GLASGOW COTTON SPINNERS.

HL Deb 09 February 1838 vol 40 cc931-40

Lord Brougham

held in his hand a petition respecting a species of offence on which very unfortunate errors prevailed, both amongst the working classes in that portion of the kingdom to which it referred, and also in Ireland. It was the petition of three delegates from the Cotton Spinners union of Glasgow. It stated that five persons, all operative cotton spinners, were imprisoned in the Glasgow bridewell in July, thence transferred to the gaol of Edinburgh, where they were tried and sentenced to seven years transportation, which was about to be carried into effect, unless the mercy of the Crown were interposed in their favour. The delegates, therefore, prayed that an Address should be presented to her Majesty imploring that such an act of grace should be performed towards them. It was fit, he thought, to state to their Lordships that the offences with which these men were charged were first stated in an indictment under ten counts, in which they were accused of conspiring, by means of assassination, and for the purpose of assassination, of arson, or "wilful fire raising," as it was called in Scotland, and of other injuries to the person and property; and also with a conspiracy, for sending persons hired by, and paid out of, the funds of a certain association raised by subscription, to perpetrate the crimes which he had enumerated. A graver offence it was not necessary to state, could not be committed by man, or made the subject matter of human accusation and decision. In that all mankind were agreed; even those who were most strongly favourable to combination, concurred unanimously in reprobating, as he did, and as he knew their Lordships would, crimes of the description he had mentioned. Now, on that indictment these men were kept in prison five months, including a portion of the winter. They were put on their trial on this indictment, and none other. It was found, however, at the beginning of the proceeding that it was necessary to depart from the indictment on which the whole rested, on which these men were confined, on which they were put on trial, and it was determined, therefore, to desert the diet pro loco et tempore; that was, to let off the prisoners on the first indictment, and instantly to recommit them on a fresh indictment. The counsel for the Crown added to those offences, already preferred, three of a grave character, if their Lordships would, hurtful to the peace of society, pernicious to trade, but above all, most emphatically mischievous, in their consequences to the operative workmen themselves, to that class of society to which these five men, who were now convicts, belonged as independent members. From acts of incendiarism, arson and murder itself, the counsel for the prosecution proceeded to arraign these men of offences, which, instead of being the worst, turned out to be of the very slightest import—of a combination to threaten, but with threats of a very inferior description, such as vexation, insult, annoyance, none amounting to arson or murder, and no arson or murder or any attempt tending that way being preferred. Such was the character of the three new charges which were for the first time made when the second indictment was preferred. After a long trial they were acquitted on the first indictment and convicted on the last. They were acquitted unanimously by the whole jury, because it was scarcely necessary to mention that in Scotland the narrowest majority, say six to five, was sufficient to decide a case. That was to say, they were acquitted on the ten counts which comprised every individual charge to which they were alone subject on the original indictment. In this country—he knew not whether such was the case in Scotland—a prosecutor would find himself in a most unfortunate predicament, the Crown would be placed in a most unhappy position, if the law officers preferred an indictment on which five men were arrested, taken from their families which depended on their labour for support, and kept in prison five months on charges found by the unanimous verdict of their countrymen to be unfounded. But worse than that, and a still more unfortunate predicament for the Crown would be, if its advisers were found to bring forward charges on which the men were acquitted, and all the time to neglect to arraign them for offences which they had committed, and of which they turned out to be guilty, and upon which, if they were included in the first indictment, there must have been a conviction: to impose upon them, in fact, an imprisonment of five months on a groundless accusation, and to cause a still further delay of justice, and a continuance of imprisonment for two months, on the charges on which they were finally sentenced. The fact was, that they were guilty of none but minor offences, but for them they were not indicted, they were accused of those of which they had never been guilty. The jury, which, as he had stated to their Lordships, need not in Scotland be unanimous, retired after the investigation and a long and learned charge from the chief justice. He would demonstrate to their Lordships that when they retired the majority of the jury were against the conviction of the prisoners even for the lesser offences; for they were out three hours, and the result was, that they found by a verdict only of eight to seven, the narrowest possible majority, that any offence, even the least of those of a less grave character, had ever been committed. Now it followed, demonstratively, from that circumstance that when they first went out they were not of that opinion; for if they had been they would have been glad, after a tedious inquiry, which had lasted eight days, to have called the roll and retired to their different occupations. It was, he repeated, clear to demonstration that one of the eight had been argued over, and that the verdict was thus decided. This, he thought, was a strong case for the interposition of the Crown; and when he spoke of the law of England, and appealed to the practice, he was glad to do so in the presence of his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor), whose especial duty it was to stand by the fountain of justice and watch the subordinate distribution of the stream. Of his noble Friend's inclination to do so he had no doubt, particularly when he called to mind the state of the English law on the subject. In the year 1824, by the 2nd and 3rd of George 4th., all the combination laws were repealed. It no longer continued to be an offence to enter into a combination to raise wages. Whether it was wise to repeal those laws without substituting some strong enactments had been among speculative men, the students of jurisprudence as well as among practical writers, a matter of disputation; but this was certain, that combination amongst either masters or men was no longer an offence, and any offence in combining must arise in cases where some criminal act was done, threatening the person or property, or for the purpose of preventing men from getting work, or making any man lose his work, or making any man join an association, or in any way impeding or obstructing the free application of labour. It was true that there was a proviso inserted in the Act, stating that threatening the person or property for the illegal purpose of inducing a man to leave employment was made more than a common assault or injury. Now what was the punishment inflicted by the 2nd and 3rd George 4th, chap. 95, on the party who was guilty of the lesser class of offences which he had mentioned?—Transportation? No such thing. Transportation for seven years, the sentence pronounced on those men who were found guilty of the less grave charges? Nothing like it. Transportation for a day or year? No. "Banished forth from Scotland," which we in England might consider a hardship, but which those who resided in Scotland were found very often voluntarily to undergo. No. Imprisonment for a year? No. For seven months? No. For five months? No. For the period during which these men were imprisoned before trial? Nothing of the kind. For the five months that these men were imprisoned on a bungling indictment, charging only the crime which was never committed, and omitting that of which the parties were guilty, on an indictment before it was known whether it could hold water, or whether this blundering piece of draftsmanship of the Crown lawyers was, with all its fringes and counts, worth the paper on which it was written? No such thing. Not five months, but just two months, was the maximum punishment in the way of imprisonment which was inflicted by that act of 2nd and 3rd George 4th, and that to which these men would have been subjected if in England they had been accused. If this case had been tried in England, instead of carefully avoiding any mention of the real offence in the first indictment, and mentioning only charges they were not guilty of, the indictment would have been drawn by careful, prudent men of business, filling the situation of Crown lawyers, upon which if these individuals had been convicted they would have been sentenced only to two months imprisonment, being the selfsame punishment inflicted on these poor men in addition to the first five months during which they were wrongfully and through the blundering of the Crown lawyers and their agents in Scotland confined. Seeing, then, that their punishment would have been only two months if tried in England, and that they had been confined for a period of seven months, including the five and the additional two months after the second indictment; and considering that the offence was of a slight degree and of a constructive character, as charging' these men with being members of what was called "the guard committee;" he trusted that the royal ear would be approached with the kind and considerate counsel to extend the mercy of the Crown to persons who had undergone three times (and more) as much punishment as they would have suffered had their case been investigated in England. Although he totally differed from those who held combination to be an offence to the extent to which it was justified by the existing law, still he thought that such practices as those of which these individuals were found guilty were mischievous to trade, destructive to the peace of the community, and, above all, mischievous to the interests of the workmen. None suffered more than the real victims of these conspiracies—those who furthered them under the delusive notion that they were for their interests, and opposed to that of their intended victims, the masters. "I don't (continued the noble and learned Lord) go the length of those who tell the people elsewhere that they have no right, to enter into combinations—that it is not right for them to combine. I utterly deny it. It is right to combine; and I hope men will continue to enter into combinations. The law says they may combine if they please. Masters may combine to lower the price of wages, and men may combine to raise them. Men may combine to resist the lowering of their wages. That is their indefeasible right. The Act of Parliament tells them it is no offence, and it may be a duty. There is no doubt of that. No good cause was ever advanced by a statement displaying gross ignorance, and by the unreflecting observation that all combination was a crime. Such a remark was as unfounded as to say that all law was a nuisance, because some instances may be found—and, God knows, as far as criminal law is concerned, not far off—of the existence of abuse. But, then, there is a much more grievous and far more perilous error in its consequences which other men fall into, and that is, that there is little or no offence in those unlawful acts by which the operatives suffer themselves to be disgraced and their welfare to be put in jeopardy." No man, the noble and learned Lord continued, had a right to combine for lowering or raising wages—for preventing men from working, or forcing men to join any association by means of threats of violence of any sort. Arguments in favour of combination were right; they might be resorted to as a duty. All peaceful means of furthering the interests, as they were conceived to be, of the working men against the plans of the masters; all endearing inducements, all means short of threats, were justifiable. Combinations of this kind the law allowed; and to say that they were illegal or mischievous would be just as tyrannical as the infringement which was committed on the liberty of a man when he was willing, but forbidden, to work for lower wages than those of his trade were willing to accept. That was the plain sense of the case, and it was undeniable law. Such was the advice which he felt bound to give to men of whom he had good reason to believe he possessed the confidence, having acted as their advocate in courts of law and in Parliament, and to assure them, that while he consented to present their petition, he could not do so without availing himself of the opportunity of pointing out the errors committed not only by those who had written this petition, but by other parties, particularly in Dublin, who did not appear to be at all acquainted with the distinctions which he had pointed out. With these observations he humbly begged leave to lay the petition before their Lordships, and to move that it be read.

Petition read.

Viscount Melbourne

said, that if he had been aware that it was the noble and learned Lord's intention to present a petition of this nature, and if he could have supposed that the noble and learned Lord would enter into a long statement involving the law officers of the Crown in Scotland, he should have felt it his duty to make himself acquainted with the whole of the facts connected with the case. It had been the general practice of Parliament, in its prudence, wisdom, and discretion, although undoubtedly it had the power of deciding on questions of the exercise of mercy, as well as on those of every other branch of the prerogative—to exercise a very great care in considering such matters, seeing that it would open a door to the greatest possible inconvenience if this prerogative were frequently called in question, and made the subject of debate within the walls of Parliament. And he owned that he did not see anything in the present case, as it had been stated by the noble and learned Lord, to make it an exception to the general rule, or to induce their Lordships to interfere by an address to the Throne on this subject. It was admitted, on all hands, that these men had been convicted of an offence of a most pernicious character; and it was with very great satisfaction that he heard the concluding observations of the noble and learned Lord, which took off the impression which might be produced by the earlier part of his speech, when he stated that the Crown had failed in proving the offence of a grave character, namely murder or conspiracy to murder, but succeeded in bringing home to the accused an offence of the lightest character known to the law. He conceived that any violence or intimidation used to carry into effect any regulation of such an association, was an offence of the gravest and most serious character, and the more open the law had been made for allowing men to enter into combinations, the ore necessary was it to check any attempt at violent proceedings by the most serious punishments which the law allowed. The noble and learned Lord had stated that the punishment which had been inflicted for the charges which were proved was severe and excessive, far more than would have been allowed by the law in this country; but when the combination laws were abolished, the fault which was found with the proceeding was, that the penalties were too weak and too light; and he must say, that if the offence were proved to the extent charged against these persons, the punishment which was assigned to it was not excessive, nor the infliction of it unjust. The noble and learned Lord had said, that the law officers bungled this case extremely. It was perfectly true, that they were obliged to give up the charge of the most serious offence and proceed in another form. There might be reasons for giving up the first indictment which did not arise from the circumstance that the offence was not committed, but because the evidence on which the law officers relied was not forthcoming, and therefore the indictment which was at first preferred was not sufficient, whether or not there were grounds for it. He begged leave to say, that he did not intend to give an opinion on this case, as he was not perfectly master of all the facts. He gave no opinion whatever as to the course which was pursued in respect of it, but he maintained, that the facts which were brought forward did not establish any misconduct on the part of the law officers of the Crown, nor prove that the punishment awarded was excessive. If their Lordships entered into the grounds of this application they would be obliged to examine into the conduct of the jury, the length of time they were out, and the proportion in which they voted. There would be no end to arguments of this kind if they were once admitted; and the conduct of the jury which had been referred to only proved the inconvenience of the law of Scotland in not requiring unanimity, and thus allowing questions to be raised as to how many voted on each side and what was the character of each. One great advantage of the verdict of a jury was, that it should be final; and if it appeared, that it was given in accordance with the evidence, and if there was no legal mode of attacking it by recourse to the higher legal tribunals of the country, it should not be made the ground for any further proceedings of an extraordinary nature. If they were to reflect on the length of time the jury took to consider their verdict, and the time they were out, and to make these circumstances raise a presump- tion for attacking the verdict, or at least bringing forward so serious a matter as the calling in question of the verdict of a jury and the proceedings of a court of justice in Parliament, there would be no end to such proceedings. Giving no opinion whatever on the course which should be adopted, and being convinced that the fullest consideration would be given to the case by those whose duty it was to inquire into it, he did not see that any peculiar claim was established for the interposition of their Lordships.

Lord Brougham

explained: The noble Viscount had remarked on the very unusual though not unprecedented course of inter-posing between the sentence and the execution by an address to the Crown. The noble Viscount was mistaken in supposing that he had intimated any wish to make a motion on this subject. He had never intimated any such wish, but his supplication in favour of the prisoners was pointedly addressed to the Ministers of the Crown that they might listen to his statement. The noble Viscount had stated, that if he had known this petition was to have been presented he should have made it his business to see that he or some of his colleagues was informed on the subject of it. He bad sent the petition either yesterday or the day before to the Home-office, and he had yesterday begged the attention of his noble Friend, the Secretary for the Home Department, as it was, he stated, his intention forthwith to present the petition. With respect to what had been said, that there was nothing extraordinary or out of the way proved against the officers of the Crown, he must conclude that his understanding was formed of very curious materials who did not see that it was something more than an every-day case to prefer ten charges, all of which failed in proof, and to omit the charge which alone could be proved. It was just as if a man were to take the indictments out of a drawer by chance, and to say, "If this cannot be proved, and is wrong, we shall go on another." The noble Viscount had stated, that the Crown might have good reason for abandoning the more serious charge. But the Crown did no such thing, but tacked the minor offence to the greater crimes. Bad as the first indictment was, they kept it, and tried to prove it. The noble Viscount also exclaimed, "The present proceeding only shows the evils of a want of unanimity which prevailed as to verdicts in Scotland. He would not argue that question, but those who were attached to the Scotch system maintained, that it was most unjustifiable to swear a man to return a verdict according to his conscience, and then if the jury could not agree, to dismiss them, or cart them, according to the old punishment, out of the county. He knew that it was often said in the law courts of this country, that it was better to have one obstinate man than eleven in your Favour, for it was very likely that if he had a good stomach and a sound constitution, he would starve out the remainder. He thought it right to say thus much to mitigate the severity of the noble Viscount's indignation against the unhappy Scotch system, and to soften the extreme admiration he had expressed of the practice in England. The noble Viscount had argued, that these prisoners would not have been tried in the same way in England as they had been in Scotland. That was exactly what he maintained, and was a conclusive answer to the noble Viscount's conclusions.

Petition laid on the table.