Lords Sitting of 15 June 1841

MINUTES.
Bills. Read a first time:—Marriage Act Amendment; Election Petitions Trials; Militia Pay; Appropriation.—Read a second time:—Metropolis Improvements Expenses; Bribery at Elections.
Petitions presented. By Lord Rolle, the Duke of Rutland, Lord Willoughby D'Eresby, Lord Beaumont, the Marquess of Salisbury, and Lord Beauchamp, from Devon, Leicester, Lincoln, Yorkshire, Essex, Worcester, and several other places, against Alteration of the Corn-laws.— By Lord Brougham, and Earl Fitzwilliam, from Devon-port, and St. Asaph's, for the Jews' Declaration Bill.—By Lord Whamcliffe, from the Guardians of a Union in Yorkshire, for an Alteration of the Poor-law; from a place in the same county, in favour of the Inland Bonding Warehouses; and from Sheffield, and its neighbourhood, for an Alteration of the Marriage Law.

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
The Earl of Aberdeenon presenting a petition from the seven suspended ministers of Strathbogie, said, that he should feel it necessary, for a few moments, to claim the attention of their Lordships, as well as of the noble Viscount opposite, while he offered to the House some observations on this, painful subject. The case had been brought before their Lordships about a month ago, by a noble Lord (Dunfermline) with so much force and ability that it was not necessary for him to go over the circumstances again. The petitioners complained that they were suspended from their sacred office by a sentence of the General Assembly, and they called on the House to interfere for the purpose of preventing that sentence of deposition from being carried into effect. The noble Viscount, on the occasion to which he had alluded, had declined to interfere for the purpose of rendering justice to those individuals. He said that the majority of
1504
the General Assembly knew perfectly well that the Government highly disapproved of their conduct, that their claims were unfounded, and that even if they were well founded, the manner in which they were brought forward was highly objectionable. The noble Viscount as usual, added, that he would enforce the law and see that justice was done; but he would take no step to check the General Assembly in the coarse they were pursuing. Since that time those individuals had been formally deposed from their situations by the General Assembly. It was sufficient to say, that these gentlemen were so deposed simply and exclusively for their obedience to the law of the land. No accusation was brought against them, no pretence was advanced of any irregularity or impropriety of conduct on their part. On the contrary, it was admitted that these gentlemen were amongst the most exemplary and excellent parish ministers existing in the Church of Scotland. Several of them, whom he himself knew, were men of the highest reputation in every respect. They were deposed not only because they obeyed the law, but because they were forced to obey the law. They were willing to obey the orders of the church courts, until, by the decision of the civil courts, they found that they would be liable to punishment, in person and estate, if they refused obedience to the law of the land. It was impossible that such a state of things as this could be suffered to exist, and he attributed its continuance to remissness on the part of the Government. He found no fault with the statement of the noble Viscount, that he would not bring forward any measure on the subject, accompanied as it was with the declaration that he would support, uphold, and maintain the law. But no effort had been made to maintain the law; and when individuals were in consequence put to an enormous expense for the purpose of supporting their rights, which were illegally invaded, it became a public question, and he conceived that the Government were bound to come forward and to protect them; The sentence fulminated against these gentlemen had excited throughout Scotland feelings of the deepest indignation. At Edinburgh a very large and influential meeting was held, at which resolutions were agreed to, sympathizing with the situation of these gentlemen, and reprobating the conduct

1505
of the Assembly. At Glasgow a similar meeting was held. Petitions on this subject, most numerously signed by persons of all parties, had been agreed to; and but for the great political excitement which prevailed throughout the country, and interfered with all other proceedings, the expression of indignation would, he was convinced, be universal. After deposing these gentlemen, the Assembly notified, that the parishes from which they had been ejected were vacant, and I stated, that the patrons might present to them. If they neglected to do so for six months, the Church might then, jure devoluto, appoint to them, and certainly the legality of such an appointment might be contested. But this sentence of deposition, iniquitous and illegal as it was, had been suspended by the supreme court. An interdict had been issued, forbidding the appointment of ministers to those parishes which were not, in fact, vacated; and he had no doubt, that the sentence of deposition would be finally and formally pronounced to be illegal. The presumption manifested by the General Assembly in these proceedings was never equalled by the Church of Rome; tyranny, such as was exhibited in this case, would annihilate the liberties of the people of this country; but it surely would not be tolerated in the present day. The division of that House on the Auchterarder case had been set at nought, and he would ask the noble Viscount—he would ask the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack—was that the way in which they would suffer the judgments of their Lordships' House to be treated? He maintained that this was a case in which the Government ought to have ordered the Lord-Advocate to act, for the purpose of putting an end to such illegal proceedings. He could refer to other acts of the General Assembly which were no less illegal, but he did not, on this occasion, wish to dwell on them or to go beyond the particular case to which he had called their Lordships' attention. The noble Earl read some extracts from the petition, in which the petitioners stated, that they had been deposed purely and simply because they had obeyed a special statute; that the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, itself established by law, had thought proper to set aside those very laws by which it was supported, and they prayed that some measure might be adopted to
1506
shield them from the effects of the sentence of deposition.
Viscount Melbourneagreed with the noble Earl, that the circumstances of this case could not be viewed but with feelings of the deepest regret, involving, as they did, not only the state of the Church of Scotland, but the position and interests of the parties whose petition the noble Earl had presented. He was not, however, prepared to admit that there had been any remissness on the part of Ministers, or that they ought to have taken a course different from that which they had adopted. He considered that Government could not have taken any effectual step for the purpose of terminating those differences that would not be liable to very grave objections. It was true that Government and Parliament might have put an end to the dispute by deciding in favour of one or other of the contending parties. They might have decided in favour of the General Assembly, and declared the measures pursued by that body to have been just and proper, or they might have declared that the General Assembly were acting illegally. They might have done this; but either of these measures would have been an intermeddling with the internal affairs of the Church of Scotland, and might be attended with the most serious and injurious effects. He, therefore, conceived that to have recourse to an Act of Parliament, for the purpose of settling the question would have been dangerous and unwise. The noble Earl said, that the petitioners were suffering in consequence of their obedience to the law of the land. That certainly was true, and he was sorry that it was so. But in viewing this subject, it was necessary for their Lordships to consider the nature of the question in dispute. The General Assembly had exercised powers, their right to exercise which was denied by the court of session. The question was brought under the consideration of the court in Scotland, and he found that a minority of the judges, considerable, both in point of number and talent, were with the General Assembly, and supported their claim. It appeared that a wide difference of opinion existed between the great ecclesiastical authority and the great civil authority in Scotland. The General Assembly declared that the civil court had no jurisdiction in this case, and six of the civil judges, amongst whom was Mr. Jeffrey, were of that opinion. The noble Earl said,

1507
that the Church of Rome never carried its presumption further than the Church of Scotland had done on this occasion; but the Church of Scotland was equal in presumption to the Church of Rome at any day, of which many instances could be produced from history. There was here a great difference of opinion between great authorities with reference to great and important principles. The circumstance reminded him of the contest in the time of James I. between the ecclesiastical and civil courts in this country. That contest led to much that was unseemly and unfitting. That contest was not, however, put an end to by unlegislative decision, but was allowed to work itself out by the efforts of conflicting parties. He felt very deeply for the sufferings of those individuals, but he did not conceive that Government were called on to interfere. The noble Earl had pointed out one course by which this question might be settled— namely, the decision of the civil court. The Church would, it appeared, jure devoluto, if the vacant parishes were not filled up in six months, proceed to appoint ministers; and on the legality of such appointments the civil court would decide. He did not say whether it would be wise to bring the question to that issue; but certainly, if that course were adopted it would lead to a decision one way or the other. It was, he repeated, the wish of her Majesty's Government to enforce the law; and he was certain that the Lord-advocate had, in this case, done all that appertained to his office, and would hereafter do all that his duty called on him to do with reference to it.
The Earl of Haddingtonsaid, the noble Viscount, although he agreed with his noble Friend as to the unfortunate situation in which the petitioners were placed by the conduct of the General Assembly, had not given any opinion on the subject. Through his whole speech he studiously avoided giving any opinion. He had said nothing—he had done nothing. The noble Viscount observed, that the Lord-advocate would certainly do his duty. Perhaps, the Lord-advocate was acting under his orders, and if so he should be glad to learn what those orders were. His noble Friend, in the course of his observations, had alluded to the Auchterarder case. In that instance, the proceedings of the General Assembly were directed not alone against the decision of the Court of Ses
1508
sion, but against the solid judgment of that House. His noble Friend wished the noble Viscount to cause the law to be enforced in that case, but the noble Viscount questioned the propriety of doing so. In that case there was no difference of opinion in the court below, and the decision of that court was, after solemn argument, confirmed by their Lordships' House. But now, the noble Viscount said, he felt great difficulty in making up his mind to interfere, because two or three of the judges, for whose learning and talent he entertained great respect, happened to be of a different opinion from the majority of their brethren. So that because there was a difference of opinion amongst the judges, a great wrong was to remain unredressed. In the course of the present Session, in answer to a question put by him, the noble Viscount stated, that the law should be enforced, and the noble Viscount had repeated that statement twice since; but now they saw what the noble Viscount's idea of supporting the law was. His mode of upholding and enforcing the law was to do nothing. To talk of two contending authorities, the one being the majority of the General Assembly, and the other the Court of Session, upon a great constitutional question, was most extraordinary language for a Minister of the Crown to hold; and it was by suffering his mind to remain in that state of doubt and vacillation that matters had assumed an aspect which filled the lovers of peace and of the welfare of the church of Scotland with the greatest dismay. If the noble Viscount had interfered two years and a half ago, before matters became so complicated, the law, no doubt, would have been obeyed; he had not done so, however, and they now saw the bitter fruits of that do-nothing system by which the conduct of Ministers had been so long characterized on more questions than with regard to the church of Scotland. There was one other point which had not yet been referred to in that House, and which, as this would probably be the last opportunity of discussing the subject this Session, he would take the liberty to mention, to show the animus by which the majority of the General Assembly was actuated. This very last act had been to appoint a special commission to visit the different Presbyteries in which questions might be pending relative to this matter between the civil and ecclesiastical autho

1509
rities, with full powers, five being a quorum, to deal with them in the settlement of parishes, church discipline, and all other ecclesiastical matters, as they might think fit. In other words, they had appointed a roving commission, to resist the law as occasion might arise—the Assembly thus assuming to itself the power to suspend—and if to suspend, why not to abolish?—the whole constitution of the church of Scotland as by law established. He presumed that fact could not be known to the noble Viscount, or he would not have spoken of this as a great question between two contending authorities—the church courts and the law of the land. In common with every friend to the peace of Scotland and the welfare of the establishment, he deeply regretted that Ministers had not pursued another course, and that even now no assurance was given that the Lord-Advocate would be required to adopt measures for enforcing the law.
The Marquess of Normanbyassured the noble Earl that references had been made to the Lord-Advocate, and communications held with him in every stage of the proceedings. The Lord-Advocate was perfectly aware of the desire of the Government, whenever in his discretion he thought the exercise of his official duties would tend to settle the question, that he should interfere, and if that officer had not taken any step, it was because, upon a full consideration of the case, the time had not arrived when he beneficially could interfere. There were, he knew, some questions still under the consideration of the Lord-Advocate; but he was anxious that the impression should not go abroad that the Lord-Advocate had not been consulted, or that he had any doubt as to the line of conduct he should pursue.
The Earl of Haddingtonconcluded, from the statement of the noble Marquess, that Government had given no orders to the Lord-Advocate, and that it was left entirely to his own discretion when and how he should proceed, it being perfectly notorious that the Lord-Advocate was himself friendly rather than otherwise to the course pursued by the majority of the General Assembly.
The Marquess of Breadalbanebegged their Lordships not to be guided upon this important question by the very strong expressions which had been used by those on the other side of the House. The majority of the General Assembly had an ex-
1510
tremely difficult duty to perform in asserting principles which they conscientiously believed were not only based on the fundamental principles, but also essential to the preservation of the church of Scotland. Until the whole matter was finally settled by the decision of the courts of law, it would be precipitate and dangerous for the Government to interfere.
The Duke of Argylldeprecated the discussion of this important question on the mere presentation of a petition.
Lord Broughamwas not surprised that his two noble Friends who spoke last, with the peculiar views they entertained upon this matter, should deprecate any continuance of the debate, and be very well pleased to rest their case, as it were, on the statement of his noble Friend at the head of the Government, and the noble Secretary of State within whose department the question more immediately and properly came; but, whatever they might have meant—he did not ascribe any such intention, but anything having a more fatal tendency on the parties engaged in these manifestly and notoriously illegal proceedings—anything having a more direct, inevitable, and powerful tendency to encourage the breakers of the law in Scotland he could not imagine. His noble Friend the Secretary of State had merely said, that the Lord-Advocate had frequently considered the subject, that if he thought anything was necessary he would act; that from his not acting as yet, he concluded he had not felt any such necessity; but when the necessity arose, his noble Friend took for granted the act would be done. Anything less satisfactory to those who wished the law to be maintained, and peace restored by proper firmness in its execution, he could hardly conceive. His noble Friend, at the head of the Government, had made a statement which he could not help thinking would be taken by the wrongdoers in Scotland as in their favour, instead of being against them. His noble Friend said, this was a grave question: no doubt, when the peace of the country was disturbed, and the violators of the law constituted the highest judicatory in the church of Scotland. There was a division of opinion, said his noble Friend, in the Court of Session, when one of the cases was first decided; there were learned and great authorities in the minority upon that occasion. [Viscount Melbourne: I said

1511
there was a difficulty in legislating on the subject.] Why, no one called for a new law. The law was already decided and determined, first by the Court of Session, and then by their Lordships sitting as a court of appeal in the last resort, clearly, unanimously, and unhesitatingly affirming the opinion of the Court of Session. No declaratory law was necessary. The law was actually declared and acted upon by the proper legal authorities. There was another reason against any declaratory law on this subject. The pretension of the violators of the law was, that the Legislature itself, Queen, Lords, and Commons, could not pass any law binding on the General Assembly; and if a law were passed tomorrow, they would violate it. Surely, that was a sufficient reason why the Executive Government of the country should take the proper steps to execute the law, and give peace to the land. He, for one, would never suffer it to be said, without protesting against it, that a mere division of opinion amongst the judges of any court, before which any question was brought, should be held in any quarter as the shadow of a ground or pretence for refusing obedience to the law, as declared by the majority.
Viscount Melbournebegged to say, that nothing was farther from his mind than to give anything like encouragement to those parties who had disobeyed the law. He had said, that the Government had executed the law, and that it was their intention to execute the law, but he had also said, that the General Assembly having done that which it was contended they had no right to do, the General Assembly having, as was contended, by the deprivation of these seven Ministers, exceeded their power and authority, he did say, that means existed at present to enforce the execution of the law, and that it was for Government to consider whether they would not trust to the law itself for its own vindication, and he must add that no noble Lord had pointed out a course, within the power of Government, by which the existing law could be more speedily and effectually enforced, than by those means which the existing law possessed.
Lord Broughamwas quite sure, it never could have been the intention of his noble Friend to give the slightest encouragement to the violators of the law; but intention was one thing and tendency another; and this he would say, that the
1512
tendency of the speeches of his noble Friends and their conduct was undeniably—contrary to their intentions—to encourage the violators of the law. His noble Friend had asked, what Government could do better by way of enforcing the law than leaving the law to execute itself. He would tell his noble Friend, in one sentence, one course which would have a most speedy and effectual result in discouraging the violation of the law, by protecting and encouraging those who obeyed it, and that was to give directions to the agents and law officers of the Crown in Scotland, to relieve those who were oppressed by the wrongdoers from the costs and risks of their oppression.
Lord Belhavensaid, he deeply regretted the state to which Scotland had been brought in consequence of this question. He must confess, that he did not very well see what her Majesty's Ministers could do to put an end to this dispute by ordering the Lord-Advocate to do anything, for he did not know what he was to do in the present circumstances of the case; but he thought some means would and could be found if there were not so much difference and warmth of opinion here as well as in Scotland. The only way in which it was possible that this question could be settled was by trying the question on a new presentation, in consequence of the deposition of these Ministers.
The Earl of Aberdeenthought this a most preposterous suggestion. The question had been tried already without bringing the matter anything nearer a settlement. The House had decided that it was the duty of the Presbytery to take a particular person on his trials. They refused to take him on his trials; not only that, but they ordered another man to be presented to the living. It was a mistake to suppose this a conflict between two authorities with co-ordinate jurisdiction. [Viscount Melbourne.—The authorities may be conflicting without being co-ordinate.] But the noble Marquess, the Secretary of State, for the Home Department said, co-ordinate. The noble Viscount stated, the question as between constituted authorities differing in opinion. That was not the state of the case; there was no collision; the Church of Scotland was established by special Acts of Parliament. Those acts imposed conditions. Who was to interpret those acts?

1513
The General Assembly? They had no right to do so; they might obey them; but he had yet to learn that their interpretation of those acts was worth one farthing. The court of session was the tribunal to interpret those acts, and their Lordships on appeal from that court. That decision he looked on as final. The General Assembly had violated those acts. Knowing the opinions of noble Lords opposite—knowing how entirely they accorded with his own views—he thought it rather too bad of them to shuffle with this question in the way they had hitherto done.
The Lord Chancellorwas understood to observe, that the Auchterarder case came before their Lordships in consequence of the operation of the Veto Act. The party presented had been refused by the Presbytery, in consequence of not having the majority required by the Veto. The subject of the appeal was, that the Presbytery might be ordered to put the party on his trials. Whatever took place in the Auchterarder case, that was the extent of the decision of that House.
Lord Broughamsaid, his noble Friend might have added that that was the judgment which the General Assembly had disobeyed. That was the judgment which the court of session had endeavoured to enforce—that was the judgment the enforcing of which had occasioned the deprivation, or at least the suspension of the seven Ministers. Until he saw the law as it stood fully obeyed, he would never give his sanction to the enactment of a new law. His noble Friend denied this to be a conflict between co-ordinate jurisdictions; but he (Lord Brougham) could not understand how it could be called a conflict at all, unless the jurisdictions were co-ordinate. A Master in Chancery might disobey the Lord Chancellor; in that case he would be guilty of disobedience if you will; of a violation of duty; of a breach of law; but there could be no conflict between the two, because there was no coordinate authority.
Viscount Melbourne: It is a conflict, though an unequal one.
Petition laid on the Table.

CHARIUTABLE TRUSTS' BILL.
The Lord Chancellorrose to move the second reading of the Charitable Trusts' Bill. He said, the objects of this bill were very simple and most important. It had been
1514
intimated to him, that there were some objections to this bill; but, as he was totally ignorant what those objections could be, he must wait to hear them. The object of the bill was to secure to the poor the benefit of the property devoted to their assistance; and that was attempted to be effeced in two ways, applicable to different species of property. The first object of the bill was applicable to all charities; it was to avoid the expense which was necessarily and constantly incurred when new trustees were appointed. Whatever the nature or origin of the trust, and whoever the trustees might be, they, of course, were liable to be trustees by death; and it therefore became necessary to appoint new trustees; and on their appointment it was necessary that there should be a transfer of the charitable property to those new trustees, as they could not perform their duties properly without such transfer, and there was, therefore, continually great expense thrown on the trust fund in paying the attorney employed, for stamps, and for the expense of the conveyance. These expenses, of course, lessened the benefit of the charitable trust to the poor. The object of the bill was, to make the act of appointing new trustees ipso facto vest the property in the trustees so appointed. The other object of the bill was not a mere question of expense, but a question in many instances of actual loss to the poor of the property. Their Lordships were called on to turn their attention to the subject, and to do what they could to prevent the inconvenience which had arisen from a defective statute. In the Municipal Corporations Reform Bill their Lordships might be aware that a provision was made for removing charity trusts from such corporations as they were vested in, or from persons, members of corporations, where the property was vested in individuals, but still under the jurisdiction of the corporations. He was not informed of what had taken place when that bill (the Municipal Corporations Bill) passed through their Lordships' House, nor could he explain how it was, that that enactment, as it regarded these trusts, was left as it stood in the statute. The words of the statute were,—
" That all the estate, right, interest, and tide which at the time existed in the corporation, or in any individual holding it for the corporation, shall continue till the 1st day of

1515
August, 1836, or until Parliament shall otherwise order, and from, and after that time shall utterly cease and determine; and after that period the Lord Chancellor, or the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, shall have powers to make such orders as they see fit for the reappointment of such trustees."
The 1st of August arrived, and Parliament had taken no steps, nor made any provision for these trusts. Those therefore who had an interest in these trusts had applied to the Lord Chancellor for the appointment of trustees. But though the trustees had been appointed, there was nothing in the act to enable the Court of Chancery to vest the property in the trustees. Trustees had been appointed, but what was to become of the legal title of the estates? It was obvious that those who held them before ceased to hold them on the 1st of August, 1836; but Parliament did not vest the property of these estates in any other persons, and it had been a subject which had greatly puzzled conveyancers to determine, what had become of the legal estate. Some supposed that the legal estate was escheated to the Crown; some to the heir-at-law of the original founder of the charity; but it had been established beyond all controversy, that it was not gone to the trustees. It was very true, that in many instances this question had not been raised; but the tenants under these trustees had paid what they knew was due. But it was equally true, that in many other instances this had not been done, and that those who held trust property had put the trustees at defiance, and asked them to show their title, which was to prove, that they had the legal estate in them to give them legal power and authority to compel those tenants to pay what was due; and in very many instances, the trustees not having that legal power to compel payment, the objects of the charity hail been defeated, and the trustees could not administer it to the poor. He had unfortunately been made very much acquainted with these evils, and had had very many communications from persons who had found it impossible to compel payment, and the only way to remedy this defect was by the authority of Parliament. This clause of the bill then before their Lordships proposed, that the legal estate and interest of the property, of which the persons so appointed were trustees, should by this act be vested in them, He should suppose
1516
that their Lordships would approve of the objects of this act; it was the only means of checking the evil which existed, and he should hope, that it would pass, and restore to poor persons those various charities which would be affected by it. He concluded with moving, that the bill be read a second time.
Lord Lyndhursthaving presented a petition from 2,000 bankers, merchants, and others, inhabitants of Bristol, praying against the Bill, would state very shortly his ground of objection to it. It was a Bill which embraced very important considerations, and questions of very great difficulty; and he conceived that a Bill of this description ought not to have come up to that House at such a period of the session, and particularly in the state in which the two Houses of Parliament were placed at the present moment. The object of this Bill was to confirm and complete the title of those trustees who had been appointed under the Municipal Reform Act. He had no inclination or disposition whatever to do anything to assist the title of those persons. A great number of these trustees consisted of Dissenters from the church of England, and a great part of the property to which the trusts referred consisted of estates, originally granted for purposes connected with the church of England, and of advowsons. The trustees therefore became entitled to present to livings. This was a reason why he thought their Lordships ought to confirm the title of the trustees. With reference to the corporation of Bristol, he learned from the petition which had been intrusted to him, that the number of trustees appointed for the management of the estates of the city amounted to twenty-one; ten of them were Dissenters, and of the eleven who professed to belong to the church of England, some were tolerably lukewarm in their professions. A great number of the estates had obviously been granted for the benefit of members of the church of England, and there were three advowsons among the property. When the Municipal Corporations Reform Bill was under their Lordships' consideration, what course had they pursued? It was urged that many corporations possessed advowsons, and their Lordships deemed that those advowsons should be sold, and until that was done the presentment should vest in the Bishops of the respective dioceses. A remedy was therefore pro

1517
vided for that particular evil; but the case of charitable trustees possessing advowsons had been overlooked. Had their Lordships' attention been called to it, they would doubtless have made some similar provision, and he was the more entitled to say so, because he found in the Irish Municipal Act an enactment providing that none but corporators belonging to the church of England should interfere with property bequeathed for the benefit of the church of England. On these grounds he objected to anything tending to confirm the title of these trustees. It was owing to the neglect of the Government that a general Bill on the subject had not been brought forward before. The present measure ought to be considered by a committee up-stairs, and was not fit to be passed at that late period of the session. He opposed the whole Bill, for the first clause, though drawn up in general terms, would by a side-wind effect the purpose he objected to. He moved that the Bill be read a second time that day three months.
Lord Broughamexpressed his surprise at the opposition of the noble and learned Lord. An omission had been made in the Municipal Bill, which gave rise to a most pernicious state of things as regarded the administration of charitable property; and if their Lordships did not pass the present Bill, not only would Dissenters not have the patronage of this church preferment, but nobody else would. He could not see what danger could arise to the establishment, if in some corporations Dissenters should have the appointment to livings. There was nothing in the law of the country to prevent Dissenters presenting; and even Jews might do so in some parishes where they were rate-payers. All that was required was, that the party presented should be qualified under the Uniformity Act.
The Earl of Warwickhad a petition to present against this Bill from the corporation of Warwick. That corporation possessed property of much value, which they stated was not charitable, but bequeathed for the purposes of the church and the corporation; and the petitioners contended that this property ought not to be taken away from them. He should certainly vote against the Bill.
The Lord Chancellor, in reply, observed, that under existing circumstances the property to which the Bill referred was in
1518
a state that rendered it impossible to be managed. The objections of his noble and learned Friend rested on facts; but of those facts no proof whatever was before their Lordships, and, even if they were, that would be no reason for preventing the people from the enjoyment of the rights which this measure would confer. His noble and learned Friend had also complained of the Government having left the former enactment imperfect, under the pledge of bringing forward some other measure to regulate charitable trusts, but that no such measure had been passed. He could only say, that one of the first measures which he had had to propose to their Lordships after having a seat in that House was a measure for that purpose, but it was thrown out by their Lordships.
Lord Lyndhurstsaid, that with respect to what had fallen from his noble and learned Friend as to there being no proof of the facts on which he had objected to this Bill, all he (Lord Lyndhurst) wanted was a committee to inquire into the facts of the case.
The House divided on the question that the Bill be then read a second time. Contents 36; Not-contents 52: Majority 16.

List of the NOT-CONTENTS.

ARCHBISHOPS.

VISCOUTNS.

Canterbury

Midleton

Armagh

Hawarden

DUKE.

Gort

Rutland

Cunning

MARQUESSES.

Canterbury

Salisbury

BISHOPS.

Exeter

Bangor

Camden

Rochester

Ormonde

Gloucester

EARLS.

LORDS.

Winchilsea

Willoughby de Broke

Shaftesbury

Saltoun

Abingdon

Sondes

Morton

Southampton

Haddington

Kenyon

Galloway

Douglas

Warwick

Calthorpe

Hardwicke

Bayning

Clanwilliam

Bolton

Mountcashel

Carbery

Bandon

Redesdale

Rosslyn

Colchester

Wilton

Bexley

Harrowby

Wharncliffe

Verulam

Lyndhurst

Brownlow

Stuart de Rothesay

Beauchamp

Heytesbury

Somers

Ashburton

Ripon

1519

Paired off.

NOT-CONTENTS.

CONTENTS.

Duke of Buccleuch

Lord Hatherton

Duke of Argyll

Earl of Rosebery

Duke of Dorset

Lord Strafford

Duke of Buckingham

Earl of Thanet

Marquis of Bute

Bishop of Norwich

Marquis of Ailsa

Bishop of Durham

Earl of Eglinton

Lord Belhaven

Earl of Airlie

Lord Clifford

Earl of Aberdeen

Lord Montfort

Earl of Dartmouth

Lord Dacre

Earl Cadogan

Earl of Erroll

Earl of Wicklow

Lord Bateman

Earl of Clare

Lord Crewe

Earl of Lucan

Earl of Zetland

Earl Manvers

Duke of Bedford

Earl of Glengall

Earl of Scarborough

Viscount Sydney

Marquis of Anglesey

Viscount Combermere

Earl of Leitrim

Lord Colville

Lord Byron

Lord Walsingham

Earl of Morley

Lord Rolle

Lord Talbot of Malahide

Lord Forester

Earl of Uxbridge

Lord Feversham

Earl of Yarborough

Lord Tenterden

Lord Hill

Lord Cowley

Marquis of Headfort

Lord Skelmersdale

Lord Stanley of Alderley

Lord Abinger

Duke of Norfolk