HL Deb 07 May 1827 vol 17 cc573-6

The Commission for the appointment of the Master of the Rolls, as Deputy Speaker, was read by the Clerk of the House.

The Earl of Lauderdale

wished, that it should be explained, by some member of the government, whether, by the commission they had just heard read, it was intended to make the learned person therein mentioned the Chairman of the House, for the purpose of hearing and deciding Appeal cases, without, at the same time, creating him a member of the House? If such was the object of the commission, he thought it involved a strange anomaly; since, after having heard the case, and drawn up the judgment, that learned person (for whose talents he entertained the sincerest respect) must put that judgment into the hands of a peer to move that it be received by their lordships. He thought the present administration had been pledged to act upon the principles of lord Liverpool's administration. Now, he wished to know whether this appointment was a part of their performance of the promise? There had been some time since a Deputy Speaker introduced into their lordships' House; but, had the noble earl, then at the head of the government, introduced among them a person who was not a peer to fill that situation? Certainly not: for it had been filled by a noble lord whose decease they had recently had reason to regret. He wished, therefore, upon this subject, to know, what were the intentions of the government.

The Lord Chancellor

[lord Lyndhurst] begged to take upon himself the whole responsibility of the measure now introduced to their lordships' notice. He thought they would be of opinion that, considered as a temporary measure, and with respect to the business of the House and of the court of Chancery, it was both prudent and proper. The noble earl had alluded to lord Liverpool's administration, and had spoken as if there was no precedent for this measure. Now, he might have recollected—and, if he pleased, no man could recollect such matters better than the noble earl—that there was a precedent to be found for it. However, without going into the circumstances of that case which furnished a precedent for the measure now adopted, it would, perhaps, be necessary, that he should state what had been the course pursued in this instance, and what the reasons which had induced him to adopt it. He would first recal to their lordships the state of the business of the House on appeals. There were now before their lordships seventy Appeals from Scotland, and forty from the courts of England and Ireland. In the course of last session the noble lord to whom allusion had been made, with all his talent for business, with all his quickness of perception and legal learning, and with all his perseverance and industry (and he did not hesitate to affirm, that to his perseverance in the duties of his office he had fallen a victim), could not get through more than forty of the Scotch Appeals. In this state of things, what was the course pursued? It was proposed, and he again declared that it was proposed on his advice and responsibility, to dispose of the Scotch Appeals by the assistance of the Chief Baron of the court of Exchequer, who was intimately acquainted with the Scotch law, and who was to devote two days in the week, for the hearing of the Scotch Appeals. More than that time he could not devote to that object, without injury to the suitors of his own court. The assistance, therefore, of the learned individual named in the commission just read would be required for one day, in furtherance of the same object. It was absolutely necessary that the lord Chancellor should sit for two days in the week, to decide English and Irish Appeals; and he was quite sure, that if noble lords referred to the business of the court of Chancery, they would be convinced that the lord Chancellor could not be spared from that court more than two days in the week, without prejudice to the public interest. By the system proposed, there would be five days in the week devoted to the hearing of appeals. The Scotch Appeals would have three days employed upon them by two individuals of great knowledge and talent, and both well conversant with the laws of Scotland; and the lord Chancellor would sit for two days in each week to dispose of the English and Irish Appeals. This arrangement would give him four days for the court of Chancery—a period which, he trusted, would be found sufficient to keep down the business of that court. He must say, that it would not have been just towards himself to launch him at once into the hearing of all the Appeals now before the House, and to require him, at the same time, to dispose of all the business now in arrear in the court of Chancery. If their lordships would grant him the indulgence which, he thought, he might in justice require, he would pledge himself, before the next session, to perfect a plan, with reference to the business of his court, that should secure its performance regularly, faithfully, and accurately [hear, hear!]. The arrangement now proposed was merely temporary; and, notwithstanding what had been said about lord Liverpool's administration, he might observe, that it had had the good fortune to meet with that noble earl's approbation.

The Earl of Lauderdale

did not object to the arrangement of the business itself, and did not wish to throw the heavy duties of the court of Chancery and of this House upon the shoulders of the lord Chancellor; but his objection was, that whoever might be appointed to take part in the performance of those duties should be enabled to do so as a member of that House. He was sure there was none more capable, in every respect, than the learned individual whose commission had been now read; but he objected to the anomaly of appointing an individual to try appeal cases there—an employment of the highest confidence—when that individual, after having formed his judgment, must propose it to a peer before it could be received by the House.

Lord Holland

said, that, as a member of that House, he must object to noble lords using expressions, which seemed to convey the idea, that the learned law lords sat in that House to try and decide appeals. The right to try and decide appeals was not limited to any one noble lord, or to any particular peers in preference to the rest; but resided in every member of that House equally. They were all "peers;" and that one word showed that they were all equal. It was the duty of every man in that House, as a lord of Parliament, to sit and insist in the hearing of appeals. If the deputy Speaker or the lord Keeper was, as by the constitution of that House he might be, a com moner, should the king choose to appoint such a person to that office, he would only sit there to assist the House, and he would be bound to give the House such opinions as the House might exact from him. That there had been a change in the constitution of that House, with regard to the hearing of appeals, he was ready to acknowledge; but it was a change effected by no other power than a majority of that House, and not only so, but at the express recommendation of the noble earl. When that alteration was first introduced to the House, he (lord H.) had warned them of the inconvenience of it; as it seemed to him it would introduce the practice of deciding Appeals by some individual members, and not by the whole House. The lord Keeper, the Speaker, and the deputy Speaker of that House might be commoners, and they would then only give their assistance to the House, not to decide the Appeals brought before them. Even the lord Chancellor himself, though a peer, did not possess any additional power, as lord Chancellor, in the decision of appeals; and when he spoke upon any subject under discussion, he was obliged to quit his seat, and to speak only as a peer, though he took, at the head of the duke's bench, that high rank to which he was entitled by the dignity of his office. If the deputy Speaker was sitting, and the lord Chancellor came in, he must also take that seat as the first peer in rank. These were the rules of the House, and he was sorry that they seemed to have been forgotten. It was not because they had the satisfaction of having some learned law lords among them, that expressions were to be used, calculated to mislead the people, and to make them imagine that those learned lords, and not the whole House, sat to decide appeals.