Lords Sitting of 7 June 1822

BISHOP OF PETERBOROUGH'S EXAMINATION QUESTIONS.
Lord Dacrerose with reluctance, to present a petition to their lordships, as it was directed against a person, whose character for piety and learning was eminent. After the petition should be read by the clerk, he would move that it be laid on the table. If their lordships agreed to that motion, he would follow it up by moving an address to the Crown. Their lordships were not ignorant of the nature of this case, as it had been before the House in the course of the last session. [See Vol. 5, p. 1166.] He must here observe, that if the right reverend prelate had thought fit to act consistently either with the statute law or the canon law, he would not have given occasion to the present complaint. But the right rev. prelate, not satisfied with the 87 questions, answers to which he originally required from all persons before he licensed them, had since added 36, making 123 intricate questions on points of doctrine propounded to the petitioner. The petitioner complained of this de-wand, considering himself only bound to declare his belief in the 39 articles. He should now beg leave to present the petition of the Rev. Thomas Shuttleworth Grimshaw, rector of Burton Latimer. [The petition was then read. It stated that the petitioner had appointed the rev. Edward Thurtell curate of Burton, and complained that the bishop had refused to license him on the ground of his not giving satisfactory answers to his questions.] The subject of complaint was briefly this—that persons who had received holy orders were compelled to submit to an examination of a very extraordinary nature before they could be licensed to curacies in the diocese of Peterborough. The questions of the right rev. prelate were delivered to the candidates printed. The candidate was expected to annex his answer to each question, and then sign the paper; but the questions were printed in so contracted a manner,

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that they could only be replied to in the most brief manner possible. On Mr. Thurtell's appointment, the questions were sent to him, enclosed in a letter, from the bishop, dated the 3rd of August last. On the 11th, Mr. Thurtell wrote to the right rev. prelate, stating that he had complied with his lordship's request as speedily as possible; that he had considered the questions attentively, and had answered them, he trusted, conscientiously: but that some of the questions involved points of so difficult and delicate a nature, that he felt it impossible to answer them in a satisfactory manner in the column appropriated for that purpose; and that he had therefore deemed it expedient to add an appendix, wherein he had inserted some of the authorities upon which the answers were founded. The right rev. prelate, in return, had written a letter to Mr. Thurtell, dated the 17th of August, in which he says, "The object of my Examination Questions is, to ascertain the religious opinions of the person examined, that I may know whether they accord with the doctrines of the church. For this purpose I want nothing more than short, plain, and positive answers; such are the answers which have been hitherto given to my questions, and such I expect from every one. But instead of giving plain answers to plain questions, you have sent me a mass of dissertation, containing such restrictions and modifications as prevent your real opinions from appearing so plainly as they ought to do." He would not here enter into any discussion on the facility with which answers might be given, farther than to remark, that what the bishop called plain questions involved some of the most intricate and controverted points in theology. But the right rev, prelate proceeded in his letter to insist on his mode of examination, which, he observed, depended entirely upon his own discretion; and he concluded with saying, "I think it right to inform you beforehand, that if you do not choose to conform exactly to the mode prescribed to you, you cannot be licensed." Now, he was ready to admit, that the mode of examination was left to the discretion of the bishop; but then he must contend that the right rev. prelate was, both by the statute and canon law, bound to en tine his mode of examination within certain limits. He would not dispute the right of even examining persons removing front one parish to another; but as this
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sort of examination had, not before been practised in the church, the right rev. prelate ought not to have been surprised at finding some hesitation in those who were called upon to submit to it. He would not contend that under the 48th canon such an examination was not within the reach of the right rev. prelate's power. But when spiritual persons removing from one charge to another produced proper testimonials, such a course as that pun sued in the diocese of Peterborough was altogether unknown; because it was naturally to be presumed, that such persons had already been sufficiently examined. If their lordships referred to the act of 13th Eliz., they would find that the bishop could only examine the candidate in order to ascertain whether he could explain in Latin an account of his belief in the articles of the church. The canon, in the same manner, requires the candidate to give an account of his faith in Latin, according to the articles. Thus, though the bishop was at liberty to examine on his discretion with respect to the mode, yet he was limited, both by the canon and statute law, as to the object, which was merely to make the candidate give an account of his faith according to the articles. The questions of the right rev. prelate were, however, of a leading nature, and often admitted but of one answer. Indeed, he called upon the candidate to answer them with yes, or no. They were a series of tests framed for the see of Peterborough, in addition to the 39 articles, which were the only lawful tests. In proof of the latitude of interpretation allowed for the 39 articles, he would quote some of the highest authorities of the church. Bishop Burnet, in his History of the Reformation, book i, part 2, speaking of the form in which the articles of the church had been drawn up by those who framed them, states, that they cut off the errors of popery and anabaptism—"avoiding the niceties of schoolmen, or the peremptoriness of the writers of controversy; leaving, in matters that are more justly controvertible, a liberty to divines to follow their private opinions, without thereby disturbing the peace of the church." Fuller, in his Church History, observes, that the present articles in the main agree with those set forth in Edward 6th's time, but those who drew them up wished to allow more liberty to dissenting judgments. He says, "These holy men did prudently predis-

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cover that differences in judgments would unavoidably arise in the church, and were loth to unchurch any, and drive them off from our ecclesiastical communion for such petty differences, which made them pen the articles in comprehensive words, to take in all who, differing in the branches, meet in the root of the same religion." The noble lord then quoted the bishop of Bangor, bishop Horsley, and several other eminent authorities for a wide interpretation of the 39 articles. To these authorities he might add the intention of the persons who established the king's declaration prefixed to them. As it thus appeared that the articles of the Church of England admitted of more than one mode of arriving at belief in them, he must contend that the right rev. prelate was bound to receive every answer by which a candidate could explain his belief according to the articles. The candidate, it appeared, was not admitted to examination until the questions were answered. But if the candidate was ready to account for his faith according to the articles, the right rev. prelate was, according to the statute of Elizabeth, bound to examine him. Their lordships must perceive, that if this course was permitted in one diocese, it might be generalized. Every bishop might have his particular set of questions, and their clergy would be driven to study these papers, in order to discover to what diocese it would be most convenient for them to go. To act on such a system was nothing else than recruiting for dissenters. There would soon be an episcopacy, with questions and articles on the other. It was the boast of this country, that there was no wrong for which the law had not a remedy. Was this system of clerical interrogation to form an exception? If there was no remedy in the hands of their lordships, they might at least be the means of procuring redress. The Crown might refer the cast to the Convocation, or some other mode of settling the question might be found. Their lordships ought, therefore, to agree to the address he intended to move after the petition was laid on the table. The purport of the address would be, to request that his majesty would be pleased to order an inquiry to be made to ascertain whether any innovations had taken place in church discipline.
The Bishop of Peterborough[Dr. Herbert Marsh,] rose and said: *—My Lords;—The question, whether the prayer of this petition shall be granted or not must chiefly depend on the truth or false-hood of the allegations. The allegations, therefore, shall be distinctly submitted to the consideration of your lordships. But, as some topics have been introduced, to which the allegations do not refer, it is necessary that those topics should be previously examined. The noble lord has stated, and truly states, that I refused a licence, in the course of last summer, to a person whom the petitioner had nominated to the curacy of Burton Latimer. But the noble lord has not accurately stated the grounds on which the licence was refused; nor was the refusal itself an act of injustice, as must be inferred from the arguments which he has employed. That a bishop is not only authorised but required to examine curates before they are licensed, appears from the 48th canon; and the necessity of such examination appears farther from the terms of a curate's licence, in which a bishop declares that he confides in the "sound doctrine" of the person to whom he grants it. Now, my lords, it would be a perfect anomaly, if they who are entrusted with the duty of examination had not the power of determining the mode of examination. Exercising, therefore, the discretionary power which belongs to examiners in general, I sent to the person, whom the petitioner had nominated, an Examination Paper, containing questions, which I required him to answer. The object a this examination by question and answer, being avowedly to ascertain the religious opinions of the persons examined, the only mode by which that object can be satisfactorily obtained, is by short, plain, and positive answers to the questions proposed. Such answers have been invariably given by the persons, to whom the questions have been proposed during the time that I have employed them in my present diocese. But the petitioner's intended curate departed entirely from the mode prescribed, which no one had attempted beside himself. Instead or giving direct answers to the questions proposed, he answered in so ambiguous and circuitous a manner, that it was im-
* From the original edition printed for F. C. and J. Rivington.

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possible to ascertain with any precision what his opinions were. Where I was the most anxious that he should be explicit, he was the most obscure. For the answers to such questions he referred me to an appendix, consisting of ten folio pages, closely written; and this appendix had so many restrictions and reservations, that instead of explaining his opinions, it served only to conceal them. My lords, this was a mockery of examination, and an insult to the bishop who proposed the questions.
Having stated to your lordships in what manner the object of the examination was defeated, I will proceed to the sequel. Being unwilling to reject, without affording the opportunity of a second trial, I sent on the 17th of August 1821, another copy of my questions, which I desired this person to answer in the same direct and positive manner, with which no one had ever refused to comply. And I added, that if he did not choose to conform to that mode, he could not be licensed. My lords, this was no exercise of severity: for the mode prescribed was the, only mode by which the object of the examination could be obtained. But in a letter which I received from him on the 30th of August, 1821, be informed me, that he could give no other answers, than those which he had given already, but that, if I wished for more explanation, he was ready to send it. Now, I request your lordships to consider the circumstances under which this offer of additional explanation was made. I had already endured the drudgery of wading through ten folio pages of explanation, which tended rather to conceal, than to explain. Could it be expected then, that I should require more explanation, which would evidently have been of the same description? It would really have been absurd to require, it. And as he positively refused to answer in such a manner, as would enable me to say, that I confided in his sound doctrine, I should have subscribed to a falsehood, if I had signed his licence. I refused therefore what as an honest man I could not grant.
Another topic, to which the noble lord has adverted, is the custom of bringing testimonials, when a curate applies for a licence; which testimonials if he comes from another diocese, are countersigned by the bishop of that diocese. Such testimonials, as the noble lord contends, imply, that the person, who brings
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them, has been sufficiently examined already, and therefore ought not to be subjected to any further examination. I cannot mean to offer an affront to any of my right rev. brethren: but where I must take the responsibility on myself, I must be allowed to judge for myself. And after all, my lords, to what do the usual testimonials amount, in reference to doctrine? They are signed by three beneficed clergymen, who state, that "as far as they know and believe," the person who brings them has never taught any thing that is contrary to the doctrine of the established church. And the bishop who countersigns them, states only, that the subscribers are beneficed in his diocese, and worthy of credit. The testimony of the bishop therefore is testimony to the credit of the subscribers. And though no bishop ought to countersign a testimonial, if he knows that the person, in whose favour it was given, really does maintain doctrines which are contrary to those of the church, as he would then declare, that the subscribers were worthy of credit in a case where he himself believed they were not entitled to it, yet where a bishop has not subjected a curate to examination, he must generally depend on the testimony of the subscribers. After all, then, the testimonial which is brought from another diocese, resolves itself generally into the testimony of three beneficed clergymen. And as their testimony to doctrine is matter only of opinion, which unfortunately for the present age is subject to great diversity, the bishop of one diocese offers no affront to the bishop of another diocese, if, notwithstanding the counter-signature of the latter, the former determines to grant no licence, till he is enabled to declare from his own knowledge, that the licensed curate is of sound doctrine.
The remarks, with which I have hitherto detained your lordships, have related to the examination of curates. But though the refusal of a curate's licence gave rise to the petition, the petition extends over a much wider field. It relates to the exminations for holy orders: and the noble lord, who presented it, has himself appealed to the 34th canon, which relates exclusively to candidates for holy orders. From that canon he has argued, against the use of those questions, which were originally proposed only to candidates for orders and are now confined, to them again. I shall at present make no remarks

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on the noble lord's construction of that canon, as in the answers to the allegations, I shall endeavour to shew, that this canon, so far from being an argument against those questions, is authority in their favour. I am now only stating that this petition is directed against the mode of examination which is applied to candidates for holy orders. My lords, since the church has existed, no temporal authority has ever interfered with the rights of bishops to examine candidates for orders according to the mode, which in their opinion is best adapted to the purpose. If your lordships once interfere on this delicate subject, there will be no end to such interference, and a door will be opened to incalculable evil. Every unsuccessful candidate for orders, not only in my diocese, but in every diocese throughout the kingdom, will then think himself at liberty to send a petition to your lordships, complaining of the examination to which he was subjected, and praying your lordships to revise it.
But there is something in the subject matter of my questions, which is thought to render them peculiarly objectionable, and to warrant an interference, which has not been attempted in regard to any other bishop. My lords, I have no concern with the modes of examination adopted by other bishops. I am concerned only with the vindication of my own mode, which has been very improperly termed, an imposition of new articles of faith. I do not deny the assertion of the noble lord, that I propose questions which are technically termed leading questions; but they are not thereby converted into a new standard of faith. The answers, whatever they may be, are tried by the Liturgy and Articles, the standard of our national faith: and that, which is always referred to a standard, cannot be a standard itself. The noble lord has represented the questions as a preliminary test, which candidates for orders must undergo before they are admitted to examination. If questions may be called a test, because the answers to them are tried, I will not dispute about the appellation. But as the answers are tried by no other standard, than the standard of our national faith, they cannot be a test independent of that standard. To the objection, that candidates for orders are tried by these questions, before they are admitted to examination, I must beg permission to answer, that the trial, which
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they undergo in regard to doctrine is as much a part of their examination, as the trial which they undergo in regard to their proficiency. And if I deem it expedient to examine in doctrine, before I examine in proficiency, it is a matter in which I have an undoubted right to exercise my own discretion.
My lords, I have thus endeavoured to explain to your lordships the course, which I have pursued in the examination of candidates for holy orders. And I hope that the general view which I have taken of the subject, will convince your lordships, that it merits not the censure which has been cast on it. To the particular objections which are made by the petitioner, I shall reply in the examination of the several allegations. I have hitherto adverted only to such topics as were introduced by the noble lord, who presented the petition: but I will now proceed to the allegations, on which the question, whether the prayer of it shall be granted, must chiefly depend.
The first allegation is, "That the lord bishop of Peterborough has fir some time introduced into his diocese a new mode of examination, consisting of 87 questions, embracing the minutest modifications of doctrine, and peremptorily requiring all candidates for ordination, and curates applying for a licence, to conform thereto, or to incur the penalty of being rejected." My lords, it is absolutely false, that I propose questions to be answered, on the terms stated in this allegation. Neither in such principle do I impose such hard conditions. When I was bishop of Landaff, the questions were accompanied with directions for answering them, in which the candidates were cautioned to pay due attention to them, because an unsatisfactory answer (as was there added) "may tend to their exclusion from the sacred office." But as this caution, thought never carried into effect, was liable to misrepresentation, I re-printed the questions before I came to Peterborough, and omitted the directions. Every copy, without exception, which has been delivered, either to curates, or to candidates for orders, in the diocese of Peterborough, has been delivered according to the reprinted form, that is, without the directions. Yet the petitioner represents the bishop of Peterborough, as "peremptorily requiring" what he calls a conformity to my questions, "under the penalty

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of being rejected." And even the directions, which I gave as bishop of Landaff (with which, however, he has no concern), are grossly misrepresented. I there said, that an unsatisfactory answer "may tend" to exclusion, whereas, according to this allegation, it must tend to exclusion.
The second allegation is, "That to the above 87 questions, his lordship has very recently added 36 more, on one doctrine alone: and that on the same principle the number may be multiplied till there is no limit but the will and pleasure of the diocesan," Here, my lords, is another misrepresentation. Instead of adding, I have subtracted. Instead of adding 36 to 87, I have substituted 36 for 87, namely, in the examination of curates: no alteration having been made in the examination for orders. But let me substitute what I will, it is impossible to please the petitioner, whose objections are, in fact, directed, not against this or that set of questions, but against all questions which relate to doctrine.
The third allegation is, "That such an exercise of authority is unwise in policy, oppressive in principle, and impracticable in its proposed end; exceeding the powers vested in any prelate, calculated to produce a spirit of faction and controversy in the church contrary to the intention and design of the compilers of our articles, and in opposition to the most approved testimonies which are recorded on this subject." My lords, I have already proved, that "such an exercise of authority," as the petitioner imputes to, his own unfounded representation. It is unnecessary, therefore, to examine any of the predicates, which he affirms of such authority.
The fourth allegation is, "That the clergy recongnize no standard, to which they are bound to conform, but the 39 articles as by law established." My lords, this allegation is again untrue. Conformity to the liturgy, as by law established, is no less required of the clergy, than conformity to the articles. It is true, that conformity to the liturgy has been understood in a different sense from conformity to the articles. It was understood, for instance, in a different sense, by the clergy who returned from Geneva in the time of Elizabeth, with the tenets of Calvin, tenets so adverse to our liturgy, that Calvin, in one of his
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epistles, calls it the leavings of Popish dregs. The Calvinistic clergy, therefore, in the reign of Elizabeth, as also in those of her two immediate successors, regarded a conformity to the liturgy as implying only the reading it from the desk, whether they believed in its doctrines or not. But no clergyman of the present age can take refuge in such explanations. By the act of Uniformity, which passed on the Restoration, it is required that all clergymen, within two months after their admission to a benefice, shall make the following declaration, openly in the church, in the presence of the congregation to which they are appointed. "I do here declare my unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained, and prescribed, in and by the book intituled the Book of Common Prayer." Now, my lords, when a clergyman declares his unfeigned assent to all and every thing contained in the Book of Common Prayer, he necessarily declares his unfeigned assent to the doctrines therein contained. It is not true, therefore, that the thirty-nine articles are the sole standard of faith for the clergy of the Established Church. But though the petitioner has failed in his attempt to exclude the liturgy from all participation in the standard of nationa faith, your lordships cannot fail to remark the principles which are displayed in this allegation. In 1641, when similar principles prevailed with regard to the liturgy, the House of Lords appointed a committee of religion, the only instance, I believe, on record. The first resolution of this committee was, that the five points, as they are called, should be explained in the Calvinistic sense. They then undertook to reform the liturgy: and not long afterwards the liturgy was abolished. My lords, I sincerely hope, that our liturgy will not be abolished again. But of this I am certain, that petitions to the House of Lords, in which such principles are revived, must prepare the way for it.
The fifth allegation, still in reference to the 39 articles, is, "That the 36th canon and the 13th of Elizabeth, c. 12, demand consent and subscription to this standard, and to this only; and consequently the system imposed by the bishop of Peterborough is a violation of this statute and this canon." That the 36th canon requires subscription to the thirty-nine articles only, is an assertion which is

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again untrue. The 36th canon requires subscription also to the liturgy? That the 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 12, requires subscription to the articles, and not to the liturgy, is no argument in favour of the position for which the petitioner contends. For an act had previously, the act of Uniformity, which passed in the very first year of Elizabeth's reign. And this act is as silent about the articles, as the other is about the liturgy. The one, therefore, would form as good an argument against subscription to the articles, as the other against subscription to the liturgy. To the inference, which is deduced in this allegation, it is sufficient to reply, that as the premises are unfounded, the inference cannot be true. I require, indeed, subscription to the liturgy, as well as to the articles. But as the 13th Eliz., c. 12, in requiring subscription to the articles, does not prohibit subscription to the liturgy, and the 36th canon requires subscription both to the liturgy and to the articles, I do not see in what manner I violate either the act, or the canon.
The sixth allegation is, "That however he may consider his system of examination to be according to the national standard, it is henceforth no longer the national standard, to which the candidate is exclusively called to assent, but rather the bishop of Peterborough's interpretation of that standard." My lords, if there must be no interpretation of the articles, there must be no examination in the articles: for the notion of examination without interpretation involves an absurdity. The matter at issue, then, is reduced to this—have bishops, or have they not, a right to examine in the articles? If they have no such right, I must abandon not only the questions of which the petitioner complains, but all other questions on the articles, which at my own discretion I might think proper to employ instead of the present questions. My lords, I contend that bishops have a right to examine in the, articles; and in support of that right I appeal to the 34th canon. By that canon every candidate for orders is required "to yield an account of his faith," and to yield this account "according to the articles of religion." Whether the account be given in English or in Latin, is nothing to the account itself. I ask, then, your lordships whether any man can yield an "account
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of his faith," and yield that account "according to the articles of religion," by the bare act of putting his name to the articles? I ask your lordships whether he can yield an account of his faith, according to the articles, by any other means than by examination in the articles? I am sure your lordships will determine that nothing but examination can elicit the account required.
The seventh allegation is, "That the title prefixed to the 39 articles, viz. articles agreed upon for the avoiding of diversities of opinions, and of establishing consent touching true religion, sufficiently illustrates their design, and proves that it is the articles themselves, and not a prelate's interpretation of them, that constitute the only authorized provision against all diversity of opinion." My lords, it is certainly true, that diversity of opinion in matters of religion is the object against which our articles were intended to provide. But I am at a loss to comprehend how this diversity of opinion can be prevented in the way proposed by the petitioner. He says it is "the articles themselves, and not a prelate's interpretation of them, that constitute the only authorized provision against all diversity of opinion." But the articles themselves as opposed to the interpretation of the articles, cannot possibly produce the effect intended. By the articles themselves, as opposed to the interpretation of them, can be meant nothing more, than the bare letter of the articles. But the bare letter of the articles, without reference to the sense of the articles, expresses no opinion whatever. And that which expresses no opinion, can never operate as a check on diversity of opinion.
The eighth allegation is, "That the royal declaration no less asserts that 'no 'man shall put his own sense or comment 'to be the meaning of the article.'" My lords, I cannot deny that these words, when taken by themselves, appear at least to militate against interpretation generally. For if no man shall put his own sense upon the articles, no sense whatever can be put on the articles. Such an assent to articles of religion would indeed be a very unmeaning assent: it would in fact be an assent to nothing. But if the words quoted by the petitioner are taken in connexion with what precedes and follows, the effect is very different. The sentence from which he has extracted a few words, is as follows, "and that

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no man hereafter shall either print or preach, to draw the article aside any way but submit to it in the plain and full meaning thereof: and shall fide put his own sense, or comment to be the meaning of the article, but shall take it in the literal and grammatical sense." From this sentence your lordships will perceive that the royal declaration is so far from prohibiting an interpretation of the articles (which would be a perfect absurdity), that it prescribe seven the rules of interpretation. It enjoins that the articles shall be interpreted in their "literal and grammatical sense;" that they shall not be drawn aside from this sense; and that no man shall put on them any other meaning, than their plain and literal meaning. My lords, these are rules of interpretation, from which I have never swerved. They are rules, which I have uniformly and zealously maintained, the as petitioner himself might have known, if he had read his Diocesan's Lectures on Interpretation.—But in the answers to my examination questions I have met with woeful instances of departure from these rules. I have met with instances, in which the words, both of the liturgy and of the articles have been so drawl aside from their literal meaning, as to make them express the reverse of that meaning. And such interpretations have been given, not merely in matters of "curious search," where a latitude of opinion might be allowed, but on points of doctrine which are too clearly expressed to admit of doubt, and too important to be regarded as not essential to the Established Church. And I can solemnly assure your lordships, that in the few instances in which my duty has compelled me to reject on account of doctrine, I have never done it for deviations of the former kind, unless accompanied by deviations of the latter kind. And as my conduct in this respect has been grossly misrepresented, I beg permission to add, in answer to the charge of undue severity, that I have spared no pains to recover those, who had departed from the doctrines of the church. And my endeavours in this respect have been grossly misrepresented, I beg permission to add, in answer to the charge of undue severity, that I have spared no pains to recover those, who had departed from the doctrines of the church. And my endeavours in this respect have been so successful, that the total number of rejection on account of doctrine has, in the course of five years, amounted only to three.
The ninth allegation is, "That such a proceeding therefore is a manifest violation of these several provisions, and threatens to endanger the stability of the
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national creed; and though ostensibly professing to promote uniformity, is destructive of the very object that it assumes to establish, by becoming a precedent for the endless multiplication of interpretations in every diocese throughout the kingdom." By the term "such a proceeding" I suppose the petitioner understands that mode of examination, which I apply to candidates for holy orders. But I have shown in the answer to the former allegation, that though a garbled extract from the declaration appears to favour his objections, the whole sentence produces the contrary effect. My mode of proceeding therefore is no violation of those provisions, to which he refers in the 8th allegation. Nor is it a violation of the provisions to which he refers in the 7th allegation, as I have shown in the answer to that allegation. I need not, therefore, examine the inference which he deduces in the 9th allegation, as the premises are unfounded.
The tenth allegation, still in reference to my examination questions, is, "That no similar attempt has ever been made since the time of archbishop Laud, when it produced the most serious consequences, alike affecting both church and state." My lords, I cannot deny, that the prelate to whom the petitioner alludes, did make, a "similar attempt." The royal declaration, prefixed to the articles, was prefixed at the suggestion of Laud, when bishop of London. And that declaration has life same object with my examination questions, namely, literal and grammatical interpretation. The declaration also gave as much offence to the Calvinists of that age, as my examination questions in the present age. The former prepared an address to the king against the declaration: and it seems a similar address is now in contemplation against the examination questions. Nor is it improbable that the fate which attended archbishop Laud would befall the bishop of Peter-borough, if the same party should again obtain the ascendancy in the church. Be this, however, as it may, I shall not be deterred from the performance of what I believe in my conscience to be my bounded duty.
The eleventh allegation is, "that the royal declaration prefixed to the 39 articles, was issued in order to prevent the recurrence of such an evil, by denouncing in the strongest manner, such innovations, and imposing the severest penalties: and

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that these solemn prohibitions are never the less violated to sundry and numerous instances by the proceedings of the bishop of Peterborough." From this allegation it is evident, that the petitioner entirely misunderstands the origin and purport of the royal declaration. The evil to which he refers, can be no other evil, than that which he had stated in the allegation immediately preceding, namely, the evil there ascribed to archbishop Laud. But the "recurrence" of that evil could not have been prevented by a declaration issued in the early part of king Charles's reign, 1628, and at the suggestion of Laud himself. The petitioner evidently supposes that it was issued at the suggestion of Laud's adversaries, and that it was issued, not for the purpose of checking the licentious interpretation of the puritans, but for the purpose of checking the measures of Laud himself. I do not wonder, therefore, at his great regard for the declaration, though his quotation from it clearly shows, that much cutting and paring is necessary, before it will suit his purpose.—That I violate the prohibitions of the declaration is a charge which I solemnly deny. The chief prohibition, is that of drawing aside the articles from their literal and grammatical sense. But I am so far from violating that prohibition, that I comply with it to the utmost extent.
The twelfth allegation is, "that your petitioner has appealed to his grace the archbishop of Canterbury, who alleges that he is not competent to interfere on this occasion." My lords, there is only one remark to be made on this allegation, namely, that in this instance, as in every other instance which has come to my knowledge, his grace has acted according to the true spirit and constitution of the Established Church.
My lords, I now come to the prayer of the petition, in which is proposed an address to his majesty as head of the church, to enforce the royal declaration. But the enforcing of the royal declaration will, for reasons already stated to your lordships, defeat rather than promote the purpose of the petitioner. That purpose, if answered by an address to the throne, can be answered only by an address imploring his majesty to issue his royal mandate to the bishop of Peterborough, and prohibit the questions, of which the petitioner complains. My lords, if his majesty could be induced to issue such a mandate, I would bow in obedience to the royal com-
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mands. But before your Lordships concur in a motion to that effect, it is necessary to consider, whether such an exercise of the royal prerogative would be consistent with the constitution in church and state. In the use of those questions I exercise a right, which I enjoy under existing laws; and laws cannot be annulled by one branch only of the legislature. The 34th canon is my warrant for an examination in the articles. My questions constitute an examination in the articles. And whether I propose for that purpose the questions which I now employ, or introduce another set, as circumstances may require, is a matter which must depend on my own discretion and in which no one has a right to dictate.—My Lords, I do not deny, that bishops, as well as other men, may abuse their authority. With such an abuse of authority I am charged in the present petition: but whether truly or not must depend on the truth or falsehood of the allegation. My lords, I have sifted those allegations to the bottom. I have proved, that the first allegation contains a direct falsehood: that the second is a misrepresentation; that the third allegation, in which the petitioner contends for an abuse of authority, is dependent on the two former, and consequently devoid of truth. I have further proved that his fourth and fifth allegations exhibit other deviations from the truth; while his attempt to exclude the liturgy as a standard of faith, betrays a creed, which ill deserves the protection of your lordships. Of the remaining allegations, as far as they have any reference to the pretended abuse of authority, I have shown, that they are altogether fallacious.—I ask, then, your lordships, will you accede to the prayer of a petition, which is founded in sophistry and falsehood? That the noble lord, who has presented it was not aware of its sophistry and falsehood, when he yielded to the solicitations, with which I know that he was earnestly pressed, I am well assured, or he would have rejected those solicitations with disdain. The noble lord could not suspect, that any man would dare to affront the House of Lords by the tender of unfounded allegations.
My lords, before I conclude I beg permission to say a few words concerning myself. Whatever be the fate of the questions, I have no personal interest at stake. I shall be no personal loser, if they are wholly abandoned. I have no other desire to retain them, than, what arises from

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the belief, that they have contributed to the welfare and security of the church. The voice of faction has been raised against them, and in the outcry, episcopal authority has been treated with insolence, and ecclesiastical discipline has been set at nought. But, my lords, this very opposition, when viewed in its true light, may be regarded as an argument in their favour. From assurances, which I still possess, I know that they were approved by learned and orthodox divines: and if that approbation has been lately checked, it is the infirmity of human nature which recoils at the approach of danger.—My lords, it might not have been expected that a bishop who devotes his life to the defence of Christianity, and the defence of the Established Church, should be called before your lordships to answer for his conduct. But as I am not aware that I have violated my duty even on the subject of complaint, I willingly resign my cause into the hands of your lordships.
Lord Hollandsaid, that he disapproved of the language which the right rev. prelate had employed in speaking of the petitioner: such language was harsh in itself, and not becoming the quarter whence it proceeded. With regard to the defence of the right rev. prelate to the charge of the petition, it was the most complete instance of ignorantia elenchi he had ever heard. The question to be ultimately decided was this—whether the learned prelate was justified in putting his questions. If he had that right, no man could doubt that he had also the right to choose his own mode of examination; but it was first necessary to determine whether the matter, substance, object, and principle of the examination were warranted by the law of the land, and by expediency and prudence? He would broadly assert, that it was ambiguous and doubtful, whether, by law, the learned prelate had a right to do so; and, whether he did or did not possess it, it had always been thought most imprudent and, improper in the right rev. prelate to assert it. With regard to the canons, when he heard the right rev. prelate speak of them in a tone of such authority, he could not help at least hinting a doubt whether those canons were, in truth, any part of the law of the land, for they had never received the sanction of parliament, like the Liturgy, the Articles, or the Homilies. The 48th canon was the only one on which the
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claim now set up could be rested: but even this 48th was liable to two interpretations. It was not to be disputed that the petitioner had subscribed the 39 articles; and that act hitherto had been considered a sufficient test. Looking at the history of these 39 articles, he found that they had been put into their present shape at the commencement of the reign of Elizabeth, in 1562; and with reference to their doctrines he must say, that from the period of the Reformation down to the time of that good man Hooker, and even of that bad man Laud, the principles of Arminianism were unknown to the Church of England. One of the greatest ornaments of the Bishops' bench had said, that those 39 articles contained opinions on which a clergyman of the Church of England ought not to be examined. Was the right rev. prelate quite sure that such men as Parker and Sanderson could have satisfactorily answered his questions? Was he quite sure, even that all those by whom he was now surrounded, could do so without offending against some doctrinal point, which the right rev. prelate held so necessary to true religion and virtue? It was not to be denied that the 39 articles were drawn up by persons whose opinions tended more to Calvinism than to Arminianism; but as bishop Horsley had correctly said; they were intended to admit both within the pale of the church; they were articles of peace and union, and observed a perfect and judicious neutrality. Whitgift had endeavoured to add six articles wholly Calvinistic; but for the reason stated they were rejected. Down to the reign of William III. that "discreet laxity" of which Fuller spoke Church History, had always been allowed, regarding the articles. Coming down to a later date, he arrived at the great authority of archbishop Wake upon this subject—an authority to which he had before alluded. The injunctions he promulgated related solely to the testimonials and to the morality of the candidate for a curacy, or for holy orders, but said not a syllable regarding rejection on points of doctrine. He had held a correspondence with the Protestants of Geneva and Bern; and in one of his letters to the latter, he had thus spoken of the 39 articles: "I have never, to any man or men, given my opinions upon that subject, and I am determined never to do it. It has always been the policy of

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the church of England, and I trust in God it will always remain so, to require nothing more than the mere subscription of the articles." Thus it was evident, that archbishop Wake could never have entitled himself to a curacy in the diocese of the right rev. prelate. He, one of the loftiest and ablest dignitaries of the church must be abandoned by those who thought with the present bishop of Peterborough, as a republican, as one who would be willing to bring his sovereign to the block, and as meriting all the reproaches and epithets which the right rev. prelate, in his truly Christian spirit, had heaped upon the petitioner. He had heard that some of the candidates to whom licenses were refused from the see of Peterborough had obtained them in other dioceses. He had read the answers to the 87 questions, and he could find no ground for the charge of artifice, brought forward by the right rev. prelate. The object of the petitioner was, to gain the curacy, and but for his honest scruples of conscience he might have obtained it. He now came to the topic of expediency, and he must observe, that if the practice of the right rev. prelate could be justified by strict law, it was in itself a tremendous grievance, and a most cruel power, the exercise of which ought to be controlled. The hardship in a case like that of the petitioner was extreme. By the resolutions in the case of Horne Tooke it had been settled, that when once a man was a deacon, he could look for advancement in no profession but the church. A man might be able to subscribe the 39 articles with the latitude hitherto allowed, and an opportunity of preferment in the diocese of Peterborough occurring, he might have reasonably expected that no obstacle would have been presented to his obtaining it. But no: the bishop stepped in, and put him to a new test by his 87 questions, some of them of no easy solution, and such as archbishop Wake himself could not have answered. Still, answered they must be; and if it could not be done without it, the candidate must read over the right rev. prelate's long controversial work for is instruction. He had no choice—"extiactæ corpus non utile dextræ" and if he did not give satisfactory replies upon all the doctrinal points, he must be content to be a beggar all his life. It might be true that only three had been rejected by the right rev. prelate; but
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could he say how many had been deterred from seeking advancement through such an ordeal? There was one remark which he would not have made but for the charge of artifice which had been made against the petitioner. The 87 questions were propounded to young, inexperienced men—to candidates for curacies of holy orders; but they were never put to beneficed clergymen, who might be supposed to be more competent to reply. The truth was, that in such cases third persons were interested—the lay patron—perhaps the Crown; and if objections were made to the interrogatories, the matter could be carried to another jurisdiction. He did not say that it was so; but it looked very much as if the right rev. prelate was resolved to go as far as he could without (to use a familiar phrase) being hauled over the coals. By a practice like this, each separate diocese would be converted into a separate church, and divisions and sects would be endless. But, since the Church of England was part of the law and constitution, parliament was bound to interpose in cases of necessity. He did not put it on the miserable ground of property; but, for the sake of the interests of religion, the House was called upon to interfere and to take care that the basis of the church was as broad and solid as duty to God and the welfare of the state would allow. The right rev. prelate had done what, till his time, had not been attempted since the Reformation. He strove to straighten and narrow the basis of the church; and the speech he had just made showed that those who wished for the peace and security of the country ought either to put an end to the practice he had begun, or at least to institute an inquiry into its legality and policy. The right rev. prelate objected to the extraordinary interference of the House; yet he himself, day after day, had sat with exemplary patience to support a bill of pains and penalties against the first subject of the realm, on the ground that the ordinary law did not reach the case. Here the ordinary law did nor reach the case; yet he contended that there was no remedy but through a convocation. As to the power of a convocation, it was unquestionably a very pretty power to be read of in books; live to see the day when it should be again exercised.
Lord Calthorpecontended, that the mode of proceeding adopted by the right rev. prelate closed all those openings in the 39 articles purposely left for the scruples of conscientious minds. He thought it most desirable for the welfare, and most essential to the peace, of the country, and the interests of the clergy, that their lordships should express their decided reprobation of the course which had been pursued by the right rev. prelate. He did hope, that their lordships by their vote of that evening, would make it clearly understood that they would not lend their high sanction to a proceeding, more menacing to the prosperity of the church, than any which had been ventured on, since the period of the Reformation.
The Earl of Harrowbysaid, that as he had, on the last occasion voted that the petition should not be laid upon the table, he felt anxious to explain the grounds upon which he should now be disposed to give a contrary vote. They allegations which the petition contained appeared to him to be of the gravest character; and, looking to the important interests which might be in some further inquiry ought to be instituted. He was satisfied, in regard to the church and its welfare, that to narrow the base was the best method of securing the superstructure. The conduct of the right rev. prelate, he considered to be clearly most impolitic. But, while he was disposed to vote for laying the petition on the table, he was far from pledging himself to support the proposed address.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, it appeared to him that the petition ought to be permitted to be read and laid on the table, whether their lordships should found any ulterior measure upon it or not. But if it was intended, by laying the petition on their table, to imply any censure on the right rev. prelate, he would vote against it, even in that stage of the question. He could not see how the right reverend prelate, indeed, could go on to the subscription, without previous examination.
The petition was read, and ordered to lie on the table.
Lord Dacresaid, he had intended to have followed up the last motion, by moving an address to the Crown; but from what the learned lord had said, it was clear that he should find much opposition if he persevered in his intention. He was
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therefore inclined to substitute for it a motion, "that this petition be referred to a committee to consider the matter thereof."
The Lord chancellorsaid, that having explained the terms on which he would consent that the petition should be laid on the table, he would only add, that he could not consent to this motion.
The Earl of Carnarvonexpressed his astonishment, that not one of the right rev. prelates on the bench had signified, either by word or gesture, whether he approved or disapproved of the doctrines and conduct of his right rev. brother. Those learned and rev. prelates' attendance on the present occasion was certainly ornamental; but whether it would be practically useful, remained to be determined. He really did think that on a question like the present, their timid silence was a desertion of the cause which it was their duty to advocate. On any constitutional question there was no delay on their part in giving their lordships the benefit of their experience; but now, on a question of church policy, it seemed they were prepared to go to a vote without any explanation of their opinions. What would the public think when they found, that among so many right rev. prelates there was not one who had said a word on the subject? He trusted, however, that one would yet be found to rescue the bench from what he must call the shame of such inactive and timid policy.
The House divided: Contents, 19; Not Contents, 58.