FORGERY. (Hansard, 14 August 1832)

The Earl of Rosslyn
, in the absence of his noble and learned friend (Lord Wynford), who had last night expressed his intention to submit an Amendment, so as to make an exception in the cases of the forgery of wills and powers of attorney, from the other cases of forgery for which the Bill provided, begged leave to move, instead of that Amend- 1359 ment, of which his noble and learned friend had given notice a clause having the same effect to exclude from the provisions of the Bill, all persons convicted of the forgery, or altering any will, codicil, or testamentary document, or writing, with intent to defraud any body corporate, or any person or persons whatsoever; and all persons convicted of the forgery or altering any power of attorney, for the transfer of stock in any of the public funds, either in the Bank of England, the South Sea House, or in the Bank of Ireland, with intent to defraud any corporate body, or any person whatsoever; and that all such parties so convicted should be punishable with death.

The Lord Chancellor
said, that his opinion upon this subject remained the same as he had last night expressed it to their Lordships, and he certainly could not bring his mind to take that distinction between the forgery of wills and powers of attorney, and the forgery of negotiable securities, which the noble and learned Lord, who was not now in his place, and for whose opinion he (the Lord Chancellor) had the greatest respect, had adopted. He had, on a former occasion, stated to their Lordships the reasons why he could not make that distinction which it was now sought to establish. He was willing to admit that a distinction was to be made in cases of the forgery of powers of attorney to this extent—that in such cases the certainty of having parties to prosecute was much greater than in others. With respect to the forgery of wills, he well remembered when the subject was last under discussion in this House in the year 1830, when a noble Marquess had introduced a hill on this subject from the other House of Parliament, the main force of the argument against that measure rested on the distinction which was then taken with respect to wills. The reason why the law had been so severe, arose from the facility with which forgeries of negotiable securities could be carried into effect, and, therefore, the same argument which would retain the capital punishment in cases of the forgery of wills and powers of attorney, would equally apply for retaining it in all cases. Indeed, he thought it more properly applied to the retention of the punishment of death in cases of the forgery of negotiable securities, than in the forgery of wills or powers of attorney. The facility was greater to forge a check than to forge a will. In the latter case, the party forging had to undergo a scrutiny from 1360 doctors and surrogates without number, while in the case of a check he had only to make his appearance once. It was true that this difficulty might be got over by a combination, but then a conspiracy of that kind always multiplied the risk a thousand fold; and, therefore, it was, that he thought if there was one case of forgery for which the capital punishment ought to be inflicted, it certainly ought to be for the forgery of negotiable securities; and he equally thought, that if there was any case in which the capital punishment ought to be rejected, it was in the cases of the forgeries of wills and powers of attorney. This was the argument which had been used in both Houses of Parliament; and having already, on a former occasion, stated his reasons for objecting to this Amendment, he would not now trouble their Lordships further than to say, that though he should not now oppose the Amendment, yet he at the same time felt it his duty to protest against it.

The Bishop of Hereford
said, he should be extremely sorry if the opinions which he advocated could take away any real securities that at present existed against the commission of this offence. He thought, however, that the punishment of death gave no security, for it prevented many from prosecuting; and criminals relying upon this, committed the offence from which they would have been deterred were there a certainty of the infliction of the minor punishment. Many of the petitions which had been presented to their Lordships stated, that the reluctance of parties to prosecute, of Juries to convict, and of Judges to execute, had rather destroyed than secured the interests which it was desired to protect. He should oppose the exceptions of the noble Lord.

§ Earl Grey
said, that his conviction on this matter was founded rather upon opinions than upon facts. The only question to be considered was, whether the introduction of those exceptions would prevent prosecutions, and the subsequent execution of the law in such cases. He did not think that it would have such an effect. He remembered, indeed, that an instance had been quoted in which sympathy had been shown for the fate of a culprit of this description (he alluded to the case of the late Mr. Fauntleroy). He (Earl Grey) however, felt no such sympathy; for if ever a man deserved the full penalty of the law, when he recollected the number and magnitude of his crimes, and 1361 their deplorable consequences to others, he must say that Fauntleroy was that man. There was also a morbid sympathy expressed for that atrocious murderer Thurtell, but he did not think that that sort of feeling prevailed to any great extent. His opinion upon the whole was in favour of the exceptions, and he had the less reluctance in coming to such a conclusion, because, if found to be useless or impolitic in their operation, it would be always in their power to remove them.

The Lord Chancellor
said, that professional men saw a great deal more of the effects of capital punishments in preventing parties from prosecuting than could be possibly brought under the notice of those who were not professional.