BELGIC NEGOTIATIONS.

HL Deb 09 August 1831 vol 5 cc968-1033

The Marquis of Londonderry

having moved the Order of the Day, pursuant to notice, for an Address for papers relative to the late negotiations respecting Belgium, spoke to the following effect:^*—I do assure your Lordships most unfeignedly, that no individual can feel himself more inadequate than I do to claim your attention to the important subject, which I am most anxious to bring under your consideration. My early military habits and education, and my constant employment abroad, have not given me those opportunities which many of your Lordships so pre-eminently possess, of addressing this august assembly with effect and advantage; and I would gladly have avoided the task I now reluctantly undertake, but that I have been, in some degree, pressed to call your attention to these affairs from two imperious considerations—first, by the mode in which the noble Earl at the head of his Majesty's Government has conducted himself towards me, when I solicited information at his hands; and, secondly, from the recollection of the great and enlightened policy of a lamented relative of mine, whose memory is not only most dear to me, but is held deservedly dear, throughout Europe, by all great statesmen and diplomatists, that have considered his career. When, indeed, I reflect upon the situation in which Europe was left by Lord Castlereagh, particularly as it regarded the influence, control, and power of this country over the councils of the other Powers of the Continent—when I consider all which that wise Minister accomplished by his own calm and dispassionate judgment—with the feelings and sentiments, and general deportment of one, whose mind and character generally, throughout the whole of his intercourse with those with whom he had to transact the most arduous business, evinced a disposition most truly calculated to give his country a fair and honourable—a courteous and considerate—a spirited and courageous standing amongst the other nations of the world; when I look back, I say, and reflect on all these considerations, and our then high and elevated position, and the splendid results which were brought about by my lamented brother and the great military genius of the noble Duke who now sits near me, it is impossible that I should not endeavour to attract your Lordships' attention, by begging you to draw the contrast between that glorious combination of political prudence and mi- ^* Reprinted from the corrected speech published by Rivingtons. litary skill, and the deplorable condition in which our foreign relations throughout Europe are now placed, and especially at this crisis, as relating to our recent transactions in Belgium. Impelled, however, by my fraternal feelings, on the one hand, and deterred by my conscious inadequacy, on the other, I state again, that I should have hesitated to proceed, had I not been assured that I might rely upon the indulgence of your Lordships in the performance of the task I have undertaken. While I expect this indulgence from your Lordships, I frankly avow, that I expect no such courtesy and no such indulgence from the noble Earl opposite, or his colleagues—from the persons who treated my former questions upon this subject as untelligible, and who congratulated me on the discovery of a "mare's nest," using that or some such vulgar unparliamentary phrase. These expressions, however becoming they may be, proceeding from the first orator—from the Cicero of the day—are not such as I have a right to expect to be applied to me in the discharge of my duty as a Member of this House. They may, perhaps, be repeated upon the present occasion, and reinforced as they may also be by those powers of sarcasm of which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack is so great a master—they may be thought sufficient to intimidate me from the performance of my duty. But there is a stubborn feeling, very natural to men who enjoy the consciousness of right, sufficient, I hope, to sustain me under these and still more severe inflictions; and I will, therefore, proceed, without fear, to draw your Lordships' attention to the topics upon which I feel it my duty, at the present moment, to insist—I mean particularly as regards the notice of my motion, as to our Belgian negotiations. I certainly did hope, and am free to own, that when the noble Earl opposite came into power, I thought I should have been enabled to give him my humble support in the management of our foreign affairs, though I am perfectly aware how indifferent such support might have been to the noble Earl. I cherished this hope the more, from personal communications, not with the noble Earl, but with some of his private friends; and when I remembered that the noble Earl, sitting on this side of the House, was, in common with myself, opposed to the foreign policy of the Canning Administration; and when I reflected on his bitter opposition to the followers, of that statesman with whom he is now allied, I certainly thought that it would have been one of the chief objects kept in view by the noble Earl, to preserve Europe, as far as possible, in the state in which he found it, and to act in the spirit of the treaties of 1814 and 1815, instead of endeavouring at once to undermine and overthrow that structure which was created by a far abler architect than he is, and abler even than all those who surround him combined. But, if I did cherish this hope, I was very soon undeceived, and if, from the first examination of the course of events, any thing had been wanting to undeceive me, it was supplied in the speech of the noble Earl, of the 24th of June, in which he completely threw off the mask. I took down the words of the noble Earl, and no more is necessary to convince me that he has altogether mistaken the interests of this country. The noble Earl spoke of the erroneous principles upon which the negotiations of 1814 and 1815 had been conducted as follows:—"My Lords, in my opinion, it was in those negotiations for the settlement of Europe at the close of the war—to which the noble Duke was a party—and in the erroneous principles on which they were carried on, that the seeds were laid of the existing distractions and changes which have taken place in some part or other of the Continent in every subsequent season, and the continuance of which, at this very time, forms a large portion of the difficulties wherewith we are now surrounded."^* When I heard these words proceed from the noble Earl, I confess I did feel the greatest surprise, exhibiting, as they did, an utter want both of wisdom and of taste. They were unwise, because the principles of those negotiations had become the code politique of Europe, and upon those principles all the Powers were endeavouring to carry on the affairs of Europe: on the other hand, they were in bad taste, inasmuch as the same Ministers are now acting with the noble Lord in Downing-street who formerly gave their deliberate sanction to all the principles he thus gratuitously vituperated, as well as all the sovereigns of Europe, and all the statesmen and diplomatists. It was impolitic, therefore, on the part of the noble Earl thus to denounce those principles which have, for seventeen years, preserved the peace of Europe, and by which that peace would still have been maintained, but for the unfortunate affairs of July last, which the noble Earl does not know how sufficiently to eulogise, but which, I told him then, would be the misery and curse of Europe, instead of its salvation, as he prophesied. I am at a loss to know how the noble Viscount (the Secretary for the Colonies) can sit quietly upon his seat, and hear the principles of 1814 and 1815 thus denounced. But the march of time and of events, and I suppose I must say of intellect, throw men into strange combinations. Still it is surprising, that the noble Viscount should not have said one word in vindication of the transactions in which he has himself been implicated; for though men change sides, and change parties, they are seldom entirely indifferent to the only successful and really great actions of their political career. I have said thus much, my Lords, in respect to the manner in which I have been obliged to intrude myself upon your notice. In consequence of the conduct of the noble Earl, I have felt myself compelled to advert to these transactions, and to state my opinions on them, with a view, not to vindicate those treaties, for, God knows, they do not require it, but to recall them, as having laid the foundation of a solid settlement of Europe, to your Lordships' recollection. But I beg the noble Earl to contrast his own opinion with what was the general opinion of the British nation, and of the British House of Commons at the period in question. The noble Earl, perhaps, forgets—but the memory of a brother is more tenacious—I remember well the proud day, when, on his return from abroad, the negotiator of these treaties was received with the general acclamations of a British House of Commons, and when men of all parties, and, without one individual exception, Tories, Whigs, and Canningites, stood up to receive him, and gave him that enthusiastic and long-continued cheering which his great and successful labours had so well earned. I wish the noble Earl may be equally fortunate with his precious Reform Bill, and I shall certainly not be the person, at the end of seventeen years, to disparage him or his efforts;—nor should I, if they prove unsuccessful, be the person disposed to bring forward an unkind philippic against the noble Earl, after seventeen years have passed over our heads, if I were to live so long. And now, my Lords, I beg to introduce the direct subject of my motion to your consideration, by calling your attention to the state of affairs connected with Belgium. In order to make myself as clearly understood as possible, in a very complicated and tedious negotiation, consisting of many different periods, I propose classing my remarks in three separate divisions. First, as to the early part of the negotiations respecting Belgium, and particularly up to the period of my Lord Ponsonby's celebrated letter, and to his recall from Brussels, to which, by the bye, I on a former occasion ventured to beg your Lordships' attention, and which letter the noble Earl pretended to attempt to defend. This brings me to the end of the month of May. Secondly, I shall take the liberty to submit to your consideration the protocols which are laid on the Table, as to the demolition of the Belgian fortresses, and the king of France's most singular and extraordinary Speech; and thirdly, I shall conclude, by directing your Lordships' attention to the manifesto of the king of Holland, and the other considerations now arising from the invasion of the French troops, and the actual position of affairs. And, first, as to the negotiation which has, as your Lordships are aware, been carried on for eight or ten months past, I think no one will hesitate to refer to it, as a most perfect specimen of that beautiful system of non-intervention which the noble Earl professes. But I certainly think, and indeed I will undertake to prove, if the noble Earl will give me the papers, that there has never, in the same space of time, been so much intervention on the part of the British Government in the affairs of foreign Powers, and not only intervention, but intervention perpetually changing its object. First, intervention with the Dutch when they were agreed; next, intervention with the Belgians, and then intervention again with the Dutch, and then vacillation and infirmity of purpose unexampled. The Belgians first intended to elect for their future sovereign the Duke of Leuchtenburgh; but no, said France, that is impossible—he is much too nearly related to the Buonaparte family. Then their thoughts to the Duc de Nemours; but no, said England, it is impossible that we can agree to that—he is the son of the king of the French. Then, last of all, it was contrived, that Prince Leopold should be chosen, although how this came to pass I cannot divine, considering the great pains taken by noble Lords opposite to prevent his Royal Highness from going to Greece. The Prince was, in my opinion, the most unfit person that could have been selected; I cannot imagine the choice of a person more inconvenient in every possible shape, not only as to France, but also as to Holland, from old transactions of a personal kind with the present Prince of Orange, besides other current reports; and evident entanglements must, in my humble opinion, ultimately arise to England from this selection; and such also was the opinion of France, I believe, as to the ineligibility of Prince Leopold, that, until the noble Earl ultimately made certain concessions to that Power, Prince Talleyrand was by no means disposed to accede the arrangement. Notwithstanding all opposition, it seems, however, that Prince Leopold was the person whom his Majesty's Government were determined to send to Belgium; great difficulties existed, as to the terms although, at this time, great difficulties existed, as to the terms upon which the separation of Belgium from Holland was to be effected, agreeably to the 11th and 12th Protocols of the Conference, which treated of the basis and principle of separation, and of the debt, as well as of various other points, too multifarious to enter upon at present; but all of which demand particular discussion hereafter. In the outset of these negotiations, Holland appeared fixed in her determination not to accede to the proposed terms in the 11th and 12th Protocols—many of the arrangements being particularly hostile to her wishes and interests; but, at length, urged by the strongest desire for the preservation of peace, and especially to comply with the wishes of England and the Allies, she did, though very reluctantly, consent, and the agreement was concluded on her part. These terms were immediately declared by all the Powers in conference to be irrevocable, and the last article of the Protocol binds the Powers, in the most solemn manner, to cause them to be adopted; and my Lord Ponsonby returned to Brussels, to persuade the Belgians to agree to the conditions, so peremptorily and so irrevocably fixed. We then are elucidated by a document inserted in the newspapers, which, I have no doubt, all your Lordships have seen, with Lord Ponsonby's name attached to it. With every respect for the private worth and respectability of that noble personage, I must take leave to say, that there never was a document of so extraordinary a nature presented to the diplomatic world. I apply myself particularly to this letter, because, from what fell from a noble Earl on a former occasion, that noble Earl seemed to think it was capable of a defence. I admit, that Lord Ponsonby had a right to press the Belgians to accept the propositions made, by using every argument he pleased in personal interviews with the parties. I will not go into a discussion upon the principle of non-interference now, denied at one moment, and used in the most extraordinary and outrageous manner at another; but I will say, that this document, published to the world as the production of the Congress, at this moment, was the most indiscreet and unadvisable paper ever promulgated. It appears to me to be a proceeding which baffles all attempt to understand. The very letter itself commences by an apology for its imperfections, and a great apology for its being written in the utmost haste. I will read the sentence I allude to: "Sir,—I arrived yesterday evening, and will not, even to do better, delay to communicate to you some idea of the state of your affairs as far as our Congress at London is interested in them. I therefore rely on your indulgence, which I hope will excuse the imperfections of a letter written in the greatest haste." This really reminds one very much of a letter from a young boarding-school girl, who invariably begins her epistle with—"I write in great haste;" or signs it, "Your's in haste." Now I put it to the House, whether it is decent or proper for a Minister, charged with communicating the great affairs of a Congress to a country, to be so precipitate as to write imperfectly, or in haste, when so much hangs upon his communications? This is neither diplomatic nor statesmanlike; and I think it may be said, that there never was such a document published as connected with diplomacy; it being also one which goes forth to the public as the opinion of the assembled Congress, although it is not signed by the other individuals representing the several Powers engaged in the negotiation. A letter of this nature undoubtedly should have been most gravely considered. And what right, I would ask, had Lord Ponsonby to say anything on behalf of the Conference? He should have gone to the Belgian Minister, and explained to him the disposition of the Powers. But when he publishes a document, as a British Minister, the noble Earl is obliged either to acknowledge or deny it. I will read another passage from this curious letter:—"Belgium is excited to have recourse to arms, and why? To retain Luxemburgh. But it may possess it in peace and security for a thousandth part of the price which an attempt to keep that country by force of arms would cost. Is it not imprudent to hesitate on the choice? Belgium desires to conquer Maestricht, the left bank of the Scheldt, and to take from Holland some other parts of its ancient possessions. Now that the policy of Europe is evident, even to the least enlightened mind, can it still be doubted, that Belgium is unable to obtain any one of these things by force of arms, unless it succeeds in conquering the armies of France, of Prussia, of Austria, and of England? Not an inch of Dutch territory will be left for Belgium, unless it has vanquished Europe, to say nothing of what it may lose of its own territory, if it should happen to be vanquished itself in such a contest. Can there be a better proof of the change which has taken place in the opinions and resolutions of the Congress? A week ago the Congress considered the preservation of the Duchy to the House of Nassau, if not as necessary, at least as extremely desirable; and at present it is inclined to a mediation, with the avowed intention of obtaining that Duchy for the sovereign of Belgium." Then the noble Earl determined to preserve the dominion of the House of Nassau. What did the Conference mean by the subsequent change? I will not go through the letter, which, I may safely say, is such a composition as I have never before read. What, I ask, was the cause of the change here alluded to? Whence arose the change from the 11th and 12th Protocols, adopted by the Conference? But really, I believe, that the noble Lord was not the composer of this letter. I cannot think so disparagingly of him as to believe it. I do not know whether it emanated from the noble Earl's Reform shop, but I know that such a composition was never before penned under such circumstances, and I challenge the noble Earl to say, whether he, or any one of the Plenipotentiaries of the Conference, will adopt or authenticate the letter. I say this document has been productive of the greatest mischief in France itself, because I believe, that in that kingdom, the feeling produced was, that the British Government were leaning much more adversely to their interests in the negotiations, than they had up to that time believed, and consequently, the French Government found itself compelled to press upon the Conference the claims of Belgium; and I argue this from what has appeared in the French newspapers, stating as follows:—"The letter of Lord Ponsonby is an honest development of the most dishonest and deplorable system of policy ever yet known under any name, and by any form in Europe! It is worse than the system of the Holy Alliance; and, at the same time, it is fraudulent, Jesuitical, insincere, and destructive of the rights of man, and the liberties of nations. If this system shall be acted upon in Europe, we have made no progress—the French Revolution has been an idle delusion, and British Reform will terminate in abortion. What! have the five Powers so soon forgotten the principles of their first Conferences, and the basis of their whole system of Protocols? Has it not been stated a thousand—and yet ten thousand times, by these Diplomatists, and by their Representatives and Journals—has it not been stated by French Ministers, and by the French King—in fact, is it not the very foundation of all their counsels and recommendations, that the five Powers merely acted as friends, and not as opposing nations, and that both parties (Holland and Belgium) were to have the right of rejecting this advice, and having recourse to arms? Has not this been sounded in our ears over and over again, until, by dint of hearing, we began at last to believe it?" This, then, my Lords, was evidently the impression upon the public mind in France, which I have just stated; and with regard to these negotiations at this moment, my opinion undoubtedly is, that it would have been well for this country at this time, and for the intervening Powers, if they could not come to a decisive and amicable arrangement of the transactions—that Belgium and Holland should have been left to themselves, rather than have departed from the first irrevocable resolutions of the Powers. I will not, however, go further into the letter of my Lord Ponsonby, be- cause that noble Lord is now withdrawn from the theatre of the negotiations; and, indeed, I understand that he has already displaced a noble and experienced friend of mine, whose merits in diplomatic zeal and ability have heretofore been universally approved of, by being rewarded by the douceur of the mission to Naples, and I hope this will cheer him for the loss of appointment and tarnished fame as a diplomatist at Brussels. I trust it will prove as acceptable to his Lordship as the Bishoprick of Derry is likely to do to his brother; and to give the noble Earl a vulgar phrase in return for that which he lavished on me the other day, I may say, that the noble Lord seems to be making hay while the sun shines, with appointments to relations and kindred. Now, my Lords, let us turn for a moment to the protocol relative to the demolition of the fortresses, which the noble Earl has laid on the Table. It seems that the conference relative to that subject was held on the 17th of April, and I should beg to ask, who it was, that instigated the subject so to be brought forward before the four Plenipotentiaries? At whose suggestion, I ask, was that Conference assembled? Is it possible that your Lordships can believe, that the four Powers would of themselves undertake to consider the question of the destruction of these fortresses, on the propriety of the erection of which they had so long and so often deliberated? Can yon believe that, after my noble friend, the noble and illustrious Duke near me, had visited those fortresses year after year, both during their erection and since their completion, those Powers who had commissioned the noble Duke to pay those visits of inspection, and had voluntarily made immense sacrifices of money to establish them, would, of their own accord, have undertaken the task of deliberating on their demolition? Well, then, let me ask, did Belgium urge the four Powers to come to the consideration of this question? Did Holland urge them to it? or could England, whose blood had been spilled and treasure expended, the one in obtaining the glorious triumph which led to, and the other in the erection of these fortresses—could, I say, either or any one of these Powers press the consideration of this question? My Lords, it is impossible that either Belgium, Holland, or England, could have pressed such a consider- ation on the four Powers as that of the demolition in question. Then we come to this, what Power was it that originated this proposition? Why, it was France, acting under the influence of Prince Talleyrand, from whom this proposition came. It is clear that Prince Talleyrand did not care whether Prince Leopold or any other Prince was king of Belgium, so long as he could have these fortresses razéed, in order that France might have the power of entering Belgium without even the possibility of meeting with a momentary interruption, on any crisis or emergency she thought proper. It is quite evident to me, that it was from France, and from France alone, that this proposition emanated, Your Lordships will not fail to see that Austria, Russia, and Prussia, came to the consideration of this question, as well as all others connected with general affairs at this moment—under circumstances of great and peculiar difficulty. We all know the state in which the Russians are, in consequence of the dreadful disease which is ravaging her armies in Poland, and that, in consequence, she had the greatest difficulties to encounter in bringing her forces at present into the field. Your Lordships also know, that owing to circumstances, which it is not necessary to enter into, Prussia and Austria are prevented from playing so high a card as they, no doubt, from their natural political interests, would wish at the present most alarming period. Under these circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the noble Lord, with reference to what is due to the pursuance of a sound policy in the affairs of Europe, to have shielded those Powers until such time as they may be enabled to place themselves in a position to act more as their inclinations and their interests would induce them to do. But how has the noble Earl shielded these Powers during the late negotiations? According to the arguments I have laid down—and I defy and call on the noble Earl, if he can, to gainsay them—we were pressed in April last by France, and at her instigation consented, to consider the propriety of the demolition of these fortresses. Now, I should like to know when the noble Earl first came to a decision on this point? The noble Earl says, in the month of April; but if such was the case, how did it happen that the result was not communicated to the French government until July, about eight or ten days before the opening of the French Chambers? And why was it communicated then? Why, merely for the purpose of giving an éclat to the speech from the throne, which was to be delivered on the opening of those Chambers. Just before that event took place, a French gentleman, (I believe) the son of the French Prime Minister, came over here, and he urged the Foreign Office to communicate the determination which the Ministers of the four Powers had arrived at, to Prince Talleyrand, in order that the necessary communication might be made to the French government, so that it might appear like a great feat in the Speech which was then preparing for the king of the French. To show the singular mountebank mockery of this transaction, I will take the liberty of referring your Lordships to the difference of language which is to be found between the Protocol and the French King's Speech. Now, how does the case stand? Why the Protocol says, "In consequence of these deliberations, the Plenipotentiaries have finally decided, that as soon as a government shall exist in Belgium, recognised by the Powers taking part in the conferences of London, a negotiation shall be set on foot between the four Powers and that government." For the purpose of doing what, do your Lordships think; why, "for the purpose of selecting" only, such of the said fortresses as should be demolished. Now, look to the Speech of the king of the French, and really it reminds me so much of the gasconade and charlatanerie of Napoleon's famous edicts, that I think it must be drawn by some disciple of his school.—"The kingdom of the Low Countries, as constituted by the treaties of 1814 and 1815, has ceased to exist. The independence of Belgium, and her separation from Holland, have been acknowledged by the great Powers. The king of the Belgians will not form part of the German confederacy. The fortresses raised to menace France, and not to protect Belgium, will be demolished." Why, any man who heard this sentence would infer, that all the fortresses are to be demolished. I ask, therefore, whether there ever was so gross a misrepresentation, or any thing so unfounded, either in fact or in protocol? The fact, indeed, is, that the protocol is a complete contradiction to the Speech. Was it decent for the members of the Conference, I would ask your Lord- ships, to permit such treachery and such extravagant misstatements upon a great and important transaction like this? No; it was the duty of those gentlemen to have demanded all necessary information from the French government, and the French Minister ought to have been called to account for his conduct. I declare that when I see such proceedings taken by France, and submitted to by the other Powers, and, above all, by this country,—and when I view the course which has been pursued by Prince Talleyrand (whose ability and activity for his employers, in all situations he has been in, no one can appreciate better than myself), throughout these negotiations, I tremble for the position in which this country is placed. I see nothing offered in the way of explanation by the Representatives of the four Powers,—I see no remonstrance from England; but I see France overawing us all by the aid of her skilful and active politician here, and I fear that he has in his hands the power of decision, and exerts that, which I shall call a domineering influence, over such of the political arrangements of Europe as are carried on and decided upon in this country, which formerly were always directed by the wisdom and genius of England. But, my Lords, even this arrangement about the fortresses is in itself so extraordinary, and has created such an electrical feeling all over the country, that it has even operated upon that able individual who conducts a newspaper, patronised I believe by his Majesty's Government. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack knows now any thing about, a particular newspaper called The Times journal; but there is an article which appeared in that paper lately, which particularly struck me as being a very forcible one, for it proves that the demolition of the fortresses was a measure which was entirely disapproved of, and was cried out against, by this bantling of Belgium, which Belgium is now in arms, through the means of the noble Earl, and the conduct pursued by this Government. My Lords, what did the writer in The Times say on the day on which this Protocol appeared in its columns? Why he said this—"If the great Powers had desired to destroy the popularity of the new Belgic sovereign—to revive extinct jealousies, and provoke fresh resentments against themselves—to give republican agitators a fresh purchase over the peace of the country, and to throw a lighted torch among a collection of inflammable materials which might otherwise have been consumed without an explosion—they could not have taken a surer or more infallible method of attaining their end. The French government had no right to make its consent to the arrangement of Belgic affairs depend upon the adoption of a measure at once so useless and so irritating—so incapable of giving it any additional security—and so sure to offend the pride of its weaker neighbour. It had no right to disturb the result of six months' negotiations, in order to make a clap-trap in the King's Speech. What would it think of a proposition from the Conference to destroy the fortifications of Valenciennes, or Lisle? and are not Tournay and Mons equally prized in the eyes of the Belgians, though they may be equally useless in preventing a hostile aggression?" Such, my Lords, is the article to which I refer your Lordships, and when I recollect the circumstance of our having had the individual connected with this paper up at our bar, to whom the noble and learned Lord, although he attempted to defend him, was obliged to give something of a lecture—I must say, that I think this editor's tone and sentiments appear to me to be rather in a changing course, in as far as approbation of his Majesty's Government is concerned. I do confess, my Lords, that I was a little surprised to see such animadversions as these, in respect of such transactions, coming from that journal. Some time ago, I remember, on a debate on the union of Belgium and Holland, the noble Earl opposite read a communication, in the shape of a letter, written, as I understood, by his noble friend, Lord John Russell, who seems to be advising him, and giving him hints in the domestic as well as the foreign line, for the purpose of shewing how unnatural it was, that any connection should exist between Belgium and Holland, and that no possible good was, therefore, to be expected to result from that union. Such having been the course pursued by the noble Earl, I hope I may be pardoned, if I proceed to read a letter from a noble friend of mine, who was fully acquainted with the foreign policy of my late brother, who is particularly distinguished for his talent and ability, and whose opinions are entitled to some degree of consideration, from having filled the high situation of his Majesty's ambassador at the Hague—I mean the Earl of Clancarty. The noble Earl says, "The course of foreign policy pursued by the present Ministry with regard to Belgium, is at total variance with the law of nations, embracing, as it does, an entire disregard to the most solemn treaties; to prove this, read the Acts of Congress at Vienna with its annexes, and the Ricés General of Frankfort, and compare them, as far as relates to the Netherlands, with the London Protocols. What possible right can the Belgians have to Luxemburgh, Limburg, to Maestricht, to the left bank of the Scheldt? And how are the fortresses upon the French frontier to be destroyed without the consent of the king of the Netherlands, whose purse contributed to their erection—who has still an interest in them as a first barrier, though, I will admit, much weakened by the oversight and miserable results proceeding from the Protocols of the Downing-street Congress? A miserable mismanagement, indeed, has taken place in things abroad, and all this has its influence, and most powerfully, to promote revolution at home." Such, my Lords, is the letter of the noble Earl; and, I am bound to say, that I coincide in every word of it, and I go entirely along with his views and conclusions. Now, one word more with respect to the policy of destroying these fortresses. I should like to know whether the Conference of London took the opinion of any military authority whatever on that point. I would beg to ask, whether the noble Duke near me, the first commander of the age, was ever sent for, or communicated with, upon this matter? or did the gentlemen forming the Congress of Downing-street, who may be very good men at ecarté, or other games at cards, or other grave questions of establishing kingdoms and creating kings, decide upon so momentous a question as that of destroying a military line of frontier, without resorting to a single military authority or opinion whatsoever as to the prudence of such a measure? I would put it to any one, whether the course pursued was not a most unjustifiable one, thus to decide that these fortresses, which, I say again, have been raised by British treasure, and maintained by British blood, are to be demolished, and the frontier laid open to France, without one military opinion being asked? I should like to know, even, whether the noble Duke, the Postmaster-General, he being the only person in the Cabinet, I believe, who has any pretension to the name of a soldier, was consulted. I must presume he was not; because, when that noble Duke recollects the scenes which he, and the other soldiers of the day, waded through, in order to establish the power of his country, and those advantages which we gained by the late war, I am sure that that noble Duke could not have contemplated such a result without lamenting the determination to which his colleagues had come, and would feel deep regret to see, that all these glorious monuments, indicative of the termination of the late war, and the exploits of his gallant friend, the Prince of Orange, as well as of his own countrymen, were to be razéed, and for what purpose? Only to let them fall into the interests of France. And if Belgium has now less population than when united to Holland, has she not greater need of these artificial defences? If it be pretended that, after the separation, the Belgians had not the means to garrison these fortresses, was it not likely that some application would have been made? None such, however, took place, either on the part of Belgium or Holland, as I have declared, and, it is quite clear, that France alone requires their demolition. Now, having disposed of the question of the fortresses, I shall proceed to draw the attention of your Lordships to the Belgic negotiations, and the manifesto of the king of Holland. It appears, that the Conference determined to proceed on the principle of separation between Belgium and Holland; and, in the eleventh and twelfth Protocols, dated the 19th and 20th of January, they declared, that the Powers had decided upon an arrangement, that they had resolved unanimously on certain bases stated therein, and that these bases were irrevocable. "Après avoir ainsi pourvu aux principales stipulations que leur semblait réclamer l'œuvre de paix dont ils s'occupent, les Plénipotentiaires ont arrêté que les Articles du présent Protocole seraient joints à ceux du Protocole précédent No. 11, du 20 Janvier, rangés dans l'ordre le plus convenable, et annexés ici dans leur ensemble (A) avec le titre de 'Bases destinées à établir l'Indépendance et l'Existence future de la Belgique.' Il a été arrêté en outre que les cinq Cours unanimement d'accord sur ces bases, les communiqueront aux parties directement intéresséeset qu'elles s'entendront sur les meilleurs moyens de les faire adopter et mettre à exécution, ainsi que d'y obtenir en temps opportun, l'accession des autres Cours de l'Europe qui ont signé les Actes des Congrès de Vienne et de Paris, ou qui y ont accédé. Occupées à maintenir la paix générale, persuadées que leur accord en est la seule garantie, et agissant avec un parfait désintéressement dans les affaires de la Belgique, les cinq Puissances n'ont eu en vue, que de lui assigner dans le systême Européen une place inoffensive, que de lui oftrir une existance qui garantit à la fois son propre bonheur, et la sécurité due aux autres états. Elles n'hésitent pas à se reconaître le droit de poser ces principes, et sans préjuger d'autres questions graves, sans rien décider sur celle de la souveraineté de la Belgique, il leur appartient de délarer, qu'à leurs yeux le souverain de ce pays doit nécessairement répondre aux principes d'existence du pays luimême, satisfaire par sa position personnelle à la sureté des états voisins, accepter à cet effet les arrangemens consignés au présent Protocole, et se trouver à même d'en assurer aux Beiges la paisible jouissance." I beg leave to observe, that the unanimity of the Powers is here particularly declared. On reading these documents, I had supposed, that, the Conference, after deliberating upon the terms of the eleventh and twelfth protocols, came to an unalterable resolution to stand by them. Now, what has been the consequence of this resolution? Why, our most faithful ally, the King of Holland, however disagreeable the terms might be to him, after much negotiation, gave his entire consent to the eleventh and twelfth Protocols, confirmed and strengthened as they were by the nineteenth. Having obtained the acquiescence of the king of Holland, I should have thought we had little more to do than go straightforward, and obtain the acquiescence of the Belgic government. If the Belgians were obstinate, and we could not persuade them to consent to the arrangement, and bring them to terms, I do not suppose any body will urge that to be a reason why we should feel ourselves called upon to force the party, who had readily agreed to the first terms which were offered, to the acceptance of new conditions, and which were essentially different. I ask, whether there was any justice in such a proceeding, and whether it is a proceeding which the noble Earl can stand up and justify in this House? It appears, however, that such was the course adopted; because Belgium remained obstinate, they turned round upon Holland, and said, "You were the first to comply with the new articles, but having gone thus far, you must go a step further, and you must submit to the new terms which have been suggested by the French Minister, since Lord Ponsonby declared his mission to Belgium to be at an end, and retired or was recalled by his Government from Brussels." Holland, be it remarked, had acceded to the eleventh and twelfth Protocols, which declared the bases on which Belgium and Holland were to treat to be irrevocable. Such, however, was not the result; for immediately the Conference called upon the Dutch to make further concessions, which I consider to have been gross and manifest injustice; and the sending a fresh mission to the Hague for such a purpose, was adding insult to injury. I am certainly glad, for the honour of this country, that that mission was not confided to a British Minister, whose character must have materially suffered in such a transaction. A noble and very excellent friend of mine, however, the Baron Von Wessenburgh, was selected to proceed to Holland, for the purpose of seeing whether he could cajole, or coax, or wheedle the king of Holland to abandon all which he had previously agreed to, and to consent to the adoption of these eighteen new preliminary articles which the Conference had framed, concocted by the Belgian Commissioners and the French Minister, as far as I am informed. I own, with respect to this mission to the Dutch Court, I never can believe it will be ratified and approved of by Prince Metternich at Vienna, or the Prussian Minister at Berlin. Now, I must here observe, that while the eleventh and twelfth Protocols arranged every thing, the eighteen preliminary Articles left every thing undetermined. It was natural to suppose, when Holland received an intimation of these new demands, she felt that she had been cruelly treated, and she determined, at all hazards, to resort to that line of conduct which her interest as well as her honour demanded. Now, my Lords, let us see what is the language of the king of Holland, as it is to be found in the manifesto published by his minister for Foreign Affairs. He says—"A mature examination having convinced him that the preliminary Articles would sacrifice the dearest interests of Holland to the insurrection, he cannot accept them, and he must again demand of the five Powers the execution of the reciprocal engagements between the Powers and the King with respect to the power by Protocols eleven and twelve, and with respect to the King by his accession to the bases of separation which the Conference itself, in its nineteenth Protocol, has declared to be irrevocable." His Majesty then proceeds to assert, that an appeal to arms would be preferable to yielding to those new demands; and with regard to the choice of a Sovereign for Belgium, the manifesto proceeds thus:—"The King refers to the declaration of the five Courts in the eleventh, twelfth, and nineteenth Protocols—namely, that in their opinion the sovereign of that country must necessarily answer the principles of the existence of the country itself, and by his personal situation must be satisfactory with respect to the safety of the neighbouring States, and to this end must accept, without reserve or distinction, the arrangements laid down in the Protocols eleven and twelve, and be in a condition to secure the peaceful enjoyment of them to the Belgians. In consequence of this declaration, which by the King's acceptance of the basis of the separation of the twelfth Protocol has become an engagement with him, his Majesty, in case a Prince should be called to the sovereignty of Belgium, and take possession of it without first accepting the said arrangements, could not but consider such Prince as, by this fact alone, placed in a state of hostility with him, and his enemy." Such, my Lords, are the declarations of the king of Holland; and I think your Lordships will agree with me, that there is so much of justice and fairness in it, that it is quite clear he had no other course to pursue, and that no blame is to be imputed to him on the ground of breaking the armistice, or for having taken a line of conduct which he considers necessary for his own defence. And, my Lords, as respects the breaking of the armistice, I think that particular point has been most ably answered in a communication which I saw to-day: I allude to M. Verstolk's speech to the States-General. That Minister says:—"Holland having accepted the 12th Protocol, and Belgium the eighteen Articles, which are wholly at variance with the former, the parties are now, as before, diametrically opposed to each other; and what hopes could the Government entertain (especially after the oath taken by the elected prince, confirming the usurpation of our territory) of witnessing the success of a negotiation, which, since last autumn, afforded no result, and which, during the last few weeks, has taken an undeniable bias in favour of Belgium? "I say, therefore, that it clearly appears that the oath taken by the king of Belgium entirely precludes all choice on the part of the king of Holland as to the course left to him to pursue, consistently with any regard to his honour and independence. I say, that there never was an instance in which a Power has been subjected to so much aggravation of injury as Holland has been during these negotiations; and I maintain, that I have made out a case against the noble Earl—which it would well become him to answer—fully proving that he has treated our old and faithful ally, Holland, in a most unfair and unjust manner. I thank your Lordships for the indulgence with which you have listened to these observations, and I promise, as a return for that indulgence, that I will be very short in the remaining remarks which I have to address to your notice. I wish to ask the noble Earl, what is the present state of our affairs? We have a nominal head, and we have the nominal kingdom of Belgium, but is there a single one of the points in difference between Holland and Belgium now adjusted? In all the addresses which have been made by King Leopold to the inhabitants of Luxemburgh, Limburg, Maestricht, and other places, is it not fairly admitted, that all the points at issue between the two countries still remain for futher settlement? Such is the state of the circumstances under which King Leopold has been placed on the throne of Belgium. Would to God he was back again in this country! For, I cannot suppose, that the noble Earl would march an English army along with the forces of the king of the French, to reduce the king of Holland to subjection, especially as that monarch had willingly acceded to the terms which the Conference at first proposed, and as Belgium is the only obstacle to their being accepted. Would that be justice, even on the principles upon which the Conference has hitherto decided? Now, my Lords, a few remarks as to the last act of this drama. I have already called the attention of your Lordships to the fact, that King Leopold, immediately after the king of Holland's taking the field—and he was bound to take the best position he could—applied to France for assistance, and France, it appears, ordered immediately 50,000 men to march instantly to Belgium. Was that, I demand, a friendly proceeding on the part of King Leopold, or a fair one on the part of the king of the French? It surely would not have been too much for either of these parties—the king of France, or the king of Belgium—to have waited a few short weeks, or even days, until they had received the noble Earl's fiat as to what was the opinion of the English Government respecting future proceedings. Where, I would ask, was the necessity for hurry? The king of Belgium was at the head of 4,000,000 of people, while the king of Holland was only at the head of 2,000,000 of subjects. Why, then, should King Leopold have sent to France for assistance in such breathless haste? Could he not have waited until the Conference decided whether France, England, or other Powers, should direct the assisting force, or if any force was necessary at all? I say, that French force is the last that should have been permitted to move. The time has arrived, I fear, when France takes the initiative in settling the affairs of Europe. But I ask the noble Earl and the noble Viscount near him, to point out the period, for a series of years past, that France was thus permitted to be the initiative power. Formerly, she was obliged to consult the Powers with whom she was acting, but now she decides at once, and, without hesitation or inquiry, sends at once 50,000 men into Belgium, in order to subjugate one of the oldest allies of this country. I should like to know whether the days of Charles 2nd are come back again, and whether we are going to join our forces with those of France to crush Holland—not, I admit, as in former times, for the paltry consideration of money—but for one scarcely less paltry,—the desire to truckle to the dictates, and, it may be, menaces of France. Every statesman who looks at our history, from the time of Queen Elizabeth, down to the peace of West- phalia, and from that peace down to the present time, cannot fail to perceive that the security of our position depends on the independence of Holland. It has always been our policy to secure the independence of that country. Is such our policy now? Does the noble Lord think, that when the French forces once get into Belgium, it will be an easy matter to get them out again? Does the noble Earl reflect, that M. Perier may be outvoted on the Address, and that there may be an immediate change of a peace for a war Ministry? Does the noble Earl think, in the event of that occurrence taking place, that the French will, at his dictation, cause their troops to retire? I say the French ministry would do no such thing; and I also say, that the noble Earl is placing this country in great jeopardy by the line of conduct which he is pursuing towards Holland. I should also like to know whether, if this question had come before the Conference of London for their decision, the noble Earl thinks, that the king of France was the most proper person to force the king of Holland to submission, and that it was fit he should march 50,000 troops into Belgium for the purpose, when 10,000 would have been more than enough? And why, if the king of the French was the most proper agent of coercion, should the unfortunate king of Holland be coerced? Holland being the Power that yielded every thing in the first instance, and not the Belgians. In this respect the case somewhat resembles the untoward event of Navarino; but I will not trouble your Lordships by pursuing this part of the subject further. Such is our position, and I humbly submit, that I have made out a case for the production of papers, which papers, if granted, will fully substantiate all the charges which I have made against the foreign policy of the noble Earl. I declare, as an Englishman, and as an individual having some stake in the country, that I cannot consent to tide on in the present unsatisfactory manner, bowing our heads in every stage of the negotiations to France, in order to avoid the contingency of a war. Why should a great country like this submit to such degradation? I have the authority of my noble friend near me (the Duke of Wellington) for stating, that when he left office, never was England more capable, if a just cause offered, of maintaining a successful war. In my opinion, the best way to avoid the contingency of war, is to shew that we are not afraid of it, and that we are prepared to meet its hazards. I would therefore advise his Majesty's Government, to take up a higher tone than that which they have hitherto used in these negotiations. I can assure them, that if they do assume such a tone, they will find Austria, Prussia, and Russia, ready to chime in with it. At present, those Powers dare not assume that tone, whilst the French are allowed to domineer, as they recently have domineered, in the Conferences. I implore your Lordships to look at the state of Europe, and of France at present, and to contrast it with the state, in which both were at the period when the noble Earl was first selected to administer the Government of this great country. France is now in possession of Greece, of Algiers, of Lisbon, and, for aught I know to the contrary, of the Portuguese fleet. [Earl Grey.—No! The Earl noble says No; but, such I contend, may be the case; and now we are about to place her in possession of the fortresses in Belgium, into which country she has been permitted to march 50,000 men, and we have deserted and abandoned Holland to the tender mercies of France. Such is the picture of the noble Earl's diplomacy in respect of our foreign relations, and I wish him, heartily, joy of it. I trust that the noble Earl will do me the favour to answer the questions I have respectfully put to him; while I think the public, who are not in this House, but who will see the satements which I have so imperfectly made to your Lordships, will think me deserving of some answer from him. The noble Earl will, I dare say, find fault with me for entering so much at large into this subject—all I can say is, that he may thank himself for my having done so: if he had consented the other day, as I think a Minister in his situation was bound to do, to give me the information which I then solicited, your Lordships would have been spared the trouble you have now had of hearing me at so great a length. In conclusion, my Lords, I will only beg to return you my most sincere thanks for your kind patience in listening to the arguments which I have very humbly and very imperfectly, but I will say conscientiously, advanced. I therefore, my Lords, beg leave to move, "that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, praying that his Majesty will be graciously pleased to order, that there be laid before your Lordships' House copies or extracts of such papers relating to the negotiations between Belgium, Holland, and this country, as can be produced without any detriment to the public service."

Earl Grey

I certainly feel, my Lords, that with respect to the transactions to which the noble Marquis has alluded, I am subject to a very great and a very heavy responsibility; and from that responsibility, when I am properly called upon to answer, I shall not desire to flinch. There is, however, one responsibility which I disclaim, and that is the responsibility of being in any, the slightest, degree the cause of the very long speech which the noble Lord has thought proper to deliver upon this occasion. That responsibility rests solely on the noble Lord himself; and I hope that when he retires from this place, he will be able to reflect with a satisfied conscience on the course which he has pursued to-day, and on the line of argument by which he has attempted to support his Motion. I should be sorry, my Lords, if I could be justly taunted with having been on any occasion deficient, either in my duty as a Minister of the Crown, or in the courtesy which every Member of this House has a right to expect from another. I am not conscious, provoked as I have been, irritated as I have been by questions put to me day after day, accompanied by invectives and declamations not very usual in this place, and founded not on answers which I ever gave, but on answers which it was supposed probable I might give;—provoked and irritated, my Lords, as I have been, I might perhaps be excused if human infirmity had betrayed me into an improper warmth; but though I might be excused, I am not conscious that I ever gave way to such feelings, or ever treated any of your Lordships either with want of courtesy or with disrespect. My answer to the complaint of the noble Lord is, that if he put certain questions to me, because he felt it to be his duty to put them, I withheld an answer to those questions because I felt it to be my duty to withhold it. The noble Marquis must excuse me, if I state to him, that a Motion more ill-timed, more destitute of all parliamentary ground to support it, more calculated to produce embarrassment to the Government, and do infinite mischief to the public service—circumstances, as the noble Marquis admits himself, and of which he is well aware, I never heard made within the walls of this House. If it be the object of the noble Marquis to hurry this country into a war,—if, in calling upon us not to truckle to France, he wishes us to declare open war against that country, undoubtedly no speech could be better calculated for such a purpose. For what does the whole of his long speech come to but this—that it is our duty to support the interests of this country, and we can only do that by stopping the course now pursued by France, which, according to his statement, is insulting and injurious to us, and which, upon his own showing, we cannot stop, except by an immediate recourse to arms? If it be the wish of the noble Marquis to cast away all plans, all management, and, contrary to his professed desire of peace, to refuse all confidence in the professions and statements of the French government, and hurry this country into a wide-spread and lasting war, if that be the object of the noble Marquis, I will admit that he knows how to attain it, but I will be no party to his success. For the alternative offered us by the noble Marquis, I am not at present prepared. I trust that this country does still possess the means, as I know that she will always possess the spirit, to vindicate her honour and her interests, when that honour and those interests are attacked. But I have yet to learn, that it is either the duty or the interest of a Statesman, who bears a sincere love to peace, and a deep-rooted hatred of war, to precipitate those measures which must produce the greatest of all national evils—I mean war—whilst there is a chance of averting it, by firm, and prudent, and deliberate counsels. I beg, my Lords, that you will not overlook the circumstances under which the noble Marquis calls upon us to take that decisive step, which may long banish from Europe all the blessings of peace. The noble Marquis has told us, that Russia has got the Cholera—that she is engaged in a war with Poland—that she would, therefore, have great difficulty in bringing her forces into the West of Europe—and that, consequently, she could give us little or no assistance. He has likewise told us, that Austria and Prussia are both in a great, degree incapacitated by circumstances from taking an active share in any general European warfare; and who, that looks upon the dissatisfied and disturbed state of Italy and of Germany, does not see the truth of that intelligence? Such being his premises, what do your Lordships think is the conclusion of the noble Marquis? That, in proportion as these our Allies are weak, and incapable of assisting either themselves or us, are we bound to enter into a war on their behalf against France, capable as she now is of rousing every State in Europe to the most dangerous pitch of excitement. I feel all the difficulties and dangers of such a position—I feel, too, that we may possibly be reduced, notwithstanding all our reluctance, to the necessity of meeting these difficulties and these dangers in the face, and of incurring the dreadful evils of another war in support of our national character and our national independence. But will the noble Marquis, who knows nothing of what has passed in these Negotiations—who sees that we are willing to forbear, as long as forbearance is honourable—will the noble Marquis say, that the moment is now come, when, after having taken every step which we hitherto have taken, with the full concurrence of all the Powers of Europe, and when we have every prospect of continuing to act with their concurrence, if his Majesty's Ministers are permitted to follow their own policy—will the noble Marquis say, that the moment is now come, when we ought to fly in the face of them all, and in the face of our own previous proceedings, and thereby to involve Europe in a war of opinions? Notwithstanding the assertions of the noble Marquis, I still hope, my Lords, that his Majesty's efforts, directed to preserve the repose of Europe, and the honour of our country, will be crowned with success; but in order to produce that result, it is necessary that your Lordships should place some reliance upon those Ministers whom his Majesty honours by his confidence. Unless you are prepared to address his Majesty to remove from his counsels the Ministers who at present direct them, it is only fair that you should, during our continuance in office, give us credit for conducting, to the best of our ability, these negotiations, which I admit to be of a very complicated nature. I say not this from any personal feelings, but to make your Lordships aware of the diffi- culties of our position, and to implore you, not by any rash unadvised measure to compromise the country, or prevent the negotiations, which have the preservation of peace for their object, from coming to a happy termination. He was not prepared, the noble Earl continued, to follow the noble Marquis through all the topics of his desultory, and he must add, inconsistent speech, in which he had touched upon some matters so lightly, that it was almost impossible to understand them, and in which, upon others, he had hastened to certain compendious conclusions, which might be justified by his own views, but which, as he should be able to shew at a proper time, were not justified in any degree by facts. The noble Marquis had inveighed in good set tones, but not with very sound discretion, against Ministers, for abandoning their doctrine of non-interference. There was not a principle which he had ever maintained upon that point, that he was not ready at that moment to re-assert. He insisted, that the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, with a view to change their domestic government, was one of the most sacred principles of the law of nations. He was ready, however, to contend, that that principle was subject to exception; and as far as Belgium and Holland were concerned, there was no choice left for this country, for she was impelled to adopt the course which she had taken, in conformity to the first law of nature, that of self-preservation. She was, therefore, bound to interfere, and although the noble Duke's (the Duke of Wellington) authority had been referred to on other occasions, he had not been pressed into the noble Earl's service on this occasion, for the noble Duke had acted upon this principle in the present case, and he was far from blaming him for it, as his interposition was specially directed towards averting that conflagration which threatened all Europe, and he accordingly united with Belgium in order to effect a cessation of hostilities. It was on the same principle that the Ministers now acted—namely, that of the prevention of war; and if they did avert war, they only acted in conformity to the principles of the noble Duke, and consequently preserved, what he had deemed to be, the best interests of the country, and had followed that line of policy which he thought was necessary for her welfare. They did not expect to receive, therefore, the animadversions of the noble Duke and the noble Marquis, who had themselves acted upon the same principles under the same circumstances. Nay more, the arrangements upon which the present Ministers had acted, had actually been begun by the noble Duke's Cabinet, for the very proper purpose of averting, what he at the time justly termed, the conflagration of Europe. He particularly alluded to that wise interference between Holland and Belgium, in which it was distinctly stated, that "hostilities shall cease between these two Powers, and that we (the interfering parties) will not permit their being renewed;"of which, he repeated, under the circumstances of the case, wise declaration, the conduct of the present Ministers with respect to Belgium and Holland was but the necessary consequence. If, therefore, war should, after all their endeavours, be the result of the present state of events, Ministers would have the consolation, if they were in error, not only of acting in unison with the great Powers of Europe, but of following the path of the noble Duke and his Colleagues. But error it was not, error it could not be; indeed, he in his conscience felt satisfied, that they were consulting the best interests of the country, as well as the dictates of policy and justice. Their Lordships would excuse him for not following the noble Marquis through the several topics of his speech, for replying to his animadversions and refuting his mis-statements, would be to provoke a premature discussion, which would not only, at the present stage of the negotiations to which they referred, be inconvenient to the public service, but might be dangerous to the ultimate object, which he trusted would be attained, the preservation of the peace of Europe. The noble Marquis had asked him, in the last sentence of his speech, whether anything had been done towards a positive settlement of the present angry relations between Holland and Belgium? He wished to God that he could answer the question directly in the affirmative—but he could not; all he could say, was, that the specific settlement—so desirable, he was sure, by all—was in a state of progress; and he hoped, that during the progress of that settlement, their Lordships would see the inexpediency of calling for information, the production of which, under the circumstances of a most delicate negotiation, might risk the defeat of the object the country had in view. The production of the information, he repeated, would at that moment be highly detrimental to the public service and though a reference to it would easily expose the groundlessness of the noble Marquis's attack, he still, by not producing it, nor referring to it, would submit patiently to the noble Marquis's vituperation—confident that when the proper hour of explanation arrived, justice would be awarded to him by their Lordships and the public. The noble Marquis had taunted him with having departed from the policy so long, according to his statement, pursued with national advantage by his late noble relative. In testifying his surprise at this alleged departure, the noble Marquis said, that "after the present Government was formed he had hoped to be able to give to it his support, but found he could not, as its principles were not those of his late lamented brother." Now this declaration was rather strange, for on the first day of last Session, when he had not the remotest expectation of filling his present office, however the noble Marquis might have felt, he had stated it as his deliberate opinion, that it was impossible to prevent the separation of Holland and Belgium; that it in fact was the inevitable result of the unnatural union and forced system of the balance of European power by which they had been most injudiciously joined together; and in illustration of his sentiments he quoted the observations contained in Lord John Russell's ingenious little pamphlet on foreign affairs, written in 1821, in which the injustice of overlooking the wishes and interests of a weaker State, in order to promote the views of a stronger party, was insisted upon. But that was not the first time in which he had given utterance to these opinions; in the lifetime of the noble Marquis's relative, at the period of what was called the original settlement of Europe, he had explained them at length, and had, in opposition to the illustrious statesman alluded to, entered his protest against that settlement, as a measure that must necessarily lead to all the consequences they were then lamenting. And the result had unfortunately proved, that he was right, and that the noble Marquis's relative was wrong. He did not say this for the purpose of awakening party hostilities, or of reviving contentions long since in their grave, but merely to vin- dicate his own consistency from the implied censure of the noble Marquis. Indeed, if there was any one matter upon which, more than another, he prided himself, it was his anxiety to bury all past animosities, political and personal, in oblivion. Because it was his misfortune to have differed from Mr. Canning on some points of policy, the noble Marquis seemed to think, that therefore he should have the more closely adhered to Lord Castlereagh's; and should have adopted another line of policy towards Holland and Belgium. It was true, that he had opposed Mr. Canning in some parts of his policy, and in so doing he had had the misfortune of differing from some of his dearest friends, who at that moment acted with Mr. Canning, and of agreeing with other noble Lords, who just now were opposed to him. However, his main objections to Mr. Canning's government were not founded on the foreign policy of that Minister, though there were points of it, relating to Portugal and Greece, not wholly unexceptionable, but some points in the formation of that government, which it was not necessary to enter upon; suffice it that they were not personal nor factious, nor influenced by any other consideration than regard for the permanent welfare of the country. But he had zealously supported Mr. Canning's foreign policy in general, not because it was that of the noble Marquis's relative, but because it was a step towards retracing the injudicious policy of his predecessors. He wished to ask the noble Marquis whether, if peace were his object, and he desired to promote the interests of Holland and this country, the violent language he had made use of in reference to other Powers, parties to the negotiations carrying on for the preservation of these interests, could serve any good purpose? He was not ashamed to avow, that it was his own anxious wish from the beginning to support Holland, our ancient ally, and to secure her independence, but he did not, therefore, feel that it was incumbent upon him to precipitate this country into a war for that special purpose. But, said the noble Marquis, "You have not adhered to your own positions; you have abandoned them at various times in the course of your negotiations with respect to Holland and Belgium; therefore, what security can we have that even your present settlement will be that of the next week?" He would ask the noble Marquis, was this occasional departure from the letter of the original matter of negotiation unprecedented? In fact, did he ever know of any negotiation, the terms of which were not influenced and modified by time and circumstances? That may be all true, admits the noble Marquis, but why make each step in your negotiation an abandonment of the interests of the king of Holland? At the proper time he would be prepared to convince, if not the noble Marquis, at least their Lordships and the public, that such had not been the case, and that, however present circumstances might be lamented, they were the inevitable results of the policy of the late Administration. With respect to the conduct of the French government, in reference to Belgium, upon which the noble Marquis had animadverted, he was bound to state, that the conduct of the French government in the whole transaction had been most fair and open. It had been called upon to interfere, pursuant to treaty, in the case of an armistice violated without notice, and contrary to the understanding of the other parties to that armistice. But France had only been called upon as this country, and the other parties to the treaty, had been called upon; and in acting as France had done, the French government felt it was merely fulfilling its solemn engagement. "Admitted," says the noble Marquis, "but why not await the result of negotiation and concerted mediation?" He was not then called upon to discuss that point. It was sufficient for the present purpose to state, that the French government had not interfered but on this most pressing solicitation, and had given the most positive assurance "that its sole object was the defence of Belgium, and when that shall have been secured, and the Dutch troops shall have repassed into Holland (he was not aware whether the French had as yet crossed the Belgic frontiers—there was no official account of their having done so), the French troops shall forthwith return within the French frontiers." This assurance struck him as most satisfactory. At a proper time it would be seen with whom the blame originally lay—that is, whether the conduct of the king of Holland, in violating an armistice which it was his duty and interest to observe, was the proximate cause of the march of the French troops, or whether, as the noble Marquis alleged, his Dutch Majesty had all along acted wholly on the defensive. He must again repeat, that he could not enter into a discussion of the merits of the question between Holland and Belgium, while negotiations, having the permanent settlement of the dispute for their object, were still pending. Should they fail in effecting that settlement, or should a discussion on its merits be expedient before its termination, then he would be prepared to produce such information as would enable them to discuss it without doing injustice; but till either emergency had arisen, or till the settlement had been finally concluded, he felt it due to the King's Government, to himself, and the country, to deprecate all discussion as premature and mischievous. At that stage of the proceeding he felt, that not to withhold the important information to which the noble Marquis's observations referred, would be improper and unsafe, and therefore, in postponing all discussion to a fitting period, he felt that he was only performing his duty as a Minister, and following the conduct of all his predecessors in office. If, however, the noble Lords opposite should deem it otherwise, and that the House should agree with them that Ministers were pursuing an unwise policy with respect to Holland and Belgium—a policy derogatory from the honour of the country and the Sovereign—why, let them explicitly say so at once, and let the noble Marquis come forward with a direct motion to dispossess them of their present places, instead of endeavouring to hold them up to public censure by indirect attacks like the present. This would be the more manly course—the easiest to be grappled with. But he confidently appealed to their Lordships and to the country, not to withhold their confidence from Ministers so long as they pursued a line of conduct which, once for all, he repeated, he should, at the proper time, be prepared to show, was that most conducive to the interests of the country.

The Duke of Wellington

did not rise, as he had stated on a former occasion, to throw any obstacles in the way of Ministers, in their present negotiations, but to offer a few words in explanation of the part taken by the king of the Netherlands in the recent transactions, which not only involved the honour and interests of that monarch, but, as it struck him, of this country also. What he had to complain of, as the main result of these transactions, was, that we had, through them, lost that influence over the government of the Netherlands, which it had been the endeavour of all English statesmen to obtain and preserve; and what he had to contend was, that all the mischievous consequences which had followed to the king of the Netherlands, our ancient ally, from these transactions, were the result of this lost influence on the part of England. The kingdom of the Netherlands had been, as he had explained on a former occasion, established by the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, the parties to which alone had the right of determining the expediency of separating that kingdom into that of Holland and Belgium, as at present. When that separation had been agreed upon by the Allied Powers, parties to the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, the terms of an armistice were laid down between Holland and Belgium, in which, by implication, the Duchy of Luxemburg was guaranteed to the king of the Netherlands. Now he maintained, that the conditions of that armistice had not even yet been faithfully observed by the mediating parties, and that, so far as it had been acted upon, it was to the prejudice of the king of the Netherlands. It was true, that Holland and Belgium were bound, by the five Allied Powers, to suspend the hostilities at the time threatened between them; but it was equally true, that it was impossible to arrive at a sound opinion, on the part which the king of the Netherlands had taken, in breaking that armistice, without taking into account all the transactions subsequent to its original promulgation, and up to the period of the appointment of the new king of Belgium. The armistice was followed up by the Conferences at London, which ended in the determination, that as it was impossible to bring two hostile portions of the kingdom of the Netherlands back into friendly union under one government, the five Allied Powers should apply themselves to effecting the separation of these two portions, into the separate kingdoms of Holland and Belgium. He, in common with their Lordships, viewed that separation as perhaps unavoidble; at least, he considered that the re-union of the two separated kingdoms under the one monarchy, was hardly practicable. That was not, however, the matter at issue. What he wished to call their Lordships' attention to was, that in effecting the separation, the interests of Holland were wholly overlooked by the English Ministry. He believed, in the first place, that the basis of the separation was not formally communicated to the Dutch government. He could not take it upon him to state this fact positively, but he would say, that he had no doubt, that the noble Lord (Lord Ponsonby), who acted as the agent to the parties in the Conferences at London, did not make the communication as soon as he might have done. On that noble Lord first repairing, in his capacity of agent, to Brussels, he, so far from communicating the record of the arrangements which had been concluded by the five Allied Powers, with respect to Holland and Belgium, to the Dutch government, returned for instructions, as to whether he should or not—though he had already announced it to the provisional government at Brussels—also communicate its purport to the king of the Netherlands; and was sent back with instructions in the affirmative. In consequence, of these instructions, the noble Lord addressed a letter to the Dutch government, in which, as it should seem, on his own responsibility, he gave up one of the most important topics in the original record of the basis of the separation—that, namely, which guaranteed to the king of the Netherlands the possession of the Duchy of Luxemburg. This very important omission, of course, gave rise to just complaints on the part of the king of Holland. That monarch found, first, that the five Allied Powers agreed to a certain basis of separation of the northern and southern portions of his dominions into two independent States, according to which basis he was to be secured the possession of his Duchy of Luxemburg; and next he found, that instead of their accredited agent communicating to him the record of this basis, to which it was more than probable he would have at once assented, he announced the separation in terms of which the retention of this Duchy formed no part—nay, in which it was laid down, that he was also to forfeit that portion of his dominions. And feeling this, the king of the Netherlands very justly complained, particularly so far as this Government had thus acted towards an ancient ally, with whom it had been our policy to cultivate amicable relations for the last 150 years. He wished to make their Lordships fully aware of the importance of this view of that Monarchs conduct—the rather, as France was a party to the ar- rangement, and that an English nobleman was the agent of the Conferences which had thus acted so partially, and inconsistently, and unjustly, towards the king of Holland—features of the transaction which prevented him from sitting silent, when they were referred to in the Debate. He feared that public opinion would not hesitate to declare, that in furthering the settlement of the new kingdom of Belgium, England had abandoned the interests of our ancient ally, the king of Holland. It had long been, he repeated, the anxious policy of this country, to cultivate the most friendly intercourse with that monarch, to secure the integrity of his territory, against the encroachments of France. It was the old interests of England, no less than of Holland, that Belgium should be beyond the control and influence of the French government, and yet Ministers had set these interests at nought, or rather, abandoned them in favour of Belgium. It was our interest not to let the French troops overrun Belgium, as they no doubt would do, if they had not done so already; and it was no valid justification of the injury to our national interests, that their having done so was in pursuance of a treaty, to which we also were a party, for guaranteeing the integrity of the new kingdom of Belgium. He asked, what business had we to guarantee this integrity at the expense of Holland? None whatever; nay more, our only business ought to have been, to guarantee the integrity of Holland against Belgium and other States. Let their Lordships look also how the interests of the king of Holland had been abandoned in the eighteen preliminary articles referred to by his noble friend. In the original basis of separation, the king of Holland was guaranteed the Duchy of Luxemburg. He was willing to abide by that basis. In the meantime, however, the new king of Belgium had stepped in, and swore to the maintenance of the constitution which the Allied Powers had drawn up, of which constitution, the annexation of the Duchy of Luxemburg to the new kingdom, was a fundamental arrangement. The king of Holland had just ground of complaint against this country, and the other parties to the articles; and this, too, in favour of a newly-elected king, whom no Power in Europe as yet had recognized, except the kings of France and England. Was it, therefore, surprising that the king of the Nether- lands should complain of his interests being thus abandoned by us? Was it surprising, too, that we had, in fact, lost our influence over the Dutch government? Could it be expected, that we should retain the good-will of a State whose interests we thus disregarded? He would not then enter upon a discussion of the question involved in the breaking of the armistice by the king of the Netherlands, further than to beg their Lordships' attention to the provocation which that Monarch had received, before he had proceeded to extremities, and to the decisive effort he had made beforehand to avert them; and, above all, to the strange conduct of the Ministers with respect to that effort. After the king of Holland had received the communication of the terms upon which the Allied Powers had agreed to the separation of Holland and Belgium, he forwarded a despatch to the British Government, in which he distinctly states, that he will endeavour to maintain the original basis of the separation—par ses moyens militaires—an expression too plain to be mistaken. Now this letter was delivered at the Foreign Office, by M. Zuylen de Nyevelt, on Wednesday, at twelve o'clock, but, strange to say, was not opened by the noble Foreign Secretary till next day. That is, a letter containing this important communication, was not opened till it was too late to prevent the mischief it was intended to warn our Government was likely to ensue. This, it was most important to bear in mind; for he maintained, that had that letter been, as it ought to have been, opened on its arrival at the Foreign Office, there would have been sufficient time to prevent the march of the French troops across the Belgian frontier, and, indeed, that of the Dutch troops across their own frontier, if they had, which he doubted, even as yet, crossed that frontier. He was anxious to obtain information with respect to the delay in opening this important communication, and he hoped it would be satisfactory.

Earl Grey

was sure, that the explanation he had to afford the noble Duke would be satisfactory, and would, moreover, show the inconvenience of the premature discussion to which the two noble Lords opposite would lead the way, and against which he had in vain often raised his voice. The noble Duke had referred to a letter from the Dutch government, which had been delivered, as he had correctly stated, on Wednesday (at twelve o'clock), with the view to induce their Lordships to believe that it contained a warlike menace, on the part of the king of Holland. The noble Duke interpreted the expression moyens militaires, as if it had no other meaning than military "means" or instruments. Now, he put it to their Lordships, whether the obvious signification of the terms moyens militaires was not military "measures," [" No!" from Duke of Wellington.] The noble Duke might say "No," but he was singular in his interpretation. It was true, as the noble Duke had stated, that M. Zuylen de Nyevelt had forwarded to the Foreign Office, on Wednesday night, the document referred to; but, as it was addressed, not to the Foreign Secretary, but to the Conference at large, it was not opened till the Conference had met on the next day—Thursday. In the mean time, we had received despatches from the British Ambassadors at the several courts, to which a similar letter had been addressed by the king of Holland, and they had unanimously concurred in interpreting the expression moyens in a sense different from that of the noble Duke. They, in fact, in common with, not only the members of the Cabinet, including, of course, the Foreign Secretary, but also the Ambassadors, parties to the Conference, united in giving to the expression but the one obvious meaning of being a mere "measure," not implying actual warfare. They never, for a moment, contemplated the proceedings of the king of Holland, and all united in expressing their surprise at his violation of the armistice. But, to put this interpretation beyond all doubt, M. Falck, the Ambassador from the king of Holland, as well as M. Zuylen de Nyevelt, were called in to the Conference on the day when the letter was opened, and asked to explain what meaning they attached to the phrase. Their answer was, "that they had no instructions from their sovereign which would enable them positively to specify its meaning."

The Duke of Wellington

would not deny that the expression moyens might be rendered "measures;" but contended that "means" or "instruments" were its most obvious meaning.

Earl Grey

repeated, that all the courts to whom the letter had been addressed had interpreted it differently. Besides, his noble friend, the Foreign Secretary, had, on the Thursday alluded to, half an hour's conversation with the Dutch Ambassador, during which not a word transpired that would lead to the belief that he had looked upon it in the light, of the noble Duke—that is, as implying overt hostility.

The Lord Chancellor

felt the inconvenience of at all entering into a discussion upon the subject-matter of delicate negotiations still pending, and which could not be properly discussed, on one side or the other, without a violation of necessary secresy. If, however, danger be the result of the irregular discussion thus persisted in—if peril be the consequence of partial disclosures of matters referring to still pending negotiations—if the present groundless remarks and insinuations of noble Lords, anxious to embarrass Ministers, should, unhappily, be the means of throwing obstacles in the way of those settlements and treaties, by which we hoped to avert war, not merely from Holland and Belgium, but the whole world, he and his colleagues washed their hands of the consequences—be they on the noble Marquis, who cared not for them—be they on his supporters, who, if he was not greatly mistaken, were not quite so careless as to what might be the result of their proceedings. The noble Marquis, who, as the mouth-piece of a party more wary than himself, had brought forward the present Motion, most probably disregarded, if indeed he clearly saw, the probable and lamentable results of such a mischievous proceeding; but not so those other noble Lords who had cheered him on, who, it was not easy to believe, could be ignorant of the evils—the alarming evils—it might inflict upon the country. Not only was the noble Marquis made the mouth-piece, but he was likewise created the head-piece of the party; and he availed himself of his being this head-piece, to snatch every possible opportunity of a chance debate, to bring forward the most unfounded charges, and to make the most uncandid statements and unauthorized assertions that any Member of the Legislature ever ventured upon. He would remind their Lordships of the results of similar discussions, which had taken place at no great distance of time, as an illustration of the consequences of the secrets of negotiation being preserved in one place, while they were, de die in diem promulgated in another, and that other a public assembly. Did their Lordships think that negotiations were be- nefitted while the Belgian Congress were daily informed of them? And who were so ready to exclaim, who so ready to draw the moral from the tale, who so ready to talk of the danger of popular governments, and to mark the certain consequences of ever permitting the secrets of negotiations to transpire, as being totally incompatible with their successful issue? They were, he believed, the very persons who urged forward the present Motion by their mouth and head piece, the noble Marquis. Then, if he wanted a reason against such a practice, without going to Belgium, without leaving that hall—he would not say, look to the danger, for that would apply only to the noble Duke, who had marched in to save his less considerate friend—he would only say, look to the absurdity of such proceedings. For could any thing be more absurd, than for persons to rush into discussions with a firm confidence that the information on which they raised debates was perfectly accurate, when it turned out that never were the assertions urged in a meeting, public or private, or in any court of law, where hired advocates are engaged to assert what they find in the instructions they receive, more unfounded? And never did he, in the course of his experience, judicial, forensic, or parliamentary, see any casein which the facts relied upon were more unfounded than those which had given rise to this discussion. In the whole course of his experience, he had never heard any man go into a court of law, even among the hired advocates, whose professional duty it was to make speeches up to the mark of the statements and instructions in their brief, with a more exaggerated statement. He did not state this out of any disrespect to professional orators, or hired advocates, he only made the observation by way of acknowledgment to the noble Marquis's discreet zeal and consummate judgment. But, in the present case, what was the charge which the noble Marquis had brought against his Majesty's Ministers, with such an apparent satisfaction, and with such an evident expectation of carrying the House with him, in his zeal to condemn the government of the country? His charge was, that if his noble friend, who had presided over the negotiations, had only been a little more alert—if he had only evinced a little more alacrity, and had he been more alive to his duty, he would not have carried in his pocket, for twenty-four hours, this sealed letter, without opening it—a letter which notified the termination of the armistice; and, added the noble Marquis, had the letter been opened, there was no saying, even he himself (Lord Londonderry) could not tell, what benefits might not have been derived by stopping the military operations. There were two answers, however, to this charge of the noble Marquis, but of which the noble Duke was in utter and in hopeless ignorance; first, that all those who read the document, the giving of which was to relieve the sovereign of Holland from the charge of breach of faith, did not understand it in the manner the noble Duke did. That this was peculiar to the Government of this country, he was glad did not happen to be the case, for there were present, the Russian, the Prussian, the Austrian Ambassadors, as also the French Minister—not deficient in acuteness amongst his brothers—and not one of them could perceive this. Moreover, there were all the Ministers, in what some might call the Bœotian air of the place where this letter was written, and they, too, were equally incapable of understanding this letter to be a declaration of hostilities. So much for the distinctness of this document—a fit origin for the motion of the noble Marquis. But how could the very opening of this letter stop operations already begun? For this notice was brought by a person who well knew, while he was the bearer of this sealed document, that, before he left the Hague, orders had been given to the army to march. So, even supposing this letter to be as plain as the alphabet, and that we got it on Wednesday, and that he had himself concurred in taking measures in half an hour afterwards, what good effect could this produce? But the fact was, that so little did the laches of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs impede the decisions of Government, that measures were taken by the Government before twelve o'clock that night, they being in possession of intelligence of the intention of the Dutch government (from other sources) to break the armistice ["What?" from Lord Londonderry.] "I say, proper measures were taken; but if the noble Lord wishes me to tell him what they were, I can only say, that here, as in other cases, he reckons very much without his host. If the letter had been opened, nothing more could have been done, since the person who brought the letter, and came over to negotiate, knew that the troops were ordered to march." Now, one word as to the good faith—the uberrima fides—he used the word of the Dutch jurists—of the king of the Netherlands. If Mr. Zuylen, and that good and excellent friend of his (Lord Brougham's), the Minister of the King, wished to give notice what his master meant, it was extraordinary that this gentleman gave no intimation of it to the Conference, though he was aware that orders had been given, before he left, to the army to march. It was still more extraordinary that this gentleman had not dropped the most remote hint of this during his conference with the Secretary of State. Whether this notice was drawn up in terms, the object of which was not to be plain, he could not say, but it looked as if such was the case! He would not enter further into the subject, but he believed that enough had been said that night to prove, that, the charge which had been brought forward against his noble friend, did very much add to the great inconvenience felt from entering into these partial and useless statements. The noble Duke had said, that England no longer possessed that influence which she once so happily exercised in the affairs of Europe.

The Duke of Wellington—I said of Holland.

The Lord Chancellor

continued: he begged the noble Duke's pardon for the error. What had been the influence to which the noble Duke alluded—the influence acquired, or, to use other language, the influence consolidated and rendered permanent by that final settlement of the affairs of Europe in 1815? The settlement of the affairs of 1815 had indeed been final, for every year had seen it approach to its end, and in the short efflux of time since 1815, it had finally ceased. But when the noble Marquis talked of the influence of England in foreign States, he (the Lord Chancellor) would tell him, that he would never consent to embroil the peace of this country every time a gun was fired on the Continent. That the present race had outlived the follies of their predecessors, he was not the man to regret. He was not the only one that took credit for seeing things in a sounder light than their ancestors Godolphin and Marlborough. If this great predecessor of the noble Duke had only lived to the year 1823, he would have held down his head with shame, and would have lifted up his eyes with amazement, to see, that after he had made war so long and so gloriously, in order to prevent France having any influence beyond the Pyrenees, this country could suffer France absolutely to overrun Spain, without firing one single shot in her defence, (he said, God forbid that she should have done so), but, what was extraordinary, without her using any of those spirited remonstrances, and of that very strong language, which diplomacy keeps bottled up for the use of cabinets. The noble Marquis had said, that it was the paramount duty of England to protect and support the king of Holland, or rather, the king of the Netherlands, for he was still the king of the Netherlands, and he had then charged Ministers with having deserted that monarch; and moreover, the noble Marquis had insinuated, that this desertion had been perpetrated with the sinister view of promoting the election of Prince Leopold to the throne of Belgium. He utterly denied the whole of the charge. He would assert openly, and without any fear of contradiction, that Ministers had not interfered, directly or indirectly; that they had not encouraged, and far less enforced, the arrangements by which the Belgian people had chosen a king for themselves. It was very well known, that Prince Leopold had not been the first person upon whom the choice of the Belgians had fallen. The choice, in the first instance, had fallen where there were family connexions and old associations to favour it: the views of the people had been directed to the Bourbon family, and to the ex-sovereign family of France (the Napoleon family); and, in either case, he supposed it could scarcely be necessary for him to state, that the choice would have been in the highest degree exceptionable in the eyes of every man in Europe who did not wish to see Belgium become a province of the French kingdom. When the noble Earl said, that Ministers had interfered so far as to say who should be chosen, or when he asserted that they had at all interfered with the Belgians' free choice he, (the Lord Chancellor) must peremptorily—he must, with the utmost degree of distinctness, plainness and emphasis—deny the charge. He perfectly agreed with the noble Duke, that Ministers had no right to interfere with the Belgians, and that they ought to be on good terms with England as the friend of peace: in short, that Belgium, in every re- spect, ought to be a neutral power. He had the greatest possible respect for the eminent virtues, for the many and high acquirements, and for the prudence, moderation, and discretion of that most distinguished Prince, who had been raised to the throne by the free voice of the Belgian people. That illustrious person had not one drawback, or at most, he had only one: he could have wished that Prince Leopold had been less connected with this country, because he did not wish that this country should be particularly connected with Belgium. In no case could England have any business to make herself a party with Belgium. Then came the noble Duke's assertion, that we had failed to advance the interest of somebody else to that throne. Did the noble Duke think that the king of Holland ought to have been elected king of Belgium? [The Duke of Wellington here signified dissent.] He was glad to find that the noble Duke did not wish such a thing. The noble Duke had, with that candour which was so characteristic, stated, as on other occasions, his opinions, whether those opinions were in favour or against the Government. But here the noble Duke ought to bear in mind what were the dominions of Holland properly considered as such, when he spoke of the duchy of Luxemburg. When their Lordships were told to make a stand about Luxemburg, and were reminded of the necessity of adhering to the ancient ally of England, it was essential to consider what were the dominions of the king of Holland quasi Holland. Luxemburg had nothing to do with Holland—it was rather a private possession of the Nassau family. If Luxemburg had been, like Amsterdam or Flushing, belonging to the territory of the United Provinces, then, indeed, it would have been a different matter. He hoped, that the family on the throne of Holland would long continue to reign. He trusted, that the monarch would see the necessity of acting with justice and liberal policy, such as became the king of a free people. It would be advisable for him to eschew taking all advantage of attacking a neighbouring monarch, if he wished to secure the confidence of other countries; and above all, let him avoid that which, whether proceeding from king or people, was equally detestable, which might possibly plunge Europe in a general war. If there were a sovereign so lost to all that was essential to the happiness and tranquillity of his people—if there were a sovereign smitten with so unholy a desire—if there were a sovereign who entertained so reckless and bloodthirsty a selfishness as the conquest of a province (even supposing it might have been unjustly lost)—if there were a sovereign, who knowingly and wilfully plunged Europe into war for such an object—he would say, that sovereign no longer deserved the respect and devotion of his people. He had always expressed his admiration of a limited monarchy, believing it the best calculated for the happiness and prosperity of the people; but if he found, at the present day, that a sovereign, even in a limited monarchy, could so sport with the happiness of his people, sacrificing that to his own selfishness, it would go far to make him change his opinion of that form of government. The noble Marquis had attacked his Majesty's Ministers, and the noble Earl at the head of the Administration had come in for a good share of his censures. The noble Earl had, however, duly answered the charges. The noble Marquis had attacked him for having made this and that appointment in his own family. Amongst other complaints of the noble Lord, he urged, that his noble friend at the head of the Government had appointed to a high diplomatic situation a relative, certainly not unworthy of that trust, and that he made matter of grave accusation, as if no head of any government had ever, under the influence of fraternal affection, appointed to a high diplomatic situation, one relative who was the furthest in the world from being fit for such a trust. The noble Marquis had attacked the noble Earl for his diplomatic appointments, and had complained of his having bestowed a bishoprick on his relative. Now, there was not the shadow of truth in this story, and the only information on that ground was derived from what the noble Marquis and his friends on that side of the House seemed to make their chief study—he meant the newspapers. Before he concluded he could not refrain from saying a few words as to what fell from the noble Marquis who had taken the lead in the present discussion. The noble Marquis had done him the honour to anticipate from his mouth what he was pleased to term sarcasm and vituperation; and, although he might be very fond of indulging therein, he must be allowed to say, that the noble Marquis was himself, in no small degree, addicted to attempts of that nature: it by no means followed, however, that because a man was fond of a thing, that he was therefore good at it. The noble Marquis laboured hard at vituperation and sarcasm, but he still, perhaps, meant no harm. He was perfectly innoxious. Sarcasm, in its original meaning, meant stripping off the skin, and the noble Marquis, in his laborious attempts at that species of rhetoric, might still show the same spirit as if he made the most successful speech that ever had been delivered in that or the other House of Parliament. He certainly never heard, there or any where else, more personal allusions, hardly ever more frequent references to particular individuals or families; certainly, never more direct censure attempted to be cast on Ministers, at home and abroad, and especially upon the representatives of foreign Powers in this country. In the course of the noble Marquis's speech, he frequently adverted to the information which he derived from newspapers, and in the same breath denounced those vehicles of information, though almost all the knowledge he appeared to possess arose from what they supplied him with. He must address the noble Lord in the language of the woman in the play "fond, ungrateful man!" for if ever there was a man who was both fond and ungrateful it was the noble Marquis. He would ask the noble Lord how he could have gone on without the assistance of the newspapers? He did that, notwithstanding all his censure of the daily press, which perhaps had never before been done in a House of Parliament—he not merely read a newspaper, for the purpose of laying before the House a document or a narrative, but he laboured to eke out his argument with the speculations of a Parisian Jacobin Journal. The noble Marquis quoted largely from The Times of this country, a newspaper which he (the Lord Chancellor) was not in the habit of reading, but to which, considering how much he was indebted to its columns, the noble Lord had behaved most unhandsomely. He borrowed its knowledge, even its expressions, and then abused it. On the subject, however, which that newspaper supplied him with, as well as with respect to the feeling which he entertained relative to the nepotism of which he accused his noble friend at the head of his Majesty's Government, it would be in vain should any attempt be made to disabuse his mind. If that mind were brayed in a mortar, prejudices could not be beaten out of it. The noble Marquis complained, that two Ambassadors and an Irish Bishop had been appointed from amongst the relatives of the noble Earl at the head of his Majesty's Government. Now, though that statement was not true, he recommended his noble friend at the head of his Majesty's Government to realise it; and at least some good would then arise from the speech of the noble Marquis. He should have thought, that the noble Marquis would have been the last to allude to nepotism in appointments to foreign missions; he could scarcely have forgotten, that fraternal affection had appointed to such missions persons unfit—notoriously unfit—unfit to a degree the world never witnessed before. Delicacy prevented him going any further, he had no doubt the allusion would be properly applied, and while he could not sufficiently wonder at the noble Marquis, for making such assertions he could not sufficiently admire the courtesy of his noble friend in making no personal allusions in his reply. He should next proceed to another subject equally distasteful to him. It had been heretofore, and justly, the boast of this country, that amidst all the contentions of party strife, her Statesmen had never forgotten what was due to the feelings of foreigners; it had heretofore been to the credit of British Statesmen, that they acted as if they knew that the foreign Ministers in this country were defenceless, and therefore ought not to be attacked—that they were strangers, and therefore entitled to hospitality—that they were the Ministers of Sovereign Princes, and that, therefore to them was due courtesy of a higher order; that though they had the feelings of men, they had the duties of Ministers to perform—the duties were cast upon them, the feelings were born with them, and it might not always happen that it was in their power to control those feelings: it, therefore, had ever been the practice, of British Statesmen to avoid attacking persons so circumstanced; because, apart from the feelings of generosity, which he trusted would animate the mind of every Briton raised to high station, it could not but be felt, that peace or war might depend upon the feelings of persons holding such situations. He did not allude, for obvious reasons, to what had been said of Prince Talleyrand, but he alluded generally to what had been said of the Representatives of Kings, Potentates, and Powers maintaining intercourse with this country. He regretted much, that they had been attacked—for the first time in his life had he heard them attacked in that House, whose duty it was to treat them with respect—he had heard them, in so many plain words, described as good at ecarté. He did not say there was any thing sarcastic in the observation, but this he would say, that it was a very coarse attack, and was calculated to rankle in their minds, unless it met with the disapprobation of their Lordships, as much as the happiest epigram that the most skilful poet ever penned. There could be no doubt, that the language held would by them be regarded in the light of a marked and decided insult, if it were not at once put down by a unanimous expression of feeling on the part of the Assembly in which it was pronounced. In thus applying a salve to the scratch or irritation—he would not call it wound—so inflicted, he would add, there were none to whom censure of any kind could be less applicable than to the Representatives of foreign Powers in this country; they were men of qualifications of the highest order—of singular endowments—of great acuteness—of large information—of sound and acute judgment; it would be well if their talents in this respect could be caught by some of their Lordships; but it would seem, that this quality of the mind was like some others, a gift bestowed by nature; and, above all, they were men eminent for their courtier-like manners; and well calculated to conciliate, rather than provoke the resentment of men with whom they mixed. The noble and learned Lord, after apologizing for the praise thus drawn from him towards personages so independent of it, went on to say, that he wished to make a single observation on a subject dear to his heart, he meant the preservation of peace. Those, indeed, were not really the most averse from war who took every opportunity of expressing superfluous horror of it; but he felt with the noble Duke, a proud confidence in the power of Great Britain, and was sure, that if in a just cause it became necessary for this country to draw the sword, her resources were ample, fully adequate to any struggle in which necessity might engage her. Did he, therefore, desire to seek cause for any public quarrel? Quite the contrary; but he would not be driven to advise the drawing of the sword by senseless ribaldry, or by any consideration less than absolute necessity; for when once drawn, no man could tell what tides of blood might be shed—what months and years might pass before the sword could be returned to its scabbard. Unless, therefore, a case of the clearest necessity should arise, regarding the honour and the interest of Great Britain, he should esteem it a crime of the deepest dye to draw that sword, which might not be sheathed till the whole of Europe had been devastated, and converted, from the smiling abode of peaceful men into the blood-stained haunt of ferocious murderers.

The Earl of Aberdeen

said, that according to the Protocol which the noble Earl (Grey) had laid on the Table of that House, it was evident that no reasonable objections could be made to the production of the papers which the noble Marquis had asked for. He thought the conduct of the noble Earl and of his friends marked by a want of candour. He would characterize it as un-English, and he might even use more significant terms, for the papers which he required to be officially laid on the Table of the House, had been printed and circulated throughout Europe. From the insular situation of the country, and from the other great advantages which England possessed, she might have taken the lead, instead of the position she now occupied, in all European transactions. He thought Ministers had acted most improperly, unjustly, and without regard to the interests of the country, in the proceedings respecting Portugal and Holland. If any foreigner were to ask him what was the foreign policy of England, he should say, that parties were divided on the subject; but there was one point on which all parties were agreed—namely, to maintain a strict alliance with Portugal and Holland. Notwithstanding this, Ministers had sacrificed Portugal to the tender mercies of a French Admiral. The noble Earl seemed resolved to keep blind to what was passing there; but at length his eyes had been opened on the subject by what had lately occurred, in which that Officer was the principal instrument. The treatment of Holland he knew not in what terms to describe adequately. His Majesty's Government had not only treated that country with neglect, but had been guilty of an abandonment of principle, in violation of solemn treaties and engagements. Their Lordships would do him the justice to recollect, that he had disclaimed, in what he had advanced on former occasions respecting Portugal, all sympathy with that government; but he had invariably maintained, that we were bound to preserve the interests of the people, which were in unison with the interests of this country. This had been the line of argument which he had always taken. He could not but deeply lament the course pursued by Ministers towards Holland. Could the House forget the heroes and patriots of Cornier periods, connected with that country? Were their Lordships indifferent spectators to what was now passing? Could they see a free and intelligent people, united with their Sovereign, so treated? Ministers had much to be condemned for, in the course they had taken. They had acted with great injustice towards Holland. He was anxious to gain the attention of the House for a few minutes, whilst he described the course which had been taken respecting Holland. In doing so he would not enter into a history of the origin and progress of the Belgian Revolution—he would not proceed to inquire how far that Revolution owed its origin to fifteen years of peace, increasing wealth, comforts, and happiness, under the beneficent sway of the king of Holland, or how far it was owing to those free institutions which existed under him, and to which that people had never before been accustomed. Without going into such an inquiry as that, he would say, that it could not be denied that the Revolution in Belgium was the first born of the French Revolution—that as such it possessed still greater claims to pre-eminence, and that to it they might apply, if they pleased, the expression matre pulchrâ filia, pulchrior. Immediately after that event, a separation between Holland and Belgium having become inevitable, the king of the Netherlands called upon the five Powers, who were parties to the creation of the kingdom, to render their advice and assistance, in order to see what course, under these circumstances, it was best to pursue. Accordingly, the Ministers of the five Powers met, pursuant to the provision of the treaty entered into in the year 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, and their first step was, to procure a suspension of arms, in order to stay the effusion of blood. The mediation so undertaken by the five Powers, was accepted by the king of Holland and the Belgians, and the armistice, so recommended, was acceded to by both the parties in the middle of November. On the 20th of December, the Conference, without any communication with Holland, decided, that Belgium was to be erected into an independent State; a decision perhaps premature, and certainly most ungracious in its form and manner. On the 20th of January, the Ministers of the five Powers agreed to lay down articles of separation between the two counties, and which were proposed to both parties for their acceptance. After some difficulties, natural enough, considering the sacrifices he was called on to make, the king of the Netherlands acceded to all the concessions that were demanded; and on the 18th of February he gave in his full and entire adherence to those articles of separation. What, however, was the conduct of the Belgic government? Why, it returned a most insulting answer, and refused to accede to the terms which had been so decided upon. The Conference again met on the 19th of February, and declared, "That it continues to be understood, as it has been from the beginning, that the arrangements fixed by the Protocol of the 20th January, are fundamental and irrevocable. 2ndly. That the independence of Belgium shall not be recognized by the five Powers, except under the condition, and within the limits, which result from the said arrangements." On the 17th of April, the king of the Netherlands still continuing firm in his adherence to the articles of separation, they were again proposed to Belgium for their acceptance, and the Commissioners of the five Powers were directed to inform the Belgian government, that the Conference had come to a decision upon the fundamental principles of the nine first Articles, which were to be considered as irrevocable and unalterable, and according to these Protocols the Conference again decided, that the independence of Belgium should not be recognized but on those principles. On the 10th of May, on the proposition of the French Plenipotentiary, the Conference came to the determination to limit the time to which the uncertainty of acceptance or rejection should endure, and the 1st. of June was stated to be the utmost limit to which they would wait for the adherence of the Belgian government, on which day, if the terms were not agreed upon, an absolute rupture of all relations with the five Powers should take place, the troops of the German Confederation were to enter Luxemburg, and the five Powers were to consider what further was necessary to be done in order to enforce the compliance of the Belgian government. He ought to have mentioned that, on the 21st of May, the Dutch Plenipotentiary gave notice, that the state of things as then existing could not be permitted to endure, and that, if the terms were not accepted by the 1st of June, the king of Holland would consider himself at liberty to act in such a manner as he should consider best for the interests of his kingdom. The 1st of June came; but no information as to the Belgians having accepted the Articles being received, on the 5th of June the Dutch Plenipotentiary inquired of the Ministers of the five Powers what it was their intention to do? At that moment a satisfactory answer was given; the Conference stating, that they adhered to their original determination, and that they were occupied in carrying it into effect. But at that time, however, some new transactions were in progress at Brussels, the success of which was thought by the noble Earl to be of more importance than the fulfilment of his engagements to the king of Holland; namely, the election of Prince Leopold to the Throne of Belgium. After this, the Belgian Deputation arrived in England; and the members of the Conference having determined to receive them, they, in concert with these Deputies, and without, communication with the Dutch Plenipotentiary, drew up eighteen Articles, for the acceptance of both parties, which they substituted for the engagements of the former Protocols. In answer to the remonstrances of the Dutch Ministry, whose suspicions had been excited, these Articles were sent—one of the members of the Conference being the bearer, to the king of the Netherlands; and, at the same time, to the government of Brussels. The king of the Netherlands refused to accept these Articles; and his minister for Foreign Affairs gave his reasons for so doing in a detailed statement, which the noble Earl, as a man of honour and a gentleman, could not have read without burning blushes; for it was impossible to conceive a more triumphant paper than that put forth by M. Verstolk, as to the merit of the claims of the King, his master, and of the justice of his cause, and the complaints which his Majesty the king of Holland was called upon to offer, with respect to the new propositions which were made to him. No situation of embarrassment could have justified the Government of this country in so gross a dereliction of all former engagements—the favourable consideration of which Holland was so particularly entitled to, in consequence of her acceptance of the former terms which were offered, and which had been so arbitrarily drawn up, without any concert with the King, and which he had no power of modifying. Having unconditionally accepted them, he was fully entitled to the support and protection of the Conference. But the sovereignty of King Leopold would not have been popular in itself, and therefore it was thought necessary to have a new set of propositions, which might render him acceptable to the people of Belgium. The king of Holland, he contended, had been most harshly and cruelly treated, though he had acted throughout the whole of these transactions with the utmost degree of fairness, candour, and good faith. The Belgian government accepted the twenty-eight Articles; but with what sort of faith? Before Prince Leopold accepted the Throne of Belgium, Luxemburg was not an object of negotiation. By the 28th Article, indeed, after it was decided that he should be King, it was made a matter of future negotiation—most unjustly, no doubt, but the result was left undecided. But what were the words of M. Lebeau, the now Foreign Minister of the king of Belgium, and who then enjoyed his confidence, and who was his principal adviser in this country—when he alluded to Luxemburg—when he announced to the Congress the coming of King Leopold? M. Lebeau said, with respect to Luxemburg—"You keep Luxemburg. I have for guarantee your right, the valour of the Belgians, and the word of the Prince. Yes, Gentlemen, the word of the Prince; for the moment is come to tell all. The Prince is determined to keep Luxemburg by every possible means; he makes it his own affair; it is for him a question of honour. Besides, does not he well know that Luxemburg is necessary to him? Without this province I defy any Prince to reign six months in Belgium. Gentlemen, the Prince will, and shall have Luxemburg. He has declared that he will make war to have Luxemburg and Maestricht." When the king of Belgium arrived in Brussels, it was well known that he received the deputies from Luxemburg and Limburg with particular favour, and that, in fact, he had since acted up to what M. Lebeau had announced. But the noble and learned Lord talked of Luxemburg as not being any part of the possessions of Holland. True; it was the property of Holland, as a member of the Germanic Confederation. But was Limburg no part of Holland? was Maestricht no part of Holland? and were they to leave Holland in a worse condition with regard to territory there, than she was left at the Treaty of Minister. Much had been said of the last letter which had been addressed to the Conference, by the Ambassador of the king of Holland; but he would say, that the conduct of the king of Holland should be viewed as a whole, and that as a whole it was quite free from the imputations which the noble Earl had thought proper to cast upon it. The king of Holland had been deserted, when he ought to have been upheld—censured for his rashness, when he might have received credit for his firmness and patriotism—it was not to him a matter of surprise, that under a sense of continued injuries, he had felt it necessary to have recourse to arms. A reference to the whole course of the negotiations, from their commencement up to the present time, afforded a complete proof of that fact, and presented a full vindication of the conduct of the king of Holland. He would maintain, that the king of Holland had done nothing now, of which he had not given previous notice to the five Powers, through his Ambassadors, and more especially in the note of the 22nd of June, from the Dutch Plenipotentiary to the Conference, in which that Ambassador stated, that he was directed by his Sovereign to inform them, that any individual who should accept the Throne, without the Belgians, in the first instance, accepting the Protocols, must be looked upon by him as an enemy. On such grounds, and after such previous notice, it, could not be denied, that the king of Holland was fairly justified in commencing hostilities. The last Ambassador that the king of Holland had sent to the Conference, he had sent at the invitation of the Conference itself, and in the letter of that Minister, to which so much allusion had been made, he directly stated, that such was the case; and he further mentioned, that his Majesty was at the same time determined to assert his right by military means. The language of the Minister was:—"His Majesty is determined to support the negotiation by his military means; a determination become doubly imperative, since the late events have taken place in Belgium, where we have seen a Prince possess himself of the Sovereignty, without having previously fulfilled the conditions fixed by the Conference in their 12th and 19th Protocols; and who has sworn, without restriction, to a Constitution derogatory to the territorial rights of his Majesty and of Holland." Taking this last notice, in company with the previous declarations of the Dutch government, into account, he would assert, that it was an absurd mockery to say, that the king of Holland had not given full notice of his intention to enforce his rights by having recourse to arms. There was not, in fact, a shadow of proof of bad faith on the part of the king of Holland. On the contrary, he had a right to expect that the five Powers would co-operate with him, in asserting and maintaining his claim to the possession of Luxemburg. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had spoken in terms of condemnation of attacking a defenceless neighbour without notice; but that condemnation could not apply to the king of Holland, for the Dutch government had given full notice of its intentions to Belgium. He maintained, that when they took the whole circumstances into consideration, there was not a shadow of foundation for a breach of faith on the part of the king of Holland in the whole of the transaction. In point of fact, too, there was no general armistice between the parties. From the impracticable conduct of the Belgian Deputies, it was found impossible to conclude any; but there was a suspension of arms and a local armistice at Antwerp. He repeated, therefore, he was not surprised that the king of Holland had again recourse to arms when he found himself insulted and betrayed by those who pretended to have interfered for his protection, and when he found every engagement entered into with him openly violated. He confessed, that it did the heart good, in the midst of so much injustice, to see how justly the rectitude of that Sovereign's conduct was ap- preciated by his subjects—to observe with how much ardour they were disposed to support him—because they felt he had proved himself deserving of their loyalty and love. It was, therefore, with the highest satisfaction that he heard from the noble Lord there were some hopes, that the misunderstanding would be adjusted, and the mischief, which had already, unfortunately, been the consequence of past events, prevented from spreading into a much wider circle. He might here take leave to say, that he regretted much the Prince of Coburg had been persuaded from any quarter to accept the Throne of Belgium. When the Prince drew back from the fulfilment of another engagement of the same description, he recollected well, that the noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) held an opinion different from some of his friends, and expressed his satisfaction that the Prince had, in his peculiar situation, avoided such a cause of foreign entanglement. Even then, although fully sensible of the difficulties in which the course adopted by the Prince involved the government, he was disposed to agree with him; but how much more must he be of that opinion now, when the Prince had been persuaded to place himself in a situation which was likely to prove the most injurious to the interests of this country, that could possibly have been devised by any of its enemies? The sine qua non of all arrangements with respect to the future Sovereign of that country should have been, that they were to choose a person whose elevation would not be likely to embroil England with its ancient ally of Holland. And yet, the first step taken by the new King had produced that effect. The nomination had, in truth, every disadvantage that could be imagined. His royal highness must naturally look up to France as his ally and protector; and although the noble and learned Lord had expressed a fear that the Prince would not sufficiently separate himself from England, he apprehended, that the Prince had already removed all alarms on that ground, and proved how closely he found it necessary to connect himself with France. In his humble opinion, the new King should have applied to all the Powers of the Conference, and left to them, rather than to France, the decision of the question at issue with the king of Holland; for if there was any point of more importance than another, it was the preservation of perfect unanimity among all the parties. Near, however, as the political connection of France and Belgium had become, according to M. Lebeau, who doubtless was in the secret, that connection was, through the means of a family tie, to become much closer. With this, however, he had nothing to do, except to observe, that it must still further affect this country and its connection with Holland; for Holland was with him the object of true national importance—Belgium he left wholly out of the account. He feared much, however, that the confidence and affection of the people of Holland—the firmest and the most faithful friends of this country—was gone, never to return. At no one period since the times of Charles the 2nd, had there been the same feelings of disgust and hatred engendered in the minds of the Dutch against England; and to such a height had it risen, that our Ambassador at the Hague, one of the most amiable and respected men he ever met with, had been actually shunned by every man, in consequence of the opinions entertained of the conduct of England by the people. The impression in Holland had indeed become general, that England did not desire to separate Holland from Belgium, but to annex Holland as a province to Belgium. He was one of the last men in that House who would attempt to throw any obstacles in the way of the negotiations, or do anything which could impede their successful progress; but if that House did not express an opinion with respect to them before the present proceedings were consummated, he would ask the noble Earl, at what time they were to express such opinions? When he saw all sympathy withdrawn from one of the most ancient Allies of this country, and every means taken to promote the success of the unconstitutional encroachments of a Revolutionary State, he could not, however, avoid expressing his opinion, that the Government was pursuing a course unjust, impolitic, unstatesmanlike, and un-English.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, that he should not attempt to follow the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, through the very discursive speech which he had addressed to their Lordships—a speech which had been a regular Will-o'-the-Wisp, and in which the noble and learned Lord had attempted to draw off their Lordships' attention, and the attention of those per- sons to whom it might be hereafter made public, from that most interesting topic which was the object of discussion for that evening—a topic which had been considered, up to the present moment, as one most essential, and even vital, to the interests of this country. The entry of the French army into Belgium was a matter of the gravest importance to all Europe. If the Ministers should allow the French army to take possession of the Texel and Helvoetsluys, their doing so would be almost as pregnant with danger to this country as if they were permitted to take possession of Plymouth and Portsmouth. There was no part of our foreign policy, he would maintain, which was so essentially interwoven with the interests of this country, as the independence of Holland. The noble and learned Lord had asked, were they to go to war about every petty squabble on the Continent? But was it a petty squabble which carried 50,000 French troops into Belgium at the request of the sovereign? Was that no subject for alarm? Was it with the consent of the Conference, or even after a consultation with the other Powers, that the French government had taken such a step as that? The king of Belgium might, perhaps, have waited for a few days longer before he made the application which he had made to France; but his fears probably urged him to do so at once, and in making his application to France, there was no doubt that he consulted his own safety. At all events, by applying to France in the first instance, the king of Belgium had rendered himself free from the objection, which, in the opinion of the noble and learned Lord on the Wool-sack, might have previously attached to him—namely, that of his too great leaning towards, or too great a connexion with, this country. The noble and learned Lord had spoken of the inability of Prussia and Austria to go to war, in the present condition of their dominions, and in the general condition of Europe; but the noble and learned Lord was quite mistaken on that subject. The armies of both Austria and Prussia, if unfortunately they should be wanted for service, were never in a more complete or efficient state than at present. It was not by thus depreciating the resources of the other Powers of Europe that war could be avoided. That was an undignified style which had never been used by former Governments of this country. They always held a firm and manly tone, and the tone of despondency which now appeared to be adopted, was not, in his opinion, calculated to uphold the character of this country in its negotiations. It appeared to him, that the noble and learned Lord had most unjustly assailed and insulted the king of Holland, who was our ancient ally, and whose only fault had been a little too much impatience—beyond what could be characterised as prudent. He thought, that such an attack, on the part of the noble and learned Lord was, to say the least of it, in very bad taste. The noble and learned Lord had exulted in the resources of this country, but was the possession of such resources any reason why we should insult, injure, and go to war with one of our most ancient allies? They had been told on a former evening, by a noble Lord connected with his Majesty's Government, that Portugal could no longer rely on the assistance of England. Was the same to be said now of another ancient ally of this country? Since the accession of the present Ministers to power, what was the feeling of Europe with regard to us? Why, that, we were abandoning all our allies—that we were crouching to France—that we were yielding up our allies to their enemies, and that we were alone occupied at home in attempting to revolutionize our own country. It was somewhat amusing, to hear noble Lords on the other side of the House ridicule the authority of newspapers. It should not be forgotten, that but a few weeks ago, the same noble Lords called the newspapers, not the authors of their measures, which they might have done without any great departure from the truth, but they called them the echoes of the public, feeling; and they appealed to them for a vindication of their own actions. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, on the occasion of the motion which had been brought forward in that House some weeks ago, with regard to a newspapers, had designated newspapers the echoes of the public voice. His Majesty's Ministers would now see how little they had got by following such echoes, and how little they had gained by becoming the echoes of such echoes. In conclusion, the noble Lord begged to say, that as it was stated, that the negotiations were not yet concluded, he should not vote for the Motion, or for the production of the pa- pers in question. At the same time he wished to impress upon Ministers the absolute necessity of bringing their negotiations to a termination as speedily as possible, for he must say, that he considered the policy pursued by the present Government as most mischievous—tending to destroy those barriers in one part of Europe, which, at the expense of blood and treasure, former Governments had built up—leaving Portugal despoiled and helpless, and forbid to look with confidence to its ancient ally—and tending to compromise the peace and safety of this country, and of all the countries in Europe. They were about to depart from that line of policy which had been pursued towards Holland ever since the time of King William, and which had been considered, up to the present period as essential to the interests of this country, and much he feared, that such a great change from the best established maxims would be attended by the most dangerous consequence to the national welfare.

Lord Holland

would not follow the noble Earl who had last sat down, through all the topics on which he had touched, but he could not help remarking, that that noble Earl, after having complained of what he called "the discursive speech" of his noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, had furnished by his own speech a complete example of such a species of oration. The subject of debates which had been more particularly noticed by noble Lords on the other side of the House, related to points of discussion in which his Majesty's Ministers were at present precluded from indulging, and those noble Lords were not to take for granted all that they had stated, because the present was not the proper time for refuting it. He accordingly could not follow the noble Earls through the various topics advanced in their speeches. He admitted the classical knowledge of the one, and the great power of sarcasm and invective possessed by the other; he would not engage in any warfare with the noble Lords. The noble Earl (Carnarvon) might indeed have displayed extraordinary ability, and without being guilty, at least in his own opinion, of making a discursive speech, he might have repelled declamation with sarcasm; but those who would attack that noble Lord, would find that they waged a war, from which they could derive neither advantage nor fame. The noble Earl said, the Ministers threw themselves upon the discontented; they did not throw themselves upon the noble Lord. The noble Lord said, they were endeavouring to maintain themselves in power by removing the cause of discontent, whenever or by whomsoever it might be expressed; the noble Lord would find, that they would not remove it as far as it related to him. He had also said, that the removing of the causes of discontent was the way to create excitement in favour of Ministers, but the noble Earl knew well, that in all instances his Majesty's Ministers had not tried to get the discontented on their side. The noble Earl had referred to something which, on a former evening, had fallen from him with regard to Portugal. Owing to the state of his health, he had not been able, on the evening of the discussion with regard to Portugal, to give an explanation of the passage in his speech, which he noticed was then misunderstood. He had been subsequently obliged, therefore, to resort to a means to which he seldom had recourse, for the purpose of explaining it. He was ready to admit, that on account of the nervousness which sometimes affected him while speaking, he was not always able to retain exactly what he had said himself, or what had been said by others. He had never said, however, on the occasion to which he referred, that Portugal could not rely on the aid of this country. What he said was, that it could not rely on the aid of this country exclusively. He stated on that occasion distinctly, that such would be the case, and what he meant then to say was, that in consequence of our late conduct with regard to Portugal, we had estranged that party there which was attached to England from us, and that now, as Portugal would be likely to lean to two Powers—England and France—it was not likely that she would continue to lean exclusively on us. With regard to the subject before their Lordships, he must say, that the speeches of the two noble Lords who had preceded him, appeared to him diametrically opposite in their views and arguments, and he and his noble friends might spare themselves the trouble of answering either, for one of them had answered the other. The noble Lords in Opposition, instead of moving for papers by patches and piecemeal as they proposed, should at once have moved instructions to Government as to the mode in which these negotiations ought to be conducted, or else have moved a vote of censure on his Majesty's Ministers. Their present course he could not forbear designating as very foolish or very mischievous. He did not intend to impute bad motives to any noble Lord, but he would say, that the speeches which they had delivered that evening, meant nothing but war, war, war, from the very commencement to the conclusion. They absolutely meant nothing short of immediate war—not a war on the narrow grounds which they had ostensibly suggested, but a desolating and revolutionary war, of which no man could foretell the end. And was there an honest man—was there an Englishman who considered the consequences of such a war, who did not feel, that everything ought to be done to prevent a cannon being fired in Europe? for, doubt there could be none, that the war which ensued would be on the one side revolutionary, and destroying in its progress all who now conducted it; and on the other side, anti-revolutionary, compromising all the governments of Europe, and commencing a struggle, the end of which no eye could possibly attain? In moving for those miserable pipers, it was quite clear the object of the noble Lords was, to create excitement in Courts, in individuals, and throughout the country. The fact was, the noble Lords were thirsting for war [no, no!]. If they denied this, it must be said at the expense of their understanding. If the motion of the noble Lords succeeded in occasioning a change of Government, the inevitable consequences would be war. And if the noble Lords had not a change of Government in their contemplation, he could only say, that their motion was exceedingly ill-managed. With respect to the dependence of the Low Countries, he must remark, that military authorities, inferior only to the noble Duke (Wellington), and all statesmen, had agreed, that the Low Countries were not capable of maintaining a large army, but had a means of defence in their peculiar situation. It was clear, that they must always lean upon some greater Power; but a strong antipathy had always existed between the Dutch and Belgian provinces; it was not possible to amalgamate them into one state. He, therefore, much doubted the policy of uniting them originally, and he maintained they could not be reconciled. In conclusion, he said, the motion of the noble Lord had no parliamentary or practical object. The noble Earls had talked of their having used strong and dangerous language at that side of the House; but he asked whose was the fault? The object of the noble Lord's Motion was three-fold—first, to provoke those on the Ministerial side of the House, to indulge in language which might be used as a handle against them; secondly, to urge Ministers into a premature discussion upon points, with which it was inconvenient, and difficult, and dangerous, for Ministers to expatiate; and thirdly, to get rid of the Reform Bill.

The Duke of Wellington

, in explanation, declared, that he had not entertained the idea, that after what had taken place, Holland and Belgium could be reconnected. There were, however, several ways of settling the separation, and one was, that of placing Belgium under the government of a Prince of the House of Nassau. He would not now enter upon the subjects to which the noble Lord had alluded; many opportunities would occur, and he would be at all times happy to discuss these points with the noble Lord. The only observation he would make was, that he was thoroughly convinced the noble Lord had not read all the treaties.

Lord Holland

felt indebted to the noble Duke for his candid explanation; it was no more, however, than was to have, been expected from him. He begged to take that opportunity of saying, that by making it so explicitly and distinctly, he had done himself great credit, and rendered the House great service.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, that after the long friendship and intimacy which had subsisted between him and the noble Lord, he certainly had not expected to be attacked by him with the extraordinary degree of acerbity' the noble Lord displayed that night. He would not, however, suffer himself to be led away by that. He would not forget the old kindly feelings which had subsisted between them—he would not forget the esteem and friendship with which, for so many years he had regarded the noble Lord, but that, any discontent, actuated his conduct upon the present occasion, or had ever done so during the thirty-seven years he had been a Member of Parliament, he, in as strong terms as he might possibly employ, did positively deny. And if any person present could assert it, let him stand forward and prove it of him. As to the cheering yells which accompanied the unkind remark of the noble Lord, he considered them ungenerous, or he might almost say, ungentleman-like. When he said, the Ministers had thrown themselves upon the revolutionary and discontented of this country—and when the retaliation upon him, that he was one of the discontented, was cheered after a mariner so unparliamentary, he received it with the contempt and scorn it merited. He had been attacked in a very unfair manner. During the thirty-seven years he had been a Member of Parliament, he never had received any thing from any Minister, for himself or any relative, nor any pledge or promise. The noble Lords with whom he had long acted, in support of the cause of religious liberty, would do him the justice to bear witness, that he had always been opposed to extensive Reform, considering that it was merely another name for revolution. He had acted conscientiously when he supported the great principle of religious freedom; and he acted conscientiously in the course he was then pursuing. What he felt strongly he would always strongly express, and notwithstanding the unkind taunts of the noble Lord, and the ungenerous and unparliamentary cheers of the noble Lords opposite, he would not be driven from what he esteemed to be the path of duty.

The Duke of Richmond

begged to ask the noble Lord who had just sat down, whether, on a former occasion, at the dissolution of the last Parliament, he had not himself made use of personal expressions towards his Majesty's Ministers? Believing the noble Earl did, he must observe, that the noble Earl had no right, when he remembered this, to complain of vituperative language, or object to cheering.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, that the noble Duke had no right to complain of the expressions he alluded to. They were used hypothetically, and applied to no individual. On its being hinted, while he was speaking, that Parliament was to be instantly dissolved, he had expressed his disbelief of the report, because the person who gave such advice would be hung upon one of the horns of a dilemma, neither of which applied to the present Government. It could be no insult to any man to say, he did not believe he would commit an act which would expose him to the charge of folly or of crime, but if the noble Duke wished to ask him, whether he now held the same opinion, and wished for an answer to his question, he regretted that, according to parliamentary usage, and consistently with the forms and dignity of their Lordships' House, he was prevented from giving him the answer it would properly deserve.

The Marquis of Londonderry

replied, that after the patient hearing which their Lordships had already accorded him, he would not, at that late hour, add much to what had been already said on this subject. He did not regret having brought forward his Motion, because it would give the public an opportunity of knowing their Lordships' sentiments, and would tend more than any thing else to open the eyes of the country to these most important proceedings. As the noble Earl opposite had stated, that he felt it would be injurious to the public service to produce these papers, it was, of course, not his intention to press the Motion. He must, however, be permitted to make one or two observations; and first, with respect to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, who had thought fit to allude to his brains, and to make some observations upon them, he begged to assure him, without putting himself in competition with him, that he should never be deterred by such observations, from doing what he considered to be his duty, as long as he had the honour of sitting in their Lordships' House. That noble and learned Lord, however, should be made to know, to use a homely phrase, that there were very many noble Lords in that House, who would always be ready to give him as good as he brought. At least, they would retort to the best of their abilities, when he indulged in satire and sarcasm; and for himself he would say, that the noble Lord would in vain seek to intimidate him. Although he did not pretend to lay claim to the stupendous talents, and flourishing powers of oratory, with which the noble and learned Lord was gifted, he would not sit still to be fired at, but would return shot for shot. He considered that he was fully justified in making the remarks he had ventured to address to their Lordships, on the Foreign Ministers at his Majesty's court, of whom he must take leave to declare, that he did not mean to speak disrespectfully. He had no doubt they were competent to the performance of the duties imposed upon them, and he must also beg to deny having made any disrespectful observa- tion upon the relations of the noble Earl opposite, or any person connected with him, but when that noble Earl referred to a lamented relative of his, he had the right, at least, to call the attention of the public to certain documents, which were of importance, considering the individual from whom they proceeded. With regard to the appointment of the individual who had been alluded to, he assured the House, and he assured the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, that no person esteemed the private character of that individual more highly than he did, and he rejoiced that he had been appointed to the situation he now held, but he had had a fair right, considering the previous remarks, to make any observations he pleased with respect to the appointment of two of the noble Earl's relatives. With the permission of their Lordships, he would withdraw his motion.

Motion accordingly withdrawn.