RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AMERICA.

HL Deb 15 March 1824 vol 10 cc970-1009

The Marquis of Lansdown

.—Before your lordships proceed to the business appointed for this evening, the noble earl opposite will permit me to ask, or rather to renew the question which I put a few evenings ago—whether any answer has been received by his majesty's government from the court of Spain, to the last despatch of Mr. Secretary Canning to sir William A'Court?

The Earl of Liverpool.

—I have no difficulty in stating, in reference to the inquiry of the noble marquis, that no official answer has as yet been received by his majesty's government, to the despatch mentioned by the noble marquis.

The order of the day for summoning their lordships being then read,

The Marquis of Lansdown

rose and said:—My lords; in pursuance of the notice which I gave on a former evening, I rise to propose to your lordships an address to his majesty, on the subject of the present state of the South American provinces, and on the expediency of an immediate recognition of the independence of Spanish America.

In opening this proposition to your lordships, I feel how incapable I am of offering to your lordships more than a slight and imperfect sketch of all the objects connected with the consideration of such vast and important interests. But, my lords, if I feel in some degree oppressed, as any person in my situation must feel, with the magnitude of the subject, I certainly feel no room for any hesitation, as to that course of policy which I am about this day to recommend your lordships to adopt. Indeed, if I feel I have any thing to account for, either, to your lordships, or to myself, as connected with this subject, it certainly is riot for any thing like precipitation in bringing it under your consideration, but rather for having so long delayed it. Your lordships will perhaps do me the honour to recollect, that when, about four years ago, I submitted to your lordships the first proposition which was adopted by parliament, for instituting an inquiry into the means of extending the foreign trade of the country, during a period of great public distress, I ventured after urging the propriety of removing the restrictions and regulations, with which that trade was then, and remains still, partially incumbered—(with respect to which, more sanguine hopes I am glad to find are now entertained by persons of all parties and descriptions than I was then told could safely be indulged, and which have fortunately met with the concurrence of those who have the means of carrying such measures into effect),—I ventured, even then, to point out to your lordships' attention, the condition of the provinces of South America, as a source from which we were entitled to look for great ultimate benefits, not only to this country but to the general condition of the whole civilized world, then struggling with the consequences of protracted wars, followed by diminished consumption, and failing trade. I did not, however, then certainly think myself justified in immediately submitting any proposition like the present to your lordships; and when the prospect became still more cheering, and the first sparks of liberty and independence in that quarter of the globe began to assume a brighter aspect, and to burn with a steadier flame, events had occurred in the old world, which involved the interests and hopes of the mother country, in a crisis as desperate as it was cruel, and would have made it as ungenerous as impolitic, to adopt measures, which, however justifiable in themselves, appeared calculated to wound her feelings in the extremity of her danger. Under such circumstances, it might justly have been considered both ungracious and unbecoming, in any individual in this place to have brought forward a proposition, which might have been considered as an attempt on the part of this country, to obtain an unfair advantage from misfortunes, with which we were bound to sympathize, if we could not avert them.

At the commencement of the present session of parliament, I should, however, have been prepared to have brought forward a proposition on this subject, had I not then understood from the king's ministers, that an overture had already been made by the government of this country to Spain, connected with this subject, to which an answer might be very shortly expected. This alone induced me to postpone the execution of what I considered a public duty. But when, my lords, after the production of the papers which the noble earl has laid on the table of the House, I found myself strengthened and confirmed in the view which I had previously taken of the subject, by the arguments and sentiments which are there stated, it was impossible that I could bring myself to consent to further procrastination. By those papers, to the language of which upon the part of his majesty's government, I am happy to be able to give my decided approbation—with one exception only which I shall have to notice—I certainly feel myself relieved from the only embarrassment I could have felt on the subject. For although I had reason to believe, from the explanation given by the noble earl on a former occasion, that this country was perfectly unfettered by any treaty or engagement with any of the powers of the continent—though it could have proceeded only from an imbecility of conduct, which no slight ground could have induced me to impute to any ministers—yet if they had by any species of engagement, direct or indirect, consented to bind down the free principles and great commercial interests of this country, the joint sources of its reputation and its power, to the contracted policy and narrow system, upon which some of the continental powers might be disposed to act, though fundamentally opposed to that which has been, and I trust will ever be, that of this country—such a line of conduct, would certainly have interposed a considerable difficulty in the course, which, with better hopes and upon more solid grounds, I am now anxious for the House to adopt; finding, that we are, up to this moment, not only unfettered, but that we have announced our intention, to pursue that independent course of action, which on all occasions, but more especially upon such an occasion as the present, it was most important for this country to adopt. I therefore come free from all embarrassment of this kind, to the consideration of this subject—a subject, give me leave to remind your lordships at the outset, of incalculable magnitude, embracing an ex- tent of territory, and an amount of population, greater perhaps, than it ever fell to the lot of any one act of human policy, and of human legislation to effect. To regions extending from somewhere about 37 degrees of north, to 41 degrees of southern latitude, equalling in length the whole continent of Africa, and exceeding I believe in breadth, the whole of the vast Russian empire, European as well as Asiatic—intersected by the most majestic rivers—the variety of climate incidental to such an extent, happily affected and diversified by the arrangement of its great parallel range of mountains, which mitigate and almost neutralize its equinoctial heats; calculated for every species of production and enjoyment of which the human race is capable; a country already inhabited by a population of twenty-one millions of persons—a population composed, it is true, of different races, but that difference proved to be not inconsistent with the most perfect harmony of interests and community of feeling, thinly indeed, and unequally spread over a wide surface—but presenting at every scattered point, all the sources of social improvement, all the elements of future strength and greatness.

My lords, it is with respect to countries such as I have described, that jour lordships are now called upon to determine, whether you will advise the Crown to recognise them in the form of independent states; a question, which, be it recollected, involves a twofold consideration "first whether you possess the right to make this acknowledgment; and secondly, whether, supposing the right to be established, the expediency of exercising that right without delay is equally clear. My lords, I say, the first point to consider is, whether you have the right; for however it may be my duty this night to point out to your lordships, the great advantages which may result from the establishment of South American independence, I hope I shall never stand up in my place in this House, to recommend to your lordships to adopt any course of policy, inconsistent with those principles of right, which are paramount to all expediency, and compose that great and universal law of nations, any departure from which, to answer the objects of a selfish and ambitious policy, never fails to recoil upon its authors. The importance of this point, therefore, will be my excuse with your lordships, for detaining you for a few moments on the preliminary question of right.

My lords, I know of no principle or mode, by which we can ascertain whether we possess that right, but by considering in the first instance, whether those states, which form the object of our present consideration, are, de facto, independent; and secondly, if they are de facto independent, whether there be any prospect of the old government of Spain, ever being enabled to recover its command of them, so as to possess the advantages she formerly did from them; and thirdly, if they are de Jacto independent, and there is no prospect of their being again reduced under the dominion of the mother country, whether they have proved themselves disposed, and able to maintain those relations of amity and commerce, which ought to exist between independent, and friendly nations. My lords, from what I perceive to be the opinion of the noble earl opposite, and from what I find contained in the papers on the table, it is not necessary for me to dwell much on these topics. On the first, namely, whether these states are de facto independent, I presume, that hardly a question can be raised, in the mind of any one who has made himself acquainted with the events which have occurred within the last two or three years in that part of the globe, and the absence of all effectual control on the part of Spain, whether exercised by civil, or enforced by military authority.

My lords; with regard to the second question which presents itself, namely, whether Spain can, with any thing like probability, look forward to the reconquest of those immense regions—to come to a conclusion upon this point, your lordships have only to look at the duration of the contest, and the present situation of the different members of that great confederacy, now united in an alliance offensive and defensive, by which they are bound to listen to no overture, individually or collectively, which shall compromise, or even pretend to annex any condition to the enjoyment of their independence; an alliance, the effects of which are already displayed in the prompt assistance afforded by Columbia to Peru, and which is, I trust, destined to become the certain and lasting guarantee of the liberties of the New World, by eternally uniting and concentrating its force, against the attack of any trans-atlantic invader.

In the first place, my lords, let us look at the state of Mexico. Mexico, containing seven millions of people, and extend- ing from sea to sea, for the last two years has not had, nor at this moment is there to be found in it, a single Spanish soldier, unless, indeed, in a detached fortress on the coast, where there is a small garrison of about 300 or 400 men. I mean the castle of St. Juan d'Ulloa. But they are cut off from all assistance; and are wholly unconnected with the shore. They may, from the particular situation of the fortress, hold out sometime, but as all communication with the continent has been put a stop to, they can have no influence on the state of the country, In Guatimala there is also now no Spanish force.

Throughout the great state of Columbia, extending from the Orinoco to the Isthmus of Darien, there is not now a single Spanish soldier, after a series of contests which lasted fourteen years, and after the contest assuming every year, a character more decisively favourable to the cause of independence; until at length it was completely established, by the reduction of Puerto Cabello, during the last summer.

In the state of Buenos Ayres, there has not been any thing like a Spanish force, for the last twelve or thirteen years; during which period this state has exercised the rights of independence under various governments, undisturbed by any effort on the part of the mother country. Indeed, no attempt has been made during the whole of that period, by the old government of Spain, to affect existing governments, or interfere with their authority; and it may be worthy of remark by; your lordships, as indicating the determined state of public feeling in that country, that although, as I have stated, there have been internal changes, no less than three changes, I believe, of the administration, or of the government, as you may think proper to call it; so rooted is the aversion entertained by the people, to the old government, that in no one of those changes, has any person attempted, or manifested any disposition to call in the power of the parent country.

The same observation will apply to Chili. In that state, the most perfect independence has been maintained. For more than four years not a single Spanish soldier has existed in Chili, with the exception of an island near the coast, that of Chiloe, to which the partisans of the old government were permitted to emigrate, and where they remain incapable of any offensive operation.

With regard to Peru, the circumstances are different; for it must be admitted, that owing to some mismanagement in the government after its first liberation, there is to be found there, and there only, a party attached to the old government of Spain. There alone, then, is any thing which can be called an army to be found, consisting, as I am informed, of 7000 or 8000 men—a force, which being, as I understand, under the direction of a very efficient leader, has lately met with some success, facilitated by the hitherto disunited councils of its military chiefs, but quite incapable of ultimately subduing the spirit of independence which has taken root in the hearts of the Peruvians, now encouraged by the presence of General Bolivar, who is engaged in extinguishing their feuds, and bringing to their aid all the glory of his name, and that force of genius, which has already distinguished his military enterprises, and, if possible, still more his political administration, by which he has established the independence of Columbia, and given to it that constitution, which appears destined to become the bond of union, and the charter of the liberties of the confederated states.

My lords, this, then, is the state of the different provinces which I have alluded to, and I will ask your lordships to consider whether it is within the range of human probability, that a continent, of the extent that I have described, inhabited by the numerous and increasing population I have stated, can, after a practical independence of fourteen years has been established, be induced to return under the yoke of a power, situated as Spain now is—and not only as she now is, degraded and enthralled, but as she must necessarily be for half a century to come. The population of old Spain, before the war, did not exceed ten millions. That population is now not only diminished in point of numbers, but has lost a large portion of its ablest citizens. And, destitute of supplies, and labouring under every financial as well as political difficulty, can it be rationally expected, that she can subjugate a population of at least seventeen millions, in her late American possessions? In the whole of Mexico and South America, there is, according to the lowest calculation, a population of twenty one millions. Of these, seventen millions form the population connected with old Spain. The remaining four millions compose the population of the Brazils; while the whole population of Portugal amounts only to three millions.

Now, my lords, I think I have stated enough, to induce your lordships to come at least to a decision sufficient for every practical purpose; namely, that it is beyond the reach of probability, that Spain should ever be able to re-conquer those colonies.

I have then, my lords, to direct your consideration to the last question; namely, the capacity of those states to maintain those relations of amity and commerce, which are naturally expected to prevail in independent states, for which, of course, some security may be looked for.

And here, my lords, it would perhaps be sufficient to decide the question, if I were to point out the course which has been pursued in those countries, where peace and tranquillity have been established, after the storm of civil distention, without troubling your lordships, by going into the details of the principles of the different constitutions which have been established. On referring to the papers which have been laid before tin's House, I find those countries described by the French ambassador to the court of London, in his conference with Mr. Secretary Canning, in language, which is of course put into his mouth by the court which he represents, but which has excited in my mind no inconsiderable surprise. He states, "that he cannot conceive, what can be meant under the present circumstances, by a pure and simple acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish colonies, since those countries being actually distracted by civil wars, there existed no government in them which could offer any appearance of solidity; and that an acknowledgment of American independence, so long as such a state of things continued, appeared to him to be nothing less than a real sanction of anarchy." Those countries, he proceeds afterwards to describe, as under the influence of dangerous and erroneous theories, and as blinded by party spirit. What evidence, my lords, do we find of this, in the actual state of things? In those states, there may be dissentions, as in all governments; but where have they been attended with less violence, less danger to property, less insecurity of person, than they have in these stales, when the force of their oppressors has been once expelled—they have given way to the establishment of sound principles of government, and of constitutions, as exempt from absurd theories, and as apparently calculated for the advantage of the people, as most of those under which we have seen other states exist and flourish. It is easy, my lord, for one government to describe any other government, as being composed of dangerous theories. Political criticism would never be deficient in furnishing a pretext for political interference: the principle of representative government, so justly dear to some countries, might by others be decried as an impracticable absurdity, or abhorred as a pernicious dogma. How easy would it be for the grand seignior, for example, when speaking of the French charter, to draw the same picture, and derive the same inference; and, appealing perhaps to the apparent instability of its provisions, and pointing to the dissatisfaction and to the alleged conspiracies of those subjects whose rights it was intended to secure, come to the conclusion, that it was time for foreign powers to give it "a new direction." Upon quite as good grounds might such a conclusion be drawn, as to the state of France, as those from which the French minister (acting no doubt according to his instructions) has thought proper to draw, of the want of good order and regular government in South America. But your lordships, I am sure, will not be led away by such allegations—you will not listen to any thing so theoretical, any thing so unfounded, any thing so absurd, as that because the constitutions of the states in South America do not happen, to be in unison with the views of the French government, they must be deprived of the rights of independent states, until they shall have furnished a sample, which meets with the approbation of all the European states.

Now, without troubling your lordships by going into details with respect to every state, I will ask you to look at the constitution of Columbia as an instance, furnishing the best refutation of the statement made, because, in fact, Columbia has been in some degree, taken as a pattern and example to the other states. Now, in Columbia I find they have adopted two principles for constituting their government, which I think your lordships will consider as the best and surest foundation of all governments; I mean, property and education. These two principles form the basis of their legislature. I also find as cautious a disposition to exclude the multitude from taking any improper share in the government, as the most prudent statesman of the old world could desire. I find property in land made the qualification for electors, even in the parochial assemblies, and that a still higher qualification, a greater possession of land, is requisite for the electors who return the representatives. I find, that not more than one elector is allowed, in the proportion of 4,000 inhabitants. I find, also, what I am sure your lordships will admit to be a step in civilization, perhaps as great as ever was made, and in which the state of Columbia may put to shame the constitutions of many states in Europe—an established system of universal parochial education now in force throughout the whole country, and a judicious application of a large proportion of the convents, to the purposes of higher instruction, under the superintendence of the clergy. I find, in that country, which has been described as in a state of anarchy, and as being torn by speculative divisions, that there has not been, since the expulsion of the Spaniards, a single soldier employed in aid of the police of the whole interior of the country, for the last two years, and that too, without its being attended with the slightest interruption of the public tranquillity.

But, are these all the proofs I find, of a well-disposed government, and of a prosperous country? By no means. The government of Columbia has carried into effect the most important municipal regulations; and when I state, that they have been successfully engaged, in attempting to provide for the gradual extinction of slavery throughout their dominions, I think I can appeal to the noble earl opposite, the secretary of state for the colonies, whether that country has not been engaged in the accomplishment of a task, which he well knows to be attended with no common difficulty and danger. I am happy to have an opportunity of stating, that throughout Columbia, a regular system has been formed, for the gradual abolition of slavery; that a particular tax has been set apart, for the purpose of providing for their manumission, and that all the children to be born hereafter will be born free. It is also due, no less to the inhabitants than to the government, to state, that the regulations I have been describing have been carried into effect, in a manner so satisfactory to the masters, that no complaints have been heard; and not only has there been no opposition raised, but such good effects have been exhibited, in the increased attachment between the servant and the I master, under the new relation so created, that masters have very frequently been induced from humane feeling, to give additional effect to the law, and have voluntarily emancipated their slaves, without waiting for the remuneration provided by the state. I advert to this fact, because, I think it is highly to the honour of those people, amongst whom it has taken place, and with other circumstances, of improved internal administration, must place that government high in the scale of civilized states.

But, my lords, I am told in these papers, that notwithstanding all these favourable appearances, the different governments have no solidity whatever, and that on that account alone it would be improper to think of any thing like a simple and unqualified acknowledgment of the late Spanish colonies as independent states. Now, my lords, if by solidity is meant capacity to enter into public engagements, and honesty to abide by them, there is, fortunately, a pretty safe and certain barometer, whereby to judge of the solidity of governments; namely, the barometer of public credit, built upon public confidence: and I would ask your lordships to consult it, before you pronounce in the present instance. It does so happen, my lords, that there is perpetually sitting in the city of London, a jury, composed of very vigilant persons, who are daily engaged in deciding upon the solidity of stales, in the most impartial manner. It would be doing great injustice to the gentlemen of the Stock Exchange, not to consider them as perfectly free from all particular bias, in favour of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. Their practical philosophy raises them above all prejudice on these subjects, and preserves them effectually from the errors of all deluded enthusiasm on these subjects. Now, referring to the standard of solidity, as presented by these gentlemen, I find, on looking at the value of the I stocks, or debts, of the various governments I have alluded to in South America, that they fluctuate between the prices of 67 and 82; and upon my looking a little further, for the value of the stock of the ancient government of Spain, from the solidity of which the South American governments have been detached, and have by that detachment gunk, it is said, into a state which presents neither1 confidence nor stability—I find the stock of the an cient government was, on Saturday last, at 18 and 20. I know it may be said, that this stock of the ancient government of Spain, was that which was contracted for by the Cortes, and of which its present sovereign now states, that he only approved with a mental reservation, and has informed the world he had so successfully deceived, that it never made any part of his intention, to pay either principal or interest. I therefore carried my inquiry further, and sought to discover, the price of the old legitimate stock of Spain. To get at this, I have been obliged to go as far as the market of Amsterdam; for it was in vain to ask for it on the London Exchange, because it appears, that at present there is no sale there for the commodity. This ancient debt of the Spanish government, with all the honour and solidity of the restored government pledged for its support, sells for only 51 or 52, while that of Chili, is obtaining 80 and 82, in every market in Europe.

Such being the state of public credit, with respect to these governments, let me ask your lordships, whether those countries in South America are really in such a condition, as to justify the interference of any of the old governments of Europe in depriving them of the character of independent governments. It appears, from the papers on your lordships' table, that we have been invited to concur in a project to bring back these colonies "to a principle of union in government, whether monarchical or aristocratical." I believe, this is the very first time that the country has received such an invitation, or that any power has been so called on to interfere, to settle the government of such distant countries according to certain abstract principles, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical. I have certainly lived in a country, in which I have learned to admire the advantageous effect of the union of all those three principles in one system of government, and to consider that system as the best calculated for promoting the happiness of the human species. But, my lords, I have yet to learn, that there may not exist a government, adapted to the different character and situation of a nation, in which only one of those principles may enter, and that it may not afford all the advantages and security which civilized states have a right to require from each other, for their mutual intercourse and advantage.

But, my lords, can it have escaped the attention of those who wish to indulge their predilection for particular forms of government on this occasion—that there exists in that part of the globe, a great and mighty power—and I am glad that it is a great and mighty power—I mean, the United States of North America—a power which has a right (and as far as propinquity is concerned) a better right, to act upon a similar predilection, though in favour of different principles. And, if any attempt should be made by any European power, to bring back the Spanish colonies to a monarchical or aristocratical government, is there not reason to apprehend, that the United States, seeing the foundation of their own institutions attacked, may think it necessary to lend the whole force of their union, to direct these neighbouring states towards a republican form of government: in which case the continent of America would exhibit to the world the strange spectacle, of a theoretical contest, carried on between all the great powers of the globe, as to the abstract principles of government, for a new people, not permitted to exercise their own judgment, or adopt their own laws.

Why, my lords, does not all experience lead to the irresistible conclusion, that there is nothing in the particular form of a government, which can in justice, or on the principles of national law, or on views of expediency, justify the interference of another power? My lords, it is upon these grounds that I propose to offer to your lordships, on the part of this country, to acknowledge the independence of these states. And I trust I have shewn, not only that we possess the right to do so, but that there exists no obstacle to its exercise—an exercise, with respect to, which I will add, there can be no fear, that it will involve us in any dispute or hostility; for I do not believe, there is any instance, since the establishment of the present order of things in Europe, in which the acknowledgment of a government de facto has been considered, or has been stated to be, a legitimate ground of quarrel; nor has such an acknowledgment occasioned war in former instances, in which the policy of this country has come in collision with the supposed rights of the very power which would have cause, if any had, to complain of our acknowledgment of South American independence. There are two occasions which present themselves to my recollection, in which Spain herself, and this country, were equally concerned; one of them is, the case of the United Provinces, the other, when the House of Braganza established itself on the throne of Portugal. The noble earl opposite well knows, that we acknowldeged the independence, carried on an open intercourse, formed political alliances, and entered into commercial treaties, with the government of the United Provinces, during a period of not less than sixty years, before Spain, acting on her characteristic policy and accustomed slowness of deliberation, could be brought to acknowledge their independence; and during the whole of which period, Spain was content to assert her supremacy over those states, without an effort to support it, and the acknowledgment was not formally made by her until the treaty of Westphalia. In the mean time, however, we acted as if Spain had no claim to the obedience of the Netherlands. With respect to the House of Braganza, our conduct was even still more openly opposed to the views of Spain, without occasioning a war. Your lordships may recollect that in 1641 the Cortes declared the duke of Braganza king of Portugal, thereby detaching the provinces, which now constitute the kingdom of Portugal, from the government of Spain; and that in 1642, the very next year, the government of this country formed a treaty with Portugal, and with the reigning House of Braganza, without occasioning any hostility on the part of Spain, and without even a remonstrance, as far as I am aware, from that power.

I am sure I need not repeat other instances to your lordships; for you will feel, that the recognition of the independence of a government de facto, has always been considered the right of every independent state. It is the peculiar exercise of the sovereignty of one state, and cannot be regarded as an act of hostility by another. The exercise of it depends upon the expediency in each particular case where it is called for, and the question of fact whether the state is in a condition to support those relations of amity and commerce which are essential for an independent government to maintain.

My lords, having said thus much, upon the question of our right to act—which I admit is an important preliminary point, on which it is the duty of your lordships, as it is the duty of the government of this country, to make up its mind, previous to its allowing itself to be swayed by any consideration of expediency, in an attempt however it may be otherwise holy—I have now to call the attention of your lordships to the next important point; namely, the question of expediency, as applied to this particular instance. In order to come to a just determination, with reference to this question, it will be necessary to look at the relative situation of this country, with respect both to the old world, and the new. Without going into the vast field of consideration, which the present state of Europe offers, it will not be difficult to show it to be such as to render it highly necessary, that this country should look about, to ascertain by what means we may increase our power—how we may multiply the means of commercial intercourse, create new connexions, and strengthen alliances with new and more congenial states, to whose systems of policy, being more congenial with our own, we may safely look as a compensation for diminished confidence in our former allies, or for aid in future dangers.

And here, my lords, I must advert, though I shall do it very briefly, to the present state of the continent of Europe. Your lordships will pardon me, if I think it necessary to caution you against being diverted from the contemplation of your foreign relations, and their bearings upon the future prospects of this country, by the satisfaction you naturally experience, at the returning appearances of internal prosperity. I must implore your lordships not to be deceived upon that account, with regard to the relative situation of this country with the other powers of Europe. Do not suppose, my lords, that, after the close of that series of struggles, to which the French revolution gave birth; after the formation of new alliances among the great powers of Europe; and particularly after the announcement of the new law of nations by those powers, that this country is placed in the same relative situation with respect to those powers, or that our means of obtaining a preponderating influence, are the same as before. I need only ask your lordships to consider, that it has been at all times a part of the policy of this country, and the successful policy of this country, to establish a connexion with some of the great military powers of Europe, in order to be better prepared for any part which she might be compelled to take, in the dissentions which might arise among the European states, but chiefly to assist in preserving the independence of the smaller states, and to maintain the general balance of power. There was always some one, if not more, of the great military powers in Europe, to which, whatever was its form of government, or the principles of its internal administration, this country could look for assistance, to repress the aggressions of a more ambitious state, to preserve the integrity of governments differently constituted, and to maintain the limits of that balance of power which was thought essential to the well-being of the whole European family. Thus, at different periods, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and even France, have successively been engaged with us in strict alliance, for the purpose of repelling unjust attacks, and protecting injured weakness. But, it is not necessary for me now to observe to your lordships, that all the great military powers of Europe, are engaged in a confederacy on a principle, to which this country is not a party, and to which, thank God, she never can be a party. Of the character of this confederacy, we are not left to form a speculative opinion. The principle by which they are connected, they have put formally upon record, in their declarations, they declare they consider it to be—[hear, hear,]—aprinciple, to which every other consideration of ancient policy must yield; a principle, liable to be called into action, upon the appeal of any one of the confederacy, and which must be pursued by all, until its object is accomplished. In support of this principle, we see 700,000 bayonets maintained in time of peace under the direction of the same authority, and destined to exercise the most despotic control over every one of the minor powers. In the short space of the last five years which have elapsed, we have seen month by month, and day by day, the practical consequences developing themselves in facts that cannot deceive us.

My lords, we know that every part of Europe may in succession be—as many parts of Europe have been—over-run by the arms of the confederacy, and be subject to the military occupation of those states. We know, my lords, that Italy has been over-run, and occupied by the armies of Austria. We know that Spain has been over run and is now occupied by the armies of France. We all know, that the countries I have described, are liable to have their administrations altered, and their governments modified, at the pleasure of the allies; while Switzerland, and other states, have escaped, only by a prompt obedience to the mandates they have received—such mandates as this country, or any country able to defend itself, would justly have considered an insult. Thus, the fairest portions of Europe, may be subjected to the most cruel of all yokes—that, imposed by the presence of armed foreigners, without this country being able to afford any other assistance than the expression of its unavailing sympathy and regret, exclaiming, in the desponding language of Macduff— —Bleed, bleed, poor countries! Great tyranny, lay thou thy basis sure, For goodness dares not check thee. Unless, my lords, it be contended, which no person will assert, that it would not have been desirable for the interests of this country to see these changes and innovations prevented, I have a right to assume, that she no longer exercises a preponderating influence, and is placed in a situation, in which, to maintain her high, rank in the scale of nations, she must look to every quarter from which she can derive an increase of strength and greatness. And, to what quarter, my lords, can she, in these new circumstances of the continent, look with greater effect or in more strict conformity with those principles which have always formed the basis of our prosperity, than to the cultivation of a connexion with the independent states of South America, as well as with the government of the United States of North America. With those countries, we may lay the foundation of that increase of strength, which our situation demands.

My lords, it is scarcely necessary, that I should detain your lordships, by attempting to shew the precise value of that connexion, and the extent of that trade the limits of which it would indeed be difficult to define: but from the papers I have called for, and which have been laid upon the table, I may state, that it appears, that in the year 1821, the very first in which the trade with the South American colonies could be said to be fairly opened, our exports to that country, amounted to 3,227,560l. This great exportation of commodities, in the first year, might be supposed to have occasioned a glut, and that the British merchant and manufacturer had supplied a larger quantity of goods than the wants of the country could continue to require. But so far, my lords, from this being the case, in the very next year, namely, the year 1822, there was an export of 3,867,959l., being an increase, to the amount of 640,000l., The accounts for the year 1823 have not yet been made up, but I have every reason to believe that they would have exhibited a still further increase. To what degree that increased demand may extend, when that country becomes more settled, and when the connexion with us shall be confirmed upon a more settled basis, I will not attempt, with the imperfect information I possess, to calculate; but I may, in passing, mention, as an instance of the rapidity with which new openings in commerce carry life and activity to every corner of the globe, and connect the remote parts of it; that, in a year and a half after the ports of the southern states of America were opened, in that part of the sister country, with which I am well acquainted, and in the prosperity of which I know your lordships feel the deepest interest, I mean the south of Ireland, in which scarcely the vestige of manufacturing industry had previously existed, the export of coarse linens to South America commenced, by means of which, a poor, unhappy, and dense population, who could find no market, or resource, in the demands of this country, have been occupied in administering to the wants of a population, no less numerous, though so differently circumstanced, in South America, and have found relief from their sufferings in those political events which have opened afresh market in that vast continent.

Your lordships know the effect which the growth of the independence of the United States of North America has had upon the commercial fortunes of this country. It is not undeserving of attention on this occasion, because it raises a hope, which gladly indulge, that the separation of the South American colonies from the parent state, may not ultimately be detrimental to Spain herself, supposing her destined to enjoy a government which shall call forth her resources, and stimulate her industry.

The independence of North America, the cause of so much dread, and the object of such unavailing resistance, was no sooner settled, than it became the source of prosperity, and of increased commerce to this country. My lords, I hold in my hand a statement of the amount of exports from this country to the provinces of North America, for the eight years previous to the declaration of independence, and of those, during the last eight years; and the result, I think, will prove to your lordships, what every reflecting person must long since have ceased to doubt; namely, that this political separation has left nothing to be regretted, but the painful recollection of the blood which was shed, and the feelings of hostility which were engendered, but which are now, I trust, for ever consigned to oblivion. It appears, from these accounts, that in the eight years preceding their declaration of independence, that is, from 1766 to 1773, the exports from this country to North America aided by all the monopolies and prohibitions then so much relied on for the protection and encouragement of trade, but happily now acknowledged to be vain and illusory, did not exceed, on an average, more than 2,441,000l. while on the other hand, taking the eight years which have elapsed since the last American war—that war, the unnecessary occurrence of which must ever be deplored, and which I. trust will be the last disturbance given to the amity of nations, whom their mutual interests, common origin, language, and institutions, ought to connect together in the pursuit of one common policy—from the period, I say, when the last American war ceased, down to the year 1822, the exports to North America, amounted annually, on the average, to 6,905,000l.—that is to say, since the independence of the United States, our commerce to North America has increased nearly threefold, as compared with the period when we held the colonies in subjection. My lords, I advert to this only to show how false the principle of the colonial system was, as applied to the wealth of the mother country, and to suggest how often it may happen, that by adopting a more liberal policy, the basis of our prosperity may be rendered more secure.

These are the objects which your lordships have to look to, as connected with the prosperity of this country, and of the states which are the object of the present motion, a prosperity which, as it has advanced with an uniform progress in the limited states of North America, may be expected in a soil more fertile and with means of expansion more unlimited, to proceed with a still greater accelerated force. The population of the United States of America had, in the course of the last fifty years, increased, from between two and three millions, to ten millions of people. The population of the states of South America consisted now of twenty-one millions. If therefore it is capable of going on in the same ratio, it will increase to an amount which it is awful to contemplate; and will extend to sixty millions in the course of the next fifty or sixty years. I am aware that there are circumstances which constitute a difference in this respect in the two countries; two of these, at least, are in favour of Spanish America, namely the complete amalgamation with the original Indian race, and the small proportion of slaves, as compared with the Southern provinces of the North American Union.

Having pointed out these advantages, as they exist at present, and the extent to which they may possibly be carried, I have finally to ask your lordships, if there is any room for hesitation, as to the course of policy, which ought to be adopted? I may be told, and probably I shall be told, for it appears to be the only argument which can be used in opposition to the proposition I shall have to make—I may be told, that if we are satisfied with the language employed by his majesty's government, as it is disclosed in the documents which have been laid before the House—if we are satisfied, that this question is still left open, we ought to acquiesce in some further delay, and continue to place our confidence in his majesty's government, for the adoption of the measure, when they shall consider the proper time to have arrived. To this, I answer, that, if your lordships are satisfied, that you possess the right to acknowledge the independence of the states which I have described, and if you are satisfied, upon every consideration of justice and expediency, bearing upon the immediate interests of all countries, but more particularly of this,—you ought to do so.

I would not hesitate to give these states the full benefit of your recognition, by solemnly announcing it, at the moment when it is most needed, and will be most valued. I would ask your lordships to recollect, that although to them your acknowledgment may not be every thing (for I believe their ultimate independence must in any case prevail), your acknowledgment now, cannot fail to be an inestimable benefit, by enabling them to compose their dissentions, and by giving them, in the eyes of themselves and of the world, that importance, which a confirmed station amongst civilized and independent nations, can alone confer. And I ask, then, my lords, if you are satisfied as to the grounds of expediency and of right, why should you remain lingering on the threshold, where your entrance is justified by every right, and invited by every principle of justice and generosity? Why not assist, at the cradle of independence, and connect yourselves with all those early associations of liberty and independence, which we all know are held so dear by succeeding generations, instead of waiting to follow slowly the example of others, until our proceeding shall appear to result, rather from necessity, than choice.

Let me ask the noble lords, if they can contemplate any course of events, by which the independence of these states can be finally prevented? Can any man rationally expect, that the government of Old Spain, situated as it now is, and as it must be, so long as it shall be occupied by a French army—and situated as it must be, long after that French army shall have retired, can be able to make efforts at all adequate to the subjection of the inhabitants of those remote and boundless countries, after they have once tasted the cup of liberty, and become conscious of their greatness? Can we suppose it possible, that the progress of civilization, and of every thing proud and great connected with it, in those countries, can be arrested? As well might we expect the mighty rivers which are now flowing through that great continent towards the ocean, to turn their course back to the snowy mountains, from whence they spring—As well might we expect, that the current of the gulf stream, should cease to carry the warm waters of the tropics forward towards its Northern shores, as suppose, that the full tide of civilization and independence can be prevented from extending itself from mountain to mountain and from shore to shore, of that New World.

The time was, when Spain had the power to root up the vineyards of Mexico, that the inhabitants might rely on the mother country for wine—the lime was, when Old Spain could make it felony, to carry roads from the inland to the sea shore of that country, lest the inhabitants should have communications, which their Spanish rulers might not approve—the time was, when the commercial regulations of Old Spain, regulations imposed by ignorance, and carried into effect by cruelty, could spread their withering influence over the regions I have described; but those times, are gone by—never to return. The regeneration of that country must continue, and your lordships are invited to assist in its perfection.

My lords, when I state, that Hook forward with confidence to the final accomplishment of this great object, I do not mean to say, that there are not corresponding dangers—if not, from the open hostility of other countries, who (to use the expression of Mr. Secretary Canning, in the papers on the table) may unfortunately, "think differently" from this country upon this subject—if not, I say, from the open hostility of those states—from a war in disguise, not less to be dreaded; from the employment of those indirect and unholy means, which we know, from experience, the most legitimate governments do not disdain to employ, for the accomplishment of their objects. If these means should be resorted to, I do not say that the prospect of South American independence can be extinguished, but its progress may be retarded, dissentions may be excited, and their councils may be embarrassed. It is to fortify them against such dangers, that I propose to induce your lordships, by the motion I have now to make, to give them, as far as you can, sanction and stability. My lords, I am confident, that it is not only the best course, as far as respects our own interests; but that it is also the fairest course, with respect to the other governments of Europe. We owe it to the governments of the continent, fairly to let them see, not only that we claim the right, but that we mean to exercise it—leaving them, if they differ in opinion from us, to pursue their own course. I call upon your lordships to proclaim your opinion by your actions; convinced as I am, that a great revolution is taking place in the globe, to which the course of political events, the state of public opinion, and the progress of all conquering science, in assisting the energies of nature, are alike contributing, but with respect to which it belongs, in some degree, to this country, to determine, whether it shall be more or less slowly effected; whether it shall take place under circumstances, more or less tainted with human passions and civil conflicts; in a word, whether it shall be in a manner more or less conducive to the immediate prosperity of this country, and Of the world.

Here, my lords, I should conclude, were I not obliged, before I sit down, to advert to one topic, which I have already stated to be the only one in the expressions employed by the British minister, which required explanation. I find, in the papers on the table, that the British government (in the minute of Mr. Canning's conversation with the prince de Polignac) has not only disclaimed any desire to appropriate to itself any portion of the Spanish colonies, but has also stated, that it has no intention to form any political connexion with them. My lords, I do not think, that we ought thus to have prejudged the question, as to what may, or may not be the interest of this country to do, with regard to a connexion with South America; nor can I discover any reason, why this country should give to the government of France, any pledge as to any political line of conduct which it may, or may not, think it desirable to pursue. I hope I misunderstand the nature of this engagement, but it strikes me in this light, and I know that it has struck others in the same way; for which reason, I am desirous of obtaining a distinct explanation on the subject from the noble earl. I now beg leave to move—"That a loyal and dutiful address be presented to his majesty, thanking him for the papers which he has been graciously pleased to communicate to the House, relating to the present state of Mexico and South America, and to express our earnest hope that he may be enabled, without delay, to recognize the independence of such states as are actually become independent; and to establish that diplomatic correspondence with their respective governments, which will afford the most effectual security for his majesty's subjects, and supply adequate means of cultivating those relations of amity and commerce, which cannot fail to prove alike beneficial to both countries."

The Earl of Liverpool

began, by observing, that he perfectly agreed in the general principles which the noble marquis had laid down on this important subject. If he felt an objection to any part of the noble marquis's speech, it was to that part in which, upon entering into detail, he had come to apply those principles which he seemed either not distinctly to understand, or not perfectly to accommodate to the purposes of his argument. He would first apply himself to clear away those parts in which there was no difference of opinion between the noble marquis and himself. He would not follow the noble marquis through his minute details, as to the precise amount of our exports to Spanish America, because he was prepared to admit, that no commerce could be more advantageous to this country, than the trade between Great Britain and America, whether northern or southern. But, it appeared to him, that we did not sufficiently consider, when we talked of the ports of Mexico, Buenos Ayres, and others being now open to us, that we enjoyed a considerable commerce with those countries, at a time when it would appear from the Custom-house books, as if we had carried on no commerce with them at all. The reason was, that our commerce before had been circuitous and indirect, whereas now it was direct. A great deal of what we exported to the West-India colonies, went to other places; so that the fairest way of considering the question was with respect to the entire of America. The whole amount of our exports averaged 43,000,000l. annually. Of this, 21,000,000l. Were confined to Europe 17,000,000l. to North and South America, and 5,000,000l. to the East Indies and the Cape of Good Hope. He entirely agreed with the noble marquis, that there ought to be no shackles imposed on commerce, and, consequently, that it was a wise policy to remove them gradually, as impediments to free trade. As for the re-conquest of the South American provinces by Spain, he held it to be just as chimerical and absurd a notion as the noble marquis himself did.

And here he felt it necessary to recal their lordships attention to the true state of the relations between Spain and her colonies. It was universally anticipated, that, after the revolution which had taken place in 1808, the period could not be far distant, when the colonies would declare their independence. It was perfectly obvious, that sixteen or seventeen millions of inhabitants could not long be held in the thraldom exercised by Spain. The question, then, for Spain was, whether she would take example from our own case, and, by a wise relaxation of her system, still continue to retain them attached to the mother country; or whether, refusing to bend to circumstances and to profit by experience she would aggravate the evil, until it should grow to a total rupture. It was a subject of speculation with all men, whether she would take advantage of the errors of others, or whether the pertinacity which belonged to that country, mixed up as it was with great virtues, would have the effect of confirming her in the opposite course. In the year 1808, when, in consequence of the most unparalleled aggression that had ever been made on the independence of any country, a general rising of the Spanish people against the French took place, doubts had arisen, as to the policy which this country ought to pursue. There were some—and those were not the least lovers of well-regulated freedom, who thought that Spain ought to be encouraged and supported in the struggle which she was then commencing, in the hope that Europe might be freed by her example. Others, again, thought that it would be best entirely to abandon Spain to herself, as it was hopeless to resist; and that we ought to direct the whole of our efforts to the detaching of her colonies from the mother country. Their lordships need not be reminded, that the former policy was pursued, and that it had been completely successful. This country was bound, whatever line of policy she adopted to declare it openly; and if their lordships would refer to the first speech from the throne, after that event, they would find, that the integrity of the Spanish dominions was then stated as the main object of this country; and this policy had been applauded, even by some noble lords who were not in the habit of supporting the measures of his Majesty's ministers. He mentioned this fact, to shew the principles on which our policy towards Spain, and her foreign dominions, had been bottomed from the beginning, and that, under the circumstances which then existed, any different line of proceeding would have been a contradiction to the understood feelings and conviction of the government and the legislature. When, indeed, in the progress of that struggle in Spain, revolutionary changes, or endeavours at a more liberal connexion, for he would not say whether all or any of the South American provinces at that time contemplated separation; perhaps the truth was, that some did act upon such a view, and others did not, the great object of the government of Great Britain was, to use her best efforts, and her most active influence, to endeavour to convince the government of Spain, that the connection between her and her colonies could only be maintained on a more enlarged and liberal basis of connexion. To great Britain there presented itself but one direct, honest line of proceeding, and that course, without deviation, she had pursued. We had at that period a growing commercial intercourse with the South American provinces. With the nature and extent of that intercourse Spain was acquainted, and to its continuance she never offered either refusal or interruption. From the year 1810, throughout all the vicissitudes of the struggle in Spain, from the moment the agitations in the South American dominions began to develop themselves whether the government of old Spain was vested in a supreme junta or a cortes, under the constitutional monarchy, or in the absolute king,—in all those successions, it was the unremitting endeavour of Great Britain to press upon all the offer of her mediation, with the view of continuing, on liberal and enlarged principles, suited to the spirit of the times, the connexion between Spain and her South American colonies. From the year 1810, to the treaty of Paris, no matter the character or the form of the Spanish government, such was the duty and the sound policy, and from duty sound policy could never be separated, which governed the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. But though on this great point Great Britain did not cease to solicit the attention of Spain, yet by none of those who administered the affairs of Spain, was the offer listened to, indeed all, whether juntas, cortes, restored monarchy, constitutional system, or absolute king, uniformly declined, or evaded the proffered mediation. And he must here observe, what was most important in the consideration of this question, that the pertinacity to decline such mediation (and it was perhaps, to be attributed to those motives which ordinarily swayed human conduct) was the more striking as the system of government in old Spain assumed a constitutional character.

Thus stood the question until the meeting of the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. At that period, the British minister at the congress renewed the offer of mediation, with the knowledge, and under the sanction, of the other powers. Spain again evaded; and whether to gain time, or for whatever other purpose, he would not say, the offer was not accepted. After these repeated and unsuccessful efforts, in which this country consulted both her duty and the soundest policy, the obligation devolved upon the government, of attending to our essential interests—to interests which were not opposed to duty,—but which comprehended the enlarged consideration of what was due to ourselves and to the world. The noble marquis, in urging the propriety of an immediate acknowledgment of the South American provinces seemed to have forgotten—at least he had over-looked—that most material part of the question; namely, what was our actual relation with those provinces, how we were situated with respect to them: and what we had done. In the year 1822, before a noble friend of his, now no more, departed for Verona, he had prepared instructions which were afterwards given to the noble duke who succeeded him. But, before these instructions were all prepared, the government had taken their line. They had submitted to parliament an act which received the royal assent, and which were to the extent of acknowledging the de facto independent provinces. What was it that was then done? If their lordships would look to the 3rd of the king, chapter 43, they would perceive, that it gave to all those provinces the rights of independent states under the navigation act, at the same time re-affirming the general principle, that all commerce with Asia, Africa, and America, must be carried on in British ships. We had thus established a free intercourse with those states as independent states; and from that time it was a complete free trade with that country. Nor did we conceal, either from Spain or from the other powers of Europe, the nature or character of that act. The duke of Wellington, on the part of his majesty, explained the measure to all those states, accompanied by a communication, that it was the intention of his majesty's government to follow up that proceeding by other steps. Accordingly from that time, the independence of those states was practically acknowledged, and we were not only enjoying the benefit of a free commerce with them, but they also had granted to them reciprocal benefits, by the enactment which he had just mentioned. In the month of September in that year, as appeared by a letter from Mr. Secretary Canning, our intention of sending consuls to the different provinces was announced. He was most ready to acknowledge, that after what had passed at Verona, an interval of delay occurred in respect to the sending away these consuls. It was felt by his majesty's ministers, that it would be more consistent and generous to suspend the execution of their intentions on that subject, under existing circumstances, rather than despatch them during the heat of that contest in which France and Spain were about to be engaged. It was that consideration alone that induced the delay that intervened.

He came next to the most important period in the history of these transactions. He meant that period when the French arms were successful in Spain, and the sovereign of that country was reinstated in absolute power. Immediately after that event, his majesty's government did not allow any time to elapse before it put the French government in full and undisguised possession of its views and determination, relative to the South American states. Taking into consideration the recognition of their flag, a de facto acknowledgment of independence, followed up by the appointment of consuls, the British government, having no interest or inclination to concealment, determined to take a further step, which, as it regarded the situation of the South American states, was worth a thousand declarations or acknowledgments of independence. He knew it had been said, that the intention of the powers of Europe respecting the South American states, had been changed, in consequence of the speech of the president of the United States of America. What effect that speech might have had, it was not for him to say; but, whatever its effect might have been, he felt it but justice to the king's ministers to declare, that weeks before that speech reached Europe, it had been distinctly communicated by them to the government of France, that, without interfering with the rights of Spain, Great Britain could not see with indifference any foreign power interfere in the struggle between that country and the South American states. Was not such a declaration distinct and prompt, and, as he had before said, worth a thousand official declarations and acknowledgments? But, was that all? Let their lordships look at the papers on their table, and say, whether such a declaration followed up by the abjuration of France, as to any such intended interference, was not a full discharge of every duty that this government owed to itself, and to those principles of honour, justice, and good faith which uniformly governed her policy.

Such, then, was our situation; and the next question for consideration resolved itself into this—what remained to be done? The noble marquis has said, "make a formal acknowledgment of independence." To that he would answer—to whom should that formal acknowledgment be made? What power possessed the right of making such a recognition, but the power that previously possessed the sovereignty over those states? In the relation in which Great Britain or any other foreign power stood, she neither possessed the right to acknowledge, nor the right to dispute that independence. But, then it was objected, that, under our relations with these states, we ought not to have so long abstained from opening a diplomatic intercourse with the South American governments. He should proceed then to a consideration of that objection; and, in the first place, he would say, that if there was any exertion of the prerogative, which ought to be committed more exclusively to the discretion of the Crown—that if there was any act of government that more especially and peculiarly devolved upon the executive—it was that of deciding at what period it would be proper to open a diplomatic intercourse with foreign states. He did not deny, that, if parliament had reasons to believe that any apathy, or indisposition to discharge what was due to the public interest, was discoverable is the conduct of the advisers of the Crown, under such circumstances it was the duty of their lordships to interpose. But, with the documents on their lordships' table—with the whole conduct of the British government before them—with the nature of our existing relations with the South American States—was there, he asked with confidence any indication of abstinence, or of indisposition, discoverable on the part of the king's government? Their lordships would feel that there might exist a thousand reasons why the opening a diplomatic intercourse might be considered a question of such delicacy, as to place a government under the necessity of proceeding with great caution. But he wished the House to believe that he had no desire to conceal the acts of his majesty's government under any such secret motives or views; and that admission led him to the discussion of principles, not only in which he and the noble marquis agreed, but in which they differed, and indeed to that part of the noble marquis's speech, in which it appeared to him that he had rather misapplied those principles.

With regard to the question of the recognition of independence, they both agreed, that it was to be considered on two grounds; the first of right, the second of expediency. That where no right existed, there could be no expediency, was an inference in which they both agreed. He had no difficulty in declaring what had been his conviction, during the year that the struggle had been going on, between Spain and the South American provinces—that there could be no right, while the contest was actually going on. He knew that our own history proved that other powers of Europe had acted towards us under a very different impression. He was aware of the conduct which the whole House of Bourbon had adopted, in the struggle between Great Britain and her North American colonies. It was notorious, that, while our armies were in the field (no matter what was the justice or policy of that contest), those powers cut the cord of connexion, and, not satisfied with merely acknowledging, assisted the ancient colonies in effecting their separation from the parent state. God forbid that, under any circumstances, Great Britain should feel disposed to follow such an example! The question ought to be—Was the contest going on? He for one could not reconcile it to his mind to take any such step, so long as the struggle in arms continued undecided. And, while he made that declaration, he meant that it should be a bona fide contest.—But, independent of the principle of a positive and absolute contest in arms, there might arise another question, from the existence of a very considerable portion of the population being desirous of a reconciliation with the mother country. He mentioned that case hypothetically; but as it had no application to existing circumstances, he should abstain from arguing upon it. Assuming, then, that there existed no contest in arms, and that the general opinion of the great body of the population was in favour of the new order of things, there could be no question, that the right was, under such circumstances, positive and absolute.

That naturally led him to the consideration of the expediency of such a proceeding. And here he had first to put the following question to those who dwelt upon the expediency of immediately making such a recognition:—Did or did not Great Britain and the states of South America actually enjoy all the advantages which a declaration of independence could afford to either or to both?—Did the abstinence of Great Britain on that point, under her existing relations with those states, demonstrate any ill-will, or even the absence of any good disposition, towards their interests or prosperity? He would appeal with confidence to any Colombian, Chilian, Mexican, or Peruvian, to say whether they believed, in their judgments, that there existed any luke-warmness or indisposition on the part of the British government? He would ask them, whether they believed, that the appointment of a minister plenipotentiary, or a mere declaration of recognition, could be as satisfactory to them as the unqualified, undisguised avowal of Great Britain, that she would never consent to the inteference of any third power, and France recording an abjuration of such an avowal. When it was a question of the good will and friendly disposition of Great Britain towards the South Americans, he would repeat, that such an avowal was worth the appointment of a thousand ambassadors. After such proofs of the feelings of his Majesty's government on that question, he would not pledge himself to any distinct line which the Crown, in the unfettered exercise of its prerogative, might adopt. The documents on the table recorded their determination to be parties to no congress having for its object such a discussion. Parliament would, he was persuaded, give due weight to the previous conduct of his majesty's government, and leave to their time and determination the exercise of a wise discretion. If it was possible to obtain the desired acknowledgment from Spain herself, their lordships would admit that, with reference to the future benefits of the South American states, protecting them as it would from all the consequent hazards to which a doubtful title might expose them, such an accomplishment, even in that view alone, would be a material object. Considering, besides, the nature of our connexion with Spain, the character of that eventful struggle in which, conjointly with that country, we had been so long engaged, the handsome, the gentleman-like course, would be, to give to Spain the opportunity of taking the lead in that recognition. He knew he might be told, that we had already given Spain that opportunity, and that she had not availed herself of it. But, it would be recollected that, we were approaching a new crisis. We stated, in the documents on the table, openly, that we would not delay taking such steps as our essential interests demanded; but that, considering all that had passed, we were most anxious to give our aid, in enabling Spain to avail itself of the grace and advantage of leading the way, and in so doing eventually consulting her best interests. By acting upon views of such evidently sound policy, no man could contend that any substantial interest of Great Britain had in any degree been compromised. With respect to the forms of government which these states might assume, for his own part he was contented with the forms which the people of those countries liked themselves. He undoubtedly had his preference; but he should never dispute upon abstract considerations, provided they were governments capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity with foreign states. But, it was most natural, before the ultimate measure was adopted in this country, to feel anxious to ascertain the actual situation and condition of those new governments—to see whether they afforded the necessary grounds of confidence in their capability of upholding and maintaining international relations. In the ordinary course of things, such would be considered not a very unreasonable course of proceeding, before any new connexions were established. Acting under such a sense of duty, commissioners and consuls had been despatched by his majesty's government to those different states. And, was it not most advisable, before we took any ulterior step, to wait for the information which it would be the duty of these functionaries to communicate? Some months must yet elapse before that information could be obtained. Under these considerations, therefore, he would ask whether the executive government had so concluded itself—whether it had proved itself so wrong in its views, and so injudicious in its policy—as to justify parliament in taking out of the hands of the Crown the exercise of its undoubted prerogative.

These were the grounds on which he put the question to the consideration of their lordships. He had stated, without reserve, every feeling by which the British government was influenced. He had traced, consecutively, the line of proceeding we had adopted towards old Spain and her colonies—our fruitless offers of mediation to the one—our de facto acknowledgment of the independence of; the other. He had shewn, that as these efforts were unavailing, we had declared to the world our determination to attend to those essential interests which the situation of things demanded: and that we were now in a state of progress to that accomplishment which was the object of both sides of their lordships' House. We had declared to the colonies, and to the nations of Europe, that it was our unequivocal determination not to allow the South American states to be trampled upon by any confederacy, however formidable; and that as we had maintained, heretofore, an unfettered discretion on our conduct as to the past, we would persevere in maintaining it, in what yet remained to be accomplished. It seemed that the noble marquis had interpreted the paragraph in Mr. Canning's declaration to the prince de Polignac, which referred to our disavowing any political connexion with the South American States, as if we had bound ourselves for ever against any connexion with those countries. No such meaning attached to that paragraph. It was merely an exposition, under the existing circumstances, of our motives, calculated to disarm any jealousy that might exist, as to the feelings by which we were actuated. It was done with the view of precluding the possibility of any misconception or suspicion, as to our real objects at that particular moment. But, with respect to other circumstances, it left Great Britain as free to establish relations with those states, in as full a manner as with any other foreign power in Europe. One word as to another question of the noble marquis, respecting the knowledge we possessed as to the intentions of the other powers of Europe to take this question into consideration at an assembled congress. He did not know whether those powers entertained any such intention, and he believed they did not themselves know whether they would or would not; but of this he was certain, that to such an intention Great Britain would never be a party. Under these circumstances, he begged leave to move, that after the word "that" in the address moved by the noble marquis, all the other words be omitted, and that in their place should be substituted, "This House gratefully acknowledges his Majesty's goodness in directing the papers to be laid before this House, and the House feels great satisfaction in the assurance given by their perusal, that his Majesty's government will continue, in the further progress of this important question, the exercise of those firm, moderate, and prudent measures, which have contributed to the glory and best interests of the British nation."

Lord Ellenborough

said, he thought that no noble lord could have heard the arguments and statements of the noble earl who had just sat down, without feeling that the question between his noble friend who had opened the debate and that noble earl was of a more extended nature than the noble earl seemed to think it; and that if the address of the noble marquis was not agreed to, it was plain that there was no security that the recognition of South American independence would not be postponed, in the way it had hitherto been, for an indefinite length of time. The question was not whether we should now recognize the independence of colonies separated from, Spain, but whether we should recognize colonies once belonging to Spain, Spain being now in the power of France. The whole course of the recent conduct of France showed that she was anxious to seize the first opportunity of regaining her ascendancy in Europe by renewing the principles of the family compact; and satisfied he was that those states would be attacked by France, in the name of Spain. Who that had attended to late events could attach the smallest credit to the denial on the part of France, that such was her object? If his majesty's ministers were so blind to the views of France and of the confederated powers of Europe, he could only deplore; that blindness, and trust that the House would take a clearer view of the designs of France and the interests of this country, by adopting the motion of his noble friend. Whilst this country was engaged with Spain in repelling that attack which the noble earl (forgetting the attack of last year) stigmatized as the most atrocious that had ever taken place, it might have been necessary, when we were fighting side by side with Spain, to say that the integrity of the Spanish monarchy was our first object; but that necessity no longer existed, when the attack was repelled, and that monarchy was out of danger from the enemy. The consolidation of the connexion of the colonies of Spain with the mother country was, in 1818, not our sole object; but if it were, he feared that South America would not forget, though he would wish to endeavour to make her forget, our foreign enlistment bill, which under the name, and with the real appearance of neutrality, was decidedly hostile to South America and friendly to Spain. As far as could be done by law, our assistance was withdrawn, and South America was left to struggle alone; but, thank Heaven, he believed there was no man base enough to put that act into force, and therefore it had remained a dead letter, and of no avail. The soldiers and sailors of England, in spite of that bad law, had, by acting in the fleets and armies of the provinces, established that friendly feeling towards this country, which the legislature, and above all his majesty's ministers, would have prevented. If he had not heard the early part of the speech of the noble earl, he must have doubted whether the noble earl entertained the opinion which it seemed he did entertain of the importance of the commerce between this country and South America. It seemed, according to the noble earl, that every thing practical had been done; and that the only question now was, merely the opening of a diplomatic intercourse—a thing which the noble earl thought trivial; hut, how was it that throughout the papers on the table it appeared to be of the utmost importance, and more particularly to the minister of France. The noble earl spoke of the other contests in which Spain had been engaged; but, every other contest appeared to be obliterated from the mind of Spain by this last contest, in which she had been crushed by France. It was in vain that the interests of Spain had been mentioned, either in the negotiations which those papers described, or in the address of the noble earl. He could not recognize the power of Spain in any of these transactions, because, look where he would—whether at Cadiz, at Burgos, at Pampeluna, or at Barcelona, in every part of the territory he saw French troops alone in possession. The praise of their moderation was not the least part of the danger. He feared nothing so much, in the issue of the Spanish affairs, as that affected moderation in the French, which was connected with measures of essential violence. He was alarmed at seeing them take the safest and shortest road to the possession of territorial power. He was alarmed when he saw the French prince who headed that army, and whose conduct certainly justified the praises of the noble earl opposite, acting, together with his troops, with a degree of prudence, moderation, and forbearance, not only unknown to them in the generally understood conduct of the French army, but totally inconsistent with the conduct of any army of any country under similar circumstances. He dreaded to see the independence of sovereign states struck down, without irritation to the feelings of any considerable party: he dreaded this precedent of the acquisition of great territorial and political power, without exciting feelings of alarm or jealousy in any other government. He knew of nothing so terrific in the history of all that had gone before, as the French nation taking possession of the power and resources of Spain, with the heart and feelings of the invaded country apparently on their side. The designs of the confederacy which had been formed against the liberties of mankind were the more to be dreaded, as they were not so much directed towards territorial aggrandizement, as towards the general subjection of the minds of men. The success of one member of the confederacy, instead of exciting the jealousy of the other states, seemed to be viewed only as an additional means of promoting the common object of putting down the principles of popular government. It was against these principles that the designs of that confederacy were peculiarly directed; they could not, therefore, but be most hostile to this country, the nature of whose constitution was so utterly inconsistent with the principles on which their combination was founded. It was not a few violent speeches or invectives uttered in parliament which excited the hostile feeling of the alliance towards this country. It was the bright example which our free Constitution held out to all Europe, that constituted the real ground of their hostility. In the eyes of that confederacy, our free constitution was a standing nuisance, which they were anxious to put down whenever they might possess the power. While our constitution existed, the whole edifice which their despotism had raised, was threatened with destruction. When he saw the allied powers ready to pour forth their whole military force to aid in the subjugation of every state which might be the object of their hostility, he must acquiesce in the policy of our not neglecting every opportunity of making a friend. South America was a country possessing, in every point of view, the strongest interest, and opening the prospect of the greatest ad vantages to this country. Her mountains and her plains, her noble rivers and her fertile valleys, excited the strongest emotions of admiration for the beautiful works of nature, and the unbounded beneficence of the Creator. The prospect of every thing which was most liberal and enlightened in government, in arts, and in morals, was opened among a people fresh and strong in the possession of free institutions. Even the power of steam seemed to be discovered at the most favourable moment for giving facilities to the navigation of their rivers, and the working of their precious mines. South America seemed destined, by a chain of circum stances concurring with her almost bound less resources, to carry to the greatest possible extent the civilization and happiness of mankind. When he beheld this cheering and magnificent prospect, he could not confine his views to any petty advantages of trade. What he wanted to gain was the hearts of the people. He trusted that their lordships, instead of hesitating and delaying with his majesty's ministers, and contenting themselves with a paltry nomination of consuls, would come forward as the constitutional advisers of the Crown, and confer upon the country the advantages to be derived from a recognition of the independence of South America, riot with the cold, calculating feeling of ministers, but with the warm hearted and sympathetic feelings which became the legislature of a great and generous nation.

Lord Calthorpe

thought that, looking to the language of the papers which had been laid upon the table, there was sufficient ground for placing confidence in the delarations of his majesty's ministers. He could not help thinking, however, that this country would be justified hereafter in feeling the utmost jealousy in co-operating with the measures of any foreign European power. He could not forget that the French government had engaged last year in an enterprise, which every man, whether he approved or disapproved of the Spanish constitution, concurred in deprecating. He was ready to admit, that the invasion of Spain had been carried on in a spirit of moderation and forbearance, and that the illustrious leader of the French armies had, in his treatment of the people of Spain, conducted himself in a manner which reflected the highest credit upon his name. Yet that very moderation was of itself alarming, because it was clear that, before they entered Spain, they were ignorant of the nature and character of the power which they went to support. They found, instead of a wise and orderly government, that they were called upon to reinstate a party, actuated by a blind, ferocious, intolerant spirit of bigotry; so that the French were obliged to act as mediators between the two factions, of whose divisions, before they entered Spain, they had not heard any thing. He was persuaded, however, that if this country had exerted her moral influence at an early period of the negotiations at Verona, the French aggression on Spain would never have taken place. The issue of this contest had fostered the disposition of France to interfere with the independence of foreign nations into a greater and more mischievous activity. The pretended object of France was, to tranquillize Spain; but that object was so far from having been accomplished, that that unfortunate country was now in a more distracted condition than ever. The papers which had been laid on the table proved conclusively, that France was influenced by a spirit of interference with the rights of independent nations. Under the present circumstances, however, he felt that he should be wanting in the confidence which he thought due to the declarations of his majesty's ministers, if he hesitated to commit to them the issue of the arrangements with respect to the South American colonies. He thought that a reasonable degree of delay might justly be observed in recognizing the independence of those colonies. If we were somewhat slow in granting a full recognition of their independence, the very delay would be an earnest that, when once their independence was acknowledged, it would not be a vain, illusory recognition, but one which would fully guarantee their freedom, their happiness, and their commercial prosperity. The noble lord concluded by declaring his resolution to vote for the amendment which had been moved by the noble earl at the head of his majesty's government.

The Earl of Roseberry

said, he rose merely to declare, that it was his intention to support the original motion, not from any doubt of the sincerity of his majesty's government to carry into effect the complete recognition of the South American states, but from being persuaded that a strong expression, on the part of the parliament of this country, of their deliberate opinion on this question, would furnish the best aid to the government in their negotiations, and be the means of removing whatever impediment might at present exist, in the way of a speedy and satisfactory adjustment of it.

The Marquis of Lansdown

briefly replied. He contended, that the noble earl opposite had not urged a single reason which could justify his majesty's government in delaying the recognition of the independence of South America, beyond that which was founded on the prospect of Spain shortly acknowledging the independence of her colonies. Now, whether the noble earl opposite regarded Spain as an independent state, free from the shackles and control of France, or whether he regarded her, as she really was, the degraded and debased dependent of the French monarchy, he would at once withdraw his motion, if the noble earl, or any one of his majesty's ministers, would lay his hand on his heart and say, that he thought Spain would, in a short time acknowledge the independence of her colonies. They all knew what the Spanish government had been, and continued to be; they all knew the reluctance which Spain had formerly shown in recognising the independence of Holland. If the noble earl waited until the independence of South America was recognised by Spain, it would never fall to his lot to acknowledge their independence—that glory would devolve to some ingenious and eloquent statesman yet unborn, who might fill the noble lord's place. Feeling, as he did, a deep interest in the independence and immediate prosperity of the South American states, and believing that their welfare was intimately connected with the prosperity of this country and of the world, he thought that the recognition of their independence ought not to be delayed for a single month, or week, or day. The noble earl had spoken of the establishment of diplomatic relations as a mere form; but he could not but be aware, that, in the eyes of civilized Europe, the greatest importance was attached to those forms. The complete recognition of the independence of the United States, by the opening of diplomatic relations on the part of this country, had given to those States, in the eyes of Europe, an importance which, until that measure was adopted, they had not ac- quired. With the independence of South America were connected the happiness, prosperity, and greatness of Europe and of the world. The march of civilization, science, and improvement, could not advance in the other hemisphere without reacting on Europe, and without strengthening the resources of our own country in proportion as we cultivated a closer relation with those rising States. Above all, it afforded the best prospect, and the most extensive resources, for arresting one of the most formidable combinations, which, since the tyranny of Bonaparte, had ever been formed against the liberties of mankind.

The House divided: For the Marquis of Lansdown's motion 34; Against it 95; Majority 61. The Earl of Liverpool's amendment was then put and agreed to.