HL Deb 26 February 1822 vol 6 cc681-747
Earl Stanhope

presented a Petition from the owners and occupiers of land in the county of Kent, which he had withdrawn on Thursday on account of informality. His lordship apologized to the House for the informality in the petition which had previously prevented its being received; but trusted, that though the signatures to it were now unavoidably but few, that it would be received as conveying the sense of the considerable number who had originally signed it. He trusted also that in the present depressed state of the agricultural interests, the people would meet with firmness and vigour for the purpose of discussing the grievances which oppressed them, and that their statements, in respectful terms, of those grievances, and of what they considered would be the best remedies, would meet with every attention in that House.

The petition was received. After which, the order of the day being read,

The Earl of Liverpool rose, and addressed the House as follows*:

My Lords; I entirely concur in opinion with the noble earl, who has just presented a petition to your lordships, from the owners and occupiers of land in the county of Kent, that on this, and on every other occasion, the petitions of any class of the people, stating in proper and respectful terms the grievances under which they conceive themselves to labour, are entitled to the most attentive consideration of parliament; not less as a matter of political expediency than as one of constitutional right. I can have no doubt that most of the agricultural petitioners, by whom your lordships have been addressed, actually suffer the pressure of which they complain; although never were men more mistaken than some of those petitioners are, with respect to the remedies which they have pointed out as calculated to remove or mitigate the evil. It is for your lordships, however, in the exercise of your discretion and wisdom, to act upon your own opinions, or rather upon your own judgment, both as to the causes, and as to the probable remedies of the alleged distress; and of this I am satisfied, that if the petitioners are in error, as I conceive them to be, there is no more effectual mode of dispelling a that error than that which the constitution and the practice of your lordship's House authorise and prescribe—a free and full investigation of the whole subject.

The purpose for which I at present rise, my lords, is, to take a general view of the condition and resources of the country—always a consideration of great importance, but particularly so at the present moment: and the motion with which I shall conclude, will have the effect of producing information essentially connected with the representations and prayer of the petitions, which have been presented by the noble earl and by other * From the original edition, printed for Hatchard and Son, Piccadilly. noble lords to this House. Your lordships are aware, from the votes of the House of Commons which are on your lordships' table, that in that House an inquiry into the state of agriculture has been instituted, and that certain measures have been proposed and are under consideration, which relate to the internal economy of the country. It has, therefore, been conceived, and it appears to me not improperly, that much advantage would arise from enabling your lordships to take a general view of the state of the country, before the legislative measures which have been or will be introduced in the other House of Parliament, shall come under your lordships' consideration. And this course certainly seems to be the more desirable, as those measures may probably come up to your lordships at different periods, and as they may relate to very different objects. I am consequently induced, before I move for the papers and accounts which I wish should be laid on the table, to trouble your lordships with a few observations and explanations, with regard to our present internal situation, and to the various topics and recommendations contained in the several petitions which have been presented to this House. Your lordships will then have an opportunity of perceiving to which of the various branches of the subject your attention ought to be especially directed; and of judging what are the points on which you agree with his majesty's government, and what are the points on which, perhaps, you may differ from them. In taking this general view of the question, it may be advisable that I should go a little more into detail than the immediate purpose of my motion may seem to require; because, without such detail, I should not be able to make myself intelligible on many of the important topics to which it will be necessary for me to advert.

The first consideration which I must request your lordships constantly to bear in mind, throughout the whole of the statement which I am about to you, is the great increase of population, which, according to the census of last year, appears to have taken place in all parts of the empire. It appears that, notwithstanding the extensive and exhausting war in which the country was so long engaged,—notwithstanding the difficulties that were encountered and overcome,—and notwithstanding the waste of human life that necessarily occurred, the population re- pidly increased during the struggle. Paradoxical as it may sound, it seems probable that the causes of the progressive growth of our population were not wholly unconnected with the circumstances and state of things growing out of the war itself. But, whatever may have been the cause, the fact undoubtedly appears, by the comparative statements of the population which is before your lordships, that, between the year 1801 and the year 1811, there was an increase in the population of Great Britain from 10,900,000 to 12,590,000 souls; being an increase in the proportion of fourteen per cent; and again, the between the year 1811 and the year 1821, there was an increase from 12,590,000 to 14,370,000; being an increase in the proportion of about 17⅔ per cent. If your lordships will inspect the returns, you will find that this increase of population has not been confined to any particular district. In England and Wales the proportion of increase had been nearly the same. In Scotland somewhat less; although there the increase has been in the proportion of about fifteen per cent. Your lordships will also find, as of course you would expect, that the increase has certainly been the greatest in the manufacturing counties; but your will likewise find that the increase had not been confined to the manufacturing counties, and that, allowing for the greater tendency to increase in the manufacturing districts, the increase in the agricultural districts bears a fair proportion to the rest of the kingdom. I have thought it indispensable to call your lordships' attention to this fact, because it would be impossible for you to form a just estimate of all the various considerations growing out of the present state of the country, with a view to discover the cause and the probable remedy of the present difficulties, without steadily bearing in mind the great increase which of late years has taken place in our population. It is an extraordinary fact, that in the course of the last twenty of thirty years, the population of this country has increase more than it did in a whole century before; and it is material to observe, that that increase has not been confined to any one class of the community—that it has not been confined to the manufacturing districts—that it has not been confined to any one part of the country—that it has not taken place merely in the North, or in the West; but that it has shewn itself in every direction in the North, in the South, in the East and in the West; and among the agricultural as well as among the manufacturing classes.

The next point to which I wish to call your lordship's attention, is one on which there can be no difference of opinion as to the fact and its importance, whatever there may be as to its cause:—I mean the state of the public revenue. I have the satisfaction of stating—and it will not rest on my statement, but will be proved to your lordships by documents prepared in so clear and simple a manner as to exclude the suspicion of error—that in the course of the last year the revenue exceeded the revenue of the preceding year, by more than a million sterling; an increase, calculated on those articles subject to the same amount of taxation in both years. This increase, my lords, is not only a material fact in itself, but becomes still more so as connected with other important considerations. Your lordships may naturally ask. "But how has this revenue been collected? With what degree of pressure upon the people?" In answer, I can positively assert, that there never was any year's revenue collected with less difficulty, or arrear. Out of about twenty-seven millions of Excise duties to be collected in the year, there is not a deficiency of more than 5,000l.; and even of that residue there is a prospect that the greater part will be recovered. So that, not only has the revenue increased—not only does it continue to increase, but it appears to press more lightly on the people than at many former periods. It has not been screwed up by any extraordinary coercion, it has not been wrung from the people by any extreme rigour of the law; but it has been collected with as little difficulty and inconvenience as at any period in the history of the country.

My lords, there is another fact which may properly accompany what I have said of the revenue, and which cannot but be highly satisfactory to your lordships—I allude to the prosperous state of those valuable and praiseworthy institutions, the Saving Banks. The progress made by the Saving Banks in the course of the last year, affords a proof of ease in the circumstances, not of the people universally, but certainly of a very large class of the people. I hold in my hand an account shewing amount of the sums paid over by the trustees of the several Saving Banks in England and Ireland to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in the last, and in the preceding year. I will state only the grand totals. It appears, that in the year ending the 5th of January 1821, the sums received by the commissioners amounted to 707,106l.; and that in the year ending the 5th of January 1822, they amounted to 1,205,960l. So that, during the last year the sums deposited in these highly important and highly valuable institutions, have increased nearly halt' a million as compared with the sums deposited in the year preceding—a circumstance which assuredly is not consistent with the notion of very general distress.

Having thus adverted to the state of the population and revenue of the country, I come next to the consideration of the present condition of our foreign commerce; and I mention this branch of our national wealth first, not because I regard it as the one of the greatest importance, but because I shall be able to dispose of it in a very few words.

With regard to our foreign commerce, my lords, a considerable increase has taken place in it, in the course of the last year, particularly in that which is the most valuable branch of it, and which is the best criterion of increasing prosperity, the export of British produce and manufactures. The amount of that increase is between two and three millions sterling; the details of which will come more regularly before your lordships, when the annual returns of the exports of British produce and manufactures shall be laid on the table. On this subject I may likewise appeal to the general observation of those of your lordships who are connected and conversant with the manufacturing districts, if there is not, in almost all the important branches of our manufactures an evident improvement. I am aware that in the iron trade, owing to particular causes, the prices are very low and the profits very small; but with that exception, I ask whether there has not been a manifest improvement in the various branches of our manufactures? Although the profits of the master manufacturer may be less than in former times, a favourable change has every where taken place since last year, and labour is every where better paid. In the woollen, the cotton, and the hardware manufactories especially, an increased activity has been manifested; producing course correspondent ease and comfort among the labourers employed in them.

I now come, my lords, to the consideration of that which has been the subject of the petitions which have been laid on your lordships' table by the noble earl, and by other noble lords—I mean the existing distress of the agricultural classes of the community, and the consequent pressure on all the interests connected with agriculture.

It certainly cannot be necessary for me to assure your lordships that I am far from being insensible to the pressure which has existed for a considerable time, and which still exists, in a very large part of the country, on all the concerns of agriculture. But the question for your lordships first to consider is, whether there is any foundation for that opinion which I must say has, as far as I can observe, led to the encouragement of the most idle and injurious hopes and expectations, whether there is any the slightest foundation for the opinion that excessive taxation has been the cause of the distress? I am perfectly ready to court the fullest discussion on that point, were it only to prove to the petitioners the delusion under which they labour. But, before I state the reasons which satisfy me, and which, I think, will satisfy your lordships, that there is no foundation whatever for the opinion which has found its way into most of the petitions, that the pressure on agriculture in this country is the result of excessive taxation, I think it material to shew the important fact, that a similar pressure on agriculture exists in all the other countries of the world. My lords, I do not adduce this fact as an argument of consolation to the petitioners; but I adduce it as a most important consideration, bearing on all the points of the question. It is impossible that it should not do so. It is impossible that there can be either dearth or superabundance in the other countries of Europe which (whatever may be the character of our laws to regulate importation,) will not materially affect this country, and influence both the degree of the evil and the nature of the remedy that may be applicable to it. If, for example, there were superabundance in this country, but dearth in a great many of the other countries of Europe, such a state of things would operate as some remedy for the evil. On the other hand, if there should be superabundance in this country, land superabundance also in the other countries of Europe, such general super- abundance must materially aggravate the local evil. The fact, therefore, of the actual conditions of the other countries of Europe is, in this respect, both very material in itself, and very necessary to be ascertained before we go into an examination of the internal state of this country, of the causes which have produced that state, and of the remedies to which we may look for relief. I shall, therefore, trouble your lordships with some information on this subject, assuring you that I will not advert to any which does not appear to me to rest upon unquestionable authority.

In the first place, your lordships have on your table the minutes of evidence taken before the select committee of the House of Commons, to whom the several petitions complaining of the depressed state of agriculture were last year referred. Among that evidence, I wish to direct your lordships' especial attention to the testimony of a person who is well known by a very able work which he has published, and whom every one will allow to be a most intelligent individual;—I mean Mr. Jacob. This gentleman has travelled a great deal on the continent, and has taken great pains to inform himself of the present state of agriculture in every country he has visited; and therefore, whatever may be thought of the conclusions which he has drawn from the facts which he has collected; and however your lordships may be inclined to differ from him, with respect to some of those conclusions, with respect to the accuracy of the facts themselves, there can be no doubt; his testimony, therefore, as it appears in the minutes of evidence on your lordships' tables, may be safely relied upon as good authority; and, coming regularly as it does before your lordships, I may refer to it without any hesitation.

Mr. Jacob

is asked, with respect to the situation of the landlords in the North of Europe:

"What is the present situation of the landlords in those countries?—Their estates are generally mortgaged, and a great many for sale, and there are no purchasers.

"Do they get any rent?—Very little; nothing but the clipping of their Merino flocks, which they now are selling very low.

"Is the committee to understand that all the corn which has been raised in those countries, as far as your observation goes, in the two or three last years, has not commanded a price adequate to the expense of growing?—Certainly it has not; most undoubtedly.

"Has the price been materially below a remunerating price?—Where the surplus is so very small it is difficult to calculate what a remunerating price is, and therefore I would rather than give my own opinion, trust to those who have made calculations on the spot, whose calculations are more likely to be accurate than those which I or any foreigner could make.

"Have you any such calculations?—I have.

"Have you them with you?—No, I have not; they are among my memoranda.

"You have stated that Holland and France were two of the countries you visited?—Yes.

"Is the state of agriculture in Holland and France similar to what you have described existing in the North of Germany?—Certainly; in all my conversation with Dutch farmers and landlords, I found they were complaining that they were losing by every thing they sold: the feudal system does not prevail there as it does in Germany.

"In those countries the population not engaged in agriculture bears a very considerable proportion to the whole population in Holland, Flanders, and France?—I am not now speaking of Holland exclusively, which contains little more than two millions; but the kingdom of the Netherlands, containing six or seven millions.

"A considerable proportion of the population of Holland is not agricultural?—In Holland they are not so, but in Flanders they are so.

"What is the state of distress in the kingdom of the Netherlands, and those countries where a different system of farming prevails from that of the North of Germany, and where the proportion of the population employed in agriculture is different?—Wherever I went I heard bitter complaints, particularly on the eastern side of Holland, from Utrecht to the frontiers of Westphalia, which is generally poorish kind of land; a great portion of which was brought into cultivation during the war at a considerable expense; but which has lowered the price, not only of its own produce, but. all other produce, to such an extent, that it was selling for a considerable loss.

"Were those poor districts declining in their cultivation?—I did not perceive any, nor is it likely they should decline so soon.

"Do you think they must soon decline?—Almost all the occupiers told me they must; that they were losing by them.

"Did you find the same complaints in the Netherlands, and in France?—I can only speak of France between the frontiers of Germany and Paris; the other parts I went through with too much rapidity, to enable me to form an opinion.

"What is the state of agriculture in that part of France?—Bitterly complaining; I attended the markets of several of the towns, and conversed with the farmers; I found they were all complaining, contrasting the prices they had obtained three of four years before, with the prices they then obtained; assuring me they lost considerably by it. Not knowing what questions might be asked, I have not brought any memorandums I made at the time with me.

"What was the difference in the prices of which they complained, and the prices to which they referred as better times?—At one town, St. Avold, I was assured that the depreciation had been about one-half from the highest period to that time.

"Was the general fall so great?—Not to the same extent any where else.

"What was the effect upon rents in those countries?— The leases, which are short, are all running out, and they expect to renew their short leases at a great deduction from the rents they have paid.

"Was that the expectation in Holland and Flanders likewise?—Yes, universally."

Such, my lords, is the testimony of a gentleman of great intelligence and experience, who had especially turned his mind to the consideration of the subjects on which it was given, and who has visited the various countries of Europe, with the view of obtaining the best possible information on those subjects. His statement, therefore, of the general depression of agriculture throughout the continent, ought to have great weight with your lordships. It is strongly corroborated and confirmed by accounts from other quarters. Since the sitting of the agricultural committee of the House of Commons, other and very important in- formation on the subject has arisen. I wish particularly to direct your lordships' attention to the address from the chamber of Deputies to the king of France, on the 26th of November last, and to his majesty's answer. In the address is the following passage:—"Organs of the gratitude and filial piety of your subjects, we do not fear that we shall diminish a joy so pure by causing to be heard at the foot of your throne, the respectful complaints of the agricultural interests, the fruitful nurse of France. Their continually increasing distress in the departments of the East, West, and South, proves the inefficacy of the tardy precautions which are opposed to the fatal introduction of foreign corn." I do not quote this passage from the address of the chamber of deputies to show the opinion of that body as to the cause of the evil to which they refer; but merely to prove the fact of the existence of extensive agricultural distress in France. The king, in his answer says—"I know the difficulties which attend the sale of corn. Notwithstanding the recollection of a recent dearth, I have for the first time restrained the importation of foreign grain. The laws have been executed; but no law can prevent the inconvenience which arises from a superabundant harvest. The whole of Europe experiences it at this moment."

Here then, my lords, is abundant proof of the fact, that, as far as concerns France, and, according to the evidence of Mr. Jacob, as far as concerns the North of Germany, the same pressure exists on the agricultural interests, as I am ready to admit exists here. I can further state, that in the North of Europe the pressure is still unabated. I have the authority of a letter, which may be relied upon, for saying, that in Hanover the bushel of wheat sells for three shillings and seven-pence; and that of rye and other grain in the same proportion; that butchers' meat is equally cheap; that the prices of provision in most instances amount to little more than half of what would be considered as fair prices, and that it is even difficult to find a market at these reduced prices.

I know it may be said, that this depression of prices probably arises from excessive taxation in other countries, as well as in Great Britain. To some of the countries to which I have alluded this remark may be supposed to apply. But, my lords, how- ever applicable the observation may be to some countries, it is wholly inapplicable to others. There is one country particularly, to which it is in no degree applicable—I mean Switzerland. In Switzerland, taxes are almost unknown—there is no standing army—and no national debt; and yet the distress among the agricultural classes in Switzerland, is as great as in any other part of Europe. I have before me a letter from Switzerland, in which the writer says—"We are suffering greatly from the abundance and low price of all kinds of provisions. There is no money in the country; and the farmers are unable to pay their rents."

Such is the present state of a country, to which none of the arguments, founded on the assumption that excessive taxation is the cause of the distress of agriculture, can apply. The fact, therefore, ought never to be excluded from your lordships' minds, that superabundance, and the agricultural distress consequent upon it, whatever may be their causes, are not confined to one country. They exist in all the countries of Europe. They exist also in the United States of America. Every country, whether agricultural, or manufacturing, or commercial—whether in the north, or in the south—whether enduring severe taxation, or wholly untaxed—seems to be equally exposed to the general evil, from some cause hereafter to be considered—I believe in a great degree from the same cause; but, be that as it may, it is evident that the existing distress is universal.

Having directed your lordships' attention to these facts, I come now to consider the question of agricultural distress, as it affects this country. But, before I state my opinion either as to the causes of the distress, or as to the measures which it may be expedient to adopt for the purpose of relieving it, it is material to observe that whether the evil proceeds from natural or from artificial causes, palliatives and modifications are all that the wisdom of any legislature can apply to such a state of things. A complete and immediate remedy is necessarily beyond our power.

Before, however, I go to that part of the subject, I wish to say a few words on that point, on which so much stress is now laid—I mean excessive taxation. Last year the same complaints were made of agricultural distress—the introduction of foreign corn was then assigned as the principal cause of the distress. The incorrect and partial mode of striking the averages, and other alleged causes of the evil, were also particularised. But at that time, the amount of taxation was never or rarely mentioned as the cause. My lords, I know it to be one of the grossest delusions that was ever attempted to be instilled into the minds of the people, that the cause of the existing evil is to be found in excessive taxation; and I am, therefore, most anxious to consider for a moment, what our real situation in that respect is.

It is rather extraordinary, that, at all the public meetings which have been recently held, with one exception, when a noble baron opposite, very much to his credit, made some remarks upon the subject, it has never occurred to any one to remind his auditors, what really has been the state of the country, with regard to taxation since the conclusion of the war. It is universally admitted by all parties, and indeed, there is an immense mass of evidence from persons connected with agricultural concerns to prove, that agriculture no less than manufactures and commerce, was in a most thriving state in this country, during the latter years of the last war. It has not, however, occurred to many of these persons to recollect that since the close of that war a fourth of the whole taxation of the country has been remitted. No less than five and twenty per cent on the whole taxation of the country has been taken off since the close of the war. In 1815, above 18,700,000l. were at once taken off. It is true that afterwards taxes were imposed amounting to more than 3,000,000l.; but in succeeding years other reductions have been made; and taking the average amount of the taxes to which the country has been subject, since the termination of the war, after deducting the amount of those since imposed, it will be found to be about 17,000,000l. less than during the latter years of the war. And what were the taxes thus taken off? Precisely those, the remission of which was calculated to operate the most directly in the relief of the country. A large part of their amount consisted of the property tax. My lords, in saying this, I do not mean to deny that the remission of indirect taxes may eventually cause as much relief to the country at large as the remission of direct taxes; but the effect is, in such cases, slow, and uncertain; it is not felt in the quarter in which it is most wanted, until a considerable time afterwards; sometimes not at all. But here we have the greatest proportion; we have three-fourths of the whole reduction in direct taxes, which must have been felt promptly, since the amount went directly into the pockets of the people.

My lords, I know it may be said, "O, yes, this is all very true; you have reduced the taxation to 50,000,000l. from 70,000,000l., which the country formerly paid; but in the present state of thins, with the change which has taken place in the value of our currency, 50,000,000l. is a more grievous burthen upon the people than 70,000,000l. in the state of things which existed before the reduction." And this brings me to the consideration of the arguments founded on the change which has taken place in the value of our currency. It is a subject which has been frequently discussed; but I am quite ready to allow that it ought to be included by your lordships, when you are taking a comprehensive view of the actual condition of the country. The depreciation of our currency at the time of the sitting of the bank committees, in 1819, was not more than four per cent; but making the most ample and extravagant allowance for the depreciation of our currency which took place during the war, I am prepared to contend, that the relief which has since bee afforded by the remission of taxes, is fully equivalent to any disadvantage that may have resulted from our return to a metallic standard. And here I must observe, that when the noble lords opposite talk of the depreciation of the currency during the war, they talk most unfairly; because they always refer to the time when that depreciation was the greatest. They select a period of two or three years, when the depreciation was the greatest, and they reason on that as the average depreciation of the war, from the time of the original restriction on the Bank. But I am ready to meet the noble lords even on that ground. I will suppose that the depreciation of the currency throughout the war, was that which it was stated to be during the last three years of it, namely, five and twenty per cent; and I then maintain that, even upon the supposition, that five and twenty per cent has been the alteration in the value of money since the close of the war, the reduction of taxation has been fully equal to it amount. The noble lords, there- fore, have no right to infer, that no benefit has been derived from the remission. I say that, even if the depreciation of our currency was as great as the noble lords assert it to have been, I have a right to contend, that all classes of the community have received a direct and substantial advantage by the reduction of taxation. It is admitted, on all hands, that during the years 1812, 1813, and 1814, the interests of the landed proprietors, and the interests of agriculture, generally, flourished more than in any other period of the history of the country. I ask, then, even is if the depreciation of our currency during the war, was as great as it is represented to have been, whether, by the reduction of taxation, and the consequent fall of the price of many of the necessary articles of life, the landed proprietors and the agricultural interest generally have not received a benefit equivalent to the full extent of that alleged depreciation? Therefore, my lords, in whatever view we consider the question, it appears that the reduction of taxation which has taken place, and which is greater in amount than ever took place at the conclusion of any former war, is fully equivalent to any change that may have taken place in the value of the currency. Your lordships cannot have forgotten the circumstances under which that sudden and immediate reduction was effected; and that it was by no means in conformity to the opinions and wishes of his majesty's government that the revenue was so hastily and materially curtailed.

But, my lords, that we may form a more correct judgment on the question of taxation, let us look at the condition of this country before the breaking out of the French war, and let us look at its present condition.—Let us first look at the amount of taxation now, and compare it with what it was previous to the year 1792. Previous to the year 1792, the whole revenue of Great Britain was between 16,000,000l. and 17,000,000l. At present, notwithstanding the great reduction of taxes that has taken place, it is about 50,000,000l. But under what circumstances has this increase taken place? Has not the wealth of the country increased in as great, or a still greater, proportion than the revenue? Is it not evident, that the chief evil of taxation, I mean, its tendency to retard the growth of the capital and resources of the public, has not been operative in our case? My lords, it is not the mere amount taxation in a country which constitutes that evil. The amount of taxation must always be considered with reference to the proportion which it bears to the produce and wealth of a country. For example, let us compare Great Britain and Ireland in this respect. The revenue of Great Britain is 50,000,000l., collected from a population of 14,000,000. The population of Ireland in nearly 7,000,000; and yet the revenue of Ireland does not exceed revenue of Ireland does not exceed 4,000,000l. It appears, therefore, that from the population of Ireland, there is not a sixth of the revenue collected, as from the same amount of population in this country. And yet the taxation of that country in respect to its capital, may be quite as considerable—it may bear quite as severely, as the taxation in this country, under the different circumstances in which the two parts of the United Kingdom are placed. The amount of taxation, therefore, must always be compared with the amount of wealth in a country, before we can determine how far its operation is injurious.

Now, my lords, if we look at the commerce and wealth of this country at the present moment, and compare them with its commerce and wealth previous to the year 1792, we cannot for a moment doubt the ability of the country to bear the increased taxation which has taken place since that time. There are few of your lordships who recollect the circumstances of the period to which I refer. There are fewer still who, having participated in the discussions which took place at that period on the various financial and political interests of the country, are thereby enabled to calculate and appreciate the present condition of all the branches of the national industry, as compared with their condition antecedent to the French revolution. But, my lords, we have documents on the subjects which cannot deceive us. Those documents will show what the real state of the country was at that period, as compared with its present condition. They will show how large a part of the present wealth of the country has accumulated since, and is absolutely a new creation. This fact is so undeniable, that any man who lived in this country prior to the year 1792, and who, having been absent from it ever since, were now to revisit it for the first time, would find the whole face of the country entirely altered.

I will take the average return of the exports and imports for the three years antecedent to the year 1790, and the average return for the last three years. The average amount calculated at their official value, of British manufactures exported during the three years ending the 5th of January, 1787, the 5th of January, 1788, and the 5th of January, 1789, was 12,852,780l. The average amount exported during the three years ending the 5th of January, 1819, the 5th of January, 1820, and the 5th of January, 1821 (a period including, as your lordships will observe, an unfavourable year—that of 1820) was 40,146,245l. The average amount of imports for the three years, ending the 5th of January, 1787, the 5th of January, 1788, and the 5th of January, 1789, was 17,884,104l. The average amount for three years ending the 5th of January, 1819, the 5th of January, 1820, and the 5th of January, 1821, was 36,759,650l. Here there is an incontrovertible proof, that in the period which has elapsed since the commencement of the last war, our exports have been more than trebled; that they have been nearly quadrupled; and that our imports have been nearly trebled.

If, my lords, we also take into our consideration the other branches of our industry, inseparably connected with the prosperity of our commerce; and the produce of which has not only kept pace with the great increase of our population, but has very much surpassed it, we shall feel that the question as to the great increase of the wealth of the country since the year 1792, notwithstanding the mighty exertions which, in the interval, we have been compelled to make, is completely set at rest.

Adverting now to the state of agriculture, it cannot be necessary to remind your lordships of the vast number of enclosure bills which have passed since the year 1792. Indeed, every man's observation, in passing from one part of the country to another, must be sufficient to convince him of the great and favourable change which has taken place in that respect. Whole districts, and immense tracts of hitherto unproductive land, have been broken up and tilled. In whatever direction we travel; whether we go to the north, to the south, or to the west, we find what were formerly dreary wastes, and commons, and sheep-walks, now brought into cultivation. I admit that in many instances this has been a forced operation; but what an augmentation has it occasioned of public and individual wealth! Let your lordships also consider the state of the old lands, which were in cultivation before the period to which I have alluded; how greatly they have been improved, and how considerably their rents have been advanced, continuing even at this moment of depression, far above the scale of 1792, notwithstanding the recent reductions, which I confess I think it a great misfortune were not made sooner. All these facts prove the great increase of agricultural wealth.

But, my lords, there is another branch of the question which shows the great increase of the national wealth, even with reference to the great increase of our population, in a manner that can admit of no deception. Let us examine what has been the increase in the great exciseable articles of consumption. I am the more anxious to enter into this inquiry, because I know an impression has gone abroad, that on one particular article subject to the Excise, there has not been an increase of consumption in any degree proportionate to the increase of the population and wealth of the country. There are certainly some articles respecting which it is extremely difficult to draw a correct conclusion from the amount of their consumption; because that consumption may depend very much on an alteration in the tastes and habits of the people. That alteration may be injurious, or it may be beneficial; but still it is an alteration. It may arise from artificial causes; it may arise from causes gradually growing up in the lapse of years, but it is not the less real on that account. Malt is one of those articles. The consumption of malt does not appear to have kept pace with the increase of population; but I shall show you from the example of other articles as highly or more highly taxed than malt, that this need not be ascribed exclusively or principally to the augmentation of the duty.

And first, with respect to one of those articles which, for the last forty or fifty years, has been in most general use;—I mean tea. In the years 1787, 1788, and 1789, tea was subject to a duty of only thirteen per cent. That duty has since been raised to 100 per cent, which is its present amount. Yet the increase of consumption has, notwithstanding, been very considerable. The average quantity of tea charged with duty during the years ending the 5th of July, 1787, the 5th of July, 1788, and the 5th of July, 1789, was 16,626,855 pounds. The average quantity during the years ending the 5th of July, 1819, the 5th of July, 1820, and the 5th of July, 1821, was 22,656,822 pounds; being a full proportion to the increase of population during the interval.

The next article that I shall mention is one on which there will be less doubt or difficulty as to its being a good criterion of the great increase of consumption that has taken place—I mean candles. In that article, as it is not one of food, there cannot be supposed to be an alteration in the consumption arising from any change in the tastes or habits of the people. It is but fair, however, to state, that in the year 1792, two or three years after the period which I have chosen for one of my averages, a halfpenny a pound was taken off the tax upon candles, at the suggestion of Mr. Pitt. Such a reduction cannot have much affected the consumption; but I thought it right to mention it. The average quantity of candles charged with a duty for the three years ending the 5th of July, 1787, the 5th of July, 1788, and the 5th of July, 1789, was 49,908,952 pounds. That of the three years ending the 5th of July, 1819, the 5th of July, 1820, and the 5th of July, 1821, was 83,559,087 pounds. This shows an increase in the consumption far beyond that on which we might calculate, in consequence of the increase of population; for if the increase in the consumption of candles had only been equal to the increase of population, the average quantity consumed in the three last years, would have been only about 68,000,000 pounds, whereas it is above 83,000,000 pounds. Such an increase clearly indicates the improvement that has taken place in the comforts and enjoyments of all classes, and especially of the poorer classes of society.

The next article likewise is one, respecting which there can be no fallacy, and it is one likewise of universal consumption—I mean soap. From the return which I am about to read to your lordships, the quantity of soap on which drawbacks are allowed to the manufacturer is excluded. It comprehends only the soap used for domestic purposes.—The average quantity of soap charged with duty in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1787, the 5th of July, 1788, and the 5th of July, 1789, was 292,644 cwt. The duty on hard soap is higher at present than it was at that period; but, nevertheless, the average quantity charged with duty, in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1819, the 5th of July, 1820, and the 5th of July, 1821, was 643,963 cwt. being again an increase in the consumption, likewise far beyond that which the increase of population might seem to have required. If the consumption of soap had increased only in proportion to the increase of population, it would not have exceeded 408,000 cwt. whereas it has amounted to 643,963 cwt.

Leather is the next article to which I shall refer. The duty has been doubled on tanned leather during the war, and yet the increase in the consumption of leather has been very nearly proportionate to the increase of population. The average quantity of tanned leather charged with duty in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1787, the 5th of July, 1788, and the 5th of July, 1789, when the duty was l½d. a pound, was 32,963,376 pounds. The average quantity in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1819, the 5th of July, 1820, and the 5th of July, 1821, when the duty was 3d. a pound, was 43,423,399 pounds.

The next article to which I would wish to advert is salt; but of this article it is very difficult to form an accurate estimate, in consequence of the alterations which have from time to time been made, as to the mode of taking the duty. It is proper, however, to state, that the increase in the consumption of salt has not been in proportion to that of the other articles which I have enumerated, or to the increase in our population, being, as far as can be ascertained, not more than ten per cent.

The last exciseable article, to the consumption of which I shall call your lordships' attention, is bricks. On bricks, there has been a very considerable increase of duty. Nevertheless, the average quantity charged with duty in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1767, the 5th of July, 1788, and the 5th of July, 1789, was only 631,414,709; while the average quantity, in the three years ending the 5th of July, 1819, the 5th of July, 1820, and the 5th of July, 1821, was 1,003,066,463; being an increase, very much indeed beyond what the mere increase of population would have demanded, which might have been only 886,000,000.

I am aware, my lords, that these details must be fatiguing to your lordships, but I have, nevertheless, entered into them, because it is extremely material, on a subject, involving such important considerations, that your lordships should be in complete possession of the facts of the case. I have stated to your lordships, not merely the actual amount of the existing taxation, but its amount, as compared with the wealth and population of the country. I have shown your lordships, that the alteration in the value of the currency can have had no unfavourable effect in increasing the burthens on the country, for that it has been more than counterbalanced by the reduction of taxation. I have also shewn your lordships what was the state of the country antecedent to the war, and have compared that state with its present condition. In the course of my observations I have likewise shewn, that the extreme depreciation of our currency existed only during a short period of the war, and that the amount of that extreme depreciation, which lasted only for two or three years, ought not to be taken as the average during the whole period of the war.

Under all these circumstances, my lords, I ask, and I wish every one of your lordships would seriously put the question to himself, if not here, in his own closet, after having consulted the various details with which I have troubled you—what further relief the country can, or ought to receive from any practical reduction of taxation? I am far from saying that a reduction of taxation is not desirable, upon other grounds; but I contend that a reduction of taxation at the present moment, and under the present circumstances, would afford little, if any relief to the existing distress.

I begin, by assuming, that there is no wish or intention to be guilty of injustice by violating the public faith pledged to the public creditor. If I were not allowed to assume this position, I would say to the agriculturist—"You will gain no relief by your injustice, because, if you break faith with the public creditor, you will ruin one great branch of consumers, by your endeavours to benefit another, and consequently affect, at least in an equal degree, all classes of producers and especially yourselves, the cultivators of the soil."

What the agriculturist really wants is a market. Ask the farmer in his sober reason, when he is divested of the delusions instilled into him by the sophistry practised at public meetings, what it is that he really wants, and he will tell you "a market." But it is not in the power of parliament immediately to give the farmer a market adequate to his wants. One great cause of the diminution of the demand, and of the narrowing of the farmers market, is the great but necessary reduction which has taken place in the public expenditure. I know that I shall be met here by the argument of my noble friend opposite, (lord Holland)—an argument, the weight of which I am by no means disposed to undervalue. My noble friend will say, "You first created an unnatural market for the farmer during the war, and then you suddenly deprived him of it." Undoubtedly, my lords, that argument does in a main degree disclose the cause of the distress which exists not only in this country but throughout all Europe, and in other parts of the world. During the war, and especially during two or three years of the war, an expenditure took place which, if it had continued, must have produced the most fatal consequences, but which was called for at the time by considerations of sound and indispensable national policy.

The effect of that expenditure certainly was, to create for the farmer an immense market for his produce. The cessation of the demand must necessarily be followed by effects injurious to him. During the last years of the war, the annual demand of the government of this country on the market, for meat and other provisions, exceeded 2,000,000l.; at present it does not reach 200,000l. Your lordships may easily conceive the effect of such a reduction in the demand for the farmer's produce. And this is a most material point to consider; because, although I admit that such a reduction of the public expenditure as is consistent with justice, and with the safety of the state, can alone place public affairs on a sure and solid foundation; yet it ought not to be forgotten that the immediate effect of that reduction must be, to aggravate the distress of the farmer, by diminishing the demand for his produce; for, as I have already observed, it is a market and a consumer that the farmer really wants.

The question, my lords, is not whether, if we were about to new model the state, we should choose to distribute property as it is now apportioned; or, whether we should choose to incumber ourselves with a large national debt, or with the extensive mortgage on the land and capital of the country, which is the real and essential nature and character of that debt. We are not to consider what line of policy we should wish to pursue, if we were a new state, or in a different condition. We are in a situation of affairs which has gradually grown up to what it is, and to that situation we must accommodate ourselves. There are two great classes of individuals in the country, deriving their support from the land—the immediate possessors of the soil, and those who possess a mortgage on that soil. If that latter class were to be destroyed, or if any large portion of them were to be destroyed or injured, you would destroy or injure a very considerable body of consumers; which, so far from being a benefit to the first class would prove a material aggravation of their evils, by diminishing the demand for the produce of the land itself.

Let us see, then, my lords, what the real question at issue is. We are all agreed in assuming it as a first principle, that good faith must be maintained with the public creditor. We are also all agreed, that the establishments of the country ought to be reduced as low as is consistent with the safety of the country, and of our monarchical constitution. The exact amount of that reduction will best be determined by an examination, into which at some future period I shall be very ready to go; being as cordially disposed as any noble lord opposite to carry it as far as it ought to be carried, in justice and sound policy. But, my lords, if we are agreed (or so nearly agreed as to render the difference inapplicable to my present argument) on the two main points which I have mentioned, the question is—whether we shall remit in taxation the excess of our income over our expenditure; or in other words, whether we shall apply that excess, amounting to about 5,000,000l. to the maintenance of a sinking fund, or to the reduction of taxation. This is the point to which all our attention must now be directed. I shall first consider it merely as a question of profit and loss; on which I shall endeavour to state the argument, as clearly as I am able.

In the first place, my lords, let us in- quire what would be the advantage to the country, and above all, to that particular class interested in agriculture, of the reduction of 5,000,000l. of taxes. I have already shown the effect of reducing 18,000,000l. But what proportion does the sum of 5,000,000l. bear to the whole revenue, and to the whole income of the country? The annual income of Great Britain, after making allowance for the reduction of rents, and the diminution of the profits of trade since the war, may be stated to be from 250,000,000l. to 280,000,000l. The annual public revenue is 50,000,000l. The proposed reduction of taxation, therefore, would amount to about a tenth of the existing taxation of the country, and to about a fiftieth of its income. This is the utmost extent to which the reduction of taxation can be carried. Does any man seriously believe that this would afford to the agriculturist a relief which would be an adequate substitute for that which he wents—a market for his produce? No doubt it would be good as far as it went; but no man can suppose, that it would be felt as a serious benefit; and for some time, perhaps for some years, it might not be felt at all. So much for the profit which would accrue from the remission of those 5,000,000l. in taxation. But what must we set against that profit? What would be the loss which that reduction would occasion? No less than the abandonment of the sinking fund—that fund, which, I maintain, whatever may be its amount, is the great support of public credit. The immediate consequence would be, that the interest of money throughout the country would be raised instead of being lowered. Let your lordships consider how the agricultural interests would be affected by such change. The principal advantage of low interest is, that it enables those who are in difficulties to relieve themselves by borrowing upon easy terms. The loss, therefore, occasioned by this remission of taxes would be much greater than the gain, for the gain would be slow and imperceptible, while the loss would be most perceptible, and it would bear the hardest upon that class which is the most distressed, labouring, as they do, under incumbrances affecting the rentals of their estates. Not only, my lords, should we be losing on one side what we were gaining on the other, but we should be acting to the prejudice of those, who, from their situation, are most entitled to relief, and who may be benefited even in their private concerns, by the support of our public credit. If, therefore, we consider it as a mere question of profit and loss,—whether, with a view to individual relief from existing pressure, we shall relinquish that which is the great bulwark of public credit, for the purpose of reducing taxation to the amount of 5,000,000l. I cannot conceive that any of your lordships will hesitate a moment with respect to his decision.

My lords, while I am on this topic, I wish to say a few words on the history and nature of the sinking fund. I am the more anxious to do so, because I perceive that some very great misapprehensions have existed respecting it. I have been too many years in public life to concur with a certain class of persons with whom it seems to be the fashion to undervalue and decry the importance and efficacy of a measure, which some of the greatest statesmen and the ablest financiers that this country ever produced, united in establishing. I am old enough, my lords, to remember the origin of the sinking fund, although I had not the honour of being in parliament at the time. I know that it was a measure on which Mr. Pitt peculiarly prided himself. But although it was introduced by Mr. Pitt, it was not by him and his friends alone that it was supported, for it received at that time the cordial approbation of all persons, of all parties and descriptions. I do not believe that party has often run higher in this country than it did in 1786; but so far was this measure from being objected to by those who were regularly opposed to the administration of that day, that no one extolled it more than Mr. Fox; who not only approved of the principle of the measure, as pregnant with great and permanent advantage to the country, but when its details came to be considered, lent the assistance of his powerful mind towards its efficiency, by offering several important suggestions which were very thankfully received. In all the discussions of that period, and in all the subsequent discussions in which the subject of the sinking fund was introduced, down to the death of those great men, there was no occasion on which it was not as much extolled by Mr. Fox as by Mr. Pitt, its author and father. It was equally approved by Mr. Sheridan, who used to take a prominent part in the financial discussions of those days. I am perfectly aware, however, that some new lights have since arisen upon the subject. The first doubts, I believe, that were thrown upon it were brought forward in a very ingenious work, of a noble lord now absent (the earl of Lauderdale), published about the year 1803 or 1804. There afterwards came out a treatise on the subject, written with great ability, by Dr. Hamilton. I admit the ingenuity displayed in Dr. Hamilton's book; but his reasoning has little or no bearing whatever on the proposition which your lordships' are this night to consider. All Dr. Hamilton's reasoning is directed against the maintenance of a sinking fund in time of war; which he contends to be so much loss to the country without any adequate advantage. This position Dr. Hamilton maintains with considerable talent.—Having applied my mind to the examination of his arguments with as much freedom from prejudice as possible, I must fairly say that, notwithstanding all the ability which Dr. Hamilton manifests in the conduct of his argument, and the weight to which the sentiments of such a man are entitled, admitting the force of his reasoning in some respects, I am, nevertheless, decidedly of opinion, that it would be highly injurious to the country to relinquish the operation of the sinking fund, even during war. I am decidedly of opinion that, even during war, the good derived from it much overbalances any inconvenience or loss that it may occasion. For, my lords, this is not a mere question of profit and loss. We must look at the moral effect produced. We must look at the effect which the sinking fund produces on public credit. We must look at the way in which it multiplies and augments our resources; and enables us in any war, as it enabled us in the last war, when we were contending for our existence as a nation, to raise money with facility, by way of loan, instead of being compelled to have recourse to the more burthensome, and, at times, scarcely practicable operation of raising a large part of the supplies within the year. Such, my lords, is the deliberate opinion which I entertain of the value of a sinking fund in time of war, to which question alone the arguments of Dr. Hamilton are fairly applicable. But we are hove to consider what is the value of a sinking fund in time of peace. We are now in a state in which it cannot be justly said, as it has been said by some persons who have followed in the track of opposition to the sinking fund that we are receiving with the right hand and paying with the left. When the sinking fund consists of a clear surplus of revenue above the expenditure, applied absolutely to the reduction of the debt, such an assertion is groundless and absurd.

Consider, my lords, what must be the situation of the country, circumstanced as it now is, if the sinking fund should be abandoned. Are we to go on, interminably increasing our debt in time of war, and abstaining from all reduction of our debt in time of peace? Is that the state in which any one would desire to see the country? No doubt, we all wish to avoid war if possible. But, in the course of human events, wars will occur. War must necessarily increase the debt, and in peace, therefore, we ought to use every reasonable effort to reduce it. Let your lordships look at the situation of the other countries of the world. Induced by our example, every country that has created a debt, has likewise created a sinking fund. Those countries especially, the proceedings of which, we must always regard with particular interest—I mean France and America—both have sinking funds. France has a sinking fund, much greater, in proportion to her debt, than ours; and the sinking fund of America, it is estimated, will wholly redeem her debt in twenty years. Will your lordships, after having been the first to set the example of establishing a sinking fund, be the first to abandon it? Will you proclaim to all the world, that your means are so reduced—that your credit has fallen so low, that you must give up the sinking fund, the surest support of the national honour, and the best guarantee of the national engagements? Will you, while your debt is much greater than that of any other country in the world, allow, that you intend to increase your debt interminably during war, and to take no means of reducing it on the restoration of peace? My lords, in every view of the subject—if we regard only our policy, without adverting to our sense of justice—I do most earnestly hope, that you will determine to maintain a sinking fund. I hope it, in order that we may support our own character and consequence in the eves of the world. I hope it for the sake of our posterity; that, if we leave them a large debt, we may, at least, leave them the means of gradually reducing it. These are considerations which must press the more strongly upon us, when we recollect that, as I have already proved, if we give up the sinking fund, we gain comparatively little by the sacrifice. I cannot believe, therefore, that the good sense—I cannot believe, that the good feeling of this country are at so low an ebb, that, for the sake of accomplishing a reduction of taxation, the effect of which would scarcely be felt by the community at large, they would consent to the destruction of that fund, the credit of which, enabled us to get through the long and arduous contest, in which we have been engaged, with unblemished honour and ultimate triumph.

Having disposed of that part of the question which relates to taxation, I come now, my lords, to consider whether any, and what other measures may be advantageously adopted for the relief of the existing agricultural distress. I have already stated my conviction that that distress cannot justly be ascribed to excessive taxation, and that no reduction of taxation which can possibly take place would operate in affording an adequate, or even a sensible relief. This, my lords, is my firm opinion. I have on former occasions stated to your lordships, what I believe to be the cause of the distress, under which agriculture labours throughout all the countries of Europe, and especially in this country. I have stated on former occasions, and I again state, that I believe it to be attributable, both here and in other countries, to that excitement created by a war in which both this country and all the other countries of Europe had to contend actually for existence as independent nations. That excitement, and the wasteful consumption incident to all wars, but more particularly to such a war, naturally led to a most extensive production of the greater part of the articles of the soil. In this country, it forced into cultivation lands which, in ordinary times, could not repay the fair profits of the capital expended on them. Why should not over-production of the articles of agriculture produce distress as well as over-production of all the other articles of trade? In sugar, and other West India commodities, in iron, in the minor articles of trade we frequently see it, and why should we be surprised at its occurrence in the produce of the soil, when the demand is sufficient to account for it? Does not every one know, that during the last war a great portion of the poor land of the country was forced into cultivation in the manner I have described? Does not every one know that the situation of Ireland tends materially to aggravate the evils incident to immense production in Great Britain? My lords, when the corn bill was introduced into parliament, I declared that, in my opinion, it was less an advantage to British than to Irish produce; and what is the fact? By the returns on your lordship's table, it appears there has been a considerable importation of corn from Ireland ever since the Union; but that within the last two or three years the importation of corn from Ireland has been much greater than ever; that it has been greater even than I anticipated: for that it has exceeded what some years ago was the common average importation of corn into this country from the whole of Europe! These, my lords, are facts which cannot be controverted, nor can their effects be averted by any legislative enactment. The same causes have been at work in Ireland as in England; and now the rich lands in both parts of the united kingdom press on the poor lands, just as the rich settlements acquired during the war, on the coast of South America, press upon some of our ancient but poorer colonies in the West Indies.

A noble earl, who presented a petition the other evening, complaining of agricultural distress, said, that the existing low prices were beneficial only to Jews and jobbers. My lords, I was astonished at this assertion from such a quarter. There can be no doubt, but that it is the duty of government, and of parliament to bold the balance between all the great interests of the country, as even as possible. I have so much respect for agriculture, however, that I will even say, that if we were justifiable in throwing the weight of a hair or a feather into one scale rather than into another, it should be thrown into the scale of agricultural interest. But, my lords, the agricultural is not the only interest in Great Britain. It is not even the most numerous interest. Will the noble earl say that it is not a material advantage to the other classes of the people to be enabled to buy meat at four pence a pound, instead of eight pence, and to purchase bread and some of the other necessaries of life on terms proportionably cheap? Will the noble earl say, that to the various classes of consumers in this country such a reduction of prices does not operate as a most essential and sensible benefit? I allow that this advantage to the consumer may be carried too far. I allow that the benefit may in consequence lead to a re-action that may more than countervail the present advantages. I allow that it may be desirable therefore, that the manufacturer should pay more, and the farmer receive more, for the produce of the soil. But, undoubtedly, the consumer is in the mean while a gainer by the reduction, and it is absurd to contend that he is not so. The truth is that the thing must be left to set itself right. Two causes are continually at work to this effect. On the one hand, the great cheapness of the necessaries of life will increase the consumption of them; and on the other hand, the absence of a sufficient profit to the producer will diminish their production. These two remedies, applying themselves at the different extremities, will at length, meet in some point of fair mutual advantage to both parties. But this must be the operation of time, and of natural causes. When, however, the noble earl says, that the low prices, incident to the distress which agriculture suffers benefit no man, I answer that, although I sincerely wish the distress did not exist, I cannot be blind to the fact that they certainly do benefit a great majority of the people. Do they not benefit the annuitant and the mortgagee, who were, during the war, the principal and almost the only sufferers. In all large towns, they have occasioned considerable benefit by the fall of the poor-rates. I have been at some trouble, my lords, to ascertain the real state of the case, and I can pledge myself to the accuracy of this statement. In this metropolis, in which your lordships are now sitting, never were the lower orders of the people in a better condition than they are at the present moment. So that, when the noble earl says that the low prices incident to the distress of the agriculturist have not been beneficial to any body, he certainly labours under a great mistake; for that distress, however much to be lamented in itself, is accompanied by a considerable benefit to a great proportion of the people.

I come now, my lords, to explain to your lordships, the view which his majesty's government take of the measures which are calculated to alleviate that distress which cannot be wholly removed.

In the first place, my lords, I have already stated to your lordships that a con- siderable reduction has been effected in the public expenditure. If it had not been for extraordinary charges, growing out of the disturbed state of Ireland, and a deficiency in the funds of Greenwich Hospital, that reduction would have amounted very nearly to two millions. As it is, its actual amount exceeds a million and a half. Whether or not his majesty's government have gone far enough in these reductions, it is for parliament to decide. But in the mean time, I wish to refer your lordships to the estimate of the expenditure of the United Kingdom contained in the report of the committees of finance of the House of Commons of the year 1817. That committee, after examining the demands of the public service, and discussing the various branches of the public expenditure, drew up a Report, in which they stated 17,350,000l. to be the expenditure below which it was not probable the establishments of the country would be reduced. The estimates for the present year, however, are drawn on a scale of still greater retrenchment. Their amount is only 16,148,316l.; thus exhibiting a reduction of 1,201,654l. below the estimates in the report of the committee of finance. Although I will not affirm, that every article of the public expenditure has been reduced to the least possible minimum, yet I am not ashamed to say, my lords, that a strong sense of the difficulties of the country, and an earnest wish, as far as possible, to relieve them, have induced his majesty's government to push retrenchment further than, I fairly confess, would, under other circumstances, have appeared to me to have been altogether convenient or adviseable, with respect to some of the establishments of the country.

The next measure to which his majesty's government have directed their attention, is one, which they have always considered an indispensable object, the securing of a Sinking Fund of 5,000,000l., conformably to the resolution of parliament in 1819. I sincerely hope and believe, that the surplus of the public revenue over the public expenditure will afford us the means of accomplishing that important object.

The next consideration which has occupied the minds of his majesty's government, wishing most anxiously as they do to afford relief to the country by the reduction of taxation as far as may be consistent with the maintenance of the great principle of supporting public credit, is a reduction of the higher rates of interest on the national debt; and of applying the money thus saved, to the reduction of taxation. Without entering further at present into the details of the subject (which are probably known to your lordships), I will content myself with saying, that, as far as his majesty's government have hitherto proceeded in their undertaking, the means which they have adopted appear likely to accomplish the object in view, without the least injustice to the public creditor; and to secure above twelve hundred thousand pounds a year for the purpose to which I have alluded. The tax which, on various accounts, appears to his majesty's government to be the one, the remission of which is best calculated to give relief to the distressed portion of the community is, a part of the malt tax; and it is intended, therefore, to propose the remission of so much of the existing duty on malt, as will be covered by the sum saved by the reduction of the interest of' the debt.

And here, my lords, I may be permitted to hold out the prospect of further relief in future years. We may look forward, as the funds increase in price, to a further reduction of the interest on the debt. We may look forward to a considerable improvement in the revenue, the result of the progress of manufactures and commerce. We may especially look forward to a diminution of that great burthen upon the country, which is called the dead expenditure, consisting of half-pay, pensions, and other allowances; and which, in consequence of the duration of the late war, has swelled into extraordinary magnitude. This charge, which we are bound by law and by good faith to respect, amounts to within a fraction of 5,000,000l., a sum, which, at no very distant period, would have defrayed the expense of the whole of our naval and military services in time of peace. The measure which imposed on the country a considerable part of that burthen, certainly did not meet with my approbation; but, nevertheless, it is an obligation which we are pledged by law and by good faith not to violate. However we may certainly look forward to the gradual reduction of this burthen, it must be considered as consisting only of life-charges, in the nature of annuities; that it is continually diminishing in amount; and, that although that diminution has been hitherto slow, it must soon be rapidly accelerated.

There is a point connected with this part of the subject, on which, my lords, I wish to say a few words. In the year 1819, parliament came to a resolution, that it was expedient for the public service, and for the maintenance of public credit, that there should be a sinking fund of at least 5,000,000l. in amount. At that time, I expressed my opinion, that it was highly desirable the sinking fund should amount to one per cent on the whole capital of the debt. But, my lords, we must always draw a line of distinction, between that which is desirable, and that which is indispensable. The proper sum necessary for supporting public credit, is, in some degree, an arbitrary question. At any rate, parliament ought steadily to adhere to its resolution of applying the surplus of 5,000,000l. to the sinking fund. Whether the gradual accumulations of this fund ought to go to the increase of the sinking fund, or the reduction of taxation, is a question, which, it will certainly be open to parliament to determine according to circumstances. It appears to me, not to be advisable to lay down any absolute rule by anticipation, which, on the one hand, may prevent parliament from appropriating that accumulation to the sinking fund, until the fund has reached a certain point; or, on the other hand, may preclude parliament from applying it to the relief of any incidental pressure on the country.

My lords, I now come to a proposition, on which a considerable difference of opinion has been expressed by the noble marquis opposite, and by other noble lords—I mean the loan of 4,000,000l. from the Bank of England to his majesty's government, for the purpose as it was supposed of enabling his majesty's government to make such advances to parishes, on the security of their rates, as may conduce to the relief of the agricultural interest. But before I explain the views which his majesty's government entertain on this subject, I think it necessary to recall your lordships' attention to what passed in 1819, when the bullion committee recommended the resumption of cash payments by the Bank.

Your lordships well know, that on that occasion the connexion between his majesty's government and the Bank of England, and the advances which had been made by the latter to the former, became the subjects of much discussion. Previously to the meeting of parliament, it was proposed by my right hon. friend the chancellor of the exchequer and myself, to repay to the Bank of England five or six millions of those advances; a sum which we had reason to believe would be sufficient to enable the Bank to carry into effect without any risk or embarrassment, the intended measure. In the bullion committee, however, the directors of the Bank urged so strongly the repayment of a larger portion of those advances; they urged so strongly the repayment of the sum of 10,000,000l., that although I believe most of the members of the committee, and amongst them two noble lords opposite, thought that the demand made by the Bank was unnecessarily large; yet at the same time, in consideration of the important operation which was about to take place, it was conceived to be better that the Bank should have to the full extent of what the directors imagined necessary to execute the operation in question with perfect safety. Your lordships may recollect that after the report of the bullion committee had been presented, I stated that I thought the demand made by the Bank was unnecessarily large; but that I was reconciled to it by what passed in the committee, with respect to the probability that, in the event of the general circulating medium being found insufficient, the Bank would lower their rate of discount. It was, allowed, my lords, on all hands, that if it should turn out that the circulating medium was inadequate to the wants of the country, it would be better to increase it through the medium of discount, than by a further issue of exchequer bills; and if your lordships will look at the evidence given before the bullion committee of 1819, by one of the most experienced directors, you will find, that on the question being put to him, "In the event of the issues proving insufficient what mode the Bank could adopt to increase their issues;" the answer was,—"by discounting to the public at a lower rate of interest." Under those circumstances, and with that expectation, I became reconciled to the demand made by the Bank.—Now, my lords, although I am ready to give the Bank of England full credit for the purity of their motives, and to believe that they always act on the best judgment they are able to form, for the advantage of their constituents and the public, I still must say, that it does appear very extraordinary to his majesty's government, and I imagine must appear very extraordinary to your lordships, and to the public, that at this moment, when the market rate of interest is not more than four per cent, the Bank refuse to discount at a lower rate than five. What renders this circumstance the more inexplicable is the fact which is known to every body, that from a period of three or four months after the presentation of the report of the bullion committee in 1819, the course of exchange with foreign countries has been highly favourable to this country. An immense quantity of treasure, therefore, must have been flowing into the coffers of the Bank of England. The quantity of gold thus locked up by the Bank, and their refusal to discount at less than five per cent, must certainly be extremely injurious to them, and if to them, to the public at large, more especially to that distressed portion of the public, the agricultural interest.

Under these circumstances, however, and finding it impossible to induce the Bank to lower the rate of interest on their discounts, conformably to the expectation which was held out in 1819, his majesty's government resolved on borrowing 4,000,000l. on exchequer bills from the Bank; with a view of applying that sum, in some manner, to the relief of the country. Whether that can best be done by lending money to the different parishes on the security of their rates, or by advancing money for the carrying on of public works, conformably to the measure which was advantageously resorted to some years ago, or whether it may not be advisable to have recourse to both those operations, are questions which yet remain to be determined. His majesty's government feel that no sound objection can be made to the principle of the proposed measure, which is the same, although the application may be different, as that which was recognised and adopted some years ago, when exchequer bills to a larger amount were issued for the relief of the manufacturing and commercial distress. The chief object which his majesty's government have in view, is not so much the adoption of this or that particular measure, as the adoption of any measure which will have the effect of getting these 4,000,000l. into general circulation. We do not imagine, my lords, that this proposition will immediately relieve the distress of the country. We do not expect that it will work wonders. But we trust, that, it may palliate an evil, which only natural causes and the operation of time can wholly remove. This sum, be it remembered, is not wanted for the supplies of the year. It is not wanted for any government services. The only object of his majesty's government is, to extend and quicken the general circulation. In order to prevent the occurrence, from this measure, of any inconvenience or difficulty, which might affect the present system of our currency, it is proposed to be one of the regulations accompanying it, that, in the event of any unfavourable turn in the exchanges, the Bank shall have the power of recalling each million, at an interval of three months, on giving notice of their intention to do so; a provision which, I conceive is fully sufficient to guard against all possible danger on that score. The whole measure is an expedient, which, from the first, appeared to me to be well calculated to mitigate the evil which most loudly calls for relief; and nothing that I have yet heard upon the subject has tended to alter my opinion. Under other circumstances, such a measure might have been rendered unnecessary. If, for instance, the Bank had consented to lower the rate of discount, such a measure might not have been required; but, under the circumstances which I have described—the Bank still persevering in their refusal to discount at a less rate than five per cent—I conceive, that it is a measure calculated to alleviate, in some degree, the existing distress.

There is only one other point on which it is necessary for me to trespass on your lordships patience, and that is, the present state of the corn laws. Your lordships are aware, from the votes of the House of Commons on your table, that a committee has been appointed in the other House of parliament, for the purpose of continuing those inquiries which were instituted in the last session of parliament on this subject. I should deceive your lordships, if I stated it as my opinion, that any material or immediate relief can be afforded by any alteration of those laws. But, at the same time, I may fairly say, that it appears to me probable that, without departing from the principle on which the corn laws are founded, some modification of that principle may be attended with advantage. It has certainly been felt by many persons who are well acquainted with the subject, that the present system is defective, in this respect, namely, that until corn reaches a certain price, say as to wheat—eighty shillings a quarter,—it gives a complete monopoly to the British grower; and that then, it suddenly permits the importation of foreign corn, wholly free from any check or restraint; so that instead of admitting a gradual supply proportionate to the public demand, the opening of the ports throws large masses of foreign corn at once into our markets, and produces all the evils which may be supposed to arise from an abrupt transition, from no importation to an unlimited supply. If' any modification of the law can be effected, by which the importation may be regulated by a gradual scale of duties, so as to prevent these sudden and violent fluctuations, I freely confess that I see no objection to such a measure. At all events, it is highly proper that the present laws should undergo an examination, with a view to ascertain how far they are susceptible of improvement. But it would not be dealing fairly with the country to bold out an expectation that any alteration in them can be productive of any great and immediate relief.

My lords, having now gone through all those topics which I have felt it necessary to bring under your lordships consideration, I shall conclude, by moving for the papers which I am desirous to lay before your lordships. I have stated my opinion as to the nature and extent of the existing difficulties, and of the causes from which they have arisen. I have also stated the measures which his majesty's government propose for their mitigation. In the view which I have taken of certain branches of the subject, I am aware that I differ from some of your lordships. But there are two points on which we all agree. I readily admit—first, that our establishments ought to be reduced to as low a scale as may be compatible with our monarchical constitution and the safety of the country—and, secondly, that every reduction that can be made in the expenditure of the country consistently with the above objects, and with the security of public faith, should be attended with a corresponding reduction of taxation. But, my lords, I must place by the side of these admissions, the assertion of another principle, which I deem so indispensable, that upon it I am determined to stand or fall—the steady maintenance of an efficient sinking fund. The noble lord concluded by moving for certain papers similar to those moved for in the House of Commons by the marquis of Londonderry.

The Marquis of Lansdown

began by expressing his satisfaction, that, the noble earl had himself brought forward the statement which he (lord Lansdown) would otherwise have felt it his duty to have called for, but which came better from a minister of the Crown than from himself or any of his friends. On the statement and reasonings of the noble earl, he should feel it necessary to make some comment; and he rose thus early in the debate, because he considered that he had in some manner provoked the discussion on which their lordships had entered. There was one point on which the noble earl was bound to explain his sentiments fully. The noble earl had alluded to the fashionable opinions of some individuals, and to the travels of others, in support of the doctrine, that taxation had little or nothing to do with the prevailing evils under which the country laboured. He knew very well that some political economists, and certain noble lords in that and the other House of parliament, considered the effects of taxation as being extremely light. They stood prepared to hold out this delusion to the public, not merely that taxation produced no unfavourable result, but that its existence was, in fact, one of the favourable circumstances of this country. As this was the case, he felt it to be his duty to state, that, without overlooking any of the arguments which were advanced on the other side—without losing sight of any of the inquiries which had been made by those who supported the doctrine he had alluded to—he had come to as deliberate a conviction as the noble earl had done, that, with the cause of the present distress, and the best mode of relieving it hereafter, the amount of taxation was inseparably connected. It required no great acquaintance with any author who had written on the subject, or with any man who had ever thought on political economy, to perceive that the effect of taxation was; to produce high prices, not to lower them. This was generally found in connexion with heavy taxation. Such a state of things arose from slighting those sound maxims of political economy, by which a nation ought to be governed, and the consequences of departing from which were constantly presenting themselves at every man's door. Many favourable circumstances he believed to exist in the country, which, if properly attended to, would produce unequivocal benefit. He heard, with pleasure, that our manufactures were again in a flourishing state; and the great object to be pursued was, to adopt such measures as would have a tendency to increase and secure consumption. Measures of that description, which would effect a radical cure of the evil, were worth all the temporary expedients which the noble earl could propose. He feared, however, that the noble earl felt insuperable objections to the adoption of such a course as he would recommend.

The view he was prepared to take of the question was, that the amount of taxation in this country formed the great obstacle to its recovery from the state of distress in which it was plunged. The noble earl admitted, that distress existed to a considerable extent; but, while he allowed this, he stated also that portions of the community were partial gainers. The noble lord had argued, and he believed he was in some degree correct, that, I more or less, the present evil affected other parts of the world. But in his opinion the distress did not affect foreign countries in so severe a degree as it pressed upon this. If he were to offer any opinion of his own, he would say, that in France, for instance, notwithstanding the address of the chamber of deputies—an address carried by the opposition in that country against the wish of the ministers, on the first day of the session, and therefore relied on as unquestionable authority by the noble earl—notwithstanding what was there stated, he would appeal to every person who had recently visited France, to declare whether that country—although there might be an occasional depression in the price of agricultural produce—ever exhibited a greater degree of prosperity? Sure he was, that if any man proposed in France the measure which the noble earl had stated in that House—that of throwing a great part of the land out of cultivation for the purpose of raising the price of agricultural produce—he would not be attended to with patience. That was one of the most extraordinary doctrines, and must lead to the most extraordinary results, that could possibly be contemplated. Yet the noble earl had repeated to their lordships, that a diminished production was the only efficient measure that could be resorted to—that without it, there was no remedy—without it, there was no hope. With respect to the advantages possessed by this country over others to which the noble earl had alluded, he would say little. It was im- possible, in that House, without documents, to institute an accurate inquiry into the state of the different parts of Europe. But he would call the attention of the House to that part of the noble earl's speech, in which he more particularly referred to a passage extracted from the evidence given before the agricultural committee, where the witness stated, "that local causes were in existence, which gave rise to considerable distress abroad." The individual stated the countries through which he had travelled, and it would be well to consider what those existing and mischievously operating local causes were. One of the parts he had visited was the north of Europe. Now, if it had been customary for this country formerly to import the corn of Poland and other northen states, and if the necessity for such an importation no longer existed, it was not difficult to see, that, to a certain extent, the demand for the grain cultivated in those countries must be diminished. The same remark would apply to Flanders and the north of France, to which the noble earl had adverted; and, beside the diminution of demand occasioned by the non-exportation to England, it should be recollected, that there were now no longer any armies of occupation on foot, which circumstance must still farther lower the demand for the produce of the farmer. These circumstances, however, were not at all applicable to the state of England.

He would say nothing farther relative to the distress which afflicted other countries, or to the remedies that might be applied to it; but he would proceed to consider what remedy could be applied to the distress which it was admitted existed in our own. And here he experienced considerable satisfaction in reflecting, that though he and the noble earl were somewhat at variance, with reference to the effect of taxation, yet, with respect to one very important point, the practical application for relief, they did not differ at all; for, at the same moment that the noble earl argued that taxation was not the cause of the present distress, he admitted fully, that it was most desirable to remove the weight of taxation as speedily as possible. Now, it undoubtedly could not be supposed, that taxation to the amount of fifty millions could have no effect, one way or the other, on the situation of the country; and if it were felt I that such a mass of taxes did not operate I as a benefit to the empire, it must be al- lowed that it had an evil tendency, by interfering with all the monied transactions of the community. The noble earl had alluded to some circumstances as proving the apparent wealth and resources of the country. He asked, whether, when travelling from one part of England to another, large tracts of land were not seen under the plough, where previously no mark of cultivation could be seen? This brought him to one great point, most intimately connected with the state of the country. Was it not, he demanded, the application of an extraordinary stimulus in the course of the last war, which rendered those previously barren places productive? And was it not the alteration of that system which now placed the cultivator in such a situation that he could not procure remuneration for his produce? He agreed with the noble earl in the fact that a great quantity of poor land had been brought into cultivation, but he dissented from the deduction which the noble earl drew from that fact; namely, that where there appeared to be a superabundant production, a dearth should be effected by artificial means. The evil was not, in his opinion, to be remedied by taking lands out of cultivation, but by raising the consumption so as to make the produce and the demand meet each other. The noble earl had dwelt with much force on the increased wealth and resources of the country: but if that increase were indeed so great as had been represented, why was distress so prevalent? With respect to Ireland, there appeared to be an enormous increase of population, even greater than in England. But, while there was this increase of population there, as well as an increase of produce, why had not the powers of consumption been also increased? Because the inability to consume was continued by severe taxation. The people of that country were not wealthy; and the consuming population had not increased in proportion to the general population. If it were otherwise, they would themselves make use of a great part of that corn which was now exported to the British market. That exportation tended to increase the dearth, which was the principal evil under which Ireland laboured, and to which might be traced her present disturbed and lamentable situation.

Feeling, then, the most decided conviction, that in considering the distress of the country they must necessarily be led to the amount of taxation, and having, to a certain degree, the countenance of the noble earl, who admitted that it was necessary, though on other grounds, to diminish that taxation as far as possible, be now came to the consideration of the mode in which that object could be obtained. There were four different ways, more or less pointed to in the speech of the noble earl. First, by a diminution of taxes; and one mode of effecting that diminution was by the legitimate reduction of the interest of the national debt. He said the "legitimate reduction" of that interest? because he had in view the proceeding which the noble earl had most properly patronized. The second mode (and he stated it only fur the purpose of expressing his entire disapproval of such: plan) was, by diminishing the interest of the national debt, contrary to existing laws and contracts. The third was, a proper application of the principle of reform and retrenchment in the various departments of government, which the noble earl stated to have been carried to a very considerable extent; and the fourth was, the application of that which was called the sinking fund, with respect to which much diversity of opinion existed. As to the first operation—that of reducing the interest of the national debt in the mode adopted by Mr. Pelham, and of which the noble earl approved—he felt much gratification that the circumstances of the country were such as rendered it feasible, whatever hardship it might inflict upon some individuals. Certainly such an alteration could not be effected without producing some degree of hardship; but, on the other hand, it must be considered, that those who invested money in this stock, did so with the knowledge that they were liable to all those hardships and contingencies that might be connected with its original formation. There was, however, one part of the plan of which he did not approve. He thought it would be more creditable for a great country, and more consistent with the dignity of the Exchequer, if on this occasion individuals had not been required to record their dissent. This part of their plan was opposed to that of Mr. Pelham. Under his bill, all those who assented stated their assent; but the present measure demanded a dissent; and if circumstances prevented an individual from expressing it in due time, the law would compel him to act as if he had assented. He therefore thought the option should not have been offered in this way. His objection went merely to this part of the measure, and was not at all of a general nature.—The second mode next came to be considered. Now, with regard to any hope of relief which might be received from a reduction of the interest due to the public creditor, except as authorized by existing contracts and laws, he was as ready as the noble earl to enter his protest against any such remedy being entertained in that House. A country might possibly be placed in such a situation as to be deprived of all means of paying its debt. He was, however, very far from entertaining such a gloomy view of the situation of this country at present; and while they were not in such a melancholy state, they were bound by every principle of honour, of policy, of morality, and of every thing connected with honour and morality, to see that justice was done to the public creditor. That House and the other House of parliament were alike bound to oppose such a suggestion as that to which he had adverted, from whatsoever quarter it might come. If he were so unfortunate as to hear that a proposition of that nature was contemplated, he would be found in his place, and he hoped the noble earl also would be at his post, ready to oppose with all his might and power, a principle so entirely subversive of public credit and prosperity. [Hear, hear.]

Then the third mode of relief which offered itself was that reduction in the expenditure of the country, which the noble earl informed them had already been carried to a very considerable extent. It would be impossible for him, or for any of their lordships, to argue how far retrenchment might justly be carried, without having before them the necessary details and estimates. At the same time, he might be allowed to say, without any imputation of want of charity or candour towards the noble earl opposite, and other noble lords, that they did not appear very anxious to carry the principle of retrenchment into effect. How often had they stated in that House, that his majesty's government had gone to the very utmost stretch of retrenchment! Had they not called on individuals to point out in what manner farther retrenchment could be safely effected? And now, having made retrenchments which a year or two ago they treated as impossible, he thought he had a right to suppose that still greater retrenchments might be effected by the vigilance, and resolution of parliament. He still looked forward to retrenchment in the various departments of the state, as affording an opportunity for a considerable diminution of the public expenditure; subject, however, to the observations of the noble earl, that such diminution would contract one species of consumption. It would do so, however, by substituting another and a more wholesome, vigorous, and beneficial consumption.

This brought him to the fourth, or last topic, on which the noble earl had dwelt at very considerable length, conceiving it to be of greater importance than those of which he had already disposed. Before he entered on the subject of the sinking fund, it was right that he and the noble earl should perfectly understand each other in regard to the question he was about to introduce. In many of the discussions which had taken place, formerly and recently, in that and the other House of parliament, on this subject, there was a looseness of statement, an ambiguity of expression, which appeared to be very useful to ministers. Therefore, prior to his going any farther, the question he wished to ask was this:—"Have we a sinking fund, or have we not?" When he said, that on this point, a very ambiguous mode of statement was adopted, he did not speak lightly. In support of his assertion, he could refer to documents produced by ministers in that and the other House of parliament. When it appeared convenient for ministers to boast of a large sinking fund, then the country was told that it consisted of the sum of 17,000,000l.—which, by a singular fiction, was held out, for the last twenty years, as working wonders, when it really was not working at all. But, when ministers found it necessary to state that the income of the country exceeded its expenditure, then this large sum was resorted to in proof of the assertion, but without any mention being made of its applicability to the redemption of the national debt; and they were told, that the country possessed a clear surplus revenue. Now he wished this point to be cleared up; and he would I ask, "Have we an income below the expenditure, and a large sum tied up by various acts of parliament, and applicable to the liquidation of the debt, or have we a large surplus above the expenditure that we may appropriate as we choose for the benefit of the country?" This was a question which had already been answered in effect, by the conduct of his majesty's government. If ever there was a government that had set aside all the principles laid down by Mr. Pitt for the formation of a great sinking fund in this country, from time to time, in war and in peace, in adversity and in prosperity, it was the present government. He spoke of that which was on record. Let them go back to the bill of 1813. Was that no departure from the principles of Mr. Pitt? On this point he could quote the authority of a gentleman whose opinions had great weight with government. He alluded to the authority of Mr. Huskisson, whose sentiments on this subject were recorded better than the debates in parliament generally were. They all knew, that when the chancellor of the exchequer proposed to take a large sum from the sinking fund, for the purpose of avoiding additional taxation, Mr. Huskisson declared "that Mr. Pitt's sinking fund was broken in upon." He invoked the name of Mr. Pitt, and he called on every friend to that statesman's principles, to defend the sinking fund from the rapacity of the chancellor of the exchequer. The plan then proposed was, however, carried into effect; and the habit which had prevailed of taking the sinking fund, again and again, confirmed the opinion of those who thought that the measure of 1813 annihilated the principle on which that fund was established. The late proceedings supported the measure of 1813, and in one respect went beyond them; for they operated against the limitations laid down in the act of 1813 itself. What did the noble earl and the chancellor of the exchequer do, when the fund was last made use of? They determined to go back to the act of 1802, and adopt the principle then held by Mr. Pitt—that of appropriating a sum of one per cent. on every loan, by which it would be liquidated in 45 years. This was considered to be a sort of quibble. But, whether it was or not, did government now adhere to the principle of redeeming each loan in 45 years? The noble earl knew that this principle had been done away; and that the sinking fund could no more get rid of the debt in 45 years, than it could answer for the whole expenditure of the country m the next session of parliament. In the view of ministers, it was deemed right, on principles of expediency and policy, to give up the surplus of the sinking fund for the benefit of the fundholder, as well (he would admit) as for the interest of the community at large; because, with the latter interest, that of the fundholder was inseparably connected. He trusted the fundholder would consider it his best interest to meet those of the community in general; and that he would feel, that the best security, both for his principal and interest, was to be found in the growing prosperity of the state.

This, therefore, brought him to the consideration of the present sinking fund. If considered merely with respect to figures, the principle of the sinking fund seemed to rest on the most logical principles; but its defects had been pointed out by Dr. Hamilton, although that individual did not give due weight to the effect which the sending into circulation, at stated periods, large masses of money, must have on the credit of a country, particularly in the article of negotiating loans. It was true, the principle on which the sinking fund had been originally formed, had been long done away; but still, for reasons which he could not understand, for reasons which, from year to year, became more preposterous, although the principle was thrown aside, all the machinery, and all the inconvenience connected with that machinery, were suffered to remain. Could they imagine any thing less calculated to impose on the understanding of any man, much less on the acute understanding of the stockholder, than the practice now pursued? Could any person suppose, because the chancellor of the exchequer every year took a sum of money from one pocket and placed it in another, that therefore a great benefit resulted to the money market? Visionary sums could produce no effect on the market; and of the sinking fund a very small portion was appropriated to the liquidation of the national debt: the rest was expended in the public service. They might be told, that it was convenient, in peace or in war, to have the command of such a sum; but while they were using it in this way, they should take care not to call it a sinking fund. Nothing could be more absurd. It reminded him of Lord Peter in the "Tale of a Tub," who, while he was inviting his brothers to cat bread, declared that they should not have any, unless they swore that they believed it to be mutton. With respect to the alleged effect of the sinking fund in depressing the rate of interest, he was of opinion that it produced no such effect. He I should have no objection if the sinking fund were extended to 4,000,000l. or 5,000,000l., provided he was satisfied that those 5,000,000l. were indispensably necessary to keep down the rate of interest, and to keep up the public stocks. But what did he learn from experience? The noble lord and the country knew well, that for some time past there was no such thing in reality, but merely the name of a sinking fund. Let them examine the statement laid on the table by the noble earl, relative to the expenditure and interest, for the year 1819; and they would find that far from there being any indispensable necessity for a sinking fund of 5,000,000l. in order to depress the rate of interest, there was in fact only 1,500,000l. Had the smallness of the sum any effect on the national funds? He believed it would be found, that not only did the price of stocks remain stationary, but, what was of more importance, that the rate of interest in the general money market was not affected in the slightest degree in consequence of the insignificance of the sinking fund. The fact was, that wherever the rate of profit was low, there the interest of money would also be low, without any adventitious aid. If any thing existed which would induce those who possessed money to lend it on mortgage for less than five per cent, the house might be assured that it was not to be sought for in the operation of any sinking fund. No; when the rate of profit was low, it forced money on the land. The sinking fund had no effect on mortgages; but reduced profits had a very great effect on them. Let the noble earl apply these facts to the conclusion which he had just come to, when he pointed out the danger of withdrawing a fund which had already been withdrawn to so great an extent, and he would perceive that his conclusion was not accurate. When the sinking fund was 17,000,000l., and a part of it was made use of for the public service, they heard very little of a breach of the public faith; there were but few appeals to the name of Mr. Pitt; no person exerted himself to save it from the hands of the chancellor of the exchequer; but the moment they came to the mysterious number five—so soon as it was reduced from 17,000,000l. to 5,000,000l, then it was considered sacrilegious to touch it! Having then gone with the noble earl, in regard to the sinking fund, from 17,000,000l. down to 8,000,000l. and even to 4,000,000l., the House was now to be told, because the surplus had reached 5,000,000l., that there would be an end of public faith it the sinking fund were invaded: that the whole edifice of the state would be ruined and subverted if any attempt were made to apply the 5,000,000l. in any other way than in that which was dictated by the noble earl. The noble earl next asked whether any man in the country would contend that the remission of 4,000,000l. or 5,000,000l. of taxes could produce any great relief to the country? But, had not the man thus appealed to, a right to turn round upon the noble earl, and ask what great effect such a sinking fund could produce upon the national debt? The average duration of peace might be calculated at six years; and, would the application of four or five millions, annually, occasion such an extraordinary diminution of the public debt as to enable the government, at the end of the six years, to meet a war with firmness and confidence? He could not help thinking that the noble earl had been advisedly obscure upon the point whether the 5,000,000l. applied to the sinking fund would be attended with a corresponding relief to the country from taxes. [The Earl of Liverpool said something across the table not audible at the bar.] He understood the noble earl to say, that that matter would be open to the decision of parliament; but unquestionably, if any thing were meant, it must be understood that the country must look prospectively to some relief. Flu wished, however, to take it most favourably, that relief would be given to the whole extent of the 5,000,000l., and then, at the opening of a war in six years, the country would be in this situation—The debt would be 800,000,000l., the sinking fund would have reduced it to the extent of 40,000,000l., and the country would thus have been redeemed from taxes to the extent of 1,200,000l. Thus including the abandonment of the malt tax, after six years of peace, and the annual application of 5,000,000l. to the sinking fund, in 1828 the country would actually find itself burthened with more taxes than it had paid in 1818. He, therefore, called upon the house, if there was any thing in the arguments he had used in favour of relief from taxation, if he had, in any respect, succeeded in showing that all possible impulse should be given to the consumption of articles now taxed, not to delay that relief for six years, when at the end of that period, out of 50,000,000l. of taxes, only 1,200,000l. would be removed. With the utmost diffidence, and in opposition to the opinion of the noble earl, he felt himself bound to say, that in his view the removal at the present moment of taxes to the amount of 4 or 5,000,000l. would be attended with much more extensive advantages to the distressed, than any thing that could be gained by an insignificant diminution of the public debt. In the latter case, the operation was simple and direct; but in the former, the operation was both direct and indirect: it was two-fold; and it was impossible to ascertain, with any precision, to what degree the removal now of 5,000,000l. of taxes might increase the consumption of the country. When the noble earl called upon his opponents to state to what they looked for the redemption of the public debt he (the marquis) was ready to admit, that he thought the country in a condition of depression and suffering, that justified an experiment relying upon the natural resources of the empire. He entertained the opinion (and though he might be mistaken, he held it as confidently as he could hold any opinion) that if an impulse were now given to consumption, by removing taxes to the extent of 4 or 5,000,000l. upon articles of necessity, at the end of a few years there would be a very large surplus revenue—perhaps much larger than that now contemplated in the project of ministers. Individuals would thus be placed in a situation of greater affluence and ease, and the increased and increasing surplus might be then safely applied to the diminution of the public debt. He might be wrong—the noble earl might be wrong; but he thought that parliament would be justified in trying the experiment boldly.

With regard to what had fallen from the noble earl, on the subject of the loan from the Bank of England, he could hardly suppose the noble earl and his colleagues serious, when they contended that it would give any direct assistance. Least of all could he think them serious, when they suggested the loan as a means of parochial relief. It could only lead to needless extravagance in parishes for a time, which must, in the end, be followed by an aug- mentation of the original evils. If by any means the circulation of the country could be safely increased, it might be attended with beneficial consequences. The greatest care must, however, be taken, not to raise that circulation above its natural level. If it were so raised, the result of issuing the 4 or 5,000,000l. could only be, that gold to that extent would be forced out of the country; and when, by unavoidable fluctuations, it returned, the greatest dangers might result from the violence of the operation. After the fullest reflection, he entertained, in concurrence with the noble earl, all his original notions on the subject of the change effected in currency. Not that he did not feel the extent to which it had interfered with private contracts—not that he did not feel the unequal pressure of the alteration on different classes; but, looking back to the state in which we were, previous to its adoption, he saw no other mode by which the nation could have been extricated. It could not escape from its situation without the trial of some calamitous experiment; and the more it was delayed the more imminent was the danger. Having resorted to this measure, and having completed it, parliament, he considered, was bound to adhere to it, and to persevere in the principle of a metallic standard. Whether that standard should be gold or silver, was one of the subordinate questions into which it was not necessary now to enter. Upon that subject, as well as upon the duty of parliament to the public creditor, he entertained the most distinct opinion. He was equally clear that some other remedy ought to be found for the distresses of the country, and especially of agriculture, than withdrawing lands from cultivation, and throwing hands out of employment.—He had now, riot without considerable anxiety, discharged his duty, by the distinct statement of his feelings and impressions at the present crisis; and he had only to repeat, in conclusion, that it would be more advantageous generally to the country, more effectual in its relief to the suffering classes, and equally safe to the public creditor, if all the relief contemplated in the course of the next six years were at once afforded, by which a new impulse would be given to capital and industry. Events, of course, might occur, that no man could foresee; but at least the project he suggested gave a fair chance of important benefit.

Lord King

commenced, by ridiculing the manner in which the vast promises of ministers had been fulfilled. He also adverted to the notion so industriously promulgated on the other side, that to remove taxes was to hasten ruin. He said, that in the year 1811, the House of Commons had thought fit to put upon record the opinions of a very grave personage (no less a man than the chancellor of the exchequer) on the subject of the currency; for a resolution had been entered on the journals, stating, "that in public estimation, Bank notes are equal in value to gold." In the same way he should suggest, that it would be wise in the House of Lords to register the opinion of the first lord of the Treasury on the subject now under consideration, and it might be done in something like the following terms:—"Resolved, that in public estimation, the amount of taxation has not in any degree contributed to the existing distresses—that taxation is no evil—that though France and Holland have also an excess of produce, their excess has occasioned much happiness, and our excess much misery—that the only fit mode of relieving that misery is by the reduction of the rate of interest, and that the application of a surplus of 5,000,000l. to the sinking fund will most effectually accomplish that object." The leading article in the ministerial creed was, "I believe that taxation is not the cause of distress;" and the noble earl had taken infinite pains, by reference to Holland and America, and by the lucky windfall of the address of the French chamber of deputies, to prove that other countries were suffering like this from an excess of production. Some of the kingdoms of Asia were also severely distressed, and might have been brought forward had they suited the purposes of the noble earl: but their distress was occasioned by the too large draughts made by the government upon the industry of the people. Such was precisely the condition of Great Britain. If he understood the argument, it was this:—"Taxation is not the cause of distress, because it does not produce cheap prices, and the cheapness of produce is the occasion of the existing sufferings." The noble earl, however, seemed to forget that taxation increased the cost of raising the produce, and that cost and nothing else, was the real cause of the distress. The noble earl argued, that the newly-enclosed lands should not be cultivated; but how hap- pened it that even the old lands could not now be cultivated? They gave no profit, and that which for a century had been a source of growing emolument, now paid no rent at all. The noble earl boasted of the reductions of taxation already made; but if they had not been made, it would have been impossible for the country to, have gone on. When the noble earl said that the taxes had been reduced to a greater degree than the country suffered by an alteration of the currency, did he mean to deny that the indirect taxes of the Excise had been amazingly augmented, within the last twenty years? Did not these affect the cost of raising the produce of the soil? Leather, soap, candles, tea, and malt, were all necessaries, and the taxes upon these had all their prejudicial operation. Ministers rested upon three principles: first, that excessive taxation was not the cause of distress; next, that relief was to be expected only from reducing the rate of interest; and thirdly, that the application of the 5,000,000l. to the sinking fund would reduce the rate of interest all over the kingdom. Such were the doctrines preached by ministers, for the last six years—with occasional varieties and transient absurdities, to be sure; but still they had generally stuck to their text. One of their agreeable varieties was, that a superabundant population was the cause of the distress; but this soon yielded to a superabundance of produce, and that to a superabundance of gold. For six years, however, the three principles be had mentioned had been more or less preached as gospel, and in some instances they had been swallowed with as much implicit faith as ministers could desire. Ministerial pamphlets and newspapers, ministerial scribblers and runners, had long maintained, that taxation was no evil, and caused no distress; and it was a position well suited for the knaves who profited by it, and for the fools who were ruined by it. Even parliamentary majorities had been found pliant enough to admit it; but after all, came the real difficulty, and it was this—that government had extracted too much from the industrious and productive to give it to the idle and unproductive. So large a portion of the gross produce of the land was taken from those who raised it, that a sufficient remuneration for them was not left behind. Perhaps, the noble earl might contend, that there was too much capital; and he could, undoubtedly, find it very easy to drive the capital out of the country. Such were the glorious absurdities of this new school of political economy! It might not be difficult to reduce the country even to a worse condition than at present; but even if the produce were diminished, and the capital expelled, hereafter they might both be restored, and then the evils now complained of would be renewed. The great objection to taxation was, that it was a bar to all future improvement: it prevented capital from returning a fair profit, and industry from obtaining its reward. To be sure, the doctrine of to-day was I one of exceeding comfort; nothing need be done but to take away a great part of the produce, and all would be right: that was the scheme, the remedy, the unfailing resource of the minister of finance, who might well pride himself upon taking away what was not of the slightest utility. This was one of the delusions attempted to be practised upon public credulity.—The noble earl had next told the House—that it must look to the effect of natural causes, and to Providence. But, who were they that gave this advice? The very men, who for twenty years, had been counteracting the effects of natural causes, and resisting the beneficent operations of Providence. Their excessive taxation had reduced this country to the condition of one with a bad climate and a wretched soil; and yet they had the face to come to parliament and say, "look to nature and Providence for a remedy!" From Providence a remedy might come, but assuredly it would never come from ministers. The noble earl expressed great satisfaction at the large surplus of 5,000,000l. for the sinking fund; but he could not give a stronger argument than this surplus, in favour of diminishing taxation. The noble earl could not hear of reductions in the establishments beyond half a million; but elsewhere, as appeared by the newspapers, it had been clearly made out, that if the establishments were brought down to the scale of 1792, not less than 5,500,000l. might be saved. Thus, with the 5,000,000l. now proposed to be added to the sinking fund, a substantial relief might be given, in the shape of not less than 10,000,000l. of taxes annually. Having spent nine-tenths of his life in imposing taxes, the noble earl now stood up in his place to preach a sinking fund and economy to accomplish it. A first lord of the Treasury, was by nature of his office a spendthrift, and he was out of his element when he spoke of economy. After imposing heavy taxes, he proposed to make the burthen a little more oppressive, as he contended, for the sake of lightening the load: he only required time, patience, and money, and he would make every body rich, contented, and happy. He (lord K.) felt by no means sure, that the real purpose of devoting five millions to the sinking fund, was to reduce the debt. What security was there, that it might not be applied to subsidize foreign powers, and to enable the ministry to use high sounding language to them as to our national wealth and prosperity? Such language would be much more becoming after some part of the weight of taxation had been removed. He would only trouble the House with one point more, and that related to the 4,000,000l. to be given to parishes. At first, the noble earl seemed to feel no possible objection to this project; but, after a little consideration, it turned out that there was one slight obstacle to it—namely, that it was impracticable. The conclusion was, that as it could not be advanced to parishes, it ought to be lent for the purpose of jobbing in the funds. The present was most undoubtedly a period of more than ordinary distress, confined not merely to the property of agriculturists, but extending to their personal and mental feelings. So extreme was that distress—so urgent did the necessity appear for terminating it—that he thought even strong or violent measures were justifiable in the attempt to attain that object.

Lord Ellenborough

could not attribute the existing distress to an excess of cultivation, as that had rather diminished than increased within the last few years. In his opinion, it was the great excess of produce last year, combined with the effect of the change in the currency, which had created the fall in price, to which the distress was owing. He agreed with the noble marquis, that the great taxation under which the country laboured, contributed to the distress of the farmer as a grower; but he could not agree with him that the diminution of taxes to the amount of 5,000,000l. would afford him any sensible relief. If it were given as a direct bounty upon wheat, it could only raise the price about 5s. per quarter. Besides, if the taxes were removed, the benefit of that removal would not be felt for a considerable time; owing to combinations to the disadvantage of the consumer. He was inclined to think that parliament ought to direct its attention either to lessening the supply, or increasing the demand, in order to prevent the existing glut in the market. In smaller states a measure had sometimes been advantageously adopted by the government for this purpose: it was, to buy up grain when the price was low, and to sell it again when the price was improved. This effect was generally produced by corn-merchants who speculated in grain; but if the evidence before the agricultural committee were correct, the capital of those merchants was now locked up in the foreign corn warehouses. He did not mean to recommend such a course by government under ordinary circumstances, but the present was a period of peculiar difficulty and distress: the capital of the farmer was gradually reduced, and the independence of the agricultural interest greatly invaded and injured. An occasional sally of ill humour, on account of the conduct of parliament, had frequently before been exhibited by those persons who had been labouring under distress; but that transient feeling of dissatisfaction was now changed to one of a permanent and settled character. Under these circumstances, he thought it necessary that some extraordinary measure, not perhaps justified by the ordinary principles of political economy, should be adopted, in order to remove the present distress, and with it the feeling of hostility which it engendered. He was disposed to agree with the noble earl opposite, that more benefit would ultimately arise from the maintenance of a sinking fund than from the reduction of taxation; yet he thought the attention of the government ought not to be exclusively confined to measures of prospective and remote relief, but that the energies of their understandings should be directed to the task of devising some plan for effecting immediate relief.

The Duke of Buckingham

disclaimed any intention of entering into those depths of political economy, into which his predecessors in the debate had wandered. He must, however, declare his dissent from those who attributed to the operation of taxation the distressed state of the agricultural interests. That they were in a state of distress, it did not need any one at that time of day to tell them. But, was this the first time that particular interests of the country had been in a suffering condition, arising out of the circumstances of the times? Did their lordships not all recollect, that the same pressure which now bore upon the agricultural interest had, a few years ago, weighed upon the commercial and manufacturing interests. Could they forget that upon that occasion the distress which prevailed was attributed to the same causes to which the present embarrassment was assigned, and that the only remedy then, as at present, was proposed to be found in a reduction of taxation, and a reform of parliament? Thank God! the effect of that remedy had not been tried; and yet, what was now the situation of the commercial interest of this country? He was happy to say it was prosperous almost beyond example. He made this declaration upon information which he had recently received from some of the principal manufacturing districts. Whenever distress had prevailed at any former period, it had always excited the same clamour, been referred for its origin to the same causes, and been proposed to be removed by the same remedies. Those remedies, however, had not been applied, but the distress had removed itself. If he were called upon to state the causes of the distress which at present pressed upon agriculture, he should say that one of the causes, in addition to those laid down by the noble earl at the head of the government was, the large quantity of poor land which God had never intended should produce wheat, that had been brought into cultivation, in consequence of the high prices which agricultural produce obtained during the war, but which, being necessarily cultivated at greater expense than land of a better quality, did not now return an adequate remuneration to its occupiers. Another source of the present distressed state of agriculture, and which he regretted the noble earl had not touched upon, was the poor-laws. It was impossible that the country could ever be relieved from the burthens which hung around its neck, until some measure should be resorted to, which would have the effect of restoring the poor to the situation in which they formerly stood; namely, that of earning their own bread, instead of living on the country as annuitants; and he trusted that an hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Scarlett) whom he had not the honour to know, but who had last session introduced a measure on this subject in another place, would continue to direct his attention to the attainment of this highly desirable object.—He now came to the means by which it was proposed to remove the difficulties attending the present situation of the country. The noble marquis near him had proposed a reduction of taxation as a means of relief. If, however, the argument of the noble marquis, that taxation was the cause of distress, were well founded, it would apply not alone to the agricultural interest, but to the commercial interest also. The weight of taxation pressed equally on all classes. Flow, then, could taxation grind the farmer into dust—to adopt an expression which had been recently used—and permit the merchant and tradesman to raise their heads? His noble kinsman had stated, that the taxes on salt, tallow, soap, and some other necessary articles of consumption, pressed heavily upon the farmer, and prevented him from deriving any remuneration from the produce of his land. He denied that proposition. If it were true, that the weight of the tax affected the consumption, that which paid the highest tax would be least used, and vice verse. But it would be found, that the contrary was the case, and that, as in the instance of salt and wrought iron, that which paid the highest tax was the least

* The following are the calculations referred to by the Duke of Buckingham:
No. 1.—Estimate of Taxation paid by a Farmer renting 400 Acres—Himself, his Wife, one Woman Servant, and three Men Servants in Family.
Articles. Quantity consumed. Total Cost. Rate of Duty. Total Tax.
£. s. d. New Rate. £ s. d.
Malt 15 Quarters 30 0 0 2s.d. per bushel. 12 15 0
Hops 60 lb 3 0 0 2 d. per lb. 0 10 0
Salt 5 cwt. 8 10 0 30s. per cwt. 7 10 0
Leather for Shoes 12lb 2 4 0 3d. per lb. 0 3 0
Leather for harness 30 lb 3d. per lb. 0 7 6
Tea 10lb 7s 3 10 0 100 per cent. 1 15 0
Sugar 52 lb 6d 1 6 0 100 per cent. 0 13 0
Soap 72 lb 8d 2 8 0 d. per lb. 0 19 6
Candles 72 lb 7½ d. 2 5 0 1d. per lb. 0 6 0
Brandy 1 Gallon 1 5 0 12s.d. per gallon. 0 12 7½
Rum 1 Gallon 1 0 0 10s.d. per gallon. 0 10 4½
Gin 4 Gallon 2 4 0 1s.d. per gallon. 0 10 6
Wearing apparel 1 0 0
Riding Horse 1 2 17 6
Groom 1 0 10 0
Windows 9 2 2 0
Father's Taxes 33 2 0

used. The price of consumption had not yet reached the price of production; and until that was the case, no material relief could be felt by the agriculturist. But with regard to the existing agricultural distress, he had no hesitation in saying that taxation had no material effect upon it. To illustrate this, he would suppose the case of a farm of 400 acres, at two guineas an acre, as to the amount of produce. He supposed 200 acres to be laid out as grass land, 134 acres as beans, spring corn, fallows, &c., and the remaining 66 acres wheat land. These 66 acres would produce 198 quarters, which, valued at 3l. a quarter, would amount to 594l. With a farm thus productive, supposing the farmer's family to consist of himself, wife, one woman servant, and three men servants, they would consume fifteen quarters of malt, the tax on which amounted to 12l. 15s. Making a fair calculation of the quantity of articles of every other description which such a family would consume, it would be found that the total amount of taxes paid to the Crown was 33l. 2s. Of the amount of indirect taxes, which depended on the price of labour, it was not so easy to get at, but the best way would be to take all the taxes which might be considered to fall on land, and throw them back to the farmer. By these calculations* it would appear, that the farmer upon the esta- blishment, and with the labourers therein mentioned, paid annually to government, direct and indirect, taxes to the amount of 39l. 6s.d.—That (without fractions) the whole of the farmer's taxes bear the proportion of 1s. 4d. in the pound on the value of his wheat; or 4s. in each quarter of wheat. In other words, that the value of the quarter of wheat, instead of being 3l., would be 3l. 4s., supposing every tax repealed, to which the farmer and his labourers paid either directly or indirectly to the Crown; and, consequently, that the farmer could only be by possibility the gainer of 4s. per quarter on his wheat, supposing the faith of the country was broken to the public creditor, and the country thereby placed in the situation of national bankruptcy; the taxes affecting his farm being about one-fifteenth part of the wheat produced, or 9l. 16s. 6d. per cent on the rent of his farm, at 20s. per acre. Was it for such an object that public credit

No. 2.—Estimate of Taxation on the Labourers required to cultivate a Farm of 400 Acres, half Grass, half Arable.
Number of Labourers. Articles. Quantity consumed. Total Cost. Rate of Duty. Total Tax.
£.s. d. £.s. d.
3 in the house. Leather 24 lb 6 pair shoes 3 12 0 3d. per lb. 0 6 0
1 married, with wife and child. Leather 10 lb 4 pair 1 18 0 3d. per lb. 0 2 6
Candles 20 lb 7½d. 0 12 6 1d. per lb. 0 1 8
Salt 52 lb 3¾d. 0 16 3 d. per lb. 0 14 1
Soap 13 lb 8d. 0 8 8 d. per lb. 0 3 6½
Tea 5½ lb 7s. 1 18 6 100 per cent. 0 19 3
Sugar 13 lb 6d. 0 6 6 100 per cent. 0 3 3
Ale 1¾ pint per day home-brewed ½. Per pint. 1 2 9¾
2 Labourers Leather 16 lb 4 pair shoes 2 8 0 3d. per lb. 0 4 0
Single men Salt 26 lb at 3¾d. 0 8 1½ d. per lb. 0 7 0½
Soap 13 lb at 8d. 0 8 8 d. per lb. 0 3 6¼
Ale 365 quarts 1d. per quart. 1 10 5
2 Boys Leather 12 lb 4 pair 1 10 0 3d. per lb. 0 3 0
Soap 6½ lb at 8d. 0 4 4 d. per lb. 0 1 9
Salt 6½ lb at 3¾d. 0 2 0 d. per lb. 0 1 9
Total Tax on Labourers 6 4 7
Add the amount of No. 1 33 2 0
Total Taxes paid by the Farmer 39 6 7
No. 3.—Estimated Produce of Wheat grown on a Farm of 400 Acres, half Grass, half Arable.
Grass 200 Acres.
Beans, Spring Corn, Fallow, &c. 134 Acres.
Wheat 66 Acres.
400 Acres.
Produce of 66 Acres at 3 Quarters per Acre, 198 Quarters.
Value of 66 Acres at 3l. per Quarter, 594l.

was to he annihilated? Was that such a necessity as to induce a measure of so much injustice as the abandonment of the good faith of the country towards the public creditor? Could such a charge "run the farmer down," as his noble kinsman supposed? The remedy for the evil which the farmer endured, in his opinion, was for the proprietors of land to follow the example of the manufacturer in his conduct towards his labourers under similar circumstances, and to prevent the farmer from sinking, by making the prices of consumption come down to the prices of produce. Nothing could be done for the farmer unless the landlords met the difficulties of the times, and imitated the example of the manufacturers, when the working manufacturers were similarly distressed. At all events, he hoped that parliament would not adopt any measures inconsistent with the permanent interests of the country; that they would not, after having pursued a steady course for so long a time, now stop short, and consent to sacrifice solid benefits for the attainment of temporary security. If they did, it might then be indeed said, that they had sold their birth-right for a mess of pottage.

Lord Dacre

thought that the opinions entertained by the noble duke were calculated to produce greater delusion than any of the doctrines which he had reprobated, and to excite a larger measure of discontent than that which at present pervaded the country. The noble duke, like other noble lords who had spoken that night, had stated his opinion, that the distress which at present pressed upon the agricultural interest depended on temporary causes, and that the farmer might expect an increased price for his produce. He could not conceive what had led noble lords to that conclusion. It was ascertained that there was a glut of corn on the continent, and it must be admitted that it was occasioned by the non-importation of agricultural produce into this country. The noble earl opposite had alluded to the increase of the population of the country, and had stated that the increase amounted to 4,000,000 since 1801. He (Lord D.) was of opinion that the increased produce of corn was more than adequate to the increased consumption. It was necessary to consider what caused the present low price of corn. He could see no reason why the price of agricultural produce should be higher now than it was in 1791. Setting aside the variations occasioned by the greater or less quantity of the circulating medium, and increased or decreased supply, corn must always obtain the same average price. The natural price of corn must depend on the existing quantity of the circulating medium by which commodities were represented. He was not aware that there was any material difference between the quantity of the circulating medium afloat now, and that which was afloat in 1791. He found it stated on an authority which the noble earl would not feel inclined to dispute that the circulating medium in 1791 consisted of 30,000,000l. of Bank paper and 8,000,000 of guineas. The number of sovereigns at present in circulation amounted to about seven or eight Millions. The amount of Bank paper now in circulation he had not been able to ascertain, but he could not conclude it was greater than in 1791. To deal fairly, however, he ought to state that he was also unable to calculate the power of the circulating medium at the present moment, because its power depended not only on its numerical quantity, but also on the velocity of its operation. But, assuming the velocity of the circulating medium to be indefinitely great, their lordships would perceive that it must produce an infinite effect upon the reduction of prices; and, therefore, he saw no reason to conclude that the present low price of corn was the effect of superabundant sup ply. For his own part, he was satisfied that the agricultural produce of the country was no more than sufficient to meet the increased consumption. The country would be deceived if it were to believe that high prices were to be expected, and that the present low prices were to be attributed to over-production. In support of that proposition, he might be allowed to show that two articles which had not increased in quantity had nevertheless decreased in price in proportion to the fall in the value of corn. The articles to which he alluded were copse wood for firing, and skins. Those articles, without being increased in quantity, had declined in price in exactly the same proportion as corn. The cause to which he attributed this effect, was the diminution of the quantity of the circulating medium. Parliament having rejected the propositions of his late friend, Mr. Horner, and agreed to a resolution, declaring that a pound note and a guinea were of equal value, though the public debt went on increasing rapidly, and upon the return to cash payments, the country found itself loaded with increased taxation to the amount of 30,000,000l. as compared with the year 1791. He did not intend upon the present occasion to offer any farther observations upon the effect which had been produced by the recent change in the amount of the currency. He wished, however, not to be understood in any thing he had said, to have implied a wish again to make any alteration in the amount of the circulating medium. At the same time, he was willing to use every exertion to relieve the agriculturists from the burthens by which they were exclusively borne down and oppressed. He could not, as the noble duke had done, consider the agricultural interest as standing in precisely the same situation as the manufacturing interest, and, therefore, he would not advise the advance of a loan to the former, which had in many cases been made with great advantage to the latter. The manufacturers could always, if there were any demand at all for their produce, force up its price by suspending their manufactures. They could lay by their machinery, until they could obtain a price corresponding to their expectation. Not so the agriculturist. If the price of his produce did not satisfy him, he could not suspend the operation of his machinery, which was man. He was bound by laws—by the poor-laws, which peculiarly pressed upon him, to maintain the population of the country, no matter to what extent it might be thrown upon him for support. He could not tell the poor that he could not afford to relieve them, because the produce of the soil would not sell at a sufficiently high price. From these circumstances, he (Lord D.) concluded, that the advance of a loan which had often afforded great advantages to the manufacturer, would not be attended with any benefit to the agriculturist.—In the view which he took of the subject, he did not think that the late abundant harvest had had any share in producing the reduction which had taken place in the price of corn. Although the late harvest had been great in quantity it was bad in quality; and it might, therefore, be taken as no more than an average year. But if the last harvest had been as good in quality as it had been abundant in quantity, the price of wheat would not now have been more than 4s. a bushel. He thought it was deceiving the agriculturist to hold out to him the expectation of returning high prices. The farmer must look for relief through a reduction of the expenditure. He was not one of those who contended that taxation was the cause of low prices, but he concurred in what his noble friend near him (lord King) had stated the other day; namely—that taxation compelled the farmer to bring his produce prematurely to market. The corn thus forced into the market would not, however, have the effect of lowering the price of the article, because it would fall into the hands of rich speculators, who would, by retaining large quantities of grain in their possession, have it in their power to raise its general price. Taxes prevented the agriculturist from producing, at a low cost, that which he was compelled to sell at a low price. It was impossible for the farmer to continue to pay at a dear rate for labour, and to sell cheap corn. To afford him relief, parliament must either raise the price of his produce, which it was out of its power to do, or diminish the cost of its production, which was fully within the scope of its capability. He would not follow the noble duke in the calculations which he had submitted to the House; but he could assure that noble duke, that he had documents in his possession by which he could plainly show, that the malt, soap, and one or two other taxes that pressed most heavily on the agriculturist, amounted to at least 3s. 6d. per acre on arable land. The amount of the taxes proper to be reduced, in order to meet the distresses of the agriculturist, would not, in amount, exceed the present savings, and the surplus fund, which had been so much expatiated upon by the noble earl opposite. Indirect taxation—he meant that system of taxation which operated on the price of leather, salt, and other necessaries of life—was felt most particularly on the pauper portion of the people. Indirect taxation was that which required alleviation most pressingly. It was that burthen which, as a matter of necessity, the people must be speedily relieved from, as far as that relief could possibly be granted. But respecting this matter, it was unnecessary that he should trespass on the time of the House; because his noble friend (the marquis of Lansdown) had opened it to their lordships, in a speech which he was sure would not easily be erased from the minds of those who had heard him. As other opportunities would speedily occur of discussing the topics connected with the present question, he would not any longer occupy the time of their lordships. He had felt anxious to say thus much, lest it should by any accident be supposed that their lordships held out to the agriculturists any delusive hope, that increased prices would in themselves prove a sufficient remedy for existing distresses. He was perfectly convinced, that the only remedy which could be applied to the multiplied evils under which the agricultural interest was labouring, and the only remedy which their lordships would conscientiously concur in holding forth as really effectual, was reduced taxation, and consequently alleviation of the charge of production.

The Duke of Buckingham

said, that his calculations were not meant to apply to the general question of taxation, as it had been put in issue, but only to the question of its effect on agricultural produce under particular circumstances.

The Earl of Harrowby

contended, that the existing distress was mainly owing to excessive production. In the years 1818 and 1819, no less than 2,500,000 quarters of corn were brought into the market. The harvests of the years 1819, 1820 and 1821, were beyond all proportion more productive than those of several years preceding. If their lordships added to these facts the increased importation of corn during the same period from Ireland, they would find that there was abundant reason for the present distress. But, beyond all this, another powerful cause was to be traced to the diminution which had taken place in the circulating medium of the country, owing to our return to cash payments. Enough, he trusted, had been said, and particularly by a noble duke to whom the House was so much indebted for the clear and able demonstrations which he had afforded of his propositions—enough had been said to remove that fatal delusion which had been with so much industry, propagated through the country; namely, that taxes were the cause of low prices. The contrary was the fact; although no man in his senses would attempt, on the other hand, to deny that, to a certain extent, taxation must be an aggravation of any public distress of a nature like that which was now complained of. But it was only to a certain extent, as the noble duke and other noble lords had shown; and it was by no means a sufficient cause to be adduced, in explanation of the general principles of that distress. In answer to an observation which had fallen from a noble lord, relative to the amount of country bank notes in circulation at different periods, he would state, in round numbers what that amount was in different years. In 1815 the circulation of country paper was 15,000,000l.; in 1816 it was 15,500,000l.; in 1817 it was 16,000,000l.; in 1819 it was 16,500,000l.; in 1820 it had fallen to 11,000,000l., and in 1821. it was no more than 7,000,000l. Their lordships would also take into consideration, that latterly there had been a very considerable reduction in the amount of the paper of the Bank of England. With respect to the distresses at present prevailing among the growers of corn, he did think that they had arisen, in a great measure, out of their own improvident speculations, and out of their omission to make proper provision, in the time of their prosperity and abundance, for that day of reckoning and of distress which, in any exercise of human prudence or foresight, they must have anticipated. As to the sinking fund, and the application to it of the 5,000,000l. of surplus revenue, he entirely approved of the measure which had been taken. Whatever inroads had been made upon the sinking-fund, he must contend, that, if it were broken down and done away with altogether, public credit would receive a greater blow, and national faith be more impugned, than by any other measure that had ever been adopted.

Lord Redesdale

said, he had taken the opinion of several intelligent agricultural men of his acquaintance, and the result of their information, added to that laid before parliament, seemed to be decisive of the truth of the position, that every farmer who was now afloat, on borrowed capital, or who had raised money on mortgage, even one half of his capital on the land or otherwise, must, without extraordinary assistance, be inevitably ruined. He agreed with the noble earl, that the distress of the agricultural classes arose from temporary causes, which, in the course of a short time, must cease, and then the agriculturist would find himself restored to his former level in society. He was old enough to recollect what farming was fifty years ago; the principle which was then applied to farming was, that the produce was divided by thirds; a third went to the landlord for rent, a third to the farmer, and a third to pay the expense of expense of cultivation. For the last twenty years, this system had been completely changed, and the produce was now, by skilful surveyors, divided into fifths, of which three-fifths went towards cultivation, and the remaining two-fifths were divided between the landlord and the former. He thought the situation of the farmer at present like that of the gentleman, who, being taken alarmingly ill, sent to collect various physicians to a consultation upon the nature of his disease and its remedy. During the consultation, one advised on thing, another another, and the dissention thus generated amongst themselves, became at length so boisterous, that the patient desired his servant to turn them all out of doors, and leave him to himself. The story ran, that he soon after per- fectly recovered: and such, he verily believed, would be the case with the farmer, if he exerted his own judgment, and rejected the counsels of those who were more ignorant of his condition than he was himself.

The motion was then agreed to.