PARLIAMENTARY REFORM—BILL FOR ENGLAND—SECOND READING— SECOND DAY.

HL Deb 04 October 1831 vol 7 cc1133-205

On the Motion of the Earl of Winchilsea, the Order of the Day for resuming the Debate on the Second Reading of the Reform in Parliament (England) Bill was read.

The Earl of Winchilsea

said, he could not consent to give a silent vote upon the present occasion, for whether he considered the vast importance of the Bill which had been placed on their Lordships' Table, the second reading of which was then the question to be discussed, or whether he considered that if a false step of legislation upon the subject were once taken, that it could never be retraced—in which ever way he regarded the subject, he felt it to be his bounden duty openly to declare his sentiments to their Lordships. He admitted that there were abuses in the present system of Representation, but when he considered the immense injury which might be done in an unwise, unjust, and injudicious attempt to correct those abuses—when, in fact, he considered that the just balance of power which had hitherto so happily existed between the three estates of the realm might be destroyed, he owned he felt deeply the great responsibility which he incurred by making any attempt to alter or to modify the Constitution. This was the sentiment he felt, but, as he had applied his mind honestly and sincerely to the consideration of the subject, he trusted that the conclusions he had come to would not prove altogether erroneous or unacceptable to the country. He had no private interest to consult; he knew of but one party, and that party was his country. To the interests of that country he was devoted, and he would earnestly and fearlessly consult them on the present and on every other occasion. He approached the consideration of the subject perfectly unbiassed by any feeling of private, or personal, or party interest; for he had no parliamentary connection with any borough which would be affected by the Bill, and he had no attachment to any party but the one great party he had already named. He approached the question, too, unawed by intimidation—whether that intimidation was attempted to be exercised by unprincipled and revolutionary individuals, or by the insolent, malignant, scurrilous, and tyrannical portion of the Press, which had for the last six months had recourse to every species of abuse, falsehood, threat, and virulence, for the purpose of lowering the aristocracy in the eyes of the community, and frighting it from the honest and wise exercise of those privileges, which, whether considered by their Lordships as Peers of Parliament or as Englishmen, were dear beyond all price, and at all hazards ought to be maintained. The privileges of the House of Lords were a part, and a vital part, of the Constitution; and if their Lordships could be induced, by the vile means which had been adopted, to limit or to sacrifice them, then they would be subjected to a power, the tyranny and oppression of which were more odious to the true lover of liberty, than was the domination of the greatest despot whose rule ever cursed society. Yet to that tyranny and that oppression he was ready and prepared to oppose himself, and if all its virulence was directed against him he cared not, for he was convinced he should be supported by every man in whose bosom there was a virtuous, moral, or religious feeling. He should be supported by all whose support or countenance was honourable or creditable, and thus assisted, he would oppose himself to that levelling spirit, which, not content with common calumny, had endeavoured, foully and basely, to turn the stream of public opinion to the prejudice of an illustrious female—one who moved in the very highest rank of life, and the distinguishing characteristic of whose conduct was, that it had secured to her the admiration and the love of all good and virtuous minds. Such was the character of the illustrious female assailed, and assailed, too, from no other reason, and upon no other ground, but because it was asserted she had used her rights in such a way as militated against the progress of this measure. Would to God he knew the vile atrocious slanderer! Would to God he knew the anonymous slanderer who had in so cowardly and base a manner insulted and traduced a virtuous and exalted woman; and if he did, either the humble individual who then addressed their Lordships, or that blot to manhood and to human nature should never again see the light of day. This was not a private question, but it involved the dearest and the best interests of the country, and as the laws of that God whom he adored and served justified his raising his arm in hostile strife to resist the invader of his country, so would they justify him in calling to a fatal account the miscreant who would stab by slander and abuse, the dearest interests of virtue and of truth. The front of the offence committed by the illustrious individual who had been traduced was, that by her uniform excellence of character she had acquired a large and powerful influence over the mind of the country, and that influence was wisely directed to a maintenance of those virtues of that Constitution and of that religion that had secured to England all its happiness and all its prosperity. When individuals in exalted stations thus conducted themselves, their welfare and their protection became a nation's nearest duty, and every one who loved virtue or his country's interest was bound to stand forward in their defence. He repeated, that he approached the consideration of the question under discussion uninfluenced by any private or party feelings; and he might also say, and with perfect sincerity, he approached it with a heartfelt wish that he might be enabled to take that course which was the best calculated to benefit his country, and to transmit to posterity that Constitution which was the best legacy the present generation could hope to leave to their successors. The Constitution had been impaired by an abandonment of some of those principles which had given it strength, but in that circumstance he saw no reason for its utter prostration, convinced as he was, that it was to the system of government the country had so long experienced that it owed the enjoyment of its civil and religious liberties. That Constitution was now assailed. It was attacked on the one hand by English radicals, and on the other by Irish demagogues and Popish priests; and their Lordships were bound to see that no new means were given to its foes by a destruction of the balance of power in the three estates of the realm. It was in this spirit that he should investigate the measure before their Lordships. He should address himself but briefly to the whole subject. In the first place he should inquire whether in the lapse of years some defects or abuses might not have crept into the system of Representation which required a remedy. In the second place, he should inquire whether any new interests had sprung up in the country, and arrived at such a magnitude, or were possessed of such a character and nature, as to require protection and assistance through the medium of direct Representation. And in the last place, he should consider whether the Bill proposed to their Lordships was calculated to remedy the abuses he admitted to exist, and to supply that new Representation that must be confessed to be desirable if upon inquiry it appeared that any new interests had sprung up; or whether it would not be desirable to adopt some other plan for remedying the defects complained of, under a conviction that the Bill as it stood was calculated, and indeed must from necessity in its operation destroy the just balance of power which was essential to the existence of the Constitution. These were the considerations he proposed to enter upon, and if it should appear that this Bill, as proposed by the noble Earl, would destroy the just equilibrium in the different branches of the Legislature, as upon the maintenance of that equilibrium depended the continuance of the Constitution, he would boldly and fearlessly give it his direct negative. With respect to the first point to be investigated he candidly owned he had long entertained the opinion that too much political influence had fallen into the hands of a few particular persons through the existence of decayed boroughs. Whatever might have been the importance attached at one time to many of those boroughs, however great might have been their trade, their wealth, or their consequence, it was now a matter beyond the possibility of dispute that many of them were not only decayed, but so decayed as to have no interest of their own to protect or to maintain. This was the fact, and he had long been of opinion that it would be beneficial to the country if that influence were reduced. He con- tended that the parliamentary influence derived from those boroughs placed a preponderating power in the hands of the Ministers which ought to be checked. It was a power which enabled a Government to carry a particular measure in opposition to the decided wishes, and reasonable and constitutional wishes, of the people. It was that influence which enabled the Ministers of the day to carry the Catholic Question in opposition to the voice of the country. The Minister who introduced that measure into the other House of Parliament well knew, and he even had his authority for stating, that if a general election had taken place, so strong was the feeling of the country against the Catholic Bill that it could not have been carried. This it was, that had induced much of the present demand for Reform. The people wanted not the overthrow of the Constitution, but seeing that abuses had crept into the Representation, which enabled a Minister to carry measures opposed to the great majority of the country and to the spirit of the Constitution, they required that those abuses should be corrected. Noble Lords opposite were now most tender of the right and the influence of petitioning, but they had pursued a very different course when the Catholic Question was under discussion. Then the Petitions of the people had been disregarded; they had been thrown aside without consideration or respect; and the consequence was, that a vast number of persons had determined upon not addressing their Lordships, or Parliament at all, until the right of petitioning was not merely recognised, but respected, by the prayers of the Petitioners being attended to. The people of this country did not require the sacrifice of any particular interest or the destruction of the privileges of any constitutional order, but what they in reality required was, that there should not be suffered to exist a preponderating power which was foreign to the Constitution, and gave a Minister the means of defeating and opposing the wishes of the country. And when he heard of individuals ostentatiously offering up their boroughs on the altar (as it was called) of patriotism, he could not but question their motives, and watch the subsequent proceedings. Respecting those motives he had no manner of doubt, and if there were any who believed them to be disinterested, he referred to their consideration the new Marquisates and other honours which had been showered upon the persons making the pretended sacrifices. Disinterestedness in such conduct there was none, and the country could not find in it any compensation for the injuries it had suffered. These were among the reasons by which he was induced to desire that the decayed boroughs might be merged in the general property of the country, and not left at the command of the Minister of the day. He would then proceed to the consideration of the next point, which was as to whether or not any new interests had sprung up which required and were entitled to the protection derived from direct Representation. Upon this branch of the subject he had no doubt whatever. Any person who looked at the great manufacturing towns which had in modern times grown up, and considered their different and peculiar interests, could not entertain a doubt as to the propriety of those interests being guarded by particular representatives elected for their preservation. Many cases might occur in which a Minister might propose a measure acceptable, as it applied to the mass of the community, but most injurious as it applied to the particular interests of some single town or some particular manufacture; and unless that town or manufacture were adequately, or, he ought to say, directly represented, it might be sacrificed through ignorance. Take, for instance, a recent proposition, to impose a tax upon raw cotton. If that tax had been adopted, a great and a new interest would have been most seriously injured; and yet the injury could only be pointed out by those familiar with the particular manufacture; such considerations made it plain that it was desirable and necessary that all new interests of importance and value should be provided with representatives. If that conclusion were correct, it necessarily followed, that representatives should be given to those great towns in which particular manufactures and those newly-created interests were chiefly situated, and where their peculiarities and wants were best understood. He therefore could but remark, that the late refusal to transfer the franchise from corrupt and convicted boroughs to large towns, in which there were confessedly and notoriously new interests, was most injudicious, most unjust, and most impolitic. He then came to the third point he proposed for consideration. With respect to those parts of the Bill which went to the disfranchisement of out-voters and to the reduction of election expenses, in principle they had his cordial approval; but he must say, he entertained great doubts as to the efficiency of the execution of the plan. He did not believe, that in many instances the regulations respecting out-voters would prove upon trial at all satisfactory; and he also entertained considerable doubts as to whether election expenses would be so greatly reduced by the provisions of the Bill as its framers appeared to imagine would be the case. He had already stated that he approved of that part of the Bill which gave to great towns, in which new interests had sprung up, direct Representation. But there his commendation must cease. He thought the disfranchising clause went too far. He did not wish to be understood as contending that there ought to be any increase in the numbers of the House of Commons; he thought, on the contrary, there ought not; and it was not necessary there should be for the purpose of putting into practice the views he entertained with respect to the disfranchising clause and giving Members to new interests. To make room for these new Representatives some of the decayed boroughs must undoubtedly be disfranchised, but there was a vast difference between such a necessary step and the wanton and sweeping act of disfranchisement proposed by the Bill. Such a course as that which he now pointed out would be satisfactory to the country; for while it properly provided for the protection of new interests, it would also pay attention to the preservation of that balance of power which was essential to the welfare and the prosperity of the country. And this led him to notice one of the principal and most fatal of the objections which he had to the Bill. He had stated that he was fully prepared to give to all great towns which had new and unrepresented interests Representatives for their protection, but he was not at all prepared to give his support to a measure which gave Representatives to towns and districts which had no particular or new interests whatever to protect. To interests he was prepared to give Representatives, but he never could consent to give Representatives to mere masses of population which had no manufactures or special interests to protect. He objected, therefore, to giving Representatives to such places as Woolwich, Greenwich, Deptford, the Tower Hamlets, Finsbury, and Marylebone. He had long thought most seriously upon this subject, and he was thoroughly convinced that there was nothing whatever in the spirit or the practice of the British Constitution, as hitherto known, which favoured the notion that Representation was or ought to be founded upon numbers. This was not merely his own opinion, but it would be found upon inquiry that the most intelligent of the merchants, bankers, and traders of London attributed a vast deal of the success of this immense city in commercial pursuits, to its freedom from the continual excitement necessarily arising out of frequent political elections. It was idle to say, that large towns, merely as large towns, required representing, for they were adequately protected by the mass of the Representatives; and he contended that a great portion of the wealth and consequence of London and its neighbourhood had resulted from the little interruption it had received from political contests. Let their Lordships compare the state of London with the state of Paris, and the force of his argument would at once be illustrated. In Paris there was political election enough; that capital had, at the least, an abundance of Representatives; and yet what was its condition? Let him not be told that they were not to refer to other countries. When the navigator saw another vessel wrecked upon a rock he must be blind indeed if he ran his own in a similar direction. He called upon their Lordships then to look at the situation of Paris, with all its Representatives and its distracting elections. In Paris there was a stagnation of trade, a dearth of commercial activity, and confidence, for the inclination and mind of the community had been directed to other topics; while in London a system of commerce, altogether unprecedented in magnitude, in importance, in regularity, and in its results, had been happily established and was in full operation. He had thus stated those principles of the Bill of which he approved, and those to which he objected, and he would then proceed to notice some particular clauses that required especial attention. If he had not considered the objections he had already stated to the Bill to be insuperable, there were still an abundance of others to regulate his conduct with respect to it. Their Lordships had been told that the provisions respecting the qualification for votes for the counties were made with a view of protecting the landed interests. He viewed them in a very different light. He objected especially to the admission of persons renting so low as premises of the value of 50l. a year being admitted to the county constituency. What would be the effect of such a qualification in the neighbourhood of large towns, of the metropolis, and upon the county to which he had the honour to belong? Let their Lordships look at its effect in Kent. Such towns as Margate, Tonbridge Wells, and the neighbourhood of the metropolis would furnish a great proportion of the constituency, and their qualification would not be of a nature to prove, that they had any connection whatever with the landed interest, or that they were at all permanently connected with the county. He objected therefore to the proposed constituency for counties. Then with respect to the clause which gave the right of voting in boroughs to 10l. householders, he thought the qualification too low. He thought so when the Bill was in its original shape; and it was only proposed to give the right of voting to bonâ fide annual tenants, upon an annual taking of a house of the yearly value upon the parish books of 10l.; but if that was his opinion, his objections had necessarily been greatly increased by the alterations which had been made in the original clause. As the Bill at present stood it admitted weekly tenants paying 3s. 10d. per week, who had occupied a house for the space of twelve months, to the franchise. Would any one be found to contend that that class of persons were independent? Surely not. They would be in the hands of those persons who chose to give them their qualification, or they would be ruled by the worst, enemies of the country. Talk of a weekly payment of 3s. 10d. as rent giving to a person the right of voting! Why, there was scarcely a man, however dependent or poor, that did not pay that sum, and this provision of the Bill, therefore, while it pretended to be founded on a proper qualification, almost amounted to universal suffrage. If that was his honest conviction, he asked to what conclusion must, he come with respect to the Bill? Again, he reminded their Lordships, that if they took a false step in this most important and vital matter, that step could never be retraced. He was ready to allow, that unconstitutional power given to the Crown might be resumed; he was ready to allow too that unconstitutional power given to such a body as their Lordships might be resumed; but he defied any one existing to quote a single instance from the volume of history in which power once given into the hands of the people had been returned by the people. The conclusion, then, he came to was this, that if this clause were adopted, and the low qualification proposed admitted, the necessary consequence would be, that the people would be invested with a preponderating power, which, judging from the invariable result of all similar experiments, would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. But he might be told, you agree to certain principles in this Bill, and yet you reject it altogether. He did no such thing. Ho came forward and fairly stated his views. He did not in general terms oppose the Bill, but he opposed it on specific grounds, and gave his reasons for that opposition. He was favourable to Reform, and while he opposed much of this particular measure he suggested a plan which he in his conscience believed would be preferred by nine-tenths of the county to which he belonged, to the ill-digested, crude and unconstitutional scheme propounded to their Lordships by the present Bill for their acceptance.—He objected to the measure upon an examination of its intrinsic merits, and his feeling in opposition to it was strengthened by the unfair, improper, unconstitutional, and illegal means which had been had recourse to in order to support it. The total want of confidence too in his Majesty's ministers, a want of confidence arising not out of prejudice, but the necessary consequence of their conduct, added to his distrust. He knew that he stood there upon the brink of destruction, and he felt the danger of his position, but he would do his duty to the best of his judgment. He said this in honesty and in sincerity, and, so doing, he would vote against the second reading of the Bill. He would not vote against it because it was a measure of Reform, but because while it professed to remedy abuses, it destroyed the Constitution. It had been asked, "What will the Lords do?" He would answer that question. The Lords would honestly, constitutionally, and fearlessly do their duty. They would do their duty to their King, to their country, and their God—to that King for whose welfare they were anxious, and from whose bounty they had derived so many benefits—to that country with whose interests their own welfare was bound up, and for whose happiness and whose liberty they would readily sacrifice their existence—and to that God who, in his almighty beneficence, had bestowed greater blessings upon this country than had ever before been granted to a nation, and who would still protect and aid them if they were but true to themselves and strove to merit his assistance. Let their Lordships look to the examples which surrounded them. It would be the worst of blindness for them to shut their eyes to what had occurred and what was occurring. Let them look to that country that was the curse of the peace of Europe. Let them look to that country in which a principle was contended for and admired that was utterly incompatible with the existence of society, destructive of every thing like true liberty, and leading only to one vast and monstrous system of anarchy and confusion or miserable and unredeemed despotism. It would be the worst of blindness for their Lordships to shut their eyes to the fact, that the spirit which had been the bane of France, and had tormented Europe, had reached the shore of this country, and was making strides that called for resolute opposition. It was high time not merely to watch the progress of that desolating spirit, but to check and to curb it. The ship was in danger, and she had been deserted by those who ought to have proved her ablest hands; but let the crew still on board do their duty honestly and zealously, and the gale would yet be weathered, and the bark once again be moored in safety. What was it that gave to that House and would secure to it the respect and esteem of the community at large, and without which that House was nothing? Was it their Lordships rank or their wealth that gave them their importance? No; but it was the honest discharge of those important duties which were intrusted to them by the Constitution. If, then, any inducement were required by their Lordships to bring them to an honest and sincere discharge of their duties, let that thought operate. And if any further stimulus should be required, he would implore those among them who derived their titles from a long line of honourable ancestry to reflect upon the glory of their predecessors, and by their conduct to prove that the blood that flowed in their veins was still pure and noble as the source from which it sprung. To those who had earned their distinction by an honourable and a laborious or a gallant and a brilliant discharge of great public duties he would say "bear still in mind your old course, and to steer right on to honour." They lived in perilous times; but, though the times were full of danger, there was an abundance of example to guide them. Warning upon warning was before them, and ardently did he wish their Lordships to avail themselves of the fruits of experience. He could not pretend to cope with the noble Earl (Grey) in historical learning, but he must be allowed to say that many of the occurrences alluded to by the noble Earl had produced a very different impression upon his mind from that which it appeared they had made upon the mind of the noble Earl. The noble Earl said, that the aristocracy of France were destroyed through their obstinacy, but he had always believed, and still believed, that the aristocracy of France fell because it bowed itself before democracy. Again, the noble Earl had said, that obstinacy led Charles 1st to the scaffold; but he had always understood, and history had recorded it as a fact, that the destruction of that Monarch was owing to an act of weakness upon his own part. But allusions to history as well as to the measure itself were not sufficient for the noble Earl. He had appealed to the Bench of Reverend Prelates, and demanded their support. He (the Earl of Winchilsea) would also address himself to those reverend Prelates, and he would conjure them to remember that they were the Representatives of the Church of England, and that the interests, perhaps the existence, of that Church were now at their disposal. He would say to them, be just and fear not, and, imploring them to adhere to those who in the hour of danger had sustained and protected them, he should be confident of their support. But it was said, why vote against the second reading of the Bill? Let the Bill once go to a Committee, and there could be no hope of afterwards stopping it. He honestly and fairly admitted that there was a strong feeling in the country as to the necessity of some measure of Reform, but at the same time he must, in toto, disavow that the feeling of the country was in favour of "the Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill." He felt that he had intruded too long upon the attention of their Lordships, but there was still one point connected with the subject to which he could not help adverting. His objections to the Bill were fatal, but still he was a friend to Reform, and so much so that if a Bill corresponding with the opinions he had expressed were at that moment upon their Lordships' table it should have his support. He felt the difficulties, however, of the case. He was aware that such a measure could not originate in that House, but let it be brought in elsewhere, and he doubted not that the people of England, as well as the aristocracy of England, would receive it with approval and with gratitude. Such a Bill would maintain the balance of power, and tend to perpetuate the liberties of the country. Against this Bill, however, the second reading of which had been proposed by the noble Earl opposite, he must vote, from a rooted and honest conviction that, while it proposed to correct abuses, it would in reality destroy the Constitution, and with it the liberties and the prosperity of the country.

The Earl of Harrowby

spoke to the following effect,^*

My Lords: I owe it to your Lordships to apologize more particularly for offering myself to your notice at this moment, somewhat out of the ordinary course of debate, and when another noble Lord, so much more entitled to your attention, proposed to address you. But I felt that it was impossible for me to let this question go to a vote without expressing my opinion upon it, and I also felt that, unless I took a very early opportunity of speaking, the state of my health would oblige me to give up all hope of doing so at a later period of the night. I have, it the outset of the remarks which I consider it to be my duty to address to your Lordships, to claim your patient and indulgent attention—a favour of which I have much need at all times, but most especially or the present occasion. I have not beer much in the habit of intruding myself or the attention of this House at any time and for some years past I have hardly spoken on any question. When I finally retired, four years ago, from official situations, and almost from any interference in ^* Printed from the corrected speech published by Roake and Varty. your debates, I had hoped that I should lave passed the short remainder of my life, without witnessing any period of so great political excitement, as to compel me once again to take an active part in your deliberations. It is no light occasion which could prevail upon me to break through the silence which it was my wish to have observed. A deep and paramount sense of duty has alone induced me to come forward. If I have but little inclination to engage in any discussion, still less can I wish to engage in what must, I fear, be considered as a mock debate, since your Lordships have been told by the highest authority that you must yield—that you must pass this identical Bill, Because the people must be satisfied—that they will not be content with any less efficient and extensive measure—and that, if you reject this Bill now, you will have perforce to pass a worse in a succeeding session. Such appeared to me to be the declaration of the noble Earl at the head of his Majesty's Government, in a speech which, after his repeated disclaimers, I will not venture to characterize as one of threat or menace, but by which, it is evident, from the very anxiety which he displayed to repel such an imputation, that he felt, unless his observations were qualified by such declarations, there was ground for your Lordships to apprehend that the deliberations of this House were intended to be overawed. This expression of my feelings on what has fallen from the noble Earl, I think I owe to your Lordships; but, having said thus much, it is my earnest desire to debate this question with as much calmness and moderation as any question can be debated which involves the vital interests of the Constitution of this country.

I could have wished that my strength had enabled me to reply last night to the speech of the noble Earl, while the arguments which he brought forward were still fresh in my memory. He has stated with perfect fairness what he considers to be the real situation of your Lordships on this question, and has admitted, that there is nothing in its nature to justify the suspicion that you will be actuated, in your decision, not by public, but by personal motives. He has also admitted, that the power of nomination to certain seats in the House of Commons does not belong to your Lordships as Peers—that it is a power attached to property and not to rank—that it is possessed by few amongst your Lordships, and is shared in nearly equal proportions by Peers and by Commoners. The noble Earl might have added, that, as far as the influence of the nomination boroughs could be traced in the divisions of the two Houses of Parliament, it would be found (so far, at least, as we can judge from the imperfect accounts of those transactions), that instead of these nominees being an united body, which, as it has been falsely alleged, is continually preying on the vitals of the people, they have been usually pretty equally divided between the two parties in the State; so that, even were the imputation well founded, the country has at least had the satisfaction (if satisfaction it can be called) of not having more than one half of these supposed harpies preying upon her vitals at one and the same time.

I find, in a list which has been recently circulated in the country with great activity, my name inserted among the patrons of nomination boroughs, as patron of Tiverton. The noble Earl having thought it right to set the House rectus in curiâ, I hope your Lordships will excuse me if I trespass upon your attention for a few moments, to set myself rectus in curiâ as far as regards this sort of charge. Nearly a century ago, my grandfather being then, I believe, Solicitor-general, was introduced to that borough by the influence of Government, under the patronage of a great merchant, who, as such, had considerable weight in the Corporation. Whilst acting in his legal capacity he had an opportunity of doing them some service: this led to a great intimacy between him and the principal persons in the borough, and he sat many years in Parliament as one of its Representatives. The interest thus established descended to my father, and subsequently to myself, for, when I first came of age, I was elected Member. In 1795, on the death of my colleague, the Corporation, without any solicitation on the part of my family, proposed to choose my younger brother, who was at that time either just called to the Bar, or on the point of being called to it; but my father doubted extremely the policy of thus diverting him from his legal pursuits. He was, however, elected, and for the last six-and-thirty years the connexion has subsisted on the same footing, and has descended to my children. One old man recollected my grandfather—others recol- lected my father—all have known me, and my brother and my sons have been personally agreeable to the present electors. During the whole of this period, neither myself, nor any member of my family, has owned a house or an acre of land within 100 miles; nor is there a single elector who owes me a single shilling, or whose vote I can in any sense command. Indeed, money is quite out of the question, and I should have heard without the slightest degree of alarm, that two nabobs from India had gone down to canvass Tiverton, even though they had each 10,000l. in his pocket. The influence which my family has exercised in that borough was a personal influence, and though I do and ought to regret that I may not be able to transmit to my posterity the valuable legacy of such an ancient and hereditary friendship, still I know of nothing, either in my public or in my private character, which should lead your Lordships to disbelieve me when I declare that, had my influence there rested upon the narrowest and most permanent burgage tenure, instead of a personal, and of course a precarious connexion, it could not have weighed as a feather in the scale towards deciding my vote on such a question as this. My object in making this statement is not to free my own character from suspicion, but merely to illustrate the sort of connexion, so unjustly stigmatized, which other noble Lords may maintain with other boroughs.

The next topic in the speech of the noble Earl was a vindication of his own consistency. In different Houses of Parliament, from the first moment of his political life, he has unquestionably been an advocate for different degrees of Parliamentary Reform; but from what has repeatedly fallen from him, towards the latter period of it, I, as well as others, had been led to hope and to believe, that his ideas upon that question had been somewhat narrowed. I had thought that, since the zeal and warmth of youth had subsided, the noble Earl, in maturer life, had adopted notions of a less theoretical and sweeping character. He still denies all intention of proceeding upon abstract principles of right. The only right which he acknowledges, is the right of the people to be well governed. To that doctrine I cordially subscribe; and therefore I contend, that he who undertakes to form a new government for the people, is imperatively bound to show, not only that, under the existing system, they have been ill-governed, but also that, under that which he proposes, they will be better governed. If he do not show this, he is a subverter of that very right which he professes to maintain.

But, my Lords, has the noble Earl substantiated one or other, much less both of these propositions? No; they remain utterly unsupported by fact or argument. And it is not too much to affirm, that the feeble attempts which have been made to substantiate them, prove as clearly that they are untenable, as that we are indebted for our new Constitution, not to the application of the noble Earl's political maxim, or indeed of any sound principle of government, but to impelling forces from without, which, setting such maxims and principles at nought, and aiming recklessly at theoretical symmetry and ideal good, can urge us on to no other destiny than convulsion and ruin.

If my memory could serve, and the patience of your Lordships could endure, I could make the longest and the best speech that was ever made in or out of Parliament, against this Bill, without spoiling it by the admixture of a single thought or word of my own, merely by repeating the speeches and writings of those who are now its proposers or supporters. Do I say this because I wish to reproach any man for changing his opinion? No! I disdain to avail myself of a mere argumentum ad hominem. My cause can well afford to spare it. But when I consider the weight and authority of those persons who have both formerly and latterly maintained the principles which they now abandon, we, who it seems have been misled by their authority, have aright to demand of them, more than of any other persons, a full and satisfactory explanation of the grounds upon which they have changed their opinions. It is not a vague declamation on the rights of man (which have not, indeed, been introduced in this place)—it is not a laboured harangue upon the deficiencies of our present Constitution, or a loose panegyric (of which, by the bye, we have heard but little) upon the transcendent merits of the new one. It is not that which we demand, but a grave and statesman-like exhibition of those reasons which induce the proposers of this Bill to believe that another mode of government, to be, established by this Bill, will be a better govern- ment for the people than that which has so long existed. This is the real question. This is the kind of statement which, as I contend, we have a right to expect from the noble Earl. The want of it is a deficiency in his argument, which the country could not anticipate, and of which it has a right to complain.

There is one reason, indeed, on which he has mainly relied, and which he seems to think was a substitute for all others; namely, that this Bill, or one of equal efficiency and extent, ought not to be, indeed cannot be, resisted. The noble Earl has told us, that at the last general election but one, the coincidence of the French revolution had flung the people from one end of England to another, into a state of great ferment; that the embers of Reform, raked up a short time before it, had given but little flame; but that, when the news of that revolution arrived, it acted like the pouring of oil upon ashes, and warmed those decaying embers into a general blaze. Now, I beg leave to remind your Lordships, that it was subsequent to that event that both Houses of Parliament (without opposition) addressed the Crown, stating that they were fully sensible of, and justly appreciated, the full advantage of that happy form of government under which, through the favour of Divine Providence, this country had enjoyed, for a long succession of years, a greater share of internal peace, of commercial prosperity, of true liberty, and of all that constituted social happiness, than had fallen to the lot of any other country in the world. Yet, with that Address of the two Houses of Parliament before him, the noble Earl has said, that the feeling of Reform, which had just, arisen from its ashes, was aggravated almost to madness by the declaration of the noble Duke now near the Table (the Duke of Wellington)—a declaration which I certainly regret, because it induced the country to think that no attention whatever would be paid to its wishes for a rational, moderate, and well-tempered Reform. The noble Earl, on coming into office, was of course anxious, and I admit properly, to bring forward a measure of Reform to satisfy what he deemed the just wishes of the people. He considered most carefully whether such a measure as that which had been presented by a noble Lord to the House of Commons, at no distant period, was or was not one which he could, con- sistently with his duty, submit to Parliament for its approbation. On this last point he came to the opinion, that no such plan would give general satisfaction; and he has thought that he could find no medium between a scheme of that description and the present Bill, by which he expects to satisfy all wishes, inasmuch as it exceeds all hopes and expectations. The noble Earl much underrated his own powers, when he imagined that he could not have framed a Bill very different from this, and yet capable of satisfying most of those whom it is possible or desirable ever to satisfy. I have no doubt that, with such a Bill, he would have conciliated a much more weighty and solid support to his Administration than that which he has acquired by his present measure, and that he would have disarmed the hostility of a large portion of those individuals who now feel themselves obliged to oppose this Bill, because they consider it to be a change which must inevitably lead to all other changes.

The noble Earl has told your Lordships that this measure is a bold measure of Reform. In that assertion I fully concur; indeed, so bold a measure has never been brought forward by any statesman in any country under heaven. Noble Lords will not expect me to fatigue myself and the House by going into a review of all the extravagant plans of Reform which have been framed for the improvement of the constitutions of other countries. I will, however, defy your Lordships to select, out of all those plans, any one which, unless it fairly professed itself to be a revolution, was equal in the magnitude of its consequences to this Bill of moderate Reform. But the noble Earl tells us that it is on the ground of the very extent of the measure that he rests his belief that it will satisfy the people. Now I am of opinion that the satisfaction with which it has been received by those classes of the people, who avowedly consider it only as a steppingstone to further and still more dangerous changes, will not be its best recommendation to your Lordships, or to any friends of the real liberty of their country.

The speech of the noble Earl, excepting that part of it in which he went into a very imperfect detail of the provisions of the Bill, was employed in making an eloquent and a very able attack on the whole system of nomination boroughs. I will not weary your Lordships by a tedious re- ference to historical details, or enter into an investigation of the accuracy of the noble Earl's assertion that this Bill goes to effect, by the abolition of the nomination boroughs, only a restoration of the ancient Constitution. I would, however, request the noble Earl to point out to me the time when the Constitution bore any resemblance to the Constitution which would be created by this Bill. In spite of the indiscriminate attack of the noble Earl on this influence over the Representation of the country—an influence which individuals possess, as he himself admits, not in consequence of their rank in society, but in consequence of their property in certain districts of the country—I defy the noble Earl to point out the time in which this influence did not exist to a great extent. The noble Earl has said, that all the great authorities who have most considered the principles on which the Constitution of England is founded, are on his side. Is this assertion correct? I could quote, if it were necessary, the opinions of Mr. Pitt, delivered at a period when age had matured his experience; I could quote the opinions of Mr. Burke, of Mr. Wyndham, of Mr. Canning. Can the noble Earl mention the names of any men who united with greater talents greater knowledge of human nature, or a more intimate acquaintance with the workings of human society? Whatever may be their future destiny, at least these nomination boroughs are well entitled to a funeral eulogy. It is through them that all those persons who have made a distinguished figure in Parliament have found their way into it, either on their first entrance, or at some subsequent period of their lives. This is no slight recommendation of such boroughs, unless you can shew that the road into Parliament under the new Bill will not be far more difficult of access to men in their circumstances. Besides, these boroughs have often proved a valuable safeguard against the domineering influence, sometimes of the Crown, sometimes of the people, and have thus prevented collisions between the two Houses of Parliament. They form one of those instances which prove the soundness of Mr. Fox's historical philosophy, when he stated that the practice of the Constitution was admirable, but its theory defective and absurd. The noble Earl is now endeavouring to bring back the Constitution to that theory which his great political prototype declared to be defective and absurd, whilst he is throwing away all the advantages of that practice which he so much admired.

It is now an old story, and though it may not be ungrateful to your Lordships' ears, I am afraid that, when my words find their way abroad, it will not be very grateful to the ears of some people out of doors—it is now an old story, that we ought not to make great changes in our Constitution, because, in point of fact, it works well. The time was, when this eulogium sounded well in the ears of Englishmen. It has been repeated in all quarters of the world, it has been proclaimed by historians, philosophers, and politicians, and echoed by the people of England. But now we have become accustomed to be addressed in a different strain. "You fancy yourselves," say the orators of the day—"you fancy yourselves a great, and happy, and glorious people, but you are wofully mistaken; you are a wretched, an impoverished, and an ill-governed people; you are suffering so universally under your present system of misgovernment, that if you leave one stone standing of that fabric which you falsely suppose to have given you shelter and protection for so many years, it will crumble on your heads, and detroy you amidst its ruins.

The principle and object of this Bill are, to make the Constitution more democratic. Look to the consequences. When that assembly, which has already become the chief governing power of the state, attains to be not only the governing power, but the government itself, and suffers itself to be guided by other assemblies of another description, such as have recently been formed in the north, and especially at Birmingham—when these come with their directions for our conduct thundering over our heads; what, I ask, will be the kind of government then presiding over the interests of the country? What is it that we are to expect from a Legislative Assembly so constituted and so directed? The people, I know, have been told that they will have cheaper bread; and it is assumed by some that we shall have fewer taxes. Weak and miserable delusion! After all the successful efforts^* of the noble ^* Since the peace, taxes to the amount of 31,350,000l. have been repealed: 4,050 offices, of which the income was 701,000l., have also been abolished; and yet the House of Commons is to suffer an universal change, because Duke and his predecessors, strenuously supported by the House of Commons, as at present constituted, to lighten the burthens of the State—efforts which, in some instances, I am inclined to think were carried too far; after all the further attempts made by the present Administration to gather gleanings from a field which had been so fully reaped, is it not a weak and miserable delusion to say that, be the assembly as democratical as it may, it can materially reduce the present amount of taxation? Yes, a House of Commons elected under this Bill could, and I have little doubt would, reduce taxation,—but at what cost?—by the sacrifice of the good faith, the security, and the happiness, of the country.

Now, as to war—for war is another point on which the supporters of this measure have attempted to delude the people. Under the government of a democratical assembly, we are told that we shall have no wars. No wars, indeed! Is then all history a fable? Where is the democratical State which was not the most warlike of all the States around it? Look at the history of our own country, and then say whether the passion for war has decreased among the people as their institutions have become more liberal, and their form of government more popular. But why will there not be wars? Because it is said that Parliament has hitherto entered into wars against the inclination of the people. Now, the Revolution is the period since which the popular voice has been most loudly heard in Parliament. Look, then, at the war which immediately followed it. Perhaps that is one of the cases of the most doubtful kind. I ask whether we are confident that a Parliament reformed on such a plan as that which is now before us, would have supported William against James? From what we know of those times, I think it doubtful whether this reformed Parliament would have supported such a war: but surely that the then Parliament did support that war will not be made a ground of accusation against it by those who call themselves friends of the liberties of the country. Again, let us look at the war of 1741: that war was actually forced upon the Government by the people. I am not certain as to the feelings of the country at the beginning of it is the indiscriminate supporter of taxation and corruption.—[Sic. Orig.] the war of 1756, but I know that that war was successful in its progress, and, therefore, was highly popular. Then came the war with America. No man can doubt, that, at its commencement, and for a considerable period, it was the war not of Parliament alone, but of the country. It grew unpopular at last, because it was unsuccessful; and I do not deny that that war was then carried on, after it had ceased to be popular, in consequence of the excessive influence possessed by the Crown in the House of Commons. That influence was then as great as in the time of Sir Robert Walpole, when about 200 Members were, as is well known, subject to it; whereas, it is indisputable that the Crown cannot now command the support of one-third of that number. In the first French war, opinions were certainly divided; but in the second, by far the most expensive, the feelings of the country were so much in accordance with those of an unreformed Parliament, that, as far as I recollect, not more than one petition for peace was presented during its whole course. There can, therefore, be no ground for presuming that a reformed Parliament would not have supported it. I contend, therefore, that the experience of this country, since the Revolution, when its freedom was secured on a firm foundation, proves that the people have more frequently encouraged the Government in war, than compelled it to refrain. So much for the question of war.

Notwithstanding all the practical benefits which are, as I believe, secured by the present construction of the House of Commons, it is, I admit, one of the parts of the Constitution, the advantages of which are not so easily perceived by minds unaccustomed to political speculations, whilst its alleged defects and anomalies can be made palpable to the most uninformed understanding. I therefore feel much like the noble Earl who has just sat down, that at this period, when attacks of so serious a nature are made upon the Constitution, and appear to produce so deep an impression upon the country, I ought, though not satisfied that the present system is perfect, to hesitate before I consent to changes which, made at such a moment, may be made too hastily, and too extensively. While I say this, I am ready to declare that I am so far a reformer that, under existing circumstances, I should not object to such a revisal of a part of our present system, as should both diminish the number of those places, which experience has proved to be most exposed to bribery and corruption, and the number of other places of which the odium now counterbalances, if it does not outweigh, the advantages. The noble Earl has urged the necessity of granting Representatives to the great towns which have lately risen into importance. On that part of the subject I agree with him. I am no new convert to the doctrine—for, never has an occasion arisen (and there have been a few in my time), for a transfer of the franchise from a convicted borough to a large town, in which I have not given my support to the proposal; nor have confined my support to votes in this House; but I have strongly and frequently pressed the necessity of the measure elsewhere. For a considerable time, even when the subject of Reform was much in agitation, it did not appear that, on the part of these towns, there was any strong impression that their interests would be materially advanced by having Representatives. That feeling seems to me to have now taken an opposite direction. Though, therefore, I may doubt whether their interests have actually suffered from the want of direct Representation, or would be better attended to by having Representatives of their own, than now when they are virtually represented by means of those mercantile men who sit for small boroughs, I am fully prepared to yield to the wish which those great towns have expressed. Indeed, I see no objection to its gratification, but the objection to change itself.

I agree with the noble Duke, that no system has ever been proposed, least of all the present Bill, which affords the prospect of working as well as that which has hitherto existed; but I feel that ground alone to be no longer tenable. I should support, therefore, even a considerable change, because I think that it is not enough for a country to be well governed, unless the majority of that part of the population, in any degree capable of judging, are satisfied that it is well governed. Do not misunderstand me. I think that much of the power of a Government everywhere, rests on the confidence of the people; and if that confidence be shaken, be the Government in reality good or bad, it is the interest and duty of the Government to take such reasonable measures as suggest themselves to recover that confidence, and assure its continuance. That, however, is not to be done by changing at once the whole constitution of the House of Commons. Whenever such a change is proposed (and such a change, I think, is now proposed) I must resist it, in the hope that the quiet good sense of the people of England will recover from its present delusion; and, however indignant they may at first be with those who dare to oppose such crude and perilous suggestions, I am sure they will soon return to their old feelings of love and respect for those who perform only their duty in arresting the wildness of the popular career.

I do not wish to follow the noble Earl into the details of this Bill; but I think, if it were, a Bill fit to go into Committee, that some of the objectionable parts of its details (if we can talk of anything in this Bill as a detail) are capable of correction. But shall I, on that ground, consent to its going into Committee? I think not, if I am satisfied, that the principle of the measure is bad. I believe the principle on which the whole of this Bill is founded to be such, that no amendments made in the Committee can so remove the objections to it as to make it our duty to pass it into a law. I confess, that there was a short period in which I flattered myself, that some amendments could he proposed which would render this Bill, if not a boon to the country, at least a measure of less dangerous import than I now consider it. I set to work—I made the attempt—I put my hand to it, but I found it impossible to proceed, and I awoke from my delusion. I was met at every step by the principle which I considered so objectionable—the principle, that population, taken by itself, must be the basis of Representation. It is said, How can it be so, when the Bill requires that, in each borough, there should be at least 300 voters composed of a class of persons renting 10l. houses? But is it not so, when a place containing a population of 2,000 persons, on the ground of numbers alone, retains one member, and a population of 4,000, on that ground alone, retains two Members? These Members they would respectively retain, even were the whole population composed of paupers. If these places do not possess the requisite amount of qualified voters, a pack of Commissioners is set loose to hunt for the complement, in the neighbourhood, and in some cases at the distance of many miles; so that the constituency, to any extent, might be composed of strangers. However small, therefore, may be the proportion which the borough itself is able to contribute to the required constituency, still its claim to be represented in Parliament is admitted solely upon the ground of its population. If this be not to take population as the basis of Representation, I know not what can be so. In that part of the Bill which gives additional Members to counties, the selection is guided by population alone. Here, at least, there can be no room for dispute. Population, therefore, taken by itself, is, according to this Bill, the basis of Representation. I will not go into the argument, whether that is, or is not, the best basis; but I believe, that in no country, except the United States, has the experiment ever been tried. Even in the wildest times of the French Republic, population and taxation combined were considered as the essential basis of the system of Representation. But, if population alone is to be taken—if you set out on that principle, and hope to find a resting-place from attempts at future changes, which is one of your grand arguments in favour of this sweeping measure, you will assuredly be mistaken. If you do adopt that principle, you ought to follow it out consistently. Has that been done here? You will indeed find great difficulty in fixing the line, and that is a reason why you should not adopt the principle at all. But if you do adopt it, what reason can you give to the towns now unrepresented, which have a population below 10,000, but much beyond that of a great number of those boroughs which retain one or two Representatives, why they should not be admitted to any share of the elective franchise—towns, too, which have not only the claim of numbers, but possess in themselves the required constituency? Why are the towns having a population of between 10,000, and 20,000, to have only one Member, when one is to be returned by boroughs having only 2,000, and two by those which have only 4,000? Why are towns, with a population of 100,000, and a number of qualified voters, amounting almost to universal suffrage, to be contented with the same share in the Representation as boroughs of 4,000, which must eke out their scanty proportion of such voters, by calling in the inhabitants of adjoining or not adjoining dis- tricts? These questions are endless; these anomalies are innumerable. I am to be told, I suppose, that the present mode of Representation is full of anomalies. This is one ground of complaint. But how does this Bill remove it? Can the varieties now existing be correctly called anomalies? In order to have anomalies, you must first have a principle. But it is our pride that, in the formation of our Constitution, no principle of abstract theory was consulted. It is the result of the wisdom of successive generations, acting upon no system, but governing themselves by the different circumstances in which at various times they were placed. They made such changes as the circumstances of society required, but in making them they did not adopt any regular plan.

I say, therefore, that my objection is to the principle of this Bill. There is no ground whatever for supposing, that the towns which you have retained or selected are more fit to send Members to Parliament than many others which yon have left out. That is my first objection, and you may hope in vain to give satisfaction by thus establishing, by an Act of Parliament, what, according to your own principles, is unjust. Let me add, that if you establish the Representation solely on the basis of population, I do not know what you will be able to say to the claims of Ireland. We, who oppose that principle, should have answers enough—we could say, that they did not pay a sufficient amount of taxation. That was the principle adopted by Mr. Pitt, who left only a Representation to those boroughs in Ireland in which the greatest amount of population and taxation were found to be united. I wish any noble Lord, who supports the Bill, to tell me what answer he could give. I know that no answer can be given to the agitators there, for nothing will satisfy them; but I think, that no answer can be given by the supporters of the Bill to those who fairly wish to see the Representation of the two countries placed upon the same footing.

I have another objection to the Bill. I think that, though the noble Earl did state reasons, good or bad, why the boroughs in schedule A or B should be wholly or in part disfranchised, why Representatives should be given to the large manufacturing towns, and why some should be added to the extensive counties, he has entirely omitted to state any reasons for destroying the elective franchise, not only in the places included in schedule B, but in every city and borough against which no complaint has been brought forward. We know what they have produced—what sort of Representatives they have sent to Parliament—and yet there is no one place, with the exception of the two Universities, in which a single right of election has been left unchanged. Although I do not assert that the species of property which exists in boroughs is to be considered as property, in the strictest sense of the term, yet I think that every right of that sort ought lo be most lightly touched, and not touched at all without some strong reason, and without a fair prospect of affording to those whom you compel to part with it, the advantage of improved government and all the compensation which that advantage can secure. Now with respect to the rights of voting in all these boroughs, whether exercised by corporations close or open—by liverymen, freemen, freeholders, burgage-holders, potwallopers, scot-and-lot payers, in short, all that infinite variety of electors, which I believe sincerely, in the working of the Constitution, has produced the best consequences to the State—I find that they are all to be swept away at once sub silentio, and as a matter of course, and swept away too, without, as I see, or am even told, on any rational grounds, securing the advantages of permanent good government. These are all to be abrogated, and in their place is to be substituted one universal right, of which we can have no experience, as it does not, I believe, exist in any one city or borough throughout the kingdom.

There is another objection I have to the Bill, and that is, the enormous number of persons it will introduce to the enjoyment of the elective franchise. I ask whether that is a trifle?—where is the example for it?—where is the country that has even the same number as we have now? Look to France, which has just been regenerated: France, which has been regenerated upon a democratic principle, had not, I believe more than 80,000 voters; and now the democratic party seems to have been satisfied with an increase which makes the total number of voters about 200,000. But France, my Lords, contains, if I am not mistaken, 32,000,000 of inhabitants; yet there her liberals thought that a constituency of 200,000 made the country sufficiently democratic. Here we have only 12,000,000 inhabitants, and yet we have—I cannot exactly state the number—but something between 400,000 and 500,000 voters; in addition to which, it is now proposed by this Bill to create half a million. Thus are we, with our 12,000,000 of inhabitants to have 1,000,000 of voters; while democratic France, with her 32,000,000 of inhabitants, is content with about 200,000 electors. My Lords, I think that, with respect to the inconvenience which must arise from this enormous increase in the constituent body, no man can venture to express a doubt. Whether there maybe provisions, hereafter, to obviate this inconvenience I know not; but of this I am certain, that so great is the influx—so great the accession of new voters, that it is impossible it should not be attended with confusion and disorder.

My Lords, the anomalies of the Constitution have been much insisted on, and the evils under which the country is stated to labour have been forcibly portrayed; but where has the noble Earl found out the panacea for all evils—the universal medicine—to be substituted for the wholesome diet by which England has been so long nourished, by which she has grown, and on which she has thriven? He has found it in the intelligence and independence of one class of voters—in one class alone—governing in all places and in all parts of the country. Formerly, my Lords, we were in the habit of considering that a variety of electors was good, because thereby an opportunity was afforded for men of different habits, occupations, and situations in life, to find their way into the House of Commons. The noble Baron (Holland) will perhaps, remember a pamphlet which was written by a person high in his confidence, and with a view of giving some advice to the Cortes of Spain. I concurred, my Lords, with many of the observations which I found in that pamphlet; and I particularly agreed with the recommendation not to create a uniform mode of election, or a uniform right of voting throughout the country. They too, my Lords, who think an equality in the suffrage desirable (I confess my Lords, I am not of that number) might with justice object to this measure, the effect which it must have in different places—in some creating, Universal Suffrage, and in others (I wish they were numerous) leaving a small but an ample number of qualified electors.

If I am told that this last objection is inconsistent with the other, and that I cannot therefore maintain them both, my reply is this.—It is true that the uniformity of qualification will not, in all cases, owing to the unequal value of property in densely and thinly-peopled districts, confer the I franchise on the same class; but this very admission, so far from invalidating one or other of the objections, affords the best illustration of the impolicy of the proposition itself; since the qualification will be virtually lowered where every prudent Statesman would wish to raise it, and raised where it might, perhaps, with comparative safety, descend still lower.

My Lords, there are some omissions in the speech of the noble Earl which I regret, and of which I think this House and the country have some reason to complain. The noble Earl has entirely left out of consideration what I, in my ignorance, thought the real, the great problem for a Statesman to consider, when about to construct a Legislative Assembly. The first question which I should have thought it necessary to ask myself, and to answer at least to my own satisfaction, and, as far as I was able, to that of others, is this:—By what mode of election is an assembly fit to govern the country most likely to be procured? I should have thought that looking to history and experience, would have been the best way to qualify men to become judges of what was in truth the best Constitution. But history and experience have been thrown aside. To an individual like me, I allow it might be remarked, "You do not seek for the best Constitution for the country, because you say, this which you now enjoy is decidedly the best." But still there is a question fit to be asked and answered, and it is this. When the clauses of your Bill come into operation, what will be the sort of persons elected by the populous places in which there is a constituency of many thousands—a constituency not merely paying 10l. per annum, but 3s. 10d. per week—composed not of householders only, but of as many lodgers at that rate as each House may contain? What probability is there that these electors would be guided in their choice by that sound judgment which upon such an occasion, ought to prevail? If too I am told, that a very numerous constituency will really be a cure for bribery, I ask you to look to Dublin and to Liverpool. I ask you to remember Westminster, when West- minster was contested, and then to tell me if it did not, on both sides, present a scene of the grossest bribery? Ought not then the noble Earl, before he decided on so enormous an increase to the existing number of electors, to have paused, and considered, and asked himself whether, if his desire were to procure good Members of Parliament, he was likely to produce such a result by the adoption of such means?—whether it was probable that such a constituency would be directed by motives which would lead them to make the best selection? It has been said, that such persons are bad judges of measures, but that they are good judges of men. This I believe to be a fallacy; although I have more than once heard it brought forward by good authorities. When you say these people are good judges of men, it is meant they are good judges of the conduct of men. What is the conduct of a public man? How is it to be estimated? Simply by his opinions or votes upon certain great measures. In order then to judge rightly of the man, they should be capable of judging of the measures themselves. Now this is the very proposition which is denied. But, my Lords, when I assert, that universal popular Representation is not the best mode of securing good Members of Parliament, do I wish it to be excluded on this account? No; I rejoice that popular franchise has formed a part of the constituency of this country. I rejoice in it, because it has tended to give the people that exalted idea of their own freedom which distinguishes them from the nations of other countries, because it has given them an interest in the affairs of the State, and fostered, in all classes, even the most humble, a spirit of pure patriotism. There is not, therefore, one place in which popular Representation prevails, from which I would take the franchise.

But with a constituency universally popular, and with the fear of a contested election hanging over their heads, how large a number of Members will act as mere delegates? With the mere prospect of such a system, how many act so already? How completely will then be forgotten that great constitutional principle, the principle which covered and corrected all our anomalies—that when once a man set his feet in the House of Commons, he was the Representative, not of the place which sent him, but of the people of England! Whenever any popular excitement takes place at the time of a general election, will not nearly the whole House represent only the temporary opinion and passions of a majority in the country, leaving the minority, however respectable in intelligence, property, or numbers, almost without an organ? With such an assembly, fluctuating, as it must do, with every variation of a breeze, which may blow by turns from every point of the compass, what will become of stability, the great element of social and political happiness? Will this be a government for which the noble Earl himself will tell us that we ought to exchange our own?

If the Bill were to leave all these 150 boroughs nearly in the state in which it found them, it would be something in its favour. But among the many reasons for which I oppose it, there is this above all—that I object to altering any one of the ancient franchises of the realm without assigning a good and sufficient reason. While I confess that there are certain portions of the existing system which are liable to condemnation, I do so most reluctantly; and I deeply regret that the noble Lord should have felt no such reluctance—should have been restrained by no fear, lest his sweeping condemnation of the whole should lead the people to the belief that there was not one part of the Constitution which should remain unchanged. The dreadful effect to be apprehended from this universal change is, that it must unsettle the minds of men as regards the whole system. If we say to the people, all the rights of such and such classes of persons, heretofore voters, are to be sacrificed, and this without deigning to assign any reason, what must be their feelings? Will they not say, as soon as their highly-raised expectations of compensating benefits shall have met with the unfailing disappointment that awaits them—"The Government which sacrifices the rights of its subjects is not that under which we wish to live, and Parliament itself is no longer entitled to our respect and obedience?"

But what is the compensation offered by the noble Earl for this indisputable evil?—the purity of election. Will then these boroughs, which are to have from three to four hundred electors, be secure from the influence of corruption? I have always understood, on the contrary, that boroughs of that description were precisely those in which there was the most direct and the grossest bribery, because men could, by a small sum of money, secure a majority, and on that account always sought those places as affording the cheapest way by which they could get into Parliament. Now, if this be the case, do you expect to attain the end you propose to yourselves, by increasing fourfold, as your Bill will do, the number of places in which a constituency thus limited will offer the same temptation?

Again, too, I would ask the noble Earl, what sort of Parliament can he hope to have under the operation of his Reform Bill? We have heard of a Parliament which acquired the title of Parliamentum indoctum. I fear that, under the circumstances to which I have alluded, a good claim to this enviable designation might be once more set forth.

Is it not essential to the deliberations of the House of Commons upon the public affairs of India, that persons should find admission into that assembly, whom long residence in that country has furnished with knowledge derived from experience? How are such men, estranged as they are from home, to procure a seat under this Bill, except by bribery? how are the West-Indian and Colonial interests to be represented? Some men connected with commerce and manufactures may, it is true, become the Representatives of commercial and manufacturing towns, unless they be supplanted by some noisy demagogue, whom they are deterred from opposing; by the salutary fear of having their persons endangered, and their houses burned down by the mob. But will the House of Commons be, as at present, an Assembly representing all the great interests of the country—all the great interests of the empire at large? Will it possess all the information necessary to manage all the complicated affairs which frequently come before them, without the aid of professional men—without the presence of his Majesty's Attorney and Solicitor General, and other eminent lawyers, to correct those mistakes into which a want of legal knowledge must infallibly lead a Legislative Assembly? For how are these persons to be returned? how can they, consistently with their attention to a profession so laborious, devise means of entering that House, except, as in the other case, by bribery; unless, indeed, they have obtained, in some way or other, political notoriety?

Let the noble Lord answer me this. Not only lawyers would be for the most part excluded from that House, but others who, perhaps, formed its most useful Members, but whose fortune, whose constitution, whose habits, all forbid them to face the expense, the trouble, and the ferment of a popular election. I ask the noble Lord, how are such men to come in? If all these classes be not excluded, will not the avenue for their entrance into Parliament be extremely narrowed?

Again, how do the noble Earl and his friends expect to be able to carry on the public business in the House of Commons, if the present Bill pass into a law? Will they promise to themselves, and to all their successors, such an inheritance of unvarying popularity as always to be placed in Parliament whenever their constituents are appealed to? Will they not, by the introduction of this measure, have subjected themselves and their successors to the sudden impulses of popular feeling—impulses which they must either instantly obey, or which may as suddenly drive them from office? The measure is akin to that by which the salaries of the great officers of the State have been reduced. The possession of wealth, my Lords, has not hitherto been, and I trust it will never be, an indispensable qualification for the higher offices of the State. The measure to which I allude is odiously aristocratical. By reducing the salaries of the great officers of the State, you leave the offices open only to the possessors of wealth; you narrow the choice of the Crown; you deprive the country of the power of calling into its service the most useful and the most brilliant talent which it possesses. The presence in the House of Commons, not only of the higher officers of Government, but of many persons in subordinate offices, is extremely useful—and, as well as that of the former, almost indispensable. Should this Bill pass, and all boroughs with a small constituency, and under private influence, be swept away, by what means can they gain a seat? How will they be able to bear the expenses of a contested election? How will they have gained sufficient popularity to command the suffrage of the people? If they are to come in at all, it must be by bribery out of the purse of government.

Another question, too, I have to ask the noble Earl, and I trust my doing so will not be considered as admitting that your Lordships have a peculiar interest in opposing this Bill. If we have any interest in this particular, it is only in common with the nation at large—I mean the possibility of your Lordships introducing your eldest sons into Parliament. I ask the noble Lord how is this, except in a few instances, to be effected under the Reform Bill? And I ask, if there is to be a House of Lords, is it not fit that it should be able to display that knowledge which must be laboriously acquired, and that talent which is matured by the habits of exertion? My Lords, I have heard many celebrated Members of your Lordships' House, during the fifty years to which my memory extends, but I cannot recollect more than ten men who have taken a distinguished part in your Lordships' debates, who had not had their schooling in the House of Commons. It is not that this is beneficial in exercising their talent as speakers alone, but it gives them an opportunity of learning how to transact the public business; and what is, perhaps, more important still than anything else they can there learn, they are brought into contact with their fellow-subjects, and with popular bodies. They are thus taught to feel and appreciate English liberty and English independence, which, born as they are to hereditary honours, and, in most cases, to hereditary wealth, might be less present to their minds and less powerful in actuating their conduct, than if they never had been elsewhere—than if they had breathed no other atmosphere but that of your Lordships' House. I would not, however, give this as a reason why you should not pass the Bill, were not the country, in my conscientious judgment, equally interested with your Lordships, on this and on other accounts, in its rejection.

I have yet another question to ask the noble Earl. I should be glad to know if he really believes that a body, constituted after the manner he proposes for his new Parliament, would assist his Government in carrying into effect their views on what are called liberal principles? Can he think so, when it is more than probable, that if we had had a Constitution framed upon a model similar to that now before us, the people would still have been labouring under a multitude of those taxes which were imposed in the ignorance of former times, and entangled in all those trammels of commercial and financial law with which society was formerly embar-. rassed. I ask the noble Earl, would the great measure of Catholic Emancipation have been passed by a Parliament so reformed? I do not believe that it would. On all these points, my Lords, I offer my conjectures: the noble Earl has not offered his; I beg, therefore, that we may hear from him (or from some of the noble Lords near him), his conjectures respecting the matters to which I have adverted. But when I have heard them, shall I be satisfied that your Lordships should pass the Bill? Are your Lordships prepared to make an entire change in the whole Representative system, simply upon the conjectures of the noble Earl? No; this is my objection—I oppose any measure which proposes to alter every thing. Amend it as you may—leave uninjured all the ancient rights, which are so wantonly to be destroyed, simply directing you disfranchisement against those boroughs which are incontestably nomination boroughs. Ought we to be satisfied? Would Ministers stand blameless? No; the injury is irremediable—I do not speak of passing, but of proposing, a plan of universal demolition and universal re-construction. Your Lordships may prevent some portion of the evils which would otherwise result, by not permitting the Bill to pass into a law; but neither you, nor the might of man, can revoke the mischief of proposing it. The Ministers have done what no Ministers ever ought to do—they have brought forward a measure which it may be almost equally dangerous to adopt or to reject. The noble Earl may pride himself—very justly pride himself—upon the distinguished powers of mind and of language which he has ever displayed as a Member of the Legislature. Through a long political life I have had the misfortune generally to differ from him, yet I respect his motives and admire his talents. But even had those talents been employed in guiding the vessel of the State through the sea of troubles on which it was embarked, and not in obstructing the measures of those who, with whatever difficulty and expense, have still successfully steered it through such tempests as never before assailed a country at any period of the history of the civilized world, still, however great the benefits which might have resulted from such an exercise of his talents, the single act of proposing this Bill would, in my opinion, go far to cancel all our obligations to him. I say this, my Lords, more in sorrow than in bitterness. I never was, or could be, a rival to the noble Earl—when he accepted office I was not his political enemy. I wished, certainly, that the strength of the noble Duke's Government should have been made sufficient to enable him to remain in power, but, finding this not to be the case, I heard with pleasure that the noble Earl was advanced to the station which he now holds. He knows that it was my wish to support him. I trusted not in the Mr. Grey of 1793, but in the Earl Grey of 1830. I trusted him then, and I still believe in his sincerity, much as I distrust his political discernment, when he declares that, in proposing this most sweeping measure of Reform and confiscation, he believes that he is not proposing anything beyond, or at variance with, the expressions in his Majesty's Speech. My interpretation of these expressions is far different. I see nothing in them to justify the principle or the main portion of the Bill.

The situation of the noble Earl, when he assumed the chief station in the Government, was one which (if, in tunes like these, the possession of high office could produce that feeling) was an object of peculiar envy. He had it in his power to confer great and permanent good upon his country. He was placed on a lofty eminence between two contending parties—those who wished to change everything, and those who wished to change nothing. He might have introduced a measure which would have satisfied as large a portion of those who can be satisfied with anything as this Bill can possibly satisfy, and he might have reconciled to Reform a large proportion of those who are dissatisfied with the present Bill. He might have secured the valuable support of many of those who are called the conservative party, and might have induced them to rally round his standard. He might have stood, as it were, between the living and the dead, and in my conscience I believe he might have stayed the plague. Instead of this, he has chosen to follow the example of the Roman Tribune:—'pollicitus toti ferè Italiæ civitatem, 'omnibus statum concupiscentibus, summa imis miscuit, et in præruptum atque anceps 'periculum adduxit rempublicam.'

What is now the state in which the noble Earl has placed himself and his country? It is, I repeat it, more in sorrow than in bitterness that I speak. I well remember, that when, in another House of Parliament, where the noble Earl and myself were sitting at the same time, he was taking measures and using language which Mr. Pitt thought betrayed too strong a leaning towards the principles of those who were then called Radicals—he warned him—a warning which the noble Earl may still remember—against any connection with a party of which he would himself become one of the first victims, because it was equally hostile to talent and to virtue. I think that what the noble Earl is now doing, will, contrary to his intention, give a degree of strength to that party which he will never be able to control. My authorities are the leaders of that party. They say, "We support this Bill, not because we are satisfied, but because, if a change to this extent be once effected, the rest of our work is easy. If the chariot be once set in motion at this pace, it must, by its own momentum, be hurried down the precipice." Do you believe them, or do you not? Do you doubt their intentions? That is strange incredulity, indeed, in defiance of their own declarations. Do you doubt their power? I so far doubt it, that I believe, should matters come to a crisis, their power would be broken by the result of a collision with a Government really determined to do its duty.

My Lords, omitting almost every thing of detail, and without discussing for a moment the manner in which the measure is proposed to be carried into execution, I have now, however imperfectly, stated my objections to the principles of this measure, and I do not think that it would be consistent with my duty to myself, your Lordships, and my country, to give my vote for the second reading. The noble Earl, however, tells us that this Bill, as it now stands, or something equally efficient, must pass. Now, no Bill equally efficient can be brought in, which does not carry the work both of destruction and of creation as far as this Bill, for nothing short of that will, strickly speaking, deserve the title of equally efficient. What hope, then, have we of doing any good by proposing amendments in Committee? The door is closed. It is true that, in another place, the Government said they were prepared to adopt any amendment which did not materially interfere with the principle of the Bill. But how did they redeem that pledge? Not a single amendment did they consent to, except some pitiful trifle, which in very shame they could not reject, save upon one occasion, when an important amendment was carried against them by a majority of their own friends—an amendment of which the noble Earl does not approve.

But the noble Earl says, that the people at large are for the Bill. If that be so, who can wonder at it? The noble Earl has spoken much of bribery; but, I ask him, was there ever, in the records of history, a bribery to the extent of that offered by this Bill, in the shape of an elective franchise to 500,000 persons? It declares a certain class of persons to be the sole electors of every city and borough in the kingdom. Thus a bribe is directly given to that class of persons to support the Bill. You ask 500,000 persons whether they choose to have, nay, to monopolize, political power? Who could expect any other answer than what was given? But even with all this, while I admit the general feeling to be still in favour of a change, and perhaps no small change, in the constitution of the House of Commons, I must declare, that I do not see any symptoms of the people being as decidedly in favour of the Bill now before your Lordships as they were when they knew little of it. It is true that petitions have been presented, and I wish at all times to treat petitioners with respect: they have aright to be heard and to be attended to; but when they come before us, we must consider the nature of the subject on which they address us. If it should happen to be a subject of so great, and difficult, and complicated a nature, that even persons of the highest talent, the highest information, and the highest wisdom, possessing, moreover, that knowledge of the mind and heart of man which alone can make a good politician, approach with awe a matter of such mighty import, and, after applying themselves to its consideration, are involved in embarrassment, and remain to the last doubtful of the propriety of the decisions to which they come; may we not, with all respect for the persons who send us those petitions, doubt whether they can, by possibility, be qualified to judge, to advise, much less to dictate upon it?

The petitions in favour of this measure come chiefly, but not exclusively (for there are many from the classes above them, and still more from the classes below them), from those persons to whom the bribe is given—from the 10l. voters; and although I admit that this class in England, and particularly since the schoolmaster has been abroad, are more intelligent and better able to form a correct judgment upon such subjects, than persons of the same rank in life in any other nation in the world, yet, as they are for the most part employed, for the largest portion of their time, in the various necessary occupations from which they derive their support;—unless they are gifted with an intuitive power of acquiring knowledge, which does not reach the higher orders, and those who have more leisure and better opportunities to learn, they can hardly be capable of forming such a judgment upon the principle and details of so great and complicated a measure, as shall preclude us from the exercise of ours. What can most of them really know about the Bill, except that it gives them votes?—and votes are good things. But then they are told it will give them cheap bread. A demagogue presents himself to them with a red cap upon a pole, and two loaves of bread, one large and the other small, saying, "if you vote for such a candidate, you will have the large loaf; but if for the other candidate, you can only have the small one." Thus are they deluded—thus played upon by the excitement of fallacious expectations, and by the exertions of a Press which has been sufficiently characterized by the noble Earl (Winchilsea), to render it unnecessary for me to say one word respecting it. Can we wonder, then, that they are in favour of the Bill, the only measure of Reform now before them, although it is obvious that not one in a thousand of them can have read it, and that, if that one can fully comprehend it, he has done more than myself, and I believe most of your Lordships, have been able to do.

The petitions of these persons deserve, no doubt, serious consideration; but I have yet to learn that either this or the other House of Parliament is bound, under the penalty of being cashiered, to follow implicitly any other guide than that of its own deliberate judgment, after full argument and discussion. If that be not so, why sit we here? If we sit here merely to register the orders of the House of Commons, and if the Commons sit in St. Stephen's merely to register the orders of the Northern Unions and the Birmingham Association, how long will it be before we, in the first place, and the House of Commons in the next, shall be called upon to give up even the semblance of deliberation? Nay more—how long will it be before the Throne itself is considered as an useless and expensive pageant?

Again I say, that I deeply regret that so universal a change in the constitution of the House of Commons has been proposed. Man is the creature of habit rather than of principle; his affections fasten to that which he is accustomed to. Hitherto the people of England have been warmly attached to the existing system, though not blind to its partial defects; but this proposition tends for ever to alienate them from the whole. Is it nothing to alter, almost without assigning a reason, and hardly mentioning it as a part of the provisions of the Bill, the constituency of at least 150 boroughs to whom the privilege of electing Representatives is wholly or in part continued, abrogating rights almost coeval with the Constitution itself, and against the exercise of which no complaint is made? Is it nothing to abolish, or, at least, lo deprive of all political power, every Corporation in the kingdom, whether close or open? Those who know the history of their country must be aware that they were the first foundation, and the main instrument of the establishment of our liberty. In my opinion, they not only have had, but still have their uses. They naturally create a great variety of local attachments, of local objects of ambition: they endear a man to the place of his nativity; and when a man feels an interest in the place where he was born, he extends that feeling to the whole country. What is, moreover, this 10l. qualification which is considered by Ministers as giving a sufficient proof of the capacity of the possessor to judge of the merits of candidates, and as being so decidedly superior to all other qualifications, that they have substituted that, and that alone, for all the varied rights of voting which previously existed? It is precisely the qualification which gives a settlement in a parish, and entitles the man who has possessed it to apply for parochial relief.

Then it is asked, what do you hope for by resisting the second reading of this Bill? In the first place, there is always something to hope for, when a man, or a body of men, feel that they are acting without private interest, without bias, without prejudice, and according to what they conceive to be the dictates of their duty. If that, generally speaking, be true, is there a body upon earth upon whom the pursuit of such a course is more peculiarly incumbent than upon ourselves? We are, whatever we may be called, whether a House of Peers, or a Senate, whether a First Chamber or a Second Chamber, we are a co-ordinate House of Legislation with one directly issuing from the people. What is the peculiar privilege and the peculiar duty of such a body? When any measure is presented to us, the adoption of which we apprehend to be pregnant with danger to the community, however strongly that measure may be pressed upon us by the House of Commons, or by the people, it is our primary duty to exercise the privilege which the Constitution has conferred upon us, and to give the country time to reconsider the step which we conceive to be dangerous. Undoubtedly, my Lords, I would rather do this in the present instance, after having tried the practicability of introducing important amendments into the Bill, were it not that, for the reasons which I have already stated, I consider any such trial as hopeless.

We are told by the noble Earl that we have no option but to take the Bill as it is—to adopt at once a proposition which is to consign us and our posterity to a new form of government, which no one has ever ventured to tell us would be practicable, and which, if it were practicable, would, in my opinion, be pernicious. If we take it at all, we must take it precisely in the shape and form in which it has been presented to us—for, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, it is not liable to change. To this decree I cannot bow. I Can, indeed, conceive a measure so framed as to secure all the beneficial results which are anticipated from this very Bill, without the hazard of so much mischief. I think that the noble Earl would have acted with more prudence, if he had commenced his Reform at the other end, if he had given Members with his new constituency, but with a higher qualification, to large places, including both wealth and population, and having distinct interests worthy of a separate organ—if he had added to the most important counties some additional Members, with a more extended constituency, and then had made room for them in the House, by disfranchising, either in whole or in part, those boroughs which stand the lowest in the scale of wealth and population. A measure of this description, though open to many and serious objections, would at least have avoided the adoption of the most dangerous principles of the present Bill—those principles which must carry us much further than the Bill itself; its effects might have been observed, and we should have retained the power of stopping short or of proceeding further, whichever might be found most advisable. To a measure of this description, within proper limits, I, for one, should not refuse my consent, when convinced that the deliberate opinion of the country is decidedly in its favour.

It was my wish to have been able to vote for the second reading of this Bill. My noble friends around me know that I have frequently expressed such a wish; but I trust that it is not necessary for me to appeal to the conversations which I have had with them, in order that what I assert may be believed. I have done all that I possibly could, to bring my mind to consent to the second reading. I have already stated to your Lordships that I had tried my hand at amendments, with a most anxious desire to render it less noxious, and to bring it into some shape in which it might be less unfit to pass—into a shape similar to that of which I have traced the outline—but I found those principles of this Bill, which I have been stating and combating, stare me full in the face at every step, and I was forced to relinquish the task in utter despair of accomplishing it.

I have a full sense of the difficulties and dangers which may attend the decision of your Lordships against the second reading; but I entertain also a full conviction that the responsibility for those difficulties and dangers rests not on us, who are doing our duty by the line of conduct which we pursue, but on those who, unnecessarily and wantonly, have brought things to their present state. Whatever may be the result, I am decidedly of opinion that the country ought to have time to reconsider this great question, and to weigh well the consequences that may attend its decision.

I have witnessed instances of agitation as great as that now existing, which, in 1780, 1793, and 1819, menaced the tranquillity of the country, but in time subsided; and prosperity, order, and content, succeeded to the violence of the storm. I cannot abandon the hope that the same happy change may take place in the present case, and that this most difficult and important question may be brought, in cooler moments, to a safer solution. I say, my Lords, out of regard to the people, we are bound to give the country time to reconsider the subject. We are bound, even for the sake of the noble Earl himself, to afford him the same opportunity. I do not expect to alter his opinion, nor do I call upon him to retract his words; but (having given a pledge, and that pledge having already been redeemed) after the decision of your Lordships—if that decision should be what I anticipate—he may still avail himself of that which Mr. Burke calls "the great ruler of human affairs"—a compromise between extreme opinions. In effecting such a compromise he may be assured of powerful co-operation, and the allies whom he will gain, though not so numerous, will be of a very different description from many of those whom he may lose.

In conclusion, my Lords, I cannot assent to the second reading of this Bill. I am of opinion that, if it shall pass into a law in its present shape, it will place us under a form of government as different from that under which we have hitherto flourished, as one free constitution can be different from another. I must again repeat my conviction, that the mere proposal of this Bill, with the sanction of the Crown and of the Administration, has thrown the country into a state from which it will never entirely recover. With this opinion, and believing that a deadly blow has been inflicted on the vitals of the Constitution, I cannot consent to be an accomplice in the crime, though perforce I must be a sharer in the punishment.

Viscount Melbourne

spoke to the following effect:—My Lords, I am most willing to concur with your Lordships in applauding the ability displayed in the eloquent, but I must say miscellaneous and sometimes contradictory speech which we have just heard from my noble friend; although I cannot but think, that much which has fallen from my noble friend might have letter suited a Committee on the Bill than a motion for its second reading. In what fell from my noble friend, in an early part of his speech I entirely agree; namely, that it is incumbent on the various members of his Majesty's Government to explain the grounds on which they support the measure, particularly those who were formerly unfriendly to Reform, and have recorded their opinions against it, and being myself in this predicament, without that intimation, I should have taken an opportunity of stating the reasons which induce me to vote for the second reading of this Bill. Nay, my Lords, concurring heartily and cordially with my noble friend I at the head of the Government, in now proposing this measure to Parliament, I think it my duty to state at length my reasons for supporting it. To many of the arguments of my noble friend it was impossible for me to listen with any other than a favourable ear; for they are arguments which I have myself urged elsewhere. If ever there was an individual in the country more anxious than another that the affairs of the country might have gone on without our being forced to incur the hazard and responsibility which must result from so great and fundamental a change in the House of Commons, I am that person. That great Philosopher and Statesman, Lord Bacon, says, that the difference between civil affairs and the sciences is, that while in the latter there should be nothing but change and movement, the former should rest for support on authority and reputation. 'Verum in rebus civilibus mutatio etiam in melius (even if the change were for the better) suspecta est ob perturbationem; cum civilia authoritate, consensu, fama, et opinione, non demonstratione nitantur. In artibus autem et scientiis tanquam in metalli fodinis, omnia novis operibus et ulterioribus progressibus circumstrepere debent.' Undoubtedly the perturbation arising from change is to be avoided; but then the other terms of the proposition must be observed. That which it is proposed to change must be supported by authority, consent, reputation, and opinion. If we find that the columns of that support are sapped and falling—if we find that, instead of authority, there is a disrespect for all authority—if we find that, instead of consensus there is dissensus—if we find that, instead of reputation and opinion, there are aversion and repudiation, it is then our duty to look about us, and to consider the dangerous situation in which we are placed; it is then time to propose some change, it is then time to revert to the first principles of the Constitution, that we may repair the edifice which is tottering and crumbling around us. My Lords, we have been told by one of your Lordships that we ought not to yield to popular opinion, that we ought not to be governed arbitrio popularis aurœ and that it frequently becomes the duty of legislative and Representative bodies, and of all those having authority, to resist the will of the people. I readily admit the truth of that proposition. Else why have a Representative body at all? The wildest democrat in existence, those who assert that all power is derived from the people, would hardly deny the proposition. No man can suppose for one moment that it is the duty of a legislative body to yield to every gust of the popular breath; no man can suppose that in questions involving the immediate petty interests of the people this should be done, much less in making those fundamental changes which affect the whole interests of a great country, and of which the people are necessarily very incompetent judges. But, my Lords, although it may be our duty to resist the will of the people for a time, is it possible to resist it for ever? Have we not in this case resisted it long enough? I say this the more freely, because I have on former occasions been in the foreground in resisting Parliamentary Reform. Night after night have I resisted it in another place, going far beyond some of those who are now adverse to the present measure. Wherever the flag of Parliamentary Reform was hoisted, I ranged myself under the opposite banner; if I did not lift the standard of the constitution and call its supporters to the field, I was always ready to follow it, and went beyond others in repelling every approach to Reform. I always opposed in the other House of Parliament the extension of the elective franchise to Manchester and Birmingham. I look back with great regret to the period when a motion of that kind was last brought before the other House of Parliament, because circumstances connected with that motion deprived the Administration of that day of the services of Mr. Huskisson; I shall never cease to regret them, for I think, and shall, I believe, always think that he was not fairly treated; and that occurrence, I own, first shook my confidence in the noble Duke opposite. On that occasion, however I opposed the transfer of the elective franchise to Birmingham, because in my own heart I knew, that if that I proposition were adopted, it must necessarily lead to a large measure of Reform, like that which is now offered to your Lordships. For why, my Lords, give the elective franchise to Birmingham and to Manchester? Because they have become great emporiums of commerce, daily increasing in wealth and importance. Because they are full of men of opulence, of spirit, and intelligence, because they have arrived almost at imperial grandeur, and metropolitan magnificence. Such of your Lordships as oppose the Reform Bill, the noble Earl who spoke last, and the noble Earl who preceded him, would give these towns the elective franchise because they have thus increased. But the whole country has so increased, my Lords; and it seems to me, therefore, as almost all your Lordships have given up the idea that there shall be no Reform, to be impossible longer to resist the adoption of the large measure now proposed or one equal to it. The noble Earl recommended us to give time to the people, he said that, on former occasions, when the wishes of the people on this subject, have been resisted, when similar claims were made and denied, everything has returned to a peaceful channel. For a certain time that may be good policy; the argument is plausible but all experience proves, when the wishes of the people are founded on reason and, justice, and when they are consistent with the fundamental principles of the Constitution, that there must come a time when both the legislative and executive powers must yield to the popular voice or be annihilated. Two of the great arguments against the measure are, that Reform is merely used as a weapon of party, and that the popular demand for it is merely a temporary clamour, that springs up whenever any general calamity occurs, and subsides when that calamity is at an end. Admitting both these arguments to be well-founded, would it not be desirable to deprive party of so formidable a weapon? But when your Lordships see that, on every occasion of public calamity and distress, from whatever cause arising, the people call for an alteration in the Representation, and that the call is accompanied with a deep, rankling sense of injustice suffered, and of rights withheld, can your Lordships suppose that, an opinion so continually revived has not some deepseated foundation, and can you be insensible to the danger of continuing a permanent cause for angry and discontented feelings to be revived and renewed at every period of public distress, and public calamity? Do not, my Lords, be parties to the continuance of this evil, if I must not say this great injustice. What constituted the great danger which attended the continuance of the system formerly pursued towards the Roman Catholics in Ireland? That it gave opportunities to those who, as has been well observed, "were always lying in wait to take advantage of the distresses of the country." It gave a handle to those who were always ready to stir up sedition. The same kind of danger that the empire was exposed to by the refusal of Catholic emancipation, it is now exposed to by the denial of Reform, but to a much greater degree. The Catholics were comparatively a small body, whose strength could always be seen and measured, but the spirit of Reform has been diffused through the whole population and the whole people may be said to be ready for commotion. My Lords, the popular feeling on the subject of Reform extends, your Lordships do not know how far; it penetrates, your Lordships do not know how deep; and the great danger is, that it will break forth with irresistible violence when your Lordships are flattering yourselves that the country is enjoying general repose and perfect tranquillity, or when it is immersed in other dangers and has no arms to resist a discontented people. I have already observed, that my noble friend who has just spoken stated many things which would have been better stated in a Committee. Why will he not allow the Bill to go into that Committee? I am sure my noble friend did himself great injustice when he said that his right hand had so far forgot its cunning, that he should be unable to adapt any amendments to the Bill. But my noble friend has not stated one objection which does not apply only to the details of the Bill, and which may not be obviated in the Committee. Undoubtedly the measure is an extensive one. It does away with the nomination boroughs; it takes away one Member from a number of other boroughs; it alters the constituency of boroughs; it proposes to add to the county Representation—a measure which has always been proposed in every plan of Parliamentary Reform submitted to either House of Parliament; it proposes a general alteration of the qualification throughout the country; and it introduces—which is not the least important part of the Bill—a great variety of regulations as to the conduct and management of elections, with a view to conducting them cheaply, and bringing them to a speedy termination. I will not deny that these are great and important changes and alterations requiring much deliberation, and I regret that so much misapprehension prevails in the public mind as to the supposed delay in proceeding with this Bill. I cannot concur in the censure that has been passed upon the House of Commons for the time and consideration they bestowed on this very important Bill. That House could not have done otherwise, and have done its duty, and no time has been needlessly consumed, no delay has been excessive, considering the great importance of the measure. But as this great measure is eagerly sought for by the country—as it is proposed by his Majesty's Government—as it has been thus deliberated upon, and considered by the House of Commons, and as they, with a large majority, pray your Lordships' concurrence—will you, I ask, at once reject it? will you, by a single night's vote, defeat the hopes of the nation, and cast away, as if it were idle and worthless, the fruit of so much care? Will you reject it on the ground that you may, perhaps, hereafter entertain some similar measure? If such, my Lords, be the ground of your opposition—if you now oppose the Bill, promising to give a better measure hereafter—consider, my Lords, that such a promise is the condemnation of the present system, and the justification almost of that dangerous discontent which I have adverted to, and which your Lordships will not in that case remedy; but your Lordships will well weigh, and deeply consider, the step proposed to you; and pause, I implore you, before you disappoint the wishes of the great body of the people. My noble friend has gone into the whole history of this question since the American war. I can only say, that into all the considerations which that extensive and discursive survey embraces, I am not prepared to enter, as the question before your Lordships is sufficiently extensive and important in itself. Let us consider the circumstances in which we are placed, and the subject as it is brought before us. Though all things may undoubtedly go well as long as the Members of the other House act harmoniously together—supposing, however, which may easily happen, that the Members returned by the popular voice range themselves on one side, determined to carry this measure, and those who are returned in a manner which I need not point out, were to range themselves on the other, what, my Lords, would be the result? Could such a contest be otherwise than perfectly serious? or suppose, my Lords, that we should range ourselves in continued opposition to the majority of the other House and the wishes of the people, must not that lead to consequences the most disastrous? My noble friend misinterpreted the language of my noble friend at the head of the Treasury, when he inferred that the Bill must not be touched or modified, and that your Lordships were to be no longer masters of the measure—and must merely register the decrees of the House of Commons. That is not the conclusion which I drew from what was stated by my noble friend, nor will his language bear such an interpretation. Nothing which fell from my noble friend, can warrant the assumption that he wishes in the slightest degree to impede or control your Lordships' deliberation. The noble Lord has asked what is the basis of the measure, and whether it is not population? Population is not the basis of the measure, it was necessary that we should have, for the purposes of disfranchisement, some practical rule; and, therefore, the want of population was adopted as the rule to disfranchise nomination boroughs. But there is nothing about population on the face of the Bill. I do not mean to deny the statements by which the Bill has been supported in another place; all that I mean to say is this—that there was a necessity for some strict rule both for disfranchisement and for enfranchisement, and population was undoubtedly chosen as the rule for determining the places which should continue to return Members to Parliament; but that mere population was the basis adopted for the Representation of the country I distinctly deny. We never intended that population should be the basis of the Representation of the country. The whole measure goes to effect an extension of the present system of Representation, and adapts it more completely to the circumstances and situation of the country; but it looks at property, at different interests, and at different classes, as well as at population. It is impossible, however, on the second reading of the Bill, when the general principle of Reform is the only question for our consideration, when we have to determine whether there shall be Reform or not. [No, no.!] Noble Lords are eager to disclaim hostility to Reform; every one is anxious to shew that he is a Reformer; and noble Lords now as indignantly deny the charge of being Anti-reformers, as they some years ago would have spurned at the imputation of being Reformers. When that is the case, I put it to your Lordships, as Reform is the general principle of the Bill, and as that is now the question for discussion, I put it to your Lordships whether you can refuse to read a Bill the second time of which you approve the principle? It is agreeable to the course of your Lordships' proceedings to discuss the principle of a Bill before going into a Committee; and if you approve of that principle, to go into a Committee. Or are your Lordships prepared to say, that you approve of the Reform, and will not go into a Committee? I appeal to the noble Earl who spoke early in the debate, and who introduced a bill in the beginning of the Session, in which he took a considerable interest, but which, I must say, was of very trifling importance as compared to this Bill, and was as inconsistent as a bill could well be, and the noble Lord pressed your Lordships to allow him to go into a Committee, merely on account of the excellency of the object he had in view. If your Lordships oppose the principle of Reform, you will not allow the Bill to go to a Committee, but as your Lordships are all Reformers, and as the Bill is made to your hand, you will surely assent to the second reading, and amend and change it in Committee according to the reason, and sense, and justice of the House. If not, what alternative is there? What course will your Lordships pursue? What do you propose? If you will not allow the Bill to go into a Committee, and there is no other Bill, what have you to offer? If it is necessary, as is stated, to appease the spirit of the people—if it is necessary to propitiate them, your Lordships will allow the Bill to go to the Committee, and so spare yourselves the mortification of hereafter retracting, and of presenting some other similar Bill. The arguments which have been directed against the details of the Bill are fit only for the Committee, and I should wish to spare your Lordships' time by not now discussing them. I will not go, therefore, into all the questions mooted by the noble Earl. I do not deny, that this is a measure of great importance—that it causes a great change—that it will be followed by other great changes; that other measures will be necessary to carry it into complete effect. There must be a change in the Constitution in respect to Ministers having seats in another place. There are some defects which may lead to other changes. I would not exclude Ministers from that House, nor allow them to obtain seats there by any other means than the voice of the people. I should be exceedingly sorry to see such a change, but the Bill will make other changes necessary to adapt it to the working of the Constitution, and to the circumstances of the country; but to effect these changes, I rely on the elasticity of the Constitution, and on its adapting power, which has preserved and improved it in times past, and will not fail, I hope, to preserve and improve it on future occasions. I am departing, however, from the rule I laid down not to go into the details, which demand more discussion than I can now give them. I must abstain, though that is doing the measure injustice, because it is not possible for me to go the length I wish. I will only implore your Lordships to consider the subject well, and not now to touch those topics which will best be considered in the Committee, but to reserve yourselves for the discussion of those details on which you are, I trust, determined to enter in another stage of the Bill. Your Lordships are about to decide a great question—a question involving the peace and happiness of the empire in a far greater degree than that great question it was the glory of the noble Duke's Administration (the Duke of Wellington) to conduct to a successful termination. There is, however, I beg leave to observe to your Lordships, a great difference between this Bill and that for the relief of the Roman Catholics, to which it has been compared. That measure, my Lords, had been frequently demanded, and as frequently refused, till at length you were forced to forget your own previous resistance, and grant that which you before denied. You are not pledged to any opposition to this Bill. You have it now in your power to grant what will be considered a boon, on which the repose of the country depends, and which is looked for with impatience. By this Bill you are not bound in any manner. You have never rejected this, or any similar Bill. Some of your Lordships may, in the other House of Parliament, have expressed an opinion on Reform; but as a body—as a House of Peers—you are unbound and uncompromised. Your Lordships have free liberty and power to decide as you think fit, and you will come to the decision free from the influence of fear, free from all apprehension, free from all menace, free even from that fear by which a noble and generous mind is sometimes led to rash and untimely acts—free, my Lords, from the imputation of fear. The noble Duke stated at the beginning of the debates on the subject of Catholic Emancipation, that he did not consider that he was addressing himself to your Lordships' fears. I am not of a different opinion. It is said that the great measure of Catholic Emancipation has not accomplished all that was promised. I admit that—but I would beg leave to ask, what would have been now the state of Ireland had that measure not been passed into a law? If the, want of complete success is to be ascribed to the conduct of one man; if he has had the power to oppose the beneficial workings of the measure, and delay its advantages, I must say, that the power of that man is the creature of your Lordships' hands; your obstinacy gave him influence, and gave him the power which he possesses to impede the healing effect of that beneficial law. That he should have had the power to raise obstacles to the peace and tranquillity of the country, is a circumstance which I deeply and seriously lament; and I implore your Lordships to raise up no such other man, not to give a scimitar into the hands of many such men, by making the people believe that their humble petitions are disregarded, and that they must not look to your Lordships for redress. Do not, my Lords, arm a host of demagogues with the discontent of the people. Whatever other motives may actuate your Lordships, I implore you not to be guilty of the rashness of fear; I implore you not to be guilty of the greater rashness of delay. I will remind your Lordships of the address of the Roman Consul to his council on going to war, when he planned that masterly march which overthrew the Carthaginian general before he could unite himself to his other forces—a march which, perhaps, changed the destinies of the world. What that great man then addressed to the council, I will presume to repeat to your Lordships. He assured them that their safety depended on the adopting his plan immediately, and that here would be danger in delay. He exclaimed, "Only do not procrastinate—do not make that measure which is safe, if adopted immediately, dangerous by delay."—Ne consilium suum, quod tutum celeritas fecisset temerarium morando facerent.

The Duke of Wellington

^*—I concur, my Lords, entirely with the noble Viscount who spoke last, in the opinion that this measure is a most extensive one. It goes to overturn the whole system of our Representation; it affects the counties, towns, and boroughs; it destroys or disturbs every existing interest; and, as the noble Lord said, it will require further changes. It alters all the relations of Representation, and even the proportions of the Representatives of the different parts of the monarchy. It is the most considerable alteration and change ever proposed. The noble Lord says, it would not be sufficient unless it went to a great extent; and he tells your Lordships it ought to go to a Committee; and that we should not reject the measure now, but proceed to consider its details in a Committee. Notwithstanding all the changes it is to effect, it will be followed by other changes, in order to render it fit for working, and adapt it practically to our Constitution. Ought we not to know what those changes are before we are called upon to consider this Bill in a Committee?

Before I go any further, I wish to observe on a statement made by the noble Earl who introduced the measure. He did me the honour to notice my conduct. The noble Earl, when he opened the measure to your Lordships, made some observations on me. He seems to prefer that course to explaining or defending his own measures. The noble Earl seemed to forget that there was any necessity to defend his own measure or explain it to the House, and chose rather to criticise me and my language, and the language of my right hon. friend (Sir R. Peel), and our conduct and language in Parliament during the last Session. The noble Earl thought proper to find fault with my language relating to the constitution of Parliament, and attributed to me, and to what I said in Parliament, the spirit of Reform in the country, and the breaking ^* Reprinted from the corrected report, published by Murray. up of the late Government. The noble Earl found fault with my opinion of Parliament; but what had the Parliament done tip to the moment when I was speaking to make it undeserving of our approbation? My noble friend (the Earl of Harrowby), who has spoken with great ability, regretted that I should have made the statement I did make to your Lordships of the character and conduct of Parliament. My Lords, I beg my noble friend and the noble Earl to recollect, that when I spoke of the Parliament, I spoke as the King's Minister, and that it is the duty of the King's Minister to support the institutions of the country: it had never, when I was in office, been the practice for the King's Ministers to give up the institutions of the country, and abandon them the moment they were attacked.

But, my Lords, if I wanted an example of the opinions of the value of the House of Commons, I should find it in the opinion of the noble Earl, the last time, I believe, that he spoke of the House of Commons. In the month of February, 1817, the noble Lord said, 'Constituted as it now was, he in his conscience believed that the House of Commons was, of all other institutions, in all the other countries of the world, the institution best calculated for the general protection of the subject. Supported by the people in temperate and firm claims for redress, it was not only able, but certain to remedy every wrong. It was capable to act as the most efficient control upon the executive, by diminishing the means of corruption and reducing the pressure of a severe and grinding taxation.'^* That was the opinion of the noble Earl himself in 1817; and what, I would ask, had the Parliament done subsequently to deserve the disapprobation of the noble Earl—what had it done between 1817 and the moment when I pronounced that approbation of Parliament of which my noble friend and the noble Earl have expressed so much disapprobation? When the noble Earl quotes what I said not quite a twelvemonth ago, he might, I think, quote it correctly. What I said was, that Parliament had done its duty by the country, and enjoyed its confidence. I said, that if I had to create a constitution of Parliament, I could not create that which existed, because I did not believe the wit of man could invent such a system; ^* Hansard's Parl. Deb. vol. xxxv. p. 428. but I said that I would do my endeavour to establish one like it, in which property, and particularly property in land, should be preponderant. That was what I said; and I afterwards had the satisfaction to hear the noble Marquis (Lansdown) deliver a similar opinion. He had stated, that in any system of Representation which he could support, property and learning must be preponderant. I said, that I should consider it my duty to resist the adopting of any plan of Reform that should be brought forward: I spoke as a Minister of the Crown, and as a Minister of the Crown I meant to resist Reform.

The noble Lords say, that this statement of mine caused great enmity to me, and created that spirit of Reform which has since pervaded the whole country. I beg the noble Earl's pardon; but the spirit of Reform in this country was the consequence of the French Revolution. It is true, that ever since the American war a desire for Parliamentary Reform has been manifested in this country—it has been manifested particularly when any disturbance or insurrection has occurred in any of the neighbouring foreign countries—above all, since the French Revolution; and when there has been any extraordinary distress or difficulty in the country. At the same time, I believe that, from year to year, the manifestations of such a desire have been less frequent. I have, indeed, the authority of those most friendly to Reform for saying, that the manifestations of the desire for Reform were less frequent till the period of the Revolution of July, 1830, than they had formerly been for a number of years. It happened, unfortunately, that, a few days before the Ordinances were issued in Paris, his Majesty had dissolved the Parliament. At the elections, my Lords, a strong spirit of Parliamentary Reform was exhibited. In several contests, candidates for seats in Parliament were called upon to pledge themselves upon the subject of Parliamentary Reform. In many contested elections, the contest was decided in favour of the candidate who declared himself a Reformer.

The noble Earl has likewise referred to what I said on the 2nd of November, in this House, as the cause of the disturbed state of the city of London and its neighbourhood, and of the circumstances which occasioned the letter from the Secretary of State to the Lord Mayor, communicating to him, that his Majesty would not visit the city on the 9th of November.

This letter was written on the 7th of November. The circumstances which rendered it necessary to write it were known to the King's servants on the 5th and 6th.

The noble Lords have the papers in their own hands. I beg to know whether, in their opinion, the information which we had received was sufficient to warrant the advice which we considered it our duty to give our Sovereign, and to obtain his commands, on the 7th of November? The noble Lords have not themselves thought proper to advise his Majesty as yet to pay a visit to the city. I may fairly presume, therefore, that our advice was judicious on the 7th of November.

But it is said, that the circumstances which rendered this advice necessary were occasioned by what I said in Parliament; that is to say, that having spoken in Parliament on the 2nd, the effect produced in the city, and in the neighbourhood, was such, by the 5th, that the King's servants were obliged to advise the King on the 7th not to visit the city. Is this possible, my Lords? I again call upon the noble Lords to say whether we were or were not justified in giving the advice which we did give?

My Lords, the state of the public feeling and opinion in London, as well as in the north of England, and elsewhere in the country, had been influenced by the state of affairs in France, in Belgium, and in other parts of Europe. It was the state of affairs which occasioned those circumstances which induced us to advise the King not to visit the city; and not any opinion of mine on Parliamentary Reform, delivered in this House on the night of the 2nd of November, and which could not have been known at all till the 3rd, and could not, therefore, have occasioned, by the 5th, the circumstances to which I have referred. Then the noble Lord has, notwithstanding my repeated contradictions and explanations, asserted that my opinions upon Parliamentary Reform, as delivered upon the 2nd of November, had occasioned the resignation of the King's late Ministers, my colleagues and myself. My Lords, we retired from the King's service on Tuesday, the 16th of November, because we found, that on Monday, the 15th, on an important question, we no longer possessed the confidence of the House of Commons. We decided in consequence to resign, and we actually requested his Majesty to accept our resignation on Tuesday, the day following.

If we had delayed to carry our design into execution, the great question of Parliamentary Reform, in which I cannot but think the interests of the monarchy are involved, would have been discussed in the House of Commons on Tuesday, and those interests defended by a Ministry no longer possessing the confidence of the House, and which must, therefore, have gone out of office.

If the question on Monday, the 15th of November, had been that of Parliamentary Reform, it is not clear to me that we should have been in a minority. My reason for being of that opinion is, that it appears on the division, on the second reading of the noble Lord's Bill in March last, many Members voted against it who had been in the majority on the 15th of November. Whatever might be the degree in which the Members of the late Parliament were pledged to Reform, I think myself justified in the statement, that my opinion upon Parliamentary Reform did not, occasion our resignation; and that most probably it was not the cause of the loss of the confidence of the House of Commons. The noble Lord assumed his office on the 22nd of November, and on that day he stated to your Lordships on what principles he intended to conduct the Government of the country. Among other intentions he stated that of proposing a plan of Parliamentary Reform. He stated, that he had obtained the King's consent to enable him to bring forward this proposition, as the Minister, and with the power and influence of Government. The noble Lord's words upon that occasion were very remarkable, and deserving of your Lordships' attention.

Your Lordships will observe, that the noble Lord told you that he intended to found his plan of Reform on the basis of 'the institutions of the country;' and, as he explained, a Reform, limited by a desire to stand, as far as prudence will permit, by the ancient landmarks, and to prevent the sudden disturbance of our settled institutions by too large and extensive changes.' He now tells you, that he had brought in a measure which would effect a great change in them; and the noble Secretary of State adds, that these changes must be followed by others. They must be so followed, or the government of the country will be impracticable.

A bill was introduced into the other House of Parliament, according to the noble Lord's plan, which, after long discussion, was read a second time by the decision of a small majority. This measure altered everything—it changed or destroyed every interest in the country. Instead of proceeding upon the basis of the established institutions, it destroyed them all; and, among other things, altered the relative numbers of the Representatives in Parliament from the different kingdoms of the united empire.

It was proposed in the House of Commons, that the proportion of Representatives for England should not be diminished, to which proposition, after long debate, the House of Commons agreed by a majority of seven. The principle of the noble Lord's bill had been agreed to. Why did not the noble Lords persevere and carry through their Bill, making such alterations as might render it palatable to the House of Commons, and consistent with the established practice of the Constitution? This did not suit their purpose. They dissolved the Parliament, and advised their Sovereign to appeal to his people. I attribute all our misfortunes to that event. The noble Lords advised their Sovereign upon that occasion to come to Parliament, and to make this speech:—

'I have come to meet you for the purpose of proroguing this Parliament, with a view to its immediate dissolution.

I have been induced to resort to this measure for the purpose of ascertaining the sense of my people, in the way in which it may be most constitutionally and authentically expressed, on the expediency of making such changes in the Representation as circumstances may seem to require; and which, founded upon the acknowledged principles of the Constitution, may tend at once to uphold the just rights and prerogatives of the Crown, and to give security to the liberties of my people.'^*

The dissolution then made, and the Speech delivered by his Majesty, were both upon a principle entirely different from that of the precedents according to which the measure was adopted. In 1784, the King, George 3rd, differed from his Ministers upon a great question. They ^*Parl. Debates, Third Series, vol. iii, p. 1810. retired from his service, and his Majesty appointed other Ministers. Those Ministers did not enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, and the King dissolved his Parliament, and put an end to the session, in the words which I am about to read to your Lordships:—

'On a full consideration of the present situation of affairs, and of the extraordinary circumstances which have produced it, I am induced to put an end to this session of Parliament.

I feel it a duty which I owe to the Constitution and to the country, in such a situation, to recur as speedily as possible to the sense of my people by calling a new Parliament.

I trust that this measure will tend to obviate the mischiefs arising from the unhappy divisions and distractions which have lately subsisted; and that the various important objects which will require consideration may be afterwards proceeded upon with less interruption and with happier effect.

I can have no other object but to preserve the true principles of our free and happy Constitution; and to employ the powers entrusted to me by law for the only end for which they were given—the good of my people.'^*

I will not give your Lordships the trouble of listening to the perusal of the case of 1807, which stands precisely upon the same principle as that of 1784. In both, the King differed in opinion with his Ministers and with the Parliament upon measures upon which his Majesty had decided; and he appealed to the sense of his people, and called upon them to elect a Parliament which should give their confidence to the Ministers of his choice, in carrying on the measures which he approved. The transaction was brought to a close before the appeal was made to the people. The people were not called upon to deliberate upon any measure; but the appeal to them was rather, it maybe said, in favour of the men whom his Majesty had named as his Ministers. In the case of 1831, however, the noble Lords have advised their Sovereign to refer for discussion to the people—not whether the King was to be supported in naming his Ministers—not whether Parliament is to be reformed, because, upon the principle of Reform, there was a majority in the late ^* Hansard's Parl. Hist., vol. xxiv, p. 774. House of Commons—but upon a particular plan of Reform, which was accordingly discussed throughout the country.

It is on the ground of the dissolution, and of this Speech from the Throne, that I charge the noble Lords with having excited the spirit which existed in the country at the period of the last general election; and with having been the cause of the unconstitutional practice, hitherto unknown, of electing delegates for a particular purpose to Parliament—delegates to obey the daily instructions of their constituents, and to be cashiered if they should disobey them, whatever may be their own opinion; instead of being, as they have been hitherto, independent Members of Parliament, to deliberate with their colleagues upon matters of common concern, and to decide according to the best of their judgment, aftersuch deliberation and debate. This is an evil of which the country will long feel the consequences, whatever may be the result of these discussions.

My Lords, this measure, thus debated by the people, and thus brought forward by the Government in Parliament, for the decision of Members thus delegated to give it the force of a law, alters everything; and requires, as the noble Secretary of State says, still further alterations in the State, in order to render it practicable to carry on the Government at all.

I will not, at this late hour of the night, enter much into the details of the system proposed, which have been well considered and exposed by my noble friends the noble Earl (Lord Harrowby) and the noble Baron (Lord Wharncliffe) behind me. One of my objections to the system proposed for the formation of the constituency of the boroughs and towns is its uniformity, and which objection was, by the by, mentioned by one of my noble friends. The electors are all the householders, payers of a rent of 10l. and upwards; these householders, in towns in the south of England—I mean the counties of Kent, Sussex, Surry, Hants, Berkshire, and Oxford—will consist of the occupiers of every house in such towns as will not require a supplement under the Bill to be allotted by the Commissioners; these will be generally the shopkeepers—a class of persons of all others the most, likely to combine in political views—and to be acted upon by political clubs and societies of the description of that formed some months ago in the Strand, with a view to assist these newly-formed corporations in selecting their Representatives in Parliament.

It is true that this society dissolved itself as soon as its existence was observed upon here or in the other House of Parliament. But political combinations among these voters in boroughs and towns will hereafter be much more probable than it has been heretofore among the various interests of which the borough constituency has been formed.

These combinations, or the influence of such an association as I have described and has existed, would be very injurious to the public interests. I beg your Lordships besides to observe, that in nearly every town not requiring a supplement, every householder will have a vote, including daily labourers, every description of menial servant, waiters, hostlers, postilions at inns, and such like. In respect to counties it appears that sixty-two Members are to be added to this branch of the Representation; of which fifty to counties to be divided, two to Yorkshire, and ten to counties which are to have three Members each. An addition is to be made to the county constituency, by enabling 10l. copyholders to vote as well as freeholders and leaseholders holding tenements of 50l. yearly rent, and even occupiers of land paying that sum.

I cannot consider that this system will place the landed interest in the same relation towards the commercial or manufacturing interest, as that in which it stands at present. I doubt the county Representation, as it stands at present, being capable of protecting the landed interest of the country without the assistance of the Members of the close boroughs. These are the true protectors of the landed interest of the country. The increase of riches in all towns, owing to the vast increase of manufactures and commerce, has given great influence to the inhabitants of towns in all county elections. This influence will be increased by giving votes to copyholders and holders of 50l. leases: these are generally inhabitants of towns and shopkeepers. Throughout the whole of some counties in England, there is not a single acre of land, not in a town, held by a lease.

Towns placed in schedules A and B, deprived of their Members, will continue to influence the elections of Members for the counties in which they are situated—which elections will be farther influenced by other arrangements of the Bill; giving votes to the freeholders of certain counties of towns in the elections of neighbouring counties.

The Members for counties will, therefore, be nearly as much under the control of the constituency residing in towns, as the Members for the towns themselves will. But, my Lords, the question for us to consider, in the formation of this new system, is, not only what is the system which will best maintain the balance between the county interest and the town interest, but what will best form for the country a Government. That is the most important point for our consideration, and for the people. We must take care that, after all this shall be done, there will be a Government in the country.

We must consider not only the Representation of England, but likewise that of Scotland and Ireland. In respect to Scotland and its Representation, I do not know enough of either to pronounce whether the Representation ought, or ought not, to be reformed; but I must repeat the words of a noble Lord, whose loss I shall never cease to lament, respecting that country (I mean the late Earl of Liverpool) "that Scotland was the best-conditioned country in Europe." I believe I may say that it is one of the best governed countries in the world; and I am sure that for the last sixty or seventy years it has been the most prosperous.

We are bound to look at what is about to be done in respect to the Representation of Scotland. In counties in Scotland, freeholders, leaseholders, copyholders (allowing for the difference of tenure) and occupiers of land paying a rent of 50l. a-year, are to have votes, the same as in the counties in England. The inhabitants of towns will have the same influence over the elections for counties as in England; but this influence will be more powerful in Scotland than in England, because there are more large towns in Scotland, which, under the system, will not send Representatives of their own, than there will be in England. The county Members from Scotland can no longer be reckoned upon as supporters of the landed interest. The franchises of the borough towns in Scotland will be given to 10l. householders, as in England; and these will, of course, be in what is called the commercial or manufacturing interest.

In respect to Ireland, the change is the same as in England and Scotland. In Ireland, there are few holders of land excepting upon lease. But every tenant upon every estate will have a vote for a county. In the towns, 10l. householders are to vote. These towns may be divided into two classes, close Corporations, and counties of towns. The first were formed by King James 1st, for the purpose of supporting in Parliament the establishment of the Church of England in Ireland, upon which I will say a word or two presently. The returns for these Corporations are now to be made by the 10l. householders of these same towns.

In counties of towns the voters are to be the resident freemen of the Corporation, and 40s. freeholders, as at present, and resident 10l. householders. All these arrangements depart from those of the Acts of 1828. Those Acts left the right of election in Corporations, and in counties of towns, as they had been settled and left at the Union. They deprived 40s. freeholders of their right of voting for Members of counties, because it was supposed that the exercise of that right gave an undue preponderating influence to persons professing the Roman Catholic religion.

The 50l. leaseholders will, under the new arrangement, take the place of the 40s. freeholders, and all will equally be the tool of the priest. For the close Corporations established by King James, 10l. householders are to vote. These are all Roman Catholics.

In counties of towns we had refused to deprive 40s. freeholders of their franchise. The freemen of these Corporations are generally, if not always, Protestants, and they can be increased without limitation. The freeholders are generally Roman Catholics. We did not think proper to alter the balance between the two, by leaving to the Corporations the unlimited power of increasing its freemen, while the 40s. freehold right should have been extinguished. But the noble Lords have gone to work in another way, and, having first deprived non-resident freemen of these counties of towns, who are Protestants, of their votes, they have left untouched the Roman Catholic 40s. freeholders, and have besides added to the constituency of those counties of towns all the 10l. householders. These are likewise Roman Catholics. The noble Lords have thus had the merit, of establishing a Roman Catholic predominant interest in every county of a town in Ireland, in every close Corporation formed for the protection of the Church of England, and in every county.

I will refer presently to the consequences of these arrangements upon the interests of the Church of England in Ireland. In the mean time, I beg your Lordships to observe, that the Irish Representation in the Imperial Parliament cannot be considered as in the interest of the land.

The due balance between the landed interest and the commercial and manufacturing interest in Parliament must be considered a matter of small importance, in comparison with the more important object of considering what will be the sort of House of Commons which such a constituency, so formed, will give us.

Throughout, the whole of the empire, persons in the lowest condition of life, liable to, and even existing under the most pernicious influences, are to have votes, or, in other words, are to exercise political power. Persons in those stations of life do exercise political power already; but in few places in large masses preponderating over the influence of other classes of society. What must we expect when these lower classes will preponderate everywhere? We know what sort of Representatives are returned by the places I have described. What are we to expect when the whole Representation, or nearly the whole, will be of the same description?

We hear sometimes of Radical Reform; and we know that the term applies to Universal Suffrage, Vote by Ballot, Annual Parliaments, and their consequences. But I declare, that, looking at these changes pervading every part of the Representation, root and branch, destroying or changing everything that has existed, even to the relative numbers of the Representatives from the three kingdoms fixed by treaty, I should call this a Radical Reform, rather than Reform of any other description. Is there no danger that, bad as what, is proposed, it will go further than would appear to be contemplated by the noble Lords? A noble friend of mine (the Earl of Harrowby) has stated the danger which will result from this measure, in consequence of the principle on which it stands. It stands, with respect to large towns, on the principle of population. Certain towns are selected to send two Members because they have above 20,000 inhabitants. Certain others to send one Member because they have above 9,000 or 10,000 inhabitants.

There is in reserve a number of about thirty or forty Members not yet allotted to any constituency. Will it be possible to refuse to extend the right of sending Members to Parliament to any town or parish, which may prove that its numbers exceed 10,000 or 20,000 inhabitants?

But we are told that this is not a question of numbers. How does it happen that there are four or five most beautiful, rich, and flourishing county towns in England, placed in schedule B? These county towns are not only rich in themselves, and by the settlements of gentry residing in their neighbourhood, but they are more populous than is required in order to continue in the enjoyment of their accustomed number of Representatives.

It happens, however, that a part of the population of each inhabit a part of the existing town, not in, but contiguous to the Corporation, as fixed by its ancient charters; such limits not containing 4,000 souls, the numbers required. We are then told that numbers have nothing to do with the various settlements of the Representation under this Bill!

Taking the whole view of this system of Representation to be established in England, Scotland, and Ireland, I cannot but consider that the House of Commons returned by it, will be a democratical assembly of the worst description; that Radical Reform, Vote by Ballot, and all the evil consequences to be expected from the deliberations of such an assembly, must follow from its establishment. I entreat your Lordships to pause before you agree to establish such a system in your country.

But we are told that the people wish for this measure; and when we express our sense of the danger which attends it on account of the democratical power which it tends to establish, an endeavour is made to calm our apprehensions by the assurance that the people are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons.

If we are to rely upon that feeling of the people—if we are to adopt this measure because it is the pleasure of the people, and because they are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, why do we not at once adopt the measure which we know that the people prefer—I mean Radical Reform; that is to say, Universal Suffrage, Vote by Ballot, and Annual Parliaments? If we are to make a change, there can be no reason for not going the full length that the people wish, if we can be sure that the measure will not injure the Government, that to which they are attached, of King, Lords, and Commons.

But before we go further, it is desirable that we should examine what is the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, as established in this kingdom. In this Government the King is at the head of everything. All the power is in his hands. He is the head of the Church, the head of the law. Justice is administered in his name. He is the protector of the peace of the country, the head of its political negotiations, and of its armed force—not a shilling of public money can be expended without his order and signature. But, notwithstanding these immense powers, the King can do nothing that is contrary to law, or to the engagements of himself or his predecessors. The King calls Parliament to assist him with its counsels, de arduis regni, and those are responsible for his acts who carry them into execution. His Ministers are responsible not only for the legality, but for the prudence and fitness of his acts. To whom are they responsible? To this, and the other House of Parliament, to the latter principally, on account of the greater activity of its inquisitorial power—on account of its possessing exclusively the power of the purse, and for other reasons. Every act of the Government, or of the King, is liable to be brought under discussion in, and is, in fact, controlled by the House of Commons; and for this reason alone, it is important that we should consider of what description of men the House of Commons is likely to be composed, when we are discussing a question of Parliamentary Reform, in order that we may be quite certain that they will exercise their high functions with wisdom and discretion.

It was on these grounds, that I some time ago called upon the noble Earl to state by what influence he intended to carry on the King's Government in Parliament, according to the principles fixed at the period of the Revolution, and in practice from that period, to this, when this Reform Bill should be passed. The noble Lord answered immediately—not by means of corruption. I am aware of that, my Lords. I am convinced that the noble Lord is incapable of resorting to such means, as I hope he believes that I am incapable of resorting to them. I did not consider this any answer to my question, which I repeated in a subsequent discussion, on the motion of my noble friend, the noble Baron behind me (Lord Wharncliffe). The noble Earl said, that the Government had nothing to do with such questions; that Parliament was to decide for itself; and that there was no necessity for the interference of Government.

I beg your Lordships to consider what are the questions which in every week, and on every day, are brought under the discussion of the House of Commons—questions affecting the honour, the interests, the rights, the property of every individual in the country, which the King is bound by his oath to protect, and in the protection of which, all are equally interested. They are questions regarding the proceedings of Courts of Justice, regarding the use of the public force, and hundreds of others, which occur daily, in which every individual is interested. I put legislation out of the question: but can the King from that Throne give to his subjects the necessary protection for their rights and property? No, my Lords. It is only by the influence of property over the elections of Members of the House of Commons, and by the influence of the Crown and of this House, and of the property of the country upon its proceedings, that the great powers of such a body as the House of Commons can be exercised with discretion and safety. The King could not perform the duties of his high station, nor the House of Lords, if the House of Commons were formed on the principle and plan proposed by this Bill.

There is one institution which would become peculiarly liable to attack in such a House of Commons, to which I wish to draw the attention of the right reverend Bench, and that is, the Establishment of the Church of England in Ireland. This Church is the object of a fundamental Article of the Treaty of Union between the two countries, and is secured by Acts of both Parliaments, and the King is, besides, sworn to maintain its right and possessions; can any man believe that, when the Representatives for Ireland come to be elected in the manner proposed by the Bill, the Church of England in Ireland can be maintained?

I have already shown that these Representatives must be elected under the influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Who are those who now show the greatest hostility to the Church, its rights and possessions?—the Members for populous places. The reason is, that the deprivation of the Church of their property is one of the popular objects of the day. The object of the Bill is, and its effect will be, to increase the number of this description of Members in Parliament, and to render the influence of this party predominant and irresistible.

I believe that the noble Earl (Earl Grey) has already found the Members returned by Ireland, under this influence, very inconvenient to himself, upon more than one occasion; and it appears, that the right hon. Gentleman, who conducts the affairs of Ireland in the House of Commons, was under the necessity, very lately, of giving up a measure which he thought important for the benefit and peace of Ireland, because the Members from Ireland, of this party, were opposed to it. How can the noble Lord suppose, that the Church of England can be protected, or even the Union itself preserved in a Reformed Parliament? There is no man, who considers what the Government of King, Lords, and Commons is, and the details of the manner in which it is carried on, who must not see, that Government will become impracticable when the three branches shall be separate; each independent of the other, and uncontrolled in its action by any of the existing influences.

A noble Earl (the Earl of Winchilsea) who has spoken on this side of the House, has made an observation to your Lordships, which well deserves your attention. The noble Earl has told you, that if you increase but a little the democratic power in the State, the step can never be withdrawn. Your Lordships must continue in the same course till you have passed through the miseries of a revolution, and thence to a military despotism, and the evils which attend that system of Government. It is not denied, that this Bill must increase beyond measure the democratic power of the State—that it must constitute in the House of Commons a fierce democracy: what must be the consequences, your Lordships will judge.

I will not detain your Lordships by adverting to the merits of the system of Government which has existed up to the present moment, upon which my opinion is by no means altered. No man denies that we have enjoyed great advantages; that we have enjoyed a larger share of happiness, comfort, and prosperity, for a long course of years, than were ever enjoyed by any nation; that we have more riches, the largest fortunes, personal as well as real, more manufactures and commerce, than all the nations of Europe taken together; the richest, most extensive, most peopled, and most prosperous foreign colonies and possessions, that any nation ever possessed. There is not an important position in the world, whether for the purpose of navigation, commerce, or military defence, that does not belong to us.

If this democratic Assembly should once be established in England, does any man believe that we should continue to enjoy these vast advantages? But a democracy has never been established in any part of the world, that it has not immediately declared war against property—against the payment of the public debt—and against all the principles of conservation, which are secured by, and are, in fact, the principal objects of the British Constitution, as it now exists. Property, and its possessors, will become the common enemy. I do not urge this argument as one in which your Lordships are peculiarly interested: it is not you alone, nor even other proprietors, who are interested in the protection of property; the whole people, middling classes as well as the lower orders, are interested in this subject. Look at the anxiety prevailing in every part of London, in respect to the great revolution to be made by this Bill. My noble friend, the noble Baron (Lord Wharncliffe) has been ridiculed for adverting to the opinions of tradesmen in Bond-street and St. James's-street. Those in Bond-street consist of more than 200 respectable persons, who are well able to form an opinion of the effect of this Bill upon the resources of themselves, the middling classes, and the poor, as they supply the luxuries of persons in easier circumstances, residing in that quarter of the town. Anything which can affect the resources of their customers, must be interesting to them, and they do feel that this Bill must affect property, private expenditure, and the resources of themselves, and of those whom they employ. The noble Lord on the other side, who adverted to this topic, greatly underrated the wealth of these tradesmen. I know of one, residing in Bond-street, who employs at all times from 2,000 to 4,000 workmen, whose trade depends, as well as the employment of this body of people, upon the expenditure of his customers: is he not interested in upholding the public faith, and the system of property now established in England? Are not the people, of all classes and descriptions, down to the lowest, interested in the maintenance of our extensive manufactures and commerce, in the conservation of our enormous dominions abroad, and the continued respect of all nations?

If I am right in thinking that this fierce democracy will be established in the House of Commons, does any man believe that that harmony can continue between the King and his Government and the House of Commons, so necessary to insure to both general respect, and to the King's Government the strength which is necessary to enable his Majesty to protect and keep in order his foreign dominions, and to insure the obedience of their inhabitants? We shall lose these colonies and foreign possessions, and with them our authority and influence abroad.

There is no instance of any country having maintained its strength or its influence in its foreign possessions, or the respect of foreign nations, during the existence of internal troubles and disturbance; and there is none of the existence, without such troubles, of a Government consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, independent of each other, and the Members of the latter depending solely upon the popular choice, and being delegates of the people. We have had an example in England of a House of Commons which was independent of the influence of the Crown, and of this House, and of the property of the country. After banishing or imprisoning the most respectable Members of this House, turning the Spiritual Lords out of it, and murdering their Sovereign, they voted the House of Lords useless. I will read your Lordships the account given by a man, who was knowing in his time, (Oliver Cromwell) of what this House became. 'The Parliament which had so vigorously withstood the encroachments of the royal power, became themselves too desirous of absolute au- thority; and not only engrossed the legislative, but usurped the executive power.'

'All causes, civil and criminal, all questions of property, were determined by Committees, who, being themselves the Legislature, were accountable to no law, and for that reason their decrees were arbitrary, and their proceedings violent. Oppression was without redress, unjust sentence without appeal; there was no prospect of ease or intermission. The Parliament had determined never to dissolve themselves.'

'At length the army interfered. They soon perceived that, unless they made one regulation more, and crushed this many-headed monster, they had hitherto ventured their lives to little purpose, and had, instead of assuring their own and their country's liberty, only changed one kind of slavery for another.'

This is the account of the state of a House of Commons acting independently of all influence, and of the state to which it brought the country. My Lords, I have stated to you what will be the probable action of the system established by the Bill on the Government of the country—that is the real question—what is the nature of our Government, and what the share of the House of Commons in its details; in what manner it controls them all; and how important the composition of that House is to the very existence of Government. I have shown you in what manner the protection of property by Government is necessary, and the dependence of all the sources of our national prosperity upon the continuance of a good understanding between the King and his Parliament. I have stated my reasons for thinking that all these will be destroyed by the Bill. I have likewise stated to your Lordships my opinion that the King's Ministers, by the Speech which they had recommended to the King to deliver from the Throne, on the 22nd of April, on the dissolution of Parliament, had excited the spirit which pervaded the late elections of Members to serve in Parliament, and had occasioned the election of delegates for a particular purpose, instead of Members of Parliament.

My Lords, the King's Speech, upon the occasion to which I have referred, has materially altered the state of this question. The people have been called upon by the King to deliberate upon it, and have been led to expect that a change would be made. In recommending to your Lordships to vote against this Bill, I earnestly intreat you to avoid pledging yourselves, whether in public or private, against any other measure that may be brought forward. I recommend to you to keep yourselves free to adopt any measure upon this subject, which shall secure to this country the blessings of a Government. By so doing, you will perform your duty by your country, and will deserve its thanks, and the gratitude of posterity.

Viscount Melbourne

wished to say one word in explanation with regard to a point on which the noble Duke had misunderstood him. He did not assert that this Bill would be productive of change in every branch of the State, and in all the institutions of the country; what he did say was, that it could not be denied, that it introduced a considerable change into the mode of constituting the Commons House of Parliament.

The Marquis of Lansdown rose, but was met by [loud cries of "adjourn, adjourn;" "go on, go on;" "hear, hear."] The noble Marquis said, that he was always willing on such occasions to consult the wishes of the House. He rose for the purpose of making a few observations in reply to what had fallen from the noble Duke, and from other noble Lords in the course of this debate; but if the House pleased, he had no objection to postpone those observations till to-morrow.

Debate adjourned.