§ Lord Lyndhurstrose, pursuant to notice, to present a petition from Glasgow, signed by nearly 600 persons, complaining of the depressed state of our foreign trade at the present moment. He was informed by individuals who were perfectly acquainted with the fact, that the petition spoke the sentiments of the most respectable, wealthy, and intelligent bankers, merchants, and manufacturers of that great city; and, with their Lordships' permission, he would read one or two passages from it. The petitioners said—
We again have to approach your Lordships' honourable House (they had a year or two since petitioned the House on the same subject) to express the anxiety and alarm with which we view the distressed condition of our foreign trade. From time immemorial, this country has been unrivalled in mercantile greatness; but that greatness has latterly been 1176 much impaired by the injuries inflicted on our merchants by foreign powers, through the infraction of treaties, and by other acts, against which her Majesty's Government should have provided. It is only by the sacrifice of our power, and the abandonment of our rights, that the commercial relations of Great Britain have been thus crippled and endangered, and we call on your Lordships to inquire into the circumstances of the case, and to afford us such redress as you may in your wisdom deem proper.It was not his intention, in presenting this petition, to enter into a detailed consideration of the subject to which it referred, because he was well aware that their Lordships would listen with impatience, at that period of the Session, to anything that was not connected with the necessary and immediate business of the House. He should, therefore, direct their Lordships' attention, very shortly, to the different matters that had been especially pointed out to him by these petitioners, reserving to himself the right, in the next Session of Parliament, of bringing those various points that were referred to more distinctly under the notice of her Majesty's Government and of their Lordships' House. That the persons who signed this petition were not without some just grounds of complaint, would, he thought, appear evident on making reference to a document which had been laid before the other House of Parliament. It appeared by that return, that the total amount of exports for the year 1836 was 91,000,000l. whilst, in the last year the total amount was only 85,270,000l., making a difference of nearly 6,000,000l. The total official value of manufactures exported from Great Britain to foreign parts in 1837 was 77,932,617l., and in the last year 72,312,207l., making a decrease of 5,620,410l. When they came to enter into the details of this subject, they would find ample matter for serious reflection. In 1837 our cotton exports amounted to 50,249,212l., and 1838, last year, they were only 41,403,110l., making a decrease on the export of cottons of 8,746,792l. If they referred again to another staple manufacture, that of woollens, the exports in 1837 amounted to 7,535,064l.; while last year the exports only amounted to 4,680,247l., making a decrease of 2,854,817l. In our linen manufacture there was a decrease of 1,000,000l. on the exports of last year as compared with 1837. On the exports of 1177 silk the decrease was 335,853l., and on hardware and cutlery 415,349l. The only article on which he found an increase was cotton yarn, in which there was an increase of upwards of 1,300,000l. Now, the petitioners desired him to call the attention of their Lordships to the circumstances connected with this extraordinary decrease of trade, and the first point to which he would direct their notice was the new Prussian commercial system. Everybody acquainted with that proceeding knew, and their Lordships knew well, the great difficulties which Prussia had to encounter in bringing the different states of Germany to accede to that agreement. And, in his opinion, a very little diplomatic skill, and a little activity on the part of the Government of this country (that was, of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), would easily, availing himself of that dissatisfaction which the conduct of Prussia had excited, have defeated and rendered impracticable the object which Prussia had in view. Such, however, was the indifference on the part of her Majesty's Government, that the states, one after another, were persuaded or forced into that commercial league. This had produced the most dangerous results to our trade with central Germany. Not only did it occasion a decrease of the exports of this country, but manufacturing establishments had started up in central Germany; and, in consequence of the cheapness of labour, the advantage of water-power, and the assistance of machinery exported from this country, they were now enabled not only to supply their own wants, but to contend with us, and to contend successfully, even with reference to our great staple commodity, in the foreign markets. In the United States of America, which was always considered our own especial market, the cottons of Germany, and the hardware of Germany could now be purchased at a lower price than similar articles the manufacture of this country. He repeated, that it was clear to him, that a little activity and the exercise of a little diplomatic skill on the part of the noble Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would have defeated the plan of Prussia, and prevented all this mischief. Another point connected with this subject, and one of no small importance, too, was this—that by the treaty of Vienna the rivers of Poland were to be free to the commerce of 1178 all nations. They were only to be subject to such small duties as were necessary to maintain the navigation. It was not only the waters of those rivers, but also all the transit through those rivers, embracing a trade very important to this country, that were declared free to all nations. But what had taken place? In consequence of the subjugation of Poland, the provisions of the treaty of Vienna had been distinctly and directly violated. The Russian tariff, and all the vexations which accompanied it, had been established in the districts which those rivers traversed, and serious impediments had been opposed in consequence to the progress of the commerce of England. Another point to which he wished to call the attention of the Government and of their Lordships House related to Cracow. Cracow, as their Lordships all knew, was situate on the Vistula, and the integrity of that city and of its territory was guaranteed by the treaty of Vienna. Cracow, from its situation, had of late years become a very extensive and a very important emporium. A great deal of trade with this country had been done through the residents at Cracow. It was stipulated by the treaty of Vienna, that no armed force, under any pretence whatever, should enter into the territory of that republic. On some pretence, no matter what, an armed force had entered it, had remodelled the police and constitution of that republic, and had completely new-modelled its trade. It, therefore, became desirable that this country should have a commercial agent at Cracow, to exercise vigilance over its commercial interests. That was represented, as he had been informed, to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign office. That noble Lord declared, that the appointment of such an agent should take place without delay. To that declaration he pledged his faith, his reputation, and his character. Some representation, however, was made to that noble Lord from some quarters, that a consular agent from this country would not be allowed to establish himself in that district. The noble Lord succumbed to that representation, and did not make the appointment, to which he had pledged his faith, his reputation, and his character. Had the noble Lord stated any reason for not making it! No; he had stated no reason. He merely said that he had altered his mind, and that he would not establish a consular agent within 1179 the limits of that republic. Our commercial interests had suffered greatly in consequence of events in that district, and he therefore called the attention of her Majesty's Government and of their Lordships House to that subject. He had touched, as their Lordships would observe, only lightly on these points. Such were the observations which he had been requested by the petitioners to make, and such were the points which he had to submit to the consideration of her Majesty's Government with respect to our trade on the continent of Europe. But this was only a small part of the case which he had to bring under the notice of Parliament. By a treaty which he had made some years ago with the French, we were entitled to carry on a trade in gum on the banks of the Senegal. Two of our vessels, laden with gum, had been seized and confiscated by the French on the most unfounded pretences. What had happened? Our Government demanded redress? Had redress been granted? Two years had elapsed since that demand was made, and up to the present moment nothing had been done. Delay in such a case was a denial of justice, and not only a denial of justice, but also the destruction of our trade. And for this reason, that whilst our trade was liable to such interruptions, no cautious man would hazard his capital by embarking in it. The result was, that we had been driven entirely from all participation in the gum trade on the Senegal. He was stating facts shortly; he had not stated them with circumstances, and he left it to their Lordships to judge of the consequences likely to follow from them. We had also a treaty with Holland as to our trade with Java—a treaty most precise in its language and its terms. Certain duties were to be imposed on British goods imported in British bottoms. The duties were to be double the duties imposed on goods imported from Holland in Dutch vessels; and in case the vessels from Holland imported goods from Holland not paying any duty, we were to pay 6 per cent. on similar goods imported into Java from this country. What had taken place in Java? The treaty had been disregarded. Duties to an extravagant amount had been extorted from British merchants. Nearly 40,000l. a-year had been forced out of their pockets. This system had been going on for years, and was still in action. There was now 1180 400,000l. due to British merchants for duties which had been extorted from them in violation of the treaty. Had any attempts, he would ask, been made to prevent the continuance of those extortions? Efforts might have been made, but nothing effectual had been done to stop the Dutch Government in its course of violation of this treaty. Such was the respect paid to our Government on the continent of Europe! Such was the respect paid by foreign Governments to treaties in which we were concerned with them! Again, we had formerly carried on an important trade with Algiers, producing a very considerable revenue. The French were now in possession of all the district of Algiers. Our trade with Algiers formerly was only liable to a duty of 5 per cent. The noble Lord who now conducted our foreign affairs had declared, that he was satisfied with seeing France in the possession of Algiers. Now, since that event had taken place a great part of our trade with Algiers had been placed under absolute prohibition, whilst the remainder had been rendered subject to the high tariff of France, which had almost annihilated it. Again, we had carried on for several years a traffic with the natives on the east coast of the Black Sea—a traffic which had given rise to a transit trade of very high importance? What had happened recently? That trade had been prohibited by Russia. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department had acquiesced in and consented to that prohibition. Another point, perhaps of still greater importance than any to which he had hitherto adverted, was the position of Persia, a position of infinite importance to England, both in a political and in a commercial point of view. What had happened there? What had led to the loss of our influence with the Schah, to the insults which had been heaped upon our envoy, and to the influence of Russia, not only superseding ours, but actually directing at once the councils and the armies of Persia? At the present moment we were in a state little short of war with Persia. We had been compelled to fit out a fleet to resist the aggressions of Persia—a country in which it was most important that we should possess an influence, not only because it was a barrier of defence in front of our Indian possessions, but also because it was most advantageous to us in a commercial point of view. What had led to the pre- 1181 sent state of things? When the treaty between Russia and the Porte was concluded, by which our fleets were to be excluded from the Black Sea on the mere demand of Russia, our influence at the court of Persia came at once to an end. The Persians saw that the better and the safer game for them to play was to connect themselves with Russia, and since they had adopted that game we had been subjected to every vexation in Persia which it was in the power of Russia to inflict. These were the various points to which he had been requested to call the attention of their Lordships. When we looked at them, we saw nothing but the decline of the political influence and of the mercantile interests of the country; and when he (Lord Lyndhurst) looked around to see whether he could find any countervailing advantage for all these disasters, he could see nothing which could lead him to suppose, that we had derived any, the slightest advantage, either from the exertions or from the diplomacy of the noble Lord now at the head of the Foreign Department. He trusted an opportunity would be afforded for a more minute and particular consideration of these various questions; when that opportunity did present itself, he should be ready to enter into them much more at large than would be convenient on the mere presentation of a petition.
§ Viscount Melbournesaid, he would follow the example of the noble and learned Lord, who had in a very temperate manner pointed the attention of the Government and of the House to the various subjects referred to in the petition which had been placed in his hands. Considering that this petition was, he believed, voted and agreed to in the month of June last, he might a little complain of the noble and learned Lord, who himself very much complained of the introduction of important matters at a late period of the Session, having so long delayed to present it. He did not complain with respect to himself, but on the part of the country and the petitioners themselves; if it was not to be a mere without effect of any kind, if their representations had any foundation to rest upon; if their complaints were just, that the commercial interests of the country were so entirely neglected as they stated in their petition, undoubtedly it should have been brought forward at a period when it might have 1182 been possible to produce some practical effect, and not at a time when it could only serve to cast an imputation on those who were intrusted with the conduct of public affairs. The noble and learned Lord began by stating that the commercial interests of the country were in a declining state, and that the exports had been greatly reduced during the last year. He apprehended the noble and learned Lord's observations applied only to the last year. Up to the close of 1836, and the commencement of 1837, the commercial affairs of the country had been in a state of progressive advancement; the exports had regularly increased generally to almost all quarters of the world, and more particularly to many of those parts where the noble and learned Lord stated they had declined. The depression of last year arose from temporary embarrassment, from overtrading and speculation, and particularly from the state of commercial credit in the United States; it was in no respect, therefore, surprising that there should be a great decline of the exports of this country, nor was there on that account the least ground for alarm or anxiety for the future. He could not doubt there would be a revival of trade from that temporary depression to which all commercial affairs in the vicissitudes of things were necessarily subject. The noble and learned Lord had pointed the attention of the Government to various subjects which he conceived to be, and which unquestionably were, of the very greatest importance; and in the first place he had directed their attention to the commercial union in Germany instituted under the influence and guidance of Prussia, and which united in one common band of fiscal regulations so many of the states of Germany. That league might be hostile, or it might not, to the interests of England; but if it were hostile, we could not complain, for it was contrary to no treaty whatever; it was a league which those states had a right to enter into if they thought proper, and which no skill, ability, or diplomatic address could have induced them not to adopt if they thought it best and most conducive to their own interests. He did not know whether it was the system of union or the high prohibitive duties established by it that was now complained of; the latter, he apprehended, was the real grievance. But that, undoubtedly, involved a question on which he did not 1183 wish to touch, well knowing it to be not very popular in that House; but at the same time they must bear in mind while they kept up such a very high prohibitive system with respect to the staple article of those states—such a very high prohibitive system with respect to that which they had to give, and which we must wish to buy—it was not easy, on very fair and equal terms, to institute negotiations with those states of the continent for greater freedom of commerce. The noble and learned Lord had also touched on another delicate and very difficult subject—the state of Poland. The power exercised by Russia in Poland was a subject dating and proceeding from a long period of time back, on which, looking to the very strong feeling it had always excited, he did not wish to make any observations. But he apprehended what the noble and learned Lord had stated with respect to Cracow, and the extent and advantage of its trade to this country, was very greatly exaggerated. The noble and learned Lord was also under a mistake when he stated that his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had pledged himself to send a consul to Cracow. His noble Friend never pledged himself to send a consul to that republic. He stated, indeed, that such was his intention, but something afterwards arose to alter that intention, and induce him to think it would be more prudent not to take that course. The noble and learned Lord next mentioned the dispute which had taken place with France in regard to the gum trade on the coast of Senegal. Unquestionably there had been a very considerable difference with the French Government on that subject; it was now matter of negotiation, and the noble and learned Lord might depend upon it that neither the interests of the merchants nor the interests and honour of the country would be hazarded or sacrificed in that transaction. The noble and learned Lord had also alluded to the duties levied at Java. The question in that case arose on the interpretation of a treaty entered into in 1824: the dispute had existed ever since 1827, and the present Government flattered themselves that they had taken more pains, and placed that negotiation on a better footing, and were more likely to bring it to a better termination, than their predecessors. The noble and learned Lord had said, that our in- 1184 fluence was as nothing on the continent. But with respect, for instance, to Holland, although unfortunate circumstances had tended recently to diminish our influence there, yet had we concluded a treaty of commerce and navigation with that country, under which Holland gave up all discriminating duties, and admitted our vessels on the same footing as those of the most favoured nations. In that respect Ministers had not neglected the commercial interest of the country, and were not open to the imputations contained in the noble Lord's speech or in the petition. His noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had never professed himself satisfied with the occupation of Algiers; but at the same time there was a great difference between being dissatisfied with a measure and taking a hostile attitude in order to remedy what had taken place; and those who occupied a country had a right to establish what commercial regulations they thought proper, and other nations had no right to complain of their exclusion. He did not deny, that the influence of England in the court of Persia was less now than formerly; but Ministers were not to be blamed for that. It was the natural course of affairs. It arose from the former war with Persia, in which that country suffered such severe reverses and lost so much territory; certainly he did not think, whatever it was, it could be dated from the conclusion of that treaty with Turkey to which the noble and learned Lord had alluded. Undoubtedly the state of affairs in that part of the world was not satisfactory, but he could not see how that should be made any charge against the Government, because results had not been so favourable or so fortunate as might have been wished. The noble and learned Lord might rest assured that her Majesty's Ministers would pay all the attention required by the magnitude and importance of the subject to which he had directed their attention; and he trusted the country would feel that her honour and interests were safe in their hands.
§ Lord Lyndhurstexplained. The petition had only been placed in his hands a few days since.
Viscount Strangfordsaid, that he had given notice of a motion for that night respecting the state of their commercial relations with certain states in South America; but after the powerful, clear, and comprehensive statement of his noble 1185 and learned Friend, he felt that anything which could fall from him must certainly fail to attract the attention of their Lordships. He need, however, scarcely remind their Lordships that he seldom ventured to trouble them with any observations; nor should he have thought of trespassing on their patience on that occasion did he not believe, that the matters which he wished to bring under their notice were in the highest degree deserving of their attentive consideration. His purpose would be fully answered if the facts which he had to state, and the few observations with which he should accompany them, had the effect of inducing her Majesty's Government to devote to these subjects some of those horœ otiosœ that were looking before them, and that with the least possible loss of time; for looking back to what had already passed, and looking forward to that which might come to pass in a distant part of the empire, he thought there was much reason to fear that before long they might be compelled to meet again in that place, as they had been compelled to meet in November last, and on the same subject, with this difference, that last year they met to apply a remedy to a disease; but next time they would have to decide on a remedy for a rash and presumptuous physician—Non vulnera sed medicum ipsum verberibus serandum. Some nights ago a noble Friend of his not now in his place, in presenting a petition, took occasion to deplore the state of their commercial affairs in the east; he entirely concurred in the views of his noble Friend—he lamented deeply the unsettled state in which those relations at present were—he lamented the ignorance in which men of enterprise and capital were left as to where they might trade and where they might not—he lamented the losses and inconveniences to which that state of things had led—he lamented the painful, and not very creditable, disclosures which had ensued; and in adverting to that subject let it not be supposed for one moment that he gave credit to the charges which had been made relative to the administration of their commercial affairs in the east; for he could not be so blinded by the feelings of party as to believe it possible that charges of such a nature could be brought by one public servant against another, who, whatever, might be his opinion of his public principles and conduct, stood unimpeached on the ground of personal integrity. But 1186 he had another reason for not believing those charges; he could not believe, that a man who had been in the employment and had enjoyed the confidence, who had eaten the bread of nine successive Administrations, of every shade of political opinions, could have served so many apprenticeships under so many different masters without having learnt the ordinary virtue of discretion. But, though he believed not these charges, he was prepared to say, that the property and condition of those merchants trading to the distant states of South America were in the greatest danger; and when he remembered the views, and objects, and principles with which they had proceeded in regard to the interests of those states as well as their own, he could not but think that they, of all other states, had the most peculiar claim on the good offices and on the exercise of all the influence of the Government to preserve them safe from the aggressions and violence of more powerful states; and what he wished to know was, whether that interference would be exerted, or whether the Government would remain quiescent whilst those large and distant states were exposed to the aggressions of France. The system, for it was a system, upon which France appeared to act, was this. Some grievance, real or imaginary, was got up—some case, in which French subjects, or persons claiming to be called so, were aggrieved, or appeared to be so—a demand was then immediately made by France, that its subject should enjoy various immunities, exemptions, and municipal privileges, and should be placed on the same footing as the most favoured nations, who enjoyed these privileges by treaty. Those demands were made with more or less openness, according to the circumstances of the case; but they were almost uniformly rejected, and for this reason, because those small states—and to their credit and their honour be it said—were just as tenacious and just as punctilious on any matter connected with their national honour and dignity as the more venerable and majestic institutions of the old world. The drama was the same throughout; but then came the last scene. No sooner were the demands rejected than the French admiral, or captain, or whatever he might be, motu proprio, began to proclaim and establish a blockade, without any further instructions from, or communication with, his own Government. 1187 Then the commerce of friendly powers was interrupted, and vessels laden with rich cargoes, having made a long voyage across the Atlantic, were refused admission into the ports of their destination, and compelled to seek a market for their goods where they could. That practice of converting petty grievances into an excuse for serious aggression was not a new invention; and whether at Senegal, or Mexico, or elsewhere, the case was precisely the same. He would not, then, trouble their Lordships with a long detail—for it would be very long—of the circumstances which led to a demand of compensation on the part of the French Government from the Government of Mexico, for injuries which were alleged to have been sustained by French subjects there. The amount of that demand was 600,000 florins, or 120,000l. sterling. The Mexican Government resisted that demand because they considered it exorbitant and unjust. Whether it were exorbitant he might leave their Lordships to judge from a reference to one item in that demand. A French pastry-cook had opened a shop in Mexico, and during the disturbances which took place there some years ago, on the appointment of a dictator, that man's shop had been broken open, and some of the soldiers had made free with the good things which they found there, and, as men are sometimes apt to do, went away without paying. What did this much-injured French pastry cook do? After complaining and grumbling for some time, he magnified that attack on his tarts and jellies into an enormous outrage on the liberty of the subject, and against the majesty of Louis Philippe and the united French nation. He assessed his own damages at 20,000 hard dollars—or 5,000l. sterling, and transmitted his claim to the admiral, and that claim was thus incorporated into the sum total of the demand, failing the payment of which a blockade was instituted, interrupting a trade from this country—he spoke not of the indirect trade, which was very considerable, but a direct trade of no less than four millions sterling per annum. He held in his band a list of the British vessels which had been stopped on that occasion; he would not trouble their Lordships with it, but in consequence of that state of things great loss had likewise been occasioned to British capitalists by the interruption of their mining operations. There was an- 1188 other point, however, to which he wished to direct their attention. Their Lordships were aware, or some day would be, for he held it impossible, that this subject should not be brought under the attention of Parliament, that there was a loan between Mexico and this country, and the payment of the dividends of the interests on that loan had been for a long while suspended; the Mexican government subsequently had entered into an arrangement by which one-sixth of the customs of the Government was to be devoted to the liquidation of that debt; but that arrangement had now been neglected, and the payment had altogether ceased. With regard to Buenos Ayres precisely the same course had been pursued by the French government. The British Government, and that of the United States, were among the first, indeed were the first, to acknowledge the independence of that state; and in consequence of that earlier recognition, and other services which they had rendered to that state at the very beginning of its struggles for independence, certain advantages, municipal exemptions and privileges, were granted to the subjects of those two Powers, and afterwards confirmed by a treaty. In 1830, the French government, for the first time, thought proper to manifest indications of a desire to enjoy the same privileges, and accordingly certain persons were sent from the French government to that state. Antecedently, however, to the arrival of these persons, the government of Buenos Ayres had established certain regulations for the government of their own city, and of such foreigners as chose to reside there—that they had a right to do so he apprehended no person would deny; but the effect of those regulations was to place all hose foreigners, except the subjects of Great Britain and the United States, on the same footing with the natives. Now, the first thing the French did on their arrival was to demand that French subjects should be put on a different footing from the rest, and elevated to an equality of advantages with those of Great Britain and of the United States. The Government of Buenos Ayres replied, that they were asking for more than they had any right to ask for, and, that the privileges which others enjoyed they enjoyed under a treaty. A very long discussion and correspondence had taken place on the subject. Complaints were then made, that French sub- 1189 jects had been injured, and forced into the militia, and unjustly detained in prison. Upon inquiry it appeared, that there were only six Frenchmen in the militia of Buenos Ayres, of which number four were volunteers; that only two men had been imprisoned, one of whom had committed murder; and the other had confessed himself guilty of robbery. That being the case, what course was adopted by the French Government? Why, they said, "Very true; there are not any of our subjects who have been forced into the militia or unjustly imprisoned; but there may be hereafter, and we will have a blockade here unless you will guarantee that hereafter no Frenchman shall be put into prison or forced into the militia." To that demand the Government of Buenos Ayres replied, that that was asking for a treaty, and that they could enter into no treaty with them so long as the French ships were at their port threatening them with a blockade. That reply produced the blockade of Buenos Ayres, and the consequent interruption of the commerce of British merchants. These republics certainly were in some measure infected with the passion of blockading each other, but they did not act in the manner adopted by the French, for they generally gave notice of the blockade to friendly States. There was another topic to which he would call their Lordships attention—namely, the encroachments which the French were making upon the northern part of the Brazilian territories, and which led to endless disputes and discussions. In 1817 the Portuguese agents in Paris were instructed to sign an order to restore to the French authorities, notwithstanding, that the Portuguese claims were confirmed by Baron Humbold. No attempt had been made by this country to put a stop to these aggressions, even when 300 miles of territory had been seized. Now, the question for us was, in what manner did this affect British interest? For the purpose of ascertaining this, it would be remembered, that the territory thus seized upon, commanded the entire of the river Amazon, whence it flowed to the sea and not to the Amazon alone, but also the numerous navigable rivers which ran into it, thus affording to the possessors the entire communication with the uncivilized tribes resident in the neighbourhood, and enabling them to withhold or advance the civilization of the latter. The Chamber of Depu- 1190 ties of France deemed these territories of so much value, that they had advanced grants of money for the purpose of maintaining possession of them. Why did not the British Government insist upon an adherence to the boundaries laid down in the treaties of Utrecht, Vienna, and Paris? Indeed, it had been admitted by the French Ministers, that they retained the territories in the neighbourhood of the Amazon in consequence of the advantages which thereby accrued to France. Indeed, this country had a predilection for interfering in matters which in nowise concerned her, and of shutting her eyes with respect to things in which she was peculiarly interested. He had no quarrel with France, nor would he interfere with those things which concerned alone the interest of that country; but he would call upon Ministers to exert that moral influence which this country ought to possess, having paid full well for it, for the purpose of inducing France to abstain from doing that, which was injurious as well to the other nations as to this country. It was the least which could be called for by a nation like Great Britain, which had expended so much blood and treasure in extending the freedom and establishing a secure relation between the nations of Europe.
Lord Broughamsaid, My Lords, if I had been aware, that my noble and learned Friend had intended to have brought the subject forward, I should certainly lave prepared myself to have entered into the discussion; but as such has not been the case, I will trouble your Lordships with a few observations only generally upon the subject. I must, however, my Lords, in the first place, bear testimony to the very able, clear, and masterly statements of my noble and learned Friend in bringing before your Lordships, at the very close, I admit, of the Session, and at a time when there is not an opportunity of bestowing upon it that attention which a subject of such magnitude deserves—namely, the subject of the whole foreign relations of this country, through the medium of which, our commercial interests are carried on and protected. Although, my Lords, the petitioners only refer to their own interests yet the general interests of the country are involved in the subject. The observations of my noble Friend, who had last addressed your Lordships, were only with reference to one branch of the discussion 1191 —namely, the foreign relations of this country with those of South America. My noble and learned Friend who presented the petition has taken a wider range, for his observations applied to the subject generally. I also, my Lords, understood my noble Friend, in addition to entering into the foreign relations of the New World, to refer, very properly, I admit, to the eastern parts of the old, with respect to which his opinions are entitled to great weight and consideration from the fact of his having for a considerable period lent his valuable assistance in watching over the interests of this country in that quarter, and I have no doubt, that her Majesty's Ministers during the recess will accede to his request, and bestow their best attention on this important though somewhat complicated subject. With respect to the still greater question which my noble and learned Friend has brought before your Lordships as to the diminution of the influence and power of this country, and of the diminution in the amount of the commerce of the country, if the facts are as he as represented them, of which I entertain not the slightest doubt, because I am sure my noble and learned Friend would not have stated them without he had full grounds for doing so—if the facts are, my Lords, as my noble and learned Friend has stated them, then, unquestionably, they deserve the best and most serious attention of Parliament and the Executive Government. It is a most hard and unhappy circumstance, but it is nevertheless true, that at the end of so many years of peace, and of a peace, it must be remembered, succeeding a war of unexampled brilliancy and success—after such brilliancy and success of the British arms—after the brilliant contests which have crowned our efforts with greater success than at any other period of the history of this country—after such pecuniary sacrifices—after the expenditure of our pecuniary resources has been most lavish—after so much English money has gone over to the Continent for the purpose of aiding other powers against their foreign enemies—after victories obtained in all parts of the world, from the rising of the sun in the East to its going down in the West—whether in the East or in the West, in, Spain or in France, or in Belgium, where our crowning victory was gained—after all these unexampled successes, and after such an expenditure of blood and treasures it is 1192 a most unhappy circumstance, that the influence of England, as regards foreign powers should have fallen back instead of having increased. Such a state of things, my Lords, is deeply to be deplored, and furnishes matter for melancholy consideration. It is a most unhappy state of things, but no one can say, that throughout the whole of these proceedings, the conduct of Great Britain has not been wholly disinterested. I am sure, my Lords, that no nation in Europe can say, that England ever fought or spent her money for any selfish British objects. I differed, my Lords, from those who thought the carrying on of the war necessary, but at the same time, I feel bound to bear testimony to the purity of the motives of those who carried on the war. It is vexatious, my Lords, after the expenditure of so much blood and treasure, that England should have greatly lost her influence instead of being clothed with the character of a mediator for the rest of the world. I look forward to the reconstruction of the whole fabric of European dominion—I look forward to the establishment of new arrangements and new relations with regard to our foreign intercourse, upon the principles of civil, not of religious, reformation—I look forward to the time when this country will stand at the head of the liberal and constitutional party in Europe, in the same manner as she was the protectress of the principles of reformation in the time of Elizabeth. My Lords, my political creed with respect to our foreign affairs is simple—and I speak with due deference before those noble Lords who possess a more intimate acquaintance with diplomatic laws—the meridian line which I should draw through the great and inexplicable map of Continental affairs, with all its entanglements and confusion—the meridian line which I should draw through the whole, and to which I should refer the several parts, would be England and France, friends, and upon constitutional and liberal principles—principles of perfect equality and absolute independence—of pure and unsullied national honour on the one side and on the other—the one never attempting to infringe upon the other—the One never endeavouring to lower the other or to throw distrust or suspicion upon its proceedings, because such distrust would be sure to end in hostility; but maintaining the relations of amity, and of alliance together, and then they may in the first place defy the world in arms, and, in the next place 1193 dictate peace to the world, and preserve the peace of the world upon such principles as would be most conducive to the improvement and happiness of mankind. My Lords, I heartily rejoice to think, that these two great nations continue to stand towards one another in those relations of confidence, good will, and friendship, and although the circumstance may appear trifling, I cannot help, as small objects appear great when near at hand, adverting to a matter at which I was very much pleased, namely, the excellent reception given to the foreign Ministers generally, on a late occasion, as evincing the friendly dispositions of this country, but particularly to that very illustrious warrior (Marshal Soult) whom the noble Duke opposite, (Wellington) admitted to have been one of his most formidable opponents, although, that noble Duke had defeated him, for beat him, I believe to have been impossible. This I look upon as a very happy circumstance, as tending to cement and consolidate those feelings of good will between the two countries. Now, with respect to our interference in the affairs of the East, I must say, that the less we interfere, according to my rude and unlettered view of the subject, the better. That there may be occasions when we must interfere I admit, and then it should be done firmly and without the least apprehension of consequences, and thus far I go with my noble Friend opposite (Lord Strangford.) It is no proof of the weakness of a nation to refrain from interference in small matters—tranquillity and repose are generally the characteristics of power and might, and a confidence in the resources which are at command, rather than of weakness and imbecility. Weak nations are generally jealous of their reputation; and I have often heard it said, that little men are touchy and testy, and apt to attribute puny and personal motives to others merely because their own ideas and intellects are stunted and contracted; and as it is with these pigmies so it is with nations. The stunted understandings of such men and such nations cannot soar up to comprehensive and enlarged ideas carried into effect by disinterested and straightforward men. So it is with little nations—I mean small in mental power, who ascribe the honest and straightforward actions of other countries to motives which they are incapable of. Therefore, I do not think that avoiding interference, and 1194 remaining tranquil on certain occasions, makes us less weak in times when we are called upon to exercise our power and authority. I do not mean "the balance of power," as it has been termed, but the weight and influence which we should have in foreign affairs at any given time in any part of the world. Circumstances may arise in which neither my noble Friend nor Lord Chatham himself, if he were living, with all the resources of the British empire at his command—with a unanimous House of Parliament, instead of a House of Lords against him, and narrow majorities in the House of Commons in his favour—I believe, with even all these favourable circumstances, my noble Friend could not have gained more weight than he has, and could not have altered the course of events, unless he had gone to war with all mankind—that last most desperate, and, unless unavoidable, most guilty of courses, unless the preservation of our country require it. My Lords, I am not satisfied, any more than my noble Friend at the head of Foreign Affairs, at the course pursued by the French government with respect to Algiers. It is not at all creditable to that government, which having, in the first instance, stated that it did not intend to occupy that country, has, nevertheless, held it for seven years. Such conduct is, to say the least of it, very unsatisfactory. I do not believe, nor is it consistent with my knowledge or recollection of any opinion professed in public, or stated privately by my noble Friend, that he ever said, either a that he approved of, or was satisfied with, the course pursued by the French government. But it is one thing to be dissatisfied, and another to demand satisfaction. It might be said, why did not my noble Friend remonstrate—why did he not send ambassadors? Why did he not threaten? But, my Lords, if there is a mode more simple, more short, and more sure than any other to lose all the influence a nation possesses, it is to threaten what you do not mean to do. It is the same with respect to nations, as it is in individual cases; and I think, therefore, that my noble Friend does wisely not to threaten, until he is ready to act; not to act until the necessity arises, and to pass over minor matters where much more important objects are to be gained by the concession, and where more important interests are at stake. For the reasons I have already 1195 stated, I cannot enter more argely into the different matters adverted to in this petition, but I wish to say one word with respect to our commercial policy. It appears, that up to 1836, our foreign trade had been going on prosperously, but since then in Poland, in the Levant, and the Dardanelles, there has been a falling off. I am not much surprised at this falling off during past years, but I look with still more apprehension to another point, the future—because I know, that there are circumstances in the position in which we stand with regard to the Northern and Eastern Powers of Europe, where the defalcation principally is—there are circumstances of a nature that must not only not diminish the amount of the defalcation, not only not equal the present amount, but in my opinion tend very greatly to increase that defalcation, and against which circumstances no one struggle that we have hitherto made, up to the last three years, has proved successful—circumstances, which will in the end, I fear, defeat that vivida vis of English commerce, which has enabled it to overcome and surmount obstacles and difficulties that no other nation could contend with; much of this arises from the vicious system of commercial legislation which at present exists. What is one of them—just observe: you cannot trade with the east of Europe, unless you allow it to trade with you in return. Now, take the Baltic: timber is there cultivated, they have the finest timber, the best for ship-building, it is the best for the hull, and the best for the masts; if you want to trade with them, the natural course is to enable them to send home their timber for your hardware, your cotton and silk goods; but what do you do? Why, you levy a duty on Baltic timber for the purpose of protecting the growers of timber in Canada, the Canadian timber being of a decidedly inferior description. Gentlemen in the other House thought fit to decree, by a majority of forty, that the Baltic trade should be stunted to all time, and be restrained from gaining its natural dimensions, in order to protect the disadvantageous commerce of Canada; and you, therefore, have a worse article, not at a cheaper, but a dearer rate. Now this is not the fault of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but of the system. I will now give your Lordships another reason for the decline of trade; you don't deal in timber alone— 1196 you deal in corn. The great staple of those countries bordering on the Baltic, next to timber, is grain. Plentiful and cheap as is the grain produced in those countries, it is peremptorily said to the people, notwithstanding, "You shall not only have bad houses, but dear bread." And yet, at the very time you stunt the Baltic trade in its two great staples of timber and grain, you complain that the trade of this country with the Baltic has fallen off. To be sure, it must fall off. The consequence of this system of policy is, that you ruin your commerce and force the people to eat dear bread, and to live in uncomfortable houses. In the first place, the price of labour in this country is rendered dear by the dearness of bread. And, in the second place, it is not to be expected (although know there is some doubt in the working of that proposition) that they will take our manufactures when we will not take their timber in return. How can you expert your manufactures to the Baltic when you won't take their timber and grain in return? Well, the price of the quartern loaf has risen from 7½d. to 11d. What is the price of the quartern loaf at Amsterdam and Antwerp? Why it is 52 per cent. cheaper. It is not very comfortable for the people of England to know, that owing to the Corn laws they are eating bread 52 per cent. dearer than the Amsterdam and Antwerp people; and there is a tax paid—taking the consumption of this country at 22,000,000—there is a tax paid by the people of this country of from 17,500,000l. to 18,000,000l. a-year—another tribute to that exceedingly vicious system. There is Dantzic, Riga, Koningsberg—you can't trade with those towns; and then not only do you stunt your manufactures, by shutting up your exportation for want of an equivalent return; but you raise the price of labour, by raising the price of the best article of food in this country, which prevents you entering into competition with the French and Flemish manufacturers. They have cheaper labour, because they have cheaper bread. So that you are burning the candle, as it were, at both ends—you are refusing to take the cheaper produce of those countries on the one hand, and on the other, by this suicidal species of policy, you invite foreign manufacturers to enter into competition with you, with the immense advantage of cheaper bread, 1197 and consequently of cheaper labour. That is one solution of the phenomenon justly deplored by my noble and learned Friend and myself. In both ways you are contracting and ruining your own trade. My Lords, I was greatly surprised—I was mortified to hear the noble Viscount (Melbourne), upon the last occasion, that this subject was before your Lordships, state in a very peremptory manner, that his Government would not take the subject of the corn-laws into their consideration. There is not a more gross or inexcusable fallacy than to suppose, that because the law states, that, when the price of grain in England reaches 73s., the entrance of foreign grain is no longer prohibited; the price in the English market being now up to 70s., an advance of 3s. a quarter more in the price will open the ports to the entrance of foreign grain. This is a downright fallacy. What trader would ever venture into the corn trade when he knows, that he is at the mercy of the winds and the waves, and that no man can calculate the prices at the precise time of arrival? No man can tell when the ports will open or when they will shut—no man can tell. For example; he might send out his ship, on speculation, when the price was 73s.; but before the winds and the waves would allow his ship to come home with the grain he finds the price has fallen below 73s.,and the ports are shut, consequently his ship would be obliged to return to the Baltic with the grain. And thus, in consequence of the existing law, the corn trade is a gambling trade—an uncertain trade; and respectable men are very loath and very unwilling to enter into the corn trade, because they know the law has filled it with uncertainty and incentives to gambling speculation, no man knowing how long the ports will remain open, when once they are so. My Lords, I ought to apologise to your Lordships for having dwelt so long on this subject, and at this late period of the Session. It is, however, one that always occupies my attention. Without doing any good to the landlord, it is, as a noble Friend of mine (Earl Fitzwilliam) has said—the only person with whom I agree in this House, on this subject, and who is the greatest landlord in England or Ireland—it is a gross delusion to suppose, that anything be so good for the landlord as to have a fixed duty, which would cause 1198 corn always to be at a steady price. It would be better for the country—it would be as good for the producer, in my opinion, as it would be good for the consumer. My Lords, these are the observations which I deemed it my duty to make on this question.
§ Lord Lyndhurstexplained, that the French minister to whom allusion had been made had stated, that Lord Palmerston had represented to the French government, that if they kept within the limits of the ancient palace of Algiers, the English Government had nothing whatever to demand. This statement had appeared in the French official journal, the Moniteur.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonobserved, that, beyond all doubt, there was no subject of so much importance to the country at large as a debate upon our commercial relations. He was of opinion, that we were now in that state, that the maintenance of the great extension to which those relations had arrived two or three years since was, he feared, absolutely essential to our existence. Nay, he apprehended, that the maintenance of the continued increase of that extension was essential to the prosperity of this country. It might be very difficult to maintain that extension in such a state as it had existed in some years ago, and also to maintain it in such a state, that it might gradually and permanently increase. The commercial relations of this country was a subject which he always approached most unwillingly, and particularly at this period of the Session. Their Lordships' House was not exactly the place in which such questions could be discussed with advantage. It would be a very different thing if that House were to apply the remedy, but above all it was quite obvious, that they could not enter on a general question of this nature, affecting our commercial relations and encompassed with difficulties, without getting into the very topics which the noble and learned Lord opposite him brought before their Lordships a few moments since—he meant the corn laws and the timber trade. He would certainly not follow the noble and learned Lord into any detailed discussion of those two questions. But he must say that in the few words which had fallen from the noble and learned Lord upon both those questions he had displayed as much address as he had ever witnessed on the part 1199 of that noble and learned Lord. The question of the timber trade was a question not only of colonial policy but of navigation. It was a question in which this country, and the trade of this country, were both materially interested. It was not a question of mere traffic in respect of the prices of different markets, but a great question both of navigation and of colonial policy. He was perfectly aware of the motives for bringing forward this question at the present period, and he must strenuously protest against it. He thought that it was not acting fairly towards the trade of this country, and more particularly towards those questions which had been brought forward by his noble Friend behind him, and by the noble and learned Lord opposite. The question of the corn laws he looked upon as not only a question of great commercial interest, but also as one of the highest internal, and legislative importance. There was one point of the discussion with regard to this question which the noble and learned Lord opposite had entirely omitted in the course of the discussion which he had introduced that evening—that was the influence of the system of corn laws, in the first place, upon Ireland. He had left that entirely out of the question. Another point which he had left out was the security to this country of its independence with regard to the article of food. There was no point more certain than that, if they came to be entirely dependent on the countries bordering on the Baltic, they would have the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia (as had been done before) levying a tax upon the importation of that article of food into the Thames and elsewhere in this country. He would not follow the noble and learned Lord further into this subject than just to observe these little omissions in his speech, which he considered, however, to be very important. He would, at the same time, observe that when noble Lords brought forward subjects of this description, they should never forget that they were quite sure to be met either by friends or opponents with corn laws and timber duties. There was another observation of the noble and learned Lord's to which he must shortly allude. It was with respect to the expediency of avoiding any interference with foreign powers on the subject of commercial matters. Now he confessed that he could not view the state of our commercial relations, and of 1200 our position in the world generally, in connexion with these commercial pursuits, with any degree of unmixed satisfaction. On the contrary, he did deplore the state in which they found themselves placed in many parts of the world, particularly as had been described in the course of the evening by his noble Friend (Lord Strangford.) What he attributed that state of our commercial relations to in a great degree was the extreme weakness and tottering condition of our naval establishments. He did not now mean to complain of the distribution of our naval establishments; though, at the same time, he by no means meant to unsay what he had said in respect to the expeditions to Spain, which he could not approve of; but he repeated his expression that he considered our naval establishments to be in too weak and tottering a condition to answer the purpose for which they were intended, which was to give protection to the commercial interest of the country in all parts of the world; for the commerce of England did extend to all parts of the world. There was not a port, not a river, not a portion of the world which was not visited by the ships of her Majesty's subjects and her Majesty's subjects had an undoubted right to protection in, whatever part of the world they might think proper to visit in the pursuits of commerce. The circumstance of which he complained he did not at all attribute to neglect upon the part of the Admiralty, neither did he include in his censure the noble Earl who was at the head of the Admiralty; but those whom he did blame were the individuals who had thought proper to reduce the establishments of the country to such a degree that protection could not possibly be given in all places where it was required. He would now call their Lordships' attention to some of the matters which had been alluded to by his noble Friend (Lord Strangford.) He would say nothing about the question as existing been France and England with relation to the Mexican government. There was a disputed claim, amounting to about 600,000 dollars, not more than 120,000l. sterling; and he was not quite sure that it would not be better for the Mexican mine-owners to pay the money at once, and thus prevent the blockade from continuing any longer. The French Government had thought proper to declare war against the Mexican government in order to recover the amount of 1201 this demand. They had a perfect right to do so if they thought proper. He did not at all dispute that right. But what he said was, that it was the duty of our Government, and of our Minister in Mexico, to turn their serious attention to this question, with a view to put an end to these hostilities by the exercise of every description of amicable office between the two parties, so as to prevent the continuance of such an evil to Mexico, and above all to her Majesty's subjects, and to those engaged in the great mining concerns of that country. When the Minister, who was concerned in carrying on the negotiations on the part of the French Government with respect to the claim for 120,000l. the subject of this war, placed himself for protection on board one of the vessels composing the French fleet, in the harbour of Santo Sacraficio, how could the representative of the English Crown upon the spot treat with the French minister at all, if he had not some force at his back? He did not at all wish to threaten, but what he desired was, to have amicable intercourse with the representative of France. But to have it he must be on an equal footing with him. He could not allow him, while he was aboard of his fleet, to say to him, "Why, you have not even a cockboat." The French minister was here on board of his armed vessel, in the midst of his fleet, lying in the harbour, and the British Minister had no support or assistance whatever. Here, then, was a blockade regularly established. It was desirable that her Majesty's Minister at Mexico should know the exact situation of the blockade; that he should know whether it was a legal blockade, and whether the blockading power had a force sufficient to maintain the blockade or not, in order that no collision might take place between her Majesty's subjects and the blockading force. He did not blame the noble Lord (Lord Minto) for what had occurred, but he blamed the state, and he would say, that we had reduced the navy too low, and that we had not sufficient means of protection for her Majesty's subjects. He was not very well acquainted with the position of affairs in Mexico at present, but he could state, that when he was in office, some two or three years ago, he had settled a Mexican case, in which there was also some money concerned; the sum was much larger than 120,000l., and he must say, that he went by an en- 1202 tirely different road from that which had been adopted by the French Government. As the case was of some importance, it went through the whole world, and was blazoned by the different newspapers, but it was settled without any threat, or anything of the kind whatever, except the usual statement of facts and treaties. With respect to this case, there was a want of the requisite information. It was not known whether the blockade was illegal or not. For his own part, he had not seen any notification of the blockade to the public, and if no such notification had been made, then there was no legal blockade. He believed, that the Admiral had no right to proclaim a blockade without having a sufficient force to maintain it, and he believed it would not have been done if we had had a sufficient force in that part of the world, and if our admiral had been properly supported in representing that this was not a legal mode of effecting the blockade. He was positively certain, although he had not had the opportunity of seeing any returns, that he was not mistaken on this point, nor in saying that this course might have had a great influence on the interest of her Majesty's subjects. He would remind their Lordships that since the peace, and particularly within the last twenty years, those great navies had sprung up in Europe, which were four times as strong as they were at any former period. Other navies, it was true, were put down, but we remained much the same. A great deal had been said by way of comparison between the strength of our navy in 1792 and in the years 1814 and 1815; but when we talked of the strength of the navy, we ought not to look at the subject without adverting to the naval establishments of other Powers. But, although our navy was on the same footing as before, our commerce was not only tripled, but extended to a degree ten times greater than it ever was before, and there was not a part of the earth, from one end of the poles to the other, in which the protection of our navy was not required for our commerce. He must say, that if we should at any time incur the misfortune of being involved in another war, which God forbid, the only mode of keeping out of difficulty would be to maintain such a navy as would give protection to her Majesty's subjects in all parts of the globe. This was the ground on which he supported the views of his noble Friend who 1203 spoke behind him, and those of the noble Lord who sat on the cross bench, really feeling as he did that this was a question of great importance, and that if he could bring the Government and the public to look at this question in a proper light, we should get rid of all difficulties.
The Earl of Mintowas rather glad that the noble Duke had dwelt as he had done in the latter part of his speech, upon the present state of the navy, inasmuch as it enabled him to correct, in a few words, a great deal of misapprehension which prevailed upon that subject. He might perhaps agree pretty much with the noble Duke in thinking, that at times there had been too great a disposition, from motives of economy, to curtail the naval and military forces of this country. But at the present moment, he thought they were somewhat corrected of that error: and with regard to the navy, it would be in the recollection of the noble Duke, that no difficulty whatever was experienced three years ago, when a proposal was made to Parliament for a very large addition to the vote of seamen for the navy. With respect to the naval force at the present moment, if it were not sufficient for the public service, he (Lord Minto) must take some blame to himself; because he certainly did not feel that there would have been any difficulty in obtaining from the country an increased force if it were necessary. But he had not received information from any one of our naval stations that the force placed there was not perfectly adequate to all the exigencies of the public service. Upon all the stations to which the noble Duke had referred, there was a very considerable force, and upon the South American coast, in particular, the force was now much greater than it had been for many years before. There was now at sea a larger number of ships of the line than had been permanently employed for very many years past. From seventeen to eighteen sail of the line were at this moment in commission, and of that number a very considerable portion were disposable, and might at once be sent to any part of the world where their services were required. But agreeing as he did with the noble Duke in the absolute necessity of maintaining a very large naval power in this country, available at any moment, it did not, at the same time, appear to him to be necessary that the whole of the ships carefully kept in a state of readiness, 1204 should be actually in commission and at sea. He thought it sufficient if the arrangements of the Admiralty were such, as to enable it at a very short notice to increase the naval force of the country and to send large fleets to sea. That was the present state of the navy, and he could say with the most entire confidence, that no call could be so sudden as not to be met with the greatest easei n he equipment of a very large and powerful fleet. If the force in Mexico were not sufficient, it was to be remembered, that upon the North American station there was a much larger force than had ever been there before, and that if the necessity should arise, any part of it would be available for Mexico. The blockade to which the noble Duke had referred, was a perfectly regular blockade, and one in which England could not interfere—it was regularly announced, and sufficiently maintained, by the blockading power—it was one, therefore which the British admiral in those seas would not be at liberty to disregard or to break through. He did not rise, however, to speak upon that part of the question, he was principally anxious to avail himself of the opportunity of stating that the naval force of this country at present afloat and in commission was much larger than it had been for many preceding years, and certainly quite equal to all the claims for protection of which he had heard; and that there would be no difficulty whatever, from the state of the ordinary and stores, in sending a very large and powerful fleet to sea in the shortest possible time.
§ The Duke of Wellingtondid not mean to dispute the noble Earl's statement with respect to the number of ships in commission and at sea; but he understood, that many of them were not half manned and armed, and that this was particularly the case with respect to two ships at present in the St. Lawrence, where it was supposed every ship ought to be fully equipped. What he meant with respect to the increase of the naval force upon the coast of Mexico was, that the minister of the country, backed by an imposing display of power, should be in a condition to settle disputes of the kind between foreign nations, especially when those disputes operated so prejudicially upon the commercial interests of this country. With that view, he would have upon the Mexican coast such a commanding naval force as should at least be equal to that of one of the bel- 1205 ligerents engaged in carrying on what he could not but call this unjustifiable dispute. He did not say, as the noble Earl seemed to suppose, that the British officer commanding in those seas should attempt to raise the blockade. All that he said was, that this commanding officer should be armed with such a force as should enable him to watch the blockade, and to see that it was carried on with a sufficient force. His great object, however, in speaking at all upon the present occasion, was to impress upon their Lordships, upon the Government, and upon the public, the absolute necessity of our having a strong naval force in all parts of the world.
The Earl of Mintobegged to correct a mistake into which the noble Duke had fallen, when he supposed that the ships in the St. Lawrence were only half manned and armed. The truth was, that the admirals upon all the different stations, with one solitary exception, had, of late, represented that it would add very much to their convenience, and to the convenience of the service, if, instead of sending troops out in very large frigates, they were to be allowed to go out in line-of-battle ships, without the lower deck guns. This suggestion had been very generally acted upon; but the moment that affairs assumed a critical appearance in the St. Lawrence, the lower deck guns were sent out to all the ships there, and at the present moment Sir Charles Paget's squadron was fully and completely armed.
§ Petition laid on the table.