Lords Sitting of 27 March 1821

NAPLES.
Lord Ellenboroughrose for the purpose of moving an address to his majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to offer his mediation to the emperor of Austria and the governments of Naples and Sardinia, with a View to bring about an amicable adjustment of their differences, consistently with the honour of all parties. When the noble marquis (Lansdown) near him had submitted a motion On the affairs of Naples some time ago, he (lord E.) had then expressed an apprehension, that at no distant period Austria herself might wish for the interference of this country, to enable her to retire from the contest with honour. That moment, as it appeared to him, was now arrived; and he called on their lordships to place this country in the proud situation of acting as mediator between the belligerent powers, and arresting the progress of a contest which might extend itself to other countries. It appeared to him that they were called upon to interpose at that moment, because it was the first moment when their mediation could be offered with effect. Whatever opinions he might entertain with respect to the conduct of Austria, and of the allied powers generally, he would observe the greatest moderation in what he should address to their lordships when speaking of those powers, and particularly of Austria herself. For, however he might lament and disapprove of her present policy, he was bound to acknowledge the great services she had rendered to the whole of Europe. He could not avoid recollecting her conduct in 1805 and the zeal with which she sprung forward when this country was threatened with invasion; he also recollected her conduct in 1809, when she seized the first moment of hope, and exerted herself for the expulsion of the French from Spain; and lastly, he remembered her faith and loyalty in 1813, which led to the successes of Europe and

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the triumph of the combined armies before the gates of Paris. He was aware of the important functions which she had performed, and was still destined to perform, in the system, of Europe; and, much as he lamented the nature of that system as it was now manifested, he was not prepared to incur all the risks and chances of war for the, assertion of contrary principles. It was not in hostility to Austria, but for the benefit of our firmest ally, that he called upon them to afford Austria an opportunity of withdrawing with, honour from the contest. He would call upon the House to consider the state in, which the affairs of Austria and, Naples stood. The road to Naples was not so easy as had been expected; and the Austrians had found that instead of an undisciplined rabble, they had to contend against a military force, and to adopt the cautious movements which were necessary to be employed against skilful opponents. Even had Austria been successful in any general engagement, the nature of the country, the enthusiasm of the people, the solemn obligation of oaths by which they were bound together, must yet protract the struggle. When they considered what had taken place in Spain, and compared the circumstances of that country with those of Naples, they would see that there was no reason to believe the situation of her cause less favourable than that of Spain. The House would also do well to consider, that since the revolution, the Neapolitan army had become one of the best disciplined in Europe; and he would entreat them to reflect, that Austria, who bad entered into the contest with the expectation of crushing the power of Naples at once, had as yet made no sensible impression on her resources. It had been truly said, that the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church. In the same way, the blood of the Neapolitans, would be the seed of the liberties of Italy. They had proved the truth of the maxim, that when a country was attacked with danger, and a spirit of resistance was awakened, in the people, it was safer to compromise the dispute than to encounter the difficulties of subduing them. The effort to put down the spirit enkindled by the Carbonari would put Austria to an expense which must destroy that system of economy which, was necessary to her establishment as a great power in Europe. But when they looked to the other powers by which
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Austria was surrounded, must she not be anxious to escape from the contest upon that ground? It was impossible that Austria could forget the conduct of Russia in 1807, or in 1809, when, instead of joining she opposed the power of Austria. It was impossible: that she could forget her conduct, surrounded as she was by states from whose territories she had made accessions, and not always in a manner the most honourable to her character as a nation. The separation of. Finland from Sweden, and the circumstances under which it was accomplished, must be fresh in the recollection of Austria and the general principle pursued by Russia in her military policy, could leave little room to doubt that she would fight for herself in Italy, and require cessions from Austria at a moment when she was least capable of resisting the demand. But even if Austria still believed in the good faith of Russia, could she look with a total want of suspicion to the state of France? What was the situation of France? She had obtained a constitution founded upon great principles, which she had force enough to protect: and though her legislators had not entered into details, which time could best supply, the principles already recognised were a great benefit to the country. Such being the situation, of France, with the Netherlands upon one side, jealous of their separation, and anxious for a re-union with that country to which they were most attached, was nothing to be apprehended from such a quarter? Again, what was the situation, of the Duchies within the Rhine? It was well known that they, too, would gladly reunite with the country from which they had been separated. But what was the situation of the Italian states themselves? Was it not probable that they would feel, that they could have no hope of succeeding without calling in the power of France to drive out the power of Russia. In his opinion, the entrance of a Russian army would be followed immediately by the entrance of a French army to counteract their movements, and join the war. They might then anticipate the probable annexation of all the countries within the Rhine to France, which had been separated from her by the treaty of Paris. The of Prussia, too, who had fought not only for their king, but for themselves, and who justly expected a constitution in return for their services, were actuated by a spirit unfavourable to the cause in, which

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Austria had embarked. The spirit of the North of Germany exhibited at that moment a class of men who were Carbonari in principle, and Germans in courage; and it was impossible not to see that the continuance of the war might rouse the Germans, and place Prussia in the situation in which Austria now stood, with respect to her Italian provinces.—Under ail the circumstances, it seemed natural to suppose that Austria would be thankful to this country for interfering, to enable her to retire with honour from the contest. The greatest difficulty which he expected was on the side of the Italian powers; but when they considered the great force that could be brought against them, and that Italy, their own Italy, must otherwise become the seat of war, with a prospect of being left more oppressed and desolate than ever; when they considered, that however justifiable their views, or elevated their enthusiasm, those views might be answered more efficaciously, and that enthusiasm attended with better effect, by the mediation of such a power as Great Britain, than by the chances of any war in which they could engage, they too would be thankful for the offer. But if Austria should still be deaf to the voice of reason, it appeared to him, that without threatening war, there was one threat, if indeed it might be called a threat, from which some influence might be produced on her decision. If the war continued, this country might at length be compelled to join; but whether compelled or not, was it to be expected that such a people could witness a contest between despotism and freedom, without taking any interest in the issue? But suppose the English would not do so, they knew that the French would, and they knew the effect which such assistance must produce on the disposition of the countries towards each other. This was felt in the case of America and France; they were attached to each other by the assistance afforded to the former at the revolution. Whatever the policy of government might be, there was no denying that the feeling of the English people was with the Italians; and he was sure he might safely say, that there was not an English gentleman who bad set foot on the other side of the Alps, who did not feel himself an Italian with respect to the present contest. He had not annexed any principle of this kind to his motion, leaving it entirely to his majesty's ministers to carry the motion into
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effect in the way which they thought the most advisable. The address move was, "That his Majesty would be graciously pleased to use his mediation to restore peace between the contending parties, on such terms as would preserve the honour of Austria, and the tranquillity and independence of Italy."
The Earl of Aberdeenopposed the motion. There were, he observed, many difficulties attached to the course recommended by the noble lord. In the first place, it was known that the king of Naples had issued a proclamation, calling upon his subjects to receive the Austrians as friends, and not as enemies; and it was far from being desirable that this country should place itself in the situation of judge between the king of Naples and the persons now exercising the government neither was it to be presumed, that the king's authority was so far gone, or that of the Carbonari so firmly established, as to render it certain that the proclamation would not be eventually obeyed. By adopting the motion, they would be guilty of that interference which was directly opposite to the course which they professed to follow. But supposing they had got over that difficulty, the noble lord had not explained very distinctly the manner in which he would have the mediation proposed. Did he mean to offer terms of perfect equality to both parties? The duty of a mediator was not that of a judge; but the motion looked rather like a sharp remonstrance to Austria than a moderate interference. In fact, it was impossible to preserve the cool spirit of mediation between two powers, under a belief that an unwarrantable aggression had been committed upon one side: That the character of a peace maker became a great country like this, he did not deny, but there should be some probability of success to warrant such an interference, and the only case in which they could have any chance of success was, where both parties were desirous of mediation. The noble lord had thrown out a species of threat, that if Austria did not consent, this country should recall the prohibition to its officers against joining the Neapolitans. Whether that prohibition was wise or not, every reason that made in favour of it, in the first instance, was still in full force; but did the noble lord think that the mere circumstance of granting permission to a few officers would have the effect of changing the

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counsels of a powerful government? If they erected themselves in to the character of judges, they were not mediators; if they professed to act as friends, they should speak the language of friendship, and not accompany their recommendation with an imbecile threat, The effect of the noble lord's proposition would be to injure the good understanding which at present existed between Austria and England. He did not wish to see Austria replaced in all her ancient possessions, taut he wished to see her remain in possession: of all she now had; not only for her own sake, but with a view to British interests, and the general security of Europe. It was impossible that any man who looked to the different states of Europe, should not be struck with the attachment which the population of that country felt towards this. An interference, such as was now proposed, would not only produce an effect of the government itself, but: would be likely to excite feelings of anger and bitterness on the part of the, whole population; and by that means disturb a better security for national attachment than treaties could establish. When he inculcated the importance of maintaining the friendship of Austria he spoke the language of all the wisest statesmen, and particularly that of a great man, whose opinions would be respected by the noble lords on the other side. He had heard Mr. Fox say, after the battle of Austerlitz, that Austria was still the country to which England ought to look. The subsequent conduct of Austria had justified the remark. On looking to the circular of lord Castlereagh, which he considered one of the wisest and most judicious papers ever issued from the Foreign office, they would find an express reprobation of the principle of interfering in the government of other states. They would see in it a particular exception which might apply to the case of Austria herself, in respect to Naples. Was not this country bound to adhere strictly to the principle she had so laid down? The time might come when her mediation would be acceptable, but it would be the more acceptable in proportion as we were exact in the observance of a strict neutrality.
The motion was put, and negatived.