Lords Sitting of 8 June 1827

KING'S MESSAGE RESPECTING PORTUGAL.
The order of the day being read, for taking His Majesty's Speech into consideration,
Viscount Dudley and Wardsaid:—Although I cannot anticipate any difference of opinion with respect to the subject on which I have the honour to address your lordships, I deem it more con-

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venient, and more respectful to your lordships, to trouble you with a few remarks. I do not consider that I am placed under the necessity of saying anything in support of the policy which originally induced your lordships to sanction the sending of British troops to Portugal. The grounds upon which that measure was adopted were explained to the House by a noble earl (Bathurst) whom I regret not to see in his place, because I am sure I should have profited by his weight and authority, in resisting any opposition which may be made to the address which I shall propose to your lordships. The statement of that noble earl had the good fortune to meet with the unanimous concurrence of this House; and the vote for enabling his majesty to send troops to the aid of our ally was passed without a dissentient voice. All the noble lords who spoke on that occasion spoke strongly in favour of the measure. The noble baron (Holland) and the noble marquis (Lansdown) near me, who at that time sat on the other side of the House, did not hesitate to give their assistance to the proposal of his majesty's government. Above all, the measure was supported by that great general and statesman, whose authority is of so much weight in all military and civil questions; and whose opinions are more especially entitled to respect when he speaks of the affairs of a country which he so long guided by his counsels and protected by his arms; a man who, if he will allow me to say so much of him, is the least likely of almost any one with whom I am acquainted, both from his extensive experience, and from the natural soundness and vigour of his understanding, to be led away by any fanciful speculations or enthusiastic projects. Never, perhaps, was a measure proposed to parliament which met with more general concurrence: it was considered, in fact, not as a question of doubtful policy, but as a measure necessarily imposed upon us by the obligations of honour and good faith. I think I may also say, that scarcely ever was a measure adopted which, in a short time, contributed more to raise the already high character of this country in every part of Europe. I feel, my lords, that it would be disrespectful to your lordships to suppose it possible that any alteration can have taken place in your opinions on this subject. I am not aware of anything that has occurred which can have occa-
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sioned any alteration of those sentiments. In this House, not the slightest objection was made to the measure; but I have heard of a sort of apprehension that it might involve the country in the calamities of a war. Now, in point of fact, the effect of this measure has been, to render altogether hopeless and desperate the designs of those Portuguese rebels, which were carried on for some time, if not with the absolute assistance of the Spanish government, at least with the connivance and support of the Spanish authorities. The effect of this measure has been, to frustrate those designs, and thereby prevent a war, which must have been calamitous to Spain herself, and which might have endangered the tranquillity of Europe. In calling upon this House, therefore, to fulfil this promise of assistance, and to maintain the course of policy dictated by good faith, as well as by the interests of this country, I do not feel myself obliged to do more than assure your lordships, that the circumstances which originally called upon us to send aid to Portugal have not entirely ceased to exist. It is a great satisfaction to me, however, to be enabled to inform your lordships, that they exist in a much more mitigated degree; and that a negotiation has been entered into between the governments of Spain and Portugal, which, promoted by the authority and interference both of England and France, is likely to end, at no distant period, in an accommodation of existing differences. Such an accommodation will relieve us from the necessity of maintaining troops in Portugal; but, in the mean time, we ask for the means of maintaining them there, so long as the honour and security of our allies may render it necessary. Of course it is difficult to specify the precise time at which it may be expedient to withdraw them; it is not a thing capable of accurate and precise specification. Your lordships will, I am sure, agree with me, that circumstances which might not be sufficient to induce us to send troops to Portugal, would be sufficient to induce us not to withdraw them. We ought, in prudence, to have a reasonable assurance—and I trust the period is not far distant when we shall have that assurance—that the troops may be withdrawn, without the hazard of a recurrence of those circumstances which originally obliged us to send them thither. How long it may be before we can have that

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reasonable assurance, whether for a longer or a shorter period, it is not possible precisely to determine; but I think it highly desirable, that the principles upon which we maintain the troops in Portugal should not be misunderstood. Those principles, my lords, are no other than those upon which they were originally sent to Portugal. What I now say on this subject, I wish to be considered as said in the face of all Europe; and I am the more desirous, therefore, that it should be distinctly understood. The British troops have not been sent to Portugal for one ostensible reason, with the intention of retaining them there for another and a different reason. It was not to maintain any political institutions, or to impose upon Portugal any particular form of government, that our troops were sent to that country; though it is certainly true, that assistance has been rendered with the greater zeal and alacrity by one free people towards another people, animated by a similar spirit, and appreciating, if not enjoying, the benefit of similar institutions. It was not for the purpose of protecting constitutional Portugal, or of annoying despotic Spain, that our troops were sent to Portugal: it was to defend Portugal, our ancient ally, a country which we were bound to defend by the faith of treaties; and, if not by the faith of treaties, by the strongest ties of political expediency. These were the principles on which the government originally acted in sending troops to Portugal; and, though it is impossible to point out the precise moment at which they can be prudently withdrawn, the period, I hope, is not far distant. I think it right to give this public and distinct assurance, that these are the principles on which they will be kept there.—There is another point on which I wish to make one or two observations. My noble friend opposite (lord Ellenborough) inquired on two former occasions, whether it was the intention of government to lay any papers before the House relative to this subject. On those occasions, I answered my noble friend's question in the negative. To state the reasons why I resist the production of papers, would, in general, be nearly equivalent to producing the papers themselves; and, I believe, I might refer for a justification of my refusal to the general responsibility of the government, and to its right to exercise a discretion on such occasions. As
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I am desirous, however, to give as much satisfaction to this House, and to every individual member of it, as is consistent with my public duty, I will state thus much:—It is obvious that the casus fœderis which called upon us to send troops to Portugal, was a case more or less against Spain. I admit that, if things wore an unfavourable aspect, and there was a tendency to a complete rupture rather than to an accommodation of differences, it might be highly proper to lay papers before the House. But when, fortunately, things have taken a different turn—when the conduct of Spain has been conciliatory, and there are sanguine hopes of an accommodation, this is surely not the moment to lay papers on the table, the tenor of which papers must be, to make out a case against Spain.—The noble viscount concluded by moving an Address to his Majesty, assuring his Majesty of the perfect concurrence of that House, in enabling his Majesty to provide for any additional expenses that might arise on account of the continuance of the British forces in Portugal.
Earl Grey—It is not my intention to offer any opposition to the present motion; but I feel it necessary to state shortly, the terms upon which I assent to it, and to make some reservation as to the opinions which I may consider it my duty to declare, at a period better suited to discussion. In the sentiments expressed by the noble viscount at the conclusion of his speech, I have to declare my unqualified concurrence. I certainly think it would not be right to press ministers for the production of any papers, under the circumstances which he has stated. It is quite sufficient to satisfy the House of the impropriety of any such production, to state that there are negotiations pending, of the amicable termination of which a strong hope is entertained, and which might be interrupted or defeated by producing documents of a hostile character. I am, therefore, not one of those who would press the noble lord for any documents of this description; but I may regret, that after so long a period has elapsed since the adoption of the measure of sending troops to Portugal, no greater progress has been made in the work of pacification, and that ministers are not prepared to state, that this great and salutary object has not been accomplished. If I before felt some degree of disappointment, that

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disappointment, is increased by the nature of the present message, and by the scanty explanation of it which has been given by the noble viscount. Am I to understand from the address to his majesty in answer to his message, assuring him of our readiness to give him support for the defence of Portugal, in the shape of a vote of credit, for no less than half a million, that this vote is solely for the purpose of maintaining the troops now in Portugal? I am afraid I cannot so understand it.
The number of British troops now in Portugal amounts to about 5,000; and I believe the expense of maintaining such a force would not exceed 160,000 l. or at most 200,000 l. a year. Now, this sum has already been voted in the usual grants for the army; and no additional sum, therefore, would be required, on account of the detachment of this force to Portugal. I am aware it may be said, that additional expenses—such as those for equipment, for the commissariat and foraging departments—are increased in the employment of troops in a foreign country. Against these additional expenses, however, are to be set others of a similar description, which would have been incurred at home; such as marching expenses, expenses for fuel, barracks, &c. In fact, the whole of the extraordinary expenses incurred abroad, might be covered by the provision made under the usual head of army extraordinaries; and your lordships are aware, that the additional sum granted under that head in the other House of parliament was voted on the express ground of the increased expense attending the employment of the troops in Portugal. After the whole expenses of the corps now in Portugal have been provided for by the grant voted in the other House, we are now called upon for a further sum, more than sufficient for the maintenance of a force double the amount of the British troops in that country. These circumstances, I confess, excite in my mind a feeling of uneasiness and alarm. The noble viscount, instead of assuring us that the employment of the British forces has been already effectual for the purpose for which they were sent to Portugal, now calls upon us for a further supply, foreseeing, I suppose, the possibility of further difficulties and dangers, which he has hitherto been unable to avert. Instead of assuring the House, that the
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measures already adopted, in defence of our ally, were likely to render it unnecessary to impose any further burthens on the British public, ministers are unable to hold out any definite prospect for the withdrawal of the troops; on the contrary, they feel it necessary that their hands should be fortified with the means of carrying on preparations for the defence of Portugal to a much greater extent. If I do not press for further information, I abstain solely on the ground of my unwillingness to throw any obstacle in the negotiations said to be pending; on the satisfactory termination of which the peace and security, not only of this country and of Portugal, but of all Europe, may depend. In so doing, I reserve to myself the right of questioning, hereafter, if I find it necessary, the whole conduct of ministers with regard to this measure. The noble viscount observed, that our troops were sent to Portugal, not for the purpose of supporting constitutional Portugal, or of annoying despotic Spain, but solely on the ground of a treaty, which obliged us to defend an ancient and faithful ally. Whether the casus fœderis which called upon us to interfere was clearly made out, I am not prepared to say; however interference might be justified upon the broader ground of policy, which rendered it necessary for us to take measures to prevent France from obtaining that power and preponderance over the whole of the Peninsula, which could not but be prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain. The passage in the speech of the noble viscount to which I have adverted is not quite consistent with another passage, in which he declared, that the measures adopted by the British government have had the effect of rendering desperate the attempts of the Portuguese insurgents to overthrow the constitutional government of Portugal. I think the independence of Portugal a great object; but I do hope, that in pursuing that object we shall not suffer ourselves to be led into the support of a principle which can never be acted upon without detriment to this country. With the constitution of Portugal we have nothing to do. It was not our work. It was not recommended by us. Whether it be good or bad; whether it be more or less consonant to the interests of the people; whether it be more or less accordant to their desires or dispositions; whether the party opposing or supporting it be right or wrong; whether

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Don Pedro, having made his election of the Crown of Brazil, and having resigned the Crown of Portugal, had a right to send a constitution to Portugal, and enforce obedience to it—all these are questions with which we have nothing to do: they are questions for the Portuguese themselves to decide; and any interference with them, on our part, would be a violation of those national rights, and that national independence, which it is our duty, on all occasions, to support. The noble viscount has stated, that our troops have not been sent to Portugal, and that they are not now maintained there, for any such purpose. If this be the case, I trust that, from the moment satisfaction can be obtained from Spain, that no invasion or aggression will be attempted against Portugal, the maintenance of British forces in that country will cease, and that they will not be kept there under the idea of supporting one party against another, or of upholding a constitution with which we have no concern, and with which it is neither consistent with the interests of this country, nor with the faith of treaties, nor with the principles upon which the law and independence of nations are founded, to interfere. In looking to the difficulties with which the government has to contend, it is impossible not to look back also to the causes which produced them. Those difficulties arise from their having originally suffered the French to invade Spain, without regarding what was due to the honour, and still less what accorded with the interests of the country. We were then in a situation to reap advantages from a decisive course of policy, which it is doubtful whether any pending negotiations can secure to us. I shall be satisfied, if by an amicable arrangement we can pro cure the evacuation of Spain by the French at the same time that we evacuate Portugal; and I think we have a right to insist upon this as a necessary condition in our negotiations. The French have now been four years in Spain. Upon what pretext they remain there I know not. They originally went there under the pretence of rescuing the monarch of Spain from the hands of a faction, which, by means of a military force, was said to overpower the real dispositions of the people. Their object has long since been effected. The Cortes have been suppressed: those rebels and traitors, as they are represented by some, but those virtuous and suffering
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patriots, as they are regarded by others, are now dispersed over the face of Europe, the objects of compassion to every generous and feeling mind. The French have now no pretence for remaining in Spain, if it be really true that the dispositions of the people are favourable to the monarch and the government; and if their presence be necessary to support the government, it is a government which ought not to be supported. It has been said, that there is this difference between the situation of Spain and Portugal; that in Spain the general dispositions and feelings of the people are decidedly in favour of an absolute king, and that in Portugal the dispositions of the people are as decidedly in favour of a constitutional government. By some singular fatality, however, it is found necessary by the French to continue an army in Spain for the support of the absolute monarchy to which the people are so much attached; while we are supposed to maintain an army in Portugal, under the apprehension, that if it were withdrawn, the constitutional government, of which the people are so fond, would be immediately overthrown! These are the difficulties in which people and governments are placed, by departing from a liberal and enlightened policy. I earnestly hope, that the government may still return to those principles. Had his majesty's ministers originally acted upon them, I feel persuaded that the object sought by the pending negotiations—a consummation devoutly to be wished for—would have been already accomplished; and that they would not feel themselves obliged, after such a lapse of time, and so large an expenditure, to call upon this House to strengthen their hands, with a view of providing against still existing dangers, and in explanation of the grounds on which I give a qualified assent to the present motion.
The Address was agreed to, nem. dis.