Lords Sitting of 30 July 1835

MINUTES.
The Royal Assent was given by Commission to the following Bills:—Stamp Duties Offices' Consolidation; Merchant Seamen; Property in Infants' (Ireland); Contempt in Equity (Ireland); General Turnpike Act Amendment; as a Number of private Bills.—Read athirdtime:— Lunatic Act Continuance.
Petitions presented. By the Dukes of NEWCASTLE and WELLINGTON, the Marquess CAMDEN, Earls VERULAM, HAREWOOD, and SHAFTESBURY, Lords SKELMERSDALE and LYNDHURST, from a Number of Places,—against the Municipal Corporations' Bill.—By the Earls of WEST-MORELAND and BEAUCHAMP, and Viscount STRANGFORD, from a Number of Places, against the same Bill—By Lord FOLEY and Lord BROUGHAM, from several Places,—in favour of the same.

CORPORATION COMMISSIONERS (TIVERTON).
The Earl of Harrowbybegged leave, on presenting a petition from the Corporation of Tiverton, against the Municipal Corporation Bill, to rectify
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some statements respecting his own conduct, in the Appendix to the Report of the Commissioners. The noble Earl then proceeded:—It is stated that there was produced to them a copy of a letter, without address, in the handwriting of Mr. Bevis Wood, a late Town Clerk, desiring the person to whom it is addressed to use his influence to procure the appointment of Duntze as Receiver General of one of the districts of the county of Devon.— This letter is written in the name of the corporators, said to be thereunto subscribed. The postscript is as follows:— "You will please to remember that this our recommendation of S. Duntze is on this condition, that he reside and keep his offices in the town of Tiverton, and that he agree to make an annual allowance to the corporators of the sum of 20 l. for every shilling in the pound land-tax, which now amounts to 80 l. yearly." It is further stated, that this letter was sent to me, and that P. S. Duntze was appointed, and regularly paid the Corporation the stipulated sum of 80 l. per annum for a certain period. It is, however, added, that the late Town Clerk, Mr. John Wood, said that I was not a party to the condition attached to the recommendation of P. S. Duntze. I cannot rest satisfied with this half-accusation and half-acquittal. If these were, in reality, all the facts of the case—if I had been really cognizant of this transaction, and acquiesced in it, I must plead guilty to the implied charge of having been a party to it. The whole of the facts, however, are these; and although at the distance of thirty-four years, my recollection of them is sufficiently accurate to enable me to verify the substance of them in the most solemn manner. On the occurrence of the vacancy, P. S. Duntze, who was the son of my late colleague, and a personal friend of mine, applied to me to procure for him the vacant office. At his personal request alone I asked this favour of Mr. Pitt, and received every possible encouragement short of an absolute promise. Subsequently to this interview an intimation reached me (whether by the receipt of the above letter and postscript, or by some other written communication I cannot now be certain, but it is of no importance) that some arrangement of the nature there mentioned had been in contemplation. I took this communication to Mr. Pitt, and told him that unless I received the most

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unequivocal assurances that all ideas of such an arrangement was abandoned, I must withdraw my application. I wrote to that effect to Tiverton. I received those assurances—I communicated them to Mr. Pitt, to whom, as well as myself, they were perfectly satisfactory, and P. S. Duntze was appointed. The fact of annual payments having been made by him is stated in the appendix. He may have made them voluntarily, under an erroneous impression that his appointment was in fact owing to the recommendation of the Corporation, whereas it was that interference which produced the only difficulty. It was certainly kept carefully out of my knowledge, as when I served the office of mayor some years afterwards I never heard of any such payment. It is further stated that a similar payment was made by Mr. Hamilton, also one of the Receivers General; but as his appointment was made in 1765, I do not think it necessary to say anything in my own behalf, or in that of the present Corporation. The Commissioners proceed to say that the extraordinary nature of these arrangements induced them to institute a strict inquiry as to this portion of the corporate revenues (as if it were a regular item.) "We found that very numerous appointments in the Church, as well as in various departments of the public service, had been obtained by members of the Corporation, and by their friends and connexions; but it did not appear that the Corporation derived any direct pecuniary benefit from any of the appointments so obtained, except in the cases of P. S. Duntze and Mr. Hamilton. It must, however, be stated, that, from the negligent manner in which the accounts of the Corporation have been kept, it was impossible to obtain any accurate or satisfactory account of the receipt or expenditure for very many years." This insinuation I can positively aver to be perfectly groundless. No application, to the best of my recollection, was ever made by the Corporation, except in one case for an office of very small amount, as a mere matter of charity. To the accusation, as far as it respects myself, of having as opportunity offered, during a connexion of forty-seven years, done service to those who were doing service to me and to my family, I should be sorry to be able to plead not guilty. Such an interchange of good offices is a legitimate bond of friend-
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ship in public as in private life; and if any noble Lord who has been connected with Parliamentary interest will assert that he has not done the same—is not now doing the same—and will not persist in so doing —I am willing to submit to the whole weight of his censure. Petition laid on the Table.

CORPORATION REFORM — HEARING COUNSEL.
Lord Brougham: My Lords, I take this opportunity to notice a misrepresentation as to my conduct with regard to hearing Counsel upon the Municipal Corporations' Bill. There is no one who cares less than I do for what is said about him, whether it be with regard to what I say and do here or in any other place. No man, my Lords, can have lived as long as I have lived in the world without knowing that it is the common lot of humanity to be occasionally abused and misrepresented. Without expressing what I feel as to the charge that has been made against me, I am entitled to state that there never was any charge move utterly groundless than that which has been brought against me by a Ministerial newspaper. Newspapers I will not say having the patronage of the Government, nor will I say under the protection of the Government, certainly not the patronage and protection of my noble Friend; but newspapers which have taken my noble Friend under their protection. I do not think if I were allowed to give an opinion on the subject, that the attack is a very judicious one; because one like myself, unconnected with the Government—never saying one word against the Government—and I am happy to say that I have not had occasion to do so—but uniformly defending and supporting it: I therefore say I do not think it the most judicious course—because sometimes my advice may have been deemed useless advice—although it was ever humble, sincere, and well meant, and I gave it at all times conscientiously —that I should be attacked in the manner I have been by those who are under my noble Friends' protection, or who have taken my noble Friends under their protection. I am sure that the attacks did not proceed from my noble Friends. I am sure that they disapprove altogether of such attacks. I know them too well to believe that they had any hand whatever in it; for they are men of sense—but their underlings are those who have made the

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attacks. One man is disappointed at not getting anything while I was in office. Another is vexed for some similar reason. It is they who are the authors of these attacks. It is not, I repeat, the principals who have done this; it is the underlings instigated by the sort of motive I have described. One of the charges made against me, my Lords, is that which, probably, many of your Lordships would think no charge at all. The whole blame is thrown upon me of the delay which is to be occasioned by hearing Counsel against this Bill, I know that I have the answer to that charge in the breasts of your Lordships; but I have also another antidote to it—I have the antidote in another part of the same paper; for the honest and faithful reporters tell what I really did say, but the writer, not choosing to look at what I did say, but with the vile purpose of misrepresenting me, had recourse to his own fancy, and fancied things which I never did say—things which were never done— though the first page of the same paper contained a true statement of what was said and what was done. But people will not always read fair statements before they make comments on them: they had rather have recourse to imagination. Perhaps it is more pleasant to utter reproof than to yield praise, or even than to be silent; and the reader may not read the report of the debates, but may turn to the leading article to get a knowledge of them. Your Lordships know what I did say. I said, and I argued, perhaps at too great length, against hearing Counsel at all. I said that if you heard them on one side, you could not refuse, if required, to hear them on the other. I entered into calculations on the subject. I told you that it was not done in the Irish 40 s. freeholders' case— all my arguments were directed against hearing Counsel at all. I said, now let it be distinctly understood what I say—let it not be misunderstood,—that I am decidedly against hearing Counsel; I resist, I oppose it altogether; but I see a great number of your Lordships, and in fact the majority, to be in favour of hearing Counsel, and therefore I shall be glad if I can make any proposal that will meet the view of the noble Duke. That is what these men think deserving of censure. As they advise me in the conduct of a case of an action at law, they would advise the noble Duke opposite in the conduct of an action Of another sort—in the conduct of a bat-
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tle; but I prefer, as he would prefer, to fight my own battle in my own way. My Lords, I consider that this Bill is my own battle—I was the author of the Commission—I originated the Bill in this House —I shall fight as good a battle as I can in favour of the Bill, and with great submission to them, I will not make an exception to that rule of the practice of our Courts, which declares that where you have Counsel and leaders, if the leadership be worth having, you shall be guided in the conduct of the cause by your own judgment, and by your leader's judgment, but not by the wishes of your client. I shall do so here, and my client will thank me in a few days for having pursued that course. I was not to lose the battle at once, as these persons advise; for such really is their advice—"Oh, lose it, to show your pluck." That is what they advise. Why not divide and stand alone? My Lords, that was not my plan. My plan was to get as good a bargain as I could; and to tell your Lordships the truth, I think that I did make a good bargain. I was ready to consent to hear two Counsel in order to get rid of the proposition of hearing Counsel for every borough that chose to ask it.—[Viscount Strangford intimated that that was not his proposition.]—I see what my noble Friend means—he does not want such long arguments of Counsel, he shrinks from the idea of it—animus meminisse fugit. I only mean to state this, that I did my best to avoid the consequences of the proposition then made. I shall not say more, than that I feel it necessary to make this statement of what really did occur; for otherwise it would be represented out of doors, that any long speech of Counsel that may take place, will be the consequence of my conduct, when, in fact, my plan was to avoid this as much as possible. I hope that the event will prove that I made an admirable compromise. It is represented that the only object of hearing Counsel is to delay the Bill. My Lords, there is no wish for delay. I say that, first upon the authority of the positive assertion of the noble Duke, and next because no man could obtain delay in the progress of the Bill; for if I am ready, as I am, to sit here from morning till night up to next Christmas, to hear Counsel on the Bill, there can be no hope of delaying it by that means.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, that there were several petitions praying to be heard by

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Counsel against the Bill, and he thought that their Lordships should make an order on the subject; for at present there were only a few of the boroughs about to be heard by Counsel, and it was important to regulate who should be heard.
The Earl of Falmouthsaid, that the House had agreed that two Counsel on behalf of certain parties should now be heard, to argue against the principle of the Bill. That was all the House had to do now.
The Marquess of Lansdownehoped, that nothing would ever induce the House to hear Counsel on the principle of the Corporation or any other Bill. If their Lordships should once agree to do that, they would be laying down a most inconvenient, and indeed a most dangerous precedent, and one on which, if he had divided alone, he would have taken the sense of the House before agreeing to it. He concurred with his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham) in the wish to limit the hearing of Counsel as much as possible. Of course they could not shut out the consideration of the principle of the Bill altogether; but the Counsel were to be heard on the details, and on the details should have the opportunity of stating the degree in which the Corporations they appeared for thought their rights and privileges would be affected. In that view he found their Lordships concurred. He really thought it most material, not with a view to this case alone, but with a view to the order of the proceedings of their Lordships' House, not to let it go forth, that their Lordships would call Counsel to the Bar to argue on the principle of a Bill, which principle it was their duty and their right to discuss, determine, and decide for themselves.
The Earl of Falmouthsaid, that the noble Marquess had misunderstood what he meant. He meant, that Counsel were not to be precluded from entering into observations on the principle of the Bill.
The Earl of Mansfieldunderstood the intention of their Lordships to be to hear the arguments of Counsel upon the principle of the Bill—not as a legislative measure, but as it would affect those towns which had petitioned against it; and further, he understood, that besides being heard on the principle, Counsel should be at liberty to be heard on the conduct of the Commissioners in procur-
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ing the evidence on which the Bill was founded. With regard to the details of the Bill, he certainly did not apprehend that it was the intention of the House to preclude corporate towns from presenting petitions claiming to be heard on those parts of the Bill which particularly affected their interests. The House had made no order upon the subject, but he certainly understood that it was open to Counsel to be heard on those points of detail as well as upon the general principle. He merely mentioned this, that there might be no misunderstanding.
The Marquess of Clanricardedid not think that they had even yet come to a proper understanding upon the point; because, if the noble Earl's view were correct, it would appear, that the two speeches, of which the noble and learned Lord spoke the other evening, were not the only two speeches that the House would have to listen to. In that case the arrangement was not so good as it was supposed to be.
Lord Broughamreally did not understand the noble Marquess. Did the noble Marquess mean to say, that he would have recommended coming to a division against the majority of seventy or eighty who were ranged on the opposite side of the House, and who were determined not to be satisfied unless Counsel were heard? It appeared, that the noble Marquess was one of those who, out of doors, attributed to him a desire to delay the progress of the Bill. But let the noble Marquess take his place, and ask himself whether, as a sincere advocate of the Bill, he would not have pursued the same course?
The Marquess of Clanricardewas not one of those who, out of doors, took notice of the conduct of the noble and learned Lord; but he claimed his privilege of appearing in that House, and finding fault with a course of proceeding which he thought neither convenient nor proper. He should have stated his objections to it the other evening, and more than once rose for the purpose of doing so, but was prevented by the three or four times repeated speeches of the noble and learned Lord. He appealed to the common sense and common understanding of their Lordships, to say whether the opinion expressed by the noble and learned Lord, as to the understanding come to the other evening was not widely different from that ex-

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pressed by the noble Earl (Earl Mansfield) who spoke from the opposite side of the House. Before they adopted the course of hearing Counsel at the Bar, he wished to know whether it were possible to reconcile that with justice, common sense, or precedent; it was true they had been told of precedents, but he was at a loss to find one exactly in point. It was obviously necessary, before Counsel were called to the Bar, that an exact understanding should be entered into as to the points to which their argument should be limited, if, indeed, it were to be limited at all. No order of any kind had been made upon the subject. The Motion, as he understood it, was, that all those who had petitioned against the Bill should be heard by Counsel, and that the Counsel called in should be at liberty to argue the case of all.
Lord Ellenborough: What I propose is, that an order shall be made directing that all who have petitioned to be heard shall be allowed to be heard, in order to enable the Counsel to appear at the Bar. If no such order be made they cannot appear at all.
The Marquess of Clanricardeknew that there were precedents for hearing Counsel at the Bar; but then Counsel were appointed for every particular person who claimed to be heard, as, for instance, in the case of the slave-trade. He did not mean to say that there was not as much reason to hear Counsel in the present case as there was in the case of the slave-trade; all that he wanted to know distinctly was, whether there was to be any limit to the argument of Counsel. If there were to be no limit, at least let there be no delusion upon the subject; let it be known that they were going to hear every person who had petitioned against the Bill by Counsel at the Bar of the House.
Lord Broughamwould again endeavour to explain to his noble Friend. It was distinctly laid down the other night, and distinctly admitted by all sides of the House, that no person had a right to be heard—that it was a matter wholly and exclusively within the grace of the House, as to whether a party should be allowed to be heard by Counsel or not; that the House would allow all these various boroughs, eighteen in number, or thereabout, which had petitioned, to be heard by two Counsel. The House gave that right to no other party—it let in no other party—it
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did nothing by which a pretext could be raised for hearing any other party, or any other Counsel whatever. His noble Friend opposite had justly observed, that there were petitioners come in that night who were not included in the first order; but who, as their complaints were the same, ought not, in his opinion, to be excluded from it. His noble Friend's suggestion was a very fair and very proper one, and all they now did was, to allow these later petitioners to be heard, if they pleased, through the medium of the two Counsel who were to appear for the rest. And this was the great delay of which the noble Marquess stood in so much horror. Why, in point of fact, the few observations that the Counsel would find it necessary to address to the individual cases of the boroughs, which, if they pleased, might be let in in the manner he had just stated, would not create so great a delay as the interposition of the noble Marquess had already created. If the parties in question should not elect to be heard by the two Counsel who appeared for the rest, it would be for their Lordships to say whether they would allow them to be heard by any one else. He for one should require very good reasons to induce him to assent to such a course. But then the noble Marquess said, "The precedents are all the other way; if you profess to be guided by precedents, you are bound to hear every party separately." Moreover, the noble Marquess had complained of his having made four speeches; but as often as men did not understand what was said, and did not keep their misunderstanding in silence, but broke out and charged those with creating delay who did not create delay, but took the best course for avoiding delay —as often as he found men obstinately persisting in that mistaken course, he was bound to rise and set them right. "But (said the noble Marquess) the course now proposed to be taken is contrary to precedent." That showed, that however frequently be might have troubled the House the other night, he had, at least, spoken once too seldom, because on that occasion he expressly stated an instance—not the instance of the slave-trade only, but another case in which there had been a consolidation similar to that now proposed with respect to the hearing of Counsel. He alluded to a case in which he acted as Counsel, in which five different persons, having five different petitions, and five

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different cases, all consolidated their applications into one case, intrusted that case to him (Lord Brougham), and he spoke once, and but once, for all those five parties. If the noble Marquess would refer to the Journals of the House in the months of April and May 1808, he would find that they bore witness to the accuracy of what he was then stating. Their Lordships, in fact, had always the matter in their own hands. If on any day, or any hour of any day, they found that the arguments were conducted in such a way as to create so serious a delay as to threaten the defeat of the Bill, it would be in their power at once to put a stop to their proceedings. And he asked any man of common sense, which course was most likely to succeed—who was most likely to carry that House and the country along with him in his principle and his object—he who, in the exercise of his best judgment, and as the hearty friend and firm supporter of the measure, recommended the adoption of such a course as he had suggested—he who ventured to make a compromise with a large majority of the House, or he, who setting that majority at defiance, at once induced it to demonstrate its power by a decisive vote? He maintained that the course he had proposed was the course most likely to carry the measure through.
The Marquess of Clanricardewas far from accusing the noble Lord of desiring to create delay, but he did not think that the noble and learned Lord was justified in presuming that the friends of the Bill were in a minority in that House. He did not believe that they were so. He believed that a majority of their Lordships were prepared to accept the Bill, and until he were convinced to the contrary his opinion as to the course pursued must necessarily be different from that of the noble Lord.
The Question that Counsel be called in was put and carried. Sir Charles Wetherell and Mr. Knight appeared at the Bar and proceeded to address the House on behalf of the Corporations. Only Sir Charles Wetherell spoke, and his address lasted three hours.
Lord Broughamsaid it was almost unnecessary for him to remind their Lordships that the learned Counsel must be in a tate of great exhaustion, from the length at which he had addressed their Lordships; and that it would be but granting an indulgence which ought certainly to be extended to him, if he were allowed to retire
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for ten minutes. Their Lordships too, no doubt, required some slight relief after the fatigue they had undergone, and he should therefore move that the House adjourn for ten minutes.
Motion agreed to.
Lord Kenyoninformed their Lordships that the learned Counsel, from the extreme heat of the House, and the great exertion he had made, found it quite impossible to proceed with his address that night. He was sure that their Lordships would extend their indulgence to the learned Counsel so far as to allow him to resume his address to-morrow.
Lord Broughamobserved that nothing was more proper than to take into consideration the great exertions made by the learned Counsel, and also the extreme heat of the House. It would, however, he thought, be well if the learned Counsel were to proceed with his address at three o'clock to-morrow.
Viscount Melbournedid not think that the learned Counsel could, under the circumstances, be fairly called on to go on with his address at present; but when he made that admission he could not help reminding their Lordships that it was agreed on all sides, and in every quarter, that this proceeding should be dispatched with as little delay as possible. If their Lordships were not to meet until the usual hour to-morrow, he was afraid that the learned Counsel would occupy a greater portion of time in their addresses than the two days to which it was, in the first instance, intended that they should be confined. He therefore suggested that means should be taken to shorten the delay occasioned by this proceeding as far as possible, and that their Lordships should, with that view, meet at an early hour to-morrow, in order, if possible, to insure a compliance with the general arrangement which had been entered into.
The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, that they had still to-morrow and Saturday to hear the speeches of Counsel; but if their Lordships were to meet at an earlier hour than five o'clock, great inconvenience would ensue to those Peers who had to attend Committees, or were engaged in matters of a similar description. They might, however, obviate the danger of delay, by postponing all other business which might precede the hearing of Counsel. All he desired was, that it should be impressed on their Lordships that sufficient time

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ought to be allowed them to consider the information with which they were furnished, before they proceeded to the discussion of this Bill.
Lord Broughamquite agreed with the noble Duke who spoke last, that the business of Committees, and other business of that nature would be interfered with, if their Lordships met to hear Counsel on this Bill at an early hour, such as ten or twelve o'clock. But no such difficulty lay in the way of their meeting at three o'clock, for the Committees would then be over. With respect to the delay which had, it was said, been caused by the hearing of Counsel, he should only say that as far as the address of the learned Counsel had gone, his predictions that, so far from any unnecessary delay being caused by allowing Counsel to address that House, their own debates would be much shortened by their so doing, were completely verified. The learned Counsel, had with great distinctness, and by a very judicious mode of statement, referred to the principal points of objection to this Bill; the minds of their Lordships were brought to bear upon these points, and, instead of floundering amidst a vague mass of objections, they came prepared to discuss the measure in a much more concise and distinct manner than if they had no such statement as that of the learned Counsel for their guide.
The Duke of Cumberland: Supposing that their Lordships were to meet at three, the best course would certainly be that they should proceed without interruption in this proceeding.
Lord Lyndhurstwas of opinion that their Lordships might meet at the usual hour (five o'clock), and yet get over this proceeding in the prescribed time. By commencing at five o'clock, the learned Counsel who had addressed the House that night, might, he thought, finish his address by eight o'clock, and thus afford time to his brother Counsel to conclude within the appointed time. He would take that opportunity of expressing his concurrence in the opinions expressed by the noble and learned Lord (Brougham) for the reasons which he had stated, because the learned Counsel had, as far as he had gone, brought under review all the strong points of objection to this measure, and thus directed the attention of their Lordships at both sides to them, for the purpose either of supporting or opposing the Bill.
It was finally arranged that the House should meet at the usual time.