§ His Majesty's Speech having been again read by the Lord Chancellor, and also by the Clerk at the Table,
§ The Earl of Chichesterrose, and spoke to the following effect:—My Lords; In rising to address your lordships on the present occasion, with a view to propose that an humble and dutiful Address be presented to his Majesty, in reply to his most gracious Speech, which we have just heard read, I am fully sensible of the difficulties that must unavoidably, and of ne- 5 cessity, attend such a task—a task that is at all times difficult, but which becomes doubly hazardous when undertaken by an individual so inexperienced as myself. I feel confident, however, my lords, that in proposing a loyal and dutiful Address of thanks to his Majesty for a Speech, the leading feature and principle of which consists in a recommendation to adopt, well-grounded precautions, to preserve peace and maintain whole and untarnished our national credit and honour—I am confident, that in addressing myself to a subject like this, I may safely rely upon your lordships for support. I can assure your lordships, that if I shall not execute aright the task allotted to me, I shall fail in the attempt, not through any want of sincerity on my part, but in consequence of a deficiency of ability to explain and enforce those principles in the manner they deserve.
My lords, reverting to the commencement of the Speech which you have just heard read, it appears from it, that "his Majesty continues to receive from all foreign Prince? and States, assurances of their desire to maintain the relations of amity with this country, and that the great Powers of Europe participate in the earnest wish of his Majesty to cultivate a good understanding upon all points which may conduce to the preservation of peace." My lords, I consider that this passage in his Majesty's Speech must be to your lordships, and the country at large, no small source of satisfaction; for, since the naval engagement which has recently taken place in the port of Navarin, between the Allied squadrons and the Turco-Egyptian fleet, I am aware that considerable fears have been entertained, that the condition of Greece would be rendered still more unfavourable than unfortunately it has long been. Besides, my lords, it may have been apprehended, that the peace which the greater part of Europe has so long enjoyed, might be thereby endangered, and that we ourselves, now scarcely beginning to reap the advantages and to taste the sweets consequent on a restoration of peace, were on the point of being deprived of them by becoming involved in a war with our ancient ally, the Ottoman Porte. My lords, while I am free to confess, that I deeply lament, the loss of valuable lives sustained on that occasion, I cannot but admire—and I am certain every man in the country admires 6 —the signal display of skill and valour made by our countrymen in the conflict—a courage and ability only equalled by the no less meritorious exertions and conduct of our Allies. But, my lords, while I willingly pay my tribute of admiration to the gallantry of our brave countrymen upon that occasion, and however proud I may feel of their conduct, I am convinced that every true and ardent friend of his country must lament, in common with myself, the occurrence of so unfortunate an accident, or event, as that to which I have alluded [hear]. In all victories, my lords, the degree of honour to which the victors are entitled must very much, if it does not entirely, depend on the justice of the cause in which they happen to be engaged. Had this engagement between the allied squadrons and the Ottoman fleet, been, on our part, the result of premeditated design, and not as it was, the consequence of unforeseen accident, or a misunderstanding not to be provided against, I should find this war a difficult one to be defended, and, as it appears to me, we might all have reason to entertain fears for its consequences. However, on referring to the Speech from the Throne, his Majesty, it will be seen, expressly declares, that so far from this engagement being an act of premeditation, or contemplated as a consequence likely to be produced by the instructions sent out by the government at home to the British admiral—so far from this being the case, the engagement, is characterised in the royal Speech, as an unexpected and "untoward event."—Moreover, my lords, his Majesty goes on to declare, that he entertains "a confident hope, that this untoward event will not be followed by further hostilities, or impede that amicable adjustment of the existing differences between the Porte and the Greeks, to which it is manifestly their common interest to accede," and to which amicable adjustment I may be permitted to add, it is the object of the treaties, entered into by Great Britain, France, and Russia, to induce them to accede. My lords, I cannot help taking this opportunity of alluding to the dignified forbearance that has marked the conduct of the Sultan, since the occurrence of the event which brought the allied squadron in collision with the Turco-Egyptian fleet; and I look upon such conduct as an additional call upon Great Britain to do her part 7 towards maintaining that ancient alliance, which, with scarcely any interruption, has subsisted for so many years between this country and the Ottoman Porte. During the war which, unhappily for the interests of humanity, has been so long carried on between the Ottoman Porte and the inhabitants of the Greek provinces and islands, the trade of this country to the Levant suffered in common with that of France and other neutral powers—and, I may add, suffered to no inconsiderable extent from piracies directly occasioned by, or collaterally arising out of, the hostilities subsisting between the two countries. It, therefore, became the policy of our government, as well for the protection of our own trade, as to promote the general peace and welfare of Europe, to endeavour to bring this contest to a speedy termination. Accordingly, measures were adopted for the amicable adjustment of the differences which subsisted; and to further this, a treaty was entered into with France and Russia, to which, as it is not yet regularly before your lordships' House, I shall not now more particularly refer. That the salutary object it possesses may be speedily carried into effect, is certainly most desirable, for our own interests, as well as for those of the rest of Europe. But it is no less essential to our national credit, and to the maintenance of that character for honour and good faith, which is the glory of our country, that we should not attempt to enforce it, by unprovokedly drawing our swords upon an ancient and faithful ally.—My lords, the object for which our troops were sent to Lisbon has, it appears, been accomplished, and that they are about to return. I, therefore, hope that Portugal, for whose interest and protection we have formerly expended so much blood and treasure, may now, in security and independence, enjoy the benefit of that assistance which Great Britain has, at all times, so liberally afforded. —My lords, with respect to that part of his Majesty's Speech which relates to the increased export of some of our manufactures, and a proportionate improvement in the condition of those classes connected with them, it cannot but be a source of considerable gratification to your lordships; and I trust that his majesty may not be disappointed in his reliance on parliament, to use its utmost endeavours to promote and extend such improvement in those and other classes of his Majesty's subjects. 8 —My lords, I shall not trespass further on your lordships' time or patience, but will conclude by moving an humble Address to his Majesty, in answer to his most gracious Speech, which we have just heard read.—The noble lord then moved an Address, which, as usual, was an echo of the Speech from the Throne [See Commons, p 41.]
Lord Strangfordsaid:—My Lords, in rising to second the motion of the noble lord, that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, thanking him for the Speech which he has been graciously pleased to direct to be delivered from the Throne, I confess I feel peculiar satisfaction; the rather because I believe that the main points urged in that Speech are such as must necessarily convey a feeling of hope and consolation to all his Majesty's subjects. One ground of satisfaction at the tenor of the royal Speech is discoverable in the spirit of peace and amity that pervades it. It contains what may be construed into his Majesty's gracious declaration, and may be understood to convey an expression of the royal resolution, to use every possible exertion to maintain the repose of Europe on the firm foundation, the proud basis, on which the memorable efforts of English valour and conduct had placed it at the battle of Waterloo, and subsequently by means of the treaty of Paris. My Lords, I am rejoiced at the expression of such a sentiment; and connecting his Majesty's resolution with the peaceful assurances which our government continues to receive from the leading powers of Europe, I consider the Speech from the Throne well calculated to allay the anxiety which the present posture of public affairs in the east of Europe might otherwise excite. The maintenance of general tranquillity is an object well deserving the care of his Majesty's ministers, and, if steadily pursued, will confer more splendor, and reflect greater credit, on the national character, than the achievement of the most signal victories. At the same time, the peaceful triumphs to which I have alluded, not only possess the advantage of greater and more lasting renown, but are also more easily attained, than the hazardous, and sometimes ruinous, successes of war. My Lords, it is impossible to advert to a conflict, the occurrence of which we must all deplore, without admitting, that not even the glory connected with the achievement can, for a single instant, diminish the regret which our tri- 9 umph at Navarin must continue to excite in the minds of Britons, so long as national honour and gratitude shall continue to be the characteristics of Englishmen—or so long as the remembrance of what Turkey has been to us, in the hour of peril, shall remain. I feel strongly, my lords, and it may be that I express myself warmly on this subject; and I ought to do so, for well I know the warmth of feeling which, in Turkey, prevails towards this country; and well do I know, and sincerely do I admire, the strict honour, the downright, undeviating fidelity, with which she has long fulfilled engagements and maintained relations of amity towards us. I will add, my lords, that theirs is a fidelity which has not proved the weaker, because it happens to rest less upon the faith of treaties and written documents, than on the simple guarantee of oral promises, entered into three hundred years ago, and from that period, handed down, traditionally, from generation to generation. My lords, I look forward with a confidence considerably strengthened by the spirit that pervades his Majesty's Speech, to the renewal and continuance of that cordial feeling, which every friend to both countries must desire to see subsisting between Turkey and England. I sincerely hope and trust—notwithstanding the most unexpected and untoward event, which has recently occurred in the port of Navarin—that a recurrence to our former relations of amity and friendly intercourse may not be impracticable. May I add, that I also hope that an end will be speedily put to those unauthorised and anomalous hostilities at present carried on by the romance or cupidity of individual adventurers, and which are but too well calculated, if permitted to continue, to embarrass the national councils, while they put in jeopardy the national honour. I trust, my lords, the day is not far distant when we shall again behold—that which I had the pride and pleasure for many years myself of beholding—the influence of England paramount, I may say omnipotent, at Constantinople. I trust events have recently taken place to accelerate an occurrence, of which all true friends of Turkey and England must ardently desire to witness the completion. Whatever may be said of Turkish apathy and indifference, there is one thing to which that people have never been indifferent—a friendly connexion with England. To those relations, of which there never should have 10 been an interruption, I sincerely hope the two countries will speedily return; and that measures, the most active and decisive, provided they are consistent with recent treaties, may be resorted to, in order to renew a state of things, which every person acquainted with the circumstances of Turkey must wish to see established. Every principle, my lords, calls upon us to co-operate in accomplishing this object. Bound, as I admit we are, by the treaty of London, we are equally bound to carry its provisions into effect with the least possible disturbance to the interest and feelings of a government which, in the most trying times, has enlisted itself in our favour, and which has been invariably anxious to preserve with us friendly relations. That such is his Majesty's intention, I think, my lords, if any evidence were wanting, the Speech from the Throne affords sufficient proof. That such is the intention of the other powers who are parties to the treaty in question, may be inferred from circumstances which are, I hope, equally satisfactory, and, above all, from the spirit and purport of the treaty itself. Those powers, like ourselves, are at present on terms of amity with Turkey—terms of amity which, I trust, no circumstances will be permitted to derange. Looking at all these considerations, and confiding, as circumstances have given me a right to confide, from personal knowledge and experience, in the high honour and unsullied character of one of the principal parties to that compact; I think there are little grounds to fear a breach of its provisions. I will add, that I am fully convinced that no prospect of political advantage will be suffered to pollute or change the object of a treaty, originating in the most humane and honourable motives. My lords, as you well know, I have had the honour to be employed as his Majesty's representative at the court of St. Petersburg, and I can affirm, from my own direct and immediate knowledge, that the views and sentiments of his imperial majesty, the emperor of Russia, are decidedly pacific, and are directed towards no other object than the maintenance of tranquillity, and the fulfilment of the treaty entered into by the courts of St. James's, the Tuileries, and St. Petersburg. Towards the preservation of tranquillity it was my duty to contribute, under the command of my gracious master, when at the court of St. Petersburg; and I invariably found his imperial 11 majesty ready to co-operate with my own Sovereign in the attainment of that desirable end.—There is another topic in the royal Speech to which I advert with feelings of unmingled pleasure—the conduct of England towards Portugal; a country to which we are bound by every the of friendship and interest. It is gratifying to see the friendly hand of England extended, and her power again successfully exerted, in behalf of that nation, and in defence of a country long united to us in bonds of the strictest amity. To England, and England alone, is the safety of Portugal to be ascribed, and on our efforts must her peace depend. What we have effected will bind her more closely than ever to our interests, and will entail upon her "a debt immense of endless gratitude." I shall trespass no further on your lordships' attention, than to express my sincere hope, that no difference of opinion upon matters which, at present, must necessarily be unaccompanied with explanation, will be permitted to disturb that unanimity which is so desirable on the present occasion.
Lord Hollandnext rose. He began by assuring their lordships, that he had no intention when he entered the House that evening, to trouble their lordships with any observations on the Speech which had been delivered to them from the Throne—or to say one word which might interrupt the unanimity of their lordships on the present occasion. Many reasons, with which it was unnecessary to trouble their lordships, some of a private and personal nature, and some of a public and general character, made him wish not to enter into debate for any unnecessary purpose. He had expected, that the address which would be proposed that night in reply to his majesty's Speech would be one which would not cause any great, difference of opinion. He had been willing to overlook its faults of omission, many and grievous as they were: and he had been willing, moreover, to overlook any inconsiderate expressions, with which he might not be inclined to agree: and he would even now say, that with the general substance of the Speech he for one, was pretty well satisfied. He fully agreed with the noble lord, that the expressions which his majesty had used upon one great point—he meant his desire for peace—were such as became the Throne, and ought to be expected from it; and he felt as strongly as the Speech itself, that the great object 12 which his majesty's late government had had in view was the preservation of peace, and he made no doubt that those who had put the Speech into his majesty's mouth were actuated at present by similar wishes. To the substance of the Speech—or he would rather say, to the substantives, of the Speech—he felt little inclined to object; but there were epithets, there were adjectives added to those substantives, which conveyed to his mind impressions which were by no means warranted by facts, and to which he could not give his consent, even for a moment. The first was the calling the Ottoman Porte "our ancient ally." He knew hot what meaning the two noble lords who had just spoken annexed to the terms "antiquity" and "alliance." They must have other notions of "alliance" than he had; they must apply the term "ancient" in a sense which he could never allow it to have, when applied to transactions between nation and nation, when they presumed to say that Turkey was the "ancient ally" of Great Britain. If he understood any thing of the meaning of words, the only alliance of Great Britain with Turkey was very short-lived in its duration, and very recent in its history; for he did not suppose that the noble lords would contend, that the existence of peace or commercial treaties between the two countries constituted alliance between them. The address of that evening proved the contrary. In that address were mentioned treaties of amity and commerce concluded with a new republic of Mexico? Was it meant thereby that that republic, which was at war with Spain, was to be considered henceforward as an ally of Great Britain? He knew not what the precise meaning of the term "ally" was in diplomatic language, but he conceived that, in common parlance, it meant a party who had a common interest in the existence and prosperity of another party. Now, with respect to Turkey, it was not true to say, that she was the ancient ally of Great Britain, in this sense of the word. The alliance between the two countries had not existed at any time for more than seven years. "I can say, unfortunately for myself," continued his lordship, "that I am rather an old man in this House, I am long known to most of your lordships." I trust, however, that I am not yet become a piece of antiquity among you; and yet I recollect the first treaty of alliance that 13 was ever formed by this country with Turkey. It was thought extraordinary at the time, that one of the stipulations of that treaty should be, that it should only last seven years; and yet it may appear more extraordinary to your lordships to learn, that before those seven years had expired, every article in that treaty had been violated over and over again by Turkey. Our ancient ally! I should like to know what was the nature of the alliance. The noble lord who spoke last admits that the alliance is not recognized by ancient treaty, but that it depends upon oral traditions, which had been handed down by one Turkish minister to another for the last three hundred years. We have heard, in various publications, of the antiquity of our commercial relations with Turkey; I am therefore anxious to say a word or two upon that part of the subject. I believe that they commenced in the reign of James, 1st; that they were formally recognized by the Porte to the time of Charles 2nd and William 3rd; and that they were at last brought into the shape of a treaty by an individual to whose exertions his country is highly indebted—I mean my honourable friend Mr. Adair. To go through the whole of the negative proof which I could produce to convince your lordships that Turkey is not the ancient ally of England would be tedious. I shall content myself with observing, that the anti-social race which now enjoys the empire of the Constantines, considers itself naturally at war with every nation with which it has not entered into a formal treaty of peace. I do not deny that it has entered into a treaty of peace with us; but, can a treaty of peace be fairly considered as a treaty of alliance? The first treaty made between this country and Turkey, I have no doubt, was considered by the Turks, as an act of grace and concession, yielded by them, in the plenitude of their power to those dogs of Christians, the Nazarene nations. The privileges which were granted to our commerce, were obtained from the Porte about 1699, by lord Winchilsea and sir John Finch, and other able members of that family. But how, I would ask, were they granted? Were the names of lord Winchilsea or sir John Finch subscribed to any treaty which secured them? No such thing. The privileges were granted as we would throw a bone to a dog: they were given, too, fox very special reasons. And what do 14 your lordships suppose those reasons were? The first was, because the messages which Charles the 2nd had sent to the Sultan were of an agreeable nature; the second because Charles 2nd was considered to be a very powerful monarch among the Nazarene nations; and the last and most ludicrous was, because the Sultan had heard that Charles was the arbiter of the differences among them. For those reasons the Sultan granted to our countrymen what was called, by a sort of diplomatic euphonism, certain capitulations, but what I believe to have been called, in the Turkish language, boons or concessions. Those concessions or capitulations—call them by which name you please—were merely commercial; they gave to the subjects of Great Britain the same immunities which had been granted, on the same terms, to the subjects of France. We had, however, no political relations with Turkey, in any sense of the word, until the year 1699. In 1692, we offered our services to mediate between the emperor of Germany and the Turkish power who were then at war; and we did so, in order to leave our ancient ally, the house of Austria,—for Austria was our ancient ally, and Russia, too, was our ancient ally,—in a situation to direct her arms, along with us, against the then colossal power of France. And what was the result of that negotiation? We were accused, by French writers,—I shall not stop to examine whether rightly or wrongly,—of having exercised our mediation with gross partiality, and with having inflicted by it a severe injury on the Ottoman power. One of the articles in the treaty, into which the Turks entered under our mediations, was to this effect,—that they should surrender the whole of the Morea and of Greece, into the hands of the Venetians. So that the result of our first political negotiation with Turkey was, to wrest Greece from its dominion; though, unfortunately, not for ever.—In the year 1718, we again entered into a political negotiation with Turkey; but under circumstances which, I contend, still preclude us from denominating her our "ancient ally." It. is right, however, to state that, by that treaty, we recognized Turkey as the sovereign of Greece, which a fatal war had enabled her to recover from the Venetians. There were some circumstances, which occurred about that time, which are so very remarkable, that, if your lordship should not consider them quite irrelevant 15 to the matter in debate, I must be permitted to mention. In the year 1718, the governments of England and France were, as now, by the course of events, closely allied together. A dispute arose between the emperor of Germany and the king of Spain, in which they both refused to take any share. On the contrary, they concluded with each other a treaty, of which the object was, to obtain the general pacification of Europe, upon terms to which: they thought it reasonable that both the emperor of Germany and the king of Spain should agree. With this view they agreed with each other, to propose an armistice to the two parties, until the question between them should be settled by the mediation of the great powers of Europe; and they determined to compel by force, if need were, the party who refused such armistice to accede to it. One of the disputants, Germany, acquiesced at once in the proposals of the mediating parties. Spain, however, dissented. She refused to comply with the conditions proposed to her, and went on equipping fleets, raising armies, and executing all those projects which the allied governments of Great Britain and France so much disapproved. Both of them bestirred themselves to dissuade the King of Spain from the course which he was pursuing. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of that day, lord Stanhope, travelled in person to Madrid; pointed out to the Spanish government the consequences of the absurd scheme of conquest which it was meditating upon the emperor's dominions in Italy; stated the mischief which would result to humanity from the devastation of that beautiful country; and said, that it was the intention of England to send a powerful squadron into the Mediterranean, to prevent the landing of Spanish troops in any part of Italy. This did not do. A powerful squadron was subsequently sent out by the British government, and the command of it was intrusted to as great and distinguished an officer as the British navy ever possessed; he meant sir George Byng, afterwards lord Torrington. And not the least part of that gallant officer's glory was, that upon that occasion he had dared to do that which sir Edward Codrington had recently done at Navarino; namely, to consider his orders as authorizing him to carry into execution, by the force of the British navy, the great object for which he had been sent into the 16 Mediterranean. When sir George Byng arrived off Cape St. Vincent, he sent his secretary to Madrid, to communicate to the king of Spain, to his prime minister the cardinal Alberoni, and to the Spanish government generally, first of all the amount of his force, and its arrival in those parts; and next, the exact nature of his instructions. He likewise insisted that the Spanish government should give him an answer in eight and forty hours. Cardinal Alberoni, who was then strenuously exerting himself to restore the vigour of a dispirited nation, at first took a high tone, and told him, that his master was determined to run all risks, rather than recal his armaments, or consent to a suspension of arms. The cardinal, however, subsequently laid lord Torrington's letter before the king of Spain, and contrived to lengthen the negotiation from two to nine days. In the mean time, the Spanish troops landed in Sicily Lord Torrington on his arrival at Messina, found, to his great vexation, as sir Edward Codrington found when he arrived off Greece, that the land forces of the king of Spain had arrived at their destination, and that their naval force was anchored close by. What did he do? He immediately sent his own captain with a polite message to the Spanish general the marquis de Lede,—as sir Edward Codrington sent his captain to Ibrahim Pacha,—proposing a cessation of arms for two months in Sicily, in order that the powers of Europe might have time to concert measures for restoring a lasting peace. He told him that the English and French governments were allied together to establish a general pacification. He therefore proposed to the Spanish general, either to agree to an armistice for two months, or to withdraw his troops altogether from Sicily, in which case he would undertake to convey them in safety to Spain. The Spanish general's answer to this proposition was, that he was an officer, not an ambassador,—that he had authority to fight, but no powers to treat,—that he was aware of the great power of England and France united; but that he should obey the orders which he had received, and which directed him to reduce Sicily for his master the king of Spain. The Spanish fleet had sailed from the harbour of Messina on the day before the English fleet appeared there; but in consequence of an accident, it was subsequently descried on the coast of Calabria. 17 What was the conduct, my lords, of lord Torrington? Did he look to this word, or that word, of his instructions? No: he looked, as he ought to look, and as I trust every British seaman will look, not to the letter but to the spirit and object of his instructions. He immediately gave chase to the Spanish fleet, brought it to action, and as sir Edward Codrington did at Navarino, attacked and annihilated it. It was stated at the time by lord Torrington, that the Spanish fleet fired first. The Spaniards denied it. I think that, under the circumstances, it was of no consequence whether we fired first or not. They had a right to say, "You came up to me ready for action—you came either to intimidate or insult me. Insult is the same thing as aggression, and I had a right to resist your aggression as I best could." Our justification rested upon our right to become the aggressors, if we thought proper; and not upon the casual circumstance of which fleet the first shot came from. All these circumstances are the very circumstances which recently happened at Navarino. The similarity, however, goes still further. It so happened, that at the time when lord Torrington destroyed the Spanish fleet in the gallant manner which I have just described, we had at home a very powerful and exasperated faction of Tories [a laugh]. They had been long, very long, accustomed to the possession and abuse of power, and they were sorely exasperated at the unexpected loss of it. There were also, unfortunately, certain great Whig leaders, who were not a little exasperated at not having been included in the administration which succeeded them. There were also some ex-ministers, who had framed the original treaty with France; and who, after its formation, had had the misfortune to lose the genial influence of the sunshine of power. There were also in the country, what I hope is now quite extinct—a set of bigotted jure divino legitimates, who were the secret favourers of Spain, and the avowed defenders of tyranny and arbitrary, hereditary, and undefecated, despotism, in every quarter of the world. All these parties, owing to some strange coincidence of conviction, joined in reprobating the measure which lord Torrington had executed, crying out with loud and angry voices, that it was a gross violation of the sacred principles of the law of nations, and prating very unintelligibly about the fatal and alarming consequences to which it must 18 inevitably lead. Nay, family and traditionary history relates, that there were vague rumours afloat at the time, that the British minister for Foreign Affairs, becoming suddenly afraid of the consequences of the wise, just, and spirited measure, which he had himself recommended, was inclined to throw the odium and responsibility of it on the gallant admiral who had carried it into execution. But, if there was any such intention on his part, which I trust and hope there was not, the administration was rescued from that ignominy by the approbation which the gallant admiral shortly afterwards received from two distinguished royal personages; for George the 1st, admiring the bravery of the achievement, wrote a letter with his own hand to lord Torrington, complimenting him upon it; and the emperor of Germany afterwards did the same. Both those letters are now preserved in the archives of the family; from a laudable pride in the exploit of their illustrious progenitor. These letters state, that the admiral had truly conceived the true spirit of his instructions, and had acted, as British seamen will always act; namely, destroy those who, if preserved, would defeat the object for which the fleet was sent out. With respect to the judgment which posterity has passed upon it, I have a right to observe, that posterity was quite satisfied with it; for it secured for many years the peace of Europe, and saved Italy from the desolation of war. The people of England were also satisfied with it; because the British navy had covered itself with glory in the transaction, and had added another to its former triumphs. And as to the objection—I particularly beg the attention of the noble seconder to this observation—as to the objection which was made by the minister of Spain, and by the Opposition of England, to its being a violation of the laws of nations, Mr. Secretary Craggs in the House of Commons, and lord Stanhope in the House of Lords,* both answered it, by showing the designs which the king of Spain was prepared to carry into execution, and by charging him, in aggravation, with having attacked the emperor of Germany, when he was engaged in a war with the "common enemy of Christendom," the Turk. —And this, my lord, brings me back to the question from which I started; namely,
* Parl. History, vol. vii—pp. 561, 564.19 the propriety of the Speech from the Throne, styling the Ottoman Porte our "ancient" ally; for the two Secretaries stated, in 1718, that the attack made by Spain upon Germany, when Germany was at war with the Turks, was a species of delinquency which rendered all that had been done justifiable—that it was a sort of aggression against, the interests of Christendom and of Europe. Strange language this, my lords, for an old and faithful ally! very odd language! But it was accidental—they were pressed in argument. Mr. Craggs might state this because he was pressed in argument, and did not know what to say; and perhaps lord Stanhope might say this because he could say nothing else; but how does ii happen that another Secretary of State, one of the greatest ornaments this country ever produced, the friend of lord Stanhope, had, three years before, said the same thing? Mr. Addison, who was not only a philosopher, but one of the wisest and best men on the Face of the earth, remarked upon the bad effect of the numerous journalists in this country, and the great spirit of writing and reading politics in the country, and went on to say, that, though there was no absurdity to which people, by this itch for talking and writing politics, might not be brought, he did not believe it possible that there could be persons in England who could think that we were interested in the prosperity of the Ottoman empire. Therefore, after the two political relations we had with Turkey, in one of which we extorted this very Greece from the Turks, we have the declaration of two Secretaries of State, and of another man, afterwards Secretary of State, as to the interest which this country has in Ottoman politics. But, I may be told, "these are old stories: we do not use the word 'ancient' in this kind of sense; we do not attach a great deal of meaning to it." But, what happened afterwards? From that period to the year 1770, I do not know any thing of political Feeling towards the Turks; nor, indeed, until we come to the memorable debate in this House on the affair of Oczakow. A most every man who had held office, and had authority, stated, that the opinion of lord Chatham was, that we should never have any kind of connexion whatever with the Ottoman Porte; and that opinion was fortified during the seven years' war by a similar opinion of the king of Prussia, In 1770 20 our allies, the Russians, sent a great fleet into the Mediterranean, for the purpose of overpowering the Turks. What was the policy of this country? To assist the Russian navy. That fleet was refitted in our harbours, and, with the munitions and implements which it received from us, burnt a Turkish town and fleet, and continued cruising in the Archipelago for no less than five or six years.—Then we come to the business of Oczakow. We had an object in preventing Russia from possessing Oczakow. My lords, did Mr. Pitt, in that part of his career—which I do not consider the most honourable part of his administration—propose an alliance with Turkey? Did he come down and say, "Here is your ancient and faithful ally that is attacked?" Did he say, "Here is a power attacked which we are interested in defending?" No. Mr. Pitt knew well enough—he must have kn6wh from his father, there was no sort of alliance between this country and Turkey, and never had been; but he said this, "We have established a new system in Europe"—and he prided himself upon it—"Prussia forms a main part of that system, and, for the interest of Prussia, we must prevent the proposed aggression of Russia upon Turkey." My lords, Mr. Pitt was hot the only person who used this language at that time; but I defy any of your lordship's to show that Mr. Pitt, or any of his friends, ever spoke of Turkey at that time as bur "ancient ally." There is another individual, nearly connected with myself, whose sentiments upon that occasion I will not—nay, I dare not—trust myself with mentioning to your lordships. They are, however, well known, and will not be forgotten. Mr. Burke, too, speaking on the same subject, after the French Revolution had disappointed the lovers of rational freedom, and had kindled in his breast a pious horror of deserting ancient allies and ancient institutions—Mr. Burke, speaking, as he always did speak, like a man of genius and knowledge—what did Mr. Burke say about our ancient and faithful ally the Turk? His words, my lords, were these—"I have never before heard it held forth, that the Turkish empire has ever been considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. They had nothing to do with European power; they considered themselves as wholly Asiatic. Where is the Turkish resident at our court, the court 21 of Prussia, or of Holland? They despise and contemn all Christian princes, as infidels, and only wish to subdue and exterminate them and their people. What have these worse than savages to do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction, and pestilence amongst them? The ministers and the policy which shall give these people any weight in Europe, will deserve all the bans and curses of posterity." Very strange language this in an English House of Commons, regarding an ancient and faithful ally! But let us see how this mighty master proceeds.—"All that is holy in religion, all that is moral and humane, demands an abhorrence of every thing which tends to extend the power of that cruel and wasteful empire. Any Christian power is to be preferred to these destructive savages."* I do not mean to say that I approve of the sentiments here expressed. I do hot quote them as rules for the guidance of your lordships; but I bring them, if the learned lord on the woolsack will permit me to use such a phrase, as evidence to the fact, and for the purpose of showing that the Turk was not considered by public men as the ancient ally of Great Britain. I may even add, that on the accession of George 1st, to the throne of this kingdom, it was urged by the courtiers of that day as a strong argument in his favour, that he had fleshed his maiden sword in Greece against the Turks—a pregnant proof, by the bye, that the Turk was not at that time considered as the ally of Great Britain.—I now come, my lords, to the first alliance really made with Turkey by this country. What was that alliance? It was an alliance formed in my time, in the year 1798 or 1799, in consequence of the invasion of Egypt by the French, who have often been reproached with being, though they never acknowledged that they were, the ancient ally of the Turks. It has been a reproach to the French nation that they were an ancient ally of the Ottoman empire. When they invaded Egypt, and not before, we entered into a treaty of alliance with the Porte. My lords, I have looked into that treaty this very evening, and I am surprised to find that, so far from its being a treaty of alliance formed for the mutual interests of Turkey and England as against the rest of the world, or as connected with commerce. —So far from being a treaty of alliance,* Parl. History, v. xxix, p. 76.22 formed for the protection of the Turkish empire against its immediate invaders, it is a treaty of alliance, at the invitation of an old and natural ally, the emperor of Russia, to enter, for the first time, into Sri alliance with the Turk. The words of the first article die as follow:—"His Britannic majesty, connected already with his majesty the emperor of Russia by the ties of the strictest alliance, accedes by the present treaty, to the defensive alliance, which, had just been concluded between his majesty the Ottoman emperor and the emperor of Russia, as far as the stipulations thereof are applicable to the local circumstances of his empire, and that of the Sublime Porte." So that all the alliance which we then made with the Sublime Porte, was made through the intervention, and at the express request, of Russia. Now, at the end of that treaty it is said, that notwithstanding the two high contracting parties are desirous to maintain it in force for ever, or at least as long as possible, it appeared most expedient to limit it at that time for seven years, to be computed from the day of the ratifications being exchanged. Strange to say, long before those seven years had elapsed, Turkey had broken all the main articles of that treaty which bound, it to remain at peace with Russia. We had a right to remonstrate, and we did remonstrate, against the conduct which it followed. It broke them, too, in as far as they related to us; for they had bound themselves to have no friends that were not our friends, and to enter into no relations with those who declared themselves our enemies. Many of your lordships must be aware, that long before the year 1807, we had occasion to remonstrate against the great influence which general Sebastiani, an agent of the emperor Napoleon, had assumed in the divan. That of itself would have been a legitimate ground of war. We refrained, however, as long as we justly could from hostilities with the Ottoman Porte; but three months had not passed after the expiration of the treaty, before we were obliged to send a fleet to Constantinople, to enforce Out opinion, and to bring them to reason; that is to say, by compelling the performance of the articles of the treaty with Russia. —Then, my lords, I do say, that I have proved to your lordships that Turkey h neither an ancient nor a faithful ally. Since that time no alliance has been made: we have preserved the relations of peace 23 and amity, but we have done no more. We have undoubtedly obtained a recognition, under the treaty, of those rights which had been granted as a boon so far back as the time of Charles 2nd. I do not wish to go at present into the general question of the justice or policy of the proceeding of this country on the subject. I do hope that those who framed the Speech are satisfied with themselves: for myself, I am convinced that it is much more convenient to the House, and much more respectful towards his majesty, to defer any decision until all the papers are before the House. I only lament there is another word in the Speech from the throne to which I do not know what meaning to attach. I certainly hope that the two noble lords who have spoken will leave the word out of the address, or give us some explanation of it. I allude to the word "untoward." If it is meant, by "untoward," that any blame is to be cast on the gallant officer who commanded the fleet at Navarino, I must say that against the baseness and ignominy of such an insinuation I would protest in the most solemn way. In Johnson's Dictionary the meaning is "froward, perverse, vexatious." If we are to understand from the word "untoward," that it refers to that which happened by accident, and which stood across the object which we had in view—if that be the meaning of it, I must also protest against it. However much I may lament the effusion of blood which has taken place at Navarino—however much I may lament that we have not yet accomplished so great an object as the pacification of two contending countries, and the liberation of Greece—that country from which we derived no small portion of all those virtues which exalt and dignify our nature, and to which we owe all that gives life and animation to our debates—however much I may mourn over the deferred hopes of a brave and gallant people—still if by that word it is meant to say, that the battle of Navarino is an obstacle to the independence of Greece, I cannot agree to its justice. I think it has furthered and promoted it. I look upon it as a step, and a great step, towards the pacification of Europe: and consider it of more use than a contrary policy could have been, in promoting that great and desirable object. I defer the discussion on the other parts of this subject to a future opportunity. All I wish at present to prove is, that those who have 24 framed the Treaties to which the Speech refers, and the great officers who have been intrusted with the execution of them will not be considered in so doing to have deserted either the ancient ally or the ancient policy of Great Britain; and that if, in the course of their career, they have pursued an object great and glorious to the country, and have not completely succeeded in attaining it, they will receive the praise of their countrymen for what they have effected, and not their censure for what they have found it impossible to execute.—The noble lord sat down amidst loud cheers.
Lord Kingsaid, that before their lordships separated, he wished to offer a word or two on a very homely subject, of which, he was sorry to see there was no mention either in the Speech from the Throne or in the Address, though it had occupied no inconsiderable portion of their lordships' time during the last session. He meant the Corn-laws. Now, that subject appeared to him to be a more difficult subject for the administration even than the battle of Navarino. It would be a grievous question to any administration, and it would not be less so to the present, seeing that there were in it two or three avowed friends, two or three decided enemies, and—what was, perhaps, more dangerous than all, two or three concealed enemies to the Corn-laws. As there were in the present administration some persons who had been in the last administration, and in the administration before the last, and who most probably would also be found in the next administration, it was to be hoped, that while they were busy in making terms, and no doubt good terms, for themselves, they had not forgotten to make equally good terms for their own principles of free trade, and for a new Corn-law. He would, however, ask what security the country had upon the point? It was said, that the country had the same President of the Board of Trade that it had before. Now, he thought that the country would have a much better security, if the noble duke at the head of the government, who had the whole substantial power—who had not only the common and ordinary powers of prime minister, but had concentrated in himself the civil and military power—was known to entertain views favourable to free trade, and to the subject to which he alluded; but when he recollected the noble duke's conduct last year, 25 he thought it a most inadequate security merely to have the continuance of the same person who, for a few months, had occupied the place of President of the Board of Trade. The country had been told, that it had obtained security that the foreign policy of the former administration would not be departed from, seeing that it had the same Foreign Secretary still in office. Now, he considered that security not a whit better than the security they had obtained on the other question: he believed that both those personages were mere satellites of the person at the head of the government, and must necessarily be drawn into his vortex. The old saying, that "there was a power behind the Throne greater than the Throne itself," seemed to be totally reversed; for there semed to be a power before the Throne more formidable than the Throne itself. He should be happy if the securities turned out better than he expected. He should be delighted to give his support to any measures of free trade, which, it was said, certain persons had secured, and should be greatly disappointed if they were not carried into effect.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonsaid:—My lords, if there be any one subject more than another, on which the country is agreed as one man, it is, that there should be a complete settlement of the Corn question. I have, therefore, very great pleasure in being enabled to inform your lordships, that it is the intention of his majesty's government, at an early period of the present session, to submit to the consideration of parliament a measure relative to the Corn-laws, and for regulating the importation of corn, founded upon the principle of the measure which was introduced last session. Having thus been under the necessity of addressing your lordships, in answer to the question put to me by the noble baron, I hope I may be permitted to say a few words in answer to what fell from the noble lord who addressed the House just now. First, with regard to the term "ancient ally," I must state that the Ottoman power has long been an ally of this country; that the Ottoman power is an essential part of the balance of power in Europe; that the preservation of the Ottoman power has been, for a considerable number of years, an object, not only to this country, but to the whole of Europe; and that the revolutions which have occurred, the changes of possession which 26 have taken place in that part of the world, render the preservation of the Ottoman power as an independent power, capable of defending itself, an essential object. My lords, I would likewise say, that not only has the preservation of that power been an object to this country, but it has likewise been an essential object to Russia. I believe I may safely say that, had it not been for the influence of the councils of this country over the Ottoman power during the late war, the disaster which finally led to the establishment of Europe in the state in which it is now found would not have occurred to the extent to which it did occur in the year 1812. Under these circumstances, although the word "ancient ally" will not apply to an alliance by treaties of a hundred years standing, yet there is no doubt whatever that the Ottoman power has been an ally of this country, and certainly an old ally. My lords, there is another term made use of by his majesty in his Speech, and in the Address, I mean the term "untoward event." My lords, the sense in which untoward is used is this. Under the treaty, which has not yet been laid before the House, and which cannot come regularly under discussion until it has been so laid, but which we have all read, it is particularly stated, as one of the stipulations of the alliance, that the operation of the treaty was not to lead to hostilities, and that the contracting powers were to take no part in hostilities. Therefore, my lords, I say, that when, unfortunately, the operations under the treaty did lead to hostilities, it was an untoward circumstance. My lords, it was hoped and expected, I believe, by the former government, that this object would be effected without hostilities. I believe it, not only from the treaty itself, but I believe it because the force they provided to carry the measure into execution was such as to render it almost impossible that there should be hostilities. That being the case, I say that when these hostilities unfortunately took place, that when the course of the measures of the late government assumed the character of hostilities, instead of that of peace, it was an untoward event. I say, also, that understanding there was some chance—some prospect—after the account of this event had reached Constantinople, that it might have ended in war, that that was an untoward event. His majesty now tells us, that these chances have disappeared; he hopes that 27 this event will no longer be an impediment to the amicable adjustment of the existing differences between the Porte and the Greeks; out, nevertheless, that does not at all deprive the event of its character of "untoward." The noble baron opposite has said, "Do you mean to make a charge against your naval commander?" Certainly not. No man has a right to make a charge against him. His majesty and his life government, who have had the gallant admirals conduct under their consideration, have wholly acquitted him of blame; and I certainly have no right to come forward and say that the gallant admiral has done otherwise than his duty to his king and his country. I will say, that the gallant admiral was placed in a very delicate and peculiar situation. He was in command of a squadron of ships, acting in conjunction with admirals of other nations, and he so conducted himself as to acquire their confidence, and to induce them to allow him to lead them to victory. Feeling this to be the case, I should feel myself unworthy of the high situation which hold in his majesty's councils if I were capable of uttering; a single word against the gallant admiral. Meaning, as I did, that the government should carry the Treaty fairly into execution, it would be highly blamable in me to insinuate a censure against the man who was charged with the execution of difficult orders under that Treaty.
§ The Earl of Eldonexpresssed a hope that, in the arduous situation in which the country was at present placed, no impediment would be thrown in the way of the government, in their efforts for the preservation of the peace of Europe. It could hardly be said, that there had been an administration in the country for the last nine months. It could hardly be said that there had been a parliament in the country which had either considered or done any thing for the same period. Under these circumstances, it was high time to look to the most pressing object of British interests,—the preservation of the peace of Europe. He did not mean to enter into the consideration of the treaties which had been alluded to, seeing that they were not at present before their lordships. If, however, he understood the meaning of those treaties, as he had read them in various publications, one of them aimed at the preserving of peace, and the other provided that hostilities should not be committed. Yet, in the 28 face, of those treaties, that had taken place which might assuredly be called an untoward event. Let him not be misunderstood. God forbid that he should throw any blame on the gallant admiral to whom reference had been made! No person, knowing the difficult situation in which the gallant officer was placed, could, without being acquainted with all the circumstances of the case, venture to say whether he had acted rightly or wrongly. Still, he could not avoid observing that, in one sense, the battle of Navarino was an untoward event. When he considered the actual situation of the country, with reference to the interests pf agriculture, trade, and finance, there was in his opinion no one object which could be put in competition with the necessity of gating every step, consistently with the honour of a great country, to bring about peace. He should give his hearty support to the Address.
The Marquis of Londonderrysaid, that the last time he had spoken in that House, he had expressed his disapprobation of an unnatural alliance, which he had prophecied would soon dwindle away. A noble lord opposite had then made a very ingenious remark; but he would now ask him, whether recent events had not completely fulfilled his prophecy? He rejoiced at the change which had taken place. He trusted that, under the new administration, the country would be placed on a high and commanding situation. The name of the illustrious individual at the head of the government carried great weight with it throughout Europe. In no transaction of his public life had he failed. Indeed, he seemed to have been born under a star which insured him success. Now that his noble friend was at the head of the national councils, he was persuaded the interests of the country, both at home and abroad, would be managed in such a way, as would again raise England to that proud preeminence from which she had declined during the last year. The noble earl opposite (Grey), than whom no man stood higher in the public opinion on account of his rare consistency and noble disinterestedness, particularly during the events of the last year, had said, that a want of confidence in the person at the head of government was a fair ground of opposition to his administration. He would take the proposition in its converse sense, and say, that his unbounded confidence in the 29 present premier would induce him to give his entire support, without reference to minor points. He knew that the noble duke at the head of the government was incapable of allowing any disunion to exist in his cabinet. Should any part of it be affected by the dry-rot, he would at once cut it off. And if that was a reason for others to support the noble duke's administration, how much stronger must it not be with him, who had for twenty years served side by side, with that great man, in whom he had, never seen any thing but what ought to be esteemed and admired. He said these words honestly and fairly before him; as, since his noble friend had come into his present situation, he had had no other opportunity of testifying his satisfaction at his appointment.
§ Earl Greysaid, that the noble marquis had been pleased to speak of him in a very kind and much too flattering manner. He rose now merely for the purpose of stating distinctly, what he had said on a former occasion, to which the noble marquis had alluded, and which did not bear the interpretation that the noble marquis had put upon it. The noble marquis had stated, that he (earl Grey) had said, that a want of confidence in the head of the administration was a just ground of opposition to the administration. Now, he did not recollect that he had given expression to such a sentiment. He did undoubtedly say, that a want of confidence in the head of the administration was a just, nay, the best ground for any man refusing his accession to it. He had said, further, that a want of confidence, not in the head only of an administration—for it was not a personal objection that had actuated him in his conduct last year, it was an objection to the general principle on which the administration was composed—but a want of confidence in an administration generally, was an effectual bar to a pledge of general support. That was the situation in which he found himself placed last year. He did not see in the composition of the cabinet such an assurance for the prosecution of measures and principles which he considered essential to the good government and prosperity of the country, as would induce him to give it his general support; and on those grounds he withheld his support, although some members of that administration were persons entitled, in the fullest extent, to his confidence. At the same time, however, 30 he had stated, that he would not support—certainly, that he would not be reckoned a member of—any opposition which might be formed against that administration. Such was his situation last year; and in a similar situation, he still found himself. He went the full length of respect noble marquis in the tribute, of respect which he had paid to the noble duke at the head of the government. It was hardly possible that any person could feel' more warm admiration towards that distinguished individual than he did; but in the composition of the administration there were defects which rendered it impossible that he could give it his general countenance. Nothing could make him happier than to find, as occasions occurred, that the measures of the administration would be of such a nature as to entitle them to his support; but, under present circumstances, he must stand aloof, supporting the measures of government when they seemed to be for the advantage of the country, and opposing them, however reluctantly, when he could not conscientiously believe them to be of that description. Having now said more, perhaps, than enough in explanation of the conduct of a person of so little consequence as himself, he would make a few observations upon what had occurred that evening. He agreed with the learned lord who spoke from the cross-bench, in considering the battle of Navarino a most untoward event. He was not disposed, from any knowledge which he had of the circumstances of the case, to impute blame to the gallant officer who had commanded upon that occasion. He had long been acquainted with sir Edward Codrington, and could undertake to assert, that a better, a braver, or a more skilful, officer did not exist. He agreed with the noble duke, that it would be extremely unjust to look with too critical an eye at the conduct of an officer placed in such difficult circumstances as sir Edward had been, and who had exerted himself to support what he believed to be the true interest and honour of his country. It was with the greatest satisfaction he had heard from the noble duke, that whatever word might be employed in the royal Speech, whether "untoward" or any thing else—no intention existed of throwing any imputation on the conduct of that gallant officer. With respect to the transaction I itself, he concurred with the learned lord in thinking it most unfortunate. That the 31 effect which was naturally to be expected from such an event might be averted, he sincerely trusted; and the generally pacific tone of the royal Speech increased his hopes on this head. His noble friend behind him (lord Holland), who had addressed the House with his usual acuteness, and had displayed a considerable extent of information, had, in the course of a speech, which he must think his noble friend had better have reserved until the subject should come under discussion, instituted a parallel between the battle of Navarino, and an event which had occurred in the early part of the last century under sir George Byng. He suspected that, when the two cases came to be carefully examined, considerable points of distinction would be found to exist between them. Upon this topic, however, he would anticipate nothing. Whatever impression he might have on the subject, he felt it to be becoming, and indeed absolutely necessary, to reserve the expression of his opinions, until the requisite information should be laid before their lordships. When the period to which he alluded arrived, he should be prepared to state fearlessly, and without reference to any party interests, his opinion upon the subject. Before he sat down, he desired to say one word upon another topic. A noble friend of his had put a question with respect to an omission in the royal Speech, and the noble duke had stated in reply, that it was the intention of government to introduce a bill respecting the trade in corn, founded upon the principle of the bill of last session. He had voted for that bill on the second reading, and therefore could have no objection to the introduction of a bill on the same principle. Now, he objected to some of the regulations of the bill of last session, and thought, besides, that it might be improved; and therefore, if a bill precisely similar, should be introduced, it would, in his opinion, require amendment. What he was anxious to do was, to direct the attention of the House to the fact, that the noble duke had stated only that a bill would be introduced founded on the same principles as that of last year; but not that the same bill would be introduced. Unless this point were explained, the noble duke's answer might possibly be misconstrued.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, that the noble earl had rightly understood him. What he had stated was, that a bill would 32 be brought in, founded on the principle of the measure of last session; certainly not the same measure.
§ The Earl of Darnley moved, that the words, "ancient ally," in the Address, be omitted, and the words "a country at peace and amity with us" be substituted for them.
§ Earl Ferrersbegged to ask the noble duke at the head of the government, whether he retained the office of commander-in-chief of the forces?
§ The Duke of Wellingtonreplied, that when he received his majesty's commands to form an Administration, he felt great reluctance to place himself at the head of it. Finding, however, that it was the unanimous opinion of his colleagues, that he ought to occupy that situation, and finding also that, under the circumstances, it was not easy to find a person to fill the office which he now had the honour to hold, he determined to resign the office of commander in chief.
The Marquis of Lansdownesaid, he did not rise with the intention of offering the slightest objection to the Address, which it was his ardent wish to see unanimously carried; but, after what had been stated in the course of the discussion, having recently been honoured with an office in a situation in his majesty's government, he felt himself called upon to declare, that there was no one act of that government, but more especially no one of its acts connected with the transactions which had been the subject of that night's conversation, that he would not consider himself bound to defend. He could assure his noble friend at the head of the foreign department, who immediately represented the person at the head of that department before him; whose dying instructions he received; and whose intentions he was expected to fulfil; that whenever he should be called upon to defend the whole of that system of which he was the representative, from whatever side of the House the attack might proceed, he would find in him a sincere and zealous, though perhaps a useless, supporter. He felt confident, that even though his noble friend should not be able to do so, he himself could satisfy the House of the sound principles on which the negotiations had proceeded. He could also satisfy the House and the country, that no danger of war had been unnecessarily incurred by his majesty's ministers. He was not only 33 bound to make this declaration, but he felt it his duty to say, in relation to the recent conflict, that if any blame did attach any where, most assuredly it was not on the gallant officer who commanded the fleet. He agreed with the noble duke opposite, and with other noble lords who had spoken, that the battle of Navarino was an unfortunate circumstance, inasmuch as it occasioned the destruction of life, and tended to lead to those unhappy consequences, which always contributed to alienate friendly powers, and to set them in something like interminable hostility with each other; but, at the same time, he should be ashamed if he did not declare that it would be childish to expect that when an armed interference had been determined on by treaty, it could take place without the risk of war. He agreed with the noble duke in thinking, that war should not take place, if the objects of the intervention could be effected without it; but the consequences of opposition must have been foreseen by those who framed the protocol and the treaty of London. There was no meaning in establishing a hostile intervention unless we were prepared to encounter all the consequences which must result from it, melancholy as they might be. He hoped his majesty's ministers would be able to prove that no blame rested any where; but that the conduct of our commander at Navarino was part of the policy which he had not heard, in the course of that night's debate, it was intended to change; but, if ministers entertained any such intention, he hoped they would have the manliness to avow it. If, however, blame rested any where, it would be easy to prove that it did not rest with the gallant individual who had been so frequently alluded to, and never without praise and honour, but with those who concluded the treaties that had placed him in the situation in which he appeared to have exercised a sound discretion, with reference to his sense of duty. Although he was anxious that the Address should be carried without opposition, he could not have given it his support without the explanation from the noble duke with respect to the term "untoward," as applied to that gallant commander who had presided over the allied fleets during the conflict. When the documents should be laid before their lordships, it would appear that the gallant officer was intrusted with a necessarily large, but well and fairly-exercised, 34 discretion. He hoped that, in justice to the gallant admiral, all the documents possible would be produced. On the intelligence of the affair at Navarino reaching this country, it was found that further information was wanting. That information was supplied; and being supplied, it was seen that the gallant admiral was entitled to the warm approbation of the government and of the country. It was not incumbent on him to say more upon the present occasion. With respect to other events, he was prepared to give the fullest explanation when called upon. He had risen merely to enter his protest on behalf of a gallant individual, who was entitled to the protection, not of his friends alone, but of every individual who possessed a particle of British honour.
Lord Goderichsaid, that, having been a member of the government under which the noble duke had been instructed to sign the protocol at St. Petersburgh, and having also been a party to the treaty of London, he felt it due to his own character to say that he subscribed entirely to all that had fallen from his noble friend who had spoken last. Whenever the time should arrive for discussing the course of policy in which he had had a share, he should be prepared to express his sentiments with the same fearlessness with which he now addressed their lordships; and he concurred with his noble friend in believing, that it would not be difficult to prove, that there was nothing in that policy, or in the particular transaction growing out of it, inconsistent with the honour of the country or its best interests. He entirely concurred in all that had been, said respecting the conduct of sir Edward Codrington. In his opinion he had exercised a sound discretion. He was placed in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, and he had discharged his duty with consummate skill and courage. He was prepared to support the gallant admiral, not only on the principle that it was the duty of a government to support those who executed their orders, but from a deliberate conviction that he was justified, under the circumstances, in the course which he had taken, and that in taking that course he had neither tarnished his own previously acquired fame, nor sullied the honour and glory of his country.
Earl Dudleysaid, that his noble friend at the head of the government had stated, that the foreign policy which had been 35 adopted by the late administration, would be persevered in; and that he desired, also, to confirm what his noble friend had asserted. With regard to the affair at Navarino, he concurred in all that had been said in praise of the course pursued by sir Edward Codrington.
§ The Address was agreed to nem. diss.
§ The usual sessional orders were voted, and the earl of Shaftesbury was appointed chairman of committees.