TURKEY AND GREECE—BATTELE OF NAVARIN — MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS.

HL Deb 11 February 1828 vol 18 cc260-305

The order of the day being read,

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, it was with great regret that he stated to their lordships that his noble friend (lord Holland) who had given notice of a motion for today was, through indisposition, unable to attend. His noble friend had four motions ready, which he had intended to move that day. All those motions were more or less connected with the question of our relations with Turkey, and the measures taken by the government of this country relative to the affairs of Greece. Two of those motions were such only as tended to illustrate the views of his noble friend respecting the nature of our relations with Turkey. Those questions it was not his intention to touch upon, leaving to his noble friend, on his recovery, to use his own discretion in bringing them forward. The other two which he intended to submit to their lordships, were merely motions for additional papers, to enable their lordships to make a fair estimate of the policy of this country; which he was convinced it was impossible for their lordships to do, relying solely on the papers which had been laid before them. Another object of these motions—no less important than the former—was to obtain additional information, that we might pay the debt which was due to our gallant officers engaged in the battle of Navarin: for although the country was fairly, fully, and perfectly satisfied with their meritorious conduct, from reading the newspapers and the gazette, which communicated the intelligence of that battle, yet their lordships were far from possessing that information which would enable them to know what were the instructions given to the commanders of the combined fleet, or whether those instructions were well or ill carried into execution. He was sure that every noble lord would agree with him when he stated, that there was no object which Englishmen had more at heart, than to give to every gallant officer—and in this instance the officer was one of the best and bravest in the service—the opportunity of clearing up any insinuations which might have been thrown out against his character, and of removing any surmise, that his conduct was not as satisfactory to the existing government as it was to the late administration, to the country at large, and to his Sovereign, who had testified his approbation of his conduct by conferring honours upon him. With respect to both these objects, he was sure their lordships would see the necessity for further information. The information which he intended to move for would be, in the first instance, for a copy of the instructions which had been sent by the combined powers to each of the officers commanding the allied fleet, which had been signed by the ambassadors of each power at London. After that, he should move, with a view to ascertain how the officers had acted upon those instructions, for copies of any communication or despatch relative to the circumstances which preceded the battle of Navarin, which may have been previously or subsequently to that event received from admiral Codrington, or any other officer. He could not anticipate any difficulty which government could feel to lay before the House both those communications, but he would say, that if they were withheld, the country and the House would be left in a most awkward, embarrassing, and unsatisfactory situation, with respect to circumstances of the utmost importance.—The only part of the policy of his majesty's government upon which their lordships were enabled to form any thing like a judgment from the papers laid before them, was merely as to the right, in the first instance, and next as to the policy, of interfering at all between the Greeks and the Turks. With a view to come to an opinion upon that subject, their lordships had sufficient information in the protocol, the treaty, and the additional article to the treaty, which were the whole of the documents before them. There were some persons who maintained, that no case can be made out to justify or to excuse an interference with the internal policy of foreign nations. To that opinion, thus broadly laid down, he could not accede. Upon the propriety of non-interference he felt much less strongly than other persons, whose opinions he considered of great weight; but still he thought that the history of all times, and of our country, teemed with examples in which such interpositions had taken place. In the instance of interposition between the Greeks and Turks, two grounds for such interposition might be assumed; either that of right or of expediency. But if it were contended that admitting, as the treaty states, that horrors disgraceful to humanity were perpetrated, still it ought not to be permitted to the governments in Europe, having the power and the means to put an end to those horrors, to do so, but that they should be compelled to tolerate them to infinity—such an abstract principle he never could admit. But, if their lordships considered that the effect of a contracted conflict between two powers on all the countries around, would be to familiarize mankind to scenes of horror, that was a further reason for bringing those horrors to an end. This was one of the grounds which justified a case of interposition; and he thought that, in the case of Greece, a sufficient case had been made out, on behalf of suffering humanity, to call upon the great powers to interpose. There was, however, in all cases of interposition, a danger to be apprehended. Pretences were often made to carry into execution plans of ambition, in the name of suffering humanity. But what was the situation of the government of this country? The government found that those powers which would have had the means of availing themselves, for such views of ambition, of the distracted state of the belligerent country, were willing to waive all such views, and to unite cordially, in a league with the government of this country, to interpose to the extent of restoring tranquillity, and with a complete abstinence of all pursuits of ambition.—The next question was one of great importance, and which had occurred in all ages and countries; namely, as to the right and policy of interference, whenever our interest was affected, directly or indirectly, by the continuation of a distracted state of things in another country. It was a very short time—only a few hours—since his noble friend had informed him of his inability to attend, and had requested him to move for that information which he had intended to move for himself. At so short a notice, it had been impossible for him to look far back, or to consult any thing beyond the page of history. It did occur to him, however, that there must be many instances similar to the present, of interference in the behalf of the unfortunate subjects of other countries, proceeding from the cause of the difference of religion. Looking back to that glorious period of our history, the reign of Elizabeth, he found many instances of interference with the internal policy of foreign nations, by-granting supplies, and even by invasion, by landing troops, and by carrying on military operations in foreign countries, in aid of the revolted subjects of other powers, while we remained in amity and peace with them, and in an alliance stronger than that which existed with Turkey; and while the ambassadors of those powers were in London, and the English ambassadors at the courts of the respective powers.—He would refer to the few instances of interference which he had selected. The first instance which occurred to him was during the minority of Charles 9th of France, three years after the peace which had been concluded by the treaty of Chateau-Cambresis, the terms of which stated, that it should never be lawful for either of the contracting princes to give protection to the rebellious subjects of the other, but that they should deliver them up to their respective masters. Here was a treaty, by which the contracting parties were specifically bound to give up the revolted subjects of each other. It was in 1562, three years subsequent to that treaty, that the Prince of Condé, heading a rebellion against the government of his country, applied to Elizabeth for succour. That queen assisted him, by the grant of 100,000 crowns and 6,000 infantry. Those troops landed in France, and remained there during the military operations and unsuccessful campaign of the Prince of Condé, and, during all that time, England continued in peace with France. Another instance occurred in 1585, at which time Elizabeth sent troops to the amount of 6,000, as well as arms and money, to the assistance of the Huguenots, while she remained during the whole period at peace with the court of Spain. Another case of interposition was that of the Low Countries. The Low Countries, owing to religious differences, had revolted from the crown of Spain—from the dominion of their legitimate prince; for there could be no question as to his legitimacy. They were people fighting for their religious freedom, and precisely in the same situation as the Greeks. Here we found that, in 1568, a Spanish squadron, laden with a good deal of money, being pursued by some French privateers, took refuge in an English harbour. The money with which the ships were laden was intended for the duke of Alva, in order to enable him to continue with effect the war against the insurgents. As soon as Elizabeth discovered that fact, she actually intercepted the money; and, though re- peatedly asked to give it up by the Spanish ambassador, refused to deliver it out of her hands. In 1578, troops were raised in England for the service of the Romanists, though Elizabeth had actually entered into a treaty with the Prince of the Netherlands. A manifesto was soon after published, stating that the alliance between the kings of England and the Prince of the Netherlands was not so much between persons as between states; and, from those words, Elizabeth drew the inference, that she might assist the inhabitants of the Low Countries, without infringing that treaty. That, then, was a treaty of alliance; and, in stating these facts, he was merely calling to the recollection of their lordships circumstances which were known to them; namely, that during those periods it was the practice and the policy of this country to support, in different parts of Europe, the revolted subjects of other powers against their legitimate sovereigns; and, in one instance, to which he had alluded, where she was bound by a treaty—something more like an alliance than could be proved to exist with Turkey—to deliver the rebellious subjects up to their sovereign.—There were, at various times, instances of interposition. We were ourselves the victims of the application of this principle. Upon one memorable occasion, when Mr. Pitt was in power, he had always heard the policy of this government commended. He alluded to the policy of this country, in conjunction with Prussia, with respect to the revolution in Holland, which took place in 1787, when that revolution was put an end to by the sudden march of the duke of Brunswick against Amsterdam. That act of policy had been greatly admired; for it really had become a question, whether this country should endeavour to maintain her connexion with Holland, or allow that connexion to be transferred to France, out of whose influence that revolution had arisen. He had always heard that act praised as being one of the wisest acts of Mr. Pitt's administration. The history of Europe, since those years, had been full of instances of interference with the internal government of foreign states. Whatever, therefore, might be our feelings respecting the policy of interference in the Greek question, the facts of precedents and of usage were established; and upon a question between right and usage, how could we hope, by our black-letter law, to bring the question to a decision? It might be contended, that the principle of non-interference ought not to be departed from, and their lordships might concur in it; but, if we did that, we should do still better by getting rid of all alliances, shutting ourselves up within our own circle, and letting all other countries go to ruin. If we were, however, to interfere in the affairs of Europe, we must be guided by policy, and by those principles so often and so signally recognized and asserted. The broad principle of non-interference should, he would admit, be the foundation of all treaties between foreign powers; but he would contend, that it ought to be relaxed, should imperious circumstances demand it. The principle of the Holy Alliance had been that of interference; but it had been uniformly exerted, not to put down anarchy, its professed object, but to crush all attempts at establishing free and liberal institutions. Was that a species of interference that ought to be applauded, while an interference with a contrary object was to be Condemned? Let their lordships look to the proceedings of the Holy Alliance, and to the present case of interference. They would find this difference between them; the interference of the Holy Alliance had been uniformly directed to put down the liberties of nations, the other was for the purpose of raising a people dear to us, not only from associations of old recollections, but from the brave and wonderful resistance which they had opposed to their oppressors. He thought he had now proved enough—in establishing, that the practice of interference on behalf of suffering humanity, was not an innovation for which no precedent could be produced, but that it had long been known to European policy. It only remained for him to show whether or not the principle had, in the present instance, been wisely applied. It might be said, that the instances of interference on the part of this country, which he had mentioned, were such as suited her policy. They were, however, instances of danger to this country: but what danger could arise from the state of Turkey? Now, he never would admit that Turkey and Greece formed no part of the balance of Europe. There was a time when they did not. Russia also formed a great and most important part of the balance of Europe. It was a state neighbouring on Turkey, powerful from its extent and position. Now, he would ask whether any one could have looked without anxiety at the state of the Turkish empire—could have seen the distracted condition of that country, and not have felt that the balance of power in the east of Europe was in danger of being broken from hour to hour. Not only had civil war endured for a long period on land, but it had been prosecuted at sea with extraordinary vigour. Could noble lords believe that such a state of things was not calculated to affect the interests of every nation in Europe? Could any one suppose that such a state of things would not give rise to violations of neutrality, and occasion a war, not between one or two powers, but the greater part of Europe? The wise policy of the English government had; been, to unite in a common treaty three powers, which, perhaps, had never before been so long or so cordially united, or with so much fairness and sincerity, for the purpose of interposing between Turkey and Greece—not for the dismembering of that empire—not with the same views as three great powers had interposed in the affairs of Poland—but to lay aside, in the event of war, all excuses and pretences for aggrandizement, and direct their united efforts to restore tranquillity, and to give an opportunity of prolonging the peace, which, from the state of the Turkish empire, was likely to be disturbed. The only question between those who Condemned, and those who approved of the present act of interference was, whether the step which had been taken was more likely to involve the great powers of Europe in a conflict, or to prevent such a danger. Let their lordships look to the policy of Russia, to its position, and then ask themselves, whether it were possible that such a civil war should exist in Turkey for any length of time without a military interference. Let them consider, that the Greek religion existed through the Russian dominions; and, if Turkey should wage war against that religion, was it in the nature of man that the Russians should remain calm spectators of the destruction—he had almost said annihilation—of the Greeks? He felt rather surprised at their long forbearance; but, when in so peaceful a temper, and with such moderation, the Russians invited this country to put an end to the wretched state of affairs which existed in Greece, giving us assurances that they would act in conjunction with us for one common object, would it not have been something more than folly, if this country had refused to accede to the proposal?—if we had said to the Russians, "we will not countenance your proposition—we protest against the proceeding—we will not act in concert with you—we will not be bound by any treaties—we leave Turkey to be occupied by you, as Spain is by France?" Ought this country, having the means offered her of objecting to any aggrandizement on the part of Russia, to have neglected the opportunity, and left herself without any right to call hereafter upon Russia to restore to freedom and independence whatever countries she might have enslaved? Ought we to have left Russia irritated at our policy, and ready to act single-handed—which must have been the case, according to all experience, before many years had passed? It could not be doubted, from the character of the Russians, that feelings would burst forth which governments cannot always control, and to which the Russian government must pay attention. No one could believe that that government could long have kept inactive the people of that country, connected as they are with the Greeks by religious ties, and for whom they feel a common interest.—It appearing, however, from the treaty before their lordships, that we had adopted the broad principle to which he had referred, he now wished for the production of other documents, to ascertain whether or not the government of this country had followed it up by sending out such instructions to the Mediterranean as were calculated to give it effect. It was with this view that he meant to move for copies of those instructions. He trusted it would be found from them, that the most cordial measures had been adopted to promote the object of this alliance. He also asked for the production of these papers, because he felt that the whole people of England took the deepest interest in the subject. It was not unnatural that they should entertain an anxious desire to have the fullest explanation of a case, in which such a strange difference existed between the manner in which it was treated by the government of France, and the dull phraseology, the "untoward" language applied to it by the present administration of this country. He was aware that the House had been told, at the commencement of the session, by he noble field-marshal who was placed at the head of the government, that the treaty entered into must be fulfilled; but their lordships well knew, that there was a material difference between acting upon a treaty with determination and energy, and adopting such a cold, hesitating, feeble line of conduct, as would render that treaty little better than a dead letter. Undoubtedly, the language of ministers induced an apprehension—it might be a peculiarity in their style—of a virtual, if not actual, dissolution of this treaty. In that case, it was only to the co-operation of France and Russia that we had to look for the realization of those hopes respecting Greece, which were so ardently entertained; but if Russia found that England manifested a cold compliance with the obligation of the treaty, he feared she would soon adopt such a line of policy as this country would long have occasion to rue. These were the feelings which led him to ask for information on this subject. He was aware that he could have obtained a complete explanation, from his noble friend (the marquis of Lansdowne) near him, so far as regarded the period during which he had been in office; but the noble marquis could not inform him of what had taken place subsequently; he could not explain the causes which led to the cold phraseology to which he had before alluded. For this explanation, therefore, he must look to his noble friend opposite. His noble friend, who had been the friend of Mr. Canning, and who was now the colleague of Mr. Canning's bitter opponent, could give him all the information he required; for he had formed part of the late administration, and of the administration which preceded that, and he was now happy in forming a part of the noble duke's administration. His noble friend had been lately advanced in a new character, and one in which the country took a deep interest; namely, a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty. The noble earl was the residuary devisee of his departed friend's political principles; he had maintained, both at home and abroad, the liberal policy of Mr. Canning. To him, therefore, the country looked for the perfect fulfilment of this measure. His noble friend had filled an important character in the recent union which had taken place: their lordships had heard much of the language of a cestui-que-trust—they now saw that this cestui-que-trust— this great guarantee, had been powerful to effect much; for he had caused two members of the late administration who could not sit together in the same cabinet, to take their places side by side without any danger of violence. He supposed these two right hon. gentlemen were bound over to keep the peace towards each other. Was his noble friend also their surety for that purpose? It was, however, to the noble earl and his friends that the country must direct their hopes of the present government, that it may not again fall into what was called the Liverpool administration. He supported the last administration, and that of Mr. Canning which preceded it, because he felt that they were the most remote in principle from that of lord Liverpool. He had therefore hailed them as the dawn of better feeling: but now the old rampant creature threatened to revive; the snake had been scotched, not killed. He saw that all that had taken place in the cabinet had only been contrived for the purpose of getting rid of a few independent Whig members who, by being placed there, prevented the two parts of the Liverpool worm from re-uniting. There was, in reality, no pretence for the change which had taken place in the ministry. With respect to lord Liverpool, he entertained the greatest esteem for that unfortunate nobleman; but towards the thing called the Liverpool principle, he entertained the opposite feeling. If such principles were again to prevail, their lordships would again have green bags upon their table, and red coats at the next popular meeting. But perhaps they could look to the "guarantee" for preservation from these principles, if he would but come forward and state fairly, that he had accepted a pledge for the continuance of that policy which he had previously maintained. He was most desirous for this avowal; for he looked with great anxiety to this guarantee, and wished to know what the country had to expect at his hands. He did not know if this ministry would follow the examples set them last year; but he dared to say there were many who now wished that much of what was said last year was unuttered. He did not wish to know why the viscount (Goderich) had resigned his most important office — whether the communication was oral, or by letter, or merely contained in a postscript. He trusted, nevertheless, that the noble viscount would explain to the House, con- duct which he was, no doubt, well able to defend. He knew that noble viscount's character well, and respected it highly, and was sure that what he had done was done with a view to the welfare of his country. He would now move for "Copies of all Instructions to the Admirals of the Combined Fleets in the Mediterranean, agreed upon by the British, French, and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and transmitted to the said Admirals between the 6th of July, and the 20th of October, 1827." He should follow this motion up by another, for certain explanatory documents preceding the battle of Navarin, to the production of which he presumed, there would be no objection, as he only called for papers which had been transmitted to Constantinople. Some further despatches may also have been received from sir E. Codrington, subsequent to the battle, which, for his own sake, and for the sake of the service, ought to be laid upon the table. Every thing ought to be freely supplied, that could place the conduct of that, gallant officer in the clearest and most honourable light.

Earl Dudley

said, he feared he should disappointment the expectation of his noble friend, when he stated that it was not his intention to follow him through the various topics upon which he had dilated, and through which he had presumed, somewhat too hastily, that it was his duty to follow him. What he had to say would relate chiefly to the demand for the papers which his noble friend had called for. His noble friend had urged, as a principal reason for their production, that they were necessary to the vindication of the gallant admiral who commanded at Navarin and the officers who served under him. His answer to that was, that the character that was not attacked required no defence. Admiral Codrington, so far from having his conduct attacked by his majesty's government, had received distinguished rewards at their hands. He therefore stood in no need of vindication from them. If his conduct had been criticised by those who had no just grounds for judging of it, that was not a reason why his majesty's ministers should make out a defence for him, by the production of papers, which, for grave political reasons, it was inexpedient to produce. Besides, even if there were no objection to the production of these papers, others would be required in illustration of them; for they could only be rendered intelligible by the production of the communications which had passed between our Ambassador at Constantinople, and the Allied Powers; while these, again, would lead to the necessity of producing others which, under present circumstances, it would be highly inexpedient to produce. It was rather too much, therefore, to ask for documents of this description, when not even an opinion was called for from parliament on the subject to which they referred. In this instance the government of this country was acting in concert with its allies; and they were therefore bound not to betray their confidence. If it had been the object of noble lords to take these affairs out of the hands of the government, and disclose their secrets to those who were most disposed to counteract their views, their lordships could not adopt a mode better calculated to effect that object, than by insisting on the production of these papers. If their lordships considered the Executive government incompetent to adopt and conduct those measures which were most fit to be adopted, then the proper course to pursue would be, not to call upon them to disclose state secrets, but to ask his majesty to transfer to other hands, unbroken, the confidence which had been reposed in theirs. It had been said, that there could be no reason for withholding this information from the people of this country, after it had been communicated to other states. The fact was, that a very small portion of these documents had been so communicated: the great mass of them remained undisclosed. These were the reasons which he had to offer for not acceding to the motion of his noble friend.—There was one other point, in the speech of his noble friend, to which, although he had no intention of entering into any of its details, he would briefly advert. His noble friend, in alluding to the change which had recently taken place in the administration of the country, had insinuated, that between those who remained in office and those who joined them, some sacrifice of principle had taken place, and he had asked what stipulations had been made? Stipulations there were none. If, indeed, there was so little honour or confidence amongst them, that it was necessary to stipulate for each other's principles, they would be, in his opinion, most unfit to act together. No stipulations, therefore, he repeated, had been entered into between them. But if his noble friend asked whether there existed amongst them a fair understanding as to all matters of general policy, he replied directly, and decidedly, Yes.—With regard to the observations of his noble friend respecting the treaty, he could assure him that it was the intention of his majesty's ministers that it should be executed—fully executed. It was never intended" to keep the word of promise to the ear, and break it to the hope." It was meant to be fulfilled, in spirit, as well as to the letter. His understanding upon this subject was, that this treaty, as far as depended on this country, was to be fulfilled in the spirit of peace and conciliation: the object of it being to establish the pacification of Greece; and in that spirit it would be the duty of his majesty's government to carry it into full effect. He knew of no shrinking from that duty, on the part of any member of the government to which he had the honour to belong; nor had he any reason to believe, that, in their mode of fulfilling it, there would be any falling off in the present government from the preceding one. These were all the observations he had to make in reply to the speech of his noble friend. He had endeavoured to express himself shortly in the most satisfactory manner he could. But when his noble friend called upon him to go at large into all the details and circumstances connected with that treaty, he must beg to decline doing so now: this was not the fit time for entering into them. The proper period, however, would arrive; and he would then—should he still have the honour to hold the office which he now filled —go into as ample and as detailed an explanation as his noble friend could desire. It was not because he was afraid of being unable to give the most satisfactory explanation of every circumstance that he declined doing so now, but because he did not think it was either fit, or wise, or seemly, to go into the facts relative to that treaty at the present moment. Whenever the proper time came, he would not shrink from it; but he trusted he had said enough to convince the House, that he ought not at present to comply with the motion of his noble friend.

Lord Goderich

said—If, my lords, I feel myself compelled to offer myself to your lordships' notice at this early period of the debate, I have to offer as an apology that the noble earl who has introduced the motion before the House, having alluded to the circumstances which produced the late change in his majesty's government, imposes it upon me as a duty which I owe to my own honour, to your lordships, and to the country at large, which always takes an interest in the character of any individual, however humble, who has taken a part in its government. I owe it to my own character to explain the grounds upon which I acted on that occasion, and which led to that change in the administration to which the noble earl has alluded. In rising, however, to discharge this duty, I feel that I have to solicit the indulgence of the House, because I am about to withdraw your lordships' attention from the more leading and important subject, which my noble friend has brought before you. Undoubtedly, the more immediate cause which led to the recent change, was the irreconcilable difference of opinion, upon a subject of the deepest moment to the country, between two individuals, members of that government, holding situations of the highest importance in the administration of public affairs [cheers from the marquis of Lansdowne]. My noble friend manifestly understands the circumstances to which I allude. And I will take the present opportunity of stating, although it does not, perhaps, belong immediately to this part of my subject, that, so far as regards the conduct of my noble friend, in the situation which he held, I never had to deal with a man whose character stood higher for honour, for fair dealing, for candour, for conciliation of manner, or for a straightforward disposition in the pursuit of the welfare and interests of his country [hear]. I am almost ashamed to speak in these terms of my noble friend in his presence; but I am forced, in justice, to say thus much.

It must be in the recollection of your lordships, that in the course of the last session, the late Mr. Canning announced to the other House of parliament, that it was the intention of his majesty's government to propose, in the course of the present session, the appointment of a committee of finance. That measure had attracted much of my consideration, and had I remained in the discharge of the duties which had theretofore devolved upon me when in the other House, I should have felt it necessary to submit a proposition of that nature to my colleagues for their consideration. It is not necessary for me to trouble your lordships with an exposition of the reasons which led me to think that there were circumstances in the finances of the country which rendered such a measure desirable. Suffice it to say, in the present instance, that I did think so, and thinking so, I considered that the measure ought to be pursued with an honest and a zealous determination to render it effectual for its purpose. It would have been my duty, concurrently with my two right hon. friends, when I succeeded most unworthily—and I will add most unfortunately, in some respects—to the head of the government last year, to have prepared for the introduction of such a measure. I am now alluding to what would have been my duty had I retained that elevated situation; when I should, in concert with my right hon. friend, the then chancellor of the Exchequer—our situations being those to which the regulation of the finances of the country more immediately belonged—to submit to our colleagues in office, first, the general situation of the public finances; and then, as connected with that subject, the important question of the finance committee, and the mode in which that committee was to be constructed. It did so happen, however, that when the time arrived at which some measure of this nature was contemplated, in the month of November, so many circumstances had arisen, connected with our relations with foreign powers, that it was impossible for me to be prepared to submit to my colleagues any definite or satisfactory view of the subject. It is true, indeed, that the situation of Portugal was then becoming every day more and more settled; and there was every ground of satisfaction and congratulation to every well-wisher of this country and of that; and every reason for hoping that the time was not far distant when it would be competent for the government of this country to withdraw the troops which had been sent to Portugal. It was still, however, uncertain when that desirable event could be accomplished; and when we looked at our external affairs elsewhere, just at that crisis, it must be obvious to all who are conversant with their import, that we were not sure we could altogether escape the perils of war. It was impossible, therefore, under these circumstances for me to ascertain the extent of the demand which it would be necessary for the government to make upon the country, to maintain those establishments which must necessarily be regulated by the state of our external connexions, as well as by the domestic exigencies of the state. That being the case, I was disabled from laying before my colleagues any precise and comprehensive measure respecting the finances of the country, but the question was not therefore out of my mind, or the minds of those who acted with me. In the course of that cordial, friendly and familiar intercourse, which must necessarily be carried on between those who act in office together, and who are not suspicious or jealous of each other—and for my part, I discovered no symptoms of suspicion or jealousy, and I believe my noble friend on my right will confirm me in this [hear, hear ! from the marquis of Lansdowne]— in the course of that friendly and familiar intercourse, which certainly did take place, it was intimated to me by a member of the cabinet, that it would be desirable if there were placed in the chair of the finance committee an individual of the other House who was considered by all who knew him as eminently qualified for the duties which the appointment would impose. As far as regarded that individual, I have long known him, and I entertain a sincere and high regard for him. I know him to be a man of the highest honour, the most incorruptible integrity; and, as a man of business, I know him to be intimately conversant with all those points which would necessarily come under the consideration of the finance committee. It was therefore impossible that I should have felt any personal objection to the appointment of that individual: but, as the matter had not come regularly before the government, but was stated to me merely in a casual and incidental manner, I did not feel myself then called upon to express any other opinion than this—that as the question was one which rested especially with the House of Commons, whatever appointment the members of the cabinet in that House should make I should be satisfied with, and acquiesce in. The matter was not placed before me for my consideration in any thing like an official way, not as at a ministerial conference, but under the circumstances which I have stated, as a mere matter of accidental conversation. It did however, happen, without my being aware, at the time, that such a step had been taken, that a communication was made, not with any view of pledging the government, at least, as I afterwards understood—that a communication was made to the individual in question, for the purpose of ascertaining whether, if the government should be disposed to recommend his nomination as chairman of the committee, he would undertake the duty. This communication I beg to say was made, as I have already declared, without my knowledge, and it was also made without the knowledge of one of the members of the government who, from his situation, was more immediately connected with the subject to which it refers; I mean the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Herries) who was then chancellor of the Exchequer. But I ought to add, that from subsequent explanations which were given to me, I understood that the application was not at all made as a settled thing, or in such a manner as to pledge the government and bind them to the appointment. When, however, I learnt that this communication had been made, the result of which was to me, from my personal feeling towards the individual to whom it was made, any thing but unsatisfactory, the first question I asked was, whether any previous communication had been had with my right hon. friend, the chancellor of the Exchequer? I was informed, that there had not been any. I lamented that circumstance—I could not but lament it—and I imputed it to mere oversight. It seemed to me an unfortunate circumstance that any thing should have passed upon the subject beyond our own immediate circle. I begged that no time might be lost in putting my right hon. friend in possession of what had been done, and in explaining to him the whole of the circumstances. This was done by my right hon. friend, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Huskisson). He explained to the chancellor of the Exchequer fully all that had occurred upon the subject. No objection was then made by the chancellor of the Exchequer. No offence was taken by him at the time, as far as I have heard, to any thing that had been done. It did, however, so happen, that on the next day—after he had had the subject under his consideration—my right hon. friend found that there were very strong objections to the proposed appointment which had been so submitted to him. He stated those objections to me; but I understood them to refer much more to the circumstance, of the nomination having been made without his having been consulted, than to the material proposition itself, and that, so placed, he could not accede to it. Various explanations followed, as I have been informed, some of them by letters between my two right hon. friends, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for the Colonies: and I, who never saw this correspondence, was in hopes, for a time, that such explanations had been perfectly satisfactory to all the parties concerned in it. Indeed, so convinced was my right hon. friend, the colonial Secretary that he had succeeded in removing the objections of my right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he did not feel it necessary to make me acquainted with the correspondence which had taken place between them both, and the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Tierney) from whom the recommendation originally proceeded. For my own part I was quite convinced, that the explanation had proved entirely satisfactory. There might be differences of opinion, as to the propriety of what had been done: difficulties were to be surmounted, and objections, unquestionably, might be made; but I had no reason to believe, that there was any such difference of opinion as would lead any party concerned to conceive, that if that appointment were persisted in, it would be impossible for the individual objecting to remain any longer a member of the government.

These circumstances, your lordships will bear in mind, took place between the latter end of November and the beginning of December; and, on the 22nd of December, I received a letter from my right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in which he first of all stated to me his objections to the mode in which the matter had been discussed, and the negotiation, as he termed it, carried on, and concluded with my sanction, without his knowledge. He then proceeded to state his objections, on public grounds, to the particular nomination; and he concluded by positively informing me, that under these circumstances he felt it his duty, on principle, to place his office of Chancellor of the Exchequer at my disposal, if it were a matter of convenience to me to accept his resignation and put it into any other hands. The conclusion I drew certainly from that letter was, that my right hon. friend tendered the resignation of his place, if the proposed nomination took place. It was utterly impossible not to suppose that that was the obvious meaning of the communication. I felt it to be my duty so to consider it; and every rational man must, I am satisfied, view it in the same light. In answer to my right hon. friend, I stated that he seemed to have greatly misunderstood the degree to which I had been a party to any thing like a settlement of the question, with respect to the chairman of the proposed committee. I explained how the circumstances had arisen, and assured him, there was no ground for saying that an arrangement had been concluded with my sanction, of which in fact I knew nothing until it was over. In reference to the latter part of his letter, I assured my right hon. friend that he was mistaken if he supposed that I could conceive a case in which it would be a convenience to me that he should retire from office; but that at all events, I hoped he would not take any final step, until we should have had an opportunity of giving to the whole question the fullest and most unreserved consideration. I felt it to be my duty to transmit copies of these two letters to my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as he was alluded to in the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I will not enter into a long detail which would be tedious to your lordships. The result unfortunately was, that while, on the one hand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, though he was pressed in the strongest manner not to risk that consistency which is the conformation of the government, and though the most earnest endeavours were made to satisfy him that there was no sufficient reason for the objections which he felt to the proposed nomination, always referred to his first letter, which involved his resignation, as the necessary consequence of that appointment. On the other hand, my right hon. friend, the Secretary of State, distinctly and unequivocally declared, not only in conversation, but in writing, that he felt his own honour and character to be so involved in the maintenance of that nomination, that it was utterly impossible that he could acquiesce in any change. The disagreement then, my lords, as I said at the outset, amounted to this: that there was an irreconcileable difference of opinion between two individuals, holding two of the most important and efficient offices in the State, on a question of vital importance to the proper conduct of the official affairs of the kingdom, It was manifest that, as both of these individuals could not remain in the goverment under the circumstances which had occurred, and with the opinions which they avowed, the administration could not go on with the essential business of the country. This was no fault of mine. I did not raise the difficulty. I had no wish, God knows, that the government should not go on. I had no design, such as the noble earl seems to impute, of shaking off a portion of the administration. I declare before God, my desire was to maintain that administration undivided; and let my opinion be what it may upon the cause of difference, no man can think I could descend to so paltry, so base a trick, as to cause differences among my friends in the Cabinet. God knows I have never done so, I tried to heal not to expose differences! Need I vindicate myself from the insinuation? I hope not, I am sure not—their lordships could not believe it.—The noble lord cannot have intended to impute it [hear, hear, from lord Carnarvon]. What was I to do? In what situation was I placed? There was an irreconcileable difference between two of my colleagues. I found—painfully found—that I could not bring them together. I could not induce either of them to vary his resolution. Under these circumstances, I found it to be my duty to inform his majesty of the situation in which his government stood. I was compelled to make this known. I could not conceal it if I would; and if I had attempted to do so, I should have been guilty of treachery to the king and to the country, and I should have compromised my own honour and that of my colleagues. I thought it my duty, frankly and without reserve, to lay before the king the state in which circumstances had placed the government, at the head of which I had the honour of being placed. His majesty was constitutionally entitled to determine, under these circumstances, what was fit to be done, with a view to the promotion of the interests of the people whom he governed. The decision to which his majesty came was to communicate with the noble duke, who is now at the head of the government, and the result was, that I ceased to hold the situation in which I had the honour to be placed.

My lords, I cannot revert to these circumstances without mixed feelings. I avow that I do feel them. I have served my king and country for eighteen years in offices, some of them offices of great trust and responsibility — and I am not ashamed to say—I feel I am guilty of no arrogance in saying—that while I filled the different offices intrusted to me, most of them connected with the most essential and vital interests of the state—the duties of these offices were not ill discharged [hear, hear !] With respect to the situation I last held, it was one that I can truly say I never coveted. I would not have stirred a step out of my way to have obtained it. I trust I am not destitute of honourable ambition, but at no time have I sought office on personal grounds, nor been induced to retire from it from such motives. When it was proposed to me to succeed Mr. Canning, I felt that I was in a situation in which it was impossible to refuse the offer; not that I could not but be sensible of the immeasurable distance, in point of ability, between that distinguished man and the humble individual who now addresses your lordships. Mr. Canning was not a personal friend of mine. My intercourse with him was purely official; but I entertained the greatest admiration for his public talents, as well as the greatest reverence for his private virtues. He is, unfortunately for his country, now no more. Calumny had been heaped upon his head unsparingly; and had I never spoken to him in the whole course of my life, I could not but have felt some sympathy for his situation, under the load of unmerited obloquy that was heaped upon him [cheers]. For me to have offered myself voluntarily as the successor of such a man would have been a piece of idle vanity—a gross absurdity, of which I am not capable: but, when called upon as I was, I knew of no just plea, upon which I could honourably avoid undertaking the responsibility that was assigned to me.

My lords, under the circumstances which I have stated, I entered office, and I have since retired from that elevated post, in the manner which I have, I hope, sufficiently explained. In thus retiring, I have secured nothing for myself—nothing as regards personal interests, or advantage; but so far as regards honour and character, I feel that I have secured every thing; for I have secured to myself the proud consciousness of having always done my duty to the best of my ability, and the feeling that my honour and character are unassailable. I can truly say that, although I am no longer invested with the attributes of power—although I am no longer clothed with the trappings of office, or encumbered with the dangerous trammels of dignity, I shall ever feel an honest and an ardent anxiety to promote, as far as my humble means can do so, the honour and dignity of the Crown, and the happiness and freedom of the people. So far as may be in my power as an independent peer, I shall always be ready to take an humble part in the noble duty—for such I consider it—of legislating for this great and noble country; and in the performance of that duty, I can take upon me to say, that I shall be as little swayed by motives of personal aggrandizement, as I was when in the more active and ostensible situations in which it has been my lot to be placed; and if it shall be my good fortune to see the government founded upon principles that are honourable and beneficial to the country, and its measures directed by principles of liberality, justice, and discretion, let it be composed of whom it may, it shall have my best wishes for its success. We live, my lords, in a time, when, as it seems to me, persons and names are nothing—principles and measures every thing—[cheers]. This is the view which I take; and if it shall be the lot of the government now in power to contribute to the great objects which combine the interests of all classes in the country, although I shall have no share in it, I shall not grudge them all the credit, gratitude, honour, and applause, which their services will justly call forth.

I have, I fear, said too much of myself; and I will with your lordships' permission, revert to the more immediate subject of discussion. I own, I regret, that my noble friend, the Secretary of State, feels it inconsistent with what he considers to be his duty, to produce the papers which are now called for, although in justice to him I must add, that his reasons for not doing so are cogent, and perfectly satisfactory. I feel too much the paramount importance of the peace of Eastern Europe to throw the slightest obstacle in the way of pending negotiations, or to take a single step which might tend to impede the great object which we have all in view. I shall for one be satisfied, provided that object be obtained. I will not now enter into the grounds of justice or policy which led to the Treaty of London. With much of the reasoning of my noble friend who brought forward the motion I am disposed to agree, although upon some points I may think he has pushed his arguments too far. And this I will, however, at once say, that there were grounds of real justice and true policy in the construction of that Treaty, which rendered our interference either as principals or interceders in the affairs of Turkey and Greece necessary. I say that no man who looked to the state of Europe at the date of the protocol of St. Petersburgh, could avoid feeling that the time for this interference had arisen. I know it was felt most strongly, even two or three years ago. It was felt by those who had looked into all the circumstances, that the dreadful war which had for years been raging between Turkey and Greece had disgraced, endangered, and injured the interests of all the countries of Europe. Unless, therefore, some interference took place, to abate the causes which led to this disorganization, or to remove the results that were springing out of them, there was felt to be a certain degree of risk, that we should soon see strife and confusion spread throughout Europe. This I am prepared to maintain; and I think that none of those who are adverse to the protocol of Petersburgh will dispute it. At least I should be astonished if they were to do so, I am ready to admit, that the mode of interference in the Treaty of July is different from that laid down in the protocol. But, had nothing occurred in the interim to occasion that variation? Had no communication been made to the Porte, calling upon her speedily to settle those differences, by which England, as well as the other powers of Europe, were exposed to so much inconvenience and injury—the destruction of our shipping, the loss of property almost to an indefinite amount, the horrible cruelties and barbarous massacres of the crews of our ships, too disgusting and dreadful to be described? If we could not redress those injuries by amicable remonstrances, we had a right to attempt it by resorting to force. These, my lords, are facts of common notoriety; they are known to the whole world, and on them I am prepared to maintain the justice and necessity of the measures which have been adopted. I have no doubt of shewing satisfactorily, that no principle of the law of nations repudiated the course which has been pursued. The evils pressed upon us with force, and no men possessing in the least degree the foresight of statesmen, could keep out of view the more serious consequences that would have followed. On these grounds, when the question shall be brought regularly before us, I shall be prepared to maintain the justice and propriety of our conduct, upon every recognized principle of the law of nations, and on all the grounds of policy which are acted upon by civilized states. I care not when the discussion comes on—whether it be now or on a future day; but I hope and believe, come when it may, that the justice, reason, and policy of our conduct can be fully maintained; and if the issue can be accomplished, so that these hostilities shall subside in peace, the government which shall achieve that result will receive and deserve the unqualified thanks and approbation of their country.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, in explanation, that the noble viscount seemed to think that he had insinuated something like duplicity against him. If a single word had escaped him which could bear such a construction, nothing could be further from his intention. If there was any man whose character was peculiarly above such a suspicion, that man was the noble viscount.

The Earl of Eldon

said, that after the explanation which had been given by the noble Secretary of State, he did not rise for the purpose of entering upon the question to which the motion immediately referred. Although, on the one hand, he could not undertake to recommend to ministers the adoption of the noble earl's motion, on the other hand, he could not sit in his place, and hear it said, by any authority in that House, that the measures of the government with which he had been connected—he meant at the time when the protocol was signed by the noble duke now his majesty's prime minister—were to be looked upon in the same point of view, as regarded the law of nations, as the treaty of July 1827. He would not follow the noble mover in the discussion of the policy of the measures of the protocol, and of the treaty. Nothing, he was sure, could be more repugnant to itself, than that the noble earl should set out by telling their lordships that the production of the papers was indispensable to the discussion of these measures, and that he should afterwards launch out into an ample examination of the propriety of those measures, which he had before said could not be properly discussed in the absence of information. He would, however, trouble their lordships with a few words on the subject of the protocol and of the treaty but he would previously beg leave to say that so anxious, so teasing, so, vexatious a curiosity did he feel to know the purport of the instructions given to the admirals, that that curiosity could only be repressed by the consideration which he had mentioned. He could not imagine what was the tenor of instructions, which ordered them to prevent collision, but yet to commit no acts of hostility. He wished his noble friend could tell their lordships how three admirals, besides the commanders of God knew how many frigates, could sail into the Bay of Navarino and keep clear of hostilities. Indeed, in the last debate in that House, it was avowed that the treaty necessarily and unavoidably led to hostilities—and yet those who made this avowal were parties to the instructions to prevent collision, but to avoid hostilities! He was an Englishman, an old Englishman, he had English habits and English feelings; and he had no hesitation in saying, that if a Turkish or a French fleet came close alongside an English fleet in one of our own ports, as the English, French, and Russian, fleets did in the bay of Navarino, and if the commander of the English fleet did not fight them because they came there, he would deserve to be employed no longer. The law of England said, that if one man held his fist in the face of another, even though he did not strike him, it was an assault: so might the advance of the combined fleets be considered an assault upon the Turks. With respect to the protocol, it would be found, when examined, a measure consistent with the law of nations, and following up the practice pursued by this government in the instance of the South American colonies, which some noble lords thought had not been interfered with soon enough, while others, were of opinion that they had been interfered with too soon. He was prepared to show, that this government interfered in behalf of the South American colonies at the express moment, and not a moment sooner than by the law of nations it was allowable. When the protocol was examined, it would be found to proceed on precisely the same system. It made a tender of our good offices towards an accommodation; and if they were not accepted, then we were to wait until the law of nations should enable us to do something more. When the question should come on regularly for discussion, he should be prepared to show, that the treaty was indefensible in every principle, as regarded the law of nations.

The Duke of Wellington

said, he did not rise to discuss the principles of the protocol, or of the treaty of July. The time would come when it would be open to their lordships to discuss the policy of those measures fully, and it would be his duty to meet that discussion. It was his firm intention to carry into full and ample execution, according to its spirit, and letter, the treaty to which his majesty was a party. It was his duty to carry that treaty into effect with good faith; and it did not become him to cast any imputation upon it, in the way of comparison with the original measure—the protocol of St. Petersburgh. It was true that the protocol did not carry with it the measures of execution which were attached to the treaty; but it should be recollected, that such measures were under consideration at the time of the protocol, and that they must at some future time be taken into consideration. Although those measures of execution were not the same as were attached to the treaty—although they were not coercive—they were yet such as were calculated to induce the Porte to accept of the proffered mediation. It was not his intention to go into a minute discussion on this subject at the present moment. He would assure the noble mover, that it was his decided intention to carry that treaty into effect, in its spirit as well as in its letter. But he could not help dissenting from a great portion of the speech of the noble lord. He did not admit that it was the right of one country to interfere with the internal regulation of another in all cases. No doubt the political position of countries, in some instances, might justify such interference; but such was not the general rule. Non-interference was the rule: interference the exception. That was the only true and safe policy. He did not mean to say that the interference in the present case was not necessary. He himself had been the means of negotiating the act of interference; but that was an exception to the conduct of this country when her interference had been solicited on the occasion of insurrections in other nations. So far he stated in corroboration of what had been said by his noble friend (lord Dudley) on the subject of the motion. With regard to the instructions, there was no doubt that they were intended to be drawn up, and were in fact drawn up by the ministers of the united courts residing in London. They were not the instructions of this government alone: they proceeded from the three governments, and were the result of various diplomatic conferences between the ministers of those powers. Besides, it should be recollected, that they referred to a transaction which was not yet concluded, and, if the British government alone had issued them, it would be the duty of its ministers to entreat their lordships not to ask for those instructions, until the transactions should be in such a state that their production could not be attended with mischievous consequences. Having before stated the intention of government to carry into execution the treaty of July, it was not without surprise that he had heard the noble lord opposite ask his noble friend near him what guarantee he had for the execution of that convention? From the moment that he had received from his majesty the commission to form a new administration—a commission which he had executed to the best of his ability—from that moment he felt it to be his duty to parry strictly into effect the provisions of the treaty. In all his communications with his noble friend, and with those gentlemen who had done him the honour to unite with him in carrying on his majesty's government, he had distinctly stated that such was his firm intention. The noble lord talked of guarantee? Did the noble lord suppose that those gentlemen who had done him the honour to connect themselves with him in his majesty's service, knowing as they did the opinions which he entertained and the principles which he professed—did the noble lord imagine, that they would come to him and require a guarantee for the due practical applications of those principles, before they would concur with him in carrying on the measures of government? Or was it to be believed, on the other hand, that, entertaining those opinions, he would abandon them for the purpose—the corrupt purpose (for such it would be)—of procuring the support and services of those gentlemen in consideration of that sacrifice? Is it to be supposed (continued the noble duke) that the right hon. gentleman to whom I understand the noble earl to allude, could have used the expressions ascribed to him at the Liverpool election? If my right hon. friend had entered into any such corrupt bargain as he was repre- sented to describe, he would have tarnished his own fame, as much as I should have disgraced mine. It is much more probable—though I have not thought it worth my while to ask for any explanation on the subject—that my right hon. friend stated, not that he had concluded any wholesale bargain with me, but that the men of whom the government is now composed are in themselves a guarantee to the public, that their measures will be such as will be conducive to his majesty's honour and interests, and to the happiness of the people. That is what the right hon. gentleman said, if I am not mistaken; and not that I had given him any guarantee for the principles of the government. No guarantee was required, and none was given on my part. But I beg to know, supposing any guarantee had been given to any one gentleman who acceded to the government, what has been done towards others in the same situation? Was there no other man whom it was necessary to satisfy in the government but the right hon. gentleman? Every member of an existing government has a right to state his views of the duties of that government, to have his objections satisfied, to state his opinions upon every subject proposed for the consideration of government, and to have those opinions decided upon. How, then, does the matter stand? Surely, I could not have withheld explanations from some, and given guarantees to others. I appeal to my noble friend near me, whether every member of the present government cannot state his opinions as fairly and as freely now as under any preceding administration. It is conducted on the same principles as the cabinet of which I was a member for eight years, under lord Liverpool, and in which all measures were fairly considered by all the members of it. I was an assenting party to the greater part of the measures of that government, and therefore I hold myself responsible for them equally with the other members of that government. My opinions are perfectly well known. I have departed from none of them; nor has my right hon. friend, I believe, departed from any of his.

The Marquis of Clanricarde

said:—My lords, it is with great diffidence that I intrude upon the time and attention of this House; but, notwithstanding what has fallen from the noble earl on the cross-bench upon the subject of explanations, I cannot refrain from seeking to obtain a more detailed explanation from the noble Secretary of State opposite, of the motives which induced him to act in concert with noble lords to whom, in the last session of parliament, he appeared to be directly opposed.

It is needless for me to recall to your lordships' recollection the occurrences of that session, or to recapitulate in detail, the grounds upon which I conclude that the coalition which has taken place could not, by possibility, have been entered into under ordinary circumstances. Surely, private feelings, and respect for the memory of an individual, to whom my noble friend was long personally, as well as latterly, politically attached, would have prevented it; and I am bound to believe that a strong sense of public duty alone can have induced my noble friend to unite himself with the noble lords on the opposite side of the House.

I hope I shall meet with the indulgence of the House, if, in seeking these explanations of my noble friend, I am led, almost unavoidably, to refer to the statements and explanations lately entered into by a right hon. gentleman, and which have been already alluded to in the course of this debate. I am anxious to learn whether my noble friend concurs in what has been stated by the right hon. gentleman, upon whose speech I wish to make some remarks. My right hon. friend is explicit and satisfactory, as far as he goes, in his account of the reconstruction of the government in the last autumn, consequent upon an event, for which I will not intrude the expression of any private feelings, but which, I must be allowed to say, I consider to have been a great national calamity: but he has omitted to take to himself the credit, which I think he deserves, for having at that time made a declaration (in which I understood that the noble earl had joined, he will set me right if I am misinformed) that nothing should induce him to take a part in an administration with those who had been so personally hostile to his late lamented friend.

I see no reason why a declaration, which, in my humble opinion, does honour to the feelings of those who made it, should be withheld from the public. It seems we are to consider no explanation as to political motives necessary; for we are told, that no differences of opinion existed between any members of the present government and my late lamented relative, Upon that I can only say, that if it be true, I am free to confess, that I have, for a long time, laboured under a great mistake—a mistake which I consider to be the more extraordinary, seeing that I know many persons, better able to form a correct judgment upon this subject than I am, to have shared it with me: I shall be glad to hear any proofs which the noble earl can adduce to settle my doubts on this head; for I own that my right hon. friend's assertion, that such impressions are without foundation has not quite convinced me of their fallacy.

But my right hon. friend, not content with stating his conviction, that there existed no difference of opinion between my lamented relative and the noble duke at the head of the present administration, has insinuated, that the present arrangement would have received the approbation of the distinguished individual who is now no more. I do not hesitate to assert, that the government, as at present constituted, would never have received his sanction; and in support of that opinion I will, with your lordships' permission, read an extract of a letter addressed by him to the noble duke, on the 5th of May, 1827. It was in consequence of, indeed in answer to, a speech delivered in this House by the noble duke a few days before its date; and I hope I shall be guilty of no impropriety in now quoting from it the sentiments of the writer on the point in question: There is but one other point in your grace's speech which appears to call for any observation from me. Your grace emphatically says, that your being at the head of the government was wholly out of the question. I learned this opinion of your grace with sincere pleasure. The union of the whole power, civil and military, in the same hands (for your grace as prime minister could never have effectually divested yourself of your influence over the army) would certainly, in my opinion, have constituted a station too great for any subject, and one incompatible with the practice of a free constitution. Nothing would have induced me to serve under such a form of government, and I was rejoiced to find that your grace's opinion was always against such an arrangement. Upon this subject I need say no more. I cannot impart any additional weight to such ample and unanswerable testimony of my lamented relative's opinion upon it. I must say, that I think my right hon. friend has fallen into a great error, if he supposed that he was supporting the principles of his lamented friend, by joining the present administration; and I hope the noble earl will give to the House a more explicit detail of the motives which guided him. The noble duke's speech has made my noble friend's conduct appear to me even more inexplicable than it did before.

Earl Dudley

said, that in answer to the observations of the noble marquis, he rose to state the two reasons which had formed the grounds of his recent conduct. And first he would allude to those peculiar and personal circumstances which, it was said, ought to have influenced his conduct as an individual; and then to those public and political principles which ought to have influenced his conduct as a minister. On both these heads he should offer a few words. And, first, as to the peculiar grounds arising out of personal attachment, which ought, in the judgment of that noble marquis, to have prevented him from taking office under the present administration. It was stated, that there were certain persons in the present government, who, soon after the formation of the late cabinet, had used angry expressions towards some of the members of that cabinet, and particularly towards its illustrious head; and it was therefore said, that as he had been a member of that cabinet, and had acted under its leader, he ought to have declined taking a situation in the present administration. Now, he would ask their lordships, whether they would sanction the doctrine, that the use of such expressions ought never to be forgotten,—whether they would admit such a plea as the sacred duty of immortalizing hatred, and of sacrificing public grounds of action to the claims of private friendship,—whether, looking back at the history of the country, and of the most distinguished characters who had conducted its councils, they would tell the world that, in point of prudence, of duty, and of private feeling, public men were bound to cherish for ever the sentiments of political opposition which they had once had the misfortune to entertain against, each other? He would remind their lordships, that the life of his lamented friend afforded a strong proof in illustration of his opinion upon this particular point. Were there ever feelings of greater bitterness;—feelings which displayed themselves not merely in the shape of personal ill will, but of direct quarrel and conflict—than those which once existed between his right hon. friend and the noble marquis, the minister for Foreign Affairs to whom he succeeded? They, however, were reconciled to each other, and consented to sit and to act together in the same cabinet; and yet, with that circumstance notorious to all the world, what was the lesson which the noble marquis opposite now wished to teach the House? For his own part, he was of opinion that it was a matter of high praise to both the illustrious individuals to whom he had alluded, that they had had the manliness both to forget and to forgive. He had repeatedly had the happiness of seeing them, after their personal conflict, acting together not merely with all the sincerity which the public situations which they respectively held demanded of them, but he believed in his conscience with all the kindness and frankness of private cordiality. Was it, then, he would ask, from the example of his illustrious and lamented friend, that he was to learn the lesson of uncompromising and unrelenting political hostility. To that great and distinguished man he was bound by the ties of early and long-continued friendship: he might even say by the ties of gratitude; for if the situation which he had then the honour to hold was an object of ambition and gratification, he had obtained it entirely by the kindness and partiality of his deceased friend. For him, therefore, to cast any imputation on the conduct of the late premier—for him to do any thing, in acceding to the present government, which was either unkind or disrespectful to his departed friend's memory, was, if he knew aught of his own heart, a matter quite impossible. He had asked himself the question, whether there was any private or personal consideration which ought to prevent him from acting in concert with the members of the present administration, seeing that his own political opinions generally coincided with theirs; and the answer which his conscience dictated to that question was, that no such consideration did exist. He sincerely believed that there was no difference of opinion, which the efflux of time would not have dissipated; in point of fact, the differences which existed between his right hon. friend and the gentlemen now in office were not of a personal nature. And that they were so regarded by Mr. Canning himself his conduct towards those noble lords and gentlemen sufficiently proved. Notwithstanding any angry discussions which might have been going on in this or in the other House, habits of personal intercourse were cultivated by him with his opponents. Having said thus much in explanation of his own conduct as regarded his right hon. friend, he would now offer a word as to the terms upon which he had become a member of the present administration. A good deal had been said about stipulation. If by stipulation was meant that sort of agreement by which one man consented to forego something which he ought to have maintained, in order to keep in with any set of men—in that sense there certainly was no stipulation. But if by stipulation was meant any communication or preliminary understanding, with respect to some points of great political importance—that was, whether certain impressions were not made upon the minds of the surviving members of the late cabinet, by conferences with the noble duke at the head of the government—such an understanding did exist. We did not stipulate that the government should incline in favour of what was generally called Catholic emancipation. We only understood that a strict neutrality should be observed upon it by the government, as was the case with the two cabinets which preceded it. We did not stipulate that the noble duke should not abandon the treaties into which the late government had entered with foreign powers. We heard from the noble duke the footing upon which he wished the government to stand. We understood from him, that he was inclined to observe the same fair and complete neutrality, with respect to the Catholic question, which had been observed under the two former governments. With regard to another point; namely, the foreign policy of the country, the noble duke had also declared, that having found, by the minutes of council of his predecessors, that his majesty was bound by treaty to perform certain agreements entered into with other powers, he spontaneously, and as part of his duty, would maintain and perform those agreements, from a proper regard for the honour of his master and the interests of the country. Stipulations, he repeated, they made none; but their understanding and agreement were, upon all subjects, complete; and under such circumstances, he said, once and for all, that he was not ashamed of retaining the situation in his majesty's present adminis- tration, which it was his fortune to have held under the administration which immediately preceded it.

The Marquis of Lansdowne

said, that although he had sufficient motives in what had already passed that evening before their lordships to determine him upon undergoing the painful task of asking their lordships' attention to circumstances purely personal to himself, still he deemed it most respectful to the House, to the importance of the question which had been moved by his noble friend, and to the great political considerations with which that question was connected, to ask the attention of their lordships on that evening to a short detail of facts, which it would have been his bounden duty, at some time or other, to submit to their lordships. He should do this the more willingly, because, though he was under the necessity of adverting to several considerations personal to himself, he should certainly take no part in those views of a personal nature, which had been lately brought forward by the noble earl at the head of the foreign department, and by the noble marquis who preceded him, respecting the circumstances which had led the noble earl to leave that government of which he and the noble earl formed a part, and to join that of which the noble earl now was a constituent member.

With respect to the motion which is at present before your lordships (continued the noble marquis), I must frankly confess to my noble friend and to your lordships, that anxious, most anxious as I feel, not only that the papers for which my noble friend has moved, but also that other papers connected with them, going much further back into the transactions, and most necessary to their full and perfect elucidation, should be produced, still, after the solemn asseveration of my noble friend at the head of the foreign department, that he is engaged in negotiation respecting them at this very moment, I, notwithstanding my private impression, that all the papers may be safely produced, must acquiesce in the objection which my noble friend at the head of the foreign department has made to their production at this time, and must express my hope, that my noble friend who originated this debate will not press his motion to a division. I am the more ready to acquiesce in the objection taken by my noble friend, and to believe in the motives which he has stated for declining to assent to this motion, because I know of no person who is more interested than he is in the production of the whole of these papers. No person, I say, is more interested than my noble friend is, as well on account of the light which they will throw upon the correspondence which he has himself conducted on this subject, as on account of the honour which they are certain to reflect upon those who preceded him in his own immediate office, upon the policy and talents of his late right hon. friend, to whom such frequent allusion has been made this night, whose services were unhappily lost to his country in the course of last year, at a time when they were most likely to be beneficial, and whose magnificent endowments shone with the brightest blaze, at the very moment when they were about to be extinguished forever. Yes, my lords, great and resplendent as the fame of that right hon. gentleman already is, when these papers shall be produced, it will derive additional lustre. I am the more confident of the effect which they must hereafter produce upon the minds of your lordships and of the public, in guiding the judgment, which the noble earl tells you, and tells you justly you ought not to form, until after you have seen them; I am the more confident, I say, of the effect which they must produce, from observing the effect which they have already produced on a noble lord opposite, who from his situation has been enabled to inspect them. If the noble lord who now holds the privy seal (lord Ellenborough), and from whom I heard the last general Condemnation which was passed in this House upon the foreign policy of Mr. Canning's administration—if that noble lord on perusing these papers, has not only been able to bring himself to join in an unanimous vote of this House in approbation of the expedition which Mr. Canning sent to Portugal—an expedition which I heard him, last year, in this very House, most loudly Condemn—if he has convinced himself of the justice and expediency of the principles which actuated Mr. Canning's foreign policy, out of which, I call upon the noble earl at the head of the foreign department to confirm me, when I say that every act of the government emanated for the last six months—if he has honestly and conscientiously—and I do not doubt that he has honestly and conscientiously—brought himself to form part of a government, the head of which has this evening promulgated in a manner that can admit of no doubt, that there is to be no change in the foreign policy which Mr. Canning adopted—I can have no doubt that those who approach these papers without that natural bias, which the expression of past opinion may naturally be supposed to create, will rise from the perusal of them with the warmest admiration of the genius and ability which shines forth in every line of them.

Although I perfectly agree with the noble earl opposite, that it would be most unwise and impolitic to consider what are the real merits of this question without first seeing all the documents connected with it, and not merely those for which my noble friend has moved, I cannot help observing, that in the meanwhile your lordships and the public cannot more usefully employ your attention than in considering the grounds on which your judgment ought to be formed when those papers are produced; and in the few words which I shall say upon that subject, I think the noble and learned lord on the cross bench will not accuse me of anticipating the conclusion to which the House may come, or of forming deductions without knowing the premises from which I draw them. The noble and learned lord, however, must give me leave to say, that at the very time when he was accusing my noble friend near me of anticipating conclusions without examining premises, he was pronouncing a most decided judgment upon the conduct of sir Edward Codrington in entering the bay of Navarino—a judgment which, I solemnly declare, it is my opinion that no man either can or ought to form, without seeing the papers on which that movement was made, and which, when produced, I also solemnly declare will, in my opinion, justify the conduct of that gallant officer to the conviction of all mankind, and will satisfactorily explain all the circumstances under which he ordered the British fleet to sail to the position of the Turkish squadron. And here, as the noble and learned lord has spoken out so plainly, I will allude, not to matters which are contained in any of the papers which my noble friend at the head of the Foreign Department thinks it inconvenient to the public service to produce at present, but to matters which are of general geographical notoriety, and which, by some accident, have hitherto escaped, the attention of all those who have either written or spoken on the subject. I mean, that the island near which this battle was fought is part and parcel of the British dominions. The island of Sphacteria, which lies in the bay of Navarino, and off which the action with the Turkish squadron took place, is part of the Ionian Islands, and therefore a British fleet had a right to anchor off it, in any manner and at any time it pleased. I believe that there is no lawyer who, if he were retained in behalf of admiral Codrington, would not, with the help of a map of the territory of the Ionian Islands, make out a good case for him upon this very ground. I believe that a very inferior lawyer to the noble and learned lord would find no difficulty in getting up a case on it, which no argument or ingenuity could possibly overthrow. I repeat, that I am not going to allude to any particular circumstances contained in the documents which it is now thought prudent not to produce; but I would ask of your lordships, while those documents are withheld from you, to make up your minds as to the grounds on which you will judge of that event which has been termed unfortunate, and which really was unfortunate, seeing that blood was shed in it, but which was beyond all dispute a most brilliant and successful naval operation. We all know—and I agree with the noble duke who made the observation—that any interference in the affairs of foreign states is an exception to the general rule of policy, which ought to guide the conduct of this country. It is quite clear, however, that occasions must sometimes arise, in which mediations, and armed mediations too, are necessary to secure the peace and repose of the world; and when the question of our interference in the present instance shall come to be argued, I will not desire to argue it on any other ground than that on which the noble and learned lord has this night placed it; namely, its tendency to secure the ultimate peace and tranquillity of Europe. I know, my lords, and your lordships know too, that it is not by pusillanimously avoiding to engage in those transactions in which other European powers are involved, that peace is most likely to be ultimately assured; and I hope that your lordships will take every pains to ascertain, not merely whether our mediation was made in the best manner in which it could be made, but also whether it was not one of those mediations which the different powers were compelled to make, not for the benefit of any two of them, but for the security of Europe at large, in order to prevent the establishment of a system which would disturb the balance of power, and consequently injure the peace of nations. If there did exist any legitimate cause for our commencing an armed mediation, then, I say, we were bound to pursue, even by arms, an interference that was intended for a beneficial purpose. I then ask your lordships to consider, whether it was most beneficial to this country, and most likely to contribute to the peace of Europe, to leave that interference in the hands of a power which might carry it further than we either recommended or approved, and which might extend it beyond that limit within which we might think it desirable to confine it for the benefit of ourselves and of others; to leave one colossus to act in the solitude of its power, unchecked by any obligation, and uncontrolled by that community of principle, which must always exist among confederated nations;—or, seeing that an act was to be done—that a danger was to be avoided, that a system was going on of which the tendency was to impair the commerce of the Mediterranean, and that a new power was erecting itself there to the general danger and inconvenience of all Europe—to join with others, taking such steps as were certain to avert from us the danger we anticipated? I say, therefore, that the peace of the world is the standard by which all these operations ought to be measured. When the documents, of which I have been speaking, are before you, it will be for your lordships to judge whether the law of nations has been complied with—whether the case in question has not been taken out of the ordinary laws, and does not involve other considerations—and whether the government did not exercise a sound policy and discretion, in applying to them a principle which, though it controls them, controls them no further than is consistent with the general repose and tranquillity of Europe.

My lords, the discussion of this night has given rise, and not unnaturally, to statements which embrace other topics than the affairs of Greece, and which enter upon all the prospects and policy of the government of this country. To those statements which have been published by all parties, more or less, I will now venture to call your attention.—The noble marquis then entered into a detail of facts, which, from the manner in which he occasionally lowered his voice, was not distinctly audible below the bar. He commenced it by an account of the difference which subsisted during the time of the late administration between Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Herries. The difference was a striking and important difference, but not, as it would appear, an irreconcileable difference, for they were now sitting together in the same cabinet. The noble marquis praised the frankness with which lord Goderich had spoken with respect to that difference, and, indeed, with respect to all the circumstances which had terminated in the dissolution of the ministry of which he was the head. He agreed with the noble lord in saying, that he never looked upon the formation of that ministry as a mere temporary arrangement of the government. Had he ever believed it to be an arrangement of that kind, no inducement would have led him to retain for an hour the situation which he had had the honour to fill in it. There was another point, on which he felt himself as much bound as his noble friend to set himself right with the country. He had seen a speech of a right hon. gentleman—which he believed to be in substance correct, as it appeared to be very accurately reported, and as all the reports agreed in the leading points of it—on which it was incumbent upon him to make a few observations, as his right hon. friend appeared to have unintentionally fallen into some error. My right hon. friend, Mr. Huskisson (continued the noble marquis), has stated to his constituents at Liverpool, the substance of a conversation which took place between me and him, on the 11th of January last, as connected with the dissolution of the cabinet over which lord Goderich presided. In meeting my right I hon. friend on the day on which I had the conversation with him, a part of which he has stated, I met him on a footing of the most perfect confidence; having in the last confidential communication I had with him received from him a full statement of the particulars of the difference which had arisen between him and the chancellor of the Exchequer, and of the necessity in which he might, in consequence, feel himself of resigning. I stated my concurrence in the course which my right hon. friend was taking, upon the facts of which I was then, for the first: time, informed, and I repeated the assurance of that concurrence in a letter on the following morning. I therefore met my right hon. friend on the 11th of January, after the result had proved the breaking up of the government, prepared both to expect from him, and to return, the most entire confidence. Nothing but what was correct has been stated by my right hon. friend as having passed in that conversation; but, as I trust that no person can be less suspected than myself of ostentatiously rejecting a proposition perhaps never intended to be made, I am desirous of stating, that it was not until after my right hon. friend had stated to me, upon very high authority, circumstances that induced me to think it probable that a proposal might immediately be made to me, and that I myself having seen Mr. Peel, had stated to that gentleman the impossibility, after what had passed last year relating to the Catholic question, of my serving under him, that I thought myself bound in frankness to state, that though I neither considered myself as receiving or as making any formal communication, I could not conceal that in an administration formed under auspices apparently so unfavourable to the settlement of those great questions in Ireland, from an ultimate decision on which I was convinced neither the parliament nor the country could long escape, I could hardly be induced to take a part without such an explanation on these subjects as I could not expect at present to be made; that I felt no objection, but on the contrary respect, for the individuals named as about to form the administration, nor any inclination to withhold assistance that might be useful; but I could not look to any such arrangement with confidence, as respecting the most important question in which the domestic interests of the empire were involved. Both when I had joined Mr. Canning, and when I had obeyed my sovereign's commands in retaining office, in September, under circumstances that might have justified me in quitting it, it had been in great measure with a view to the advantage to be derived to Ireland from the person at the head of the government being favourably disposed to the settlement of Ireland—a view in which I was confirmed by finding it had been taken by Mr. Peel, and had induced that gentleman, on the same ground, to take an opposite course. I state most distinctly, that political and not personal objections formed the ground of my refusing to join the present administration; for nothing would hurt me more than to have it supposed that I ostentatiously put forward personal objections to the members of a government. I do not complain of the statement which the right hon. gentleman has made. There was nothing unfair or uncandid in it: but I regret, that in his anxiety to set himself right with his constituents, he did, in conveying to them some notion of the causes of the dissolution of the government, think himself bound to withhold that which both the noble earl and myself had stated to be the principal cause of it. One thing, however, I must confess, pleased me. His statement went the full length of saying, that the whole foreign and commercial policy of this country was guaranteed to be the same as that of the administration of Mr. Canning [hear]. This was a plain, distinct, and, up to this moment, uncontradicted statement; and it is a testimony of the strongest kind, that the present members of the administration are convinced of the wisdom of that policy. I am glad that the noble lord opposite is now relieved from the charge of having indulged in personal animosity against Mr. Canning, and that his strong expressions are declared to have been against the policy of that right hon. gentleman, and not to have originated in personal dislike. That disapprobation of Mr. Canning's measures has now vanished; and I am warranted in believing, that the same change of opinion would have taken place in the noble lord if, when out of office, he had possessed the same means of judging that he now does. If, therefore, after due deliberation, he has satisfied himself that, on all points, he can act with the present government, which stands pledged to support Mr. Canning's policy, I congratulate them on having obtained so useful an ally, and I hail his appearance as a friend to that cause.—For myself, I am little disposed to enter into any cause of opposition to the present government, as I am so positively assured that they will pursue measures which, I am certain, have for their end, the good of the country. I have no motives for going into such opposition. When I resigned the seals of office in the employment of the discharge of which I was honoured with the approbation of his majesty, I did not feel any thing like an intention to enter on a course of opposition to the government; and still less do I feel it now, when I find that it is to be conducted on principles which I approve of, and which, if strictly pursued, will, I am sure, deserve and obtain the confidence of the people.—With respect to that which is called the Catholic question, I certainly know that I do not entertain the same sentiments as the noble duke; but at the same time, I trust that it will not, on this account, be allowed to retrograde. I am told that it will be treated as a neutral question; but I nevertheless wait with peculiar anxiety for the result, as I know too much of political affairs not to be aware, that in the country to which this question so mainly attaches, the principal garrison may be said to be in the hands of the enemy; but though we are thus placed under the guns of the fort, I trust that the principle of the question will continue as sound as heretofore. The noble duke has pledged himself, that nothing of hostility shall be evinced on the part of the government; but he must excuse me if I say, that I must look at the actions of the cabinet, before I can feel satisfied that Ireland may hope for release; but I am quite sure, that the noble duke would not have quitted the situation in which the whole nation wished to see him, and which, of all men, he is most fitted to fill, without the conviction, that by so doing, it would be in his power to render the commercial and financial departments of the state greater services, than if he had remained in it. The eyes of his country and of Europe are upon all his actions, and I trust that the brilliancy of these actions, of which the country is now enjoying the advantages will be eclipsed by others still more splendid—by others as splendid as the noble duke himself can possibly wish them to be. But I must confess that I should see that appointment with greater satisfaction, if I could bring myself to believe that the interests of the army would be distinctly separate from the present office of the noble duke. I am glad, however, for the safe of the constitution, that that pledge has been given; and I hope that it will be strictly adhered to; for I think the noble duke acted wisely and constitutionally, when he intimated, on the first day of the session, that a separation of office was to take place, I shall watch every thing that takes place, as a member of the legislature; and I can assure the noble duke, that I wish him success in his administration; but before I sit down, I beg leave to assure him, that whatever he may be able to achieve, there is one thing which he never can achieve, and against which I warn him—let him steadfastly remember, that he may conciliate, but that he can never reconquer Ireland.

Lord Ellenborough

said, that whenever his majesty's ministers feel themselves at liberty to lay upon the table of the House all the papers, from which alone a full knowledge of all the circumstances which had taken place could be derived, he should be as ready as the noble marquis himself to express his opinion upon them to the House. He would assure him, that whatever his opinion might have been, previous to his joining the present administration, on the subject alluded to, it had remained unaltered, and no man had presumed to question him on the subject. The noble marquis had considered it as a proof of inconsistency on his part, that he (lord E.) who had disapproved of the expedition to Portugal should have now approved of the expressions made use of in his majesty's Speech. That expedition was sent out to Portugal in fulfilment of our treaty, and its object was to preserve the peace of Portugal; but, admitting that he had disapproved of that expedition, surely there was no reason why he should be dissatisfied with the announcement in his majesty's Speech of the probability of the troops being soon withdrawn. The noble marquis, however, was wrong both in his facts and his reasonings. He had never disapproved of the expedition to Portugal. How could he disapprove of the honourable performance of a treaty? But he did disapprove of calling that expedition "a master stroke of policy," because that could not have been a master stroke of policy, in which there was no choice left, and which executed only the conditions of a treaty. If, however, he had disapproved of the expedition, how much more warmly must he approve of that part of his majesty's Speech in which it was announced that that expedition was at an end? Then as to the foreign policy of Mr. Canning; he had been asked, how he would act on that policy with his present colleagues? But the fact was, that he had never heard any man attempt to, explain what the principles of Mr. Canning's foreign policy were, as contradistinguished from those of his predecessor. He very well remembered that Mr. Canning had said, that he should act unfairly towards that government of which he had recently been a member, if he did not state that he had found those principles already reduced to writing. Yet this was called Mr. Canning's system of foreign policy. The noble marquis had stated, that the recognition of the independence of the South American States was the work of Mr. Canning, that this was also a part of his policy; but this statement was also incorrect, for at the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle it was very evident that things were then moving towards the recognition of those States, and the question was merely one of time, as to the period at which they ought to be recognized. The merit of this recognition was, therefore, not due to Mr. Canning. With regard to the treaty of the 6th July, he was as ready as any of his noble friends who surrounded him could be, to carry it fairly and fully into effect, but in the spirit of conciliation and peace—a spirit which some noble lords did not seem to understand. He perfectly agreed with what had fallen from his noble friend, the foreign secretary. He never was the personal enemy of Mr. Canning. He had only met him once or twice in his life, and what had passed between them was in the ordinary intercourse of civility. He believed that Mr. Canning was a man beloved by all his friends, and that he was endowed with many virtues. He looked upon him as a great public man, but as a dangerous minister; and if he were then present he should not hesitate to oppose him. That feeling he formerly entertained, and he entertained it still: but ought that to prevent him from sitting by the side of his noble friend? The noble marquis had alluded to the commercial policy, and had stated, that that also was Mr. Canning's. But he should recollect, that at the time those measures were brought forward, he (Lord E.) was sitting on the other side of the House, and that he had not opposed them. He approved, generally speaking, of the principles of free trade, and should be desirous of carrying them into effect as widely as possible; but, as some persons formerly argued in favour of the slave trade, by comparing the condition of the slaves of the West Indies with their condition before they left Africa, forgetting the miseries of their intervening state, and thus attempted to justify the traffic—so it appeared to him, that some persons now were too prone to look at the attainment of national wealth, without looking at the condition of individual interests, which had grown up under another state of things. The noble marquis could not find fault with him in respect to the Catholic question; as that question remained in the present administration, just as it had been in that of which the noble marquis had formed a part. He had said, last year, and he would repeat it now, that the Catholic question was likely to stand better in a neutral government than in one united in its favour; for he was convinced, that if such a government could be formed, it would produce such a reaction in the public mind, as would throw it back for many years; and, however paradoxical it might appear, he was satisfied that more good could be done for the Catholics by a mixed or neutral government, than by a government formed entirely of individuals in their favour.

Lord Wharncliffe

said, the noble baron had stated, that he considered Mr. Canning to have been a dangerous minister, but that he would support a government founded upon his principles. Now, must not the noble lord himself be a dangerous minister, if he acted upon such principles? They had been publicly told, that the reason why the friends of Mr. Canning had joined the present government was, that they had received a pledge that the policy of the last government would be followed in every respect. It was not enough to tell the country, that the treaty of the 6th of July was to be carried into execution. He would appeal to the House, whether Mr. Canning was not at the head of a party acting upon more liberal principles than any other; and admiring, as he did, Mr. Canning, he could not believe that the policy of the present administration was, to follow the footsteps of Mr. Canning. They were told that his commercial policy was to be followed; that the corn bill introduced last session was to be reconsidered; but where did the noble Secretary of State look for support for that measure? Did he not see sitting by his side those who defeated that bill? He was convinced that these pledges were not worth a farthing. He should wait to see what the measures of the present government would be before he would give it his support. He hoped that they would be such as he could approve of; but, as to their being conducted upon the principles of Mr. Canning's policy, that was a mere dream. He had doubted it from the beginning, and his doubts were now confirmed.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, that after what had been said, he would not press his motion.—It was accordingly withdrawn.