The Marquess of Londonderry
felt, that he was scarcely justified in renewing the discussion on the subject of the war in Spain after the able and enlightened debate which had taken place upon it recently, not only in their Lordships' House but also in the other House of Parliament. The question had been so fairly stated, and had been so clearly developed by a noble Duke, who had hitherto preserved a strict silence upon it, that he was not vain enough to hope to throw any fresh light upon it. The same views had also been ably advocated by a noble Earl who followed on the same side. In another place the discussion had taken so ample a view of the military state of the question, that it would be idle in him to add one word upon it. He had not been present at either of those discussions; but he had been most anxious to state how grateful he felt to the noble Duke for the allusions which he had made to his humble exertions, and for the lucid manner in which that noble Duke had brought our unhappy course in Spain under the consideration of their Lordships. The arguments which the noble Duke had then urged with so much force and clearness had been met by the noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty by a singular declaration, to which he should feel it to be his duty to allude more particularly hereafter. On the important question of the mode in which the war in Spain was conducted by his Majesty's Government, he thought the majority of that House—nay, he might even say the majority of the people of England, and the majority of the people of Europe, poignantly lamented that the warfare in that country should be carried on by a system on our part which was not creditable to the British arms, and which every British soldier must deeply lament. It was with a view to discover whether there were still any efforts made on the part of the British Government to raise new levies for the Queen of Spain, and to furnish them with arms, ammunition, and warlike stores—which we had already furnished to the amount of half a million— 1466 that he rose to address their Lordships for a few minutes. Looking to the economy of the thing, he would ask, whether there was any chance of the amount of these supplies being repaid to the country, in case Don Carlos should prove successful, as it was probable that he would? Was the same system, he would ask, to be carried on for the future as had been carried on for some years past? There was also another question equally important to all British subjects, which he should take the liberty of asking on the present occasion. He wished to know whether the noble Viscount had made any efforts or whether he had continued the efforts of the preceding Administration, to arrest on the part of the Spanish Government the sanguinary proceedings, the wanton bloodshed, the extraordinary atrocities with which the war was carried on in Spain? Had the noble Viscount come to a determination to send a British officer or a British diplomatic agent to the Court of Madrid to ascertain whether the arrangements which he had formerly explained to the House were actually carried into effect in the Basque provinces with respect to the Elliott convention? Had the noble Viscount taken measures to extend the provisions of that convention to all the other provinces of Spain? He should be happy to hear that the noble Viscount had done so. If he had, the Durango decree would have fallen to the ground at once a dead letter; and had that been the case, we should not have heard of those melancholy instances of bloodshed among men who wore the Spanish cockade, and were yet clothed in English cloth and bore English muskets. He feared that it was not with the noble Viscount as it was with a prudent statesman or with a prudent general, who having made a mistaken march, or who having taken up a wrong position, made a retrogressive motion and placed himself where he could most easily recover the ground which he had lost. It was reserved for the noble Viscount and the Members of his Administration to pursue an obstinate, pertinacious and bigotted line at all hazards in employing the British troops engaged in the war in Spain, so that no feelings out of doors, no representations from our ally the King of the French, no consideration in the world, could arrest the noble Viscount in his determination to carry on this war in the same reckless spirit in which he had 1467 embarked in it. The noble Viscount would perhaps recollent that at the close of last Session of Parliament he had ventured to indulge in various predictions. Had the noble Viscount's predictions been justified by the result, or any thing like it? Let the House look at the facts. He had put upon paper a comparative statement of the forces commanded by, and opposed to Don Carlos at the close of the last Session, and at the present moment. If the noble Viscount could contradict that statement, let him do so; he believed it to be true; and if it were true, what chance had the noble Viscount of defeating Don Carlos in his present attempt to gain possession of his throne? The noble Viscount's plan of warfare would not only plunge Spain into a continuation of all those scenes of horror and bloodshed which were so disgraceful to the character of the Spanish soldier, but would also involve England in an enormous expense, which would never be paid. The comparative statement to which he had alluded was as follows:—"At the end of 1835 the Carlist forces were, infantry in Navarre, 11,300; Alava, 5,500; Guipuscoa, 5,050; Biscay, 6,750; and Castillians, operating in the above provinces, 5,350. Also cavalry, 1,300; and artillery, 350. Total 35,600 regulars, besides 10,000 armed peasants." That statement he had made before in his place in Parliament, and that statement had been contradicted by the noble Viscount. But to proceed—"In Catalonia there were then in the various districts, but badly armed, 22,000; in Arragon, under Cabrera, 5,000; and under Quiles, 4,000; in Valencia, La Mancha, Toledo, in flying columns, 6,500; in Galicia, under Lopez, 3,000; in Castile, Rioja, Estremadura, Andalusia, and various parts of the kingdom, in small bands, 6,000. Total 56,500. At which period the Christinos had, including militia, natives, amounting to 275,000 men, contending against the Carlists, besides three foreign Legions viz. British 10,000; French, 8,000; and Portuguese, 5,000; independent of naval forces." That was the comparative statement of the forces of the Carlists and of the Christinos at that period. The bulk of the Carlist forces were in the Basque provinces, with the British Legion and the British fleet on their flanks. They had nevertheless maintained the war under 1468 all the difficulties in which they were placed, and had maintained it with success up to the present moment. At present, in 1837, the Carlist forces might be stated thus:—
This statement gave the amount of the regular troops of Don Carlos. He had left a part of these troops in the Basque provinces, and with the remainder he had marched through various provinces of Spain, until he had reached Catalonia, where he had a population of 1,400,000 souls to fall back on. The Carlists had also bands of irregular troops in Lower Arragon, in Estremadura, in Andalusia, and elsewhere; and when all Spain was rising, or on the point of rising, in support of Don Carlos, was it wise in his Majesty's Government to allow a British force to be employed against him in a service which could only lead to the sacrifice of their own lives without any chance of success to the cause in which they were enlisted? He trusted that the noble Viscount would recollect his former predictions. He had taken the trouble of looking back to what the noble Viscount had then said. On the last occasion on which the force of the Carlists had been mentioned, the noble Viscount said, "I have every hope that a speedy and happy termination will be put to the Spanish contest, through the means now in operation. There is a prospect of the result from the conduct pursued by the present government of Spain. There is no one, my Lords, so incurable as a prophet; the spirit of prediction is a most obstinate disease. I do not know whether the noble Marquess has any adequate reason for declaring our prediction will be falsified, but I have every reason to believe what I have said will turn out. to be the fact?" He quoted those words, 1469 as a slight reminiscence of the debate which took place on the 12th of February, 1836, but at the close of the debate the noble Earl now at the head of the Admiralty said, "I shall only add, that I speak from information which I have derived from authorities in Spain, and probably from less public sources than those on which the noble Marquess relies. From these I arrive at the conclusion, that General Evans is likely to pursue that successful course which he has hitherto done." All that he should now say in reply to these predictions was, that we were now carrying on the war in Spain in a much more unfortunate plight than that in which we were during the last Session. These were the grounds on which he thought that their Lordships had a right to be informed, first—"Whether any instructions or authority had been sent to Colonel Wylde, British Commissioner in the North of Spain, to aid the formation of any new British Auxiliary Legion, or to lend his exertions to induce British soldiers to enter the service of the Queen of Spain?" And secondly—"Whether any further communications had been received from the Spanish Government relating to their efforts to arrest the sanguinary system of the warfare." If any such communications had been sent in the one case or received in the other, he should certainly move, that they be laid on the table on a future day. If no such instructions or authority had been sent to Colonel Wylde, he should be satisfied at hearing that fact announced; but he should deeply regret it, if he should be informed by his Majesty's Government that no efforts had been made by them to bring this war into a more civilised and humane form. He also desired to be informed "whether the French government had not distinctly informed his Majesty's Ministers that they intended strictly to limit their interference to the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty;" and whether they had not given his Majesty's Ministers that information since the close of the last Session? He particularly wished to call the attention of the noble Viscount to what our excellent ally the King of the French had said on this subject in his speech on the opening of the two Chambers, and to the words which he had uttered respecting those troops who marched under other colours than the glorious colours of their own nation. Did not the noble. Viscount, 1470 he would ask, feel that those words were a taunt directed against the British marines now serving in Spain? When was there to be an end put to the system of allowing men wearing English uniforms to fight under the Spanish cockade? On these various points he now demanded some information. He had no wish whatever to embarrass his Majesty's Ministers; but he wished that all England, and indeed that all Europe, should know whether it was their intention to pursue any longer the system which they had been pursuing during the last three years under a most mistaken policy.
"In the Basque provinces and Navarre, for their defence, and including armed peasants 35,000 "Under the Infante, gone to Catalonia 12,000 "In Catalonia, well armed, under carious leaders, and organised twenty-three battalions, say 20,000 "In Valencia, under Cabrera, Serrador, and other leaders 16,000 "In Lower Arragon, now chiefly with the Infante's expedition 10,000 "In various parts of the kingdom, in small bands 6,000 "Total 99,000
§ Viscount Melbourne
was sure that the House would excuse him, and so would the noble Marquess if he confined himself to the mere answering of the questions that had been put, and not go very largely into his general argument. The noble Marquess had very justly observed, that the whole policy of the question had been discussed very much at length already in that House; and also, that it had been very fully and amply, and he begged leave to remind their Lordships, not only discussed by themselves, but also in the other House of Parliament. With respect to what would be the policy pursued, the renewing the Order in Council, he apprehended was a sufficient answer to that question. At the same time he begged leave to say, that the renewal of the Order in Council, whatever might be thought by all who were originally opposed to it, was not precisely the same thing to be considered as if it were now for the first time made. Their Lordships were aware, that it was not very easy to depart from a line of policy once adopted; and that such a course would be attended with very great inconveniences. Having induced men to enter into a particular service, by exempting them from the penalties of an Act of Parliament, when those persons felt themselves bound to the same service by feeling, by honour, or by interest, to turn round upon them, by renewing the same severe penalties from which they had been exempted, and thus to compel them to withdraw from that service, could hardly be justifiable, whatever might be the consequences of continuing the present policy. He would add, too, it would hardly be justifiable to the Spanish government, to give to all Europe an example of such marked abandonment of its cause at such a moment; and he felt, also, that such a 1471 course could not be consistent either with the engagements entered into or with the honour of his Majesty's Government, or the good faith of this country. He thought the original issuing of the Order in Council might have well been objected to: but still he thought it by no means the same question, the renewing the Order in Council; and, in fact, it would have been liable to great objection not to have pursued that course. If it had not been done, it would have been a blow inflicted upon the Spanish cause, and it would be a desertion and abandonment of the engagement into which the Government had entered. If the noble Lord had informed him of any particular despatch with respect to which, or for which, he intended to call, then he should have made it undoubtedly his business to inform himself more distinctly as to its existence. The noble Lord had said, that he probably would not answer him upon a particular point upon which he made inquiry—whether there was or not a distinct intimation from the King of the French, of his confining himself to the Quadruple Treaty. Not only now, but at all other times, they never had any other intimation from the King of the French, than that it was strictly and truly his intention to execute that treaty, and to confine himself to the letter of that treaty; and he begged also explicitly to tell the noble Lord, that all they ever required from the government of the King of the French was, that it would execute that treaty. But there was one matter upon which he could give to the noble Lord the most satisfactory and explicit answer, and that was, that the Government of the King of the French had most distinctly disavowed the interpretation of the terms and the expressions put into the speech of the King of the French—it was not their intention, and, furthermore, it did not enter into their imagination, to cast any imputation, to utter any reproach, or to throw any blame on the government of England, by the expressions which they had advised the King to use, and to employ upon that occasion. The noble Lord had said, that there was a pertinacity in adhering to the course they were pursuing, that there was obstinacy in it, and that there was a violent and bigoted attachment to the system that they had adopted, while he must say, notwithstanding the difficulties that were to be encountered, and the dangers 1472 to which they might be exposed, what they adhered to with tenacity, and what they always had adhered to, and what he hoped they would adhere to, was the execution and fulfilment of the treaties extered into by this country. That was the obstinacy—that was the pertinacity—displayed upon this occasion, and no other. The noble Lord said, that he had denied the accuracy of his statement upon a former occasion. He did not recollect the particular statement to which the noble Lord referred, but all he did upon a former occasion was, to hope that the result would be different from that which the noble Lord declared it would be; and he took the liberty, in the same way, in differing with the noble Lord in his expectations of the result of the war upon the present occasion, as he had upon a former. With respect to the specific question which had been moved by the noble Lord, he would say, that it was very well known that the Order in Council suspended the operation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and permitted persons to engage during the period of another year. He begged to say, that Colonel Wylde had no specific instructions as to the reconstruction of the Legion. He was not aware whether there were any specific dispatches relating to that subject on which their Lordships were all so deeply interested, namely, the attempts which had been made to mitigate the sanguinary character of the war in Spain; but he could confidently say, that every possible exertion had been used by the persons in the employment of the British Government, and more particularly by his Majesty's Minister at Madrid, to induce a more humane mode of carrying on the war. He thought, however, that the noble Lord took much too partial a view of one side, when he supposed that the Durango decree would have been abandoned, as a matter of course, if the forbearance he had spoken of had been practiced by the other side. He begged to say, that there never had been the slightest appearance of any disposition on the part of Don Carlos, to withdraw that decree, or to relax its severity; on the contrary, it was acted upon in the most sanguinary and merciless spirit, whenever the opportunity presented itself. He would further remark, that there was a great difference between the barbarities committed under the Durango decree, and any barbarities which might have dis- 1473 graced the Queen's troops, because they were contrary to the wish of the Government. They were against its will and orders, and were the result of the violence and ferocity of the generals and troops themselves; but the barbarities under the decree were the act of the Government—they were the act of that man who called himself King of Spain. He could pledge himself, that every possible effort had been made to produce that result so strongly felt by their Lordships to be in the highest degree desirable.
§ The Duke of Wellington
said, that when he saw his Majesty's Government lending their sanction to his Majesty's subjects engaging in the service of a foreign power, he concluded that their services would be given under certain engagements on the part of that power, and certain terms in favour of the individuals, whether officers or private soldiers, who rendered their services. Now, he wished to ask the noble Viscount, as a Minister of the Crown, whether it was desirable that an agent of his Majesty's Government acting with the army on the Spanish frontier should have gone and interfered in those arrangements and engagements, and should, so far as his own conduct went, for he would not go further than that, have given those individuals cause to believe that those arrangements were sanctioned and guaranteed by his Majesty's Government. He thought that if this officer had taken upon himself to interfere in an arrangement of this description, without the authority of his Majesty's Government, he had done what he ought not to have done. He was an officer employed at the head-quarters of one of the Spanish armies by his Majesty's Government for the purpose of giving them intelligence of the operations that were expected to take place in the course of the war. It was quite right that he should give that intelligence, and that he should be on the best terms with all those who were engaged in those operations, but an interference on his part with his Majesty's subjects, either in assisting to form a fresh Legion, or in any other manner which would induce them to enter into a foreign service, exposed the Government of this country to be sued and called upon to make good the engagements which its agent had been instrumental in forming. He really hoped that the noble Lord was mistaken in supposing that Colonel Wylde had taken any part in the formation of a fresh Legion, 1474 but he must say, that if he had taken that course he had done what he ought not have done.
The Earl of Carnarvon
assured their Lordships that it was with sincere pleasure that he heard the noble Viscount at the head of his Majesty's Government declare that he would use his strenuous endeavours to humanize that most sanguinary warfare which had so long disgraced Spain and civilized Europe, and which he wished to God had never sullied the page of its history. He sincerely trusted, from what had fallen from the noble Viscount, that there was some kind of lurking repentance in the mind of his Majesty's Ministers. Their conduct with regard to the Basques had given him as much pain as if he had experienced a personal misfortune. The noble Lord had said, that the Government would not be consistent with respect to its engagements with Spain if the order in council was not renewed. Now, when he looked at the history of the contest in Spain for the last year, he really could not see any thing which would entitle that country to the particular attention of his Majesty's Ministers. The noble Viscount had also said, that the Spanish generals and soldiers had persevered in the execution of their acts of cruelty in defiance of the Spanish government. Now, he believed, that in many instances the instructions given by the Spanish government were exceeded by the generals and troops who professed to yield obedience to its orders; but he also believed, and his information was derived from sources that he could not doubt, that those instructions were to carry terror into the revolted provinces by the most unsparing execution of the last penalties of the law. Granting, however, that the noble Viscount was right, and that the Spanish government wholly disapproved of the severities practised by its generals, were we at an expense of so much blood and treasure as had been lavished in the prolongation of this contest, to continue our assistance to a government which was so utterly powerless as that of Spain had proved itself to be? He could not but consider as worthy of imitation the policy pointed out by the King of the French in his speech at the opening of the present session of the French Chambers, when he said that France would only arm when French interests were concerned, and that her sons should march to battle only under the glorious banners of their native 1475 country. He perfectly agreed with his noble Friend who spoke so energetically at the commencement of this discussion, in the abhorrence which he felt at this mode of warfare, and the manner in which the English name had been mixed up in this contest. He lamented that so many brave Spaniards had died on British bayonets at Irun, not exactly in cold blood, but still after the town had surrendered. After all that had occurred he must say, that he thought that the order in council ought not to have been renewed. We ought to have known what arrangements had been made in favour of the Legion, when we knew all that it had suffered during its former period of service. Could they, knowing what had passed, believe that the Legion would have regular pay, and not only regular pay, but also that fair treatment and usage which a force encouraged to enlist by the Government of this country had a right to expect, and which the British public had a right to demand for them? When he looked at the state of the Legion for the last two years, he saw that the officers were without authority, and the men without discipline, imbibing in many instances the ferocious habits of those with whom they were combined. Without meaning any disparagement to the officers, he could not help saying, that in his opinion that force ought not to be permitted to compromise the military character of England. He did not believe that we were authorised to send out persons to fight the battles of a foreign power when we had no just cause for doing so. The honour of the country was deeply implicated in what had occurred recently in Spain. No distinction was drawn by the natives of that country between a regular British force and the Legion; and all that was known in Spain generally was, that a body of Englishmen in arms had experienced some of the greatest reverses in that country which it had been our fate to sustain for a long period of time. The national interests had in consequence suffered, and our military glory had been obscured; operations had been undertaken, the extreme injustice of which it was impossible to overrate, and although the success of them might have dazzled opinion, yet that would have been a poor compensation for a great departure from sound policy. The point, however, which he considered most objectionable in the conduct of His Majesty's Government was, 1476 that they had no settled views of policy on this subject, but that they had been wafted from one indiscretion to another by the changing circumstances of the war. What he complained of, and what the Basques had a right to complain of, was this—that they had never been able to know what were the real intentions of His Majesty's Ministers. In the beginning of the war they disclaimed all intention of dictating as to the mode in which the war was to be carried on. Our assistance to Spain was limited by the treaty, and by the additional articles, to a naval co-operation, which could only be afforded by a blockade of the coast. This treaty was followed by the formation of the Legion, and that step was supported by sending out the marines to co-operate with the forces of the Queen of Spain, in opposition to the population of the Basque provinces, whose heroism and devotion had no parallel in history. It appeared to him that there would not be found any provision in the treaty which justified the kind of military co-operation which under a forced interpretation had been brought to bear on this unfortunate people. He lamented most deeply that any inconsistency should be found in the language employed when debating these subjects, by any members of His Majesty's Government. In the collision of party these inconsistencies of language might be looked upon as mere breath, but they were often replete with misery and ruin to others. If the report of the speech attributed to M. Molé in the French Chambers was correct, in 1835 France did apply to the Court of St. James's to know whether the English Government was willing to co-operate with her in a military intervention in Spain. It was stated that England refused, alleging that it was not a casus fœderis. Subsequently, however, England was found quite ready to co-operate, and had actually interfered. Now, was it fair, was it just, to trifle in this manner with the feelings of men who believed that they had taken up arms in the defence of their lawful Sovereign? How many individuals who had staked their fortunes, and risked their families on the issue of this civil war, would have paused before they rushed on the perils of that encounter, if they had known what were the intentions of the British Government. If His Majesty's Ministers were determined upon interfering they should have said to the Basques, 1477 "Although you are exhausting your families which they were, and sending out child after child to die in the defence of his country, we must entreat you to cease from this hopeless and useless contest, because, although you are shedding your blood (and blood had been poured out like water), yet in, the fulness of time, when we think it most fitting, we shall interfere to establish such a state of things as without our assistance the Spanish Government can never hope to establish, and which must consign you, if you persevere, if not to the scaffold, at least to exile, accompanied by the total loss of the property which you may possess." He must stop here; there were some other points to which he wished to have called their Lordships' attention, but he should not be able. [The noble Lord was exhausted.] He must, however, advert, though it was a very delicate subject, to the disposition of the continental powers towards England with reference to the Spanish contest. He did not wish to say anything that could be construed into a manifestation of a desire to precipitate convulsions; but he must say, that the peace of Europe could only be preserved by a system of mutual—which he did not call dishonourable—forbearance and compromise. Now, he thought that the northern powers had, in respect to Spain, evinced very great forbearance indeed: and he thought it became his Majesty's Ministers, not to tempt that forbearance too far, lest they kindled the flames of a general war. For what purpose did His Majesty's Government interfere? Why, only to support what, if there was a spark of vitality in its composition, must be kept alive by the Spanish people themselves. The constitution of Spain might boast of very little political wisdom, but their Lordships must recollect that the people of Spain were not mere novices in constitutional struggles. He was convinced that our interference could produce no good result; but he wished to know whether by that unfortunate treaty into which His Majesty's Ministers had entered, they had not implicated the Government of this country in difficulties of which they could not see the extent or limit. Suppose the civil war in Spain was to go on for ten or fifteen years—and who that knew Spain and Spaniards would say that the contest might not be continued for a longer period?—would the people of this country, op- 1478 pressed as they were with public burthens year after year vote sums out of the public money to continue a murderous strife which brought no glory, and in which they had no imaginable interest? It was observable, too, that in all this business his Majesty's Government had only professed to expect some general possible, and remote advantage to this country. He trusted that after all that had been said, His Majesty's Ministers would restrict their interference in Spain within the narrowest limits that it was possible to set out. He was quite sure that the path of policy and the path of honour lay in that direction. Such a course would be more conducive to the peace of Europe—such a course would be better for England and would be better for Spain.
The Earl of Minto
must say one or two words on the most ungenerous treatment which had been bestowed on the brave men under the command of General Evans, who had acted with a degree of forbearance and humanity—and on this he would appeal to the noble Duke (Wellington), whose fairness and generosity he acknowledged—of which he knew few examples in history. It had been the fashion in the debates of last year to say, that these men would, if they continued in the Spanish service, come home half savages, and that they would be unfit for the society of their friends. He asked whether there was any thing in the conduct of those men which indicated a probability of such behaviour? and he would observe, that, notwithstanding all that had been said with respect to the disgrace which had been suffered by the British name, in consequence of the atrocities which had been committed, not one word had been said of him who had been the author of these cruelties. The noble Earl who had last spoken, adverting to the conduct of the British Legion at Irun, said, that soldiers of the Spanish garrison fell upon British bayonets not before the surrender, but after the victory had been gained. Now, he thought it due to that corps to read the official despatch of Lord John Hay, or at least the concluding sentence of it:—"This important fortress surrendered on the 18th inst., and I have the greatest satisfaction in bearing testimony to the respect which was paid to the persons and property of the inhabitants by her Majesty's troops." In a private letter accompanying that despatch, after com- 1479 plimenting the gallantry displayed by the troops on that occasion, Lord John Hay said, "Every possible respect was paid to the persons and property of the inhabitants, not a man was killed after the town had surrendered, and it is wonderful that the Legion kept their temper so well, as the day before they left Hernani five of the corps were taken and shot by the Carlists." If he wanted any other document he would refer to the letter drawn up by the garrison of Irun, and addressed to Don Carlos, in which they stated, that 700 families were indebted for the lives of their relations to the forbearance of the British troops, and in which they requested in the most emphatic and impressive manner, that their barbarous Sovereign would repeal the cruel order which he. had given.
The Marquess of Londonderry
, in reply, asked, did the noble Earl suppose that noble Lords on his (the opposition) side of the House approved of, or did not look with horror upon, the sanguinary conduct of the Carlists? He maintained, however, that the Christino generals, at the commencement of the war, led the way to these atrocities. But what had been the course taken by his Majesty's Government? He would fearlessly declare, that they had not used their best efforts to insist upon the Spanish government giving an example of humanity, which, if they had set, he would take upon himself to say, would have been immediately followed by those who were opposed to them. With respect to the services of the Legion, he had never touched upon them. As a soldier he should be very sorry to judge these questions if he had not all the grounds for forming an opinion before him. He might have an opinion upon the despatches which had been published, but they might not contain a correct account of what had happened. Looking, however, at those despatches, he must say, that it appeared to him that if it had not been for the gallant seamen and the distinguished corps over which the noble Earl (Minto) presided, the Legion might have been placed in a very difficult situation. The Legion was in confusion; the columns were in disorder; they were clogged, they could not deploy, and, by mistaken directions, they had been placed in positions in which they were rendered useless. If the noble Viscount argued upon military details, he might hear opinions he was not prepared for.
§ Subject dropped.