HL Deb 14 March 1826 vol 14 cc1347-58
The Earl of Liverpool

, in moving the order of the day for the second reading of this bill, observed, that it was not his intention to enter into any statements upon this occasion; because, when he brought forward the measure relating to the Bank charter, he had put their lordships in possession of the whole system which his majesty's government thought advisable to adopt with respect to this subject. Should any doubt arise with respect to the provisions of this bill, or any objection be urged against it, he should be ready to state in explanation whatever might occur to his mind. The operation of this bill was intended to be confined to England; its object was, to extinguish the circulation of notes under 5l. He had been asked if it was intended to extend the operation of this measure to Ireland and Scotland? He had then stated, that it was the opinion of government, that the principle ought to be extended to Ireland and Scotland; allowing, however, a larger interval, with respect to time, when it was to come into operation in those parts of the empire. He now begged leave to apprise their lordships that it was his intention to move on Friday for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the present banking systems of Ireland and Scotland. He adopted this course of proceeding, not from any alteration which had taken place in his own opinion upon this subject, but from a thorough conviction that the investigation would prove the expediency of the application of the proposed measure to those countries.

The Earl of Carnarvon

objected to the whole of this measure; first, on account of the time at which it was introduced; next, on account of the circumstances under which it was brought forward; and thirdly, on the abstract principle, that a paper-currency founded on a metallic one was the best and the safest for the interest of this country. He also objected to it because it was intended to prevent the recurrence of such crises as that which the country had lately suffered and continued to endure, convinced as he was that it would be found wholly inoperative for that purpose. It was therefore his determination to give it a decided negative. If the measure professed to afford relief to the present distress, he should, perhaps, have hesitated before he offered any opposition to it; but when it was admitted, that it would bring no relief at present, and was hastily brought forward without inquiry, not for the purpose of meeting the existing evil, but to prevent a recurrence of it, the case was widely different. He was not for adopting measures to-day, which it might be found expedient to abandon to-morrow; and if any question brought forward under such circumstances were more calculated to produce mischief than another, it was a question affecting the currency of the country. The effect of the bill was counteracted by the principle of another measure with which it had been coupled, respecting the Bank of England. To that measure he did not object; but he felt that it strengthened his objection to the adoption of this bill at present, when the agitation which it excited in the public mind had produced the introduction of another measure before this had gone through the House. It produced the greatest effects upon the money-market at this moment. He knew, however, that that argument would be met by the observation, that the measure ought therefore to be set at rest at once. Now, he should rather say, in the present state of the money-market, let them wave all future considerations now, and apply their minds to the application of a remedy to the existing distress. But no; a different line of conduct was adopted by his majesty's government. They said they had foreseen the evils which had arrived, and therefore would apply no remedy to them. Others might do so if they pleased, and welcome, but they would only adopt measures for the future. Now, he thought that the members of the executive government might have done more service to the country, if they had afforded the public relief more promptly; whether they did it themselves, or induced the Bank to do it. With respect to the object of this bill, he contended, that if the thing was to be done at all, it had better be done at once; otherwise, the effect would be similar to that of the memorable adjustment, as it was called, of 1819, when they came to the resolution of paying a paper debt, according to the old standard; which, instead of being an act of justice, was one of the grossest injustice; and one, towards the country at large, of the greatest impolicy. The committee, in whose suggestions that measure originated, had laid it down, that we ought to return to a metallic currency; and now, upon the occasion of the first panic, without waiting an hour, we must forthwith have recourse to this, the most important measure that could be applied to the country. He contended, that in a commercial country like this, a metallic was not preferable to a paper currency Convertible into gold. The noble earl opposite had calculated, that not more than from 6,000,000l. to 8,000,000l. of gold would be necessary to replace the paper which he proposed to withdraw from circulation. Now, that calculation only applied, he believed, to England; how much, therefore, would be required for Ireland and Scotland, he could not say, but he did not think that less than ten or twelve millions would be required altogether. Whatever would be its amount, it would be considerable. Now, these seven, eight, ten, or twelve millions must be withdrawn from the productive capital of the country; and if the compound interest of that sum for the next 40 or 50 years were calculated, it would be seen what a considerable diminution would be thus produced, in what would otherwise have then been the amount of the national capital. That paper was a cheaper currency than gold, the noble earl would not contradict. Then came the question, was it as safe a one? For an answer to that question, he referred the noble earl to Scotland. It was impossible to look to the state of that country, which for forty years had no other currency than paper, without being convinced of the safety of such a circulation, when founded upon a proper system of banking. The present system of banks in Scotland had existed for upwards of a century. During that period, Scotland had made the greatest progress in the acquirement of wealth. What was the difference between the currencies of Scotland and England? Was it only that they had no metallic currency there? No; but they had chartered banks, while the banks of England were formed upon a very different system. No man would defend the circulation of the one and two pound notes which issued from such banks as these. He thought that ministers ought, before they adopted a measure like the present, to have recommended the Bank of England to sacrifice a portion of their privileges, and permit the formation of chartered banks within a certain distance of the metropolis. The noble earl contended, that the distress had been produced by excessive trading and speculation, originating in causes wholly unconnected with the paper currency. At the time of the South Sea bubble, we had no small paper currency. In 1783, we had no currency of 1l. and 2l. notes; and the pressure was at that period greater than the present. In 1793 the case was the same; although it was the fashion to attribute the state of the country at that time to the war. Thus it was clear that there were no grounds for imputing the present distress to the state of the existing currency. The noble earl had intimated his intention of imparting to Scotland the blessings of his proposed system; but the noble earl ought first to consider, whether it would not be better to place the currency in this country upon the same footing as that of Scotland, under which she had been exempt from all the evils which England had endured. He ought to consider whether, by tracing cause and effect he might not discover that it was that system which had so exempted Scotland from those evils, and find it a wiser measure to assimilate our own system to hers, instead of forcing upon her the application of our theory of 1819, or any theory at all. There were no grounds for presuming that a paper currency so established would not produce the same beneficial consequences here as in Scotland; and it would, therefore, be much wiser to adopt that than have recourse to another which, the moment it was introduced, had produced a degree of distress that obliged its authors to relax it, even pending its progress through the House. He did not know whether the Scottish banks had received any assistance from the Bank of England during the recent pressure; but whether they had been enabled to weather the storm with or without such assistance, it equally proved their stability; for if the Bank had afforded them any aid, it showed that they possessed a degree of credit which the banks in England could not obtain.—He would now allude to some circumstances connected with the currency when the small notes were not in circulation, and nothing but the "genuine currency," as it was termed, prevailed. In addition to the loss to which a man was exposed by taking bad gold, he also suffered from clipping, and sweating, and other processes, by which the value of guineas was reduced. He remembered, that when he paid away four or five guineas, they were all weighed and rung before they would be taken, and he was generally obliged to change part of them. When paper was introduced, the greatest convenience was experienced. There was no longer any necessity for weighing. If their circulation were limited in point of extent, forgery would soon be detected. The one and two pound notes of the Bank of England were liable to forgery because of their extensive circulation; but that objection did not apply to local notes. Another objection to a metallic currency was, that it produced a greater number of robberies. At the period to which he had referred, robberies were numerous. A friend of his had been robbed on the highway, another had been wounded by a shot fired at him by a footpad, and a third had narrowly escaped with his life, by seizing the muzzle of the pistol which the robber had thrust into his carriage, and wresting it out of his hand. Since the introduction of bank notes, this description of robberies had greatly diminished. The note was numbered; it had the name of the person upon it to whom it belonged, and it furnished evidence to convict the criminal. It was, in every respect, a more dangerous property to a robber than a sovereign. When the transition took place from paper to gold, every body preferred notes, for their greater convenience, to sovereigns; although we were now apt to forget all those circumstances. He was of opinion, that no case had been established for the substitution of a metallic currency. Noble lords said, "Let us adopt the good rule, and go back to a gold currency;" but when we had, it would not save us from such evils as the present. Another objection to this measure was, that the small notes—notwithstanding all that had been said about their having caused over-trading—had contributed much more to the upholding and propping up of the agricultural interests than to the encouraging of any wild speculations or adventures. In his opinion, a paper currency, founded on a metallic basis, was preferable to any other, and formed a circulating medium far more capable than any other of being expanded or contracted as circumstances might require. Under this system the nation had made the most rapid advances to a real and solid addition to its wealth and resources. Surely, then, it ought to be well considered, whether this bill was not calculated to check that proper spirit of enterprise and speculation which had produced these beneficial results. The noble lord here went into some calculations, for the purpose of showing that the excess of paper issues during the recent feverish period of speculations, had been much too trifling to afford any pretext for ascribing to it the present disasters; indeed, the excess in the issue of small notes had only been about a million and a half, and this was all which the present bill was calculated to get rid of. But, if the present description of paper were withdrawn, would not at least half its amount be supplied by some other description of paper? He was apprehensive that if the present bill were passed, it would be most injurious to the poorer classes, and be productive of great convulsions in the country; and that their lordships would be compelled to retrace their steps. So thinking, he felt it his duty to move, as an amendment, "that the bill be read a second time that day six months."

The Earl of Darnley

said, he could not agree with his noble friend in thinking that this measure was likely to prove injurious to the poor. Indeed, he should give it his support, because he looked upon it as the first duty of government to protect the labouring classes from the misery to which they had lately been exposed by the stoppage of so many banks. If he could bring himself to believe that its effect would be to throw a large por- tion of them out of employment, he would hesitate in giving it his sanction, but being perfectly convinced that unless parliament afforded protection against such evils as they had lately experienced, they would be constantly recurring, he must give it his cordial support. His noble friend had somewhat misconceived the reason why highway robberies had become less frequent. It could not be owing to the want of a metallic currency, because, in point of fact, that species of currency had been in general use in the neighbourhood of London for these last four or five years, and scarcely an instance of highway robbery had occurred during that period. As to the argument, that the suppression of a paper currency would throw considerable difficulties in the way of mercantile transactions, it should be recollected, that in Liverpool and Manchester, a metallic currency had for some time prevailed, and had not produced any of the difficulties which were apprehended. He thought that ministers, by putting an end to the fabrication of paper money, would best do their duty to the country, and protect the interests of the poor. He wished to call to the recollection of the noble lord who had that evening presented a petition from the sister kingdom against this bill, the great distress which some years ago was caused in Ireland by the failure of the Cork and other banks. Indeed, he had been informed, that many of the poor Irish had actually died through want; for in that country there was not, any fund to which the starving poor could have recourse. He should give his vote in favour of the bill, because he considered it calculated to render a recurrence of the present evils impossible. Adverting to the commercial distress, he certainly thought, that government had proceeded on an erroneous principle in not affording relief in the manner in which it had been advantageously afforded on former occasions. If the noble earl and his colleagues had not pledged themselves in the last session, to grant no help to those whose commercial speculations might involve them in distress, an issue of Exchequer-bills would have had the effect, in a great degree, of restoring confidence.

The Earl of Liverpool

said, he wished to make a few observations on what had fallen from the noble earl who had moved the amendment; but, in the first place, he was desirous to reply to some remarks from the noble earl who had just spoken. That noble earl seemed to think that his majesty's government had abstained from issuing Exchequer-bills, merely because they had pledged themselves last year that they would not do so. He could assure the noble earl, that they were not so strongly attached to their own opinion, as to persevere in any system which they discovered to be an injurious one. But of this he was satisfied, that his majesty's government had never effected a greater good, than by resisting the applications which had been made on that subject. If those applications had been now acceded to, upon any future occasion, when any distress had arisen, relief would have been demanded as a matter of right. He could not but regard the precedent of 1793 as one which it would have been highly impolitic to have followed in the present emergency; for the distress which now prevailed could not be said to have occurred by the hand of God. There had been no bad harvest or other similar cause; but it was allowed on all hands, that over-trading had been the primary cause of the mischief. If future ministers did their duty with like firmness, no more would be heard of Exchequer-bills being issued for the relief of private distress. He felt persuaded, that, if the relief had been afforded by government, instead of by the Bank, it would have been as different as possible in its practical effects, and that the assistance would have got into totally different hands. The secresy with which this relief would have been administered, had it proceeded from the government, was with him the principal objection. This very secresy had a manifest tendency to encourage speculation. If relief was to be given, it was desirable that the names of the applicants for it should be generally known. He had put the question to the great deputation from Manchester, whether they wished for secresy, and their answer was, no, they were ready to accept the relief in any way it might be tendered. There could be no objection to the great Bank of the country coming forward, and giving that relief which, by its charter and by-laws, it was enabled to do. If it met with any difficulty in effecting this, then let the government do what it could towards the removing of that difficulty. Besides, if government afforded this relief to one interest, it ought to afford it to all; but the proper policy was to afford it to none, except where the exigency was such as no human foresight could guard against. Had it been the wish of himself and his colleagues to have spent an easy session of it, nothing could be more within reach. If they had merely come forward with an issue of Exchequer-bills, they would have been hailed as the most benevolent beings, the most considerate of ministers. But instead of studying their own ease, and looking for popularity on such terms, they had, by acting up to their honest conviction, involved themselves in embarrassment; at least in parliamentary embarrassment, for such it was, as far as it went. With respect to what had fallen from the noble earl, as to the encouragement likely to be given to highwaymen by the extinction of small notes, he felt himself the more competent to approach that subject, as he had once, when a schoolboy, been attacked by a highwayman. He was very young at the time, but he remembered losing all the money he had about him. It was natural, therefore, that he should be as much alive to apprehension on that head as the noble earl. Still, with all his early associations, he was inclined to think, that the observation made by another noble earl opposite was entitled to greater weight namely, that if that was to revive with the return to a metallic currency, it would have been felt during the last four or five years; seeing that every noble lord who had travelled in the vicinity of the metropolis during that period, was in the habit of taking about with him sovereigns, and not notes. For his own part, he was inclined to attribute the almost extinction of highway robberies to the regulation introduced by him when he held the seals of the Home-office, and since improved by others; namely, the establishing a good and effective police. And although much was owing to its vigilance, he was not quite sure whether the police could effect it, were it not for the inclosure of the large commons.—As to the objection, that this bill would not have the effect of doing away with all wild speculation or over-trading, it was never imagined that those evils could be entirely remedied by this measure. It must, in order to effect this, be accompanied by other measures, one of which must be the introduction of a sounder system of banking; and although, owing to the monopoly of the Bank of England, this system could not at present be rendered as perfect as it might be after the year 1833, still that was no rea- son why we should not now make as much improvement in the system as it was capable of receiving under existing circumstances. The extinction of one and two pound notes would, at any rate, operate as a very considerable check upon wild and speculative projects. None of the deputations of the substantial country bankers had made any objection to the extinction of the one and two pound notes, but had declared that they would as soon be without them. But this had not been the case with the lesser bankers. To this class the small notes were a principal source of profit; consequently the present bill was calculated to do away with the lesser banks, the existence of which had a considerable effect in rendering the whole banking system suspected and insecure. It had also been objected, that the paper currency could not be withdrawn without great inconvenience. But the fact, that in London, Manchester, and through the whole of Lancashire, a metallic currency had prevailed for the last three or four years, without creating any obstruction to trade, completely refuted this objection, especially when it was considered that the Customs of London and Liverpool were three-fourths of the Customs of the whole kingdom, and that the Customs of Liverpool were equal to those of all England, with the exception of London, and that the Excise of London and Liverpool amounted to three-fifths of the Excise of the whole kingdom.—As to the objection, that the agricultural interests would be affected by this bill, he would remind their lordships, that until 1797 we had done with a metallic currency without sustaining any inconvenience; and when it was considered that we should get rid of the losses and fluctuations in the value of property which must always be attendant on a paper currency, it seemed to him that the balance of advantages preponderated much in favour of the present measure. He and his colleagues were not trying any new experiment, but simply returning to that wholesome state of things which prevailed previous to 1797; for at that period, and far many years preceding it, there was nothing but a metallic currency; and he was satisfied, that if the withdrawal of the small notes, and the introduction of a metallic circulation, did not effectually cure the existing evils, they would, at all events, have a great effect in removing them.

The Earl of Lauderdale

said, he agreed with the noble earl, that a great distinction existed between the system of the Scottish and English banks. But it was asked, why not then adopt the former in this country, instead of calling upon the Scotch to adopt the British system? The answer given to this requisition was—"We cannot, for really we do not know enough of its details." He would give another reason, and a more forcible one; namely, that it could not so easily be imitated here; for in Scotland it was founded on the best foundation for any great establishment, namely, the practice of ages. The banking system in Scotland had the confidence of the people; and when the same could be said in an equal degree of that of England, then no change would be necessary. It was idle to talk of transplanting systems from one country to another. They all knew how valuable the British constitution was to those who lived under its influence; but endeavour to transplant it to Sicily and Corsica, and see the very different manner in which it would be received by the people. With respect to the test of experience in favour of the Scottish banks, he believed that, within the last century, no greater loss than 38,000l. had been sustained from any accident among them. A great deal had been said, during these discussions, of the connexion between the foreign exchanges and the over-issues of paper, and much confusion prevailed upon that point. He entreated the government, when so much misunderstanding prevailed, not to seize upon so unfavourable a moment for effecting so important a change. The noble earl opposite thought, that because the course of exchange had turned against this country, it was all to be attributed to an over-issue of paper. Surely the noble earl must be aware that there were various other causes which were sufficient to produce the same result. It might be caused by the balance of trade or of payments being unfavourable to us, as well as by a depreciation of the currency. There were certain unerring marks by which it could be ascertained what the real causes were. But it should always be recollected, that the exchanges never could run against a country to a greater extent than the relative expense of the conveyance of gold from one place to the other, including, of course, the amount of agency and insurance. The exchanges had never shown a depreciation of the currency, nor could they, so long as the paper medium was convertible into gold. He repeated his condemnation of the time chosen by government for effecting the proposed change, believing as he did that the experiment would greatly aggravate the existing evils. As to the condition of the country banks, he thought their credit at that moment better than when the tottering banks were doing business. The bad ones had since fallen; and the effect of their stoppage would be beneficial to those that remained. He repeated his objections to the measure, and said that they applied more to the time of the alteration, than to the change itself.

The amendment was negatived, and the bill read a second time.