Lords Sitting of 1 June 1840

MINUTES.
Bills. Read a first time:—Indemnity.—Read a third time:—Feuing of Entailed Estates for Churches, etc. (Scotland).
Petitions presented. By the Earl of Radnor, from Perth, St. Andrew's, and other places in Scotland, for the Separation of Church and State; from Dundee, Sunderland, Newton, a place in Somersetshire, and Leicester, for a Repeal of the Corn-laws; and from Southwood, in Somersetshire, Bradford, in Wiltshire, and other towns, against Church Rates.—By the Earl of Winchilsea, from the Protestant Association, against any further Grant to the College of Maynooth.—By Lord Holland, from Nottingham, against Church Rates.—By the Earl of Rosebery, from places in Scotland, against the Intrusion of Ministers.—By the Duke of Rutland, from Leicester, in favour of Church Extension.

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND
The Marquess of Breadalbane, in presenting a petition against the intrusion of ministers into the Church of Scotland, and praying that the bill then before Parliament, introduced by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen), might not pass into a law, observed that the general assembly of the Church of Scotland had, as their Lordships were aware, come to a decision, by a large majority, unfavourable to that bill, and such he believed to be the feeling not only of a great majority of the Church of Scotland, but of the people at large.
The Earl of Haddington felt it necessary to say, that the concluding portion of the noble Marquess's observation did not tally with the information which he had received, and which he believed most other persons had received, from that portion of the United Kingdom.
The Marquess of Breadalbanecould only refer the noble Earl to the numerous

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petitions which had been presented in favour of the principle of non-intrusion which principle he did not consider was embodied in the bill of the noble Earl.
Lord Broughamsaid, that not having been able to consider sufficiently the bill of the noble Earl, he would abstain at present from saying anything respecting it. He would, however, maintain the opinion which he held the last time he had the honour of addressing their Lordships upon the subject, which was, that the people of Scotland did not go along with those who had placed themselves in resistance to the law of the land. The law of the land had been declared by the highest authority in the law—by their Lordships in their judicial capacity; and if there were any who persisted in offering resistance to the law, he asserted that it was not the people of Scotland, but those misguided individuals or bodies who had thought fit to join them. He might be told that there was conflict and collision upon the subject; but what was it? It was a conflict and collision which there ever would be in every case where a decision had been pronounced by a legal, authorized, and only authorised tribunal—namely, a conflict and collision between that tribunal and the party against whom that tribunal had pronounced judgment. And whether that party were an humble or a powerful individual—whether an individual or a body corporate—whether the meanest lay corporation in the country, or the highest clerical body in the country—it fell within the same rule, and must be considered as the party in a suit in which the decision was given against it by a competent tribunal. Great differences prevailed on other points in that part of the kingdom to which he alluded; he was anxious that those heats should subside; he was anxious, as the peace of the country would be endangered if the peace of the Church were endangered—he was most anxious, before any legislative measure should be adopted, that proper means might be taken in the proper quarter to secure and enforce not merely a nominal but a real and substantial obedience to the law as it at present existed.
Petition laid on the table.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—COURT OF CHANCERY.
The Order of the Day for going into Committee on the Administration of Justice Bill having been moved,
Lord Broughamsaid, that he had to apoligise to their Lordships for rising to give his opinion with respect to the bill in its present stage, but not having been present on a former occasion, so as to avail himself of the opportunity of doing so at the proper stage, he had no other alternative. He had had repeated occasions—indeed he was sorry to say how often, as the frequency showed for how long a period so important, a question had been left unsettled, but he had had repeated occasions of addressing their Lordships upon this subject, and his noble and learned Friend deserved the thanks both of their Lordships and the country for bringing it again before their Lordships, without being dispirited by the failure which he suffered upon the point four years ago. He hoped he should not be accused of an obstinate adherence to his former opinions if, after having since the introduction of this bill given to the subject, the greatest possible attention, he still, in some measure, adhered to those opinions. In giving the grounds he would not say of his opposition to, but of his doubts as to the necessity of so large a measure, he did not mean to say that there was no necessity for some increase of the judicial force; but, as there was great conflict of argument upon the subject, it would better tend to guide the House, so as that it might more clearly find its way through so intricate a question, to state clearly all that might be urged for and against it; for his own part he felt that he should best discharge his duty by fairly stating the reason which induced him to adhere to his former opinions. One of the main facts which the House had to consider was, whether the increase of business in the courts of equity was or was not such as to require so large an increase of the judicial force. The two main sources of the business were the bills filed and the petitions presented, and in both these it was stated, that a great increase had taken place. Now, in the five years ending in 1754, he found the number of bills filed was 1,698, being something under 1,700., and the average number of petitions was 282, making altogether 1,980. In the five years ending 1835, being the latest period at which returns had been presented, the number of bills filed was 2,366, and the number of petitions presented was 1,271, making a total of 3,637, which, instead of being double, as

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had been argued, was only about as five to nine compared with the former period, If the average of the five years preceding 1819 were taken, it would be found to be nearly as great as that presented by the last return; but these arose from peculiar circumstances relating to the period, which were subsequently obviated, and in 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, there were great diminutions in the arrears. Indeed, in the years 1831 and 1832 it might have been said, that there were no arrears, and the consequence was, that a great extension of justice ensued, for the cessation of a denial of justice was tantamount to an extension. By the arrears which had accumulated the channels of justice had been choked up, and the stream could not flow freely. The consequence was, that bills ceased to be filed; but when the obstructions were removed, and the stream flowed freely, a great increase took place in the filing of bills, and in 1833, the effects of the increase began to be practically felt in the business of the court, and in 1833 the amount of business was from this cause—namely, the removal of the obstruction, increased to an enormous extent beyond its natural limit. The result, however, of all the calculations and inquiries which he had made was, that taking the amount of business as a test, and even including the extraordinary increase arising from peculiar circumstances, the increase was not greater since the time of Lord Hardwicke, was not greater in proportion, than as five to nine. That was one side of the account; but they must take the other side of the account also, and on doing that they would find, that instead of the judicial force to perform the office being the same as it was in the time of Lord Hardwicke; on the contrary, if the work was increased threefold, the machinery for effecting that work, the force by which the weight was to be moved, had also increased threefold, or at least had increased more nearly in the proportion of three to one, than of two to one. He did not understand, and he believed nobody understood, why, when the force was increased threefold, and the weight had only increased in the same proportion, the force was not sufficient for the work. Let it be remembered, that the case was very different now from what it was in the time of Lord Hardwicke. Then there were the Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls to perform the business of the
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court, but since there had been a great increase of force. By a cursory observation it appeared, that the increase had been fifty per cent., but in reality that increase had been much greater, because the Master of the Rolls only sat in the evenings formerly, that was to say, only twelve hours in the week. The number twelve, therefore, answered to the power of the Master of the Rolls in Lord Hardwicke's time. Then, again, thirty hours in the week was more than the Chancellor then devoted to the public business of the court, because he had to attend to the Privy Council business, the Cabinet business, other judicial business, and Ministerial business, which came under none of the former heads; and, last and greatest, the business of their Lordships' House, which was certainly a most material item; so that, taking all these, and stating the number of hours devoted to the business of the court by the Chancellor, instead of thirty, at twenty-seven, or perhaps twenty-five hours—and he believed that was rather an overstatement that an understatement of the time which the Chancellor was enabled to devote to the Chancery Court—but taking it at twenty-seven hours, the power of the master of the Rolls would be represented by twelve, and that of the Lord Chancellor's Court by twenty-seven, or twenty-five, perhaps, in the time of Lord Hardwicke. Now, what was the case at present? Taking the same sum to represent the power of the Lord Chancellor, and thirty hours at least to be the number occupied by the Master of the Rolls now sitting in the mornings, which was according to the statement of his noble and learned Friend the Master of the Rolls; and therefore, if this were the least number, the average would be something greater, but taking thirty as the average of the Master of the Rolls, and supposing the Vice-Chancellor to sit thirty hours a week, and add these sixty hours to the twenty-five hours, which were the common period of the Chancellor of the present day and of Lord Hardwicke, that all together would make eighty-five hours; therefore it was quite demonstrable that they had between eighty and ninety hours instead of between thirty and forty hours occupied in the business of chancery. But if instead of taking thirty and twenty-five hours, he was to take, as he had a right to take, this ground of supposition, that the Vice-Chancellor and the Master of the

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Rolls sitting six hours a day, and why they should not sit that number like the courts of common law did, he (Lord Brougham) did not know—then he should have seventy-two to represent the power of these two judges, and then, instead of the power of the whole court being represented by forty-two, as in the time of Lord Hardwicke, the amount of judicial force would be represented by 102, that was to say between two and three-fold what it was then. But that was not the only circumstance which had occurred having a bearing on the question, for another alteration had taken place in the Court of Chancery which was very important in reference to this discussion. The business of bankruptcy had been re moved from the great seal. Some little relief had been given in respect of the Recorder's report, the abolition of which had given about seven or eight days in the year which it used to take. If, therefore, he said that the increase of force had been such as to make it between two and a half and threefold greater than it was in the time of Lord Hardwicke, he should not be wrong. It might be said that these were merely speculative opinions, and that he did not exactly show that these three learned judges had power to increase the force of the court. He came therefore to the returns themselves, to show that there was ground for thinking, as perhaps their Lordships would think by and by, that something of the sort might be effected. At all events, justice must be done; the suitors must be relieved; the court must be helped. Well, then, the number of causes set down for hearing annually on an average of seven years, ending with the year 1834, was, according to his noble and learned Friend, 890; the number of bills and answers was 370; the number of pleas and demurrers, 56; making a total of all matters to try, of all the business in Chancery, of 1,316. But it was said, that very extraordinary exertions were made in those years. Take, then, the number of matters occurring annually on an average of the four years ending in 1839, and it appeared that there were to be disposed of 1,281; and that of those the number actually disposed of was 1,253. From this, therefore, they were fairly entitled to argue that the judicial force had been found sufficient for the discharge of the increase of business, and on the face of the returns, at least, more or less
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adequate to the performance of the duty. But there was the arrear. No doubt there was an arrear, because if a bill failed, a suit was commonly brought into court. There was, then, an arrear, and no doubt it was necessary to find some remedy and relief against the evil, and he would, therefore, request their Lordships and his noble and learned Friends who had proceded and succeeded him on the Woolsack to give him their particular attention on this part of the subject. He said, then, there was an arrear; he admitted there was a heavy arrear. Then the first question, and the main question, was, whether was that arrear temporary, or constant and permanent; did it arise from a defect in the machinery of the court, from a want of judicial power, or was it accidental, arising out of the nature of the business, as, for instance, the increase of bills on railways which had come into the court within the last few years, of which so much had been said, but which it was manifest could not last for ever? He asked, was the arrear temporary or permanent? This was very material to ask and to have ascertained, because, if in order to get rid of this arrear they should appoint additional judges permanently, then, in case of the arrear turning out to be temporary, they would have the arrears got rid of, and the judges remaining with but little to do. He must say, he did not anticipate a very triumphant answer to this, but certainly the judges ought not to be too highly worked. Let them see, then, was the arrear permanent or not? He took now as the test that which was always resorted to—namely, the amount of causes, the exceptions, and the pleas and demurrers standing ready for hearing and not heard in each year. He took the end of Michaelmas term in each year. He should begin with the year 1827, quoting what he found in the printed returns. Then the causes ready for hearing and not heard, the pleas and demurrers, in 1827, were 668 at the close of Michaelmas term; in 1828, they were 668; in 1829,722; in 1830,374; in 1831,229; in 1832, 145; in 1833,202; then they came to the great influx of business to which he had referred, and in consequence of which the number of bills had increased from 2,600 to between 2,600 and 2,700; consequently, in 1834, the number was 630; in 1836, it was 782. In order, then, to ascertain

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whether the arrear was permanent, what mode could be better than to see whether that arrear had continued the same, or whether it had diminished or increased? Proceeding with the above account, the number in 1837, was 647; in 1838,607; in 1839, 693. This was a great number, but still it was about 100 less than in the year 1836. It was clear, therefore, that the arrear was not a permanent but a temporary arrear; and was it not a most important inference from this statement, and its peculiar tendency to show, that if they applied a great increase to the permanent judicial force of the court in order to get rid of the arrear, that arrear would be got rid of, and that in two years or so, perhaps, there would be no sufficient occupation for those additional judges? But, then, it was said, in order to prevent this, you may increase the business of the Court of Chancery in two ways. First, the business of the Court of Equity Exchequer was to be transferred to the Court of Chancery. That would be one source of increase. And, second, there might be an increase in consequence of the diminution of arrears, which would invite more suitors into the court. With respect to the first, he would not then go into a discussion of it, because their Lordships would have other opportunities of going into that part of the plan, but be might observe that it was not denied, that that change would increase the business in Chancery to the extent of 1–13th or 1–14th. Then, however, if they were to increase the judicial power of the court, as was proposed, they would increase it not by 1–13th or 1–14th, but by something like two-fifths or more, for the bill proposed to appoint two more vice-chancellors. The judicial force then, instead of being, as it ought to be, only two and a half times as great as it was in the time of Lord Hardwicke, would be, on the plan of his noble and learned Friend, at least four and a half or five times greater than it was then. Considering, indeed, all the circumstances, he was disposed to think, that they would be in all increasing the force seventy per cent., at a time when the additional work caused by adding the Equity Exchequer jurisdiction to Chancery would only be about eight or nine per cent.; therefore, there was to be eight or nine times as much increase of power as that increase of business would justify. But then it was said, that there would be another cause of
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increase, in consequence of the diminution of arrears attracting suitors to the court. The increase, however, would be but slight in comparison; instead of being seventy or eighty per cent, on the business, it would not be much more than three or four per cent. The remedy proposed to remove this increase was a quintuple power to that which existed a century ago. Though there was an increase of business, he thought there was nothing to require the addition of two judges. At most he should be inclined to give but one additional judge, and would ask their Lordships not to give more. The reason why he very reluctantly said one, was this—that he knew if they should get into arrear the consequences would be, there would be an additional judge appointed. When he had filled the office, now so much more worthily filled by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, he had resisted the wish of the common law judges in Westminster-hall to increase the number of the judges. He had stated to them that his opinion was, that some extraordinary increase of exertion was preferable to endeavour to diminish the arrear of business, and then to go on. And certainly, if an additional judge at common law had been appointed at that period, there would have been more judges appointed than would have been wanted. There was another part of this measure which opened a subject of very serious consideration, and that was the manner in which it was proposed to deal with the appellate jurisdiction. It had very often been said, "Why don't you have a great board, a great tribunal, to judge these causes, which, instead of sitting occasionally a week now and a week then, would sit regularly? Why had they not a regular court, as they had in other countries, always sitting when there was appeal business to do, so that every one should have free and open access to it to have their judgments reversed? But they must attend to the right constitution of the court on the one hand, as well as to its constant and convenient sittings on the other. If they had a court constantly sitting, it was impossible that the judges of it could belong to other courts; they must be judges of appeal only; but if they were so, they would be comparatively less able to transact the appeal business. He did not mean that it, was necessary that every one of the judges should have seats in other courts; some

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of them might be advantageously always placed in the Court of Appeal, and not sit in the other courts; but some of them should be accustomed to sit in the other courts, otherwise two difficulties would occur, one of which was sufficient to show that it was necessary. Matters of practice hardly ever came to appeal, or very rarely, but they might now and then come before the court, and might be the very points on which the cause turned; but in matters of ordinary practice, that court would have little or no experience. It was, therefore, necessary to have in the Court of Appeal one or two judges who were in the everyday working of the courts, and who saw all the trifling matters that came before them. But there was another consideration more material. The judge who only sat occasionally had not sufficient constant practice to enable him to have a due confidence in his own judgment or the judgment or the opinions of others. Those, therefore, who had considered the question had generally risen with the impression that it would not do altogether in a court of appeal to have judges so constituted and appointed as to have no dealings with the other courts. But if they had a court of appeal consisting of judges who sat in other courts, it followed that the appeal court could not hold permanent sittings, but that it must more or less study the convenience of the other courts from which it drew some of its judges. This was one of the difficulties to be met. He thought that if such an arrangement could be made, and the permanent assistance of the competent authorities be obtained, such a tribunal should be presided over by the head of the law—the great law officer of the Crown—who should preside as the chief judge of that court. He admitted that one additional judge might be required, but no more, to get rid of the arrears, and that assistance would enable the Lord Chancellor to preside over the court of appeal. This led him to say a word on that part of the plan which related to the transfer of the Master of the Rolls from his own court. The following was the state of the causes set down to try in the Rolls' Court since 1833. In 1833 there were 652 cases set down for hearing; in 1834, 462 cases; in 1835, 519; in 1836, 465; in 1837, 370; in 1838, 259; and in 1839, 202 cases. So that it had come down from 500 or 600 cases, to 200 within the last
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five or six years. Could any one doubt that if the Rolls' Court were shut up for sixty days in the year, but that it would put an extinguisher on it, and that instead of 202 cases, there would not be 102 next year, and that parties would only go to get a decision there to bring their causes up for appeal? Instead of being taken away, the judge ought to work double tides, and ought to be more ready and anxious to remain in his court, in order to keep up to the business. When he said, that the business of that court was coming down, he begged not to be misunderstood. There were not, there could not be, any ground, not even the least vestige of a shadow for saying that this was owing to the court itself; but they all knew that at different times there was a fashion with respect to courts in Ireland; for instance, at this moment he understood there was an enormous disproportion of cases taken into the Court of Exchequer, which was overwhelmed with business, while some of the ablest Judges were in the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas with comparatively little to do. At other times, in England, it had been the fashion for suitors to crowd the Court of Queen's Bench, although judges to the full as able as the judges of that court presided in the Common Pleas. The business of the Exchequer was increasing, and had increased. The increase had begun at the time his noble and learned Friend opposite, presided over that court. There was no reason in the world why that court should be a favourite, since just the same legal talent, and the same judgment, could be found in all the other courts. He would now state what, in his opinion, was the proper remedy for this. He did not see why there should be any choice of courts permitted. He could never see any reason why a plaintiff should have the power of choosing his court any more than the defendant. If it were because the plaintiff was the person in possession, it might perhaps be right, but the plaintiff was generally the person out of possession. Now, if the choice was given because he was the person out of possession, it would at least be consistent; but he was not always the person out of possession, and there was nothing less consistent than that the plaintiff should have the choice of courts, and in earlier times such was not the case. The plaintiff in those times had no choice, and all

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suits went to their respective courts, and it was not until fictions were introduced that the plaintiff had the choice of courts. Now, how did this apply to the Master of the Rolls? He would say, that if they removed the Master of the Rolls from his court, they would increase the evil, and the remedy was not to give parties the choice of courts, but to send suits to the Rolls to relieve the Court of Chancery and the Vice-chancellor. He might be told that it would be hard upon the suitor to compel him to go to the Rolls, but what were they about to do? The Master of the Rolls was going to the Privy Council. The suitor had no choice of judges of appeal, and there could be no appeal against his decision, as there was no appeal from the Privy Council. On one other point he wished to address the House. He thought there ought to be an intermediate Court of Appeal for certain purposes. He believed they ought to allow an appeal from the Rolls to the Vice-chancellor or Chancellor. Parties might elect which, but they should not have another appeal from that decision. The bulk of appeals which came to the House of Lords, did not come from the Court of Chancery, but from Scotland and Ireland. His noble and learned Friend would, he hoped, not require further assistance than would, after the arrears was once got rid of, be sufficient to meet the real exigencies of the case, and he should advise their Lordships strictly to restrict the additional supply to those exigencies.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, he would recall his noble and learned Friend's attention to one or two tests which he (the Lord Chancellor) thought his noble and learned Friend would admit were quite conclusive as to the necessity of having a considerable addition to the force of the Chancery judges. He knew that it was almost universally the opinion of the bar, that great additional strength was required; and that it was the opinion of the solicitors who practised in the court, he knew. It was also the opinion of the judges engaged in administering equity. These were the persons, and the only persons, who, being conversant with the present state of business in the Court of Chancery, could state the difficulties which at present existed in obtaining justice in the present state of the arrears of that court. Whatever might be the
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arrears, it was their duty to apply a remedy as soon as they found the evil existed. In order to find out the evil, let them take the book of causes, and take the first forty causes set down for hearing before the Vice-chancellor, and they would find, that in all those causes, after they had been completed, and after all the evidence had been examined, three years must elapse before a suitor had any chance of obtaining a hearing. And then very few causes were disposed of without a report, and the suitor had in that case to wait three years more. He waited three years for the original decree, and three years more for further directions. It had not been suggested by any body that a want of exertion on the part of the judges had caused the present arrear, and he knew that if it were so suggested, it would be without the slightest foundation, for he believed that in every branch of the courts there was every exertion for doing that which the public of right demanded—namely, justice, and justice failed only because there was not the power to do it. His learned Friend had alluded to a period which showed great peculiarity in the administration of justice—he meant the period when a very celebrated man, afterwards Master of the Rolls, was made Vice-chancellor—Sir John Leach. More work had been got through by him, than ever before by any individual, and, considering the vast quantity of business he did, it was well done. But he would ask his learned Friend, whether there was not great danger of failure in justice, when the judge had only in view the rapidity with which he could get through his causes? He might get through a great quantity of business, but that was not the only question: the most important was, how was the business done? He did not think that Sir John Leach's example was one which it would be wise or safe for any other judge to attempt to follow. His noble and learned Friend had referred to a period which had always excited the astonishment of every one who had looked into these matters—namely, how it happened that so large a number of bills were filed in the time of Lord Hardwicke, compared with the business before him. The reason was this—if a party came into court he was sure to have his business done, and was not told he must wait six years for justice. But if they wanted to ascertain what was the business of the

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judge, they must look at the hearings; it was these which occupied the time of the court. But there were not one-third of the number of hearings in the time of Lord Hardwicke that there were at present. In the five years ending 1764 there were 283 hearings, and in the same period ending in 1839, the number of the hearings was 1,248. There was not, therefore, one-third of the quantity of business in the time of Lord Hardwicke. But it was not necessary to go back to the time of Lord Hardwicke; the time of 1812, when the Vice-chancellor's Court was established, was a much safer period to go back to, and the business was now double what it was in 1812. During the five years following 1812 the hearings amounted to 562, and in the five years ending 1839 they amounted to 1,248. But it was not merely the quantity of business to be done at a particular period that they were to look at; they must look to the country to see what business was to be done which was not entered for want of opportunity. The average number of causes set down for hearing during the three years before the Vice-chancellor was appointed was 540, and during the three years afterwards it was 714. What had happened in the course of these six years to make the great change? It was not anything in the history of the country; but before the Vice-chancellor was appointed, the suitor knew that he had no chance of being heard, and afterwards, instead of abandoning his rights, or compromising them, he came into court. The number of bills filed after the appointment of the Vice-chancellor proved the same thing. When they inquired what additional strength the Court of Chancery might want, they had, in these returns, something from which to form a conclusion. They had to provide, not only to get rid of the arrear, but also for what they knew would happen, to get rid of the number of suitors who would come. There was another point to which he wished to call attention, from which it might be seen how unsafe it was to refer to figures. He knew that in the Court of Chancery, the longer a list of causes remained unheard, the more impracticable it became when it came to be heard; and the reason was, that it was not every cause that had a chance of being taken, but short causes were picked out. The result was an arrear, not of common causes, but of causes which had been postponed from
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term to term, and from year to year, in consequence of their length. It would, therefore, require a long time, and great judicial strength, fairly to grapple with the evil. His noble and learned Friend had referred to some of the details of the bill, which he thought would be better discussed in Committee; but there was one to which he could not help adverting for a few moments—he meant the attendance of the Master of the Rolls, as president of the Privy Council. In order that the extremely important business of that court might be satisfactorily conducted, fifty days, or one quarter of what was called the judicial year, must be devoted by the person who should be appointed to preside. It was natural, in looking to the profession for the purpose of finding a judge who could attend to this duty, to select the Master of the Rolls, who had for fifty years before the Judicial Committee was instituted presided over the Privy Council. No doubt the Court of Chancery would lose his services to that extent, and no one lamented this more than he (the Lord Chancellor) did; but, as there would be a power under this bill of distributing the Chancery business, no inconvenience would arise to the suitors from the partial attendance of the Master of the Rolls at the Privy Council. So much could not be said if any of the other superior judges had been selected; their places could not well be supplied. The business of their courts would be at a stand-still during their absence. For these reasons he was prepared to justify that part of the bill. There were other details to which his noble and learned Friend had alluded, but he should reserve what he had to say in reply till the bill went into Committee.
Lord Lyndhurstsaid, their Lordships had attended to the statements and details which had been entered into upon this occasion, in a manner which the importance of the subject demanded; and he was quite satisfied they could only come to one conclusion—that it was impossible to arrive at any safe and satisfactory decision with respect to this bill, except by referring the consideration of it to a committee upstairs. He was clearly of opinion, that at least one additional judge was necessary for the Court of Chancery. It was quite impossible to get rid of the arrears existing in that court, without consenting that one judge should be added to its present strength. The only doubt that existed in

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his mind was, whether one additional judge would be sufficient for that purpose. That was matter of detail for minute, particular inquiry; and, with a view to that investigation, he proposed that the bill itself should be referred to a committee up stairs. He felt it was unnecessary to enter into the details at present, as they would be fully and more properly investigated in the select committee, to which he now moved that the bill be referred.
The Lord Chancellorfelt perfectly satisfied as to all the details of the bill; but, believing this motion to originate in a bonâ fide intention to serve it, by enabling other noble Lords fairly and fully to investigate the subject, and having no doubt as to the conclusion to which they must come, he should at once acquiesce in the motion.
Lord Broughamhad no objection to that course. In explanation, however, he must be permitted to say, that his noble and learned Friend had somewhat mistaken his argument. He admitted that there was a very heavy arrear in the Court of Chancery, but he contended that that being only of a temporary nature, the appointment of one additional judge would be abundantly sufficient to master it within a reasonable time.
Lord Ellenboroughentirely agreed in the propriety of sending this bill to a committee up stairs; he hoped, however, no one in that House would misunderstand, and none out of doors misrepresent, the object of his noble and learned Friend. He was quite sure his noble and learned Friend would go into the committee with the sincerest desire to abate this long-continued grievance, which he had himself brought under their Lordships' consideration in former years. His noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Brougham) thought one additional Vice-chancellor would be sufficient to get rid of the arrears. But even if the smallest case could be made out for the appointment of a second, it would be the duty of the committee to recommend it.
Lord Lyndhurstsaid, unless he were satisfied with the clearness of demonstration almost that one would be sufficient, he should certainly vote for a scond additional judge.
Lord Abingeralso concurred in the propriety of referring the consideration of this bill to a committee up stairs. The evil
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was admitted on all hands, but the extent of the remedy would be most fittingly discussed in that committee. He sincerely hoped the result would be found satisfactory and beneficial.
Lord Denmanthought their Lordships were perfectly competent, after all the inquiries which had taken place upon this subject, at once to form an opinion as to the best remedy for an universally admitted evil, without sending this bill to a committee up stairs. At all events, he hoped the committee would proceed with its inquiries forthwith, and report as speedily as possible. He had come with great, reluctance to a full conviction that it was necessary to increase the judicial strength of the Court of Chancery, and the sooner that remedy was applied the better. A state of transition in courts of justice was one of the worst for the suitors that could possibly exist.
Bill referred to a select committee.