REGENCY BILL. (Hansard, 6 December 1830)

The Lord Chancellor

wished to take that opportunity to state an important circumstance connected with the principle of this Bill. It appeared that the whole of the arrangements of this measure were such as to meet the exigency of the occasion, while they were so framed as to steer clear of the various conflicting interests connected with such an important question. As the principle upon which this Bill was founded, was capable, and likely, of being drawn into a precedent in after times, it was necessary and fitting that the measure should go down to posterity clear of all doubt and uncertainty, not only as to its arrangements, but also as to the observations and arguments which might have been stated in reference to it by any person either there or elsewhere. It had been said, he believed, that this was a case entirely of the first impression, and that this Bill was framed upon no ordinary principle, much less in accordance with any example to be found in the former periods of our history. He thought it right, 765 therefore, if there was an example to be found which, though not exactly, yet substantially bore out the principle of the present measure, that such an example should not be withdrawn from the attention of their Lordships and of the public. He concurred with the statement of his noble and learned friend who had introduced this Bill, that there was no direct precedent to be found for the principle of it in the history of England. He had, however, been referred by a learned friend of his, a member of the legal profession, to a case which bore greatly upon the present measure, and he conceived it his duty to inform their Lordships, of the particulars of that case. It was satisfactory to be enabled to state to their Lordships, that that case was disposed of both by France and England, who had a common interest in the decision of the question, precisely in the same way that his noble and learned friend had disposed of the present case. He alluded to a period so far back as the reign of Henry 2nd. The son of that King, Geoffrey, Duke of Brittany, held his dukedom as a fief under the Duke of Normandy, who was likewise King of England; but the claim of Lord Paramount was set up by the King of France, both Normandy and Brittany being held of him. Geoffrey died, leaving his widow enceinte, and a daughter Eleanor, but no son. On his death two rival claims were put up for the wardship of his daughter Eleanor, and it would be seen that, in the proceedings to which they gave rise, the principle of the present measure was admitted by both claimants. Philip Augustus of France, as Lord Paramount, put in his claim to the guardianship of Eleanor, the Duchess of Brittany, and Henry 2nd put in his claim, as Duke of Normandy, and therefore superior Lord of Brittany, to the guardianship of his granddaughter. Both the claimants acknowledged Eleanor to be Duchess of Brittany, though her mother was enceinte at the time. Now, according to the doctrine which had been broached elsewhere, allegiance was due not to Eleanor, but to the child en ventre sa mere. That was not the principle upon which the rival claimants in this instance acted. They held that the allegiance was due, not to the child en ventre sa mere, but to the eldest born child of Geoffrey, to whom, as in cases of real property, the possession at once passed. Eleanor being the eldest born child of Geoffrey, they acknowledged 766 at once her right to the Duchy of Brittany, at the same time admitting that that right was defeasible (and this was the point upon which he wished to show that that case approached so nearly to the principle of the present measure)—at once and instantaneously defeasible by the subsequent birth of a child, if that child should happen to be a son. Their Lordships were aware that his Majesty's Government, who had introduced this measure, had brought it forward, founded distinctly upon those two principles; they said that no allegiance was due to the child en ventre sa mere, but to the eldest born child, and that that right, as vested in a female, was defeasible by the subsequent birth of a male child. But they, it seemed, were not the first to assert those principles. How did the parties act in the case to which he had drawn their Lordships' attention? In the course of a few months, Constance, the widow of Geoffrey, was delivered of a son —a son who was well known, unfortunately, in the history of this country, and whose name did not belong alone to the history, but to the drama of the country too; for he had been immortalized by Shakspeare. That son, Prince Arthur, who was subsequently murdered by his uncle, King John, became at once Duke of Brittany. The moment he was born the defeasance of the title of his sister took place, and at once an end was put to the dispute between Henry 2nd and Philip Augustus, and to the preparations for a war which was about taking place between them, to settle the question with regard to Eleanor. The birth of Arthur at once produced a defeasance of the title of his sister to the duchy, and that settled the question which had been raised between the two kings with respect to her wardship. That portion of our history which was connected with the fate of Arthur was involved in much obscurity. All that was known with certainty of it was, that Prince Arthur came subsequently into the possession of his uncle, King John, who murdered him some years after. Eleanor was also carried away by him to this country, and placed in captivity somewhere in Wales, and she was succeeded in the possession of the Duchy of Brittany by her sister Alice, the daughter of Constance by a second marriage. It was satisfactory and gratifying to find that the present instance was not the only one in which the principle of this Bill had been acted upon. 767 Here was proof that the principle upon which his noble and learned friend had founded this measure, had been distinctly adopted and acknowledged by the learned feudalists of France and of England so early as the time of Henry 2nd. The discovery of that precedent removed all doubts and obviated all objections, and he cordially approved of the Bill.