Lords Sitting of 14 April 1823

NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO SPAIN.
The order of the day being read,
The Earl of Liverpoolrose and said:*
I rise, my lords, to lay on your lordships' table, in obedience to the commands of his majesty, papers, relative to the negotiations in which his majesty's government have lately been engaged at Paris, at Verona, and at Madrid, for the purpose, and in the hope, of preserving the peace of Europe, by adjusting the differences which had unfortunately arisen between France and Spain. Before I make the usual motion, that the titles of these papers be read, it is my intention to offer to your lordships some observations and statements, explanatory of their general purport; in order that you may be distinctly informed of the course which has been pursued, during these negotiations, and of the policy which his majesty's government now think it advisable to adopt, in consequence of their unfortunate issue.
My lords, I know it was stated in this house, upon a former occasion, that the course which I propose this evening to adopt, is consistent neither with fairness nor with precedent, and must be attended with inconvenience to your lordships. I should be very sorry, my lords, if that were really the case.—I should be very
*From the original edition printed for J. Hatchard and Son, Piccadilly.
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sorry, in a proceeding of any kind, but more especially upon a business so important as the present, to make an unnecessary and injurious deviation from the usual practice: but I cannot for a moment believe that the course which I am about to take is liable to such an imputation. It is the more especially requisite, on the present occasion, because, although your lordships will find in the papers now communicated by his majesty's orders, the fullest information with regard to the line of conduct which has been adopted by his majesty's government; it is nevertheless, obvious that there must be papers connected with the negotiations, over which (from their not having been officially communicated to this government) we have no jurisdiction or control. All that can be produced, are now produced; but there are documents to which his majesty's government have not been parties, which cannot be laid on the table, and which therefore must be verbally alluded to and explained. It is not, however, my intention to call upon your lordships for any opinion, or even for any intimation of an opinion, on the papers now presented, but merely to furnish you with such explanations as they do not afford, and thereby to put your lordships in possession of the whole case of his majesty's government. It will then be for your lordships to consider, whether it may be necessary or proper to found any proceeding upon these communications.
On a former evening, I observed to your lordships, that his majesty's government were not in the situation of submitting to parliament the history of a negotiation terminated (as far as this country is concerned) by war. On such an occasion, it has been usual to accompany the papers with an official declaration, comprehending not merely a statement of facts, but the whole argument of his majesty's government, and embodying all the grounds and reasons on which their conduct has been founded. On the present occasion, however, from the very nature of the case, no such declaration can be issued; and it has therefore been felt to be more expedient and desirable, and more fair towards all parties, to accompany the production of the papers by a general statement, explanatory of the course of policy which his majesty's government has adopted. With this view, I now address your lordships; and I shall endeavour to execute my purpose as

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briefly and clearly as possible; referring to the papers themselves for the necessary elucidation, and stating, first, the general progress of the negotiations in which his majesty's government have been engaged; and, afterwards, the policy which they have thought fit to adopt, in consequence of the result of those negotiations, as well as the reasons which have led to the adoption of that policy.
My lords, the papers now before your lordships begin with the proceedings of the last year as to Spain. But, before I enter upon them, it may not be unadvisable to recal to your lordships' minds some antecedent filets, in order that it may be clearly seen in what situation the government of this country stood, with respect to the transactions in Spain, before the meeting of the allied sovereigns at Verona. Your lordships will recollect, that when the king of Spain was restored in 1814, that country was under the administration and government of the constitution which had been established in his absence in 1812. That constitution, it must be acknowledged, had been established under many circumstances, which neither his majesty's government, nor the noble individual who was then employed by his majesty's government in that country, could possibly approve, and which it must be allowed were, in some respects, of a very unpropitious nature. It had been established while the cortes were confined to the Isle of Leon; and, as might have been apprehended, without a sufficient knowledge of the wishes of the nation. It had been established, likewise, on many principles extremely erroneous; and which were not only erroneous in themselves, but wholly inapplicable to the state and feelings of the country. Upon the restoration of the king of Spain, it became a question, what course it would be most proper for him to adopt with respect to the constitution, to which till then he had been no party.
The right hon. gentleman, who at that time represented his majesty at the court of Spain (sir H. Wellesley) advised the king, when at Valencia, to accept the constitution, subject to certain alterations and modifications. After some hesitation, a different line of conduct was pursued by the Spanish monarch. He was led to think that the sentiments of a great majority of the inhabitants of the country were unfavourable to the constitution; and undoubtedly, as far as I have pos-
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sessed the means of ascertaining the fact, I believe that this opinion was correct. Nay, I will go further. I will say, that I should not at all have regretted that the king of Spain had declined the advice of our minister in that country, and his adoption of another course, had his majesty only adhered to the promises which he made, when he refused to sanction the constitution, on the ground that it was neither conformable to the wishes of the people, nor applicable to the circumstances of the country. At the time that the king of Spain signified his refusal, he issued a declaration, promising that the cortes should be immediately assembled, and distinctly recognizing the principles of a representative constitution, a limited monarchy, and a free press. If that promise had been performed—if that proclamation had really been acted upon, I am far from thinking, that Spain or Europe would have had any reason to regret the course which was adopted.
But, my lords, notwithstanding the king of Spain's declaration, that the cortes should be immediately assembled, and that a representative constitution and a limited monarchy should be established—notwithstanding all this was promised in terms as strong and unequivocal as it was possible to use, the cortes was not assembled from the year 1814 until the year 1820, when the revolution took place; and not only was no cortes assembled, but a course of misgovernment was pursued, which made the events of the month of April 1820, a matter of no surprise to any one acquainted with the circumstances of that country. In April 1820, those events took place, which are subjects of general notoriety, and which terminated in the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The restoration of that constitution, and more especially the circumstances by which the restoration was accompanied, created alarm among some of the allied powers. Undoubtedly, my lords, the manner in which this change was brought about, must be a matter of considerable regret. But I thought at that time—I think now—and every consideration only serves to confirm me in the opinion—that if ever there was a case which, in justice and equity, ought not to have provoked the hostility of foreign powers, it was the restoration in Spain of the constitution of 1812, however bad that constitution may be.
For, what was the fact? That constitution was established in 1812. It existed

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for two years; during which, Spain, with the assistance of Britain, nobly and effectually contended for her liberty and independence. During those two years, all the powers of Europe renewed friendly relations, and some of them actually concluded treaties of alliance with the government which administered that constitution. Whatever, therefore, my lords, may be the defects of that constitution—to whatever objections it may be justly liable—however much the evils of its formation may require a remedy, what right can any government, which recognized it in its former existence, have, to consider its restoration as the justification of hostility? Are not those, who are the most deeply concerned and interested in that restoration, entitled to say to any government evincing such a disposition, "we have merely brought matters back to the state in which they were when you made treaties of peace with us, and courted our alliance?" My lords, in my opinion, it must, on those grounds, appear to every candid and reflecting mind, that whatever defect there may be in the Spanish constitution—whatever there may be to regret in the mode in which it was re-established, there is nothing in the restoration itself, which ought to have provoked the hostility of any power in Europe.
Such, my lords, being the feeling of his majesty's government, they took every opportunity of distinctly stating that feeling, and of inculcating the policy which it naturally suggests, to foreign powers. It must be in the recollection of your lordships, that, at an early period of these transactions, when a question was put to me by a noble lord on the subject of a paper published by the court of St. Petersburgh, I openly avowed the feelings and policy of his majesty's government on this subject. From that period, down to the meeting of the sovereigns at Verona, no event occurred by which any opportunity was afforded to the government of this country to express their sentiments, of which they did not avail themselves, for the purpose of deprecating, in the strongest manner, any interference in the internal concerns of Spain. That interference has been deprecated by this country on every possible ground. It has been deprecated on the general principles repeatedly put forth by his majesty's government, especially in the paper which was addressed to the allied powers in January 1821; namely, that the policy
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of this country, in conformity to the law of nations, was that of non-interference in the internal concerns of other countries; and that it required a special and extraordinary case to justify such interference. On every occasion this was distinctly repeated by his majesty's government, from the earliest period to the last moment of the departure from London of the noble individual who represented the French government in this country, to attend the congress at Verona. In addition to those general reasons of policy, which, except in very special circumstances, forbid interference in the internal concerns of any country whatever, the peculiar situation of Spain, her localities, the difficulties to be encountered in an invasion of her territory, the probability of a protracted war—the results of which it was impossible for human wisdom to foresee—all these considerations, in addition, as I have said, to the claims of justice, were urged in the strongest manner as grounds for abstaining from interference with Spain.
This, my lords, was the view of affairs taken by this country, when it was determined by his majesty's government that a noble friend of mine, now unfortunately no more, should repair to Vienna, in the character of his majesty's plenipotentiary at the congress appointed to be held there, and subsequently at Verona. I have no difficulty in stating, that at that moment, although his majesty's government were perfectly aware that the question of Spain, in common with various other questions, might undergo some discussion at the congresses of Vienna and Verona, it was not their belief that it would form any very prominent part of that discussion. There were several other matters which, they were led to think, would be more likely to engross the chief attention of the sovereigns and the representative ministers assembled on that occasion. However, the general instructions given to my noble friend, at that period were precisely in the spirit of all our former communications. Certainly, events did afterwards occur, which induced his majesty's government to believe that the affairs of Spain would bear a more prominent part in the discussions than they had anticipated, and that those affairs would be brought forward by the French government in a distinct manner at the congress, for the purpose of obtaining from the other powers of Europe, some decided and recorded opinion, in regard to the course

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which ought to be adopted with respect to Spain.
The first intimation of such an intention on the part of the French government, will be found at the commencement of the papers on your lordship' table. It was thrown out in a conversation which took place at Paris, in September last, between a noble friend of mine, who, in consequence of the lamented death of my noble friend, to whom I have already alluded, was on his way to the congress of Verona, and the French minister, M. de Villèle. Soon afterwards, other circumstances occurred, which clearly indicated that the affairs of Spain would form a more prominent feature of the discussions at the congress than his majesty's government had previously supposed. The right honourable gentleman, who had filled the office of his majesty's ambassador at Madrid, having resigned his situation, and another gentleman having been appointed to replace him, the concerns of the embassy were at that time in the hands of a chargé d' affaires. A representation was made to his majesty's government, by some of the powers who were about to assemble at Verona, requesting that the gentleman newly-appointed might not proceed to Madrid, until the negotiations at Vienna and Verona should be brought to a conclusion. But before the receipt of that representation, the right honourable gentleman who was appointed his majesty's minister at the Spanish court, had been desired to lose no time in repairing immediately to Madrid; in consequence of the strong conviction, on the minds of his majesty's government, of the expediency of his being at his post before the commencement of' the discussions at Vienna and Verona. The attempt, however, to prevent his departure, appeared to his majesty's servants to be indicative of intentions of which they were not before aware.
In consequence of these indications, my right hon. friend, who had recently been appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs, sent instructions, at the earliest possible period, to my noble friend his majesty's plenipotentiary at the congress. Those instructions were most unequivocal in stating the policy of this country. "If," says my right hon. friend, in a dispatch dated the 27th of September,—"if there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so
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convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party."
Such, my lords, were the precise and positive instructions sent by my right hon. friend at the head of the foreign department, to my noble friend his majesty's plenipotentiary at the congress of Verona; and to those instructions all that follows will be found to bear the strictest conformity. When the congress assembled, the first step taken by the French government was to put certain questions to the other powers, to which they desired that they might receive from those powers distinct and specific answers. Those questions were three in number.
The first question was,—"In case France should find herself under the necessity of recalling her minister from Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with Spain, will the high courts be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to recal their respective missions?"
The second question was,—"Should war break out between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the high powers afford to France that moral support, which would give to her measures the weight and authority of the Alliance, and inspire a salutary dread into the revolutionists of all countries?"
The third question was,—"What, in short, is the intention of the high powers as to the extent and the form of the effective assistance (secours matériel) which they would be disposed to give to France, in case active interference should, on her demand, become necessary?"
These questions certainly appeared to his majesty's ministers to relate to prospective and contingent cases, rather than to be applicable to any state of things existing at the moment at which they were proposed. They did not appear to contemplate any invasion of the Spanish territory by France at that time; they rather seemed to contemplate some period at which Spain might be the aggressor, and France might feel it necessary to take the field in self-defence. However, the

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French government having called for answers to these questions, the three other allied powers made answer, that if France should be induced to break off her diplomatic relations with Spain, they were disposed to imitate her example, and to break off theirs, as well as to give to France every countenance and assistance she might require. The noble Duke who represented his majesty's government at Verona gave a very different answer. He stated distinctly that "since the month of April 1820, the British government had availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to his majesty's allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain;—that, without adverting to those principles which his majesty's government must always consider the rule of their conduct in relation to the internal affairs of other countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution, the system then established, or the conduct of those who had since had the management of the internal affairs of Spain, might be disapproved of, any amelioration which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad; and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the king: that they considered that an interference with a view to assist the monarch on the throne, to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of government or constitution, particularly by force, would only place that monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach;—and that such an interference always appeared to the British government an unnecessary assumption of responsibility; which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the king of Spain to danger, and the power, or powers, which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expenses, and final disappointment in producing any result."
This was the very first communication of the sentiments of the British Government, made by my noble friend, who was their representative at the congress of Verona, in answer to the three questions addressed to the several allied powers by
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the French plenipotentiary; and your lordships must see that it conveys a most distinct refusal, on the part of this country, to take any share in proceedings, having for their object an interference in the internal affairs of Spain. But, my lords, subsequently to that communication, two steps were suggested at the congress, on which the several powers were called upon to decide. The first, and the only one to which it is at present necessary for me to allude (for I shall have hereafter to state the second), was, to cause official notes to be prepared, for the purpose of being presented to the government of Spain, by the ministers of the several powers resident at the court of Madrid; but that plan was afterwards changed. Instead of official notes, it was proposed, in order to afford a greater latitude for discussion and explanation, to address dispatches from the great powers at congress, to their ministers respectively, to be communicated to the Spanish government, requiring that the king of Spain should be set at liberty, and expressive of the wishes and intentions of the several courts, that certain alterations should be made in the constitution, stating, at the same time, that if those representations should prove ineffectual, the ministers should be ordered to withdraw from the court of Madrid. My noble friend made every effort to prevent the adoption of such a measure. He stated what had always been the policy of his majesty's government, on the question of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, except under circumstances of a peculiar and extraordinary nature; he most solemnly protested against any interference in the internal affairs of Spain, particularly in the shape of menace; and he strongly advised the other powers of Europe, if they thought fit to interfere at all, that they should confine themselves to what might properly be called the external quarrel between France and Spain;—to grievances which the Spanish government complained of having experienced from the French government, and, on the other hand, to grievances which the French government complained of having experienced from the Spanish government.—On that occasion, my lords, my noble friend, after having requested the cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to consider, whether that was the moment at which the intended remonstrances ought to be made to Spain,—whether

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they were calculated to allay her irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture, proceeded thus;—
"They are certainly calculated to irritate the government of Spain; to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation existing between that government and France, to call down upon Spain the power of the alliance, and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French government.
"The result of these communications will probably be, that the diplomatic relations between the three allied courts and Spain will be discontinued. Whatever may be the state of the questions between France and Spain, this occurrence cannot assist the cause of France; as those questions will stand upon their own ground, and the government of France must decide them upon their own merits.
"But these communications are not only calculated to embarrass the French government, but likewise that of the king, my master. His majesty feels sincerely for the king and the people of Spain; he is anxious to see a termination of the evils and misfortunes by which that country is afflicted; and that it should be prosperous and happy. His majesty likewise earnestly desires that the usual relations of amity and good neighbourhood may be re-established between France and Spain; and his majesty's government would have been anxious to co-operate with those of his allies, in allaying the existing irritation, and in preventing a possible rupture.
"But his majesty's government are of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his majesty has invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his majesty in serious responsibility, if they should produce any effect; and must irritate, if they should not: and, if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussions between that country and France.
"The king's government must therefore decline to advise his majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion: and it is so necessary for
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his majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description and calculated to produce such consequences, that his government must equally refrain from advising his majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish government, on the subject of its relations with France.
"His majesty, therefore, must limit his exertions and good offices to the endeavours of his minister at Madrid, to allay the ferment which these communications must occasion, and to do all the good in his power."
Such, my lords, were the terms of the solemn protest addressed by the British Plenipotentiary to the Cabinets of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France, on this important occasion. A paper was afterwards drawn up by those governments, to which this country was no party, stating the several contingencies,—the occurrence of which would induce the other three powers to join with France in hostility against Spain. Those contingencies were, first, in the event of France being attacked by Spain, or of any attempt, on the part of the Spanish government, to propagate its opinions in other countries, by force of arms. Secondly, the dethronement of the king of Spain, or any act of violence towards the king or royal family, Thirdly, any measure on the part of the Spanish government, taken with a view to change the existing dynasty in Spain.
In the first place, my lords, independently of the general objection to any interference, in a case in which interference was not called for by necessity, I should have entertained the strongest indisposition to enter into any prospective and contingent engagements of such a nature. The only case in which his majesty's government ever allowed that interference might be justifiable, was as to the external question; and of the merits of that question they had not been apprised, and therefore could give no opinion. If, however, grievances existed, as probably they did exist, on both sides, it appeared to them that those grievances might furnish a fair and proper object for the interference-and mediation of the other powers of Europe, with a view to the general tranquillity. But against all other kinds of interference, and more especially against any interference assuming the shape of menace or hostilitv,—I repeat, my lords, that his majesty's government most solemnly protested.

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My lords, it is most material that I should observe to your lordships, that down to this period, that down to the conclusion of the meeting of the allied sovereigns and their representative ministers at Verona, nothing occurred that was calculated necessarily to produce war between France and Spain. For your lordships will remark, that, however objectionable in your opinion, and however objectionable in the opinion of his majesty's government, the conduct of the allied powers respecting Spain, there was nothing in their conduct which, at that time, appeared to lead to the invasion of Spain by France, or by any other power. Of the three conditions on which hostilities were to commence, the first was purely defensive, and all were contingent. None of those conditions were applicable to any case which then existed, or which, as far as the information of his majesty's government went, was likely at that time to occur. And, although I have no difficulty in stating, that, in my opinion, the measure adopted by the allied powers at the congress, of issuing those instructions to their respective ministers at the Court of Madrid, was an unwise and improper step—that it was a step against which it was the duty of this country solemnly to protest; yet it is not for me to inform your lordships, that the breaking off diplomatic relations between states is neither war, nor a circumstance which can, properly considered, be a legitimate cause for war. There are instances of diplomatic relations having been suspended for years between countries remote from one another, without the occurrence of war; and there is no reason why it should not be so. Between countries near to One another, and with conflicting interests to adjust, it must be admitted, that from the want of proper diplomatic intercourse, communications, and explanations, on matters in dispute, become difficult, if not impossible, and that this unsatisfactory state of things may lead to war; but still in itself it is no just ground for war. All countries have a right to decide for themselves on that point. The removal of a resident minister from any Court is, I repeat, no just ground for war. Nay, there may be cases, although undoubtedly that to which I have been referring is not one of them, in which it may be most advisable that all diplomatic intercourse with another state should be suspended, although it may neither be
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justifiable nor expedient to go to war with that state.
It is material, my lords, that, before I proceed further, I should establish the fact that, at the conferences of the allied powers at Verona, there was no act which appeared to contemplate the immediate invasion of Spain by France. Not only was there no such recorded intention, but there was that which rather negatived the idea, that any such intention was then entertained; because; after the three contingent grounds of interference with Spain by France had been determined upon, a general provision was agreed to, that if any other case should arise of the same nature, but not in terms particularised, there should be a re-assembling of the ministers of the powers, to consider whether such case could be considered a casus foederis, and what ulterior proceedings ought to be adopted. Therefore, my lords, although I have no difficulty whatever in declaring, that the course of policy which the allied powers had pursued at Verona was, in all its parts erroneous, and in many of its parts unjustifiable; yet I contend that no step had hitherto been taken, which necessarily pointed at the invasion of the Spanish territory by France. What was the influence, and what were the views of particular individuals,—what was the spirit which dictated the policy that the allied powers pursued?—these are different questions, into which I do not mean to enter: but I maintain that the deliberations of the congress, were not accompanied by any act which could lead to the inference, that a direct attack upon Spain by France was at that time in contemplation.
After the separation of the congress, it certainly was, as before, for reasons which I need not trouble your lordships by detailing at length, the obvious policy of this country to embrace every just and honourable means of averting the perils and calamities of war. It was our object in case matters should appear to be proceeding to extremity, to endeavour to interpose the offer of the friendly mediation of this country between France and Spain. My noble friend was instructed to that effect. Upon his arrival at Paris, on his way from Verona, my noble friend found the French government, professing a disposition favourable to peace. That disposition was manifested and confirmed by one of the first acts of the French government, after the representations made

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by my noble friend to M. de Villèle. That act was to send a messenger to Verona, with orders to the French ministers at that place, to express the desire of the French government, that the transmission of the dispatches which had been addressed to the ministers of the respective powers, at Madrid, might be suspended. Still, my lords, under all the circumstances of the case, it was considered necessary for the perfect discharge of the duty of the British government, in a crisis so deeply affecting the interests and happiness, not only of the powers immediately concerned, but of the whole world, that my noble friend should put the French government in possession of his majesty's eventual offer of mediation. It was important that, whatever might occur, his majesty's government should have the satisfaction of being able to say to the people of this country and of all Europe, that such an offer had been made. Accordingly, my noble friend communicated to the French government his majesty's friendly wishes on the subject. His majesty's mediation as such, was, however, declined; and eventually, as is well known to your lordships, the proposition for suspending the transmission of the dispatches to Madrid was not agreed to by the allied powers. Those dispatches were transmitted; and the French government adopted the course of sending the letter from M. de Villèle to M. Lagarde, the French ambassador to the Court of Spain, which is already before the public, and which must be well known to your lordships. Undoubtedly, after the intimation, that the French government were disposed to adopt a more pacific course of policy, that letter did occasion some surprise in this country: for, although it did not contain any direct menace of hostility, it certainly had reference, in general terms, to a state of things which might lead to hostility. Still, however, this communication did not convey to his majesty's government any impression that the immediate invasion of the Spanish territory was contemplated by France. It is evident that it was considered by the court of Madrid in a more favourable light than it was by his majesty's government; for your lordships will observe in the papers on the table, when you come to peruse them, that when the Spanish government were apprised that M. Lagarde had received the letter to which I have alluded, they felt rather relieved than alarmed by
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the line of conduct which the French government had taken; the impression on their minds being that no measure of immediate hostility was intended on the part of France.
This, my lords, was the state of things at the period to which I have been alluding. I have now to state the course of policy adopted by the British government in this stage of the proceeding, and the principles on which that policy was founded. I have no difficulty in setting out, by saying, that his majesty's government were firmly convinced that every exertion ought to be made by this country, to prevent, if possible, the peace of the world from being disturbed by a contest between France and Spain. We felt that it was incumbent upon us, to use every effort, consistent with our honour, for the purpose of endeavouring to prevent the occurrence of such a calamity. I say, my lords, that we were bound so far to interpose from a regard to the interests of all parties. We were bound to do it from a regard to the interest of Spain:—We were bound to do it from a regard to the interests of France:—We were bound to do it from a regard to the interests of the whole of Europe. For what may, my lords, could say, when once hostilities were commenced, and commenced on such a principle, where they would terminate? We owed it therefore to France—we owed it to Spain—we owed it to Europe,—and still more, my lords, we owed it to ourselves, to adopt such means of attempting to prevent the actual occurrence of war between France and Spain, as were consistent with the safety, the interests, and the character of the country. It happened that we were placed in a situation which gave us an especial right to offer our mediation or good offices on the subject; because, about the very period to which I have been referring, and just a little antecedently to the last step taken by the French government, we were called upon by Spain for our amicable interposition in the disputes between her and France. We had been previously desired by the French government, to assist with our advice for the purpose of averting war, so that we did not volunteer our offer of mediation. It did not originate on our part, or from any regard to our own peculiar interests,—although, if it had so originated, I should have thought it a perfectly justifiable and honourable pro-

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posal;—but it originated in the desire and application of the governments both of Spain and France, for the amicable interference of this country; and on the part of Spain it was assumed, that even if she should be engaged in a defensive war against France, Great Britain would maintain a strict neutrality. I mention "neutrality," in this stage of the proceeding, for the purpose of showing, that it was in the contemplation of the Spanish government, at that time, that this country would remain neutral, in the event of Spain being involved in a war with France.
I have already referred to the offer of mediation made by his majesty's government to France, and to its being declined by the French government. They declined it, on the ground that the existing differences with Spain were not of that specific nature which would admit of mediation; but with the expression of a wish, that the good offices of Great Britain might be exerted with Spain, to restore a friendly understanding between the two countries. The interposition of this country was not therefore, as I have already said, a voluntary act on the part of this government, but was conformable to the declared wishes of both Spain and France.
My lords, we know from former communications, what was the great and immediate object which Spain had at that time in view. The gradual increase of strength, and the position of the French army of' observation assembled on the frontiers, were very naturally the object of Spanish jealousy; and it certainly was the first wish of the Spanish government, that that army should be withdrawn. It is in vain, however, to deny that circumstances had occurred, calculated to afford a plausible ground to France for keeping up some military force on her frontier. Events had taken place, possibly without the concurrence or connivance of the Spanish government, which rendered such a measure of precaution, on the part of France, advisable. At the same time, it is quite clear that the proximity of such an army to the Spanish frontier, although the French might have a perfect right to maintain it in the position which they had chosen, was naturally and inevitably calculated to excite alarm, and to encourage dissensions in Spain; and therefore that it must have been considered by the Spanish government as a very serious
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evil. But, my lords, I speak in the presence of many noble individuals, who are too conversant with the affairs and practices of states, not to know that France, having a perfect right to keep up the army in question, if she thought proper to do so, and having determined, whether on sound or unsound principles of policy, is not now the subject of consideration, to exercise that right,—could not be expected to withdraw her troops, unless Spain herself should furnish her with some plea or reason for doing so. For, my lords, if we look at the situation of the government of Spain, we must also look at the situation of the government of France. We must look at the state of parties in France:—we must consider that the government of France is a limited monarchy, administered by responsible advisers, whose opinions and conduct must be in some degree influenced by popular feeling, and subject to popular control; and no one will I think say, that, under the existing circumstances, France could, in regard to her own honour, be expected to withdraw her army from the neighbourhood of the Pyrennees, unless the Spanish government would afford her some facility for so doing.
I know of no consideration on earth, my lords, that would have induced his majesty's government to recommend to the government of Spain, even in the most amicable manner whatever, to concede one tittle of their constitutional rights, or to give up one atom of their system which they conscientiously thought of importance to their liberty or safety. But, my lords, we well knew, as all the world well knew, not only that there were defects in the Spanish constitution, but that there was not a reasonable man in Spain, who was not perfectly ready to admit that some modifications of it were indispensable. We were also bound to take into our consideration the existence of civil war in Spain, and the various local agitations which convulsed the country, and rendered the Spanish a divided people. Our advice having been asked by the Spanish government, we thought it right likewise to consider, what were the means which Spain possessed to resist an immediate attack on the part of France, should such attack be made.—Now, my lords, although I believe that the means of ultimate resistance possessed by Spain are greater than those of

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any other country, yet it is clear, that as to immediate resistance, Spain, from a variety of causes, was in a great degree destitute of all the ordinary means of repelling an attack. We, therefore, felt that, although in the event of war, Spain might, as in the last contest, be ultimately successful, she could not expect to purchase that success without passing through sufferings of the severest nature. We felt that she must submit to see her best and fairest provinces overrun by the invading army, and her country pillaged and desolated—for such, sooner or later, must be the effect of the war, whatever declarations or proclamations may be issued by the generals of the invading army, with a view to prevent it. I have, therefore, no difficulty in distinctly avowing, that, although no consideration whatever should have induced me to recommend to Spain to concede one iota of what she might deem it materially important to herself to retain; yet I thought, that, if there were any point which the Spanish government themselves considered would hereafter be a fair subject of change or modification in their constitution, they might very beneficially do at once that which they were disposed to do some time hence; or, at least, that they might agree to some declaration that they would make such modification as soon as practicable. In the view which his majesty's government took of the subject, we were influenced by a regard to the interests of Spain—not, perhaps, as our first consideration (for undoubtedly our own interests must always predominate),—but still by what we conceived to be the best interests of Spain; and we thought that, under all the circumstances of the case, it might be suggested to Spain, without doing violence to her honour, or trenching on her independence, to act as I have described. Our recommendations were conveyed in the sincerest spirit of conciliation and amity; not by any means as demands, but as the intimation of friendly opinions, not subjecting the party to whom they were offered to any penalty if he did not listen to them; they were tendered as the well-meant advice of one ally to another, founded on the clearest view which we were able to take of the interests of that country, It was very satisfactory to his majesty's government, that, in a situation of so much difficulty, we had the advantage of the assistance of a noble individual, whose authority is of great
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Weight in this country, and who must be regarded with the highest respect in every country in Europe, and more particularly in Spain. We felt that we could not do better than avail ourselves of the instrumentality of my noble friend to aid us on this important occasion. If ever any country has incurred the most valuable obligations to a single individual, Spain had incurred them to my noble friend. My noble friend knew Spain well. He had resided for several years in the country; he knew all the various parties; he knew all the prominent individuals to whom those parties were composed; he had had experience of the operation of the existing constitution, during the two years that he was conducting the tremendous conflict which he terminated so gloriously. It was well worth while, therefore, to try if the sentiments and influence of my noble friend might not be advantageously employed. He is the last man to recommend to any nation the slightest disgraceful concession. He is the last man to require from any country a step inconsistent with its honour, its character, and its dignity. It was most desirable, then, that my noble friend should bring under the view of the Spanish government his opinions on their actual situation and policy.
This, as your lordship will observe, occurred antecedently, not only to any invasion of Spain, but to any direct menace of invasion, or to any avowed decision, by the French government, that Spain should be invaded. For, if your lordships examine the papers on the table, you will find that, up to the middle of January, the Spanish government remained strongly impressed with the conviction that no immediate invasion of the Spanish territory was contemplated by France. In fact, it was only within a few days of the delivery of the king of France's speech to the French chambers, that I myself conceived there was any ground for believing that the immediate invasion of Spain would actually take place. Your lordships will see, by the papers on the table, that, until that period, his majesty's government had felt it their duty to represent to the Spanish government, the situation in which it appeared to them that Spain was placed; as well as their opinions as to the best means, under the existing circumstances, of averting the calamity of war; always with especial care that those representations should be

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in the spirit of friendship and suggestion, and in no case in that of injunction or dictation.
When the king of France made his speech to the French chambers, undoubtedly that occurrence caused a great alteration in the state of things. The first feeling of his majesty's government, on the perusal of the speech, was, that all hopes of accommodation were at an end. But it appears, as your lordships will see in the papers, that, even at that very period, the French government declared that their disposition to preserve peace with Spain was as ardent as ever, and that they were still desirous that the good offices of this country should be interposed, with a view to the accomplishment of that object. Even with respect to that particular passage in the king of France's speech, which gave such universal and such just offence in every country in which the principles of liberty are understood, and rightly appreciated—I mean the passage in which it was asserted, that all authority and liberty must necessarily emanate from the crown—even with respect to that passage, a disposition was manifested, on the part of the French government, only a few days after the speech was delivered, to qualify it, and explain its meaning in a sense very different from the natural interpretation of the words; and as different as possible from the meaning which had been actually and generally put upon them.
It was in this situation of things, your lordships will recollect, that, on the first day of the session, when the relative situation of France and Spain was adverted to, I stated that I did not consider the door as closed against all hope of the preservation of peace. For, most criminal indeed, would have been the minister, who, as long as a ray of hope remained, should have made any declaration having a tendency in the slightest degree to preclude the possibility of realising that hope. There certainly were moments when I was led to entertain some expectation,—not a very sanguine one, I confess, nor did I ever so describe it,—but some expectation, that circumstances affording an opening for conciliation might yet arise. That expectation I was led to entertain, in a great measure from the state of public opinion in that nation by the government of which it appeared that the war was about to be undertaken from the discussion which had taken place in their
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chambers, in which the war was opposed by a larger minority than ever opposed itself to a similar measure in the history of this country, without success. I knew that the sentiments and wishes of the commercial part of France pressed very heavily on the French government. I still, therefore, cherished a hope that means might yet be found to prevent a calamity, which it was the most anxious desire of his majesty's government to avert; and I still am of opinion, that if any opening had been offered by the Spanish government, however slight, the French government would have been compelled, even if not desirous, to avail themselves of it. Perhaps, such an opening could hardly be expected from Spain, after the king of of France's speech; but it was the duty of this government not to forego the chance of it. From the period of the king of France's speech, his majesty's government felt it to be their duty in this respect, not to urge any thing further upon the consideration of the Spanish government. But, as all the other powers of Europe had given up their diplomatic relations with Spain, we considered his majesty's minister, at the court of Madrid, to afford the only means of communication; and he was instructed to be the channel of any proposition which the French government might wish to make to that of Spain. All hope, however, arising from that mode of intercourse, eventually failed; and France Spain, and Europe, were thrown into the situation in which they now are placed.
I now come, my lords, to that which is by far the most material part of the subject, with which I have had to trouble you, namely, to consider what ought to be the policy of this country, under the peculiar circumstances in which we find ourselves placed—together with the reasons on which that policy is founded.
I have already stated on a former occasion that our policy is neutrality; and it is very material to remark, what the papers on your lordships table will prove, that, from the beginning to the end of these negotiations, and in every stage of the proceeding, his majesty's government distinctly avowed to Spain, though not so distinctly to other powers, that such was the determination of this government. Not only, my lords; did we distinctly avow to Spain that such was our policy, but it was so distinctly understood by the Spanish government. Our friendly interference was asked upon the understand-

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ing, that if our efforts were unsuccessful, we were to remain strictly neutral. There has been no ambiguity, therefore, nor misconception on that point. No delusion has been practised with respect to Spain. Whatever we have done, or whatever we have omitted to do, has been so done, and so omitted, on a complete understanding with Spain, that, in any result, we were not to depart from the principle of neutrality.
It may now be expected by your lordships, that I should state the reasons why his majesty's government consider neutrality to be the policy of this country; and I have no wish to abstain from that statement.
In considering the duty of this government, as to the alternative of neutrality or war, I am bound, in the first instance, to advert to our own domestic situation and policy. Now, my lords, I have no hesitation or difficulty in again declaring, what I stated on the first day of the session, that, if either the honour, or the essential interests of this country should require us to engage in war, we have the means of carrying on war with effect. I repeat this, my lords, not loosely or, generally, from the persuasion which every true British subject must entertain, that a great country, like this, will always find the means of protecting itself, when its safety its interests, or its honour, are really endangered: but I say it, from the opportunities which my situation gives me of examining such a question in detail; and I aver, that if any circumstances should render it either necessary or advisable for this country to engage in war, I should feel no difficulty in finding the means to support it, without materially impairing any of the great sources of our prosperity.
But, my lords, when I say this, I must add, that after the unexampled contest which we waged for two and twenty years, from which we are just now recovering—a contest as unexampled in magnitude and extent as in its duration—after all the hardships and sufferings which, in consequence of our unparalleled exertions, the country has undergone;—it cannot be consistent with true wisdom or sound policy to replunge the country into all the evils and inconveniences of a new war, without a clear and obvious necessity, more particularly at a time when we find our commerce and manufactures, not only recovering from the depression
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which they more sensibly experienced on the conclusion of peace, than while hostilities were raging, but advancing to a degree of prosperity which they never before enjoyed; and when we find our agriculture the last interest to recover, because the last to suffer, beginning to revive from the difficulties and distress under which it has been labouring. I ask, if there is any rational man, my lords, who does not feel that, at such a moment, it is most desirable that this country should continue at peace, if peace can be preserved consistently with our honour, and consistently with our essential interests; and that we should not throw a great proportion of the advantages which we now enjoy into the hands of other countries; a result which must inevitably happen, if war, no matter under what circumstances, should unfortunately occur? I do not wish to state these advantages, my lords, for more than they are worth; but they are worth much, and ought to have their due weight upon your lordships minds.
But I say, secondly, that if we are to determine between neutrality and war, it is very desirable that we should consider next, what is the nature of the war in which we should have to embark, if such were to be our determination. Let it not be supposed by any one, that if we were to engage in a war in behalf of Spain, we should merely have to equip a fleet, to send a supply of arms and ammunition, and to afford a moderate subsidy. No, my lords, if we embark with Spain in this contest, we must embark as we embarked before, we must embark with all our power, and with all our means:
"Toto certatum est corpore regni."
We must send an army to Spain, and the very first brigade that you land there, will bring the burthen of the whole Spanish war upon your shoulders. I am justified by experience in asserting, that the necessary expense of a war in Spain is four times as great as it would be in most other countries in Europe. Let your lordships recollect the events of the last war in Spain. Let your lordships recollect on whom the battles fell, on whom the sieges fell, by whom all the principal exertions of the war were borne. I mean not to undervalue the support and assistance we received from the Spaniards. I thought at the time, and I still believe, that in no other country of Europe, could we

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then have contended so effectually against France; but still we were the principals in the war, and so must we become again, if we decide to enter upon it.
To embark in this war for Spain, but not in Spain—to submit to most of the inconveniences of war, whilst we confine ourselves to a few maritime operations, which could afford the Spaniards no effectual assistance, would be childish, and would render us deservedly the ridicule of all Europe.
In the third place, my lords, we must look at the different situation of Spain in the year 1808 and now. In the last war, let it be recollected, we did not go to war in support of the Spanish revolution (if so it may be called), but that revolution found us engaged in war. In the last war in which we engaged in Spain, my lords, the cause of Spain was indeed important in itself, but it was not the end so much as the means of the contest. The end was the safety of Europe. Spain afforded the most advantageous stage on which to maintain the cause of Europe. It was in Spain that the battles of Europe were for some years principally fought; not for the sake of Spain alone, but for the sake of restoring the balance of power, and the liberties of Europe, of which Spain was an integral part. But what was then the state of Spain? She was a united country. From one end of Spain to the other—from the most northern point of the Asturias to the southernmost point of Andalusia—there was no difference of sentiment. There may have been individual traitors and dastards; the spirit of patriotism may have been more fervent and energetic in one province than in another: but I have a right to say, that the universal feeling was at that time embodied in favour of the cause, for which we lent our aid to Spain. I ask your lordships, would that be the case now? Spain is now a divided country:—not divided as countries are sometimes divided, when all the active spirits and enthusiasm are on one side, and only the quiescent parts of the population on the other; bat divided with just as much enthusiasm and determination on the one side as on the other. There is at this moment a civil war in Spain; a war of the country against the towns; a war of the priests and the peasants against the lawyers, the merchants, and shop-keepers; a war in which the intelligence may be on one side, but in
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which it is evident that all the old stub-born prejudices are on the other. The fanaticism of liberty may be with the government, but the fanaticism of religion is with those who oppose that government. The question, therefore, which, in this divided state of Spain, we are called upon, my lords, to decide is, not whether we are prepared to embark in a war for the purpose of supporting the cause of all Spain against France; but whether we are prepared to engage in a war for the purpose of assisting one half of the Spanish people against the other half. So that, my lords, whether I look at the magnitude and extent of the contest itself, or consider the divided state of the country in which it must be carried on, I cannot think it possible you would hesitate as to what ought to be your decision.
Fourthly, I am desirous of adverting to a view of the subject, which may have some weight even with those who may be opposed to me. We all know that the war with Spain is by no means popular in France. It is not popular with the great mass of the people, nor with the commercial classes; it is not popular even with the army. I allow that it is perhaps too much to suppose that any war will not be in some degree popular with the army of the country that embarks in it; but this is a war in which the French army must and do feel that, whatever may be its result, little glory can be obtained by it. Now, my lords, does any man believe, that if this country were to take part in the war, the immediate effect would not be to change the whole feeling of the French nation with respect to it, and to render the war more or less popular among all classes of Frenchmen? My lords, the Spanish war, before three weeks had passed over our heads, would, in the feelings of every Frenchman, be merged in the English war. It must be so in the nature of things. This has been the effect in all similar cases. There have been many instances of this. Lesser interests will always merge in the larger. But there is one instance of a very remarkable nature, which I will beg leave to mention.
In the year 1739, the government of this country was forced, against their will and judgment, by the clamours of the people, into a war with Spain. The contest originated in the attempt of the Spanish government to enforce the right of search on the coast of Spanish America. So enthusiastic and general was the feeling

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at that time, that the two Houses of Parliament came to an unanimous resolution, that no peace should be made with Spain until the right of search was renounced by the Spanish government. It happened, however, that, In the course of a short time afterwards, we became involved in a war with France, on quite different grounds. That war was carried on lot several years. What was the consequence?—the cause of the war with Spain was lost in it, and was totally forgotten; the pledge which the two Houses of Parliament had so rashly and imprudently entered into was totally forgotten also; and in the treaty by which that war was closed, not one word was said of the original subject of dispute, though parliament had solemnly declared that no peace should be concluded until that point was conceded by Spain state this, my lords, as an example of what would be—of what must he the case, if we were to engage in the present contest. No man, whatever may be his opinion as to the expediency of the measure, can doubt, that, the moment we went to war with France, the war between France and Spain, except as far as Spain might be the theatre of Operations, would be forgotten, and that nobody would talk or think of any thing but the war between France and Great Britain.
But I know it has been said, my lords, that the menace of war, if it had been thrown out, might have prevented the aggression of France. I ask your lordships, would any man have seriously recommended that we should throw out such a menace, unless we were prepared, in the event of its proving ineffectual, to enforce it? Was it not necessary, then, that we should first determine that war would be politic, wise, and expedient, before we determined on throwing out any menace? Can any thing be conceived more unworthy, base, and humiliating, than to vent idle threats, and, when we find them disregarded, to turn round, and declin to realize them? Though menace might precede war, therefore, the policy of menace must be subservient to the policy of war, and we must decide eventually upon the latter, before we can have recourse to the former.
I have heard it further stated, that we may be ultimately compelled to go to war, and that it was therefore better not to forego so advantageous an opportunity. It has been said, that France may succeed in conquering Spain, and that she may
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then attack our ancient ally, Portugal; which case, the interests and the honour of this country would oblige us to interpose—or that she may advance views of aggrandisement and ambition which we could not tolerate. I admit, my lords, that cases, affecting the interests and the honour of the country, may, by possibility, arise, which will compel us to go to war. But, in the first place, I say, that, under the present circumstances, the best way to secure that honour and those interests from being endangered, is to remain at peace. I have no difficulty in allowing that the consideration of what step it may be our ultimate duty to take, may become a very serious one. This, however, is a question which must be determined when the necessity shall arise. It may be wise to encounter a present danger, for the purpose of averting a greater danger in future; but this depends, not only on the comparative magnitude of the danger, but on the comparative prospect of immediate and ultimate success on the part of the power which, by its aggression against another state, occasions that danger. All the arguments for maintaining the balance of power are founded on that principle. With respect to the present case of the invasion of Spain by France, I firmly believe the undertaking of France to be absolutely impracticable, unless she is assisted by the greater portion of the Spanish people. If the object of France be unattainable, why should this country interfere? If France have the greater part of the population of Spain on her side, why should we contend against the wishes of so large a part of the Spanish people? Although, therefore, no man is more ready than myself to admit that the calls of national honour are the first which ought to be listened to, I deny that there are any such calls at present; and, that being the case, I again ask your lordships to consider whether the essential interests of the country will not be much better promoted by neutrality than by war?
No one who knows any thing of Spain can well doubt that the first operations of France must be successful. But may not her difficulties begin at the very time when, according to her own principles and expectations, they ought to end? Does it follow that the termination of the career of the French army in Spain must be as fortunate as the commencement may be? I do not say that it will be unfortunate; but I say that the result of the struggle

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must, in my opinion, very much depend upon the part which the people of Spain take in it. If the people of Spain entertain the same hostility towards foreign invaders, and towards the French in particular, as they did in the late war, I can see no chance of the ultimate success of France. If, on the other hand, the sentiments of the Spaniards are changed in that respect—if they hate the constitution of the cortes more than they hate the invading armies, that circumstance would afford the strongest prudential reasons against any active interference on the part of this country. There are events, my lords, which, undoubtedly, may render our active interference necessary. Of course, I cannot foresee what the contingencies of the war may be. The French, it may be said, will ultimately attack Portugal. All that I can say, in answer, is, that his majesty's government have hitherto received the most direct and positive assurances from France, that she meditates no attack upon Portugal, while Portugal maintains her neutrality; and your lordships will find, in the last communication of the French government, that his majesty is relieved, as far as assurances can relieve him, from any apprehension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that intimate defensive connection, which has so long subsisted between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal.
If this country, my lords, really wishes to maintain peace, and to avoid war, I ask why she should be induced now to enter into the contest between France and Spain, in which France, most unfortunately for Europe, has engaged, because events may occur, to render war necessary, when it must be admitted by every one, that the occurrence of such events is at least uncertain, and when it is contended by others, that, according to all common probabilities, the events in question are never likely to arise?
I assume, then, that our policy is neutrality. If our policy is neutrality, I hope that we shall be honest enough to make our neutrality effective. No man can say when circumstances, not at present existing, may arise, which may render it advisable for England to assume a different attitude. It will be open to those who may have the direction of his majesty's councils—it will be open to parliament, if a case fairly demanding interference should occur, to recommend and to take such steps as may be necessary to secure
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the safety and honour of the country, But, until we are forced to a determination of that nature,—until we draw the sword, and throw away the scabbard,—until we do decide that the policy of Great Britain is war, I trust that our neutrality will be real. If the justice of this be admitted as a general principle, and in ordinary cases, this country is especially bound to take care that its neutrality shall always be fair, honest, and effective; for never was there a country which had more abundant and frequent reason to complain of the faithless and hollow neutrality of other countries, than Great Britain. There has not recently been a war in which we have been engaged, in which we have not had to maintain a contest with professed neutrals, as well as with professed belligerents. Having ourselves suffered so much in this respect, and having, very properly, held high language to these aggressors in disguise, I trust that we shall be ready "to do unto others "as we would they should do unto us;" and that in this, as well as in any other contest between the powers of Europe, to which we may not be parties, we shall set the example of a strict, impartial, and undeviating neutrality.
My lords, I thank you for the attention with which you have done me the honour to listen to the details that I have thought it my duty to submit to you. I shall merely move that the titles of the papers which I now lay on your lordships' table be read. In the course of a few hours they may be in the hands of every noble lord, who will then have the opportunity of considering what line of conduct he may think proper to adopt. As I have already stated, in reply to a question from a noble earl, it is not my intention to call for any expression of opinion on the part of your lordships; but it has been the anxious wish of my colleagues and of myself, that the whole course of the recent transactions should be laid before parliament, with a view that, after the most deliberate consideration and after the most minute examination of the papers on the table, they may judge how far his majesty's ministers have done their duty to Europe,—have done their duty to France—have done their duty to Spain, and, above all, have discharged that which must be their principal care—their duty to the king, and to the people of this united empire.
Earl Greysaid, that the noble earl had

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referred to the complaint which he had made on a former evening, as to the course of proceeding which he proposed to follow on the present occasion; but, from nothing which he had just heard, was he induced to alter the opinion he then expressed. On the contrary, what he had then anticipated had now taken place, and he must be under the necessity, either of allowing the noble earl's statements to go forth to the public without objecting to the views of policy founded on them, or of entering on a discussion without having seen the documents which the noble earl had in his possession, and of which the House knew nothing but from the statement of the noble earl. Under these circumstances he felt much embarrassed. Impossible as it was to enter into the discussion of the various topics on which the noble earl had touched, he still felt it impossible to suffer it to pass without testifying his dissent to its general tenor. The noble earl had clearly told the House, that, he had failed in averting a war most dangerous to Europe; and, from the noble earl's statement, he appeared to have failed, in a great degree, from not having persevered in the direct and manly policy which had always governed our ancestors. The noble earl had most justly characterized the attack upon Spain, as an attack not justified by any thing which Spain had done; as iniquitous in its principle; and, as he admitted, dangerous to the power that made it. And, not only so, but—as the noble earl had not stated—if successful it struck at the foundation of the system on which the independence of Europe rested, and was highly dangerous to the honour and interests of this country, by transferring to France, in peace, that influence in the affairs of Spain, which by protracted wars, and great sacrifices of blood and treasure, we had long laboured to prevent. Such was the character of the war which had now broken out between France and Spain, in defiance of our efforts. That these results could have been produced without great misconduct on the part of his majesty's ministers, he could not believe. In his humble opinion, if a different policy had been adopted, we should have experienced at this moment a different result. If, instead of that policy, that bold and decisive tone had been adopted at Verona, which the great interests at stake required—if we had spoken out boldly against that act of vio-
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lence which had now been perpetrated, and declared our intention to resist it with all our power, he believed we should be placed in a very different situation from that in which we now stood, and Europe would not have to dread the fatal consequences of this war. He was himself convinced, and so was every man with whom he had conversed on the subject, that Spain would at this moment have been secure. She would have proceeded as she had done hitherto, calmly and deliberately, to mature and perfect her institutions, and to amend those defects of which the noble earl complained. But, it was impossible for a country not deaf to the calls of honour, to submit to the arbitrary dictation of foreign powers. Let it not be imagined that he would have counselled the use of any threat, if he had not been prepared to put it in practice. No such language would he have held, unless with the firm intention of acting upon it. He firmly believed, that, if the threat had been made, a war would have been avoided. But, even if war had followed, it would have been more honourable for us, and carried on with better prospects of success than any we could now entertain, if we should be ultimately forced into a war. He begged the House to believe that there was no man more desirous of peace than the humble individual who was then addressing them. He knew it was the interest of this and of every country to be at peace; and if ever it was more peculiarly desirable for this country to remain at peace, it was now, after the long and painful exertions which we had made in order to repair those resources of which we had been so largely drained. But in this, as in all other questions of war and peace, the dangers of war were to be balanced against the dangers of peace; and, if it could be shown that the balance and security of Europe were on the point of being endangered, the evil was incurred, and a great nation must then appeal to arms.—He had only stated this generally, because it was impossible for him to follow the noble earl through all the details of the subject; and on the other hand, it was impossible for him not to express his dissent from the noble earl's general principles. This was a war, not undertaken by France for any offence committed on the part of Spain, but solely upon the principle, that France had a right to interfere; and upon this ground measures were pursued which might have

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the effect of subjugating Spain to the dominion of France, and which would, at the same time, compromise the best interests of this country. No man was more anxious than he was that the affair should be terminated by negotiation; but he felt bound to look forward to what ulterior course it would be necessary to adopt, in the event of negotiation proving unavailing; and doing so, he must contend, that if this country was not prepared to acknowledge that war could in no case be justified, she was bound to assert those great principles of conduct upon which her honour and credit and greatness so materially depended. He had, at present, nothing further to offer. It had not been his intention to answer the noble earl; but thus much of an answer to that noble lord, he could not forbear from offering, in order that he might rescue himself from all imputation of having, for one instant, hesitated upon the course which this country was called on to pursue, in a matter wherein her interests were more vitally concerned, than in almost any other which had of late years come under their lordships observation. Their lordships, however, would undoubtedly enter into a discussion of the whole of this question, and of all the circumstances arising out of it. A nopportunity for doing so would speedily occur; and he hoped that the discussion would then be brought forward by some one more capable than he was of conducting it. To him it certainly did appear, that the views of the noble earl had been as mistaken on this subject, as he thought them dangerous to the interests, the honour, and the character of the country. When the discussion to which he had alluded should take place, it would be time for him to enter more at large upon this topic; but, even upon the statement of the noble earl, in all probability further information would be requisite, for the full explanation of the conduct that had been pursued by his majesty's ministers. At present it was not necessary that he should say more, than that he sincerely regretted to find, from the statement of the noble earl, that that course of policy had not been pursued by this government, which the interests, the essential interests (to borrow a phrase from the noble earl) of this country so emphatically and imperatively required.
Lord Kingsaid, that the whole course of the negotiation had been just such as might have been anticipated. It display-
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ed throughout that weakness and indecision of character, which were naturally to be expected from his majesty's ministers; and the result of all this was, that the policy of England was to be a strict neutrality! The noble earl opposite had told their lordships, that, up to the very last moment, he could not prevail upon himself to believe that it was the determination of France to make war upon Spain. This was, in his view of the case, rather curious. He had once heard of a man who declared, that he had found it impossible to stultify himself. But the noble earl opposite appeared to have felt no such difficulty; as he had publicly avowed that he had been able to dupify himself, if he might be allowed to use such an expression.