§ The Lord Chancellor,having presented a petition from certain Members of the legal profession in support of the Administration of Justice Bill, proceeded to say, that he rose for the purpose of moving the second reading of that bill, which was for the better administration of justice, and which had been for a considerable time on their Lordships' table. Although the time which had elapsed since the bill was introduced was much longer than he could have wished, still he certainly had no reason to regret the period that had thus passed by, because it had given an opportunity to those who took an interest in this subject to consider and examine the measure. It had occasioned very general, and very deep discussion amongst professional men, and in his conviction, he was stating nothing more nor less than the fact, when he said, that the measure had met with all but the unanimous concurrence of the profession. The opinion which the profession entertained on the subject, and which, to a certain extent, might be collected from the petition which he had 1335 just presented, arose from the decided conviction of those who had considered the question seriously, and who saw the absolute necessity of an extensive alteration. Indeed, there was no man who knew the manner in which business was conducted in the Court of Chancery, but must see that the power of that court was totally inadequate to the prompt and proper performance of the duties that devolved on it. The evil had been so often stated in their Lordships' House, that he felt it almost unnecessary at this time to enter into any review of the accuracy of those statements. If he thought that any proof of this were wanting, he should refer to the many bills which had been brought into Parliament for the remedy of this acknowledged defect. Bills with this object had been brought forward in the years 1829, 1830, 1832, 1833, 1835, and 1836, when the last bill was brought in by himself. The number of those bills was a proof, at least, that those who had presided over that court, considered that it was essential to the due administration of justice in it that some measure of alteration of the existing practice should be passed into a law. But, an increase of power in the Court of Chancery formed only a portion of what he considered necessary to the establishment of a due administration of justice. Their Lordships had disagreed from the last measure, principally, perhaps, because it was too extensive, because, perhaps, it went to effect what, in their Lordships' mind, was attempting too much, and because their Lordships considered it as involving measures of great difficulty, and measures about the expediency of which there might be considerable room for doubt. The present bill did not go so far, nor would it interfere, he had the satisfaction of thinking, with any measures of a more extensive nature, which it might be deemed necessary at any time to adopt with reference to the Court of Chancery, and the high office which he had the honour to hold, might be altered in future in any respect, notwithstanding anything in this bill. He was not asking in this measure for relief for himself, or for others who might hereafter hold the great seal; this would not be the effect of the bill; on the contrary, it would probably add materially to the amount of the duties of whoever should preside in the Court of Chancery. He, however, had this protection, and the individuals who might hereafter succeed to the office had this protection that it was utterly impossible 1336 to impose new duties upon the Lord Chancellor which that officer could perform. Unless their Lordships could add to the twenty-four hours, they could not impose additional duties upon the Lord Chancellor. In fact, it was impossible that any one individual could effectually do the duties which were already imposed upon the great seal. This bill might vary those duties, perhaps increase them, but it would afford no relief from the pressure of business. He, therefore, had no personal interest in the measure, but he considered it to be one of the duties of the office which he had the honour to hold, vigilantly to preside over the administration of justice throughout the country, and particularly in the court over which he presided, and when he saw that justice could not be done, when he found that in the court in which he presided the suitors had justice denied to them, because there was not sufficient power in that court to render effectual the administration of justice in it, he thought that their Lordships would be inclined to agree with him as to the existence of the evil, and to assent to the expediency of devising some remedy for such acknowledged abuses. When he said, that the business in chancery was more than it was possible for any three men to get through, he thought he might go on to consider that this was so much confessed and admitted as a basis of argument on this subject, that it would not be necessary for him to take up much of their Lordships' time by proceeding to demonstrate the fact by a reference to figures. Sometimes those who were not possessed of very accurate information on the subject were fond of referring to the number of bills in chancery that were disposed of by Lord Hardwicke, and of remarking how ably that distinguished and eminent and learned man, had gone through the duties of the chancellorship. Now, no man had reason to regard Lord Hardwicke with more respect than he had—no one perhaps was more fully aware than he was of the way in which Lord Hardwicke performed the duties of the office. He had had access to all Lord Hardwicke's papers, to all his note-books, and to the written judgments which he had delivered, and, therefore, he could say that Lord Hardwicke had bestowed very great labour upon the duties of his office. Of that labour he had reaped the fruits, and though so many years had elapsed since Lord Hardwicke had held the great seal, the memory of his great talents and 1337 of the able manner in which he discharged the duties of the office had not yet passed away. When, however, he looked to the quantity of business in chancery in the time of Lord Hardwicke, and compared it with the quantity now, he was only surprised that Lord Hardwicke had not more leisure than it appeared he had. Now, with respect to the number of causes in chancery, the books had unfortunately not been so accurately kept in Lord Hardwicke's time as it had been the practice to keep them since, and therefore, the only comparison he could make would necessarily be incomplete. Lord Hardwicke had acceded to the great seal in 1756, and the year 1759 was the earliest date respecting which he (the Lord Chancellor) could give any information. The average number of causes, then, which were set down for hearing in the five years ending with 1764 were 383, the average of the five years ending in 1769 was 461, that of the five years ending in 1804 was 501, while that of the same period ending in 1812, and immediately preceding the appointment of the Vice Chancellor, had risen to 562. That was, no doubt, a very great increase upon the average in Lord Hardwicke's time. But what was the case afterwards? By the end of the five years ending with 1824 the influence on the cause-paper of the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor was felt, and the effect was to raise the average number to 959. But the average number of the five years ending with 1839, which was the latest period for which an average could be calculated, was 1,248. A very great increase, then, in the number of causes set down for hearing had followed the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. That showed to demonstration, that in estimating the proper amount of power to be given to the Court of Chancery they ought not to look to the quantity of business which was done now in the courts, but they ought to consider what would be the result as to the increase of business, if the Court of Chancery were in fact thrown open to the suitors; that was to say, if the suitors of this country could have a court which they could resort to with any hopes of justice. He had shown that the number of causes had very much increased of late years. What was the case with respect to bills filed? The average number of bills filed in the five years immediately before the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor was 1,830; the average of the period ending last year was 2,236. Then it ought 1338 to be considered, that there was scarcely any cause which had not to work its way up twice through the paper before it could have a hearing. In the very great majority of causes which came on for hearing, a reference to the Master became necessary, and was ordered accordingly. When this was done, and the inquiry was finished, the cause was again set down on the paper for hearing. Every cause, therefore, worked its way up the paper twice before it came on to be heard. Each of these causes took three years in performing this. The mere time, therefore, occupied in working through the list was three years, and during thin period every thing was suspended in the cause, except the expenses of the suitors. No exertions of the solicitor could remedy this. That was a great grievance, and one which he trusted that their Lordships would feel it to be their bounden duty to put an end to, for it was nothing else than a denial of justice. There was no doubt that parties only came to the Court of Chancery when dire necessity compelled them. That was a grievance which ought to be remedied. There was another test by which the increase of business in the Court of Chancery might be rendered apparent. He would now call attention to the fund which was intrusted to the administration of the Court of Chancery. In 1802 the suitor's fund, that was to say the money under the Court of Chancery, being not all of it money in litigation, but the property of lunatics, infants, trusts, in short, property of every description which could be under the administration of the Court of Chancery, amounted to 19,908,441l. In 1839, this sum had increased to 41,546,000l. Therefore in those 37 years the suitors' fund had more than doubled, and had reached the enormous amount he had last mentioned. That amount was too large to be administered by any one establishment. But, though it was true that part of this sum was there in consequence of delay in the court, this was not true of the greater portion of it. Then as to the increase of business which accrued from the two other branches of the court, it should be remembered that there had been a considerable increase to the duties of the Lord Chancellor in consequence of the appeals arising from the other two courts. Now here again, on comparing the pressure of business upon Lord Hardwicke with the pressure upon those who might hold the great seal in these days, their Lordships would 1339 be aware of the vast difference which existed in this respect; or their Lordships might judge by considering that the increase of the annual average upon an average of 10 years had been since the period of which he spoke from 10 to 52 appeals. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the present power of the Court of Chancery to get through the business which which came before it. Everybody conversant with the Court of Chancery was aware of the great extent of additional business which the establishment of railways had brought into the court. He could not exactly calculate what was the proportion which it bore to the other business, but the amount was immense; and he believed nothing had been more beneficial than the effect of the interposition of Chancery, on the one hand, to prevent imposition upon individuals by the railway companies, or, on the other hand, to obviate the attempts of individuals to take advantage of the wants of the companies. This, their Lordships were aware, must needs bring into the court many new cases; and so it was with every variety of business which the public engaged in; it was quite sure to find its way, sooner or later, into a court of equity. Many of their Lordships might have had experience of what that was: in fact, there were few persons of considerable property who were without some experience of this at some period or other of their life. It was most important, therefore, to the public and to individuals, that the Court of Chancery should be put into a state to perform its functions duly. When he had brought in his last bill in 1837, he had then very recently acceded to the great seal, but he was certainly not a stranger to the Court of Chancery, having passed 30 years of his life in it; and every impression which he then entertained respecting the necessity of reform there his subsequent experience had served to confirm. He had endeavoured, by every exertion of his strength, to get over the arrear of business, but his strength was not adequate to that purpose. Still he had done more business—that was to say, he had occupied more time in the business of his court, than any of his predecessors for one quarter of a century. It had not been usual of late for the Chancellor to hear causes in the first instance, but he had thought it his duty to take those causes in addition to the ordinary business. During the vacations and other seasons in which their Lordships Were not sitting, he had thought it his 1340 duty to sit in Chancery; but the effect of all his labour had been comparatively trivial, or rather all that he had done had been of no effect in diminishing the arrears. He was convinced, therefore, that nothing but a great accession of strength to the court could do that justice to the public which the public had a right to demand. These being the difficulties with which they had to contend, the next thing to consider was what way was the best to get rid of them. He had stated before what he conceived to be their Lordships' reasons for disagreeing from his former measure, and in the present bill be had as much as possible avoided whatever was likely to create controversy, and had endeavoured to embody those points which were likely to meet with the greatest concurrence. The principal point to which he should call attention was the alterations he projected in the Court of Chancery. Another point was the state of the Court of Exchequer; the third was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Their Lordships were aware that the Court of Exchequer exercised a jurisdiction at common law as well as in equity. This last jurisdiction was until very modern times exercised by the Court itself, that was to say, by the barons sitting together. Latterly, a change was introduced, and the Chief Baron was empowered by act of Parliament to sit in equity by himself. That was the first step to the division of duties. The act also contained a provision, which was extended by a subsequent act, enabling one of the barons, to be named by the Crown, to sit in case of the absence of the Chief Baron; so that, in point of fact, there were two Courts of Exchequer. Well, that Court being thus divided into two, there were, consequently, many temptations to come into that court. One was the profits of the solicitor there, as compared with the Court of Chancery. A person who was conversant with the subject had told him that the profits on the equity side of the Exchequer were at least 10 per cent. greater than those in Chancery, and he himself had caused a comparative bill of costs to be drawn up, which fully bore out the statement. The principal cause of this discrepancy was, that in the Exchequer seventy-two words were allowed to a folio, while in Chancery ninety words went to a folio. Then a party in Chancery might have his cause depending for from three to six years before it was decided. But in the Exchequer there was no arrear whatever. 1341 The suitor there had not to wait a moment. As soon as the cause was ready for hearing it was heard in the Exchequer. This would appear to be in favour of the Exchequer. But the fact was, this was a matter of taste, and though there were all these temptations to suitors, the result was not such as might be expected. The statements he had made showed that the business in Chancery had trebled since 1764, and since 1812 had doubled. Now in 1764 the number of causes in the Equity Exchequer was 83; in 1794 it was 106; in 1804, 106; in 1812, 116; in 1824, 115; in 1835, 111; in last year, 102; so that while the business in Chancery had trebled last year, the business in the Exchequer had been less than any year since 1794. The returns of bills gave corresponding results. There must be some reason why the business in Chancery stood in this relation to the equity business of the Court of Exchequer. It was no fault of the learned judges of that court. He was perfectly satisfied that every attention had been paid to the equity jurisdiction of that court, and he believed that the duties had been satisfactorily done. Why, then, did the public repair to the Court of Chancery, and not to the Court of Exchequer? First of all, the Exchequer was not constituted as the exigencies of the public required. The system of having one court for the administration both of equity and of law was not consonant with the spirit of these times. Time was when the barrister practised both in law and in equity, as was the case at present in Ireland; but when the bar were divided between law and equity, it was competent for the Crown to take judges from one description of court or the other. It was likewise a great inconvenience to the solicitors transacting business in the Court of Chancery to have anything to do with any other court. The practice of the two courts was different; and a clerk well practised in the management of a suit in the Court of Chancery might be perfectly ignorant of the conduct of a suit in the Court of Exchequer. The inconvenience to which the solicitors were subject was, to a certain extent, felt by the bar, and no equity barrister, if he could possibly avoid it, would have anything to do with a suit in the Exchequer, because it removed him from the court in which his practice lay. It, therefore, happened, that solicitors were content to take less fees, rather than go into the Court of Exchequer, and have an immediate decision of their cause. This was 1342 an objection applying to the court itself, and not to any particular judges, for he had known distinguished equity men at the head of the Court of Exchequer, when the same reluctance was manifested by equity practitioners to go to that court. There was one branch of practice which had hitherto brought many suitors to the Court of Exchequer—he alluded to tithe suits; but their Lordships were aware of the probability, nay, the certainty, of those suits ceasing to exist. While the Court of Exchequer had failed in gaining the good will of the public as a court of equity, it was on the other hand amply compensated for that failure by the opinion it had established for itself as a court of common law, and he believed it had now more business in actions between individuals than any other court. It was a most thriving and useful court for business in common law—it was useless as a court of equity. The Chief Baron had to sit at nisi prius, he might be called on to attend the judicial committee of the Privy Council, and he had many other important duties to perform. It was therefore a matter of uncertainty to the suitors in that court who would be the judge in equity, and this uncertainty was far from being satisfactory to them. The only remedy he had heard suggested for this state of things in the Court of Exchequer was the appointment of another judge, that was to say, a sixth judge in that court, who should exclusively devote his attention to the business of equity. This arrangement would answer no purpose. If there was not equity business enough in that court for a judge, or half a judge, singly, why appoint another judge, who would have little or nothing to do? The Court of Exchequer had only 1–13th part of the equity business of the Court of Chancery. But it was argued, that if an exclusively equity judge were appointed in the Court of Exchequer, the public would then be drawn to that court, as the practice was more profitable to solicitors. This might be the case, if there were no other inconveniences connected with the equity practice of the Exchequer; but there was another great inconvenience, which could only be remedied in the way he proposed. There was no appeal from the Court of Exchequer except to the House of Lords. Now, it would be perfectly ridiculous to appeal to that House upon an erroneous decision with respect to interlocutory applications. In the Court of Chancery, however, such matters would come before the Chancellor, and then the 1343 application might be reheard. It very frequently happened that these erroneous decisions resulted from the circumstance of the parties themselves not having understood and properly staled their own case, and in the Court of Chancery the rehearing enabled them to correct their own errors. He had seen it suggested in print that this evil, as connected with the Court of Exchequer, might be removed by allowing an appeal from an individual judge of that court to the Lord Chancellor. This was an extravagant proposition; for the courts were entirely distinct, and the Court of Chancery had no superiority or jurisdiction over the Exchequer Court of Equity. But if the proposition were adopted, the Court of Exchequer would be to all intents and purposes a part of the Court of Chancery, except in name. Why, then, should the title of "baron" be preserved, if he was in fact transformed into a Vice-Chancellor? But this was not all. As noble Lords might imagine, the establishment necessary for the administration of a distinct branch of law—that of equity—required a great number of officers, a complete staff indeed, whether the suits were numerous or few. Their Lordships would be surprised at the expense of such an establishment, for the Court of Exchequer, having an additional Baron exclusively confined to equity, as compared with the business to be transacted. Whatever merits the Court of Chancery might have, it was never supposed to be a particularly cheap court, but its cost would be as nothing compared with that of the Equity Exchequer, taking into account the business done. From the best information he had been able to get, he believed that the expense of the establishment of the equity part of the Exchequer was not less than 18,000l., which was at a rate, considering the work done, as if the Court of Chancery cost about a quarter of a million. Taking the number of cases in Chancery, and dividing them among the different masters, it appeared that there was one master to every 120 cases; while, according to the present state of the Court of Exchequer, there was one master to every fifty-eight cases. It was obvious that such a system led to great and useless expense. What, then, was his proposition in the present bill? To abolish the equity side of the Exchequer altogether, to transfer its equity business to the Court of Chancery, and leave the Court of Exchequer to the dis- 1344 charge of those functions which it had shown itself so well capable of performing. This scheme would add 100 cases to the 1,200 or 1,300 already in the Court of Chancery, but it would at the same time afford the means of getting rid of many offices in the Exchequer, which existed only for the purpose of administering that portion of equity business which found its way to that court. Some of the officers who might be made available, would be transferred to the Chancery, but the number of these compared with those got rid of, was trifling. Compensation would, of course, be afforded to the officers whom it might not be thought necessary to retain. Another subject to which he would call the attention of the House, related to the important duties of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. A great addition had of late years been made to the duties imposed on the Privy Council, owing to the appeals from the Admiralty and Vice-Admiralty Courts abroad, and from the colonies, in which a variety of laws was administered. The inconvenience felt in the discharge of these duties by the Privy Council had led to the passing of a bill establishing a Judicial Committee of that body, and as far as the decisions in individual cases went, the result had been most satisfactory. But the judicial officers appointed members of that committee, such as the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench for instance, had other important duties to perform, which they could not neglect, and therefore they could not always attend the committee. To remedy this inconvenience, it had been proposed to appoint certain of the puisne judges, members of the committee, but he thought this a system which their Lordships would not approve of, for he did not think it right that any individual puisne judges should be selected from among their brethren, and distinguished by being made members of the Privy Council. It was then suggested that all the puisne judges should be made Privy Councillors, but such a plan was objectionable, as it would throw new obligations on those high functionaries. When the Judicial Committee was appointed, it did not seem to have been at first suggested as an inconvenience that no head was appointed to the Committee; but this inconvenience seemed to have been early felt, for in 1834, a bill was introduced, authorising the Crown to 1345 appoint a head to the Judicial Committee. The noble and learned Lord who introduced the bill, proposed that the Lord Chancellor, and the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, should be Vice-Presidents of the Judicial Committee, the Lord-President being, of course, officially president. That bill never came to a second reading. The evil, then, of the want of a head to the Judicial Committee still continued. He had endeavoured to remedy that defect, and the mode in which he proposed to do so was, to put at the head of that Court the Master of the Rolls, who had for fifty years before the establishment of the Judicial Committee, been in the habit of presiding in the Privy Council. When the Judicial Committee was appointed, that high officer had withdrawn his attendance; but there was no reason why it should not be restored. He looked to him as the natural head of that court. It was necessary they should have the highest judicial officer who could afford time to attend to its duties; for the questions which came before that Court were most important, embracing as they did the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts, and Vice-Admiralty Court abroad, involving points of common law as well as equity, and requiring a knowledge of colonial, Spanish, Dutch, and East Indian law. It was, therefore, not only requisite that the individual should always preside, but that his acquirements and standing should be such as to give the profession, and the public, confidence in his decisions. He confessed he had come, with much reluctance, to the determination of proposing the Master of the Rolls for the performance of this duty, because he must thereby deprive the Court of Chancery of a certain portion of his services. But that was an inconvenience which he, and the public, would be obliged to put up with, unless his noble and learned Friend could devise some means of obviating it. If not, the Master of the Rolls, a chief baron, or a judicial officer, placed in one of the highest situations of the country, must be appointed, in order to give effect to his decisions; and it appeared to him that it would be more easy to supply the loss which would be sustained by the Court of Chancery, by the absence of the Master of the Rolls for a certain number of days in the year, than of the judge of any other court; because there would be no difficulty in distributing the 1346 increase of equity business which might arise from the absence of the Master of the Rolls among the present and additional judges of that court, so that at least no delay would be occasioned thereby to the suitors. He therefore proposed that the Master of the Rolls should be the vice-president of the Judicial Committee to attend in all cases the sittings of that court, with power given to the Crown, in case of his necessary absence, to appoint another vice-president in his stead. In order to facilitate the administration of justice in the Judicial Committee, he was anxious, as occasion might require, that the assistance of some of the learned judges should be had, not as members, but merely to give their advice as they did to their Lordships when occasion might call for it. He thought that would be convenient; it would not often be necessary, for questions of common law were not so frequent before the Privy Council as matters of equity; at the same time, though he proposed this, it formed no essential part of the measure. He had now stated the details of his plan with respect to the equity jurisdiction of the Exchequer, the Privy Council, and the exigencies of the Court of Chancery, which, under the proposed scheme, would lose the assistance of one of its judges for a certain portion—say fifty days in the year; and taking into consideration the additional business which would be imported into that court from the Exchequer, to the extent, perhaps, of other fifty days, there would be the business of 100 days added to the Court of Chancery. From the best calculations he had been able to make, one additional judge, independent of this arrangement, would not be adequate to the business of that court, but he believed that two, with the arrangements he had explained, would enable the Court of Chancery to get through, provided there was no very great increase of business. He entertained, however, an opinion, that even that number of judges would be found inadequate, for this reason—that when suitors had a prompt adjudication of their causes, the increase of business, he should say the increase of justice, administered to those who required it, would be great indeed. In proposing the present plan, be wished to guard himself against the supposition, that he considered it all that was necessary. He thought it all that should be done now, 1347 because he believed it was sufficient to remedy one great and acknowledged evil. He left the appellate jurisdiction untouched. There were other matters, too, connected with the interior jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery which required revision even after giving it greater judicial strength. He was perfectly satisfied, that on many points, when duly investigated, their Lordships would be of opinion, that material improvements might be introduced by diminishing expense and delay before the cause came to a final decision. But these would be matters, should their Lordships sanction this bill, for future consideration. There was one part of the case which he was sure their Lordships would hear with satisfaction—that although a large addition of officers was proposed to be made to the Court of Chancery, its own funds were amply sufficient to carry the plan into effect, both with respect to the new judges and compensation to the officers of the Exchequer, without expense to the public. He, therefore, begged leave to move, that the bill be now read a second time.
§ Lord Lyndhurstrose for the purpose of seconding the motion of his noble and learned Friend. The state of the Court of Chancery had been so frequently under discussion in that House, and the general nature of the facts was so well understood, and in truth so accurately and fully stated by his noble and learned Friend, that it would not be necessary for him to trespass for any length upon their Lordships' time, particularly as he had stated that it was his intention to vote for the second reading of this bill. The evil to which his noble and learned Friend had alluded was by no means of modern origin. The arrear in the Court of Chancery had existed for a very long period of time. It was almost coeval with the existence of that court; it was complained of over and over again even in that golden era to which his noble and learned Friend had referred—the time of Lord Hardwicke. It was now, he believed, as great as ever it was on any former occasion, which he did not ascribe as matter of reproach to the learned judges of that court, because he was sure that men of more industry, more perseverance, more activity, and more accurate knowledge in their profession, could not be placed in their situations. It arose from the overwhelming business of the court, with which its strength was wholly 1348 incompetent to cope. His noble and learned Friend had alluded to the manner in which this operated, and to which he himself had taken the liberty of calling their Lordships' attention on more than one occasion. It operated with a species of compound force. It was not in a court of equity as in a court of common law. If the decision of a case in a court of common law were postponed, it would be at length heard and decided, and then there was an end of it; but, as his noble and learned Friend had accurately stated, the case in equity, before being finally disposed of, generally came repeatedly before the court, and every interval therefore between the time of setting down the cause for hearing and the time when it was actually heard, must be multiplied by the times it so came before the court, so that the evil was increased in an accumulated ratio. He had always felt that this was a great and intolerable grievance—it was an opprobrium to the country. No person who had not been connected with a court of equity, or the suitors of that court, could possibly form any conception of the extent of misery it produced to individuals and to entire families; it would be a disgrace to the Parliament of this country if it did not take effectual measures to put an end to such a state of things. If Parliament were willing to do so, it would be a disgrace to the Government of the country not to co-operate with Parliament for that purpose. Therefore, he most cordially supported the second reading of this bill. He hoped he should be allowed to say, that he took satisfaction and pride to himself, because he had, ever since he was connected with the Court of Chancery done everything in his power to remedy the evils complained of. He had, on two or three occasions, brought forward bills corresponding in principle with that which had been introduced by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack. In the result, they were unsatisfactory; and he trusted their Lordships would allow him to say a few words with respect to the history of those proceedings, because they connected themselves with the course he was taking on the present occasion. Their Lordships would recollect that a commission was appointed to inquire into the condition of the Court of Chancery for the purpose of facilitating the progress of its proceedings. That commission was composed of the 1349 most intelligent and enlightened men conversant with the proceedings of the Court of Chancery. They made heir report and suggested many improvements, and when he had the honour of filling the situation now so well filled by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, he drew up in conjunction with his colleagues, the late Master of the Rolls and the present Vice-Chancellor, a series of orders founded on that report; his noble and learned Friend who succeeded him continued those orders; he believed everything recommended by that commission was carried into effect, the object being to expedite and facilitate the proceedings in courts of equity. The misfortune, however, of that commission was, that they applied themselves only to the course of the proceedings up to the time of the hearing. He had repeatedly stated in the other House of Parliament, and also before their Lordships, that what was done when that commission was appointed, was only one step towards those measures which he thought necessary for the purpose of getting rid of the grievance which he believed existed in the Court of Chancery; and in pursuance of that system he had brought in bills which passed their Lordships' House, he believed with entire approbation, he believed without any division, which went to the other House of Parliament, and were there received certainly not with much favour; indeed, were it not for the respect he owed to that very enlightened assembly, he should say they were received not without something like clamour, and party prejudice, and passion. It was stated, in opposition to those bills, that they were wholly unnecessary; that the effect of them would be to render the situation of the Keeper of the Great Seal a sinecure; it was insinuated that such was the object with which they had been introduced, and the result was, the bills were lost. He had never, from that time, abandoned the views he entertained upon this subject, and everything that had since occurred in the Court of Chancery, every subsequent discussion in that House, had tended to confirm him in those opinions. All the facts now so well stated by his noble and learned Friend were known at that time; but in the face of those facts the bills had been rejected in the manner he had stated. If it was admitted, and no man could deny that there was more business standing in the Court of Chan- 1350 cery than could be disposed of by the judges of that court—if it was hardly an exaggeration to make use of the saying of the present Vice-Chancellor, that three angels would scarcely be competent to the business, what was the simple remedy to be adopted in such a case as in any other business or proceeding in life? If the present judges were not competent to the work, we must have a fourth, and if a fourth was not enough, we must have a fifth. No other course consistently with common sense could be adopted; he should, therefore, be acting inconsistently with himself, and deserting the duty he owed to the suitors of that court over which he had formerly presided, as well as his duty to their Lordships, and to the public, if he did not give to the principle of the bill introduced by his noble and learned Friend his most warm and cordial support. He knew it had been thrown out as an objection to bills of this description, that the number of appeals would be increased, and that it was idle to provide for the hearing of causes without providing also for the hearing of the additional appeals which must arise if the measure were carried into effect. Even admitting that the appeals would be increased, he could by no means admit the validity of the argument. Not more than one decision in fifty became the subject of appeal; was it nothing, then, that the forty-nine causes should be decided? If there was not sufficient force to dispose of the cause on appeal, still it was ridiculous to use that as an argument against the present measure. But the fact was not so. There was no arrear of appeals; and when the present arrear of causes was worked off by the assistance given by the new judge or judges, the number of appeals would not be so great that his noble and learned Friend would be unable to keep them under as he anticipated, otherwise they must come to Parliament to provide a remedy. Why should they, however, in. anticipation of an evil which might not arise expose the public to a considerable expense, provide a remedy? They should rather wait till the evil displayed itself; then they would be enabled to appreciate its extent, and devise an adequate remedy. It was, therefore, though often urged, no argument against the measure of his noble and learned Friend to say that there was no provision for hearing the additional appeals which would be created by the 1351 bill. Others, and among them men of great distinction and eminence, said they would not support a partial measure of this description; that there must be a general reformation and review of the whole court; that the appellate judicatory of their Lordships must be reformed or abolished; that a wide and general measure of that kind must be brought into Parliament and carried into effect. All this was idle and chimerical. He had heard many complaints made of the appellate jurisdiction of their Lordships and other tribunals, but he never heard any two individuals agree in a precise remedy; to wait, therefore, for a concurrence of opinion on measures of this kind, instead of providing a practical remedy for a great practical evil, would be doing a great injustice to the country. Here was a great practical evil, and a practical remedy pointed out which would be effective for the object. Consistently, therefore, with common sense and the principles of common justice, they could not oppose this measure. So much as to the principle and the second reading of the bill. There were, however, points of great importance which would be the subject of consideration and inquiry in the committee. The plan of his noble and learned Friend involved three subjects; first of all, the Court of Chancery, the means of providing for the arrears of that court, and the extent of assistance requisite; in the next place he proposed to abolish the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer; and thirdly, he proposed some reforms and amendments in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On each of these in their order he would say a very few words. His noble and learned Friend said, that for the business of the Court of Chancery the assistance of two new judges would be necessary. He did not deny it; it was possible; but that would be a matter for consideration and inquiry in the committee, and was no objection to the second reading. He would only make one or two observations for the purpose of directing his noble and learned Friend's attention to those points he was most desirous of having reconsidered. His noble and learned Friend who succeeded him on the Woolsack, by almost incredible exertions, wiped off the whole arrear of appeals which had been standing at about the same amount for a period of many years. He deserved the thanks of 1352 the country for those extraordinary efforts and exertions. Since that time there had been no arrear of appeals. That part of the case, therefore, required no consideration. Now, as to the state of the causes. He had looked at the returns, and he drew this conclusion from them—there was a great and heavy arrear—a stationary arrear—not a growing arrear. He remembered when he had the honour of occupying the office of his noble and learned Friend, in introducing one of those bills to which he had alluded, he directed his attention to the same subject, and he then stated in that House before their Lordships, that there was no growing arrear—that the arrear was stationary, or nearly so. What was the consequence? If once that arrear were wiped off, the present force of the court would be sufficient to prevent its accumulation. Now, what was the conclusion he drew from this? That the addition of one judge to the Court of Chancery—a man of eminence, a man of standing, of knowledge in his profession, and industry, would, in a year and a half, dispose of the whole of the existing arrear. That arrear consisted of from 500 to 600 causes. The late Master of the Rolls disposed of nearly 700 causes in one year. The present judges, then, it appeared, were sufficient to prevent the arrears from accumulating, and when by the appointment of one new judge, they were wiped off, there would be this judge, in addition to the present judges, to hear the new causes. Then the question was, whether a second additional judge was required. If the facts which he had stated were correct, was it necessary to have two new judges in the Court of Chancery? He did not call upon their Lordships to come at present to any conclusion upon this question, but he requested them and his noble and learned Friend to give it their serious attention. His noble and learned Friend had said, and he (Lord Lyndhurst) had often heard it said before, that if the court were opened, and if facility were given for hearing cases, there would be a very great increase of business in the Court of Chancery; that might be so, but it was a matter of pure speculation and conjecture, and when the increase took place, it would be time enough to provide for it by the appointment of a second new judge. But he repeated, this increase was at present merely speculative. In one of the chan- 1353 cery courts there were at present no arrears. He believed the number of causes standing for hearing in the Rolls' Court did not exceed 150, and his noble Friend who presided over that court was in the habit he believed of getting through 200 causes in the course of the year. There was, therefore, in this court ample room for the additional suitors whom it was supposed that additional facilities would call forth. Why did they not come into this court? It was not from any want of learning, intelligence, impartiality, or independence on the part of that learned judge. There was room for suitors to come in, but it did not appear that this circumstance had caused any increase in their number. The equity side of the Exchequer to which his noble and learned Friend had alluded was another instance; there was no arrear in that court; the suitors had not to wait there even as long as they had in the court to which he had just adverted, for in the Exchequer Equity Court a cause was heard in a few days after it was set down. Why then was there not a great increase of business in the Exchequer? Looking at these facts, he doubted whether the speculation of his noble and learned Friend as to the increase of business to be expected from the appointment of a new judge was well founded. He said he entertained a doubt, but at all events was a mere speculation or conjecture sufficient to warrant their proceeding at once to the appointment of two new judges in the Court of Chancery? He would now come to that part of the bill which proposed to abolish altogether the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer; that would be a proper subject for discussion in Committee, and it was one involving important considerations. He remembered that when he first sat upon the Woolsack, having less experience and more courage than he possessed at present, he had brought in a measure, which was not indeed a bill to abolish the equity jurisdiction of the Exchequer; but, having introduced his bill, he had stated that one of its objects was to abolish that jurisdiction. How was he met on that occasion? Why, Lord Eldon, who had sat upon the Woolsack twenty-five years, came down to the House and opposed the bill with the utmost warmth and earnestness. Besides meeting with the opposition of Lord Eldon, he (Lord Lyndhurst) had to 1354 encounter that of Lord Redesdale, a judge of very great experience and knowledge in his department of the law. The whole weight of authority not only of the equity courts, but also of the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, was thrown into the scale against him (Lord Lyndhurst), and the opposition was of so formidable a character, and the weight of the authority opposed to him was so great, that he was obliged to renounce his design, and had never afterwards ventured to bring it forward again. He did not say, that he had changed his opinion, or that he now thought that he had been wrong upon that occasion, all he said was, that the subject was one which ought to be considered with great care, attention, and caution. The abolition of the equity side of the Exchequer did not appear to be a necessary part of a bill, the object of which was to give additional force to the Court of Chancery, while it might lead to many inconveniences. The business of the equity side of the Exchequer had been stated as consisting of from sixty to seventy causes in the year, or rather more than one-fourth of the business of the Rolls' Court; but, besides this regular business, there was a variety of summary applications of an important kind which required to be promptly disposed of, and which were referred expressly to the equity side of the Court of Exchequer on account of the prompt manner in which it was able to deal with them. Now, what would be the effect of transferring all this business to the Court of Chancery by a bill introduced for the purpose of getting rid of the arrears in that court? The provision certainly did not appear to be a necessary part of such a measure. He had heard it said that the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer was an incumbrance upon the common-law jurisdiction, and that the common-law side would work better if the equity jurisdiction were got rid of. This appeared to be a singular proposition, since, although a greater number of causes were entered in the Exchequer than in the other courts of law, there were arrears in both the other courts, and none on the common-law side of the Exchequer; so that the five judges of the Court of Exchequer were not only able to dispose of all the common-law business of the court, but they also disposed of, and, as he understood, well and satisfactorily, 1355 a considerable portion of equity business besides. He submitted, therefore, to their Lordships that these were reasons for pausing before they assented to this provision of the bill. But he was next told that the machinery of the equity side of the Exchequer was cumbrous, and that its practice did not correspond with the practice of the Court of Chancery, and that, therefore, solicitors were not disposed to bring their causes into this court. He could not consider this as a sufficient reason for abolishing the court altogether. The whole of the practice in the Court of Chancery had been remodelled within the last few years. Why should not the same thing take place with respect to the Court of Exchequer? When he was at the bar, the practice varied in each of the common-law courts; the course of proceeding in the Court of King's Bench was different from that in the Court of Common Pleas, and this again differed from the practice on the common-law side of the Exchequer; yet all these courses of proceeding had now been rendered uniform, and why should not the practice of the equity side of the Exchequer be made to correspond with that of the Court of Chancery? It was said that some called the Court of Chancery a grievance, and others a nuisance, on account of causes not being heard for three years after they were set down; and in order to apply a remedy to this grievance, it was proposed to abolish an equity court entirely free from the inconvenience and evils which were the subject of complaint. Would it not be dealing hardly with the present suitors in the Exchequer Court, whose causes were to be transferred by this bill to the Court of Chancery, and who had probably instituted their suits in the Exchequer for the purpose of insuring a prompt and speedy decision, to hand them over to a court where their causes might not be heard for three years to come? With regard to the appeals from the Court of Chancery and the equity side of the Exchequer, there appeared to be an advantage of no slight importance in favour of the latter, for when the appeal was made from the Court of Chancery, it was heard in that House before the very judge with whose decision the party appealing was dissatisfied. Now he (Lord Lyndhurst) did not mean to say that his noble and learned Friend would not be as ready lo review his own decision as to review that of another judge, but, 1356 after all, the question was, what would be the feelings of parties themselves upon the subject? Now if the appeal were made from a decision of the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, his judgment would be reviewed by another judge. Suppose any of their Lordships had a cause decided against him, however great might be the reliance which he might place upon the independence and integrity of the judge who had decided the cause, would he not rather have the judgment reviewed by another judge than the one with whose decision he was dissatisfied? That was one advantage of the equity jurisdiction of the Exchequer; but his noble and learned Friend had said, and said justly, that there was one great evil in the Exchequer, which was, that there was no remedy if a party were dissatisfied with the decision of the court upon a motion, except by appeal to their Lordships. But, in the first place, the motion might be reheard before the same judge; and, in the next place, the evil seemed to admit of an easy remedy without an appeal to the Court of Chancery. At present there were two equity judges in the Court of Exchequer; practically speaking, there were three, for he might reckon among them the learned Baron who lately filled the office of Solicitor General. Now, how easy would it be to give an appeal from the decision of one of those judges to one of the others, or to both; and was it not better for their Lordships to apply themselves to remedying the evil in that way, instead of abolishing the equity jurisdiction altogether? In Ireland the equity side of the Exchequer was for many years the favourite equity court; why should not the same take place in this country? He pronounced no positive opinion on this subject, it did not appear to be a necessary part of the bill, and would properly form matter of consideration in committee, but he felt it his duty to throw out these doubts, for he called them nothing more than doubts, and if they had been put rather in the form of arguments than of doubts, that was according to his habit, and he should go into committee with his mind completely unbiassed upon the question, whether the equity jurisdiction of the Exchequer should continue or not. The third portion of this bill related to the judicature of the Privy Council. Now, he agreed with his noble and learned Friend, that it was proper to appoint a 1357 permanent vice-president of the judicial committee, and he had over and over again so stated in his place in Parliament, and upon the same grounds as those mentioned by his noble and learned Friend. He had no doubt as to the propriety of the proposal; but then came the difficulty to which his noble and learned Friend had adverted. If personal qualifications were alone to be regarded, the difficulty would be at once removed, for there was no person whose learning, industry, and independent spirit better qualified him for the office than the noble Lord upon whom it would be conferred by the present bill. But this arrangement would be attended with great inconvenience, for the noble Lord must be taken out of his own court, which was at present the most regular of all the equity courts, having a judge who sat every day, besides having a regular bar of its own. Now, he was unwilling to see extended to the Rolls' Court the inconveniences which he had over and over again urged as reproaches against the Court of Chancery, both in their Lordships' House and in the other House of Parliament. It was constantly exclaimed against as a great inconvenience that the Lord Chancellor should be taken from his duties in the Court of Chancery to preside in their Lordships' House; every one felt the inconvenience, but the difficulty was to find a remedy for it. It was now proposed to introduce into the Rolls' Court the inconveniences which it had been found impossible to remedy in the Lord Chancellor's Court, and to transfer the same causes of complaint to a court in which justice was at present administered in the manner which he had just stated. Surely it was singular, that in the same bill which proposed to abolish the equity side of the Exchequer, because it sat for only half the usual time, a provision should be introduced for the purpose of reducing the Rolls' Court to the same state of incapacity which formed the ground of removing the equity jurisdiction from the Court of Exchequer. He submitted, therefore, to his noble and learned Friend, that the subject deserved the greatest consideration; he admitted that there must be a choice of evils, and it would be for their Lordships to consider, when the bill was in committee, which was the greater—the appointment of a permanent judge to preside over a tribunal which only sat for fifty days in the year, or the interference 1358 with the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery which would arise from interrupting the sittings of the Rolls' Court. His noble and learned Friend had used one argument which seemed a little fallacious, when he stated that the Master of the Rolls had for fifty years presided by custom over the Privy Council. He admitted that the fact was as stated by his noble and learned Friend, but at that period it produced no inconvenience whatever, because the Master of the Rolls sat in his own court in the evening from, six o'clock till ten. At that time the Master only sat in the morning for a very short period in the year, and therefore his attendance at the Privy Council did not interfere with his sittings in the Rolls' Court. The precedent consequently had no application to the present time when the sittings only took place in the morning. There was another part of the bill upon which he should say but little at present, as his noble and learned Friend seemed not indisposed to abandon it—it was that which enabled the Privy Council to call the judges to its assistance. Now, such a provision did not appear to treat the judges with sufficient respect. By long custom and ancient usage, the judges were in the habit of attending their Lordships and of answering such questions of law as their Lordships thought proper to submit to them; but for the judges to attend the Vice President of the Privy Council at his disposition, appeared to be a little inconsistent with the rank and station which those learned personages held in this country. But not only was such a provision inconsistent with the station of the judges, it was also irreconcileable with the very constitution of the Privy Council itself, according to which no one could join in the Privy Council who was not himself a member of the Council. There was this other objection to it, that some of the subjects on which the Privy Council would have to decide might be political cases, in which the Ministers for the time being might have a deep interest. Now, this bill would give to the Government the power of selecting those judges to sit with the Privy Council, who might be considered most convenient for the purpose of Ministers. That would be inconsistent with equity and with justice. He was not imputing or supposing anything with respect to the party now in power, but it was a principle which ought not to be 1359 allowed to be established. That constitutional jealousy with which their Lordships ought to be impressed, should make them careful how they established a principle which might lead to the most serious abuses in the administration of justice. He had thrown out these observations, not for the sake of opposing the bill, but for the consideration of his noble and learned Friend. He had before said, that with respect to that part of the bill which related to the Court of Exchequer, when it went into Committee he should enter upon the consideration of it free and unbiassed, and their Lordships would then have opportunity of fully considering, whether the alteration that was suggested was such as should be made. He considered the great principle of this bill to be this. There was a standing arrear of causes in the Court of Chancery to be disposed of. It was not an arrear of to-day, or of yesterday, but had been existing for ages, for at least 100 years; he could himself trace it back through a period of 50 years. That state of things was grievous, and must be got rid of. The principle of this bill was to appoint additional judges to get rid of that evil. The other parts of the bill were only subsidiary to it, and might be adopted or not. If rejected, they would not impair the principle of the measure. He, therefore, would agree to the second reading of the bill, keeping his mind perfectly free and unbiassed as to the consideration in the Committee of the various points to which he had directed their Lordships' attention; those points were as to the number of additional judges, the abolition of the jurisdiction of the equity side of the Exchequer, and the amendment of the constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
§ Lord Abingerconceived the great principle of this bill to be the improvement of the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery, and that their Lordships might therefore with propriety agree to the second reading of it. The first intimation which he had received of its existence was a printed copy of it, which his learned Friend on the woolsack had conveyed to him. He had heard some vague rumours of it before, but, as they came from no authority, he did not pay much attention to them. He was much surprised, however, to find afterwards, on coming down to the House, that the bill had been laid on their Lordships' table, It was not his 1360 intention, after the very able and distinct manner in which his noble and learned Friend who had just sat down had, as he thought, commented on the arguments of the noble Lord on the woolsack, to trouble their Lordships with many observations. With respect to the business of the Court of Exchequer, it was true that since the act for the commutation of tithes had passed, there had not been a single suit on that subject in the court; but if that kind of suit was altogther abstracted from the calculation, he thought there had of late been rather an increase than a diminution in the business. There were many petitions presented to that court for paying over money to parties in various cases, which were more in the nature of suits than mere petitions. Now, in the last year, when the noble Lord had stated the number of causes on the equity side of the Exchequer was only 102, there were no less than 433 petitions of the sort he had just mentioned, and yet there was no arrear. But if the equity business were to be transferred to the Court of Chancery, not only would that court have all the suits now in the Court of Exchequer, but also all the petitions which were in the nature of suits. If his noble and learned Friend had attended more to the defects in the Court of Chancery, he thought he could have presented a much more disgusting picture as to the accumulation of business than by referring only to the defects of the Court of Exchequer. Now with respect to costs. The difference in the costs of the two courts was very great; but the reason was this—that in the 3rd and 4th year of the reign of his late Majesty, a bill passed this House which reduced the fees of the officers of the Court of Chancery, but the same thing not having been done as to the Court of Exchequer, the expense there was much greater. But nothing was more simple than to reduce these costs. It was said that solicitors would not go to the equity Court of Exchequer; but he did not think that was the case, and he considered that if that court were abolished, it would be one of the greatest injuries to the public that could be inflicted. He found that the class of suitors who now came to the Exchequer, consisted of those who could not afford to pay the expense of the Court of Chancery arising from delay. If the property were very rich, if the funds were large, the suit found its way into the 1361 Court of Chancery, and there it might be i for a very considerable time. But if a man wished the matter to be decided immediately, and if the property were not very great, the Court of Exchequer was chosen. He might mention an illustration of this which came within his own knowledge. Lately a bill was filed in the Court of Exchequer by a trustee for the due administration of his testator's estate. On a motion, however, that was made to the court, it was discovered that a bill had already been filed in the Court of Chancery. He then said he should not decide upon it, but refer it to the tribunal it was first taken to. But the argument made use of for not going to the Court of Chancery was, that the suitor would be detained there five years, whilst, if he would hear it, it would be settled in five hours. If, then, the Equity Court of Exchequer were abolished, they would take away from suitors of a certain class a court in which they now found refuge, and those suitors would become clients to solicitors who wished their causes to last a long time. The delay which occurred in the Court of Chancery was, as he believed, one reason for many bills being filed there. Many years ago he knew a bill filed by a gentleman against his father-in-law, for not settling property according to the agreement before the marriage; and the answer of the father-in-law was, that he had settled on the plaintiff three suits in Chancery, which ought to last his lifetime. Why, the term fees alone, in consequence of the arrears of business in that court, amounted, he believed, to as much as 20,000l. a-year. But he would submit to their Lordships that it would be better to improve the Court of Exchequer than to abolish it. He had no interest in the subject in that respect; on the contrary, if the court were abolished, he should be relieved from a great part of his labours; but he was satisfied that such a step could by no means be beneficial to the public. If the noble Lord on the woolsack could show that he could get through all the business now in the Court of Chancery, then perhaps the equity side of the Exchequer might be abolished; but unless that could be shown, let not the court be abolished, merely because the costs were great, and there were some few other objections to it. The better course would be to lessen the costs of the court and correct its other defects. He wished to 1362 make one observation on another part of the bill. The Master of the Rolls was now of very essential importance to the Lord Chancellor: he assisted him in a great number of cases; and he would throw it out for the consideration of his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, whether, instead of making the Master of the Rolls vice-president of the Privy Council, it would not be a much wiser and more efficient course to appoint his own Vice-Chancellor to that office. He should not trouble their Lordships with any further remarks, except that he should oppose with his utmost force the abolition of the equity side of the Exchequer.
§ Lord Wynfordsaid, that the evil to be corrected with respect to the court of the Privy Council was this—that there was no fixed time for assembling, and that it never sat a sufficient time to do its duty. What was wanted was not so much a vice-president of the court, as members to attend it. As to the abolition of the Equity Court of Exchequer, he thought it would not contribute to relieve the Court of Chancery, and that transferring the business to that court would be attended with great confusion. There might, too, be numbers of persons to be pensioned off, to the amount of many thousands a year. He had also another objection to transferring the equity business to the Court of Chancery. There was some equity business that must remain with the Court of Exchequer; that was the business relating to the revenue. That branch, however, was so small, that if the court had no other equity business but that, they would not be so well fitted to attend it. Many changes had already been made without any great advantage, and he thought it would be a good rule, where it was uncertain that a change might effect any good, to be careful how any change was made. In this case he did not see what good would be done by transferring the equity business of the Court of Exchequer to the Court of Chancery; and if it did no good, it must necessarily do evil. He would, however, consent to the bill being read a second time, but in the committee he would state his reasons for not agreeing to that part of the measure.
§ Lord Langdalesaid, that as the second reading of this bill was not opposed, he would not occupy much of their Lordships' time; but there were some parts of the Bill 1363 on which it might appear right that he should address some observations to their Lordships. In this case it was no longer a question, whether additional assistance was or was not required in the Court of Chancery. Every one agreed that it was; but the mode of giving it required consideration. When he entered the House tonight, and was informed that his noble and learned Friend opposite had expressed his intention to support the second reading of the bill, he must confess he felt very great satisfaction; but it was needless to say, that after his noble and learned Friend had expressed that intention, it was impossible for any friend of the bill to hear his objections stated one after another in his clear and forcible manner, without feeling deep disappointment. That disappointment, however, was somewhat alleviated, when he found that his noble and learned Friend said that his objections were stated rather as points for consideration, than as opposing the bill, and that he should enter into the discussion in the Committee free from any bias whatever. Let that be so, and he should have no doubt of the issue of the bill. There were many parts of it upon which he would not take up their Lordships' time, but it was right he should state his reasons why he supported one part which might be supposed to have some relation to him individually, or to the office he filled. He had formerly stated to their Lordships his views as to what ought to be done in the Court of Chancery, and which required much more than was now proposed. His opinions on the subject had undergone no alteration, and he was prepared to support them by reasons which he thought sufficient. Amongst other things, he thought, that under proper arrangements, and by the addition of appropriate strength, the House ought to be enabled to dispose of all the appellate judicial business of the country; and that the appellate business of the Privy Council ought then to be transferred to this House. That had been and still was his opinion, and he should be very glad to see it acted upon—but he Was obliged to admit, that neither the House nor the country was yet prepared for a change so considerable; and, therefore, he was compelled to consider it as settled, for the present at least, that there must be a separate appellate jurisdiction in the Privy Council and this being so, the question was, how the inconveniences arising from the present arrangements could best be remedied. Now, the judicial business 1364 of the Privy Council was said to occupy about forty or fifty days in the year. To have that business performed, it was necessary to have judges whose duty it should be to perform it—not judges who might go or not at their pleasure, but judges whose duties it should be to go when required, and that with such regularity, that the business might be steadily conducted. To attain these ends, it was necessary either to appoint judges who should have nothing else to do, or to borrow judges who had duties in other courts. To appoint judges who had nothing else to do, would be to give rise to all the inconveniences which had occurred on another occasion from the appointment of judges who had not sufficient occupation, and would be, for many reasons, so objectionable, that in this place, at least, the project was scarcely worth consideration. To borrow judges from other courts, which was the alternative, must undoubtedly be a considerable inconvenience. It was the abstraction of so much time, say a fourth, or nearly a fourth part of all the time, which ought to be devoted to the peculiar business of the courts from which the judges were taken. This was, no doubt, a very great inconvenience; but it was unavoidable so long as it was determined to preserve the jurisdiction of the Privy Council as a separate jurisdiction; and the question then became, from what court the principal judge could be most conveniently borrowed? The regularity of proceeding required that there should be a permanent head. [Lord Lyndhurst: There is the President of the Council.] There was so; but it had long ago been considered whether any great political officers formerly exercising judicial functions could be employed as judges now; and he took it for granted that neither his noble and learned Friend, nor any other noble Lord, would deem it expedient to place the President of the Council, or the Lord Privy Seal, or the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, at the head of a judicial tribunal with active judicial duties to perform. Surely it was not proposed to make them judges, or to place judges in their offices. It was therefore necessary for the present purpose to borrow judges from the other courts; and the question now was, from what court you could most conveniently take a head for the judicial committee. And when he was asked by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, whether he could consent to the present proposal as connected with a plan for increasing the strength of the 1365 Court of Chancery, he set aside all personal considerations whatever, and after the best attention which he could give to the subject, he thought it his duty to consent to the proposal—and he would state his reasons. First, a regular head was required for the judicial committee of the Privy Council. Secondly, the Master of the Rolls had for a long time usually presided in the transaction of such business. No doubt, as had been said, when he did so his time was much less occupied in the business of his own court than it was now. Except for a few days after each term, he sat in the evening only, and for only twelve hours a week in term time, and sixteen hours a week out of term—while now he sat regularly in the morning, and for thirty hours a week, and sometimes more, both in term time and out of term. Still, however, as this duty had formerly devolved on the Master of the Rolls, there was a better prospect of acquiescence than if an officer who had never had this duty imposed upon him were selected; and if, as this measure proposes, sufficient additional strength be given to the Court of Chancery, the inconvenience to the suitors of that court would be prevented. Thirdly, it was impossible that the judicial business of the Privy Council could be well conducted without the attendance of a regular bar—and it had appeared to him that there was no mode of proceeding so likely to procure the attendance of a regular bar as that of making it the duty of the Master of the Rolls to be there. The bar who usually attended upon him in his own court were men of distinguished ability and reputation, and being released from the Rolls' Court on the days on which the Master of the Rolls would be attending on the Privy Council, they would, in all probability, be resorted to by the suitors in the Privy Council. And, whilst his noble and learned Friend considered that the regularity with which the business of the Rolls' Court was conducted afforded a reason for not disturbing it, he saw no reason why, with the assistance of the same bar, the same regularity should not be continued at the Rolls, and, at the same time, be extended to the Privy Council; and he confessed he saw no other way in which the same regularity could be obtained. He believed, that if the Master of the Rolls attended at the Privy Council the assistance of an able, intelligent, and experienced bar would be obtained at the Privy Council, and he considered this a matter of the highest importance. Such, 1366 then, were his reasons for assenting to this measure. His noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Wynford) had been pleased to say, that he would willingly accede to any measure that was agreeable to him. Upon this he begged leave to observe that this measure was not personally agreeable to him. If any one supposed so, he committed a great mistake. The measure, if carried into effect, would impose upon him great additional trouble and responsibility; and he could very sincerely say, that if he consulted his own feelings, he would much rather remain as he was. His only wish was faithfully to discharge his accustomed duties; and if he might be permitted to allude to such a subject, he would add, that long habit had attached even his affections to the discharge of his duties in the place and office in which he now was. The proposed change did not suit him personally; but he agreed to it, because he thought, that under the circumstances, the public service required it.
§ The Lord Chancellorobserved, that his noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) had, in the year 1829, proposed to transfer the equity business of the Court of Exchequer to the Court of Chancery, and it had also been proposed, by the same noble and learned Lord, in 1836, to add another judge to the Court of Chancery, and impose upon him the duties connected with the Privy Council; and now his noble and learned Friend met him by saying that he had not done justice to the Court of Exchequer, for that of late there had been a great increase of business in that court, owing to the quantity of property with which the Court of Exchequer had to deal under a variety of local acts. He had said nothing more than that which he was willing to repeat—that no one would go to that court who was not compelled.
§ Lord Lyndhurstadmitted that he had proposed to make a transfer of the equity business of the Exchequer to the Court of Chancery, but upon that point he was opposed by Lord Eldon, Lord Redesdale, and Lord Tenterden, and he yielded to their authority. He stated that there was no growing arrear in the Court of Chancery; that he conceived one judge would be sufficient for speedily working off the existing arrear, and that the balance of his time would be available for the business of the Privy Council, as the present judges of the Court of Chancery would be suffi- 1367 cient to prevent any fresh arrear from accruing.
§ Bill read a second time.