Lords Sitting of 6 March 1835

MINUTES.
Petitions presented. By the Duke of GORDON, from several Parishes in Aberdeen, Ross, and Roxburghshire, for Extending the Established Church in Scotland.

EDUCATION IN IRELAND.
The Earl of Roden,seeing the noble Duke in his place, was anxious to put a question to the noble Duke, which he would no doubt be kind enough to answer. Knowing the extreme anxiety that there was, not only among the Protestants of Ireland, but among the great mass of religious communities in this country, with reference to the subject of Education in Ireland, he wished to ask the noble Duke whether it were the intention of the Government to
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propose this year an estimate for the National School in Ireland; and if so, whether the amount of that estimate would be an increase upon that which was proposed last year?
The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, that it was the intention of the Government to apply to the House of Commons for the grant of a sum for the support of the National School in Ireland; and that that sum would be greater than was asked last year, on account of providing for the expenses of certain buildings.

UNIVERSITY OATHS.
The Earl of Radnorrose to move for certain returns respecting Oaths taken at the Universities. In order to explain something of the object he had in view, and likewise to defend himself against an attack that had been made upon him, he should feel it necessary to preface his motion by a few observations. In the course of the last session of Parliament, a bill had been brought to their Lordships, from the other House, upon the subject of these University Oaths. That Bill was thrown out upon the second reading. In the course of the discussion that then took place, a good deal was said on both sides on the subject of the nature of these University Oaths. He had given notice, a day or two after that Bill was thrown out, that he should bring in a measure relating to subscriptions and tests, as well as oaths at the University. Having given that notice, he had been induced to turn his attention to the subject; and the more he looked into it, the more serious in its consequences did it appear to him to become. He should probably, therefore, make a separate measure of that which related to Oaths applied as tests at the University; for the more he examined it, the more he was convinced that the subject of these Oaths required to be reviewed. In the course of the discussions, he had alluded to something of a personal nature which had occurred, which he must be pardoned if he now remarked upon. He felt strongly upon it at the time, but he should dispose of it now very shortly. One of the right reverend Prelates, in answer to an observation that he feared that some of the young men who took these oaths on entering the University must commit perjury, remarked that he (the Earl of Radnor) must be the only perjured man in the University, as he did not appear to be acquainted with the sta-

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tutes to which those Oaths related, and had not obeyed them; for he had not attended certain lectures, as they required him to do. He did not much feel that he was liable to the charge of perjury; for he believed that, in the case of Oaths of this kind, the perjury, if any, was not in the person who took an oath, the meaning of which he did not rightly comprehend, so much as in the man who compelled him to take it. But the right reverend Prelate should have been sure of his facts, before he brought such a charge against any person. If there was any guilt in his not attending the lectures it was the guilt of those who required him to attend the lectures, but gave no lectures at all. There was the Epinomis, too. He had been talking to several friends of his, men educated, like himself, at Oxford, on the subject of the Epinomis, and all but one of them said that they knew nothing whatever about it; that one said he certainly had heard the word, but never could comprehend what was meant by it. What, then, did the authorities at the Universities do, but call on boys of sixteen to take an oath, the nature of which they did not explain? If these persons did their duty, they would make a standing statute of the University, that these boys should become acquainted with the nature and meaning of the Oath, before they took it; or, at least, that they should construe or translate the Epinomis. He thought, however, that it would be better to get rid of the Epinomis altogether, for there might be very good reasons why young men should not he instructed in it; for, in his opinion, it opened the way to the easy committal of perjury, or at least it stated things that much shook the authority and sanctity of an oath. It made quibbles on the subject, which it would be just as well not to present to men's minds. It stated three cases in which a man might commit perjury. The first of these was one about which no man could doubt, namely, that if a man swore that he had done a thing, or that he believed a thing, when he had not done it, or did not believe it, he would be guilty of perjury. The second was, that those were perjured who swore that they would do something, but were not willing afterwards to submit to punishment for not doing it. That appeared to him altogether doing away with the value of an oath. If a man only bound himself to submit to punishment for not doing what he had sworn to
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do, the oath to do the thing was of no value whatever, A witness in a court of justice was sworn to speak the truth; but, according to the doctrine he had just stated, if the witness was willing to undergo the penalty for perjury, he was absolved from his oath. This doctrine was one of a most false and dangerous kind. The third of the cases stated was, where a man had incapacitated himself by any disobedience of the statutes from taking his degree; but against this it was said there might be dispensations. It, again, seemed to him most mischievous, that men should ever understand that there might be dispensations to absolve them from the consequences of the oaths they had taken. Then there were three chapters on dispensations. The first treated of ordinary dispensations; the second of dispensations to be granted by the great convocation; and the third mentioned cases, where no dispensations at all could be granted. It was curious enough, that those things which in the third chapter were treated of as incapable of being made the subject of dispensations, were now held at Oxford to afford the most ample ground for dispensations. It seemed, therefore, that there were three sorts of satutory dispensations very commonly, if not universally in use; and one of these was intrusted to the Chancellor of the University. He had no doubt that the noble Duke opposite was not in the least aware that as Chancellor of the University, he could give these dispensations, (which the Epinomis said could not be given at all) to every one about to take the degree of Master of Arts. Here was an instance. It was a rule, that before receiving that degree, a man should keep twelve terms; but it appeared from the Oxford Calendar, that only one of them was indispensable; and that three might be dispensed with by the convocation; and six more by the Chancellor's letter. The noble Earl here went into a statement relating to the keeping of terms, and the dispensations from them. An anonymous writer had attacked, in a very furious manner, those who said that these things were abuses; and had lavished some very hard epithets upon them, and upon him among the rest; but he was not to be deterred from conscientiously discharging his duty by such abuse. He proceeded, therefore, to call their Lordships' attention to the fact that the Epinomis actually declared guilty of perjury, all those au-

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thorities of the University who should presume to allow the statutes to fall into disuse, even through negligence alone. Having stated these things generally to their Lordships, he should move for a copy of the Epinomis, from the University of Oxford, together with an account of the Oaths taken at that University. His object was, to make some alterations in the laws of the University on the subject of Oaths. He believed that the noble Duke, since becoming Chancellor of the University, had desired to make some change of this sort; but that he had found that the body from whom he desired these changes to proceed, was not quite so easily moved as some other troops that he had had the command of. It was to be hoped, however, that they would consent to make the necessary alterations. It would be more for the good of the University, that such alterations should come from them than through the means of an Act of Parliament. This was, in substance, the return of which he had given notice, though the form of it was somewhat altered. With respect to the University of Cambridge, he only wanted one return—namely, the oath which was administered to young men on matriculation. They were sworn during the whole of their lives to maintain the honour and dignity of the University; an oath most improvidently taken, at the early age at which they generally entered themselves there. The noble Earl concluded by moving for Copies and Translations of all Oaths taken by Members of the University of Oxford, (excepting the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, as follows:
1. On Matriculation.—2. On taking the respective Degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts.—3. On the Admission of Masters of Arts to their Regency.
Also, Copies and Translations of the Form used,—1. In petitioning for Graces for the Degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts respectively.—2. In applying for, and—3. In granting Dispensations for the Degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts, under Tit. ix. Sec. iv. §, 2., Articles 1 and 4, and under Tit. x. Sec. v., respectively.
Also, Copy and Translation of the Chancellor's Letter for Dispensation, stating the Form and Mode of Application for, and the Manner of obtaining the same; and the average annual Number applied for and granted for the last Ten Years.
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Also, Copy and Translation of the Epinomis.
Also, Statement of the Number of Degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts respectively granted in the last Ten Years, under the following Circumstances:—1. Without any Dispensation whatever.—2. Without Dispensation under Tit. ix. Sec. iv. § 2. Article 1.—3. Without Dispensation under Tit. ix. Sec. iv. § 2. Article 4.—4. Without Dispensation under Tit. x. Sec. v.
And also, Copy and Translation of the Oath taken at Matriculation in the University of Cambridge.
The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, that the noble Earl having been so kind as to communicate to him the list of the papers comprehended in the motion which he intended to make, he had thought it his duty to consult those who were most interested in the inquiry which the noble Earl had thought proper to institute, and he had obtained the willing consent of those persons to the production of these papers. The noble Earl said, that he had altered the motion; still he had no objection to make the required return. But he did think that the noble Earl, having communicated the motion he intended to make, and having been informed that there would be no objection to it, he ought to have been also informed, by the noble Earl, of the noble Earl's intention to come down there, and make a charge against the University of Oxford, if it was his intention to do so at the period that these communications took place. The noble Earl said, that he was anxious to awaken the public mind to this matter of the University of Oxford, in order to influence the University by the expression of public opinion. In his opinion, the public mind was not likely to be influenced by one-sided discussions; but would wait till both sides were heard, when there was some one to make the charge, and some one prepared to answer it. He acknowledged that he was not prepared; and he was not because the noble Earl had not done him the justice, nor the University the justice, to state that he intended to come there, and make a charge against the University. There was not the smallest objection to the production of the papers. He should be perfectly willing to meet the noble Earl when the papers were produced—when he moved for his Bill, or after it was brought in; but he had not expected that the noble

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Earl would take the course he had taken that day, and therefore he was not prepared with an answer. Under these circumstances, he could not do more than consent to produce the papers, which he did most readily.
The Bishop of Llandaffcould make some answer to one of the charges of the noble Earl, as he had long been connected with the University of Cambridge. Knowing the candour of the character of the noble Earl, he thought the noble Earl would have abstained from making charges which involved the moral character of the men to whom they related, and which went to throw on them a stain of a very serious kind. The noble Earl objected to Oaths, which he said were administered to men at a time of life when they were not quite competent to decide what these Oaths meant, and to pledge themselves to things which they did not intend, and could not be expected to intend, to perform. Now the Oath administered was no more than this, that the young man would observe and keep the laws, statutes, and customs of the University. A copy of the statutes was delivered to the young man at the time he took the Oath, and the most superficial observer of these statutes could not look at them without seeing that they put an end to mach of the serious charge brought against the University by the noble Earl. Some of the offences, there provided against, were to be visited with a fine of 8d., some of 1s. 4d., and some of a larger sum. A gradation of penalties like these, showed that the offence was not considered to amount to perjury. The offender was bound to submit to the punishment, for the disregard of the statutes, or else he would violate the Oath he had taken. But, besides this, annexed to the collection of statutes, given to each student, there was a declaratory law, which stated the limits of the obligation under which those, who took this Oath, were placed. All the writers on the subject of moral philosophy were agreed, that the measure of the obligation was not that which the mind of the man who took the oath put upon it, but that which was put upon it by him who proposed the oath. That was the opinion of Paley, and of Saunderson, in his celebrated treatise, De Juramenti Obligatione. The explanation of the meaning of the University Oaths, was drawn up by Bishop Saunderson himself, for the purpose, as it is expressly said, of satisfy-
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ing tender consciences, and of pointing out to them the extent of their obligation. It might be better not to retain a form of words that required explanation, but the practice was not culpable, as it had been stated to be this night. It might, also, be culpable not to explain to each new comer, in the fullest manner, all that could be said on these Oaths; and he himself had always thought it his duty to explain to such persons, the sense in which they administered these Oaths; and whether his explanation was right or wrong, their consciences were clear. But the omission of this well-understood explanation, was not deserving of the serious censure expressed, with regard to the whole matter, by the noble Earl. Then, the noble Lord had attempted to assimilate the proceedings at the University, with what took place in a court of justice. He said, a man having been sworn to speak the truth in a court of justice, and having been punished with the pillory for not speaking the truth, was according to the rule adopted in the University, absolved from perjury when he had undergone the penalty. This was a very curious, but not a very accurate, view of the subject. If, indeed, the witness was told beforehand by the judge, that such was the meaning of the Oath, there might be some ground for the comparison.—In a court of justice, a man is sworn simply to speak the truth, but in the case to which the noble Lord referred it was openly declared that something was to be done, or, in default, a certain penalty was to be submitted to, by which means the offence of perjury was removed. Another of the noble Lord's charges was, the facility with which dispensation was procured for the non-performance of those duties which the oath rendered imperative.—Whether dispensations were too easily granted, was quite a different question from the guilt of perjury. It was to avoid perjury that they were granted; but when he said this, he agreed with the noble Lord, that it would be better to repeal obsolete statutes, than to be continually dispensing with them as a matter of course. His great object, however, in addressing their Lordships was, to defend the moral character of those whose conduct was impugned. They were not considering what at was most expedient with respect to the course which the University should adopt, but whether the individuals who were con-

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nected with the University, were guilty or not guilty of forsaking the duty imposed upon them by an oath. With regard to the last of the charges, which the noble Lord had supported by reference to a pamphlet, which he (the Bishop of Llandaff) had never seen in his life, if the noble Lord examined that pamphlet again, with more attention, he would probably find that that part of the system of which he complained, was perfectly consonant with strict observance of the statutes.—In conformity with the Oaths, certain degrees could not be taken, without certain exercises had been performed, unless a dispensation were granted in due form. Now, there was a chapter in the statutes, as to what was indispensable, and what might be dispensed with, by application to certain authorities. There was nothing ambiguous in this. On such and such points, proper reasons being assigned, dispensation might be granted, by the inferior body to whom the ordinary business of conferring degrees was intrusted. But other things could not be dispensed with by that body. These things were called indispensable—i. e. not absolutely indispensable, but indispensable by them. A higher authority must be called in, namely, the collective authority of the whole University, acting upon a recommendation from the Chancellor. The course was, to have the case submitted to the deliberation of the heads of houses. Then, a petition was sent to the Chancellor for his recommendation—which, being addressed to the Vice-Chancellor, and read in full Convocation, the dispensation was allowed to pass—the result was then made known. This was meant as a check to the grant of such indulgences. He understood, however, that in most instances, it was become a matter of course, and that the practice had been abridged ever since he had left the University—that blank forms, signed by the Chancellor were left to be filled up as the case might require. But it was not so in Lord Grenville's time. This was a subject, however, not for their Lordships' consideration. They were assembled for public purposes; and he should not therefore enter into private details of that nature, connected with the customs of the University. It was, however, a great deal too much for the noble Lord to say, that the young men at the University were so treated, that they did not mind the obli-
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gation of an oath. The public were told so, and he would say, that nothing could be more decidedly false, than such an assertion. He knew very well, that, thus taken by surprise, he had not done justice to the subject; but feeling, as he did, for the character of the University, and of those individuals who were closely connected with it, he could not avoid saying, that the charges of the noble Lord, as far as they related to the obligation of Oaths were utterly unfounded.
Lord Broughamsaid, he did not mean to accuse any of the authorities connected with the Universities; but he was sure their Lordships must feel with him, that the subject was worthy of serious consideration. He knew nothing personally of the University of Oxford; but he entirely objected to the taking of Oaths, when the individuals did not know to what they were binding themselves when they made an asseveration in the presence of God. In the first place, it was for their Lordships to consider whose fault it was that such a system prevailed, and, in the next, to look a little at the manner in which the Oaths administered in the University were kept. His noble Friend had been attacked, as if he had brought a charge against the University—as if he had brought any imputation against it—as if he had charged the University of Oxford with wilfully encouraging perjury. He had done no such thing. But his noble Friend having been charged last year, with somewhat of the guilt of perjury, he turned round and said, "So far from my being guilty, it is you who propound those Oaths with whom the guilt rests, seeing that they are administered without due preparation." His noble friend cast no blame upon individuals, but he blamed the system. The Oaths, it appeared, were taken as a matter of course. "The consequence," said his noble Friend, "is neither more nor less than this—that we are driven to the conclusion, that the oaths are more lightly dealt with than they ought to be." Now, what was the extent of this charge? Why, it went only to the extent which he had mentioned. His noble friend had brought up evidence in support of what he had said. He had pointed out in the statutes the denunciation of perjury against those who suffered the law to fall into desuetude; and yet it was clear that the law had in the instances pointed out been allowed to fall into

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desuetude. This, then, went to one of two things—those who had the care of those laws ought to keep them up; or, if they were totally unfit to be retained, then they ought at once openly and fairly and frankly to be repealed, instead of allowing them to remain on the book. When they saw that the statutes were not kept up, did not that circumstance clearly show that they were no longer applicable to the circumstances of the University; and that being the case, was it not evident that those oaths should no longer be allowed? He could not help considering the taking of oaths on such trifling occasions as extremely reprehensible. That the occasions were trifling he inferred from the circumstance, that 6d. absolved an individual for breaking one, 8d. for breaking another; and so on in gradation. Oaths ceased to be proper safeguards when they were so lightly treated. They ought to be reserved for the most solemn occasions—dignus vindice nodus. If a necessity existed for the intervention of an oath—if an appeal were proper to be made to divine justice, let it be done in the most solemn manner. It surely ought not to be resorted to in a case where a fine of 8d. would remove the charge of perjury; it should only be introduced with reference to the performance of duties that could not by any means be dispensed with. As to other oaths, they came within the same principle, with the exception that they were taken by adults in the course and practice of business, and the affairs of the world; whereas these Oaths prescribed by the Universities were taken with all the form and solemnity of oaths generally, although in quality, in reality, or in effect, they were unlike other oaths. He had always thought that voluntary affidavits made before Magistrates (affidavits in which, if such should be the case, perjury could not be assigned, though still such false swearing might be treated and punished as a misdemeanour), tended to bad effects, and to bring oaths into a sort of levity of dealing, and to remove the impression of those solemnities which should be flung around, and to fence so important an obligation. However absurd it might be to take voluntary affidavits, it was more absurd to make a boy take oaths which perhaps might be explained, but which were such a trifle that he could either keep them or not, for a penalty only of 6d. or 8d.
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The Bishop of Llandaff begged to say, in explanation, that students did take a serious oath, to obey the authorities of the Universities.
Lord Brougham.—And to swear to keep the statutes.
The Bishop of Llandaff.—To observe the statutes.
Lord Brougham.—Yes, or to make the last an eightpenny matter, and in fact, and in substance, it was not, therefore binding. His (Lord Brougham's) opinion was, that it would be a most excellent thing to get rid of these Oaths, as well as others, which had fallen into desuetude, and to fix on Oaths required by law the denunciation, that to break them would be perjury.
The Earl of Radnorreplied. In answer to what had fallen from the right reverend Prelate, he begged to say, that the first complaint or charge which he made against the University of Oxford was for not doing that which as the head of one of the houses the right reverend Prelate had stated he himself had always done—namely, that care was not taken by those to whom the education of youth was there intrusted to explain to them this form to which they were liable, and which he had mentioned. It was the duty of those so intrusted to make that explanation. The other complaint was, that in the University of Oxford there prevailed a far too great laxity in granting dispensations, and that degrees were granted by those means too readily, and in these two complaints he, as it seemed to him, had the perfect concurrence of the right reverend Prelate himself. The other practices to which he had alluded were not charges of his making, but charges made by the work he had mentioned, which stated that parties were perjured in certain cases. He, however, further contended, that under one chapter dispensations could not be granted. Their Lordships were aware that under the standing orders of the House a Bill could not pass more than one stage in one and the same day. It was true that in cases of urgent necessity this standing order was suspended, but should it become a practice that every Bill should be so treated, and perhaps progressed all its stages on the same day, what would their Lordships say to swearing, on the opening of the Session, to keep and observe the standing orders of the House? By such a proceeding their

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Lordships would stultify themselves in the same manner as he contended the Universities did in matters of dispensation. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Wellington) had complained of want of candour on his part in this instance. The facts of the case were these:—When he had read his notice of Motion, the clerk at the Table asked him to furnish it, in order that it might be entered upon the notices. He remarked that it was probable he might alter it before the Motion came on, and when he spoke on the subject afterwards to the noble Duke, he had also mentioned the probability of an alteration in its form. He had certainly not told the noble Duke that it was his intention to preface the Motion with a speech, and when the noble Duke inquired if he sent down the terms of the Motion to the Universities and they assented to furnish the information, he had replied that in such a case he would make the Motion. Now, he was sure that when the noble Duke and himself formerly sat together in another place, it was deemed improper to submit a Motion without first laying some grounds for it. Under the impression that such a practice was to be followed in this House, he thought he had done sufficient to relieve himself from the charge of want of candour by putting the noble Duke in possession of the terms of his Motion, and also of his intention, under any circumstances, to make it. It had been also stated, somewhat in the tone of complaint, that owing to these circumstances there was a want of preparation now to meet the Question. He was surprised to hear this advanced, because scarcely twelve-months had elapsed since the noble Duke himself had taken the oath to observe these statutes, and, besides the noble Duke, there were several Prelates who had taken them over and over again. He was therefore at a loss to know how want of preparation could be urged on the present occasion. Repeating his impression, that the only charges which he himself had made had been sanctioned by the right reverend Prelate who had addressed the House, he should conclude by expressing the satisfaction he felt that his observations on the subject had met with that right reverend Prelate's concurrence.
The Bishop of Llandaffsaid, that he assented to the observations of the noble Earl no further than to say that it would be much better that those statutes should
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be repealed, instead of dispensations being continued.
The Bishop of Gloucestersaid, that he should not have said a word on the present occasion had it not been that the noble Earl who had brought forward the present Motion had applied, last year, words to the University of Cambridge which he (the Bishop of Glocester) was disposed to think undeserved. The noble Earl had alluded to one Oath, which was to the effect that the party taking it would "protect and preserve all the honours, dignities, privileges, and immunities of the University, and defend them by his counsel and advice so long as he lived." The noble Earl had termed this oath first to be absurd, and, afterwards, to be wicked. He (the Bishop of Glocester) was himself so decided an enemy of all unnecessary oaths, that he should be disposed to join in the wish that this law of the University should be expunged as soon as it was proved to be unnecessary. Indeed, he might almost agree in the proposition that the Oath was unnecessary, upon the fact that though it had existed for many centuries, the instances of perjury on that head were indeed very few, for there had ever been found many ready to defend the honours, privileges, and rights of the University with which they had been connected. If this was wickedness, it was a wickedness which had extended over many ages, and yet many advocates had been found for the Oaths both of matriculation and the conferring of degrees.
The Earl of Radnorsaid, that he was in possession of the form of Oath, which had been sent him by a son who had recently entered the University of Cambridge, and he repeated, that if that University did its duty by those confided to its care, an attachment to its institutions would of course grow up with increasing years, but that to make a boy of sixteen years of age swear to impressions, and feelings to be retained all his life was, as he thought, absurd as well as wicked.
The Motion was agreed to.