835, yet I am by no means prepared to say that the parties may not be punished by the ecclesiastical law for the incest though the validity of the marriage cannot be called in question, for the enacting part of the act does not make these marriages good and valid to all intents and purposes. The truth is, my Lords, that that act did no more than restore the law of marriage in this respect to its ancient state, and give free course to the old canon law of this country. This statement is no as- sertion of my own, but has been made by another learned ecclesiastical judge, the present judge of the Consistory Court of London, Dr. Lushington, who says,— This act restored the old canon law by which these marriages were treated as absolutely void. It was the interference of the common law courts which, in such cases, prohibited the spiritual courts from bastardizing the issue, that created the unnatural distinction of voidable and void. My Lords, I mention this, because it is a justification of those who with me supported the noble Mover of that act in his endeavours to carry it into a law, from any charge of inconsistency. We thought it right that the question should be settled; and that any person who had contracted such marriages while it was unsettled, should be saved from penal consequences; but that for the future, those consequences should be known beforehand as certain; and that persons should be deterred, if possible, from contracting those marriages by knowing that they would be ab initio void.

My Lords, this induces me to say a word or two on that part of the question, as to the extreme hardship of such prohibitions. I admit, my Lords, that no prohibitions should be admitted, if possible, which are not sanctioned by the laws of God, or the laws of nature. But, my Lords, it is not a valid argument on the part of men who object to such restrictions to say, that they feel them in their own persons to be a hardship. Why do they feel them to be so? Because they cannot tame and regulate their own passions and inclinations to submit to what the Church and the State consider a salutary law. Persons, no doubt, might he found, my Lords, who would argue, and not without some plausibility, even against those restrictions which are founded on the law of nature. My Lords, what is the law of nature? I am not going to enter into a discussion on the subject, but merely to make this remark; what the noble Lord speaks of as the law of nature, and which I am disposed to admit is the law of nature, in one sense, is not recognized as the law of nature by all people and at all times. My Lords, there is hardly a prohibition with respect to marriage, grounded on the law of nature which has not been departed from in some age and in some country of the world. There is no tie of consanguinity so near, but that it has been lost sight of in the contracting of marriages, by some one or other of the nations of the heathen world. I mention this, my Lords, to shew that there must he a certain vagueness of definition as to such a point; that it is not easy, independently of revelation, to decide the line, at which the law of nature ceases to operate, and that of expediency begins. My Lords, we may conceive persons, standing in a near degree of relationship, who might say there was cruel hardship in preventing their marriage, if they had formed what they might consider natural attachment; but, my Lords, we must stop somewhere, and our guides ought to be, first, the laws of God, and then social expediency. My Lords, I have dwelt longer than I intended on the question of these prohibitions as founded on the precepts of God's law, and I will not trespass on your Lordships further on that point, because that may be more properly discussed at length, if ever a measure should be introduced into this House for the purpose of abrogating these restrictions.

But, my Lords, allow me to say a word or two with respect to its expediency. It may be expedient, that persons who are now living in a state of discomfort and anxiety, if not in a worse state, from the present condition of the law, which they well know, but disapprove, should be placed in a state of less anxiety and less discomfort, and perhaps in many instances less immorality; but are we to sacrifice what we consider to be the barriers of domestic comfort and good morals, to gratify the scruples or remove the difficulties of comparatively a few persons, who have knowingly involved themselves in difficulty? When the fact is once known, that it is impossible to contract a marriage with a certain person, say a wife's sister, why should there be any more difficulty in a man's shaping his affections, inclinations, wishes and thoughts in such a line, as to shut out from his contemplation all idea of marriage with that person, any more than with his own sister by blood? I see none. What is there to prevent our minds entertaining a criminal attachment towards the nearest relations, but the knowledge that such connexions are forbidden and must never take place? I know, my Lords, this might be carried too far; but in the case of a wife's sister, or one's own sister, I think the same principle of self restraint which operates in the one may be safely and properly required in the other.

Now, my Lords, with regard to the question of expediency. I look at the state of society in this country, and I see reason to think, that the prohibitions which prevent the intermarriage of persons within certain near degrees of affinity, is the very safe guard of our domestic relations. Whatever advantages, my Lords, might result from its removal, in my opinion, they would be more than counterbalanced by the evils that would flow from that measure. There are cases, my Lords, I admit, where a widower is desirous of marrying the sister of his deceased wife, because he thinks that he has thereby a fairer chance of obtaining for his orphan children a kind mother and a faithful protectress, than if he were to introduce under his roof a strange step-mother; but there are many more cases, in the proportion of fifty to one, where the husband would be desirous of having the benefit of the same maternal care over his orphan children, shewn them by the sister of his deceased wife, without any intention of marrying her; where perhaps his affections so linger about the grave of his deceased partner as shut out altogether from his mind, thoughts of future marriage; where he would be grateful to have bestowed on his children the tender care of his deceased wife's sister, an advantage from which they would be utterly precluded, if it was known that it was possible for him to marry that sister. For, my Lords, the state of society in this country is such, that it is held impossible for a man and a woman, not past a certain age, to live together with respectability and propriety, without marriage, if they are persons not prevented by any legal impediment from contracting it. My Lords, I hold that this is a distinction between ourselves and some nations of the Continent very much in our favour; and most sorry should I be, to see the day when that distinction should be removed. My Lords, a deceased wife's sister may now with propriety undertake the care of her orphan nephews and nieces, because she never can stand to their father in any nearer relation. If the prohibitions were removed, it would be impossible for the husband to invite her to come and live under his roof, unless he held out an offer of marriage. The instances where the deceased wife's sister now fills that situation are so many, compared with those where the husband would be desirous of marrying her, that I think a great deal more would be lost on the one hand by permitting such marriages, than you could by possibility gain on the other.

The noble Lord has alluded to the Continent, and has distinguished between Roman Catholic and Protestant countries. He has said, that in Roman Catholic countries they have restrictions, but they are dispensed with. With regard to Protestant countries, there are in some countries a few restrictions, and in others none at all. My Lord, I have yet to learn, that the domestic habits of the Continent are such, as to hold out by their example any encouragement to us to relax any of the restrictions which makes marriage in this country so sacred and honorable an institution. My Lords, if I am not much misinformed, the facility of contracting these marriages which exists in Germany, has produced effects which would make the sober-minded among the Germans glad to return again to the prohibitions. With regard to America, I admit the great respectability, eminent learning, judgment and sagacity of that distinguished judge, whom the noble Lord has quoted, and who, as he rightly observed, has been cited with distinction by the most eminent lawyers of our own country. I have heard the late Lord Stowell, the great expositor of the law of nations, if not the founder of modern international law, speak of Judge Storey with the greatest respect. But, my Lords, look at the state of America with reference to its population, and the circumstances in which a certain part of that population are placed. It is not very safe to argue from analogy between America and England, the countries are so exceedingly different in respect to population, and to their habits and means of subsistence. With respect to the religious part of the question, I must beg rather to demur to the opinion of Judge Storey, because, if I remember rightly, there is one of his judgments in which he states, that the marriage of sisters to brothers is forbidden by the law of nature, and ought not to be allowed, but that beyond that the prohibition ought not to go.

The bringing forward of this measure, my Lords, leads me to believe, what I have been told is the case, that the removal of this prohibition, of the marriage of a husband with a deceased wife's sister, is only to be the first step which is to lead, by not very slow degrees, to the abolition of all those restrictions, which cannot in the strictest sense be said to be restrictions on account of consanguinity, and I believe even some of those too. Now, my Lords, I cannot believe, that the people of this country will contemplate with anything like satisfaction, the enactment of a law which I am told is to legalize the marriage of an uncle with his niece. Here again may be urged the same argument which I have touched on before tonight. The uncle is now able to adopt his niece, and take her into his own family and treat her as a daughter, because she never can stand in any more intimate relation. The difference of age in these cases is sometimes not so great, but that attachments might be formed; but if it were possible for any uncle to contract a legal marriage with his niece, no uncle could ever receive his niece into his house as his adopted daughter. My Lords, these are some of the reasons which lead me very much to question the expediency of meddling with the law as it now stands.

Another reason is one which I have already slightly adverted to— namely, the undesirableness of doing anything to shake, further than it has been shaken, the opinion which the people of this country entertain of the sacredness of the marriage contract, and the stability and unchangeableness of those laws by which it is recognised. I must say, at the present moment, my Lords, there is not the same feeling with respect to marriage as there was before the passing of the last Marriage Act, and I am inclined to think, if this House and the other House of Parliament entertain the proposition of my noble Friend, a great deal will be done to undermine morality and weaken the hold which religion and the Church have on the people of this country. With regard to the instances adduced as having occurred at Manchester, it is quite obvious, and it cannot have escaped the attention of the noble Lord, that you might adduce instances of the violation of any of the laws of God and man from all the great manufacturing districts, because there are now in those districts thousands who are suffering from the consequence of long and criminal neglect, on behalf of those who ought to have provided for them, clergymen, and churches, and schools. The law has been violated by persons who never heard of the existence of that law, and never have been initiated into those principles of religion upon which obedience to all laws ought to be founded.

For these reasons, My Lords, I am disposed to say, that the marriage law, as it respects the prohibited degrees, had better remain as it is; and that persons should be taught by sound religious instruction to regulate their passions with a view to what they know to be just and right. My Lords, so long as the law is the law, it is our duty to obey it, so far as it is not contrary to the law of God. It may possibly relate to a matter not of moral, or natural, or divine right, but of positive right, still it is our duty to obey the law; and I cannot see any difficulty if the law is not to be evaded, why men should not discipline their tempers and passions into a ready and willing obedience to that law. My Lords, that is the true cure for any evil that may be occasioned by these prohibitions amongst a certain class of persons, which I believe to be much less than it is represented to be; and I hope your Lordships will not at once consent to repeal a law which has been the law of the Church almost from its foundation, which is embodied in the laws of this land, and which I believe is as much to be justified on the ground of expediency, as it is consistent with the language of Scripture.

Petitions laid on the Table.