SETTLEMENT OF GREECE.

HL Deb 12 February 1830 vol 22 cc395-429

The order of the day being read, Lord Holland

said— I was, I confess, my Lords, disappointed and surprised on the first day of the Session, to learn from the Lords Commissioners Speech that the pacification and final settlement of Greece was not yet in such a state as to enable his Majesty's Ministers to lay the papers connected with this subject before Parliament. If I were at first disappointed, a very little reflection, in my own mind, allayed my disappointment; and this disappointment was more allayed when I further reflected—considering, as I do, that the proceedings, in this case, were anomalous; that the delay might be considered as an auspicious circumstance, tending to make the final settlement of Greece more advantageous to Europe in general and to this country, and more honourable to his Majesty's Crown. And why, my Lords? For this reason. The unexpected delay occurring in the completion of these arrangements just at the meeting of Parliament, enabled and invited Parliament to express its opinion, as no explanation has been afforded it of the state of the negociation, as to the principles on which it will consider the settlement of Greece advantageous to this country, and honourable to his Majesty's Crown; and I now call on you, my Lords, to seize this opportunity of declaring your sentiments and recording your opinions. The Motion with which I shall conclude, will be to call on your Lordships to admit those principles which I stated on a former evening; and they are so true, that in them all your Lordships must concur. At least, they are so obvious to my mind, that there is no Peer, I believe—and, indeed, no man of sound mind—who will not acquiesce in them; and it will not be necessary for me to take up much of your Lordships' time in bringing you to agree to the sound principles contained in my resolution. But it is not enough to show that these principles are true—your Lordships must also be satisfied that the situation and circumstances of England, as well as the duty and interest of the Crown, make it right and proper now to act on them. I must fairly acknowledge that it is not sufficient to induce Parliament to adopt a proposition, unless it be also shewn that it be expedient. I readily admit, that more is requisite than to prove the truth of my proposition. My resolution may contain sound principles, just and prudent in their application; but it may not be necessary or useful that Parliament should at this time say anything about them. I am bound, I admit, not only to prove that these principles are just, but that your Lordships would, by the expression of your opinion, promote the advantage of the Crown and be of use to the country. To this part of my subject, therefore, I shall more particularly direct your attention. My Lords, in doing this, I am aware that calling on your Lordships to express an opinion on this subject, implies a degree of distrust in his Majesty's advisers, either in the intention or capacity of those intrusted with the the conduct of the negotiation. I fully acknowledge, and, moreover, I will own, that my distrust rests on the grounds of general observation on the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, which observation does not give me confidence in them, particularly as to their conduct in our foreign relations; that it is from distrust—from distrust founded on observing the conduct of his Majesty's Government, particularly their conduct in managing our negociations—and I feel that it would not be fair in me, it would be disingenuous, not to speak explicitly and openly and freely on the subject. I think, in general, it is neither very Parliamentary, nor very fit nor proper, to make the reasons why an individual distrusts his Majesty's Ministers, a subject of discussion. But it is fair that I should state my opinions sincerely; and, therefore, it is necessary that I should say a word or two on the subject. In doing so, (and I mean not to speak but with sincerity), I may say many things which are irksome and disagreeable to particular persons. But I can assure your Lordships, that in expressing myself bluntly, honestly, and sincerely, I have no intention to offend any individual. I can assure your Lordships, and your Lordships will believe me, that in expressing distrust of his Majesty's advisers, as to their foreign policy, it is not done with a view to disturb them in the possession of power, or to establish any systematic opposition to them. To this Government I do not profess any direct or great hostility, nor do I give it any direct or systematic support: to remove them from office is not my object. I gladly acknowledge that his Majesty's present Government has on one important subject done the State great service, I am ready to acknowledge this—though I do not feel that overflowing gratitude which some persons express—but, I may repeat, I can assure your Lordships that I have no wish to place other persons in the situation of the present Ministers; for I expect that they will yet do greater services. Though I distrust these Ministers, I do not move my resolution with any view to remove them from their situation. To the present Government I feel an obligation; because whatever may be their opinions and systems, when they see that the opinions and feelings of the people and of the country are made up against them, they give up their own system, which is a course that deserves commendation. When they have ascertained the temper of Parliament and the feelings of the people, whatever line of policy they may before have resolved to act on, they manifest a laudable deference—they discard all their former professions—they turn round against all their former precepts; and, with a justice and moderation I admire, they do that which is right with a calmness and firmness I can never too much applaud. But when not forced into any particular line of conduct—when there are many paths before them—when, from the inactivity or apathy of the public they are allowed to choose their own course, they generally choose that which is wrong. I have no hostility to the Ministers—I do not wish to put others in their place—I have no such views; I do not "assault" his Majesty's Government; but I wish, from seeing what has been their conduct, that Parliament should admonish the Ministers, and by their voice direct them in that path from which, unless they are admonished, they are sure to go wrong. It is on this ground that I think it necessary, at this the eleventh hour, to call on Parliament to admonish the Ministers, and direct them in what they have to perform. To the first objection which might be made to my Motion, therefore, I have this Reply:—It must be granted to me in argument, that the Ministers do need the interference of Parliament; and, also, that when Parliament interferes, they take the correction willingly—they swallow their physic like good boys, and deserve praise. [laughter] It is necessary, however, that your Lordships should enforce good advice; and it will be impossible for you to adopt my resolution without finding the Ministers fully prepared to admit and adopt it. My Lords, I rest my objection to the conduct of the Ministers upon the results of that conduct in foreign affairs. In the first place, I cannot help remarking, that whatever may be the final pacification of Greece, if it shall be such as I am most anxious to see—if that unfortunate country shall at length have a good Government; it is obvious that if this can now be accomplished, it is demonstrable in argument that the final pacification of that country might have been obtained heretofore more to the honour and advantage of Great Britain, and with less risk to the tranquillity of England, and less risk to the tranquillity of Europe. Immediately after the battle of Navarino, and before the rupture between Russia and Turkey, and before the successes of Russia in Roumelia and Bulgaria, it is obvious that it might have been then achieved by the exertions of the three confederated powers in a better and more efficacious manner than after the war between the two powers, and after the success of their ally in Bulgaria and Roumelia. This is so plain a proposition that it is not necessary to prove it. It is merely a statement of facts of common and plain sense evident to every man. It is only necessary to call to your Lordships' recollection how his Majesty's Government stood at the period when the noble Duke made his first appearance in this House as First Lord of the Treasury. I must call him the First Lord of the Treasury, as that other name sounds, in my opinion, neither English nor constitutional; but if I must use it—when he made his first appearance in the House as Premier, what was the situation then I ask, of Great Britain? She then stood as she always ought to stand—noble and commanding. She was, if not above all her compeers, not excelled by any—she stood the first and foremost of the great powers which had entered into a great confederacy for the benefit of mankind, and for preserving the repose of Europe. And what were the circumstances which placed her in this situation? First, France, which we must always consider as most emulous of our glory—I will not call her our rival—had only recently acceded to the confederacy, induced to do so more by an unwillingness not to be of the party than from any great and comprehensive views of the general good. Russia had consented, and great praise is due to the Government of that day, and to the noble Duke for the part he took in signing the protocol. Russia consented to make a sacrifice of her own interests to our views, and shewed the great value she set on our co-operation by entering into a cordial and friendly alliance. My Lords, our possessions in the Mediterranean, in the vicinity of the theatre of war, gave us a command—gave us a considerable degree of influence—more than either of the other confederates. But above all things, the great respect which the Greeks had never ceased to profess for this country through their long five-years' struggle, secured Great Britain a paramount influence in the confederacy. It was seen in many respects by Russia and France—it induced them to place their squadrons under the command of a gallant English Admiral—and they had reaped the advantage they foresaw—which every body would reap who placed confidence in a British Admiral—they reaped glory and conquest. That Admiral is a great commander. He is a man who will stand high in the pages of our history, and will be spoken of hereafter with great honour. That commander achieved a great victory with an inferior force; with a force even ludicrously inferior he long baffled a superior force; and finally, by as successful an action as is on record of the British navy, he achieved a glorious victory, which elated all the other parties, and seemed likely immediately to promote the views of the three confederated powers concerned in the engagement. Such was then our situation. Look, my Lords, at the contrast now. Let us look at the language and conduct of the Government of the present day. In the first place, as to their language. When the news of that victory reached England, your Lordships will recollect that the present Cabinet had recently been formed, and when the country was to be informed of this victory the vocabulary was ransacked for an ungenerous word to express distrust and disgust of that victory. That word introduced it into the King's Speech that they might tarnish the laurels of the only British commander who had, in modern times led a combined and confederated was even put into the sacred mouth of his Majesty; the Ministers introduced it into the King's Speech—he said the Ministers, for the word was theirs—they force to as great a victory as I ever recollect in our naval annals. It was only in this country that this victory was called "untoward." The French King spoke of it in very different language; and the Emperor of Russia distinctly and directly approved of it. The Ministers called it "untoward." But why, when it was so well calculated to promote the great end the confederates had in view, and even bring the affairs of Greece to a happy conclusion? In this manner, then, my Lords, were the prospects of Greece blighted—its hopes disappointed, and its expectations frustrated by that single word "untoward." I am not, as I have already said, in the possession of any papers: neither have I any information by which I could lay before you the exact succession of the dates of those events which I have mentioned, or to which I may hereafter have occasion to refer. It is not from any official documents, or from any thing more than common rumour, that I state a blockade of the Dardanelles was proposed; but whether I have it, or have it not from such sources, it is a matter of public notoriety, announced in the newspapers. In this it was understood the British Administration acquiesced; Russia was the active party, France did not object. But it was maintained that the permanent blockade was not to be agreed to; for the Turks would be more likely to yield to the wishes of the three allied powers, if they would only sit still with their hands before them, and let those said Turks commit every conceivable cruelty they chose upon those unfortunate beings whom they thought proper to designate as their subjects. There was a difficulty about this proposed blockade of the Dardanelles. If it had originated with the English, all that difficulty would have been removed; and if Great Britain had only been true to its ancient ally, as the Turks were called, the weakness and humiliation of the Turks would not have been exposed—not that I feel, I confess, as much regret at the misfortunes of the Ottomans as perhaps other noble Lords now in this House, Amongst other causes of regret arising from the manner in which this extraordinary course of public policy has involved us is, that whereas we might have received the confidence and gratitude of Russia in the exercise of the discretion intrusted to us, we have, by an opposite policy from that which common sense and common prudence dictated, given her reason to suppose that we entertain against her a secret enmity, and thus added further causes of excitement to that hostile temper—if such exist—which it would have been for our honour and advantage to use every exertion to allay. But though we talked much of our ancient ally, our language almost the next moment was of the most discouraging character—the whole of our conduct, both to the Turks and the Greeks, was such as both were entitled to complain of—our language to the Greeks at the most critical moment was cold and freezing, sufficient to damp and chill the most ardent spirit. It reminds me of the hacknied passage of Virgil—as if profane hands were never to touch the symbol of wisdom— Ex illo fluere ac retro sublapsa referri Spes Danaûm. It then seemed as if the Greeks were in a worse situation than before. The noble Duke said no troops should be sent to them; but then they replied, if you do not send us troops, send us money. To this his answer was, practically, you shall have neither—no troops shall enter the country. But France and Russia advanced, saying to England, though you do not send troops, or send money, allow us to do it; instantly thereupon Great Britain interposes, saying, that to assent to any such principle as that one or two members of a triple alliance should act without the privity and consent of the third, was not to be for a moment endured; that to make such a proposition was nothing less than to propose the utter destruction of the whole treaty; it would be, the British Government alleged, contrary to the words and spirit of the bond. I do not know but that there is some colour for giving to the treaty that interpretation. It was perfectly true, that if one party obstinately held out, the others in good faith were not at liberty to move an inch—they must act together, or not at all; but what was to prevent one of the parties, by consent, enabling the others to do what the occasion demanded? Why should England say no money and no troops are to be sent put to Greece, because I am not in a con- dition to send either? Here, then, was England assuming to herself the harsh and disagreeable office of saying to a poorer and a weaker country—one that had scarcely yet assumed the form of a State—True, you are in distress and difficulty—you are struggling with powerful enemies—you have looked up to me in an especial manner for protection and countenance in the hour of your adversity; but from me you shall receive none—not only will I not advance you a single shilling, nor send you one man for your protection, but I will interfere to prevent others doing so, however willing they might be; and willing they were, but England forbade it. At one time she held one language, at another time she adopted a different tone—she went through every note in the gamut; no instrument could play so many tunes. It was in vain that her allies proposed to send troops. No, said the noble Duke—not a man shall move. The French said, send your own troops. The noble Duke said, no. Then let us. Oh! that would be ten times worse—[No, no! from the Duke of Wellington]. I see the noble Duke denies my statement; and from the eagerness with which he does so, I am, I suppose, to conclude, that though wrong in that, I am right in all else, seeing that up to this time he has not expressed the slightest dissent. At length troops were sent; and when they arrived, our commander in the Mediterranean immediately, with the highest judgment and promptitude, took advantage of that favourable occurrence to negociate with the Pacha of Egypt, with a view to effect the recall of his barbarous troops from the Morea, and a treaty for their evacuation of that territory was signed; but the ink with which that treaty was signed had scarcely time to dry when that gallant officer was superseded in his command and recalled. The moment the French troops landed, Ibrahim Pacha quitted the Morea. Therefore the assertion was perfectly well founded that the French had cleared the Morea. But all that time a horrible warfare was going on in other parts of Greece, and the commander who had endeavoured to rescue Athens and the other districts exposed to that warfare, was recalled by the British Government. In the meanwhile an earnest remonstrance on the part of Greece was forwarded to Paris, but the effect of that was defeated. I will not say whether it was right or wrong, but this I will gay, that it produced a withering influence upon the victory at Navarin; it distracted the councils of the Greeks—it estranged their minds from that particular country which they had chosen for their ally and protector—that country which, at the moment most important to their success, recalled the gallant commander who had done them the highest services they had ever experienced at the hands of foreigners. I need not tell your Lordships that this had a most ruinous effect upon the fortunes of anew State endeavouring to establish itself in Europe. If it had been encouraged and supported as it ought, its original predilections and attachment to this country cherished, how different would have been the result, and how advantageous to England, I will leave your Lordships to judge. But Russia stepped in, and it was not with the most tardy, and, if I may so speak, unwilling submission that England admitted an interference obviously repugnant to the feelings of her Government. Was that, I put it to your Lordships, the conduct which ought to have been pursued by the Ministers of a great powerful and benevolent monarch, mediating in a conflict between violence and barbarism on the one side, and a suffering and Christian people on the other? In coming forward to censure the conduct which Ministers have pursued on this occasion, and throughout the whole of this interesting contest, I admit that I am bound to shew, by means of indisputable facts and just reasoning, that the conduct they have pursued is not worthy a great nation, or one professing to act upon principles of good faith; and I trust that, so far as I have gone, I have succeeded; and I expect that in what I have to go through I shall not fail to establish the positions for which I contend. I admit that we were bound to Turkey to a certain extent—that I acknowledge is true; and it is equally true, to adopt the language of a noble Lord when the Address was moved—that I am no lover of the Turk, but I am a lover of good faith—and I am a lover of fair dealing and of honourable character—and I never can bring myself to think that it is consistent with the honour and character of Great Britain to have behaved even to Turkey as she has done. Has not her conduct been that of deceitful and hollow friendship? Has not England towards Turkey been guilty of base and pusillanimous desertion? Has she not shrunk from the support of her ally in the moment of adversity and dis- tress? On that memorable day, when the noble Duke took his seat in this House as First Lord of the Treasury, it was stated to us as historical truth that the Turk was our ancient ally, and not only our ancient ally, but one, the integrity of whose empire and dominions we were bound by the ties of interest and the faith of treaties to maintain. Yes, my Lords, that the maintenance of that empire in Europe was essential to the balance of Europe; and finally, that it was alike our duty and our interest to maintain that empire in such a situation as that it should be capable of defending itself. Towards the close of the same session similar language was held by the noble Secretary. He, indeed, did not dwell upon the antiquity of the alliance—there his reputation would have been at stake; as President of the Antiquarian Society he was not forward to contend for the antiquity of the alliance, for he had archives to refer to, and possibly he there found that this most ancient alliance was only of twenty or thirty years' standing. Still the noble Secretary, though discreetly suppressing any allusion to the remote origin of this alliance, repeated as emphatically as the noble Duke had done, that it was essential to the balance of Europe that there should not be any diminution of the power of the Turk, or any diminution of his influence in the affairs of Europe; and that it was the duty of his Majesty's advisers to do all in their power to prevent that diminution.

I will not waste the time of your Lordships with inquiries, at this time of day, into the justice or the folly of those opinions, for facts have before now pretty fully disclosed their true character as a policy unknown to the practice of British statesmen, and decidedly opposed to the dicta of all the great men of the last century. However, such were the avowed opinions of the responsible advisers of the Crown, and it now remains to be seen how far their conduct accorded with that opinion; and if, upon examination, they had not been found to act up to it, what opinion must be formed of their wisdom and their principles? It must be fully in the recollection of your Lordships, that not very long since a noble Lord, familiar with the affairs of the East of Europe, stated in this House, that the language of his Majesty's Government was the subject of unreserved discussion with the Ottoman Porte—that the Government of Constan- tinople freely canvassed what was said in this House, and minutely weighed and canvassed the language of the Sovereign and the Ministers. From this the interference was obvious, that though the Turks might have found themselves engaged in a war with Russia, their ancient ally, England, would come to their assistance in the moment of need. The Turks might well think, though the formidable power of Russia might threaten them, that yet there was a great power—a great maritime power, whom she might always regard as her confederate whenever real danger was at hand. The Turk might say, I have a faithful and an ancient ally, in whom I may confide, who has declared herself bound by treaties and determined by interest to preserve the integrity of my empire in Europe, and who at the first moment of her interference will put my enemy to flight. Thus was the Ottoman Porte deluded—thus was it induced to persist in a ruinous course buoyed up as it was by the adulation and the praises of his Majesty's Government, but how grievously and fatally was it deceived, and at what a distressing moment was that deceit first felt, when the altered language and vacillating conduct of the King's Government announced to them that from their firm friend, their ancient ally, they had nothing to hope. In the blockade, for instance, of Treviso by the Greeks, it was alleged that that was out of the line of the proposed neutrality. Some noble Lords were great friends to a blockade, for the blockade of Oporto by Don Miguel had been acknowledged with almost breathless haste; and others were great lovers of a neutrality as was seen in the instance of Terceira. In the same manner his Majesty's Government sometimes supported the Greek, and anon gave encouragement to the Turk, and both were sufferers from her hollow friendship, and her substantial enmity. For my part, I never could understand the policy which made this country send an Ambassador to Constantinople, when the Porte would not consent to concession of any kind. Then look, my Lords, to the position to which the conduct of the British Government reduced the Ottoman Porte. After the Russians passed the Balkan, they made an offer of treating with the Turks—to that the Government of Constantinople sent no answer, good or bad, not even an attempt at an evasive reply. The Sultan did that which Louis 18th did on the return of Buonaparte from Elba; he said, "I will never desert my capital, rather than do so, I will lay down my life at the gate of St. Denis. I will contest its safety to the latest moment;" with a great deal more talk of a similar kind. So when the Russians arrived at Adrianople what said the Turk? Why that he would die within the sacred precincts of St. Sophia, and how did all this end? Just as such boasting generally does, in complete submission—victory succeeded victory, and all this time what was passing in the mind of the Turk? He must have soliloquized somewhat after this fashion—"True I am in great jeopardy—I am encompassed with danger and difficulty—the enemy is at my gate; but then I have an old friend, an ancient ally, who has employed the strongest expressions which his language affords, to prove how strongly he feels bound to preserve the integrity of my empire by every obligation of honour and of interest—how necessary the maintenance of my Empire is to the preservation of the balance of Europe; and now, since I have lately become better instructed in the customs of the Christians, I learn that the preservation of that balance of Europe, is the sole and only reason for keeping up a standing army"—as he might easily have seen from the preamble to the Mutiny Act. He then might go on to say—"My ally and faithful friend has not, it is true, large armies at his disposal; but then he is master of a powerful fleet, and capable of transmitting assistance in more forms than one: and as a proof of the sincerity of his desire to afford me the necessary aid when the proper moment shall arrive, he has sent the brother of his Reis Effendi to consult with my Reis Effendi for the safety of my Throne and my dominions, and to give them the benefit of his advice and information. Besides, the mere name of my ancient ally will be, in itself, enough to intimidate the foe—like Achilles, his shout from the walls will suffice to put the hostile army to flight." Well, then, my Lords, the brother of the Reis Effendi goes out as an Ambassador, and, after a few secret communications, and so on, the British Ambassador gives his final advice, and what does that turn out to be?—After all that was said about ancient treaties, and the balance of Europe, and the necessity of preserving Turkish influence in European affairs, what is the advice of the British Ambassador?—nothing more nor less than unconditional submission. One point still remained, which might be urged for the interest of Turkey—the mere nominal Sovereignty over Greece, and the payment of a small tribute. Yet even that point was struck out, and the interests of Turkey totally disregarded, and all this time the British Government told the Turk that they could not help what was going forward; and then when those hostilities ended in the perfect humiliation of the Turkish power, the Minister comes to Parliament, and says he has great satisfaction in announcing the termination of hostilities, and such a termination, too, in the annihilation of their old and faithful ally. Such are the speeches of his Majesty's Ministers. Now, my Lords, is not this a fair illustration of the conduct of his Majesty's Government in the position into which they have brought this country with relation to Turkey, and I should gladly be instructed as to the manner in which that position can be made to consist with the true interest of the country, the justice of Parliament, or the honour of the Crown, however convenient to themselves his Majesty's Ministers might have supposed it. Having occupied so much of your Lordships' time, I shall not now go through the various considerations that suggest themselves as to the manner in which these proceedings are likely to affect our relations with Russia. As respects France it was extremely ill-timed, calculated to excite the most injurious suspicions, and likely to alienate us from the Government and inhabitants of that country to an extent the consequences of which we yet severely experience. There is one observation with respect to Russia, which I cannot avoid making, that much stress has been laid upon our trade with the Black Sea. Now with the exception of Azof, which can scarcely be considered necessary to except, we had no trade with the Black Sea while it was in the hands of Turkey; but from the moment Russia got possession of it, we might be said to have the command of the Black Sea, for one ship of this country that before traded to the Black Sea, thirty-four were now found in its ports. The whole of our policy towards Russia has been, during this contest, such as almost to exceed the bounds of credibility, did not the facts stand upon evidence the most unquestionable. Our conduct with respect to that country was the acme of imbecility. I will apply to this case the lines of a writer, Ausonius, who, though he writes in verse, is not very poetical, yet with some success he contrasts a wise and foolish man— Quid prudentis opus? cui possis nolle nocere. Quid stulti proprium est? non posse et velle nocere. My Lords, the day will come when we shall rue the errors of which our Government have been guilty—when our treatment of France, a country that had throughout this affair, acted a generous as well as a friendly part—when our neglect of the opportunity of adding Candia to the territories of Greece; and when our omission to strengthen the young State, by means of Egypt, will react upon ourselves with a force of which no man can see the remote consequences. I think, my Lords, I have already laid sufficient grounds to justify the assertion that this Government has acted disingenuously. I now come to a part of the subject on which it is necessary that I should acknowledge I speak a good deal from conjecture. I have no private sources of information; no access to official papers; no man in the House has taken less pains than I have to ascertain what is going on. I really know nothing but what is derived from the current conversation of the day, and from the newspapers—for, my Lords, newspapers will continue to write, notwithstanding the prosecutions of the noble Duke. In this way these rumours have been put forth, to which I am anxious to call the attention of Parliament. They are to this effect:—that there is an intention to contract within still narrower limits the territory of Greece than even those within which it was at first understood that the boundaries of the young State were to be confined; and I the more particularly address myself to this, as there is at the present moment something very like civil war going on in Candia, of a kind the most disgraceful to humanity; and as, apart from other reasons, that island has Greeks for the major part of its inhabitants, I conceive that those who had to deal with the boundaries of Greece were guilty of an egregious error, in not negociating for Candia's being included within its limits. But it was enough for us to have to execute the Treaty of the 6th July, and that even in doing that we had better do it, if possible, without plucking a feather from the Turk—to do him, in short, as little injury as possible. As to our conduct towards Russia, it was little less than downright madness; it was not fair with respect to any Government, and it was peculiarly impolitic with regard to such a one as that of Russia. The great principle, my Lords, for which I have been contending, is this, that we have been guilty of the grossest error in not securing to Greece a strong Government, and a territory sufficient for the maintenance of its own independence. The establishment of a weak power in the Mediterranean is worse than nugatory. The name of an illustrious Prince (Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg) has been mentioned in connection with this subject. The intellectual qualifications of that illustrious personage for the situation in question are well known. He has had the advantage of ten or twelve years' experience of free institutions in this country, and it is rumoured that he is still designated by the wishes of the people of Greece, as the individual most to be desired, and that he even was so before the Protocol of the 6th of July. Of this, however, I profess to know nothing, but the general rumour upon this subject is so strong, and the concurrent evidence in its favour proceeding from every quarter, that I cannot entertain any doubt as to the wishes of the Greek people. I believe that the Greeks have too much sense to adopt any other form of Government than that of a limited monarchy; but let us reflect upon the cruel situation of the head of that Government, if, before he takes upon himself that authority, the affairs of Greece, in the most extended sense, are not completely settled. Observe what is the present condition of Candia, in the nominal possession of the Turks. It is peopled by Greeks, who are now in a state of insurrection; the strong places are in the hands of the Turks, but commotions already prevail, and a general civil war is on the point of breaking out in the island. However wise, however prudent, however just, the new head of the Greek Government may be, he will be a stranger to the people, and you may compel him to adopt a line of conduct he would not otherwise choose. He must, in the first instance, either connive at his own subjects carrying on clandestine intercourse with the insurgents in Candia, and then the predatory warfare, with all its outrages revolting to human nature, must be continued, for he must openly espouse the cause of his oppressed brethren and subjects. If such be his determination, what then, will be the consequence? Peace? No—a new war, which may embroil all the powers of Europe in the dispute, and then the Treaty will have to be re-settled, and all that has been done, having been undone, will have to be done again. The Sovereign of Greece may take a third course—he may say, "I will maintain a strict neutrality, and prevent the consequence of any assistance from my Empire." I suppose that he will be allowed to pursue vessels on the high seas, that have left his ports for the purpose of carrying arms or stores to Candia; and if he maintain that strict neutrality, what is it but folding his arms in apathy before him, and seeing his brethren in language, in manners, and in country, murdered and massacred by wholesale? If any, the slightest, suspicion be felt that such will be the situation of the Potentate of Greece, it is the duty and right of Parliament to interfere, and to express a decided opinion before the great work is attempted to be completed. There is another report which I have heard, and which I earnestly hope is without foundation. Perhaps the suggestion of that evil genius which seems to have hovered unseen over all who have interfered in this question— Infert se septus nebulâ, mirabile dictu Per medios, miscetque viris: neque cernitur ulli. That care is to be taken that the Government of Greece shall be in a particular form—that whoever may hold the reins of authority, he is not to consult the wants and wishes of the people, but is to obey the dictation of others. That is the rumour; and any such intention I must deprecate. Some fears of the Pope or of the King of Naples (for I suppose Austria does not venture to stand forward and avow her own apprehensions on the subject), are supposed to have led to this determination. Such an abominable, such a disgusting principle of action, I hope in God will never guide the Ministers of this country. I do not, and cannot suspect them of it; but I think, nevertheless, that Parliament ought to interpose, in order to put them on their guard, and to declare, in the words of my Resolution, that the Government of Greece ought to be established "with full powers to adopt laws and institutions suited to the wants and wishes of the people." I have gone a greater length than I intended into the statement of my views, and I have therefore to apologise to your Lordships; but I maintain the undoubted right of the House to adopt this course as the hereditary Counsellors of his Majesty. It was said that such a course was unprecedented. I thought I remembered instances of the kind, but I would not trust my memory, and looking through the Journals, I found precedents enough to overwhelm anybody. I shall not, therefore, further fatigue your Lordships by producing or explaining any of them; but I will conclude with moving, that it be resolved—"That no pacification or settlement of Greece will appear to this House permanently advantageous to the interests of Europe, or honourable to his Majesty's Crown, which does not give to that country a territory sufficient for national defence both by land and sea, and which does not establish therein a Government with full powers to adapt its laws and institutions to the wants and wishes of the people, and to protect its subjects from all foreign interference in their domestic concerns."

The Earl of Aberdeen

rose and said,—I had hoped that the declaration in his Majesty's Speech, by which Parliament was informed that the King had concerted measures with his Allies for the pacification and final settlement of Greece, and the expression of a confident hope on the part of his Majesty that it would be in his power speedily to lay before Parliament the particulars of that arrangement, would have been sufficient to repress, for a time at least, the impatience of noble Lords to enter into a discussion of this subject. But the noble Baron having been unable to resist the temptation of such an inviting topic, has, in my opinion brought it before the House in a manner certainly most unusual, and which can only be justified by a well-founded suspicion of those whose duty it is more immediately to advise the Crown. To warrant such a proceeding, the noble Baron must suppose, with apparent reason, that we are either indifferent to the honour of the Crown, or unwilling to carry into effect the stipulations of Treaties by which we profess to be bound. Now where, let me ask, is the proof to justify any such suspicion? What right has the noble Baron to entertain it, and how has any thing that has occurred since his Majesty was advised by his present Ministers led to any such conclusion? The noble Viscount who spoke on a former night (Goderich), interested as he naturally was in the execution of that Treaty, which now engages attention, and which your Lordships are desirous to be fulfilled, admitted, with the fairness and candour belonging to him, that the acquiescence of Great Britain in the French expedition to the Morea was a sufficient proof of the desire of this Government to see its provisions adopted. Had we not been disposed to attend to the spirit of that Treaty, most certainly by the letter of it, we might have forbidden the departure of a single soldier from France. We gave this proof, therefore, of our desire to see it carried into execution, and in the whole of our conduct we have afforded no ground whatever for the suspicion which the noble Baron entertains of our sincerity. But if his motion be extraordinary after the assurances from the Throne, and in the present state of our foreign negociations, it is still more extraordinary when we come to examine its real character and nature. By proposing a vote, that in constituting this new State we shall give it certain capacities, dimensions and powers, he sanctions an act of wanton spoliation on a friendly nation, without the slightest pretext to justify it. The noble Baron speaks as if there were some huge, newly-discovered continent to be partitioned, and forgets the real stipulations of the Treaty of London. He forgets that that Treaty does not profess to have in view the independence of Greece to any extent. It is a Treaty for the pacification of Greece. I see in it the expression of various motives operating upon the high contracting parties, not one of which has relation to the independence of Greece. If, then, from a change of circumstances, we have been able to deviate from the strict line of the Treaty, and uniformly deviating in favour of the Greek population, it cannot be said that we have been reluctant to carry into effect the stipulations of the Treaty of London. So much to the contrary has been our conduct, that we have gone beyond the expectations of the most sanguine friends of the Greeks: those who framed the Treaty never could have entertained the shadow of a hope that we should have been able to go so far. The noble Baron also charged us with unnecessary and, as he contended, intentional delay in the execution of this work. Without wishing to object to the Treaty to which we are parties, and without wishing to criticise it too narrowly, I must request your Lordships candidly to reflect on the nature of that Treaty: observe how undefined it is in its object, how necessarily uncertain in its means of execution, and then you will be aware how extremely difficult it must be to give immediate effect to desires so vaguely specified. Recollecting who are the parties to the Treaty, and adverting to the progress made under it, your Lordships will admit that in two years as much has been done as could be reasonably expected in a work of this nature. But the noble Baron says that we are indebted for that progress to the arms of Russia; but he is greatly mistaken. There is, no doubt, not a shadow of doubt, that but for the occurrence of the war with Turkey, the object of the Treaty would have been more speedily accomplished. As it is, the result of the war will not have operated on the execution of the terms of the Treaty. The noble Baron has given a recital of facts, but so incorrect and confused, as to the time and manner in which events occurred, that it is very difficult to follow him; but he has accused Ministers of not giving immediate effect to this Treaty after the conflict in the Bay of Navarino. Although the noble Baron professes to be so imperfectly informed, I apprehend it is sufficiently notorious to all the world, that the present Ministers had nothing to do with the affairs of Government until some time after that event: when, too, he stigmatizes the conduct pursued towards the gallant officer engaged on that occasion, he may have heard, however imperfectly informed", that the present Ministers sent out an inquiry, and are not in any way responsible for the result. As to the gallantry displayed at Navarino, no man ever entertained a doubt—the doubt was as to the justification in taking such a step. The noble Baron has said, that when first the proposal was made to send French troops to the Morea, Ministers objected to it. They unquestionably did so in the first instance, and why? They objected because a plan had been already concerted by three powers, by which the same object was to be attained by naval means—by means of a naval blockade. Were not Ministers, then, justified in objecting? Did not the convention between the English Admiral and the Pacha of Egypt actually effect the evacuation of the Morea before the arrival of the French troops? This fact establishes that we were right in resisting the expedition on the ground that it was not necessary, for means existed of accomplishing that object independent of any expedition. In one part of his speech the noble Baron has urged, in very strange terms, the necessity of extending the new State of Greece so as to include the Island of Candia; and having intimated that he would with pleasure have seen a Russian army in possession of Constantinople, of course he cannot be expected to feel any difficulty regarding-the transference of Candia. But looking still to the Treaty of the 6th July as our guide (for the noble Lord and I can never agree; we seem to be as opposite as different parts of the world) I say that I consider the honour of the Crown to be concerned in the execution of the engagements of the Crown. The noble Lord seems to have some notion that this new State should be of certain dimensions, and that to make them so the Island of Candia must be taken from Turkey. Upon that part of the subject, as well as all the rest, the noble Baron seems to be very imperfectly informed. The existence of any war at all in Candia is to be attributed to ourselves and to our allies: at the date of the Treaty of London that island was tranquil: a mountainous district in such part of the world indeed was always in that state of insubordination which is too frequent in Turkish provinces; but Candia, at the date of the Treaty of London, was as tranquil as it had ever been under the Turks. In the execution of the blockade it was found necessary to establish the blockade of Candia; and what was the effect of it? The Greek pirates were driven to take refuge with their brethren in the mountains; and this was the signal for excesses and the commencement of a civil war. By means of assistance of money and men from the Provisional Government of Greece, a war was kept up, which is not yet entirely at an end. That was a state of hostility, as I said, arising out of the Treaty of London and the conduct of the Allies. The noble Baron has also alluded to a report, if pos- sible more inaccurate than most of those on which he has founded his motion; he has supposed that there is some intention to interfere with the establishment of the form of Government most desired by the Greeks, and this design he has gratuitously attributed to that demon that seems to haunt his Lordship's thoughts whenever he talks of foreign politics, and which he imagines has influenced us to adopt a course he holds in abhorrence. If he alludes to Austria, I can assure him that Austria has had about as much to do with the settlement of Greece as the noble Baron has had, or not so much, indeed. I deprecate any interference with the internal Government of the new State; for God's sake let the Prince and the People settle their institutions for themselves. We must not force our institutions upon them, but give them full liberty to act as they please, and to found a constitution for themselves adapted to their wants and wishes. On that head, therefore, the noble Baron need not be in any state of uneasiness. The noble Baron has not omitted to renew his charges, in consequence of the opinions expressed by my noble friend near me (the Duke of Wellington) and myself, upon the importance of preserving the Turkish Empire. Those opinions I have no objection to repeat; and I therefore regret the change recently effected in the relative position of that power, as compared with its neighbours. I do not regret it from any love of the Turks or of the Turkish Government—God forbid! I have seen and know the effect of the barbarous rule existing there: and nobody can be more alive to the horrors with which it abounds. But give me leave to say, that the improvement of Turkey may be purchased at too dear a rate; and I still think that the conquest of that country would be paying dear indeed for the amelioration of its condition. The power of Turkey has been considerably weakened, and it remains to be seen how it may be affected by the change, and whether the apprehensions entertained are warranted. The noble Baron treats these opinions with ineffable contempt—as notions not to be tolerated in a Member of this House; but surely he must have forgotten that they are not only not new, but that they have been always entertained by this Government. By no man have they been more strongly felt than by a right hon. gentle- man for whom the noble Baron naturally feels the greatest regard and the highest veneration—the late Mr. Fox—who declared that he was not only most anxious for the independence of the Turkish Empire, but that he was ready to guarantee its integrity. With this authority on our side I do not think that the noble Baron is again likely to treat us with such supreme scorn because we profess the same opinions, not for the sake of the Turks, but for the sake of the peace of Europe.

The noble Baron has also drawn a humorous picture of the futility of our friendship and influence in the progress and termination of the late war: upon that point it does not become me to speak decisively; but with all the noble Baron's affectation of imperfect information upon that subject, I know that he has good sources of information, and to those sources I would refer him for better information upon this matter. He will learn from those sources whether the charges which he has made are sanctioned by the facts; whether he is right in supposing that we gave the Sultan any encouragement in his resistance to Russia; whether we encouraged Russia with one hand, while with the other we were stimulating Turkey to make resistance. Let him consult the sources of his information, and say whether he is right in making us responsible for the war. But I defy him to any such proofs. I maintain that so far from playing such a part, before and at the commencement of the war we saw the only result which could follow from it; but the state of things preceding the war, and the circumstance of there being no Minister at Constantinople, made communication with it very difficult. At the end of the first campaign, though there were many in this country who thought that the Russians had partially failed, we did not alter our tone; we still kept on in a style of urgent remonstrance and advice to the Porte to accept, by all means, the pacific overtures of Russia, and to conclude a peace. Therefore the obstinacy and infatuation of that Government having brought them to a pass which cannot be looked at with indifference by the rest of Europe, is it fair to lay at our doors such a result? The noble lord has also been pleased to characterise our whole conduct, upon this and other public matters connected with our relations with foreign powers, as disgraceful to the country, and calculated to lower us in the eyes of the world. Our policy he deems to have been imbecile, puerile, and pusillanimous. Now these, though hard epithets, were mere assertions of the noble Lord unsupported by proof. The fact is, that upon the whole subject of our foreign policy, and particularly upon this, I feel greatly at a loss how to answer the noble Lord. These taunts, I am afraid, produce upon the minds of your Lordships a painful effect; and so they would upon mine, my Lords, if I heard them now for the first time. But ever since I have had the honour of a seat in this House, which is for the last twenty-five years, I have been so accustomed to those sorts of accusations, in peace and in war, when we were opposed to a single power—or, single-handed, strove against all Europe—or when, by the aid of my noble friend near me, were able to conclude a triumphant peace with our allies—that they have now little value in them. I do not pretend to answer these accusations, all I wish to say is, that upon the subject of foreign policy, I prefer the noble Lord's proofs to his assertions. I am afraid the noble Lord will obtain but little credit when he charges an Administration, at the head of which is my noble friend, with imbecility and pusillanimity. We are disposed to peace, and this is the effect of our position. For what is the advantage of the real power and inexhaustible resources of this country if they do not enable us to pursue a course which with feebler powers would be impossible? The noble Lord mistakes if he thinks that our conduct has been misunderstood by the powers with whom we have been in communication. Let him but apply to the best sources of information, and he will find that we have lost nothing with those powers by the temperate and even cautious policy which we have pursued; at the same time never losing sight of the honour of the Crown, in our determination to preserve peace. I ask you whether, if we had followed the noble Lord's suggestions, we could have got through the difficulties which we have gone through? This was our policy, and has been respected by those powers, who, the noble Lord, no doubt, thinks despise us, and by all the world whose respect we value. I can now only repeat to the noble Lord, that we mean to pursue the same policy; that we will, above all, abstain from that restless, meddling policy, which might embroil us in war with Russia, and probably with all Europe also. The noble Lord, throughout his speech, seemed to feel that he had made a ground for your Lordships to act upon. He seemed to think it enough to justify his motion by a precedent; but these are not grounds enough for you to act on. Under these circumstances, then, in which this motion is brought forward, and feeling it to be impossible for me to explain the particulars of an arrangement which is promised in a short time to be laid before you—feeling it impossible, also, to correct the errors and mistakes of the noble Lord without committing myself to a statement of the whole case, I entreat your Lordships not to vote for this Motion, and thereby affirm a suspicion, unfounded and unwarranted, against his Majesty's Government, upon a statement which will be proved to be fallacious. For all these reasons, I think it my duty to move the previous question upon this Motion.

The Marquis of Clanricarde

said, he could not but contrast the professions of Ministers with their acts in relation to the invasion of Turkey by the Russians; upon the one hand they professed to avoid war, while upon the other they held out a positive threat, when the Russians were at Adrianople, that if they advanced to Constantinople they would sail up the Dardanelles. This step was hazardous, and exposed them to all the consequences of a war. He should support the Motion.

Lord Melbourne

said, in his opinion, the great question on the Turkish war was, whether the integrity of that Empire was worth preserving at the risk of a war with Russia? If, upon that question, Ministers had made up their minds in the affirmative, they ought to have pursued their object at all events. Such, he believed, was the view which the noble Duke took of the question.—But, if Government had decided not to abide the risk, they ought not, in any case, to have given the least encouragement to the Turks to resist, as, unfortunately, some expressions in the speech of the noble Duke, at the begining of the Session, had the effect of doing. He should not now discuss the question; but he wished to call the attention of the House to one important fact. Turkey had been represented as playing the most blind and stupid part throughout this war; but was this the fact? Towards Russia only was she undoubtedly blind; for immediately after the noble Duke came into power, Turkey violated the Treaty of Akermann, which gave the Russians a right to go to war. But what was the conduct of Turkey towards this country and France?—She bore every thing. She bore the Protocol signed by the noble Duke; she bore the Treaty of July; she bore the expedition to the Morea. The only solution of this inconsistency was, that she was encouraged by this country and France to resist Russia. He did not mean to say distinctly that any pledge had been given—he would not impute such perfidy towards Russia to the British Government; but he fully believed that the Turks were given to understand that if they resisted they would be supported. His honble. friend, the noble Secretary, had taken credit to Ministers for going farther than the letter of the Treaty; but was it forgotten that circumstances, had very much altered since the making of that Treaty? With respect to Greece—he hoped that it would not be made a blot in the list of States, nor an encumbrance amongst the number of our friends, but a substantial and useful ally. He was glad to hear that there was no intention of interfering with the internal Government of the new State, but that it should be at liberty to adopt such institutions as it pleased. That was the right course for this country to pursue; and he was delighted with the distinct assurance that there was no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of this rising government.

Lord Goderich

begged to congratulate the Government upon the declaration which they had made of neutrality, as concerned the internal affairs of the new Government of Greece. He hoped, however, that our legitimate influence would be used to prevent any other power from shackling that people in the choice of their institutions. We ought to persuade them to adopt our own institutions, if it were only to show the world that we bear with them less as grievances than cherish them as blessings. Such a gift to the new State would be consistent with our national greatness and the public interest. He should support the Motion.

The Duke of Wellington

said,—My Lords, although perfectly satisfied with the defence of the Government which the speech of my noble friend has afforded, yet, as some things have been stated since he sat down, more particularly by the noble Lord upon the second bench, whom, if he will allow me, I will call my noble friend (Lord Melbourne), I shall trouble you with a very few words upon this occasion. My Lords, his Majesty, in his Speech from the Throne, delivered upon the first day of the Session by the Lords Commissioners, stated to you, that he had concerted with his allies a plan for the pacification of Greece, and in order to carry into effect the Treaty of the 27th of July; and it was further promised that he would shortly lay before you all the circumstances necessary to enable you to form a judgment upon the course which he will pursue with respect to these transactions. That was the promise, and yet the noble Lord comes down and tells you, "don't wait for the communication which the King has promised in his gracious Speech to you; don't wait for the plans, but at once adopt the proposition as stated by the noble Lord, and resolve that the plan of the Ministers will not satisfy the honour of this country." That is the proposition which the noble Lord makes to you, and which he calls upon you to adopt, before you know whether or not the plan is irrevocably fixed, and without knowing whether the plan upon which you resolve will have any influence upon our proceedings for the future. But I ask whether this is a situation in which the House ought to place itself? or whether it is consistent with its dignity to come forward and enter into resolutions such as this, without knowing whether the Crown would alter one tittle of the arrangements which it had already made? The noble Lord alludes to the resolution of 1827; but what can be more ridiculous than that resolution, except that which the noble Lord moved to-night, and by which he would call on your Lordships to vote that you had lost all confidence in his Majesty's Ministers, and particularly in myself? To prove that, however, what does the noble Lord do? Why, he collects a pack of stories from the newspapers, and makes a statement with what I must term an absolute contempt for dates and facts. My noble friend (Lord Melbourne) seems to think that the Turks were encouraged to publish their Hatti-scheriff, or manifesto, or whatever it was, by the circumstance of my coming into power. Now, my noble friend may be well informed upon this subject; but if he consulted with the sources of his information a little more closely, he would find that the manifesto was published before the Parliament met, or I was in office. The offence, therefore, was not in any thing done here, or in the King's Speech, for that was sent forth some time before, the King's Speech being delivered the 29th of January. The truth is, though it was not published, that the Hatti-scheriff was delivered to the Grand Seignior long before the Ministers left Constantinople. Now, to charge me in this way with that with which I have nothing to do, is what, I must say, is something like being "too bad". The noble Lord alludes also to Navarino, and asks why we did not blockade the Dardanelles, and why other consequences did not follow with which I have just as much to do as I have with the Hatti-seheriff? The order was given by the preceding Government, and they acted very properly to show their determination to carry into effect the Treaty of the 27th July. I have followed their example; and have not advised the blockade of the Dardanelles, but accommodated myself to circumstances. Our principle was, to confine hostilities to the circumstances which rendered them necessary. I do not mean to reproach the noble Viscount for the measures which he has taken, but I will say, on the part, of the present Government, that they have not forfeited the confidence of the country, and that they could not, or ought not, to forfeit it by measures of which others were the authors. The noble Baron has brought a variety of charges against the Government, into the details of which it is impossible for me to enter without laying papers before the House of which they are not now in possession. This much, however, I will say, that there is not one of the acts alluded to by the noble Lord which I could not justify in the most satisfactory manner if brought before your Lordships in a tangible shape. But the noble Baron has reproached us on account of the Russian war. [Lord Holland.—No reproach on account of the war itself.] Well then, on account of circumstances that arose out of the war. Again, I would beg to remind him of the importance of facts and dates; the Ambassadors of the three Allied Powers retired from Constantinople in December, and I did not come into office until the January following.—From the time that I came into office I omitted no opportunity of communicating with the Porte, and of doing all that could be done by the influence of this Government to prevail on the Porte to give to his Russian Majesty the satisfaction to which he was entitled; His Majesty's Government did all that they could, but in vain; and having failed in that object, it was impossible that they could prevent the war from taking place. It is quite a mistake to suppose that we had ever been deceived as to the result. For my own part, I never dreamt that it could have terminated otherwise, and I could produce many proofs, if necessary, to show not only that I thought all along that the war must come to that one result, but that it ought to have come to it in the course of the first campaign. I should have felt that I was abandoning my duty if I had not exerted myself all along with the Porte for the purpose of bringing about a peace. But the noble Baron says, "Oh! your language led to the war, and you ought to have been prepared to support your language with arms." On the contrary, I maintain that our language neither could have, nor was intended to have, any such effect. We were most anxious to prevent war. When I say that we were most anxious to prevent war, let me not be mistaken. I most firmly believe, notwithstanding the distress of this country, that there never was a moment in her history when she was more capable of embarking in a war for any legitimate object. I do firmly believe that there never was a period when our resources were more available, or her establishments so effective. No, I do not even except that period when, as the noble Baron has said, she was capable of contending against the world in arms. But, taking all this into consideration, there were still other questions to be asked. In the first place, would it be a just war?—It would not; for no one can deny that the first, insult proceeded from the Porte. In the next place would it be a politic war? We were engaged with Russia and France in the endeavour to accomplish the settlement of Greece, an object which the Parliament, if not the people of this country, had deeply at heart. We had to consider what the effect of a war might be upon that object; and, seeing that such a war must sooner or later embroil the whole world, we were bound to consider deeply all the consequences before we meditated war. After all, the Turkish power still exists in Europe, and there is every reason to hope that the Sultan may so establish himself in a little time as to be able to act his part in the general system of European policy. The, noble Baron blames us also for not having carried on active hostilities against the Turks to fulfil the Treaty of the 6th of July. If there was any principle which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Canning) with whom all these transactions originated insisted on more strongly than another, it was the principle that the Treaty should be carried into effect without any act of hostility. I know this to have been the case, for I received his first instructions when I was engaged in an Embassy respecting it, which were distinctly to that effect. But that is not all; the Treaty itself provides that we should not mix ourselves up with any of the hostile attempts of the parties. But the Government did contemplate ulterior measures, and the battle of Navarino was one of the results. And here again I would call upon the noble Baron to attend to facts and dates. It is true that an arrangement was made with the Egyptian troops for the evacuation of the Morea, and it is also true that troops were sent to compel the evacuation; but at the time the troops were sent, it was not known what arrangements were made upon the subject. Such, I can assure the noble Baron, was the train and order of the facts to which he has alluded. I say that throughout the whole of those transactions we were guided by the spirit of the Treaty, and of the declaration made by his Majesty to Parliament. Our object was a peaceable settlement of Greece, and not a disturbance which might promote the purposes of extensive empire. But again, the noble Baron has accused us of omitting to include the island of Candia within the new territory of Greece. This is hardly fair; the noble Lord knows as well as I do, that the Protocol of the 27th March did not include that island, so that Candia was omitted by the combined act of the Allies. The noble Baron should reflect, however, that, if we were resolved to give Candia to Greece we must first conquer it from the Turks. And, as I have said before, neither the terms nor the spirit of the Treaty could justify us in conquering any thing for the Greeks. For the reasons which I have already stated, and which I could prove still more distinctly if I had the papers before me which will be at the command of the House, I shall conclude by moving the Previous Question upon the resolution of the noble Baron.

Lord Holland

replied.—He was not disposed to press his Motion to a division. All that he should do would be to enter his Resolution on their Lordships' Journals, as a record of his opinions on a subject which he had much at heart. He wished to say one or two words in explanation of what had fallen from the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs respecting the sentiments of a distinguished relation of his on the policy of maintaining the integrity of the European dominions of the Grand Seignior. The noble Lord had quoted a passage from a speech of Mr. Fox as a proof of that great man having entertained the same views of policy with respect to Turkey with those at present acted upon by Ministers. Now, he believed he might say that no man was better, or so well, acquainted with the opinions, political and general, of that great statesman and lover of his country than he was; and from that knowledge he would take it upon him to assert, that so far from Mr. Fox wishing to protect the Porte against the aggressions of his neighbours, it was an earnest object of his to drive the Turks entirely out of Europe. He repeated that Mr. Fox had more than once expressed this his invariable opinion on the subject. [The Earl of Aberdeen here gave a sign of dissent] What, the noble Earl holds up his hand in dissent! Did the noble Earl pretend to know as much of Mr. Fox's opinion as he did? If his opinion be derived from a newspaper speech of Mr. Fox he would tell him unhesitatingly, from his knowledge of that stateman's opinions, that it was ill reported, and did not faithfully state his relative's sentiments. He knew of no speech of Mr. Fox, in which such a doctrine was even alluded to; and he knew of those in which a very different one was distinctly asserted. He could not be mistaken on this point. He had a perfect recollection of Mr. Fox's opinions on the Ottoman institutions. He remembered them particularly well, for he was familiar with them from his entrance into public life. At the time of the landing of the French troops under Buonaparte in Egypt, he remembered Mr. Fox observing that though England might be injured by the success of the French arms, one great general benefit would follow from that success,—the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In fact, such was the opinion of every man at the time; and he would go further, and affirm, that till it was asserted by the present Government that the integrity of European Turkey was essential to the balance of power, no statesman considered the possible expulsion of the Turk from the map of Europe but as a general benefit. The noble Duke had, in his stress on the importance of dates, not correctly interpreted what he had said respecting the blockade of the Dardanelles, and of the conduct of Government in relation to the Russian war. He did not hold the noble Duke responsible for acts arising out of the policy of his predecessors in office. He knew that the proposal of the blockade was anterior to his accession to power, and therefore could not charge him with whatever might be objectionable in carrying that proposal into effect. What he said—in fact, the gist of his whole argument—was, not that the noble Duke was the cause of the Hatti-scheriff document, or that he had urged Turkey into the war with Russia, but that the tendency of his observations respecting the belligerent parties since his acceptance of office, and of the King's Speech of last Session, for which he was responsible, was necessarily to buoy the Porte up with the expectation that England would not be a mere witness of her prostration; in a word, that the impression which Turkey received from the speeches of the noble Duke and his colleagues was, that England would throw herself between the combatants, as a shield to "our ancient ally." He had heard no answer to this part of his speech, and he was convinced that no satisfactory one in the negative could be given. With respect to the blockade of the Dardanelles, which he would say was too long deferred by the predecessor of the noble Duke in office, (whom, moreover, he would blame for instituting any inquiry into the circumstances that led to the battle of Navarino, which might imply a disapproval of that event)—he would remind the noble Duke of his taking credit to himself for acting strictly in obedience to the Treaty of July 1826, to which Treaty he told us that Russia had waved her belligerent rights, while we remained as neutral parties, though, as the noble Duke had told us, we might, under the Treaty, have felt ourselves as no longer bound by its enactments. The noble Duke had taunted his resolution as ridiculous, because a different line of policy from that implied by it might be expedient. He could not see how that made it ridiculous, or how the possible fact of its being supported by ultra Whigs and ultra Tories affected its intrinsic merits. The noble Duke might be-whig him as much as he pleased—it was no great offence to be classed with such men as Somers and his illustrious associates, and he acceded to his proposition. It was no objection to it, to say that it would be pro tanto a violation of Treaty, for there was precedent for resolutions much more implying infractions of Treaty and interference with foreign States. After the Treaty of Utrecht, for example, had been signed, in the reign of Queen Anne, a motion of Address was made in that House, calling on her Majesty to interfere with a foreign power, the Duke of Lorraine, so as to prevent his harbouring the Pretender in his dominions. It was objected by the then Minister that the Queen had no right to interfere with the domestic affairs of a foreign Prince, when such interference had not been implied in the recently concluded Treaty, and that if then-Lordships agreed to the Address it could do no good; for though her Majesty, with her usual condescension, should declare her willingness to comply with its request, she could not; so that her assenting to the Address would be an idle embarrassment, she not having the means of enforcing it. Notwithstanding these plausible objections, the House of Lords—a most distinguished body, as the history of the times shows—passed the resolution. This precedent in point he thought showed that there was nothing very ridiculous in his Motion. He readily concurred with what the noble Duke had said of the arrangement that had been made to embark the French troops for the Morea, so as to compel Ibrahim Pacha to fulfil his engagement with Sir Edward Codrington, to transport his forces back to Egypt. The noble Duke's statement, that such was the fact, did not require with him the proof of dates. With respect to the island of Candia, he was willing to admit that its annexation to the Greek territory constituted no part of the Protocol. But be would ask simply, had that Protocol never been departed from,—was it strictly adhered to by the noble Duke, or was it not? Was it not a fact, that the Greek line of territory extended from the Gulf of Volo to that of Arta? And, not withstanding, was it not also a fact that the line of boundary which had been since fixed upon, extended much further, namely, from the Gulf of Volo in the east, to a river, whose modern name he did not then recollect, but which was known in geography as the ancient Acheloüs, in the west? Was not this a departure—he did not mean to imply an injudicious one—from that strict adherence to the letter of the Protocol so much insisted upon by the noble Duke? Why not, then, in the same spirit, annex Candia to the new Greek State? Surely it was as essential to the main object of the Treaty of London, the pacification of Greece, as extending the line of boundary westwards. He was convinced that the distinction between pacification and settlement was one of mere words—that Greece would never be settled till Condia was an integral part of its territory,—that, in fact, no man with a Greek heart in his bosom would rest contented till he had thoroughly ensured the independence, and thence the prosperity, of his country. Why then not ensure that pacification or settlement, so much desired, by annexing Candia to the new State? What answer was it to say, it is not set down in the protocol? Had they not given up the Sovereignty clause in that protocol, thereby acknowledging that there could be no permanent settlement but in national independence. It was some satisfaction to him, in conclusion, that acquiescing with the Previous Question was not abandoning the principle of his resolution, and that the former did not imply a negative on the part of its proposers; but that it might be not discreet or prudent formally to avow the principles implied in his proposition. From the spirit of the admission made that night by his Majesty's Government, which he hoped he might add was in unison with the principle of his resolution, he was led to entertain sanguine expectations that the great powers, parties to the Treaty for the settlement of Greece, would enable the new State to be respectable if not powerful abroad, and happy at home. If the result of that night's discussion should impress the Greeks with the conviction that it was to the interference of England that they were in- debted for the opportunity of being once more a free and noble people, it would not only add to the influence of England in those parts, but would increase the respect for the British name throughout the civilized world.

The Earl of Aberdeen

said, that what he had quoted as the sentiments of Mr. Fox, in relation to the policy of preserving the integrity of European Turkey, he would inform the noble Baron who had just addressed the House, he had taken from the most indisputable authority within his reach. The noble Lord had represented his distinguished relation as the invariable enemy of the Ottoman dominions in Europe, and stated, that any speech expressing a contrary doctrine must be a misrepresentation. Now he begged to inform the noble Lord, that the extract he had quoted was from no speech or report of Mr. Fox's opinions, but from his own letter, written with the deliberation due to an official document, for such it was. The occasion which gave rise to the following declaration of opinion on the part of Mr. Fox was a letter to him, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from M. Talleyrand, dated April the 1st, 1806, in which the French Minister, among other matters, says, "The integrity and the complete and absolute independence of the Ottoman Empire form not only the sincerest desire of the Emperor, but constitute also the undeviating object of his policy." To which Mr. Fox replied in a letter, dated Downing-street, April 8, 1806, as follows:—"as to what relates to the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire no difficulty can present itself, those objects being equally dear to all the parties interested in the present discussion." Now, though this declaration did not amount to a pledge that Mr. Fox would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it went to show that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe was not, as the noble Lord had stated, an invariable object of his policy.

Lord Holland

said, he was not then able to determine how far the declaration, just read by the noble Earl, was inconsistent with what he had stated as the sentiments of Mr. Fox on the policy of protecting or discouraging the Turkish dominion in Europe. The matter was rather new to him, and he would investigate it before he would offer any opinion on its apparent discrepancy with what he had stated,

The Motion was then put and negatived.