Lords Sitting of 4 February 1823

THE KING'S SPEECH ON OPENING THE SESSION.
This day the Session was opened by Commission. The Commissioners were, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, and the Earls of Harrow by, Westmorland, and Shaftesbury. The usher of the black rod having been ordered to require the attendance of the House of Commons, he withdrew. The Speaker, accompanied by several members, having appeared at the bar, the Lord Chancellor opened the Session with the following Speech to both Houses:—
"My Lords and Gentlemen;
"We are commanded by his majesty to inform you, that since he has met you in parliament, his majesty's efforts have been unremittingly exerted to preserve the peace of Europe.
"Faithful to the principles which his majesty has promulgated to the world as constituting the rule of his conduct, his majesty declined being party to any proceedings at Verona, which could be deemed an interference in the internal concerns of Spain, on the part of Foreign Powers; and his majesty has since used, and continues to use his most anxious endeavours and good offices to allay the irritation unhappily subsisting between the French and Spanish governments, and to avert, if possible, the calamity of war between France and Spain.
"In the east of Europe, his majesty flatters himself that peace will be preserved; and his majesty continues to receive from his Allies, and generally from other powers, assurances of their unaltered disposition to cultivate with his majesty those friendly relations which it is equally his majesty's object on his part to maintain.
"We are further commanded to apprize you, that discussions having been long pending with the court of Madrid respecting depredations committed on the commerce of his majesty's subjects in the West-Indian seas, and other grievances of which his majesty had been under the necessity of complaining, those discussions have terminated in an admission by the Spanish government of the justice of his majesty's complaints, and in an engagement for satisfactory reparation.
"We are commanded to assure you, that his majesty has not been unmindful of the addresses presented to him by the two Houses of Parliament with respect to the foreign slave trade. Propositions for the more effectual suppression of that evil were brought forward by his majesty's plenipotentiary in the conferences at Verona; and there have been added to the treaties upon this subject already concluded between his majesty and the governments of Spain and the Netherlands, articles which will extend the operation of those treaties, and greatly facilitate their execution.
"Gentlemen of the House of Commons;
"His majesty has directed the estimates of the current year to be laid before you. They have been framed with every attention to economy; and the total expenditure will be found to be materially below that of last year.
"This diminution of charge, combined with the progressive improvement of the revenue, has produced a surplus exceeding his majesty's expectation; his majesty trusts, therefore, that you will be able, after providing for the services of the year, and without affecting public credit, to make a further considerable reduction in the burthens of his people.
"My Lords and Gentlemen;
"His majesty has commanded us to state to you, that the manifestations of loyalty and attachment to his person and government, which his majesty received in his late visit to Scotland, have made the deepest impression on his heart.
"The provisions which you made in the last session of parliament for the relief of the distresses in considerable districts in Ireland, has been productive of the happiest effects; and his majesty recommends to your consideration, such measures of internal regulation as may be calculated to promote and secure the tranquillity of that country, and to improve the habits and condition of the people.
"Deeply as his majesty regrets the continued depression of the agricultural interest, the satisfaction with which his majesty contemplates the increasing activity which pervades the manufacturing districts, and the flourishing condition of our commerce in most of its principal branches, is greatly enhanced by the confident persuasion, that the progressive prosperity of so many of the interests of the country cannot fail to contribute to the gradual improvement of that great interest which is the most important of them all."
The Commons then withdrew. After which, the Speech being again read by the Lord Chancellor, and also by the clerk at the table,
The Earl of Morleyrose. He said, that although the day was past, when their lordships for so many years, upon occasions similar to the present, were in the habit of hearing of the conflicts of fleets and armies, and of the rise and downfall of particular states, yet it might perhaps nevertheless be stated, that upon no occasion did the sovereign of these realms ever address to parliament, a speech more fraught with interesting matter, more pregnant with topics eventually bearing upon the future happiness of mankind, more declaratory of principles and sentiments dear to the hearts of Englishmen, than that which his majesty had that day been graciously pleased to deliver by his commissioners to their lordships and the other House convened at their bar. In proposing for the adoption of their lordships an address to the throne, he should, as a matter of course, feel it to be his duty to expose those general grounds, on which each paragraph in the address might be considered as founded, and as entitled to their favourable attention. The convulsions by which Europe had been agitated, during the last ten years of the past century, and the first fifteen years of the present, and the struggles to which those convulsions gave rise, could not but be fully impressed upon their minds. Whatever difference of' opinion might have existed as to the territorial arrangements and general provisions of the treaties, by which, in 1815, those contests were finally closed, no difference had ever existed as to the fitness of abiding by them; of henceforth, in common with the rest of Europe, looking upon peace as the system to be adhered to; and of abstaining from all proceedings calculated, directly or indirectly, to disturb that state of repose, which exertions beyond all parallel had rendered essential to the general welfare. It could not therefore have been without the deepest regret, and he might add astonishment, that they had this day heard that, his most christian majesty had considered the state of affairs existing in Spain, as demanding the armed interference of France. He would not enter upon the principles upon which the present constitution of Spain was founded, nor upon the events of the 7th of July, nor upon the personal conduct of his catholic majesty since his restoration to his throne (a point which, if it was fit to enter into a detail of Spanish affairs; could not be passed, over), nor upon, the

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language held in the democratic clubs of Madrid, nor generally upon the situation of Spain; still less could there be any necessity for his attempting to expound the subtile and difficult question of the right which one state may possess, to interfere (by force of arms), in the internal concerns of another. In the statement of this question, facts and opinions were often confounded, and groundless apprehensions frequently held the place of both. As far as matters of such nicety could be rendered clear, such principles had been laid down and promulgated to the world in the circular letter sent by this government, to all the different ministers in Europe. His noble friend at the head of his majesty's treasury had last year taken a forcible distinction between the right of foreign interference which might exist in different cases, and especially noticed the difference existing in the cases of Naples and Spain. It was however clear, that all cases must claim, as they arose, their own particular application of principles, and that all attempts to apply rules upon a supposed state of things could lead in practice to nothing but error. It was therefore not necessary to argue whether the king of France had or had not a right to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, or whether be took a correct view of his own affairs in asserting that right at Verona, and preparing to exercise it at present. It was sufficient for the exposition of the British government to state, that at Verona his most christian majesty did prefer such claim, and was unequivocally supported in it by the three great continental sovereigns who were there assembled. His majesty's ministers did not only discourage the assertion of this right of interference on the part of France, but when asserted, they did not admit its existence. They were deeply impressed with the paramount and transcendant necessity of maintaining that which had ever been declared by the confederated sovereigns themselves to be the grand object of their alliance—the general tranquillity of Europe. Appeals to the policy and moderation of France were reiterated at Verona and at Paris. No pains bud been omitted, no efforts (short of those by which we ourselves might have instantly become principals in the war) had been neglected to impress upon France the certain present evil of war, in the existing circumstances of the world, and more especially
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the calamities which might result to France herself from a contest undertaken for the object in view, and under circumstances similar to those very peculiar ones which now applied to France. Certainly, it could not be for this country, and, above all, in the present century, to be insensible to the imminent hazard which must be incurred by any foreign army entering in a hostile manner into that part of the Peninsula. The peculiar and efficient mode adopted for the defence of their country by the great mass of the Spanish population, could only have become known to Europe for the purpose of being forgotten, if it could for a moment be thought, that the entrance into Spain by a foreign army did not, upon that army, induce hazards of the most serious character—
"quæ vos fortuna quietos "Solicitat, suadetque experta lacessere bella."
It was not, however, from any idea of the peril of the enterprize, that his majesty's government receded. In their view no necessity for foreign interference existed: in their view, by such interference, the first of blessings and of wants, the peace of Europe, was instantly interrupted, and to be restored at a period which no man could foresee. Notwithstanding the anarchical and disorganizing principles on which the government of France had been founded in 1793, and its direct interference in the internal affairs of other states, by the official and ever-memorable invitation to the disaffected in all countries against their rulers, the government of this country never did, upon any occasion, avow the principle of interference in the internal affairs of France as such; so disinclined was the English government at all times to bring discredit upon that valuable general maxim, that the conduct of all independent states, in what related to their own internal administration, belonged, of right, exclusively to themselves. Upon this principle his majesty's present servants had acted at Verona; upon this principle they had acted and were still acting at Paris; upon this principle they claimed the confidence of their lordships and the approbation of the public. France, however, appeared about to enter upon the contest. If she did so (for fortunately the extremity of war might still be considered as uncertain), Europe and posterity would know that she commences the war upon her own responsibility, and with all the

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hazards and contingencies such as had been described. The exertions of his majesty, however, which could not have been otherwise than beneficial to the maintenance of peace, up to the present moment were still employed, and hope was not forbidden, that justice and true policy might eventually triumph.—Their lordships could not but approve the act of vigour which it was well known accompanied our latter remonstrances to the Spanish government, on the subject of depredations committed in the West Indian seas. It was certainly time, as well from regard to what was due to individual sufferers, as to the honour of the British flag itself, that effective measures should at length be adopted, to arrest proceedings so dishonourable and injurious. It was not to be imagined that this step was taken with any reference to the actual state of affairs in Spain, or from an idea that embarrassments in other quarters might more readily lead to an acquiescence in our just demand. Such was not the fact. The affair of the ship Lord Collin, wood had last year made a strong impression in this country; and he was empowered to state, that the reclamations addressed to the Spanish government upon this subject had become urgent before the assembly of the congress at Verona, and further, that the courier who brought to London the acquiescence of the Spanish government in our demands, brought, at the same time, a proposition which marked, in the strongest manner, the friendly and confiding feelings of Spain towards this country, and in so much her absolution from all imputation of unfair dealing in this transaction. If, adhering to that pacific system prescribed by the unquestionable interest of all nations, the king lamented the war which threatened the peninsula, he could not do otherwise than feel satisfaction that his efforts for the preservation of peace in the eastern part of Europe were likely to prove successful. No Christian country could be insensible to the sufferings of the Greeks, or to the ravages of a civil war, which extended itself from the shores of the Adriatic to those of the Euxine. This government had not omitted to impress upon the Porte the necessity of a line of conduct more consistent with the dictates of humanity. Now, however, that a little time for reflection had been accorded, he thought that no Englishman could
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seriously have wished that a war should have been commenced for the amelioration of Turkey, or for securing a better administration of affairs, even to those regions to which are associated the fondest recollections of literature and of art, and to which all scholars and liberal statesmen must ever look with sentiments of affection and partiality.—Their lordships would be glad to hear that the parliamentary grants of last session for the relief of the distresses in Ireland, had answered their object. The extensive private subscription which accompanied those grants must, as a demonstration of English feeling, have had the effect of drawing still tighter the indissoluble bonds by which the two countries were united. Painful had been the discussions which, for many years past, had taken place on the subject of Ireland. Let them this day bail with joy his majesty's auspicious recommendation, to consider of such measures as should be calculated to promote the future tranquillity of that country, and permanently improve the condition of her people. Let them cherish the fond hope, that the work of substantial, practical, and gradual amelioration was about to be commenced. Let the real state of Ireland be probed to the bottom. Let every lurking grievance be exposed and remedied. Let the Irish proprietors, more especially, co-operate in the beneficial views of his majesty. Let such as are not prevented by public duty, repair to their native country, and by their presence, example, and counsel, assist in repairing the injuries which an unwise expatriation may have contributed to produce. He said nothing upon removing the civil incapacities under which a large portion of his majesty's Irish subjects laboured, being anxious to carry with him, upon the present occasion, not only the unanimous vote, but the unanimous feeling of the House.—After all the speculations which had been submitted to the public as to the cause of the severe calamity which had befallen that valuable class of the community, connected with the cultivation of the soil, he would not detain the House, at any length, with any views of his own: he might, however, say, that the prosperous state of agriculture, in 1818 and 1819, seemed to negative the opinion, that this calamity was produced by over cultivation, or (the peace having been

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concluded several years) from government having ceased to come as large purchasers into the market. He would rather be disposed to attribute the evil to the large importation of foreign grain, in 1818 and 1819 (in consequence of which many thousand quarters of grain must now be in the country more than there otherwise would be) to three abundant harvests following that importation,—to the diminution of the circulation of country banks, in consequence of the change of the currency, and to the operation of the act of 1806, by which the Irish cultivator, who pays less tythe and no poor-rates, comes into the market on the same footing as the English grower. It might be very well to say, that England and Ireland being united, such ought to be the case; but under such generalities great injustice was frequently concealed. The king's speech did not hold out the expectation, that any particular mode of relief would be proposed on the part of government; nor, on the other hand, did it express any opinion that the united energies of government and parliament might not be able to devise measures to mitigate the evil: he hoped such might be the case: if on no other grounds, on this, that such has always been found to be the admirable machinery and workings of our laws, that no grievance has ever weighed long upon any particular class, without some measure of relief having been devised. It would be idle to suppose, that in the present crisis any mode of relief could be brought forward, to which not only plausible doubts, but even just objections, might not be raised. The usual course of our practice might be changed, the dicta of the economists might be violated, principles which, under ordinary circumstances, should be held sacred, might be suspended; but these, perhaps, may scarcely be called evils, with reference to that annihilation of property, which it was to be feared was making progress in different parts of the country. The obvious interest and duty of government must, of course, lead them to recommend any plan which afforded a chance of success, even at some compromise of principle. But if they were conscientiously satisfied, that no plan could operate relief, they should not excite expectations on the part of the public. No sovereign of the present family had, antecedently to the last year, ever visited that part of Great Britain
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which lies to the northward of the Tweed. Having advertence to some peculiar circumstances relative to Scotland, and having ever in view, as a primary object, the uniting the hearts of all descriptions of his majesty's subjects, it would have been difficult to have devised a step more calculated to secure that object, than the visit which his majesty made last summer to his capital in Scotland;—of the general satisfaction and good order observable upon that occasion, he spoke before many who could confirm him as witnesses. Not only, however, was it in Scotland that loyalty and peaceable conduct had been manifest; throughout the kingdom might have been remarked an increased general tranquillity, and a comparative absence of that flagitious and seditious spirit by which unfortunately latter years have been characterized.—The House could not but feel gratified at the steps which had been taken for the abolition of the foreign slave trade: it was now 35 years since the nations of Africa had first to hail the name of Wilberforce: since that period great had been the efforts made by this country, in favour of this great, this christian object of general abolition. Some foreign governments might have been luke warm; some might not have given England credit for the sincerity and disinterestedness to which she was entitled. It was possible upon the assembling of the sovereigns at Verona, that his majesty's ministers might have submitted to them something more novel and attractive than the never-ending subject of the abolition of the slave trade. They, however, were not influenced by any such considerations. They knew what humanity dictated, and what the public voice of England desired; and they knew, unfortunately, that much yet remained to be achieved; and it therefore fell to the destiny of an illustrious duke, who had already contended for the freedom of one continent in the field, to contend at Verona for that of another in council, and by negociation. A recommendation to the maritime powers to declare all ships transporting slaves to be pirates, was, at the instance of the noble duke, sanctioned by the sovereigns, and, if adopted by them, the maritime powers would give a more effectual blow to this detestable and degrading traffic, than any antecedent measure had ever inflicted.—Upon the flourishing state of the revenue, and upon the gratifying pros-

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pect of a further very considerable reduction in the taxes, and upon the prosperous situation of our trade and manufactures, he would dwell but shortly: these all offered separate and most important themes for congratulation. In the present situation of the country, it was impossible to rate too highly the value—the immensity of these advantages, virtually affecting, as they did, the resources of the empire and the prosperity of the people. With regard to trade, it was difficult not to see in the events now passing in the world, the probability of a greatly increased trade with South America; a country far exceeding the whole of Europe in extent and also in fertility, and occupying on the surface of the globe, a situation unparalleled for the commercial advantages which it appeared to unite. If he had compressed still further what he had to state, he should not have discharged his duty to the House,—to his majesty's ministers, or to the momentous subjects which had come under review. The situation of the country was in many respects one of anxiety;—the depression of the agricultural interests,—the anomalous state of Ireland,—the uncertainty of continental events were sources of watchfulness and solicitude. If, however, on the one hand, there were points on which the public anxiety must still be protracted, there were not wanting, on the other hand, topics of just pride, and of well-grounded hope. Let their lordships carry to the foot of the throne, the expressions of loyalty and attachment which it was always grateful to the princes of the house of Hanover to receive from that House. Let them with firmness support the king on the pinnacle of glory, on which, as with reference to the events of the late wars, he might most fairly be considered as standing. Let them, by their unanimity, strengthen the arm of his servants; and let them entertain a confident hope, that their vigilance, their moderation,—their love of England,—would conduct the country through every difficulty,—would surmount every thing which might appear inauspicious in its situation,—would turn to the largest account the many important advantages which now opened themselves,—and finally lay the basis for securing, for times to come, the internal happiness and external power,—to the enjoyment of which, this country in every view is so
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justly entitled.—His lordship concluded by moving an address to his majesty, in the usual terms.
The Earl of Mayoseconded the Address, in a short speech, which was inaudible below the bar. His lordship expressed his great satisfaction, connected as he was with Ireland, at the manner in which that country had been noticed; and bore testimony to the good which had resulted from all that had been done of late in her behalf.
Earl Stanhopesaid:—My lords; I am aware, that on occasions like the present, unanimity is generally thought to be desirable; but there are circumstances in which all such considerations must give way, and in which it is consistent neither with your dignity nor your duty, that your Address should be nothing more than a servile echo of the Speech. If ever those circumstances existed, it is at the present moment, when the distress which afflicts the nation is universal and unexampled; when the necessity of administering relief is most urgent, and when that relief cannot he delayed without danger, nay, without destruction to the country. This is the third session of parliament which has been opened by a speech from the throne, acknowledging and lamenting the existence of distress; and this is also the third session in which you have been invited by the mover of the address, to express in your answer nothing more than general and unavailing regret. The address which has been moved gives no pledge for an inquiry, and no expectation of relief, and it is upon this ground that I intend to propose to your lordships an amendment. If, according to the theory of the noble earl who is at the head of the Treasury, we have been cursed with too much plenty; if we have been afflicted with too much abundance; perhaps the only remedy that could be found under such an unusual, nay, such an unheard of calamity, would be, to adopt the recommendation which has been so kindly and liberally offered by some persons who are connected with administration, and which has, I am sorry to say, been repeated in other quarters, and to discontinue the cultivation of those lands which are of inferior quality. I have no doubt that such advice would be very thankfully received in the county of Norfolk, acid in several others which consist exclusively of land of that description. The inhabitants

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of those extensive and populous districts would learn with great satisfaction, that they would in future he relieved from the labour of cultivating the land, and would continue during the remainder of their lives, to be pensioners upon the poor-rates. Really, my lords, without intending to pay any compliment to that noble earl, I must, however, say, that I think too favourably of his understanding to suppose that be is serious in maintaining such a doctrine; and I am ready to believe, notwithstanding the gravity with which he generally delivers his opinions, that he meant nothing more than to make a sort of experiment on the credulity of your lordships, or what is vulgarly termed a "hoax." But if the noble earl is serious, I would ask, whether it is possible for the ingenuity of man to devise a severer satire upon his own administration? What! my lords, is such the state to which his course of policy has reduced this once happy and prosperous, but now miserable and mis-governed country? Is such the glory of his administration? Are such the achievements of which he can boast, that he has perverted even the course of nature itself, and converted into a calamity and a curse that bounty of Providence which formerly was hailed as a blessing? Can the noble earl state in what period of history, ancient or modern, any mention was made, or any hint was given, that abundance had been productive, I will not say of distress, but even of injury or inconvenience? That abundant harvests tend to lower prices, is indeed obvious; but, far from being the cause of distress, it was always found that the deficiency of the price was compensated, or more than compensated, by the increase of the consumption. If the noble earl will refer to the evidence before the agricultural committee, he will find that many witnesses denied the existence of such abundance as he has represented; and that they considered abundance to be beneficial to those who, cultivate, as it undoubtedly must be to those who consume. One of these witnesses, Mr. Iveson, who is a land agent, and a receiver of rents in many counties, says, very truly, "I cannot conceive abundance to be injurious to any body;" and such was the opinion entertained by all mankind till these new fangled doctrines were first promulgated. Does the noble earl suppose that any favourable seasons or abundant harvests could, by possibility, have had the effect
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of lowering the price of corn fifty per cent in three years? Even if such could have been the case, would it also have lowered, in the same proportion, the price of cattle and of other agricultural produce? The argument does not, however, stop here; for, on referring to a document which comes from the town of which the noble earl bears the name, and is entitled "The Liverpool Price Currents," it is found, that in the same period of three years, several articles of commerce have fallen in price above 35 per rent. For example: on the four sorts of cotton which are there enumerated, the average depression of price has been above 41 per cent; on four sorts of silk, above 37 per cent; while sugar has fallen 31 per cent, and ruin 50 per cent. Your lordships see, that while the prices of agricultural produce have fallen 50 per cent, the prices of several articles of commerce have fallen above 35 per cent; and a similar depression is represented to have taken place in articles of manufacture. What, therefore, is the cause that all those articles have so much fallen in price, some of them being the produce and some the manufactures of this country, and some being imported from abroad? It cannot be contended, that all those articles have been produced at a smaller cost, or that upon all those articles there has been either an increased supply, or a diminished consumption; and, as the fall of prices does not proceed from those causes, it is, I maintain, a conclusive logical argument, that it must proceed from the only remaining cause; that is, from an alteration in the value of the money in which those articles are bought and sold. That such is and must be the case is proved also by the utter futility of all the other causes which have been alleged. Of one of those causes, that is, of excessive production, I have already spoken; and I need say nothing about another of those causes, that is, of excessive importation, because the noble earl has avowed his conviction, that it was not the cause of the present distress. As for another of those causes, I mean the transition from war to peace, it seems to be forgotten, that peace was not recently concluded; that we have been for above seven years in the enjoyment of that blessing, and that this country did, in the year 1818, exhibit symptoms of reviving prosperity, not indeed of such prosperity as existed in the year 1792, but of such a degree of pros-

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perity as could have been experienced after a war of such extraordinary duration and of such excessive expense. That the present unexampled distress is the effect of the alteration of the currency, may be proved by the same clear and demonstrative evidence as a mathematical proposition; and your lordships will perceive, by the facts which are stated in the admirable pamphlet that has been recently published by Mr. Western, that while agricultural produce has fallen in price 50 per cent, and articles of commerce and manufactures above 35 per cent, there has been, upon the average of all of them, a depression of above 40 per cent. This shows to what amount the currency was depreciated in 1819; but I am ready to argue the question upon the assumption, which however I do not admit, that no depreciation existed, and I should arrive exactly at the same conclusion. It was represented in some quarters, when the bullion question was first considered by a committee, that bank notes were not depreciated, but that gold had risen in value in consequence of an extraordinary demand; and it is stated by Mr. Jacob, who was examined before the agricultural committee, that the supply of gold from the Spanish mines was, during the ten years which elapsed from 1811 to 1821, only one-third of what it had been in the ten years preceding. But if no depreciation of paper had existed, it is, however, equally true, that the contraction of the currency, which was requisite to render it convertible into gold, has been the cause of that most extraordinary fall of prices which we now witness. It was, I know, said by one of the witnesses before the Secret Committee, by Mr. Ricardo, that the depreciation of the currency was only four and a half per cent, and that the fall of prices would not exceed five per cent, and he endeavoured to prove the proposition, by comparing the mint price of gold with that which he called the market price of that period. The argument was most fallacious, and has been falsified by the event. Your lordships will recollect, that in 1819, there was no demand whatever for gold, neither for foreign subsidies nor for the supply of armies on the continent, both of which had required enormous remittances during the late war; and that there was no demand for it in foreign trade, as the exchanges were generally, and almost con-
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stantly in favour of this country; and there was, in fact, very little, if any, demand for it, except by jewellers and goldsmiths. In considering the market price of gold as compared with the mint price, the question is not, what is the price which is paid for that inconsiderable quantity which is required by an insignificant demand, but what is the price which would be paid for an indefinite quantity, and for such a demand as the coinage would occasion? Upon this point, I have very recently conversed with a Bank director, of whom I asked this question:—"Supposing that government had inquired of the Bank of England, in 1819, at what price it would have agreed to furnish any quantity of gold that might have been wanted; would you, the Bank Directors, have named 4l. 2s. per ounce, which was then said to be the market price?" His answer was, "Undoubtedly we should have named a much higher price." Upon the erroneous principle of Mr. Ricardo, that measure was adopted which is known by the name of Mr. Peel's Bill, and for which no petition was presented from any part of the population. Some reasons have since been discovered for the measure, which were not stated at the time, and which appear to be after thoughts. It is now represented, that the measure was adopted for the relief of the suffering manufacturers. No person felt more sincerely than myself for the distress under which the manufacturers then laboured; and with a view of procuring for them relief, I submitted to this House a motion for the appointment of a committee to consider the means of providing them with employment. Your lordships know that it was the want of employment, and not the dearness of provisions, which was then the cause of their distress; but when, as might naturally be expected, they became discontented, and were clamorous in their complaints, parliament passed six acts of coercion and restraint. I have the happiness and honour of never having voted for those acts, one of which abridged in a manner which I most strongly reprobate, the ancient, constitutional, and invaluable right of holding popular assemblies. I deny that the distress of the manufacturers at that period proceeded from a high price of provisions; and I deny that the object of Mr. Peel's bill was stated to be that of lowering their price. I deny also that any practical relief could have been experienced, if the prices of provisions had been

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reduced only five per cent, according to the expectation which some persons then entertained; that is, if the price of a quartern loaf, for example, had been reduced from tenpence to ninepence halfpenny. If it had been stated, that the object of Mr. Peel's bill was to lower the price of provisions 50 per cent, as we have found to be the case, I do not believe that it would have received such support as would have enabled it to pass into a law. The reasons which were then alleged for it, were the importance of establishing what was called a "wholesome currency;" of reverting to the "ancient standard;" and the other general arguments which we remember to have heard. Although the measure was pregnant with the most portentous consequences, and has been productive of the most calamitous effects, the inquiry seemed to have been conducted without a due consideration of that which was the essence of the question, of its operation upon the internal condition of the country. The principle of that measure, the object which it had in view, and the effect which it was intended to produce, were to diminish the quantity of the circulating medium, and thereby to increase its value. Such being the case, it followed as a necessary inference, that in justice to all parties, the amount of payments ought to have been diminished, in the same proportion as the value of the currency had been increased. It has been found that heavy payments are, in private transactions, incompatible with low prices; and it will, I believe, be found by government, that such prices are equally incompatible with high taxes. I am represented to have said that low prices were advantageous only to Jews and jobbers. Heaven forbid that I should ever have entertained or expressed such a preposterous doctrine! I said no such thing; I said that Jews and jobbers alone were prosperous at the present moment, and that the assertion of the country being in a state of general prosperity, was an unparalleled absurdity, which was worthy only of the Jews and jobbers from whom it proceeded. Far from wishing for high prices, I wish that prices should continue to be low; but. I wish also that taxes and all other payments should be proportionably low. Whence does it arise that low prices are ruinous and destructive now, when they were accompanied with great and general prosperity thirty years ago; or in the still more auspicious period of a
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century ago? No other reason can be assigned than the difference which exists; in the amount of taxation, and in the private contracts that were formed in a depreciated, or at least in a very different currency. The landlords have been falsely represented as wishing for high rents, though they would gladly agree to be restored to the moderate rents which they received in 1792, provided that they could be replaced in the same situation with regard to the taxes and other payments, to which they were then subject. In some cases, no rent whatever is now received from land; and in other cases, the monstrous spectacle has been exhibited, of rent being paid by the landlord to the tenant. I am informed, by authority on which I can rely, that cases are known in Essex, where landlords have paid half-a-crown per acre to the tenants to induce them to continue the cultivation of the soil. This is an undeniable proof, that in some cases the whole produce of the land, after paving the expenses of cultivation, is consumed by taxation; and I consider as taxes, the poor-rates and other local assessments, which fall exclusively and most unjustly on the agricultural interest.—If we contemplate the effects which the change of currency has produced upon taxation, we find that the public annuitants now receive twice as much in the produce of the earth as they did in 1819, and nearly twice as much as they then did in other commodities. Is not this to be considered as a most nefarious fraud that has been practised on the nation, and as an act of public robbery? We hear much about public faith, but it did not, and could not pledge the nation to pay the public creditors twice as much as they ought to receive, and as they did receive three years ago. The reduction of the dividends, which is imperiously required by the safety of the country, is strictly conformable to justice, in consequence of the alteration of the currency in which they are paid. I wish that the question between the nation and its creditors could be argued as one between two private individuals, before my noble and learned friend upon the woolsack, whom I venerate as a most wise and learned, as well as a most honest and upright magistrate. His virtues and talents render him an ornament to this House and to the country, and even to the age in which we live. Though he is inclined, from those conscientious feelings, which are so honour

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able to him, to pause and hesitate and doubt, I am convinced that upon such a question, he would have no hesitation or doubt whatever, and that he would decide upon the principles of equity, that if you increase by a legislative measure the value of the currency, you ought in the same proportion to diminish the amount of the payments, whether they are public or private. If ministers will not, however, diminish, and to a very considerable extent, the amount of taxes, it is to be expected that the taxes will reduce themselves; for the period may not be far distant, when the noble earl at the head of the Treasury, may be obliged to provide warehouses and magazines to lodge the corn and cattle, and implements of husbandry, which he may wrest by distress from an impoverished or ruined tenantry It is my firm conviction, that if the present system should be long continued, a national bankruptcy may be anticipated, and I would entreat your lordships to cast your eyes upon that abyss of ruin which is now opening beneath your feet. From that ruin you have no retreat, but by one or the other of these two alternatives; that of extending the circulation, or of reducing taxes and other payments, in the same proportion as the value of the currency has been increased. If we consider the effect which the change of the currency has produced upon private contracts, we must recollect, that those contracts were formed during nearly a quarter of a century, in a currency of a very different value and description, and upon the declaration which I find recorded on the Journals of the House of Commons, that a pound note and a shilling were equivalent in public estimation to a guinea, although it was known that guineas were sold for twenty-eight shillings each. The alteration of the currency has had the operation in private contracts, of conferring upon one party an advantage which he is not entitled to receive, while it imposes upon the other a burden which he did not stipulate to bear. The effect has, in some cases, amounted to nothing less than a total confiscation of the property, and many instances might be adduced of the most melancholy and afflicting nature, of individuals who have been ruined by the operation of this measure, This indeed has been said to be only a "transfer of property." The complaint, however, is in some cases, not that there is a
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"transfer," but a destruction of property; and the land which is wholly unprofitable, and yields no rent, will not become of greater value by being transferred to some monied man, who may purchase it on speculation, or as an investment, which though it is not at present lucrative, may be ultimately secure. What is a highway robbery but a forcible transfer of property? And of what nature are the transfers to which I allude? I am filled with horror and indignation, when I hear called by the mild and gentle phrase of a "transfer of property," an act of gigantic injustice, and the most systematic spoliation which ever yet disgraced a government or desolated a country. It has been described as a general confiscation of the property of debtors for the profit of their creditors. And here I must beg to submit to your lordships a question which is most interesting and most important, and which deserves your most serious consideration. I know that parliament is invested with great and extensive powers, which it holds for the benefit of the people, from whom they were originally derived, and which it ought to exercise only for the furtherance of that object. I would ask, whether any parliament, however constituted, even with that perfect system of representation which does not now exist, can have the right to plunder one portion of the community for the profit of the other? If it has not that right, and if it should assume and exercise a power which does not lawfully belong to it, I would then ask your lordships, what are the rights which in such a case would belong to an oppressed and injured people? To prevent such injustice, to avert those calamities, which, if continued, may terminate in convulsion, this House has the remedy in its own hands. Let it act upon true constitutional principles, and according to the practices of ancient times, in refusing any supplies until those grievances are redressed, which are now become intolerable, and which would have appeared incredible to our ancestors, as they will, I trust, appear also to our descendants. The argument in favour of parliamentary reform, has become unanswerable, and may prove to be irresistible. To parliamentary reform, if conducted upon proper principles, I am a zealous friend, but the mode of executing that object is of not less importance than the object itself; and while,

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on the one hand, I deprecate those inept and inefficient plans of reform which seem to have in view only the abolition of close boroughs, I should, on the other hand, condemn still more strongly that mischievous project of universal suffrage, which would give the whole weight to numbers, and would deprive property of its just and salutary influence, and even of its necessary protection. But, my lords, if the grievances which we now suffer should not be redressed, a convulsion may ensue, which may render it impracticable to effect a reform of parliament with due deliberation. What, if a hurricane should arise which might shake the empire to its basis, and endanger all the existing establishments both in church and state, a reform of parliament might arrive too late. The constant object of my zealous, but, alas! ineffectual exertions, has been to secure the public tranquillity, to promote, and, as far as possible, to perpetuate the public prosperity. If I were so selfish, which happily I am not, as to wish that the separate interests of any class of the community should be pursued at the expense a the others, I would intreat ministers to persevere in the course which they have adopted, to shut their eyes and ears to time complaints of the people, and to continue the present currency, and all the taxes and payments which now exist; for I am thoroughly convinced, that the result would be to grant to the agricultural interests, a relief such as they never asked, such even as they never desired, by the total annihilation and extinction of the national debt. We should not then hear of an "equitable adjustment" of the debt, and I approve of that phrase, but the consequences might be, that no vestige of it would remain. Such may be the consequence if the evil is allowed to take its own course, and to work its own cure. It has been truly observed by a noble earl, whose absence I deeply regret, that "your lordships possess every quality which can command respect, and which ought to secure independence." In this great crisis of our fate, a dereliction of your duty would not be forgotten or forgiven by the people. You will immediately institute an inquiry into the cause and into the cure of the present grievances, unless you are disposed to carry bankruptcy and beggary into every parish, and to extend throughout the empire, distress, discontent, despair, and even
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disaffection. You will support the motion which I shall propose, if you are not willing to be driven from the mansions of your ancestors, where you have lived in splendor, diffusing comfort and happiness around you; and if you are not prepared to become an assembly of noble and titled paupers, whose poverty and degradation would be the more galling as contrasted with the wealth which you have enjoyed, and would be the more conspicuous as combined with the rank which you will still continue to possess. I call upon you by the duty which you owe to your country, by every tie the most sacred, and by every consideration the most solemn, to institute an immediate inquiry. Such is the object of the proposed amendment; and I feel so strongly the vital importance of the subject, that I am determined to take the sense of the House, I know not with how many nor with how few I may divide, but I should not be ashamed or afraid to divide alone. Unconnected as I am with any party, the observations which I have made may have no other weight than that which they may receive from the integrity of my principles, from the independence of my conduct, and from my ardent zeal to promote the happiness and welfare and prosperity of my country.—I move, that the following words be inserted before the last paragraph of the Address: "That this House views with the deepest regret and anxiety the severe and unexampled distress which now afflicts the country, and will immediately proceed to examine its nature and its causes, the results that have arisen from altering the value of the currency, and the means of administering speedy and effectual relief."
The Marquis of Lansdowntrusted, that his noble friend would not imagine that he intended any thing like disrespect to him, or that he felt any indifference for the important topics of his speech, when he said, that having, for reasons which he would presently state, brought his mind to the conclusion, after a patient consideration of his majesty's Speech, that it was desirable that their lordships should adopt the Address which had been proposed with unanimity, he meant to abstain from entering into a protracted discussion upon any of the various matters to which his noble friend had very regularly and very naturally adverted, and many of which must, at a future period, become the subjects of grave consideration. It was cer-

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tainly impossible to describe the distresses of the country in too strong colours. Their magnitude and importance must be felt and acknowledged by their lordships; and he was certain that no man could have a deeper sense of them than himself. He believed that the unabated pressure which continued to weigh upon the most important interest of the country, even tended to destroy the frame of society; yet, with this impression, and with these feelings, he felt it his duty to declare, that there was a crisis at present impending on the continent, which ought to fix their lordships' attention almost to the exclusion of every other subject, and which would justify them in referring to a future day the consideration of those topics which had been alluded to by his noble friend, however important they were in themselves. It was hardly possible that any one of their lordships could fail to perceive, that transactions had recently taken place on the continent, out of which a crisis had arisen, which must come borne to the interests of every free country of Europe—he had almost said the interests of every individual inhabitant of Europe. It must particularly affect the most important interests of this country. He was or opinion that this country, although anxious for the preservation of tranquillity, would soon be placed in a situation in which, unless it was prepared to abandon the whole course of policy which it had pursued for centuries, and to discharge itself from the obligations arising out of existing compacts to which it was bound either by treaty or policy, would be compelled to depart from a pacific system, in vindication of that place which it ought to maintain in the scale of European society, and in support of the national independence of those countries with which we were connected. Under these circumstances, he was not disposed to offer any opposition to the address which had been proposed for their lordships' adoption, though he wished that it had been couched in stronger terms. He wished that, both in the Speech from the throne, and in the address which was proposed to his majesty, there had been a stronger and more explicit declaration of the sense which this country entertained of those principles which had unfortunately found their way into the councils of some of the great powers of Europe; and which, if acted upon to the extent to which they might be carried, would not
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fail to involve Europe in confusion, and to rouse the worst and most dangerous passions of human nature. Those principles had now, for the second time, been promulgated, in a manner which left no room for doubt as to their tendency. It would be vain and useless for ministers to attempt to conceal, even if they were so disposed, the character and extent of such principles, and the crisis which their promulgation had induced. Far from thinking it an object of expediency to palter with the sense of parliament and the country, he was of opinion, that his majesty's ministers would act wisely end judiciously, to unite with the legislature and the people in expressing their indignation, rather than their disapprobation, of the system which was founded upon the principles to which he had adverted, if there was any chance of averting the calamities which must grow out of it. Whether or not government would declare its opinion of the conduct of the continental powers as he thought it should do—and he was willing to believe that, in some degree, it already had done so—he was sure that public feeling would find vent through some channels, and that every part of the country would be eager to proclaim to the world the opinion which it entertained, and the sense which it cherished, of the rights of nations and the important interests which England had in maintaining them. The people of England had often been told that they had been the means of restoring and establishing in safety certain continental governments, and that of France was among the number. The price at which that safety and restoration had been purchased would long be remembered by this country. Our sufferings under the burdens which were the consequence of our exertions in favour of the present government of France, were embittered by the painful reflection, that it was the existence of those very burdens which compelled us to hesitate, as to whether we could or not venture to act, at the present moment, as our interests and character as a nation demanded. It must be mortifying to ministers and to the country to find, that notwithstanding the many monitory counsels which appeared to have been administered by the British government to the great foreign powers, those powers, totally unmindful of the debt of gratitude which they owed to this country, and of the part which she ought to take in assert-

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ing the independence of nations, were prepared blindly to rush upon an enterprise, which England had declared to be dangerous to the welfare of Europe, and in opposition to that system which had been agreed upon at, what a noble lord had that evening called, the pacification of Vienna. After what was generally known of the conduct of the English government, it was unnecessary for him to argue the unprincipled character of the invasion of an independent nation, which had been pointed at in the manifesto of the congress of Verona, and had lately been spoken of in a more undisguised manner in the speech of his most Christian majesty the king of France. Neither in that, nor in the other House of parliament, could there be found a man so base and so bold as to entertain and avow, a feeling of approbation for the system by which it was proposed to regulate the great concerns of Europe. On the ground on which he stood, therefore, he felt that he was without an opponent. In the speech of the noble mover of the Address, he could not find the slightest approximation to an approbation of the unprincipled system of the continental powers. On the contrary, he could perceive, that if that noble lord had not found himself cramped by the peculiar situation in which he stood, and the task which he had undertaken, he would not have failed to speak of that system in more emphatic terms. Such being the case, it was unnecessary to argue the sense in which the conduct of the allied powers was viewed in this country; and it was equally unnecessary to argue the merits of that government, the existence of which was now threatened. Whatever were the merits or the demerits of the Spanish constitution, was a question into which he would not enter. He entertained speculative opinions upon that subject, as any other man might do; but he felt that distrust which every person ought to be conscious of, when his opinions were applied to the internal concerns of another country. But, supposing for a moment, that defects did exist in the Spanish constitution, the means by which they were least likely to be remedied was foreign interference. That alone would be sufficient to attach every patriotic Spaniard to the constitution of his country. Men of all parties would rally round it, and reserve for another time the task of its amelioration, if it required any Without discussing the
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merits of the Spanish government, which formerly had been acknowledged by all the governments of Europe, although some of them now thought fit to make it the object of attack, he would endeavour to show the inevitable consequences that must follow from the system of the continental powers, if put into action. It should be remembered, that those sovereigns who were now conducting an attack upon the independent government of Spain, founding their aggression on the principle of putting down theories and experiments in governments, were themselves great theorists and experimentalists. Would it not be supposed, from the language of the continental state papers and manifestoes, that the system of interference in the internal concerns of other governments had been regularly attended with the happiest effects, and that the best institutions and governments were those which had grown out of such interference? But it would be found in every part of the history of the world, that the greatest instances of human perfidy had been brought into action, for the purpose of supporting governments founded on foreign interference. Let them look at the effects of such interference in modern times; let them consider the state of Naples, Piedmont, and of Poland; and then he would ask, whether the Spaniards, with the example of those unfortunate countries, and the experience of all history, before their eyes, were likely to accept that species of happiness, and that degree of liberty, from the hand of a foreign master? He would request their lordships to bear in mind the part which England took in a former invasion of Spain, and then consider what line of conduct it might be necessary for her to adopt upon a similar occasion. The projected invasion of Spain might be successful. If so, by what means could the government of a despotic king be maintained in that country, except by its military occupation by France? In that case, what would be the situation, of our own country, and particularly or Ireland, with every province of Spain occupied by foreign troops, ready to be directed against our maritime interests and domestic peace? He need not, he apprehended, say any thing more on this point. There was, however, another view of the question, not less important. In the event of complete success attending

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the French designs upon Spain, what would await Portugal? It would be inconsistent with the principle—if principle it could be called—upon which the French government proceeded to leave a free government existing in Portugal, after having succeeded in putting down one in Spain. The French government would, therefore, attack Portugal. Then he would ask, whether Portugal was not a country which we were bound by treaties to defend with our armies—a country whose interests had always been held to be indissolubly connected with those of Great Britain? It appeared certain, therefore, that, in the event of any hostile movement against Portugal by France, we should be forced into a war, probably under highly disadvantageous circumstances.—But, if France were only partially successful in her attack, a danger of another description would await this country, and the rest of Europe. If France should succeed in penetrating into, but not in overwhelming, Spain—if it should be obliged to leave a portion of the government in existence, and a part of the population attached to it, these unconquered Spaniards, grown desperate, would be compelled to have recourse to every measure, however extravagant, and to every principle, however revolting. There would be reason to dread, that defence might be sought in the spirit of Jacobinism, and that it would be sent forth over the world, probably to take root and spread in other countries. He felt bound, however, to bear testimony to the prudence, temper, moderation, and dignity which had characterized the conduct of the Spanish people. From regard to the great cause in which they were embarked, and in the hope of the glorious triumph of that cause, he most fervently prayed that it might remain unstained by those excesses, which a too fervent love of liberty had produced in other countries. But it would be too much that Spain, abandoned by all the world, and pressed by a foreign foe, and possessing no resource but the passions of an infuriated people, should abstain from calling into action that instrument so potent for the present purposes, but at the same time so mischievous in its results. If the government of Spain should resolve to raise the standard of Jacobinism, and let loose the population of that country, the consequences would be fatal to the peace, not only of Spain, but of all Europe. In any view of the
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subject, the invasion of Spain would be attended with great danger to the welfare of Europe. Such being the sense which he entertained of the crisis which was now threatening Europe, and of the character of the principles which had produced it, he wished that the Address had contained a more explicit declaration of the opinion which their lordships entertained of those principles in general, and of their application in the particular case of Spain. But, being bound to give credit to ministers for having used their exertions to avert the calamity of a war on the continent, and for having addressed protestations, however vainly, against the conduct of France, he must confess that he did not, under all the circumstances of the case, think the present was a fit time for proposing any further declaration of opinion than was contained in the Address; and if he had no other objection to the amendment of his noble friend, the absence of any allusion to the important question of the state of the continent would be sufficient to induce him to reject it. It ought not to be forgotten, also, that negociations were still pending; hopes were still entertained of convincing those who would not be convinced, and influencing those who would not be influenced.—With respect to the question of the currency, which was alluded to in the amendment, he entertained an opinion, that part, though perhaps a small part, of the difficulties arising out of the return to a metallic standard, arose from the unfortunate preference which was given to a gold rather than to a silver currency. He could not see what benefit could arise from a general examination of the question of the currency; but to an inquiry limited to the sole purpose of ascertaining whether gold or silver was the most proper standard, he would give his support and assistance.—The state of Ireland formed one of the topics of his majesty's Speech. He was sorry that he could not, last session, prevail upon their lordships to enter into an inquiry concerning the causes of the disasters of that country. He was happy to find that the state of Ireland appeared at length seriously to occupy the attention of his majesty's government; and he trusted that vigorous and effectual measures would be adopted for the amelioration of that country. In conclusion, he must repeat his wish, that the conduct of France

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towards Spain had been described in terms commensurate with the character of the proceeding. The fact was not truly stated, when it was said that there was "irritation subsisting between the French and Spanish governments." If the emperor of Austria were to send 100,000 men over to England to alter the constitution of the parliament, he should like to know how the noble earl at the head of the Treasury would describe such a proceeding. Would be infer from that circumstance, that there existed an irritation between the courts of Vienna and St. James's? There should be no softening clown of facts. England should show that she was not yet fallen so low, as to be obliged to conceal her opinions. He was certain, however, that the unanimous vote of that night would convince the French as well as the Spanish nation, that there was but one opinion among the people of England, with respect to the conduct of the former power.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he would not have addressed their lordships upon the present occasion, but for the amendment which had been proposed by the noble earl. He regretted that the noble earl had thought it his duty to propose that amendment, because he considered it calculated to disturb that unanimity which might be of the most essential service. He regretted that circumstance the more, because he could see no necessity for the motion of the noble lord being made upon that particular day. There was nothing contained in the Speech from the throne, or in the Address to his majesty, which could preclude the noble earl from moving for an inquiry as to the state of agriculture or the currency, on the first open day. There was no sentiment in the speech of the noble mover of the Address which militated against any opinion which the noble earl might entertain. He therefore greatly regretted that the noble earl had seized that occasion to move his amendment. Their lordships were always unwilling to adopt any amendment, unless it were provoked by the speech of the person who proposed the address, or by the address itself; because it might, as on the present occasion, lead to a discussion on some of the most intricate questions of political economy, which every body knew could not, in such debates as usually took place on the first day of the session, receive the minute attention which was necessary.
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If at any future time, the noble earl should think fit to bring the internal state of the country, either with respect to its agriculture or its currency, under the distinct consideration of their lordships, he should be prepared to meet the question. The noble marquis seemed to be of opinion, that parliament had committed a great mistake in 1819, in preferring a gold to a silver currency. But the noble marquis ought to have considered one thing before he broached his proposition respecting the currency. It was one question, whether gold or silver were the better standard; and it was another, whether, having adopted a standard, parliament would change it, at the risk of augmenting the existing evils. He would now revert to those other topics of the noble marquis's speech. The noble marquis did not object either to the terms or the views of the Speech, or of the Address, but thought that they did not go far enough, and wished for a more distinct declaration of the opinions and policy of his majesty's government. Now he could not conceive a more distinct, clear, and open statement of intentions, than was made in the first paragraph of the Speech from the throne, which was as follows:—"Faithful to the principles which his majesty has promulgated to the world, as constituting the rule of his conduct, his majesty declined being a party to any proceedings at Verona, which could be deemed an interference in the internal concerns of Spain." It would be in their lordships' recollection where those "principles" were to be found: they were to be found in a document which had been alluded to by the noble lord who moved the Address; it was a note written by a dear and lamented friend of his, and issued on the 19th of January, 1821. In that note, the policy of the British government was distinctly declared, and it rested on the principle of the law of nations, which allowed every country to be the judge of how it could be best governed, and what ought to be its institutions; and, if exceptions to the rule might arise out of self-defence and self-preservation, they were to be considered as exceptions, and were to stand on their own peculiar merits. It would be in the recollection of noble lords, that a comment had been made upon that document on a former occasion, in the course of certain debates in that House. When the opinion of ministers

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was at that time asked, in respect of recent transactions in Spain, his majesty's government had most explicitly given their opinion, and in a manner with which the noble baron who had asked the question expressed himself perfectly satisfied. His majesty's government, he had no hesitation in declaring, viewed the question of Spain as one clearly and purely Spanish. It was not mixed up with any other. The question of her constitution was, for this purpose, not mixed up with any other consideration about the country. The constitution had been actually adopted by Spain during a war that raged in that country, and it had been acknowledged by Great Britain. If that constitution was defective, or required correction (as possibly, looking to the circumstances under which it was originated, it might have done), correction was in the power of her lawful and recognized sovereign, when he himself accepted it. Correction, accordingly, correction, but not abrogation, was advised: and he might at the time have objected to it. Had the sovereign then corrected it, the country would have thanked him for the modification—the people would have received it with applause. It was therefore that he (lord L.) did say, that Spain having acted in the manner he had mentioned, whatever right of interference there might, under other circumstances, exist as to other countries, nobody could honestly apply it to the case of Spain. But the question did not rest here. The conduct of Spain was most important in another point of view—in regard to the danger which had in some quarters been apprehended, from the extension of those principles that had been acted upon within her own dominions, to other existing governments; and this conduct showed that they who resisted foreign interference with their own institutions, were by no means endeavouring to effect the same changes in those of other countries: for not only did they not wish to do so, but they had expressly offered a disclaimer to this effect. He could not but think that, over and above all the considerations that must weigh with those who were to sit in judgment upon the affairs of Spain, there was one that, in the discussion of such a question as this, must always carry with it the greatest weight and influence; for, (although he certainly conceived that the case of Spain was to be looked at, and
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dealt with differently from that of another country which was some time since the subject of much discussion), he must concur with the noble lord in thinking, that whatever objections might be offered to, and whatever defects might (and doubtless did) exist in a constitution of this nature, yet there had been, and he sincerely trusted there would be, through out the career of those who had the conduct of affairs in Spain, a less taint of blood, of crime, and of violence, than was afforded by almost every other example of a similar revolution that had occurred in modern history. Such being the views that were entertained by his majesty's ministers, he thought there could be no doubt in the mind of any noble lord, as to the justice by which the policy of Great Britain would be guided on this occasion. But their lordships must observe, not only the justice, but the expediency of that policy, as the noble marquis had observed, in insisting upon the question of expediency. That was a question arising out of the danger that might accrue to all Europe, from an attempt to overthrow the Spanish constitution by force of arms. What was the wisdom of this country at the present moment? What should it continue to be? It would be our wisdom to confine ourselves within a position where we might be careful and vigilant observers of every operation—a position in which, without in any degree shrinking from the avowal of those great principles of conduct upon which we had always acted in great emergencies, we might be enabled, upon the approach of danger, to arrest the evil and to prevent it from extending to this kingdom. Having offered these remarks, he, for one, should have thought that the use of stronger language than was called for, either by the occasion, or by any necessity that had been shown, would have been, whether in the Speech from the throne, or the proposed Address, most improper, and most unwise. To have gone farther, indeed, upon this subject, was hardly within the power of his majesty's ministers; for he would even now say, notwithstanding all the threatening facts which had become matter of public notoriety, that war was not absolutely unavoidable. He would not say, indeed, that appearances were not strong; but he must hold, that whilst peace yet existed between the two countries, it would ill become either the power or the dignity of our own legis-

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lature, to use language that could only tend to prevent the attainment of that very end which they so much desired. The noble marquis had alluded to that paragraph of the Speech, in which his majesty had declared that he had employed his "good offices to allay the irritation unhappily subsisting between the French and Spanish governments." Now, he should be extremely sorry, if those words were to be supposed by any one to have reference to such an act as a forcible attack by France on the constitutional independence of Spain. But their lordships were aware, that there had long existed causes of "irritation" on both sides. There could be no doubt that, in consequence of the military operations on the frontiers, and of various other circumstances, a catalogue of little complaints might easily be drawn out by each country. He did not mean to deny, that it was very probable the stronger party might take hold of occurrences intrinsically insignificant, for the purpose of oppressing the weaker; all that he said was, that no doubt there were many causes of complaint on both sides. When, therefore, his majesty spoke of "allaying the irritation unhappily subsisting between the French and Spanish governments," the expression had evidently reference, not to the forcible entry of Spain by France, but merely to all those minor causes of complaint between the two governments, the existence of which might very easily be conceived by any one; and which the British government, in the character of a mediator, might not despair of being able to remove. He would trouble their lordships no further on the present occasion. He trusted he had spoken with sufficient explicitness on the question of the justice of the cause of Spain—He trusted he had spoken with sufficient explicitness on the question of the policy of the war with which Spain was threatened. On that latter point he probably felt more strongly than the noble marquis—he meant with reference to the probable effect of war—not on Spain only, but on France—not on France only, but on all Europe. For, much as be dreaded and deprecated war as affecting the interests of Spain, he had no hesitation in saying, that he dreaded and deprecated it still more as affecting the interests of France, and through France of all Europe. With respect to the conduct of this country in the possible situation in
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which it might be placed, every man must feel, that under our present circumstances, the policy of this country was neutrality. But, while he said this, he protested against being supposed for a moment to admit the idea—come from what quarter it might—that if unavoidable circumstances presented no alternative to this country but war or dishonour, it was not in a state to go to war. On the contrary, he was firmly convinced, that if parliament refused to adopt any measures calculated to sap the foundations of public credit, and if a war should appear to be necessary to the preservation of our honour, the country was in a state to meet it. Still, he readily allowed, that, after the extraordinary efforts which Great Britain had so recently made, and taking into consideration the present state of Europe, it was most desirable that if we could do so with regard to justice, with regard to our safety, with regard to our honour, with regard to our engagements with our allies, we should preserve our neutral position.—The present, however, was not the time for the consideration of that question. He had already asserted, and he would re-assert it, that whatever might be the existing probability of a rupture between France and Spain, he did not consider the door absolutely closed against negociation and amicable arrangement. Believing there was still a chance of accomplishing an amicable adjustment, he maintained, that as long as such a chance did exist, it was the interest and the duty of this country to hold such language as might not incapacitate it from furthering an object so generally desirable.
Lord Ellenberoughdeclared, that he had heard the greater part of the noble earl's speech with much pleasure and satisfaction. But, acknowledging (as the noble earl had acknowledged), that Spain had given a disclaimer of the mischievous principles that had been imputed to her constitution and government, he was the more astonished that the noble earl could be satisfied with the mere repetition, in the Speech from the throne, of that cold and inadequate protest, which his majesty's ministers had entered in respect of the case of Naples. Yet more astonished he was, that the noble earl could be satisfied with the line of policy that he would have the country adopt, seeing he considered the door of reconciliaton to be still open. Looking to the former conduct of

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government, he could not think that the Speech from the throne really contemplated the preservation of peace on the continent. At such a time as the present, he was unwilling to indulge in any language, that might excite anger or ill-feeling. He could not help remarking, however, that the conduct of his majesty's ministers had, for a long time, been such as not to place it in unison with the feelings of the people of this country. He had long observed, that the people placed no confidence in them. He felt, indeed, more than this—he felt that, whatever might be the expressions which his majesty's government, with a view to their own interests, chose to put forth as the expressions of their zeal for the interests of these kingdoms, and however much they might apparently desire to induce the allied powers to accept them as their own opinions, on this and on other occasions—he could not but apprehend that to those allied powers it somehow did appear, that the opinions of our own government were not in reality very different from those of the deliberating sovereigns who assembled at Laybach and Verona. If his majesty's government were sincere in those feelings which the noble earl had described them as being actuated by, they conceived themselves, upon their own representation, to be bound by the feelings entertained by the people of this country. Yet if so, he was astonished, that at the first opening of the proceedings that were had in the congress of Verona—on the first manifestation of those feelings to which allusion was made in the Speech from the throne, ministers did not on the instant call parliament together, and obtain the sanction of their public opinion on matters of which the importance seemed to render such a step absolutely necessary. He could not but think that the simple repetition of a protest on this occasion, which was originally made two years ago in respect of dangers that had now passed away, could hardly have been deemed sufficient by those who repeated it. But if, notwithstanding the speech delivered by the king of France to the two chambers—if, notwithstanding the march of hostile armies into Spain, the door of reconciliation was yet indeed open, he could not suppose that the noble earl really imagined that the language of the Address was of such a nature as to quiet the fears that must be entertained for the result. Surely the noble
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earl knew, that during the whole course of the revolutionary war, it was from the expression, the strong expression, of public feeling, that every great project was agitated, and every great measure attended with success. But if noble lords really felt an anxious desire to save Spain from the dangers threatened by the invasion of France, the consideration of our dangers ought to induce us to carry forward our negociations in the manner and tone most likely to give them effect. The noble lord then adverted to that part of the marquis of Lansdown's speech, in which he had alluded to the relative situation of Portugal to Spain, in the event of Spain being attacked by France. What had been suggested by his noble friend on this subject could not have failed to impress their lordships with its importance. He also would now wish to ask, supposing that Russia, more zealous and more persevering in effecting the proposed interference than France herself, should ever obtain a station in the Mediterranean—Minorca, for example—were the Russians to be permitted to remain in the Mediterranean? Supposing that Spain, from the operation of unfortunate events, should find herself unable to prevent the French from possessing themselves of her territory left of the Ebro, was it meant that we were to prevent the blockade of the coasts of Spain by Russia? or was the supply of stores to the Spanish army to be interdicted to us? Feeling that the allies had, in fact, declared war against the principles of all governments, derived, either in their origin or in their constitution, from the people—feeling that the principles upon which they would now attack Spain, might, in their effect, apply to this country—feeling that the existence of the parliament of England was infinitely more dangerous to the despotic authority of the sovereigns of Verona than any thing which had been done in, or imputed to, Naples, Piedmont, or Spain—feeling that it was highly desirable for this country to maintain its ancient union with states governed, not by absolute monarchs, but by wholesome laws, and happy institutions—he protested that he looked to the event of success on the part of France with infinite dismay. Feeling, too, that in the threatened struggle so many cases might arise, in which; consistently with our honour and our interests, it would be impossible that we should not be in-

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volved, he did conceive that the noble earl might have done more than merely reiterate the protest of two years ago, adapted to the peculiar circumstances that were considered to render it necessary, and quite inapplicable to the present.
The Earl of Darnleydeclared his inability to concur in the amendment of his noble friend. What he now rose for was, to state that he had intended to call the earliest attention of parliament to the state of Ireland, with a view to mitigate the calamities with which that unhappy country was afflicted. The passage, however, in his majesty's Speech on the subject, induced him to postpone that intention.
Their lordships then divided on earl Stanhope's Amendment: Contents, 3; Not-Contents, 62. After which, the original Address was agreed to, nem. dis.