HL Deb 28 April 1828 vol 19 cc156-86

The bill was read a third time. After which, the clerk proceeded to read the bill, until he came as far as the Declaration in the second clause, upon which

Lord Holland

rose to propose an amendment. The Declaration, as it stood at present, commenced in these words:—"I A. B., do solemnly declare, in the presence of God, &c. on the true faith of a Christian." Now, to the previous form of words he did not object; but with respect to the present, he felt it due to that most respectable body of Christians, the Society of Friends, to state, that these words were likely to affect their consciences. Their lordships were aware, that in the Toleration act, passed in the reign of William 3rd, an oath was introduced, which all persons taking the benefit of that act were required to take. But many of the body to which he had referred were deprived of the benefit of that act, because their religious scruples would not allow them to take an oath; in consequence of which, in the true spirit of toleration in which the measure was proposed, a clause was subsequently introduced, substituting a declaration to be taken by that class of Christians in lieu of the oath. However, in time, the same conscientious persons who had scrupled taking the oath considered that the declaration "I solemnly declare before God" approached so nearly to an oath, that they could not take it, without doing violence to their religious feelings; whereupon the legislature carried their deference for those feelings so far, as to introduce a clause, allowing them to take the declaration in these words, "I solemnly and sincerely declare." This proved the respect in which the legislature had held the religious sentiments of that most excellent class of his majesty's subjects. It also showed, that they considered that the oath or declaration ought to be adapted ad animum deponentis. However, he trusted that when the members of that class found that a proposition to substitute the word "swear" for "declare" was rejected, they would not consider the present Declaration to border so closely on an oath, as to excite any scruples in their minds against taking it. Although, therefore, in order to avoid throwing the slightest difficulty in the way of this great and glorious work, he would not move the omission of these words, which some noble lords seemed to consider essential, yet he thought it due to those worthy and excellent men to whom he had referred, to state, that he should be acting disingenuously, if he did not call the attention of the House to those words. His objection to the words "on the true faith of a Christian" was, that they implied, though they did not absolutely express, that a particular religious faith was necessary to the due discharge of a civil duty,—a principle which he never could acknowledge. He had also considered how these words would affect the members of the Jewish persuasion. He recollected that when the introduction of another measure into another House was found to have a similar effect, parliament immediately relieved them from the consequences of it. The history of the condition of this people in this country was well worthy their lordships' consideration; but if he were to attempt to describe their condition, from the time of Charles 2nd until the reign of queen Anne, he should be taunted by his noble and learned friend at the table (lord Eldon), and told that he was intrenching on the province of a lawyer; [a laugh]. Every man acquainted with that history, and having the feelings of an Englishman, must wish that they were subjects of Great Britain. However, since the reign of Charles 2nd., there was nothing to keep a Jew out of parliament, except the Oath of Abjuration, which was introduced into the Toleration act. That act was passed against the adherents of the House of Stuart, to keep the exiled family from the throne, and preserve the influence of William 3rd. Now, although those who were inclined to taunt the memory of that great man might say, that he, as well as the House of Hanover, was more hostile to the Jews than the House of Stuart had been, it so happened that it never was the intention of parliament, on that occasion, that the act should have that effect. This was not a little hard, however, upon those who were so affected by a bill of which they were not the objects; but it would be harder still upon them on the present occasion. In the reign of George 1st, a somewhat harsh law was passed, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the property and the residence of those persons who were supposed to be friends of the exiled prince. The way in which it was done was this—every man was obliged to take the Oath of Abjuration, and to register his estates, place of residence, &c. The Jews found they could not take all the oaths required in this act, because of the words "on the true faith of a Christian." They therefore applied to parliament on the subject, and the 10th of George 1st was passed, allowing them to leave out the words "on the true faith of a Christian." That act, however, was but a temporary one, and had expired. In ten or twelve years after, when government were anxious to procure settlers for the North American colonies, and particularly Jews, who were supposed likely to be possessed of capital, a law passed in the 13th of George 2nd to enable foreign persons, not Roman Catho- lies, to be naturalized there; and in the oath which that act prescribed the words "on the true faith of a Christian" were left out. Now this proved, first, that measures of this kind frequently produced consequences to individuals who were not intended to be affected by them, and who were not objects of alarm; and secondly, that parliament, when it found that such was the case, always dispensed with the words which produced this injurious effect. It was unnecessary for him to inform their lordships, that if he could act upon his sentiments, he would leave out these words; but he would, at all events, move the introduction of a clause giving Jews permission to make the Declaration without using these words. Although he would prefer leaving the words out altogether, yet, if they were an addition which other noble lords who supported the bill deemed important, he would not press his objection to them; because he believed them to have been proposed from a feeling not hostile to the spirit of the bill. However, he would put it to their lordships, whether in a bill intending to give relief to one class of persons, it was fair to impose another shackle in addition to those which they already bore, on a body of men who were not the objects of the bill. He was most anxious that this great work should not be disfigured with that which would work such a hardship upon this body of men; and he would, therefore, propose that those words be omitted; and if not, then he would leave it to some other noble lord to move a clause in a subsequent part of the bill, giving Jews permission to omit the words "on the true faith of a Christian."

The Bishop of Llandaff

said, he had not been aware of any such consequences arising from the introduction of the words in question; but although they were now pointed out by the noble lord, he still approved of the words, because it was an acknowledgment, that Christianity constituted part of the law of the land.

Lord Bexley

said, that as it was so much the object of parliament to give relief to all classes of his majesty's subjects, he was disposed to support in principle the motion of the noble lord, by introducing a proviso permitting the Jews to omit these words. To this he saw no objection. If they had heretofore admitted any Jews to occupy offices, it would be a monstrous thing now to exclude them, by means of a bill which had for its, object to give tolera- tion to another body of men. He should, therefore, at the proper time, move a proviso to the effect suggested by the noble lord.

The Earl of Eldon

said, that no man would deny that the Established Church and the civil state formed together the constitution of this country. That was a proposition which not only Christians but Jews admitted, and he requested their lordships to bear it in mind. His noble friend (lord Holland) commenced his speech by hinting some propostion with regard to the Quakers: and here he must do his noble friend the justice to say, that he had told him (lord Eldon) last session, that he hoped the time would come when he should never more hear of the word toleration. Now, in the Toleration act itself, the Quakers were required to express a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. But it seemed that Jews had now been rendered capable of participating in the civil government of this country. Some of their lordships were old enough to remember the result of an attempt of that kind formerly. He requested their lordships would be so kind as to feel a little for those who felt that the doctrines of the Established Church were the doctrines of true Christianity. Let it be remembered, that the Jews were here and there and every where, and yet they were no where; and that they were a people whom their lordships did not acknowledge. But there was no denying that a Jew was as capable as any other man of filling a civil office. That, however, was not the principle on which their lordships acted. If they were to legislate on this principle, that a state had no right to inquire into the religious feelings of a man before he was admitted a member of a governing community, there would be an end to the foundation on which the constitution of this country rested. He considered this Declaration quite insufficient; because any man who took office might say, he was not doing any thing "by virtue of his office" to overturn the Established Church; what he did would be by virtue of his conscience, and its dictates would lead him to do every thing in his power to overturn the ecclesiastical establishment to which he was opposed.—After his noble friend's motion was disposed of, he would move the introduction of the words "and that I am a Protestant," and take the opinion of the House upon it. Their monarch was called to the throne to support the Protestant religion, and every act of parliament on the subject took care that the prince governing this country should be a Protestant. Their lordships had had a debate the other night as to the operation of the Test act. Now, he knew that he had the reputation of being very much addicted to doubting; no man, however, was more anxious than he was, that the opinions of his noble and learned friend on the woolsack should carry with them the greatest possible weight. Under these circumstances, he should by and by propose, for the purpose of removing all doubts on the subject, a clause, requiring that all persons on entering upon office should take the declaration against transubstantiation. It was already incumbent on persons taking office to do so: he (lord Eldon) thought otherwise; but he did not wish to set his opinion up against that of his noble and learned friend. However, to remove all doubt on the subject, he should propose a clause to that effect. He should now, however, as soon as the present motion was disposed of, move the introduction of the words "and that I am a Protestant" into the Declaration. He was desirous that nothing contained in this bill should affect the claims of the Roman Catholics; but he was quite certain, that unless some such clause as that was introduced into the bill, that question would be most essentially affected by it.

The Earl of Winchilsea

conceived that these words were perfectly nugatory, so far as the security of the Established Church was concerned. With respect to what the noble baron had said respecting the Jews being affected by these words, it had little weight with him. What were the words? "On the true faith of a Christian." Why might not a Jew make a declaration in these terms? It was not necessary that he should be a Christian to make this declaration. If a Jew made such a declaration, it no more followed that he was a Christian, than it would follow that he (the earl) would be a Jew if he were to declare any thing, "on the true faith of a Jew." Looking at this question as he did at first, he was prepared to agree to the removal of the Test and Corporation acts. It was his full intention to have given his support to any measure founded on the broad basis of liberality to the Dissenters; but he certainly was not prepared to agree to a concession which admitted that it should be a matter of perfect indifference what religion a man professed, or, indeed, whether he professed any religion at all. He deeply regretted the hasty and inconsiderate manner in which a bill of such vital importance had been carried through both Houses. There were those among the supporters of it, those, who, at a future day, would deeply lament that they had not resisted the attempt at a total repeal of the Test and Corporation acts, which must leave the country without that rock, on which their prosperity had been founded—the rock of the Christian church. He could assure the right rev. bench, that their conduct had not given satisfaction to the majority of the members of the Established Church nor of the Dissenters. He should be, to the last hour of his life, proud of the opposition which he had given to this measure, and would not barter one tittle of it for all the wealth, honours, and titles which the world could bestow.

The Bishop of Durham

said:—My lords, although I have already more than once troubled your lordships with my sentiments on the measure now before us, yet during the discussions that have taken place since the second reading of the bill, so many animadversions have been made, not only upon the bill itself, but upon the supporters of it, and especially upon the episcopal bench, that I cannot forbear entreating your lordships' patience for a few minutes, whilst I offer some further explanations as to the conduct I have myself hitherto pursued, and still intend to pursue concerning it.

My lords, never since I have had the honour of a seat in this House, have I witnessed a discussion, to me so painfully distressing, as this has been. It is the first time, and I trust it will never happen again, that I have found myself opposed on a great constitutional question, affecting the interests of church and state, to persons whom I have been always accustomed to regard with respect, esteem, and affection, as among the ablest and purest, and firmest defenders of those interests. This has inflicted a wound more painful than I can express; and it is certainly not much mitigated by the sort of commendation which has been bestowed upon us, on the other hand, by some of the most strenuous promoters of the bill.

When this measure was first brought forward, I was not insensible to its difficulties and its dangers; and most sincerely did I wish it might have slept in peace. And I believe that it might have slept in peace, had the wishes only of the most respectable Dissenters been regarded; many of whom, there is reason to think, are very indifferent as to the fate of this bill. I cannot, therefore, but regret that it has ever made its appearance. But, my lords, when it had actually been brought forward, and had reached the House, a new crisis presented itself to us. Not only the sense of the other House of Parliament in its favour (for I do not mean to say, that the decision of that House should in any way restrict your lordships' judgments upon it), but also the strong feeling excited for it in the public mind, placed myself and my right reverend brethren in a new and critical situation. And here, my lords, I must take leave to say, that with respect to the episcopal bench, a somewhat hard measure has been dealt out to it, on this occasion. We were more especially bound to contemplate the subject in its religious aspect. In this point of view it was evident, that not only among the Dissenters, but among the laity and clergy of our own church, a very strong and general feeling prevailed against the Sacramental Test. To this feeling our attention could not but be particularly directed; and this I can truly say, for myself at least (for I do not presume to speak for others, who are so much better able to plead their own cause), is the sole ground on which I have consented to this measure. But this main point, which I felt myself especially called upon to consider as a religious difficulty of the most serious kind, has not, I must say, been fairly met and encountered by our opponents. Even the noble and learned earl, who has so ably conducted the opposition to this bill, and for whom I can never cease to entertain sentiments of the highest veneration and regard, has, I think, scarcely noticed the religious objections to that particular Test. Had any other Test, not liable to the same objections, been in existence, I should probably not have been inclined to part with it. But the Sacramental Test (as seems to be generally acknowledged on all sides) is found to be no longer tenable, without giving occasion of offence. Another circumstance attending this Test, seems also not to have been duly adverted to, though, as I conceive, it strikes at the main principle on which it is assumed the Test laws were founded,—that of excluding from corporations, and from places of trust and power, all but members of the Established Church. This principle (if it were indeed the real one) has clearly been, in effect, departed from by the annual Indemnity bills. For what purpose, let me ask, have those Indemnity bills been granted? If they had only been occasionally passed, to remedy some particular inconveniences that had incidentally occurred, the case would be very different. But when they have been annually repeated for sixty or eighty years, they can hardly be considered as having, for their real or sole object, (what they usually set forth), merely to secure members of the Church of England against the consequences of unintentional omission or inadvertency. On the contrary, they are evidently intended for the very purpose of admitting Dissenters into office. And if this be the case, is not the original purpose of enacting the Test so far actually annulled? When these acts have, in point of fact, been in a state of abeyance, and are rendered so totally inoperative, can it, my lords, fairly be said, that the repeal of this particular Test, with the substitution of a Declaration in its stead, makes any real change in the constitution itself, or breaks up that fundamental principle of it, the alliance between Church and State? Had this measure come up to us, as an unqualified and unconditional repeal of that Test, I should certainly have opposed it, and should willingly have borne my share of the obloquy of doing so. But, my lords, though the nature of the security has changed, the main object of it, I conceive, remains the same. The alliance between Church and State did not originate with the Test laws. That union existed long before. The Sacramental Test, no doubt, was intended, among other enactments, for its better preservation. But if this has, by lapse of time and untoward circumstances, become inexpedient, or even impracticable, I do not see that the substitution of something-else in its stead implies any real change of principle. In short, the question is, not whether the fortress shall be surrendered, but whether the outworks shall remain as they were, or be reconstructed on a somewhat different plan. On this question there may be room for diversity of opinion, without any intentional abandonment of the main object.

My own simple view of the matter is this, that the ancient safeguard—whether or not it was, from the first, the best that might have been devised—has now become altogether ineffective and almost nothing worth; and therefore it is, that I am inclined to accept another security less exceptionable in its kind, and I trust not less calculated to produce the intended effect. Yet after all, my lords, I confess I have not so much confidence in the result, as some of its supporters seem to entertain; nor am I entirely free from some misgivings and apprehensions in this respect. Could I feel assured that it will be regarded as a final and conclusive measure by those for whose benefit it is intended, my satisfaction would be much greater. But I see too much reason to apprehend that it may be viewed by many of them as an incipient measure only, opening a way for some ulterior objects. The tone and sentiments of many of the petitions on your lordships' table naturally tend to excite such apprehensions; and, if I mistake not, the noble baron who introduced this bill to the House, observed, on presenting one of those petitions a short time before the bill came up, that he should not consider the object completely attained, and hoped the Dissenters themselves would not rest satisfied—until they had an entire equality of rights and privileges. These are somewhat ominous circumstances. My chief confidence, therefore, is placed in the legislature, which, I trust, will never encourage such ulterior views as may, perhaps, be in contemplation, nor suffer that, which is intended only as a fair concession to reasonable and conscientious scruples, to be made instrumental to other views and purposes, not resting on the same ground. More especially do I feel confident, that those of his majesty's government who now guide the helm of State will be vigilant in preventing and counteracting any such intentions, and not give countenance to encroachments of whatever kind which may put to hazard those venerable institutions, on which the peace and the welfare of the community so essentially depend.

So much, my lords, for my general view of the present measure. With regard to the alterations the bill has undergone in this House, I am unwilling longer to detain your lordships; my opinion is, that such alterations as have been made are substantial improvements, and particularly that the Declaration is much strengthened by the solemn expressions with which it is now introduced. I could have wished, how- ever, that the addition proposed by the noble and learned earl, by which the individual should declare himself to be a Protestant, had been agreed to. I do not presume to enter into the legal differences of opinion on this point, between the two great legal authorities who discussed them; but such is the veneration I feel for the consummate legal knowledge, attainments, integrity, and laborious investigation of the noble and learned earl, and the almost implicit deference I would pay to his opinion, that I could not easily satisfy myself by voting, on such a point, contrary to his judgment. But, in the present instance, my own view of the matter is simply this—if the Oath of Supremacy be sufficient to exclude the Catholic from office, this addition to the form of Declaration cannot alter his case; and if that oath be not sufficient, then I deem it necessary to ensure his exclusion. I regret, therefore, that it has not been adopted.

To another addition, proposed by a noble earl for whom I have the highest respect, enjoining a Declaration of belief in the canonical books of the Holy Scriptures, I should have seen no objection, had it not been thought—according to the terms in which it was framed—to pledge those who dissent from us, to an acceptance of our interpretation of the Scriptures; and had I not felt assured, that the Declaration, as it now stands, comprises the same in substance as a direct acknowledgment of belief in the Scriptures. For the same reason I did not support the proposal of another noble earl, to introduce into the Declaration a more specific designation of our blessed Saviour, conceiving the addition to be already provided for, and feeling, also, objections to the too frequent and familiar use of that sacred name. My lords, having made these few observations and explanations, chiefly from respect to those noble lords who have manifested so zealous an attachment to our venerable establishment, and especially to the noble and learned earl, from whom I can never differ without pain and reluctance, I will detain your lordships no longer from proceeding on the question immediately before us.

The Earl of Eldon

assured the right rev. prelate that the manner in which he had spoken of him, coming as it did from so valuable a quarter, gave him the greatest comfort and consolation. He must, however, say, that not a syllable had fallen from him in favour of retaining the Sacramental Test. On the contrary it was his wish that it should be taken away. The Sacrament was never intended as a Test for office, but as a Test that the individual called upon to take office was a member of the Established Church. The scruples which were entertained were more than sufficient to require that it should not be retained; but the Church and State together, which formed the constitution of the country, required that, instead of the Sacramental Test, something of substantial protection should be substituted. What was he to think when, under a Protestant king, and a Protestant legislature, he found the rev. bench opposing a proposition like that which he had made? And yet the reverend bench appeared to be of opinion, that the constitution of this country should be handed over to persons, who would not tell what sort of Christians they were, but were merely to call themselves so. It was painful for him to say so, but he must again declare, that this Declaration was a substitute that was not worth any thing; and he would not believe that the character of it was otherwise, until, by passing the bill, the authority of that House told him that the character of it was different; and then he would say no more about it.

The Duke of Wellington

said, it was his wish to confine himself to the discussion of the question actually before their lordships. But, first of all, he must assure the right rev. prelate, that if this was merely an incipient measure—that if it was intended to be followed up by any other measure—he was no party to any such plan. He had supported the measure, not because he wished to destroy the present system of laws; but because he believed it to be essential to the preservation of the peace of the Established Church, and of the religious peace of the country. In order that they might not have the same ground to go over another year, he had determined at once to give the measure all the support in his power during the present session. And now, for the question before their lordships. It was proposed that the words "on the true faith of a Christian "should be left out of the Declaration with the view of admitting the Jews to office. For his own part, he did not believe it to be the intention of the law that Jews should, be so admitted: he did, not believe that it was the intention of the laws that Dissenters should be admitted. But, be that as it might, they had for the last eighty years gone on suspending these laws, and it was notorious that Dissenters had been admitted into corporations, although it was the object of the original laws to keep them out. Now, it appeared that the legislature was perfectly well aware that Dissenters were admitted into corporations. There was a law in existence, by which it was enacted that mayors and others should not carry the insignia of their office to places of worship, except where the Cathedral service was performed. Did not the legislature, then, know very well that Dissenters were admitted into corporations? Was not this law a proof that they were acquainted with the fact? It was not so, however, with the Jews. There was no instance in which the legislature had sanctioned the admission of such persons into office. Under these circumstances, therefore, he must oppose the proposition for expunging the words "on the true faith of a Christian." But there was another reason why they ought to remain. It was quite a new principle, and disliked by this country, that Jews should be admitted into corporations and public offices. If, however, the principal was to be recognized, let that question be fairly brought forward, and not be introduced, on the third reading, into a bill which originally contemplated nothing of the kind. He must really take the liberty of suggesting to their lordships that the more convenient course of proceeding, and the only course likely to bring their lordships' labours to a termination, would be for noble lords to confine themselves to the point immediately under discussion, and avoid the debating of points alien from that before the House.

The Marquis of Lansdowne

said, that if the noble and learned lord (Eldon) chose not only to repeat all his former arguments, but even to argue prospectively, no doubt he was at perfect liberty to do so. But the noble and learned lord having done so, and the right rev. prelate having had an opportunity of stating on what ground the rev. bench had acted, nothing could be more convenient than the course recommended by the noble duke. Let him, therefore, now call the attention of their lordships to the motion before them. His noble friend (lord Holland) had stated, that he did not mean to divide the House upon his motion, but that he had made it; —first, for the purpose of recording his opinion on the Journals of their lordships; and secondly, in order that he might have an opportunity of stating doubts respecting the manner in which those words would affect the Jews, and of suggesting to their lordships the consideration of what degree of claim the Jews might have upon the legislature. This, he thought, had been distinctly answered. There was no intention under this act of depriving the Jews of any of the advantages which they now possessed. Beyond this he believed his noble friend did not wish to proceed: at least he should not feel himself warranted in supporting his noble friend in any thing else; because, if the Jews were to be relieved, it must not be by a side wind, but by a direct proposition. All that he wished for the Jews then—respectable as he believed them to be, and well conducted as they for the most part were—was, that they should be saved harmless by this bill. As to what had been stated by the learned lord; first, if the act of George 1st was still in existence—he knew that there were some doubts upon the point, but it was generally believed that it had expired—all he wished was, that if, hereafter, it appeared that, contrary to the intention of parliament, any class of his majesty's subjects had lost any of the privileges which they formerly possessed, their lordships would interfere and set the matter right. Whatever views their lordships might entertain as to the Jews, or Catholics, or any other persons, he was quite sure that their lordships would legislate in detail; that they would look at the justice and expediency on which each question rested; and would not, by a side-wind, pronounce an opinion on any but the subject on which they were called upon to legislate. They had already heard that the Jews were now kept out of parliament, because they would not meet the legislature half way, and swear upon the faith of a Christian, as a noble earl, on the cross-bench, had said he would swear on the faith of a Jew. By the present measure they were merely excluded to the same extent. This bill, therefore, did no more than the present law: if it were found that it did, he was quite sure that the case of the Jews would be attended to.

The Earl of Guilford

said, that, whatever might be said to the contrary, it must be admitted that this was a revolutionary measure. For what was a revolutionary measure? It was a measure that subverted the fundamental principles of the constitution. He would state what he felt those principles to be. They were, that there should be a king, lords, and commons; and these, together with the laws which ascribed to each part its several functions, formed the fundamental laws of the constitution. But these laws were changeable, and whenever they were changed that was a revolution. The act passed in the reign of Henry 8th giving the king's proclamations the force of law was a revolution; for it overthrew the balance of the state. The act for the divorce of the same monarch, by which his issue by his first queen was bastardized, was revolutionary, as it clearly affected the succession to one branch of the legislature. The act also by which that monarch was permitted to demise the Crown, possessed the same character, because it thereby altered the constitution. He maintained that the Corporation and Test acts were of the nature of fundamental laws. They immediately affected the safety of one branch of the constitution. The noble lord, who originally introduced the bill represented those acts as having been passed at different periods, and against different parties, and therefore he had argued they were not an essential part of the constitution. Now, he would maintain that they were founded on principles engendered by the Reformation. It was not necessary that they should have existed while the Crown exercised its high prerogative, nor during the persecutions that followed. But they saw the light in the dawn of religious liberty, and they had uniformly answered one purpose when they had been enacted or upheld; they had maintained the existing order of things, whatever it might be, against its enemies, whomsoever they might be. He wished to know to what length the noble lord would go, who had talked so much of restoring the lawful prerogative of the Crown. Would he re-establish the authority of the two first kings of the House of Stuart? Or would he go still further back to the arbitrary line of Tudor? These were not times, he thought, when the prerogative was to be wielded over the liberties of the people. The noble lord in his view of those times, had placed himself in opposition to all the commentators on the laws, and all the historians of these transactions. Notwithstanding what the noble lord had said, there was no period when better laws had been made; and for this reason, that there was just then a coincidence of the abuses of the prerogative, and of the excesses of the liberty of the people. The legislators of that day had acted with the wisdom of statesmen, who were enabled to foresee a remedy which would be applicable to the evils they had to encounter. He would quote, in support of his opinions, the historical work of Mr. Fox, in which it was stated, that "good laws were then brought to the greatest theoretical perfection." The noble lord had put this question on the ground of the Revolution, and how? He had brought king William the Third down to that House, to inform their lordships, what were the doctrines and principles of the Revolution? But he trusted their lordships would rather receive that information from the mouth of king William's opponents, who had not his prejudices. But what were the principles adopted at the Revolution? They were those of Toleration, and of Tests against the dangers that might arise from the excesses to which religious liberty might be carried. Toleration and Test acts were two things that must always go together. Either there must be a Test act or no toleration, or no Established Church. He maintained, that the possession of power and public confidence formed no part of the right of the subject. They depended wholly on his moral qualification, and they were bestowed on the individual, not for his own benefit, but for the public welfare. In support of this opinion, he would quote a passage from an eminent author, who had written lately on the constitution, and who certainly was no churchman in his principles. He did not profess to recite the very words; but the sentiment, in which he entirely agreed, was to this effect;—" If any man wanted to govern or hold any office of trust, it was right to inquire what were his qualifications; but if he only wanted to live in peace as a subject, the state had no right to scrutinize his religious opinions." The greater the toleration which was allowed, the more cautious the state should be to guard against the licentious excesses of fanaticism, and the evil designs that might be entertained under the cover of religious scruples. The Test act was as sure a sign of religious liberty in a country, as the growth of a certain plant was evidence to the traveller of the mildness of the climate through which he passed.

The amendment moved by lord Holland was negatived pro forma. After which the earl of Eldon moved, the insertion of the words "I am a Protestant" in the Declaration.

The Earl of Harrowby

said, that as the noble and learned lord had not enforced his proposition by any new argument, he should not be justified in detaining their lordships at any great length. He was anxious for the success of the present measure, and he wished that the grounds on which he supported it should be fairly and properly stated. That support was founded on the same principle which he had advanced, this day, on presenting a petition to their lordships. He was anxious, above all things, on the one hand, in effecting the object of the present bill, which he had much at heart, that no advantage should be taken of it, with reference to the success of any other measure; while, on the other, he hoped that any amendment which seemed to cast the slightest suspicion on their lordships' motives, or which seemed, in any degree, to prejudge another great question, should be rejected. If the words "I am a Protestant" had been originally introduced into the Declaration in the other House of Parliament—if, without being the subject of discussion, it had formed part of the bill when it came up to their lordships' House—he, in that case, should have opposed any amendment moved for the purpose of altering it. But the circumstances were perfectly different, and he could see no use whatever in inserting in the bill the words now proposed. What was the state of the bill? It might be considered presumption for him to declare his opinion on its provisions, when the two greatest law authorities in the House had already given theirs. He would take either of their opinions, and still, whichever he adopted, he felt himself justified in supporting the bill in its present state. If his noble and learned friend on the woolsack were correct in his opinion, then it was impossible that any tiling could be more decidedly unnecessary than the amendment; because, according to his statement, the Declaration against transubstantiation must be taken by those who had any connexion with the government of corporations. Here then was an efficient security. According to both the noble and learned lords, the lower grades of corporations were open to the Roman Catholics—because, as he understood, neither the Oath of Supremacy, nor the Declaration against transubstantiation, was required with reference to them. With respect to the higher offices, it was doubtful whether it was necessary that an individual called upon to act as a mayor or an alderman, but who was not a justice of the peace, was bound to take the oaths in question. But, as to those persons who filled the important situation of justice of the peace, it was quite clear that they were obliged to take the Declaration against transubstantiation. Now, with respect to those who took high office in corporations, it was admitted that they must take both the Oath of Supremacy and the Declaration against transubstantiation; and if the noble and learned lord opposite were right in his interpretation, but a very small number of persons, and those filling minor offices in corporations, were exempted from subscribing that Declaration; but, ex confesso, it appeared, with reference to them, that the obstacle of the Oath of Supremacy stood ever in their way. Now as, according to one of those noble and learned lords, it was impossible to shew any necessity for this insertion, and as, according to the other, any expedient must be reduced to a point so extremely narrow, he could not help thinking that the introduction of those words was totally unnecessary—and being unnecessary, they ought, he conceived, to be received with great jealousy on the part of their lordships, lest they might be looked upon as prejudicing another great question, which sooner or later they would be called on to consider. He hoped, therefore, their lordships would not admit an amendment, which would not, he believed, exclude from corporations a single individual who might now obtain admission into them, and yet would have the effect of prejudicing a question on which the minds of their lordships ought to be completely open and uninfluenced. On these grounds, he hoped their lordships would not agree to this amendment. Indeed, he was sure that their lordships would not, on any particular occasion, sanction the insertion of words which appeared to have reference to another question that was to be settled hereafter. Actuated by these feelings, he could not consent to the amendment. With respect to the observations which had been made on the right rev. bench, for the course they had pursued with reference to the bill, he would perhaps be allowed to say, that the right rev. bench had done themselves, throughout the discussion of this question, the greatest credit. Without losing sight of the interests of the establishment, their conduct had been firm, temperate, and conciliatory. One part of the speech which the right rev. prelate (the bishop of Durham) had addressed to their lordships, with so much effect had attracted his attention in a peculiar degree. That right rev. prelate had observed, that he feared the unfounded calumnies which had been cast upon him and his rev. friends, with respect to their conduct on this question, had made some impression abroad. But, on other occasions, the same course of misrepresentation had been pursued, and with as little effect, he was sure, as would attend the groundless accusations brought forward in this instance. The right rev. bench must recollect, that in the course of the debates in their lordships' House on the bill against occasional conformity in queen Anne's reign, bishop Hough, and the other prelates who opposed that measure, were accused of having made a compromise of the rights and privileges of their order. But the mitre of that great man did not, in consequence of that attack, shine less unsullied—his name was no less dear to his country on account of the promulgation of that calumny. The right rev. prelate, to whose observation he had alluded, might, in like manner, smile at the calumnies which he had mentioned. The spirit out of which they arose was, he felt happy to say, sinking deeper and deeper into that oblivion from which he confidently hoped it would never again emerge.

The Bishop of Chester

said:—I trust I may be allowed in a few words to explain why I oppose the amendment. I am not disposed to place the Roman Catholics nearer the attainment of the object they have for so many years sought, unless they offer a more substantial security than any they have at present proposed. When your lordships divided on the former occasion, I forbore from voting, because, I must confess, I was in a state of doubt as to the practical effect of the amendment on the political condition of the Roman Catholics. I must acknowledge that I, for one, was perfectly satis- fied with the bill, as it came to your lordships' House from another place; and I have no hesitation in adding that I earnestly wish the opportunity had been allowed your lordships of passing it as it was presented to us. It would be disingenuous if I did not admit, that certain amendments which have been proposed, and almost unanimously adopted, are improvements, though not, in my opinion, absolutely necessary; but still I think, if the measure had gone through the House with the least possible discussion, it would have worn a greater appearance of unanimity, and would have been more indicative of a spirit of conciliation and kindness towards those whom it was intended to benefit. On this principle I do not feel myself at liberty to support any further amendment that is not absolutely necessary to secure the interests and privileges of the Church. Since I abstained from voting on this particular question, I have taken some pains to make myself master of it, and it is my conviction now that the amendment is wholly unnecessary; I mean, of course, for the protection of the Church, the object which we are bound to keep in view, while we consent to give relief to the Dissenters. I find that all persons who take offices of trust and government in corporations as low as common-councilmen, are obliged to take the Oath of Supremacy. It has been said, I know, that this is not sufficient to keep out the Roman Catholics; but I am of a contrary: opinion. The most respectable members of that body have declared, in the most unqualified manner, that no sincere Catholic could take that oath without a legislative explanation declaratory of the animus imponentis. Attempts have been made at an earlier period, I am aware, to reconcile the conscience of Roman Catholics to this oath, and in some few instances it has been taken; but the most learned and eminent professors of that religion have declared that no conscientious Roman Catholic could take it, "unless explained by the legislature, without compromising his religion, and giving scandal to his church." I fully believe that no Roman Catholic of the present day would take the Oath of Supremacy, in order to qualify for office. Believing, therefore, that the Oath of Supremacy is sufficient, I am not willing to impose on the Roman Catholics any additional restriction, or any test that would seem to fasten further disabilities on them. The one simple object of the present bill is, to relieve both Dissenters and Churchmen from a test which is disagreeable to them; and I should be sorry to introduce a form of words which would have the appearance of an anti-Catholic declaration. When that great political question comes on, I shall do my duty without favour or fear, and view the subject calmly and fairly, in all its bearings, as I have done on former occasions, when I opposed the admission of Roman Catholics to office, because they offered no security to the Established Church. But in looking to the present proposition, I think your lordships have no right to make this an opportunity of introducing an anti-Catholic declaration. If you give, in place of the Test and Corporation acts, an equivalent security, it is all the Church has a right to expect, and all that your lordships are bound to grant. Perhaps your lordships will excuse me if I say one word, and but one word, on an accusation which has, again and again, been brought before your lordships in many forms. The accusation is, that the right reverend bench, or the majority of them, are compromising the interests of the Established Church, and relinquishing those securities on which they ought to insist. This is said with reference to the Test and Corporation acts, as perpetuated by the Act of Union.

When such a charge as this is made, I am happy to have it in my power to refer (and I wish I had done so formerly, when the subject was before the House) to the opinion expressed by an eminent, able, and most t conscientious lawyer—one who had for many years discharged the duties of a high judicial function, with honour to himself, and great advantage to his country,—I allude to the late lord Kenyon, who used these remarkable expressions in his correspondence with an exalted personage, now no more: "So long as the king's supremacy, and the main fabric of the act of Uniformity, the doctrine, discipline, and government, of the Church of. England are preserved, as of a National Church, and the provision for her ministers kept as an appropriated fund, it seems that any ease given to sectaries, would not militate against the Coronation Oath, or the Act of Union." With reference to a similar charge against this bench, the noble earl who has just sat down has referred to the transactions in Queen Anne's reign, when complaints more violent, not to say virulent, were made against those who filled the chief seats of the Church, when the unjustifiable bill against Occasional Conformity was introduced. The following are the words of the zealous and able prelate who was the historian of his own times: "Angry men took occasion from hence, to charge the bishops, as enemies of the Church, and betrayers of its interests; because we would not run blindfold into the passions and designs of ill-natured men: though we can appeal to all the world, and what is more, to God himself, that we did faithfully and zealously pursue the true interests of the church; the promoting religion and learning; the encouraging of all good men and good designs; and that we did apply ourselves to the duties of our functions, and to the work of the gospel."

Lord Kenyon

said, that nothing could have been further from his intention than to offer himself to the House; but after the right rev. prelate had appealed to the authority of his revered parent, he felt it his duty, to the best of his ability, to rescue his character from the imputation which seemed to rest upon it, if the sentence quoted from his letter was considered alone. If the right rev. prelate had read the whole letter, their lordships would have seen, that his venerated ancestor having been consulted by his gracious sovereign—who reposed such confidence in him, that to him he referred the question, how far he was legally bound by his Coronation oath, not to consent to measures affecting the Established Church—his revered father had given an opinion, in which, while he had advised that every thing consistently with the safety of the Established Church should be granted, for the ease of the tender consciences of the Dissenters, no concession of political power should be made to them. This opinion was expressed as clearly as possible.—The question before the House was simply whether it was fit, in this bill for the relief of the Protestant Dissenters, to insert words to maintain the law as it existed with respect to the Roman Catholics? In point of principle, there could be no doubt they were not admissible into corporations, as their admission would be prejudicial to the interests of both Church and State. All he looked for was the security of the Established Church, which he venerated not only for its spiritual character, but for the political influence it exercised for the support of the constitution. The great majority of the bench of bishops, he observed, had shewn little or no concern for either The right rev. prelates, he was sorry to say, had shewn much more regard for the temporalities of the Church than for its spiritual welfare. Suppose a question of temporal interest, on which two lawyers of equal knowledge being consulted as to a particular course, gave different opinions—one saying it would be unsafe, the other saying the reverse—what would anybody do? He intreated the House, therefore, on a question where two such great lawyers as the late and present Chancellors differed, to take the safe course, and insert the words that would be sure to exclude the Roman Catholics.

The Bishop of Chester

said, he had quoted the words of the illustrious lawyer to whom he had referred, for the purpose of showing that he considered the integrity of the Church of England to consist in the recognition of the doctrine and discipline, and the legalized support of her ministers.

The Bishop of Llandaff

said, the question in this case was not one of law, but rather as to the theological interpretation of the Oath of Supremacy, which must be taken by all those entering corporations. Now, upon that point, he believed he was right in asserting, that it was the opinion of almost the whole of that bench, that the Oath of Supremacy formed a sufficient barrier against the introduction of Roman Catholics.

The Earl of Eldon

said, that his opinion, that the Oath of Supremacy was not a sufficient security, was confirmed by the judgment of the House on more than one occasion. He also complained, that the recital of the bill upon the table was most insidious, and omitted the most important words of the two acts from which it professed to be copied: namely, those in which the inviolability of "the true Protestant Religion as established by law was affirmed." It was to secure that "true Protestant religion," in the bill under consideration, that he should divide the House upon his amendment.

The Duke of Wellington

said, the learned lord had just told them, that parliament had frequently decided that the Oath of Supremacy was not a sufficient security against the Roman Catholics. But the learned lord had not stated, that the Oath of Supremacy was altered by the act of king William, and he knew of no declaration, since the statute of William, which did not go to prove that the act was fully sufficient for the object which its framers had in view. But it was not on this ground alone that the question stood. The learned lord on the woolsack had stated most clearly his opinion, that the declaration against transubstantiation must still be subscribed by persons taking offices in corporations: and the learned lord opposite had advanced no answer to that statement. But there was another part of this question to which he begged their lordships to attend. It was this—that the Oath of Supremacy did now prevent Roman Catholics from voting at elections. Now, if it was sufficient to prevent them from voting at elections, would it not be sufficient to prevent them from taking governing offices in corporations? It had been asked, if the existing oaths were by some not thought sufficient, why not adopt the words of the learned lord? If there was a shadow of a doubt on the subject, why not take the safest course? In the first place, he contended, that the existing laws were sufficient. And surely, they would not admit, in a law brought in for one specific purpose, a declaration intended for another object. The present bill was meant to enlarge, not to contract, the privileges of the Dissenters; and certainly it would not be fair to introduce into such a measure a clause that would militate against Roman Catholics. There was no person in that House, whose feelings and sentiments, after long consideration, were more decided than his were with respect to the Roman Catholic claims; and he must say, that, until he saw a great change in that question, he should oppose it; but no man, on the other hand, was more determined than he was, to give his vote against any proposition which, like the present, appeared to have for its object a fresh enactment against the Roman Catholics.

The House then divided, when there appeared—For the amendment, present, 42; Proxies 10–52: Against it, present, 100; Proxies 54–154: Majority against the Amendment 102. After some further amendments had been proposed and negatived,

The Bishop of Llandaff

said: My lords, I rise for the purpose of proposing an amendment to the present bill, as far as regards those who are to be called upon to take the Declaration. This Declaration partakes largely of the solemnity of an oath, as it at present stands, and I know there exists an objection abroad, in which I confess I concur, against the unnecessary multiplication of oaths. I think that this objection might be remedied by introducing a pledge into the Declaration, which would be applicable to every person not being a Dissenter, who should be called upon to make it. The Declaration, as it now stands, is, in fact, inapplicable to nine tenths of the persons by whom it is to be taken. It commences in an awful form, which I would scruple unnecessarily to repeat, and that is followed up by such trifling words as these, "that he (the subscriber) would not exercise any power, authority, or influence, to injure or weaken the Protestant Church, as it is by law established," &c. Under the Corporation and Test acts, the taking of the Sacrament was a proof that the person admitted to office was a member of the Church of England, or that at least he was not hostile to it, or that he was in its communion, by his thus partaking of a rite which implied a general approbation of all its doctrines; and then no further Declaration was required. I fully agree with those who think it is perfectly right to put an end to the Sacramental Test. But why should a Church of England-man be called upon to make the present Declaration? In the case of a Dissenter, the Declaration is required on the presumption that he may entertain feelings hostile to the Established Church; but why impose it on those who must naturally be intent on preserving that Church, and against whom, therefore, no such presumption can be entertained? It surely cannot be supposed that a member of the Church of England will ever seek to "injure or weaken the Protestant Church." Now that we are going to admit persons who do not belong to the Church, to office—it is quite reasonable to require from them a Declaration that they will not, as far as concerns their office, seek to injure or weaken the Established Church, or to disturb it in the possession of its rights and privileges. But where is the reason for such a Declaration from persons who never can be supposed to entertain such an object? It is objected to the present proposition that it goes to make two classes of persons in society; and that invidious distinctions will be generated by compelling one class of persons to take this Declaration before admission to office, while another class shall be totally excepted from it. It is argued that the pride and feelings of the one party will be thus unnecessarily mortified, by the distinction conferred upon the other. I confess I see no reason in these objections, nor would they add much to my respect for the Dissenter who could use them. I cannot see why a Dissenter should consider it a hardship or a humiliation to be called upon to declare his dissent from the Established Church. If he wishes me to respect his opinions, he must show that he respects them himself. He must not be ashamed to avow them in the face of the whole world; and I do not hesitate to say, that the man who is unwilling to declare his religious opinions when called upon, cannot really possess any religion at all.

I am well aware that many persons are desirous to be regarded, in the opinion of the populace, as entertaining opinions which, in reality, they do not entertain. It has been related of the celebrated historian, Hume, that he was always annoyed in private society, when he was accosted as if he were a deist or infidel. Now I confess I am not much disposed to humour such duplicity; and I think it would be an ill compliment, indeed, to any man, to have it supposed that he entertained in private, religious opinions which he would be unwilling to profess in public. I admit that the present Declaration is a great and beneficial alteration in the character of the Test acts, because it substitutes a harmless test in lieu of one which was offensive and liable to profanation. But I cannot allow that this is the main feature or the principle of the present measure. Its principle is, to admit to civil offices, persons who, ever since the Corporation and Test acts have been passed, have been excluded from them by law, on account of their religious opinions. I cannot agree with the noble baron who introduced this measure, in considering these acts to have been the offspring of passion, prejudice, and violence. Neither do I consider them as being the result of a more than ordinary degree of wisdom; but I do believe that they were very useful in times of a peculiar character; and I also believe that they are no longer useful now that those times are changed. I do not believe that the Dis- senters are still distinguished for the same virulent hostility to the Established Church, by which they were then animated. The noble and learned lord (Eldon)—with whom I regret that I cannot agree, though I hope that he will not think the worse of me upon that account—has said that myself and my reverend brethren have not read the petitions on your lordships' table in favour of this measure, or we should have been aware of the fact, that a spirit of virulence pervaded them all. I candidly confess, that I, for one, have not read them, for I have not had leisure to do so" I have no doubt there is much of asperity I and virulence in their composition; much of what, in the time of our wise ancestors, was called malignancy; but, even admitting the fact—how, I ask, does that affect the question? For my own part, my conduct and opinions would be still the same. If the indulgence of this spirit, and the expression of it in language be, as it certainly is, far from characteristic of a "true Christian," let us show that we are truer Christians by forgiving it. It may do harm to their own cause, but it can never injure us. Neither do I think that it necessarily proves the body of Dissenters to cherish such sentiments. For it has been charged against these petitions (which, indeed, I believe to have been the fact), that most of them have been got up in London. They were prepared in such a way as was thought most likely to be acceptable to the different dissenting congregations, and people have been, no doubt, in many instances, called upon to sign them who were quite ignorant of their contents. The language, therefore, of these petitions should not be laid to the account of such persons, but to the account of those agitators in London, who made them their tools. But even if this were the case, is not the tone of those petitions to be attributed to the fact, that they who drew them up had fallen into the error of prejudging the degree of opposition the bill would meet with in this House?

I have no doubt that had they been aware of the mild and liberal disposition which prevailed towards them, especially among the members of my own order, had they an opportunity now of re-stating their case, that the tone and temper of the petitions would be widely different. With reference to the charge brought against us on a former night by a noble lord (Winchilsea)—whose zeal I beg to say I rever- ence, while I am opposed to his opinions, I must say that it contained towards myself and my reverend brethren, an uncharitable feeling. That noble lord imputed to us that we were negligent of the unity of the Church, and that we were sacrificing it to a false and spurious liberality. Now, if I understand rightly that much-abused term, liberality does not consist in being loose, or indifferent, or unsettled, in our opinions, but in being tolerant of those of others who differ from us; in not thinking the worse of them upon that account; in not seeking to mortify, or stigmatize, or degrade, them. But by giving them credit for the sincerity of their profession, by not supposing them unwilling openly to declare what they think, I really act with more respect towards the Dissenters, than those who wish to disguise the difference, and who pretend to fancy that they are of the same religious persuasion with ourselves. Knowing the contrary to be the fact, I call upon those persons who differ from me to say so; and then in admitting them to office, I call upon them for such reasonable security as may be necessary for the Church to which I belong. Neither do I think lightly of the duty of Church union, or of the sin of groundless separation. But I cannot concede the title of High-churchmen to those who seem to me almost exclusively to claim it; and who are distinguished by an excessive care for the temporal interests of the Church, more than by a devotion to its spiritual duties. When assumed on this account, I contend that the term is wholly misapplied, and even used in an inverted sense. For I maintain that its temporalities are valuable, only inasmuch as they tend to preserve and to perpetuate divine truth, and to increase its influence over the minds of men. The high-churchmen to whom I allude, resemble much the character drawn by our great poet, when he describes the spirit who still inhabited heaven, but whose ——looks and thoughts Were always downward bent, admiring more The riches of Heaven's pavement, trodden gold, Than aught divine or holy else enjoyed In vision beatific. I will detain your lordships no longer, than to express a hope that the clause which I shall now move, for the exemption of members of the Church of England from making the proposed Declaration, may receive the support of your lordships. Of those, at least, I may expect the sup- port, who condemn the needless multiplication of oaths, and the imposition of them upon trivial or improper occasions: for I think no candid person will deny, that with nine tenths of the persons who will be called upon to make it, this solemn protestation in the presence of God will have absolutely no meaning at all. Neither do I despair of the support of those who wish frankly to avow the true character of the measure; namely, that with our eyes open we propose to admit Dissenters, and thus to widen the door of admission to civil office. They must, I think, allow, that by doing it in this manner, we do them more honour than if we affected not to know of their differing from us, or to think that they would themselves be unwilling to acknowledge and profess that difference. The clause is as follows: "Be it therefore I enacted, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any person residing in England or Wales, or in the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, being Members of the Established Church, to take the before-recited Declaration, but that the following Declaration shall be alone required, 'I, A. B., declare that I am a member of, and am in communion with the Church of England.'"

Lord Holland

said, he should vote against the clause, as it was in direct contradiction to the whole character and principle of the measure. The principle of the bill was to unite those persons who had been divided, and this amendment went to keep up that division. He objected that, in the very marriage articles, there should be included an article for separate maintenance. This amendment would strip the measure of all its grace and all its advantages, and he therefore trusted it would be rejected.

The Earl of Eldon

said, he had in a former stage of the bill proposed an amendment similar to this, and should therefore vote for the present clause.

The Bishop of Bristol

said, he should support the clause, although it did not come up to his opinion as to what should have been the leading principle of the bill.

The Duke of Wellington

disapproved of the clause. He did not see why a Roman Catholic might not obtain admission to a corporation, if so simple a declaration as that proposed by the right rev. prelate were only put to him.

The clause was negatived.

The Bishop of Bath and Wells

said, he was entirely actuated by a sense of duty in voting for the repeal of the Corporation and Test acts. It was abhorrent to the principles of genuine religion, that persons should be called upon to take the Sacramental Test for secular and interested motives. It was a profanation of the sacrament to employ it for such purposes. He had voted for the bill, because he conscientiously considered it necessary. He had to regret that upon this occasion he had the misfortune to differ from the learned lord (Eldon) who had so long adorned and benefitted his country, and he felt it quite impossible, by any eulogy or words of his, to do justice to the manliness, good sense, and good feeling, which had throughout characterized that noble lord.

The Duke of Cumberland

said, he was desirous of expressing his sentiments on the bill then under consideration, and trusted that the House would allow him to place his opinion upon record; which he thought it the more incumbent upon him to do, after his long absence from the country. In carrying his intention into effect, he begged to say, that it was with unfeigned reluctance he found himself compelled to dissent from the noble duke, in the view which he took of the measure then before the House. He never felt more concerned at any circumstance than at that of being obliged to oppose a bill, which had the noble duke's support and approbation. Nothing but a conscientious feeling of the rectitude of the course he was then taking, could induce him to pursue it, opposed as it was to that adopted by the noble duke. But having now for one and thirty years followed one undeviating line of conduct, in relation to the established constitution and church of the country, he found it impossible to depart from it; and considering, as he did, the present measure favourable to neither, he must be permitted again to express his dissent from it.

The Earl of Darnley

rose to say a word or two in consequence of what had fallen from a right rev. prelate. He merely wished to remark, that, early in the present session, he had presented a petition from the corporation of London, in which the Sacramental Test had been alluded to, as exposed to profanation when used as a religious rite to promote civil qualification. That sentiment, which was both true and just, had been since re-echoed from all sides of the House, but from no quarter so loudly as the right rev. bench. He should have been gratified had a plainer measure of relief—for instance, a simple repeal of all these disqualifications—been sent up from the Commons, it being his full conviction that such a mode of repealing these impolitic restrictions would have afforded the best guarantee the church of England could obtain for its permanent security. The country and parliament had done justice to the triumphs of the illustrious duke opposite, but sure he was, that, great as were his past deserts, the spirit of candour, moderation, and justice, which he had displayed during the discussions upon this bill, would do him as much credit, and eventually confer as great benefit upon his country, as the high military achievements upon which he had previously founded his fame. He could confidently assure the noble duke, that if he persevered in maintaining the same liberal and conciliatory policy, he would encounter no opposition from that side of the House, but on the contrary, receive that support for his government which they would feel it equally a matter of duty and satisfaction to afford.

Lord Holland

said, that in performing the pleasing duty of moving "that this bill do pass," he could not refrain from expressing his feelings in language both of gratitude and congratulation—gratitude to that House, for the manner in which it had discharged its duty to the country, and congratulation to the country upon the achievement of so glorious a result.

Lord Redesdale

took a review of the circumstances under which measures founded upon the same principle, and urged by the same reasons, had, in former times, received the concurrence of parliament, and eventually exposed both church and state to extreme jeopardy. "When he looked at the safeguard which they were about to repeal, and the substitute they proposed in its place, he could not help being struck with its utter insufficiency, and protesting, in the strongest manner, against the enactment of such a measure.

The Earl of Mountcashel

felt it his duty to oppose the present bill, which was calculated to endanger the Established Church, and to let loose upon the country, with power to do mischief to its institutions, large classes of Socinians, and others, who could not be denominated the supporters of true Christianity, The bill was then passed.