HL Deb 06 February 1840 vol 51 cc1279-310
Lord Colchester

rose to call the attention of the House to a subject which he had brought before their Lordships in the course of the last Session. He had, at that time, endeavoured to call the attention of their Lordships and of the country to the undefended state of our own shores, and he believed it would be found on inquiry that very little change had since taken place. 'It was, therefore, his intention to move for certain documents principally in continuation of those given last Session to show the present state of our naval defence. In making this motion, he might lay himself open to the imputation which had fallen upon others, that he was actuated by party motives; either that, for the sake of attacking Ministers, he was describing a weakness in our naval force that did not exist, or which, if it did exist, he was unwisely exposing to foreign nations. To the first objection, which was only personal, it would not become him to make any reply. To the second, which had reference to our naval weakness, he would only say, that it was already too well known to foreign powers, and too little known to ourselves. He was, therefore, anxious that such measures should be taken as would effectually remedy the existing defects in our naval system, and prevent the country from feeling the evil consequences that were likely to arise from long neglect of the naval department. The first return he should move for was an account of the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of 1839. He was, aware that 35,000 men, the number voted, was as great a number as had been voted since the peace. But that was no sufficient answer0; because the state of our relations with other nations, their state of preparation, and the state of our commerce, rendered it necessary to have a larger naval force afloat at one time than at another. The second return he should move for would be a statement of the distribution of that force on the different naval stations abroad. And the third return would be a statement of our forces on the home station, showing the number of officers, seamen, and marines composing the complements of those ships, and also of the numbers actually borne on their books, on the 1st of December, 1839. Now, this was a question which appeared to him of very great importance. What did our force consist of? Only three guardships of from 110 to 120 guns, manned with one-third of their complement, and with officers for a fifth or sixth rate, and, therefore, not in a state for efficient service. Upon the home station there was one frigate of 36 guns with some small schooners and cutters. That was the whole force at home, excepting ships recently put in commission for foreign stations, or that were about to be paid off, which we had for our own protection, or for sending to any other part of the world that might need it. To judge how far that force was sufficient, their Lordships should look to what the other great powers in Europe had in readiness. The other two great naval powers of Europe at present were Russia and France; and their Lordships would see how badly we could bear a contrast with those powers. Russia has in the Baltic 28 sailof the line, 18 frigates, 39 smaller vessels carrying 3,672 guns, and 30,087 men. She had in the Black Sea 13 sail of the line, 11 frigates, 17 smaller vessels carrying 1,956 guns, and 14,300 men. It had been said that many of the ships of Russia were old, and that the soldiers were senton board for a few weeks,during the summer only; but if he was not mistaken, an officer in the confidence of her Majesty's Government, who had seen that fleet, and made a report on it to the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty, was of a different opinion. So much for the state of the naval force of Russia. From the official budget for 1840 presented to the King of France on the 1st of January, 1839, for the peace establishment, it appeared that there had been wanted for the service of this year 34,000 men, being within 1,000 of the number voted for this country, notwithstanding our extensive colonial possessions and great trade with every quarter of the globe; while the colonies of France were comparatively few and insignificant. Of this number, there were for the service afloat above 23,000 men. The following was the distribution of those 34,000 men. There were 8 sail of the line, 12 frigates, 20 steamers, 90 other vessels—making 130 sail, carrying 20,498 men; 8 vessels "en disponsibilité," carrying 1,225, and 16 "en commission de rade" carrying 120. According to the report of the Minister of Marine there were for the service "àterre," equipages de ligne, 4,323; artillerie de la Marine, 1,402; regiment d'InfanterÍe 5,119; and for the service "à Mer" there were etats majors and equipages des bailments arms 22,420, officiers militaires (not included above) say 753, making altogether a force of 34,017 men. It should likewise be borne in mind, that the ships of France were of a more powerful description than ours. They had 40 sail of the line kept ready for their peace service, one-half of which the noble Lord opposite was aware were in the water, and the other half in the slips, ready, or nearly ready, for launching, as the French preferred that to the ordinary mode of disposing them. Of these there were 10 of 120 guns, 10 of 100, 15 of 90, and 5 of 80. Now let them see the comparative state of the resources of France and England for the defence of their own shores, in case of any sudden attack, or upon foreign stations in case of any unexpected emergency. He had stated, that we had only three guardships at home. Well, we had two sail of the line at Lisbon, which he supposed the noble Lord opposite would consider part of the home force. The noble Lord was of opinion that it was preferable to have ships in the Mediterranean to lying idle in the ports of England. Now, instead of admitting that, it appeared to him that even Lisbon ships, which were so much nearer than the Mediterranean, could not be regarded in that light. In the first place, the Hastings had been stationary at Lisbon for no less a period than 1,230 days, being nearly three years and a half, without lifting her anchor, and the present flag-ship, the Donegal, was imitating her example. So much for lying idle in ports. Then with respect to ships at Lisbon being ready for any service for which they might be required, he must beg their Lordships' attention to a circumstance which occurred two years ago. It would be within their Lordships' recollection that in the month of December, 1837, the news arrived of an insurrection in Canada, which rendered it most important, that troops should he sent out without delay. Unless he was greatly misinformed, there was not, when that news arrived, one disposeable ship in the English ports, with the exception of the Inconstant, a ship of 36 guns, which sailed for Canada on the 7th of January. It was, therefore, necessary to call ships from various foreign ports. The Pique, 36 guns, was recalled from the coast of Spain, and sailed from Cork on the 23rd of January, by which there was a loss in point of time of one fortnight. The Hercules, of 74 guns, was recalled from Lisbon, and sailed from Cork on the 27th of February, whereas, had she been in an English port, she might have sailed on the 7th of January, showing a loss of six weeks. She was followed by the Vestal which did not sail until the 3rd of March. So that he could not think that ships lying at Lisbon could be considered as ready for general service as if they were lying in English ports. While on the subject of disposable ships, he might mention that the squadron which was now said to be fitting out for active service in China, consisted of four ships—the Blenheim (72 guns), which was recalled from Lisbon, and arrived the 11th of December, the Blonde (42 guns), which was commissioned November the sixth, the Pique which was the only efficient ship, but which was not ready till November, having been sent to Canada, and the Andromache (26 guns), which had been recalled from North America, and arrived on the 14th of December, Now, in observing these dates and facts let their Lordships remember that the answer of the Government to the memorial of the merchants, upon the subject of the seizure of opium at Canton was dated about the middle of November, when it was to be supposed, the fact of the seizure having been known to them, as a noble Lord just observed to him, in the month of August, that they had made up their minds as to the course they would pursue. It appeared, however, that at that period, there was only one efficient ship at their command. He would now call their Lordships' attention to the advantages which other nations possessed in the manner of increasing their forces. In Russia, men were kept constantly ready, and in a state of discipline. In France, they had their seamen registered, and could at all times increase their force; while we generally took some months to beat up for voluntary seamen. We found a difficulty, too, in getting officers to serve, especially mates. They had no established rank in the service, and when thrown on shore had no half pay. That was not a very enviable position for young men to be placed in. By a return which was made by order of the House of Commons on the 3rd of last May, it appeared that of 310 mates in her Majesty's navy who had passed their examination previous to the year 1836, 7 had served 18 years, 15 had served 17 years, 25 had served 14 years, none had served for a less period than 10 years; and yet of those 310 mates, 288 were still looking forward for those posts for which they were so well qualified, but 22 of them having been promoted. These were facts which he trusted would meet with consideration from the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty. There was another point to which he could not avoid adverting, and in reference to which many plans had been, at different times, suggested by officers more competent than he was—he meant that of giving encouragement to the men. In his opinion, no means could be more effectually adopted for that purpose, than in the first place, the continuing pensions granted for long service, to those who re-entered on board her Majesty's ships, instead of, as at present, depriving them of their well-earned reward so long as they were serving their Sovereign. Many on this account preferred serving in merchant-vessels, and even in vessels of foreign countries, the evil effect of which was evident, as her Majesty's navy, thereby often lost efficientand valuable men, capable of teachingthe younger men their duty, and consequently facilitating the service. In the next place, he would restore the pensions to the widows of warrant officers, and permit the petty officers of ships paid off, to be borne on the flag-ships at the different ports (as authorized by his late Majesty when Lord High Admiral), till they could find sea-going ships. He was sure the noble Lord would agree with him, that it was highly desirable to hold out some encouragement of the kind. Another evil which had arisen from our having so small a squadron at home, was, that no squadron had of late years assembled to practise evolutions. However well manned might be our ships, if they were not accustomed to exercise together, they would not be able to perform their evolutions with that degree of dexterity and skill which was so essential in engagements with the enemy. Since the year 1831, we had had no squadron practising evolutions; so that the greater part of the younger captains in the service, he meant those who commanded frigates, had never seen any. It had been said, that though we had no ships, we had steam-vessels; that steam-vessels had become so numerous that we had nothing to do upon any occasion or emergency but to hire them from merchants, of whom we should find very many in the city willing to enter into such engagements. It was certainly true, that the number of merchant steam-vessels was greatly increasing and that of that number there were some which were fit for the service of the navy; but in the valuable report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into steam-boat accidents, he found two opinions, to which he begged their Lordships' attention. Speaking of the quality of present steamers, Messrs. Curling and Young observe:— In some vessels, materials of inferior description and perishable quality are employed; in others, the connection of the parts is ineffective, the fastening injudicious or scanty, or the workmanship negligent. Mr. Gibson says:— The steam-packet owner looks only to the splendour of the saloon and the velocity of the vessel. It is upon these alone, that he depends for success; the safety of the passengers is altogether lost sight of; to insure speed the fabric of the vessel is made as light and flimsy as possible to hold together. It should also be remembered, that many of our ships were getting old and defective and that many might be disabled in action or through accident. It was, therefore, highly necessary that a proper supply should be kept up. He should, therefore, move also for a return of the names of all ships launched since January the 1st, 1835. If he was not much mistaken, the returns for which he moved would show beyond a doubt, that our home station was deplorably deficient in case of any sudden attack and that we have no adequate reserve to supply reinforcements which might be required suddenly in any of our distant stations when their Lordships took into account the chances of war, and the contingencies of hurricanes and weather. Besides, our squadrons could not be increased so rapidly as those of France or Russia—another reason why we should not leave our shores open to attack, and our trade unprotected. He hoped, therefore, that endeavours would be made on the part of this great empire to regain that supremacy of the sea which we had so long and so gloriously enjoyed, which, he was sure, if proper means were taken we had the power to regain, and which, if once regained, he hoped we should ever after be able to preserve. The noble Lord concluded by moving for the returns specified.

The Earlof Minto

thought that the greater part of the observations which had been made by the noble Lord had better have been reserved until the returns for which the noble Lord moved had been made to their Lordships, and it would then be seen whether the navy was or was not in the state which the noble Lord had represented. He would most readily acquit the noble Lord of being influenced by anything like a factious motive in making the present motion, but at the same time he must say, it appeared rather strange that some such motion had not been made during the whole time of those reformations which had almost reduced it to the lowest ebb. When the pressure of economical measures was so great as to induce the Government to withhold the necessary supplies for maintaining that sort of establishment, upon which the efficiency of our navy mainly depended— when those popular reformations were taking place, and those large reductions were made, there had not been heard one word in reprobation of the measures. It was only since a larger demand had been made upon the country—when stores were amply supplied, when ships were thoroughly repaired, and when the fleet had been nearly doubled—it was only then that those returns were moved for, only then that complaints were made of the danger with which the country was threatened from the inefficiency of the navy. Through many of the ob- servations which had been made by the noble Lord, he. did not intend to follow the noble Lord; first, because he did not deem it necessary; and next, he was not prepared, even should it be deemed desirable, to detain their Lordships. There were but one or two points of the noble Lord's speech to which he should address himself. The main ground of complaint which had been put forward by the noble Lord, was, that our fleet was not sufficiently strong. He was ready to admit, that the question was not so much whether we had more or less ships, but whether we had enough. He would also admit, that we had not ships enough in commission to cope with the whole Russian fleet, if that fleet were also in commission, and prepared to take the seas against us; but he would at the same time say, that it was not necessary to be in such a situation at the present moment. It was not necessary at a time of profound peace, when from our political relations with that and other states it was not only highly improbable, but there was not even the slightest danger of hostilities. Under such circumstances, he could not at all see why we should make preparations to obviate evils which were merely imaginary. The noble Lord had told them that France had at present a large fleet. Undoubtedly she had, and it was probable that in the course of the summer, she would have a considerable force at sea; but what was there to lead to the supposition that she would employ that fleet against this country? The noble Lord said, that our shores were in danger, because we had no line of battleships in the Downs, or at Spithead; but, what country was there in the world, which would maintain a naval force equal to the protection of its whole coast in a time of profound peace? Rather than this, it would be better to go to war at once with every naval power, and take the chance of the issue. The noble Lord said, we had but three ships for our protection. Now, what was the fact? There were 21, or 20 sail of the line in commission, and he would ask their Lordships was not that a respectable force? The noble Lord alluded to our having a considerable force in the Mediterranean. This only showed that we had a large disposable force at hand, which when necessary we made use of, and the sending them on detached service was a proof that it was well to have them in reserve, so as to avoid the expense of putting ten or twelve more in commission. At this very moment, there were four sail of the line at home, there were two at Lisbon, and two others were on their return from the Mediterranean. During part of the last month, there were five sail-of-the-line on the home station, but of course the number varied at various times. The noble Lord had stated nothing to show that the relation in which we stood towards foreign powers would render it either desirable or necessary to have a large naval force in commission. The noble Lord said, that when a naval force was called for in Canada, we were not prepared to answer the call. There was a delay, he said, in sending ships to America. Now, the noble Lord must see with different eyes from others, for so readily had the call been answered, that the gallant officers in Canada expressed both their satisfaction and surprise at the expedition with which the call had been responded to. In a very short period, six line-of-battle ships had been sent to the colony. At present we have 22 sail-of-the-line, and 12 in the Mediterranean. Should circumstances arise, which would render the equipment of a larger naval force necessary, he should not shrink from the necessity of coming to Parliament and asking for the means necessary for such an equipment. Whilst the noble Lord talked of the want of new ships and the decay of the old ones, he contended that they had at the present moment 40 sail-of-the-line, which could in a very short time be called into activity. The noble Lord had alluded to the comparative weakness of our naval force as contrasted with those of France and Russia. That might be very true in part, and as related to an old fleet. The newest were always, of course, the stronger in. proportion; but it was not true that we had not large ships capable of coping with those of other countries. With respect to the fleet in the Mediterranean, it should be remembered that it was stationed there for a particular purpose, for which purpose it was found to answer sufficiently. It was sent out for the purpose of acting in alliance with the French fleet. If it were sent out with a hostile motive to act against France, it of course, would be unwise to select weak vessels, and in that case the noble Lord's observations respecting it would have been well founded. Still, however, the force in the Mediterranean was a respectable one, being composed of three-deckers and large second rates, with the full peace complements. The noble Lord said, that the Andromache had been recalled from North America for the purpose of being despatched to China. This was not the case, as the Andromache had not been sent for. The noble Lord had also alluded to the manner in which she was manned. Now, he would inform their Lordships, that the manning was fully up to the highest peace complement, and far beyond that of any vessel in which the noble Lord had served since he held the commission. The complement of men was larger than was ever before known in time of peace. In some cases the complement was nearly as large as in time of war; in others it was quite so; and in others again, it was even beyond the war complement. Yet in the budget of charges which the noble Lord had opened up upon the Government, he had laid particular stress upon this point. With regard to what had fallen from the noble Lord respecting themates and men, he wouldmerely state that the subject was under the consideration of a committee, over which the noble Duke (Wellington) opposite presided, and it would, therefore, not become him to utter a word upon that subject. He would only say, upon this point, that the condition of the petty and warrant officers was far better at present than it ever had been before, under any other Government, inasmuch as an increase had been made to their pay, and they enjoyed several other advantages. He did not remember any other topics in the speech of the noble Lord which called for a reply, and he would therefore only say, that the Government would not be found wanting in all that was necessary for maintaining our naval establishment upon a proper footing. All that was necessary to its efficiency should be closely looked after. They would see that the existing ships were kept in a state of perfect repair; that those which were old and unfit for service should be replaced by others of a larger size, and superior construction; but, above all, care would be taken to turn to the best account the advantages which the great increase of power in steam-vessels afforded, and there would be no hesitation on the part of Ministers in proposing whatever was necessary and practicable for the efficiency of the navy, without resorting to those showy modes which were sometimes adopted for the purpose of captivating applause. He had no objection to make the returns which had been moved for by the noble Lord, though he did not entirely like the character of some of them. There was one of the returns, however, to which he objected, and he thought their Lordships ought to pause before they granted it. He meant that one which called for a return of all the ships which were being built within the same period, with the state of forwardness in which they were at present. He did not think it was right to call for an official return of what was done, of what was doing, and of what was in progress. If the noble Lord wished to press for that return, he (Lord Minto) would not resist it, but he would take leave to suggest to the noble Lord, that it had better be omitted.

The Earl of Hardwicke

could not agree with the noble Lord who had just sat down, that we were at present in a state of profound peace, that there were no signs of approaching war, no symptoms calculated to create alarm, and that our position was so perfectly secure as to leave us nothing to think of but the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of our own firesides, that there was nothing to call our attention to the state of our dependencies abroad, or to the defence of our country at home. How could the noble Lord talk of 40 sail-of- the-line at a moment's readiness, when there was a fleet in the Mediterranean and another proceeding to China? What could the noble Earl have been thinking of when he asked why no complaint had been made before? Why, the reason was obvious. There had been no complaint because all was in a state of peace. War was not talked of, or even hinted at, and not only was there peace, but there was satisfaction also, and not the remotest supposition of a war existed in the mind of any man. Could this be said now? Were not our American colonies in a most unsettled state? If noble Lords followed through the whole line of the American coast, they would find a French squadron carrying on a sort of buccaneering expedition. Last year it was exhibited at San Juan d'Ulloa, and this year at Monte Video. Then again, passing on to India, could it be said that we were in a state of peace? Look then to China, where it was found necessary to send out a squadron, which, if our naval resources were such as the noble Lord would have the House think, ought by this time to be half way on its mission. Was there no war in India? For what, then, was the vote of thanks passed on Monday night, to the army which had so signalized itself there? Was that peace, he begged to ask? Had not the House and the country a right to put these questions to the noble Earl opposite? The noble Earl had then proceeded to state that he had not a fleet sufficient to meet the Russians. Had the noble Earl a fleet sufficient to meet the French? Let the House observe what really was the state of the fleets of the two countries, France and England, in the Mediterranean. He would give the noble Earl opposite a considerable advantage in the discussion of this part of the question, for instead of only twelve sail of the line, which die noble Earl claimed as being now in the Mediterranean, he would concede to the noble Earl that there were fourteen sail of the line. Against that amount of British naval force he would put the French naval force at present in the Mediterranean, which, from the report of Admiral Rosamel, it appeared was twelve sail of the line. He said in his report that he had nowhere less than twelve sail of the line; that in 1839, he was to have eight sail of the line; and that he had twelve sail of the line on the 1st of January, 1840, in the Mediterranean. The noble Earl said they were not equipped. Why, they were either in the port of Toulon, at anchor in the Levant, or they were engaged in the conveyance of French troops to Algiers. Now, what was the state of the two fleets in respect of ships' complements. The complement of the twelve sail of the line of French vessels was, according to the report of Admiral Rosamel, 8,222 men; the complement of the fourteen English sail of the line, giving them, as for the sake of argument he would, a full war complement, amounted to 8,710 men. There was an advantage, he admitted, in this respect to England. The number of guns also was in favour of England by 224; but presently he should call attention to a comparison of the weight of metal in the two fleets. But speaking of the complements, when he turned to the frigates, he found that the balance of each fleet was thrown all the other way. The complement of eighteen French frigates scattered all over the world was 7,884 men, while the complement of twenty-four English frigates scattered all over the world was only 5,045 men, giving a balance in favour of the French of 2,839 men, which balance would be sufficient to man the remainder of the line-of-battle ships which the noble Earl said he had. With regard to the calibre of the ships, the noble Earl did not dispute that out of the twelve line-of-battle ships there were one of 120 guns, one of 100 guns, two of 90 guns, three of 80 guns, and five of 72 guns; that of the eighteen frigates, there were four of 60 guns, seven of 50 guns, and seven of 40 guns, besides twelve corvettes and 35 smaller vessels. Now the English 'ships, with the exception of a very few, were chiefly of 74 guns, or as they were; now called 72 guns, with one of 104 guns; one of 92 guns, and three of 80 guns. So; much, then, for the comparative force of the French and English fleets. He would venture to say, that in ability to manœuvre, the English were exceedingly superior in every way, yet at the same time there was that disparity of force which rendered it excessively necessary (and it was not extraordinary that such should be the case) that British officers should look with anxiety to the duties and services they might be called upon to perform. The noble Earl had stated, that he had quite a sufficient force in other parts of the world, and that on the home stations he possessed six disposable frigates. He apprehended that those six ships included the flag-ships at home, and he could not think the noble Earl serious when, with their present complements, he could include them in his disposable force at home. [The Earl of Minto: They could be manned immediately.] He could scarcely think so; but, admitting it for the sake of argument, the noble Earl had then three line-of-battle ships in port at home that he could man immediately. Why then, if the noble Earl had these three disposable ships, had the noble Earl sent out to different parts of the world to recall ships home in order to send them out elsewhere to carry on his operations? Why, when the British flag had been insulted {for so he must call it, though an apology had been made) last year at San Juan D'Ulloa, had the noble Earl sent out to the American station to Sir Charles Paget to come to that coast with the squadron under his command? Why, instead of taking that course, had mot the noble Earl sent out at once and without delay the three ships which he stated he had in reserve at home? If the noble Earl had three sail of the line fit for use at home, why did he not at once send them out to China, instead of calling the Blenheim to refit at home, where she had been since December last? In short, why i was it that the noble Earl had not availed: himself of his disposable reserve at home to: settle those points of difference which had arisen in different foreign countries? Why, because they were not fit for the service. Out of the six sail of the line of which the noble Earl had spoken, two were at Lisbon still, and yet he included them in his reserves at home. Last year, a treaty had been concluded between France and this country, by which it was agreed to draw a line of demarcation of the ground each country was to use in fishing. Had that treaty been of any use or benefit to the English fishermen—had they been protected by any ship of war? No; if the noble Earl would ask the fishermen of Dover, or of Brighton, he would find, that as there was no ship to protect the British boats, the treaty had been a dead letter altogether. Of what use, then, were the reserves of which the noble Earl had spoken? The truth was, the reserves were three ships of the line, officered according to fifth or sixth rates, with three lieutenants instead of eight or nine, and just a sufficient complement of men to wash the decks and keep the ships clean. Beyond that they were worth nothing. If his representations were true, he begged to ask the noble Earl opposite what he would do in case of emergency? The noble Earl had said he could send 40 sail of the line to sea directly. Recent events, had, however, shown that a line of battle ship could not be manned without the greatest difficulty. A ship of the line now lay three months in port, and was seldom manned in that time. [The Earl of Minto: The Benbow was manned in two months.] The case of the Benbow furnished a remarkable instance, but even her crew had not been completed without sending for men to all the ports of the country, and he knew well that it was impossible, without difficulty, now to man a ship except by draughting from other ships in harbour. In short, though France had a reserve, though Russia had a reserve, still he maintained the noble Earl opposite was not prepared with a reserve. The truth was, that the officers of the British service who felt that they would have the responsibility of answering to their country for the performance of the duties they might be called upon to execute, were sensible that if sent to sea against a force trained and drilled such as that of France, they were not competent to meet them in a manner that would be satisfactory to this nation. That formed one of the reasons why the subject was pressed upon the attention of the noble Earl and of her Majesty's Government. He begged to ask whether now, after twenty-four years of peace, there was in the country that degree of experience amongst the officers of the profession who were fit for active service, that experience which would warrant their being sent to sea in command in the same way as were the French officers who were kept in constant practice? The French had no more officers than they actually wanted for the use of their ships and dock-yards: they were, therefore, constantly in employment, and were never without their uniforms on their backs. Admiral de Rigny, while captain of the Syren, had told him that he had been afloat 16 years. Now, were the young officers of this country—men of his own standing in the profession—competent to meet such men as these? Though there might be great zeal for, and attachment to, the service—though there might be deep loyalty and affection towards the country on the part of British naval officers, was there that affection and attachment towards the Government which would of itself induce them, if called upon, to serve? Did the noble Earl think he had done justice to the officers of the naval profession—had he bestowed the patronage of the profession in a manner which became him as First Lord of the Admiralty? Had this been done in such a manner as to induce the officers of the navy to serve the Ministers as they would the Crown? There was one home which had heretofore always been left for an old and meritorious officer, where in his old age he might repose on his honours, and be regarded as a man who righteously had deserved that place. In what manner had that home been recently disposed of? He would take that piece of patronage as a type of the general way in which the noble Earl opposite had acted—he would take it as a sample of the sort of feeling which the noble Earl had shown towards the service. The noble Earl had given that appointment to one who had not fought the battles of his country against the enemies of that country, but who had fought side by side with the noble Earl at an election contest. Would that course of proceeding satisfy either the service or the country? Though the noble Earl had said he could send forty nail of the line to sea immediately, would that force go forth officered by men who not only loved their country, but who also had affection for those Ministers with whom they had to deal? If such were the case, then this discussion was useless, and the noble Earl opposite had a triumphant answer to the case put by his noble Friend who originated the discussion. Then, if the noble Earl had not a sufficient force at home—if he had not sufficient force in other parts of the world—if he had not seamen to man the forty sail of the line, putting officers out of the question, he asked him in what position did he stand, and what course he had to pursue? He believed that the cause of this state of things was not wholly attributable to the noble Earl—he did not believe but that the noble Earl was desirous to do his best—he did not believe that the noble Earl objected to have the appointments and patronage of a large fleet, but the cause of this state of things was that the successive reforming Governments which had taken the country in hand, had commenced a most niggardly system of finance, which had so cut the naval profession down, that the noble Earl had been obliged to ask in supplies for 4,428,0002., and had expended upwards of 5,000,000l., being an excess of 969,776l. over the naval expenditure of the empire when the noble Duke behind him (Wellington) left office. Since the effects of niggardly economy had been seen, the Government had attempted to whip up, and place the navy on a better footing. The noble Earl had said he would not flinch from asking additional supplies if he found them necessary; but he complained that the service should have been let down so low as to make it necessary to whip up in order to make a decent show to the French, who, while British ships had been rotting in harbour, had increased their force and was ready to say to this nation, "Now we can deal with you." He believed he had now answered all the points raised by the speech of the noble Lord opposite. There still remained another point to which he desired to refer. It had no reference to the active force of the country, but it was a subject upon which he spoke with great respect and diffidence—he alluded to the state of the young officers of the profession. The noble Earl had spoken of his forty sail of the line being ready for sea, but where would he find his midshipmen, for there were now no young men coming forward to the profession? Had the noble Earl tried to improve this state of things? The object of parents sending their sons into the profession, would be first to see they had a proper education, and yet the first thing the noble Earl had done, was to knock up the only means provided in this country for the education of young men for the naval service. The noble Earl, after putting down the only naval seminary, had erected a new plan for the education of youth intended for the naval profession. He told the noble Earl last year, and after two years' trial of his plan, that it had not succeeded. There were now but twenty-three instructors in the fleet, and though the noble Earl had said he intended to have one highly educated instructor of good character and of great mathematical attainments on board each ship, yet after three years' endeavour to induce men of that description to enter the service for this purpose, he had now only twenty-three instructors in ships which had ninety midshipmen on board. But what had become of the education of the rest of the youth? "Oh !" said the noble Earl, "I will provide for them ashore in the old building which constituted the former seminary, and there, with new instructors, I will receive thirty young men who have served their time afloat and passed their examinations, and there I will finish them as at an university." The noble Earl had now got there just twelve pupils instead of thirty, and these, he begged to remark, had been taken from service afloat at that period, of all others, when they should be kept at sea—the period at which, having passed their examination, they ought to be practised in quarter-deck duty, and occasionally have charge of the ship. On all these grounds he maintained, that the education scheme of the noble Earl had been a failure. The East India Company still retained their college at Sandhurst, and why should not this nation have kept up its naval college as it was, and have provided that in every ship there should be an instructor in the shape of a lieutenant, who had sense enough to induce the youths on board to continue the exercise of those attainments which they had acquired at that college? If that had been done, the parents of the country would have been satisfied with the means of education provided for their children, and the navy of Great Britain would not be so deficient of rising young men ready for the service as she was at present. He had now done. He did not think it necessary to trouble their Lordships with any further observations on this subject: he would only say, that while the noble Earl was thinking of the various political affairs which occupied the Cabinet at home—while they were considering Irish and other internal questions—the noble Earl ought to remind his colleagues, that the liberties of this empire were nothing, unless its means of naval defence were kept in a proper condition.

Lord Colville

said, that holding the high rank which he had the honour to hold in the profession, he could not avoid offering a few observations to their Lordships. If he consulted his own inclinations, he should not, at that late hour, trouble the House. But, as it seemed to him, France had awoke from her slumbers like a giant refreshed, and had held out her arm towards this country with something like a threat. Now, so far from being in a state I of profound peace, we were in such a state, that the French Minister of Marine had prepared the country in a very short time for entering on service, for he observed, that in the expenses stated to be wanted in the current year, the Minister had alluded to the necessity of the navy being in a state to meet one of three things—a state of war, a stale of peace, and another to meet the exigencies which might arise and had arisen. An announcement had been made from the throne extremely agreeable to hear—that our relations with foreign countries remained undisturbed. He did not know how far their Lordships could feel that to be the case: he left them to decide. But they all knew the uncertainty of human life, and if, unfortunately, the King of the French should die, how long was it possible to say, that we should be at peace with France? He did not treat this as a party question at all; but it was clear where the shoe pinched. The Government had not exerted themselves sufficiently, or aroused themselves from that apathy in which they had been long plunged in regard to the state of naval affairs. How was our commerce to be carried on, if, in the case of a war breaking out, we did not maintain that determined and decided superiority at sea which, in the late war, we had the good fortune to possess? There was a time when, in consequence of the great and glorious victories obtained under a Wellington and a Nelson, followed up by the victories of those who fought under their banners, that our commerce was carried into every corner of the world. Could that be expected to be the case now, if we did not start at the commencement of a war with a superiority at sea? The great difficulty, he thought, existed in the state of our finances. He thought that it was high time that something should be done. When he saw the sum which it would require to put our navy on that respectable footing in which it ought to be, and reflected that a much larger sum had been sacrificed to the silly and ridiculous project of a penny postage, he could not but express his regret. The state, too, of a very important branch of our commerce with China, involving a revenue of about three millions and a half, was such as to prevent our making those advances in support of the navy and those exertions which were necessary. He was one who deprecated the opening of the trade with China, and who was of opinion that that trade could never be carried on properly except through the medium of a body such as the East-India Company. He feared that it would require a considerable force to settle that trade, and he, for one, regretted the loss of time which had occurred in carrying out that purpose, in having to send for ships of war from Lisbon for that service. He did not think that the exertions had been made which ought to have been made, considering the present state of affairs; at the same time, the establishment of our navy was not in the state it ought to be. Many men were allowed to be scattered about the world when ships were paid off, because there were no other ships to receive them. It was very easy to talk of forty sail of the line, but where were the men or the officers to come from? He would not call in question the materiel—the store of the dockyards; he believed enough had been said last year to induce Ministers to have the dockyards well supplied with stores; but where were the men and officers? The only way to be prepared for war was to have an efficient force in peace. With regard to the Hastings, which bore the flag in her of his gallant Friend, Sir W. Hay, was the exercise of that ship such as was calculated to keep the men efficient? Practice in the navy was everything, and the officer who took charge of a man of war, and had to put her through evolutions, would be unable to give the necessary orders if he had never done so before. These were things which were part of the necessities of the case, and he hoped that the purse-strings of the country would be opened—opened they must be, sooner or later. He much deplored that such a state of things existed as at present. He did think that there was danger of the taunt of Napoleon being literally fulfilled—that Great Britain was nothing but a nation of shopkeepers. But how were their shops to be kept open if a war should commence? Where were the funds to come from for their great plate-glass windows and their gin palaces? If we were not properly prepared for a war, our ships would be taken in the Channel by steam-vessels; and if we supposed it possible that we could trust to the mercantile steam-vessels as fit for vessels of war, we should be very much mistaken. We had no vessels to compete with the French steam-vessels of war. He would also express his anxious hope that something should be done for the midshipmen, mates and officers on service, many of whom we were likely to lose for want of something being done for them. A commission had sat on the subject, which led him to hope the greatest things for this class of men.

Viscount Melbourne

had certainly not expected so lengthened a debate to occur on this occasion, and was therefore not prepared for it; but some observations had been made by the noble Lord, and particularly by the noble Lord who had addressed their Lordships last but one (Earl Hardwicke), of such a nature, of such a character, and of such a description, that it was impossible for him to pass them over in silence. He had begun by stating, that in recent times to which he had referred no attention had been paid to this subject—that no attention had been paid to the state of the navy—that no remark had been made about the diminution of its forces, because everything was calm and quiet, and everybody was satisfied because perfect peace prevailed in Europe—because the minds of all men were perfectly satisfied. When was this, he begged to ask? What times did the noble Earl mean? What times did the noble Earl refer to? He declared, that since the termination of the French war he remembered no such times. The noble Earl referred to the Administration of the noble Duke (Wellington). Did he refer to his Administration in 1828 and 1829, when Russia was marching on Constantinople? Did he refer to those periods as exhibiting no danger and no reason to look for war? At that period the noble Duke had only been restrained from actually interfering in the affairs of Europe because he believed that Russia would fail. Did the noble Earl allude to 1830, the year of the termination of the administration of the noble Duke—the year when, contrary to every representation of the noble Duke, the French entered into that expedition to Africa which was now spoken of as the most dangerous to this country? He asked to what period he referred, when it was possible for us to rest on the perfect tranquillity of Europe? He confidently stated, that there was no such time. He confidently answered, that there was no such period since the termination of the great war of the Revolution in which it was not our duty to attend to the situation of the navy; and he confidently stated, so far as he could understand the statement of his noble Friend, that there was no period in which greater attention had been paid, in which greater exertions had been made to retrieve former errors, if errors they were, than during the Administration of his noble Friend who now presided over the Admiralty. It was very easy to make calculations of the navies of foreign powers— that they had so many sail of the line, and that we had so many; it was very easy to point out dangers in different parts of the globe—to point out the commercial interests we have; to say, "Here we have not sufficient guard, there they have not sufficient guard; there they have not sufficient security; there they have not sufficient safeguard on your interests." He (Viscount Melbourne) said, it was impossible to have sufficient safeguard on every point; it was not in the nature of things with an empire like ours, and with the difficulties which must always arise. It was impossible that any finances or resources of the country could maintain a force sufficient to be ready at every point. They must run some risk—they must run some hazard somewhere—they must commit some points to chance; there must in some instances be delay, and there might in some instances be disaster; and the only course they could pursue was, to have as large a force as it was possible for the country to maintain, and to dispose of that force with the greatest skill in order to give assistance in the most easy and ready manner in every quarter. The noble Lord said, the Russians had their sailors in regiments, and could put them on board their ships immediately. It would be absurd for him (Viscount Melbourne) to give any opinion on the merits of different services; it was certainly true, that such was the organization of the Russian navy, and that they could so bring them into immediate service. He would not give any opinion as to the merits of those troops when embarked; he could not pretend to do it. He said the French could also man their fleets in a similar way, from having their sailors registered.

He knew very well that that was the case, and he knew very well what was the opinion of persons holding high offices in France of their own navy and the character of their sailors. He knew very well it was very diffident indeed, and and that they did themselves think that from the circumstance of the short time during which their men served, and from their never returning to the service when the had left it, from the indisposition to the service which prevailed, there were many persons in that country who despaired of their navy ever reaching a great degree of efficiency; and, therefore, he could not entertain the desponding notions which the noble Earl had attempted to induce the House to embrace on this subject. But the noble Lord had gone further than all this; he not only said, that the foreign services were so extremely well conducted, and so very powerful, and able, and superior, but he did not spare his own service, or the officers of his own grade and character; he attacked the experience and skill of our own officers. [No, no !] The noble Earl did; he said that they had no experience compared with French officers.

The Earl of Hardwicke

rose in explanation. He had said this in arguing with the noble Lord on bringing forth his forty-sail of the line. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) stated, that the Navy-officers had not at this time equal experience, generally speaking, with the officers of the French navy; and he did it for this reason: it required some explanation, because the noble Lord put it forth as if some aspersion had been cast by him (the Earl of Hardwicke) on his brother officers. He did it for this reason—that the French navy had no more officers than were necessary to command their ships, and to carry on service on shore; therefore, they came into service a-float in rotation. Look at our navy: an order in council obliged the officers to serve six years, and, therefore, the officers of a certain standing in the service, who would be the officers in time of war (for the old officers of the past war were past the service), had not the experience of the French officers.

Viscount Melbourne

continued.—That was what he (Viscount Melbourne) had said, that the officers of the navy had not the experience of the French officers; and the noble Earl went on and attacked the spirit of those officers, and stated that from the inferiority of their means, they could not enter without apprehensions of the result upon the services which they were called upon to perform. He did not believe, that there was any fear on their part; he believed that there was that sanguine confidence in them which had always distinguished the service, and which would carry them through. The noble Lord had attacked also the patriotic zeal of the service, and had stated that the officers would be unwilling to come forward in time of war, under the present Government to serve their country, if that country should call on them for their services. The noble Lord had said, that on account of the manner in which his noble Friend had dispensed the patronage of the service he had discouraged the whole of it, and had filled that service with a different feeling from that which had before prevailed in it, and he had adverted to the circumstance of the late appointment to the governorship of Greenwich Hospital. For that appointment he begged leave to say he was as much responsible as his noble Friend, perhaps more so, and from all he could learn of the state of the navy—he did not wish to say anything disrespectful of the comparative merits of the services of officers, bat he did not believe, that any individual had a greater claim to a disposeable preferment than the person who was appointed; but at the same time however that might be, however his noble Friend might have dispensed the patronage of the navy, however he might have acted, he did not believe, whatever feeling might prevail, or whatever dissatisfaction might be felt, that in case of difficulty or danger it would have any effect whatever on the feeling and spirit of the officers of that profession. And with respect to their not feeling confidence in themselves—with respect to their not feeling that superiority over the enemy which they had always felt, perhaps the noble Lord might so feel, but he did hope, that the general feeling of the navy would be that which it always had been, and that their spirit and courage would never be found wanting on any occasion on which they might be called on to act. The noble Earl had declared that he had not taken up this matter as a party question, but he could not think that the noble Earl had argued the question as if it were not a party question—he could not think that the noble Earl had spoken on it with impartiality. He admitted that it was a question of great importance and well worthy the attention of the House and the attention of the Government at all times, and though he could not participate in the apprehensions of the noble Earl, and though he could not think that there was a greater call now for military exertions on the part of this country than there had been in late years, yet he certainly thought that the state of the navy ought to receive attention as well as the state of the naval forces of the other powers; he certainly thought that we were bound to keep up our resources in time of peace on such a footing as might enable us to use them most effectually and most beneficially in time of war, and he should always be glad, and he was sure that his noble Friend, at the head or" the Admiralty, would always be ready, to receive advice upon this subject; yet he could not but think that that advice might be tendered in less of a party spirit, and with a greater infusion of patriotism, than had been displayed in that evening's debate.

The Earl of Hardwicke

said that what the noble Viscount had said seemed very like an endeavour to throw upon him the imputation of having made remarks which must render him odious to his brother officers. ["No, no !"] It was, certainly, very much like it. The noble Viscount had misunderstood him. What he had said was, that he did not think that when the patronage was bestowed as it had been bestowed of late in the navy, officers of the navy could be so favourably disposed as they ought to be to the Ministers of the Crown. He had thrown no aspersions on his brother officers.

The Duke of Wellington

The noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty had said, very truly, that the proper time for discussing this subject, in order to ascertain whether the fleet was equal to all the services which might be required of it, was after these papers had been laid on the Table, but lie must say, that this was not the only question which their Lordships were called upon to consider on this occasion. They must look a little at the state of the services which had been required of the navy for the three or four last years, and see how those services had been performed. That was the real question, and it was an answer, in a great degree, not only to the observations of the noble Earl, but to those of the noble Viscount also. The noble Viscount had thought proper to refer to what had fallen from his noble Friend (the Earl of Hardwicke), and to draw their attention to the state of Europe and of the world during the years 1827, 1828, 1829, and 1830. Now, he had always understood, that the navy, in those years, was fully equal to the performance of all the services required of it; he had never heard of any want of ships in any part of the world, during that period—he never heard that the navy then was smaller or less efficient than it ought to have been—indeed so efficient was it, that he believed the first thing which the noble Lords who succeeded to the Government in 1830 did, was to make a very large reduction in the navy. Therefore, that the noble Viscount should compare the state of things as existing in the years 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, with the state of things as they were now, or as they had been for the last two or three years, did appear to him, begging the noble Lord's pardon, to be one of the most ridiculous things which he had ever heard in their Lordships' House. He was not aware, that there were any apprehensions of war in the Year 1828 or 1829. The fleets of the three principal naval powers of Europe were at that time co-operating in the Mediterranean, and he had never heard at that time, that there was the smallest notion of our going to war, or that the fleets of this country were not sufficient for all the services which were required of them. But the state of things for the last three or four years, had been entirely different. In the month of December, 1837, the noble Lord opposite had come down with a message from the Crown, to inform Parliament of the revolt of an important portion of his Majesty's dominions in North America. He had taken the liberty of giving a bit of advice to the noble Viscount at the moment, he had entreated the noble Viscount not to consider the war he was then engaging in as a little war. He had recommended to the noble Viscount, to form his fleets and armies on such a scale as might be worthy of a great country, and in such a manner as might enable them to perform the services which might be required of them for the protection of commerce, in order to prevent insults to the British flag, and to preserve British subjects from the conse- quences of illegally and improperly established blockades, and, in short, that they should be able to perform all the services which, under the Government of 1828, 1829, and 1830, they had performed, and performed without either complaint, reproach, misfortune, disaster, or disgrace. But what had been the facts? First of all he said, that the service was neglected in North America, and that at that moment, that was to say, more than three years after the period when that revolt was announced to their Lordships, the noble Viscount was not nearer to the settlement of the affair, as far as military means were concerned, than he was three months after it commenced. What was the cause of this? Because the Government had neglected to provide means, or to call upon Parliament to provide means, (besides those necessary for the settlement of that affair), for enabling the fleet and the army to perform the services, which it was their duty to perform, and the proof of this was, that they were obliged to call away ships to perform those services from the Gulf of Mexico, notwithstanding the necessity of attending to Buenos Ayres, and the necessity of attending to other parts of the world, at the same time that they ought to have had large fleets and armies on the coast of North America, in order not only by military force to put down the revolt in her Majesty's dominions, but to give by those means that political and moral support, to the governors and officers employed in those colonies, and to those who were engaged in political services in other places, which all in such situations ought to have given them in every part of her Majesty's dominions. He said, that if they had had in 1837 and 1838, such a fleet and army as they ought to have had, he should not have felt under the necessity of addressing their Lordships, and this contest in North America would not have been now, in the year 1840, unsettled and impending over us. Their Lordships would recollect, that at the same time that we went to war in North America, we were at war in Central Asia, and most particularly we were carrying on a maritime war—we were at war in the Persian Gulf. The Admiral of the Indian station was himself in the Persian Gulf with the greatest part of his squadron, carrying on operations at the very moment that those affairs were in discussion in China, which ended in that outrage and disgrace which occurred, he believed, in March last. The admiral, when that happened, too, was engaged in the Persian Gulf, instead of being, as he ought to have been, in the Canton river. Their Lordships had now under their consideration, the accounts of the transactions which had taken place in the Canton river up to September, or October, or November, he did not recollect which, that is to say they had the accounts up lo seven months after these events occurred, which were known in this country in July or August, and yet still there was in the Canton river only one frigate, which was unable to do anything, and even since the arrival of this frigate another insult had been offered to her Majesty's superintendent there. This was what the noble Viscount called peace. He thought that it must have been perfectly well known to the noble Lord, and perfectly well known to her Majesty's superintendent at Canton, long before March last, that this opium question was hanging over them, and must come to a decision; the superintendent must have given notice of this to the authorities of India, and among others to the admiral of the station; and he must say, that if the admiral had got notice, he ought to have gone to Canton, and suspended his operations in the Persian Gulf. Now, the noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty must know that a fleet cannot go in a few days to the Canton river from the Persian Gulf. [Viscount Melbourne.—That's our case.] The Government ought to have provided such a squadron in Asia as might have been able to have performed the peace services which her Majesty's subjects might have occasion to demand from them, not only there, but in other parts of the Indian command. But no such thing was done; the Government had not the means of doing it; they had not called upon Parliament to provide such means; and therefore it was that we had suffered this disgrace, and this loss that we had suffered, he might say, this serious misfortune, loss, and disgrace, in the Canton river. This was the case of a great nation carrying on a little war, and thinking that they could put an end to a little war by insufficient means, without considering that so great a nation as we were had connexions everywhere in the inhabited globe; that every part of the world was visited by the subjects of the British Crown, and that every- where they had interests at stake, and without considering that when we get into war in Central Asia or in North America, questions will arise everywhere, and that therefore the Government ought to be prepared to support the peace services at least in every part of the world. His remarks might be called faction. If after having said this, three years ago, he had manifested in the interim any disposition to withhold his assistance from her Majesty's Government, either in the way of vote or of advice, or in any other way in which he thought he could lend them or the public his assistance, he would allow that it might be imputed to him that he was factious; but, he never said anything with that view; he wished in what he said to be of use to the noble Lords opposite if he could; and he only adverted to the subject because the noble Viscount for the purpose of taunting his noble Friend (the Earl of Hardwicke) thought proper to draw a comparison between the period in which he was at the head of the Government and the present, whereas there was no more comparison between those times and these than there was between the year 1840 and the year 1740. With respect to the noble Viscount's remarks on his noble Friend's speech, he believed his noble Friend had been entirely misunderstood by the noble Viscount, and especially with respect to what his noble Friend had said of the experience of the officers of the navy, and his explanation on that point must, he thought, be satisfactory to their Lordships. His noble Friend had stated that there were not means of instruction and practice for officers of high rank in the service; and that the officers of our navy, not having at present those opportunities of practice, and of seeing the manoeuvring of fleets in large bodies, which the naval officers of other countries had, could not have so much experience as the officers of other fleets, and that therefore they could not have the same confidence in themselves, and that particularly the French officers, from the great number of ships in proportion to officers, always had opportunities of practice. That was what he understood his noble Friend to say. By no means could his noble Friend have stated that there was among naval officers a want of confidence in themselves, and a want of confidence in those over whom they were placed. For his part, he always had felt, and then felt, the fullest and highest respect and confidence in gentlemen of that profession; he had always attempted to emulate their services in the services which he himself had been called on to perform, and he was sure that he had been desirous to emulate them in nothing more than in placing confidence, not only in officers of his own rank, but in the troops which were placed under his command. It was impossible for him to enter into all the details adverted to by the different noble Lords who had spoken on the present occasion, but he was bound to say, having sat upon the naval commission, together with the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty and other officers of the navy, that no men could have taken more pains than they did to adopt every measure which could be suggested with the view of improving the service, to render the old officers more desirous of continuing in it, and to engage in it as much activity and ability as possible. He should not have discharged his duty if he had not made this statement, and he had no doubt that when the report of that commission was laid before the public, his observations would be found to be fully borne out. He believed that the result of that commission would be to render the service more efficient. With respect to one topic alluded to by his noble Friend, and by the noble Viscount opposite, it was impossible for him to give an opinion. It appeared to him quite legitimate, in a discussion like the present, if a noble Lord thought that the Government patronage had not been fairly distributed, that he should declare his opinion to that effect. He had never heard a discussion of this kind in which such a topic had been introduced. As for himself, he had never turned his mind much to such points, and was not able to express any opinion on them. He knew it was a subject on which the minds of men were naturally jealous; and he did not think his noble Friend was justly liable to the charge of converting the present question into a party question, because he had thought proper to allude to that subject. He did not approve of these imputations of factious motives. It was his opinion, and he slated it again, that the noble Lords opposite had terribly neglected the Chinese affair; and this country, he feared, would have reason to regret that it had been so neglected. It was now eleven months since the transactions alluded to first occurred, and not one ship had yet been sent from this country to that part of the world. This did not look like capacity for the performance of those duties which the occurrences in that part of the world rendered necessary.

The Earl of Aberdeen

said, the noble Lord opposite, in alluding to the supposed dangers of the country in 1829 and 1830, had mentioned the French expedition to Algiers, undertaken, as that noble Lord represented, in spite of the representations and remonstrances of the noble Duke; and the noble Lord also stated, that the possession of that territory now constituted a source of danger and apprehension to the country. The noble Lord was quite mistaken in his facts. The noble Duke made no representation or remonstrance against that expedition—none whatever. The noble Duke did that which was better. He obtained a pledge from the French government, that if they succeeded in that expedition they should derive from it no advantage which should not be shared by the rest of Europe, and that no settlement should be made in that territory by France without the concurrence of her allies. If that pledge had not been given, that expedition, the noble Lords might be assured, would never have taken place; and, let him add too, that that pledge would have been fulfilled to the noble Duke. But the French government now knew with whom they had to deal. They knew that they might safely trust either to the indifference or apprehensions of the Government opposite.

The Earl of Minto

said, that the noble Lord had thought proper to attack him for a misapplication of patronage, and had given, as an instance, the appointment of Admiral Fleming to Greenwich Hospital. That appointment was not exactly within his department, but he was not disposed to flinch from any responsibility attaching to it. He thought Admiral Fleming well worthy to hold the office. He challenged the noble Lord to enter into an investigation as to the manner in which he had distributed patronage. When the noble Lord spoke of the abuse of patronage, he did not know what was coming. He thought the House was doomed to hear the Plumridge case again. He only wished that when the noble Lord thought he had got a fair case against him for abuse of patronage, he would state it. The noble Lord said, that there was a deficiency of skill among our officers, in consequence of their number and the few opportunities that occurred of employing them, and that the French officers displayed more ability. He denied that this was the case. The discipline and skill of our naval officers formed the wonder and astonishment of the French officers on board vessels lying along side. He could not lose the present opportunity of bearing testimony to the great skill and ability displayed in every department of the British naval service. He should certainly wish that the number of officers not capable of being employed was not so great; but still he must say, that, when after a temporary retirement they returned to the service, they retained all the skill for which British naval officers were so distinguished.

Lord Ellenborough

inquired whether it were true, as had been frequently reported, that Admiral Fleming had never been engaged with the enemy? He asked the question, because it appeared to him that to entitle an officer to the highest situation of emolument and honour, it was essential that he should be distinguished.

The Earl of Minto

did not know how often Admiral Fleming had been engaged with the enemy, if at all. He believed that Admiral Fleming had been in action, but should be sorry to pledge himself to the statement. This he knew, that Admiral Fleming had from his youth seen service of the most active kind. He was distinguished for his skill and intelligence, and very few officers in the navy had discharged more arduous and useful duties than Admiral Fleming.

Lord Ellenborough

As the noble Lord does not know whether Admiral Fleming, now promoted to a high situation of honour and emolument, was ever in an engagement, I take for granted that the noble Viscount opposite made inquiries respecting the merits of this officer before he appointed him to an office for which, no doubt, many distinguished officers competed. I therefore now ask the noble Viscount to stale whether this officer was ever engaged with the enemy.

Viscount Melbourne

I do not know. Taking into consideration Admiral Fleming's general services, we thought him worthy of the situation he now holds. I beg the House to recollect that many distinguished officers have never been in action. ["Name."] I do not like to mention names, because I might be wrong with respect to them; but of the fact I am confident. Besides, fighting is not the only business of a sailor, nor of a soldier either.

Lord Ellenborough

That may be true; but fighting, and fighting with distinction, is that which entitles officers to places of honour and emolument.

Viscount Melbourne

I do not think so.

Lord Colchester

believed the real facts to be, that Admiral Fleming did command the Egyptienne frigate in Sir R. Calder's action, but that he never commanded a ship of the line in any general engagement, or any frigate in a single action with the enemy. There were in the Navy List nine admirals above him, who had been engaged in actions with honour and distinction. He begged to say, that if Admiral Fleming had been put in active command of a fleet, not a word would have been said against such an appointment. As to the latter part of the motion, with respect to the number of ships ordered to be built, he should omit it.

The rest of the returns were ordered.