Lords Sitting of 2 March 1821

NAPLES—CONDUCT OF THE ALLIED POWERS.
The Marquis of Lansdownrose, pursuant to his notice, to call the attention of their lordships to the transactions which had been, and which he feared, were still carrying on in the South of Italy. However strong his personal opinion on the subject he hardly knew whether he should have had the courage to introduce a subject of such importance, if he had not felt, after what had passed in that House, and in another place, that he was supported by the universal voice of the people of this country. With that conviction on his mind, he should have thought it an omission of duty, if he had not endeavoured to give to the general feeling the most effectual expression. He was the more inclined to do this, when he perceived by the latest accounts from the head quarters of the allies, that a most extraordinary delusion still prevailed amongst them as to the real sentiments of the British government. Notwithstanding the circular written by the secretary for Foreign affairs, and the explanations given to the continental powers, it appeared from the contents of the declaration lately arrived, and of the authenticity of which no doubt could be entertained
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that up to the moment in February when it had been issued, the most extraordinary delusion existed, and was announced to the people of the continent, respecting the sentiments with which the proceedings against Naples were viewed by his majesty's government. It was his object, therefore, to place the opinion of the government and of the House beyond all possibility of doubt. In doing so he should avoid as much as possible recurring to the past conduct, or rather omission, of his majesty's ministers. He wished to take no advantage of that; much as he lamented that so many months should have elapsed without their finding it possible to make foreign ministers understand their motives—much as he was surprised that the secretary for Foreign affairs, who was personally acquainted with those ministers, should also have been unable to make them comprehend the views of this country, but should on the contrary have led them into a total misapprehension of them. The only use which he wished to make of that circumstance was, to impress upon their lordships the paramount duty which they owed to themselves and to their country, of making known and publicly embodying their sentiments. He should first consider what were the principles which the Allied Powers had proclaimed on the present occasion, and on which they had founded their proceedings; and, in the next place, what consequences were likely to result from their acting upon those principles. On the outset he must also state, that in speaking of the courts of Vienna, Berlin, and Petersburgh, he meant no disrespect to those courts; neither did he object, whilst governing their own territories, to their acting that part which became great powers, and which they had occasionally done to advantage. Because the principles on which such governments were formed, were such as he could not approve, he did not wish to interfere with their internal administration, for he well new that the nature of human affairs required the existence of different governments. He well knew in the commencement of the French revolution, when one of the wild dreams of those men misnamed philosophers, proposed to to reduce all governments to something like one uniform system, that such an attempt must fail. Whether it tended to make all nations equally free or equally slaves, to establish anarchy or despotism,

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failure, he was convinced must attend, and he fervently hoped, would attend such an attempt. As on the former occasion, a sort of republican purity was set up for a pattern, so now the standard was a certain monarchical principle into which were admitted only a very few grains of the alloy of liberty. This monarchical principal was that which he had with surprise and astonishment seen laid down in the document to which he had already alluded. It was stated, that the measures undertaken, and the views disclosed by the allied powers, were in conformity with the principles of the British government. Though particular relations and motives were stated to prevent our taking part in the resolutions of the other allied courts, yet it was asserted that this government had the same views, and that, as far as principles went, this government was perfectly agreed with the other powers. These principles had been disclosed at Troppau, and afterwards at Lnybach. It was then full time for their lordships to consider what they really were; and he found them most distinctly explained in that state paper which had lately appeared under the title of the declaration of the allied powers against Naples. He saw in that declaration a complete exposé, of the false and wicked grounds on which the allied powers pretended to justify their attack on an independent kingdom. It was stated, that there existed a sect in Naples dangerous to the repose of Italy; and the existence of this sect was made a foundation for the proceedings adopted against the new government. What was said about this sect might be as truly as lie believed it to be falsely slated; still, the allied powers were not entitled to draw from that circumstance any reason for attacking Naples. He was willing to admit that in a free country the existence of a secret political sect might be attended with mischievous consequence: but with its existence or non-existence foreign governments had nothing to do. Was he called on to condemn the existence of such a sect in a country in which men might by necessity be driven to take refuge under secrecy and disguise? That the sect described was to be found in Naples, was a circumstance far from constituting the right or the necessity of interference. But without the existence of something like a sect, certainly no improvement could have been made in the government of Naples, or any other
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arbitrary government. The particular sect, alluded to was not of recent origin. Its existence, under the name of the Carbonari, might be traced in Italy up to the time of the emperor Leopold. The Carbonari received the particular protection of those who looked for their assistance in emancipating Italy from the power of France. Their encouragement was then considered a most effectual means of gaining that object; and yet the share this sect had had in the late revolution of Naples was put forward by Austria as a ground of condemnation notwithstanding that power had formerly sought the support of the Carbonari. But the Carbonari were not only called a political sect, but were accused of working in the dark. This charge was very extraordinary when it was considered that the accused sect was stated to be existing in a country in which the public manifestation of its wishes could not fail to draw down Upon it all the vengeance of the government. Did the persons who defended the conduct of Austria mean to say that the Carbonari ought to have posted up on the church-doors a notice, stating, that on such a day they were to begin the revolution, and giving warning, as in legal matters, for the other parties, the courts of Austria, Berlin, and Petersburgh, to come and oppose them? Was it not obvious that any change of an arbitrary government could only be effected by that sort of art which seemed to be in the eyes of the allied powers, the whole corpus delicti of which they complained. The declaration proceeds to describe the late government of Naples as full of paternal kindness, and infers that that amiable character, and the endeavours to introduce into all branches of the administration essential improvements, had had the effect of putting a stop for a time to the designs of the Carbonari. The reason, however, why all the efforts of the Carbonari in concert with the people were unsuccessful was, not that stated in the declaration, but the presence of the Austrian army. It was neither the improvement nor the deterioration of the branches of administration that suspended the efforts of the Carbonari. There was one branch of administration, the improvement of which he knew, from good authority, to have been neglected. There had been no remission of taxes. There was besides, in that country no enjoyment of personal security, no protection for pre-

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perty. He could speak with the most perfect confidence on this subject. One instance he would state to their lordships. About four or five years ago there was a scarcity amounting almost to famine in Naples, and at that time one of the ministers held a share in a monopoly of corn. At that time a British general officer was applied to, on the part of an individual, to use his interest to procure his release from prison. The officer found him confined in a dungeon half full of water. The unfortunate man stated that he was not conscious of having committed any crime, and that he was not informed of any charge having been made against him. The only thing he could recollect was, that he had some conversation about the disposal of corn, and that the transaction had reference to the concerns of the minister, for he had a share in the monopoly. The British officer went immediately to the minister, but he denied any knowledge of the imprisonment. The officer returned to the prison, where the gaoler told him that the man was confined by the express order of the minister. He then went again to the minister, to whom he could not on this second occasion obtain access; but he was told by the secretary, that; the imprisonment of the man had been ordered because it was understood that the minister might wish to speak to him. The prisoner was finally set at liberty, and owed his release to the interference of this English general officer, whose name he could mention were it necessary. Was this a state of things which did not require a changer Or was it one which foreign powers were entitled to describe as the result of the care of a paternal government? But the declaration stated that the new constitution had been imposed on the king. Now the king appeared to have given it his voluntary consent, and no effort had been made to compel him. But then it was objected to, because it was the Spanish constitution. He was not going to undertake the defence of the Spanish constitution; but that there was any thing extraordinary, connected as Naples was with Spain, in the preference given to the Spanish constitution, he must deny. Being under the necessity of adopting some new plan of government, was it not likely that the example or persons professing the same religion, and living under a. monarch of the same
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family as the sovereign of Naples, would be followed? And here be it recollected, that the British constitution, which it was said some of the allies wished to be preferred to that of Spain, was one which the king of Naples had some years before rejected, after it had been, under the auspices of this country, established in another part of his dominions. There was another circumstance which ought not to be forgotten. Their lordships might remember that lord W. Bentinck had, in 1814, addressed proclamations to all Italy, in which he called upon the people to rise and assert their rights. These proclamations, issued on the part of the British government, were signed by lord W. Bentinck, and certainly no name was calculated to give them better authority and effect. The conclusion of the proclamation ran thus—"Warriors of Italy, you are only asked to come forward to assert your own rights and liberties. When you shall have joined our forces, then Italy may become what in her best time she was, and what Spain is now." Here was a direct recommendation to follow the example of Spain. In the same proclamation it was observed that Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and Holland, could attest the liberality of Great Britain. It was farther stated, "that Spain had succeeded in her great undertaking;" meaning that very constitution which Spain had framed, which Naples had been desired to imitate, and was now condemned for adopting. It might be said, that this was only done to rouse Italy; and he had heard of something being said somewhere of the absurdity of continuing for ever married to a promise. A breach of promise would not, however, be vindicated; and with regard to Austria, the world would not forget, that the proclamation of lord W. Bentinck was issued at a time when Austria was co-operating with the British forces in Italy. Austria, who now thought the Spanish constitution so unsafe, was in fact a party to this proclamation; though not a principal, she was an acceding party. The principle of the proclamation was, besides, in perfect conformity with that of the treaty which Austria in the month of March preceding had, in concert with the British government and the other powers, signed at Chaumont, and which it was declared that the whole object of the allied powers was to support. Support what? Not the rights of sovereigns, but the liberties

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of nations. The noble lords opposite cheer at this, but where do they now hear any thing of liberty or the rights of the people, either in proclamations or treaties? No, the word liberty is carefully excluded from the vocabulary of the allies. But it was these proclamations and promises which called for the exertions of the people of the continent; and the allies sitting at Troppau had no right now to condemn that freedom which they had at Chaumont pledged themselves to support. The reasons assigned for these distressing contentions might indeed be summed up as follows:—Although the Austrian government fully respects the independent rights of nations, with which they do not in any respect wish to interfere, yet still they hold that the recent conduct of Naples now justifies their interference. That is, in other words, that there are certain circumstances which in their eyes do justify an interference with the rights of other nations; and that these circumstances are—whenever sects in a state shall privately assist in promoting a revolution, or a change in the government; whenever an army shall assist in such a revolution or a change; whenever private meetings shall be held to assist in such a work; and where there was a party in the country so revolutionized, which was hostile to that revolution, and where the tranquillity and silence with which the change in the government was effected, show the existence of that party.—These then, were the reasons which Austria had set up to justify her aggression upon the existing government of Naples. It was true, indeed, that they were preceded by an avowal of not interfering with the independent rights of nations, implying that a revolution in an independent state might be permitted where these disqualifying reasons did not exist. Really, this abstract proposition of the disqualifications which were to restrict the rights of independent states, was like the abstract idea which had been, to ridicule false philosophy, set up as exemplifying corporeal agency. It strongly reminded him of the famous dialogue between Martinus Scriblerus and his fellow pupil Crambo, in their exercises in the study of logic. The discussion was about an abstract idea of a lord mayor. Martinus sets out with saying that many things are necessary to make up the abstract idea of a lord mayor, but that, according to his idea of such a personage,
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there must be a wig and gown. Crambo cannot allow that, nor can he reconcile with his idea of a lord mayor, any thing which shall have eyes, hands, mouth, or legs. Just so it was with Austria, in the abstract idea set up by that government of what did and what did not justify an independent state in changing its government. It admitted fully the right to make the change, but then it must not be made by a sect, it must not be made by an army, it must not be made by private meetings, it must not be made while a party in the state opposes that change. If it be done without any of these means, then, said Austria, it amounts to my abstract idea of a justified revolution. What then, he would ask, are the means by which the confederate sovereigns declare they can tolerate a revolution or a change? Can such a change be only tolerated when done by the will of a monarch? Shall that royal will alone constitute a legal change? Such appears to be the opinion of Austria. Now? what are the changes which these sovereigns will allow the king of an independent state to make? When Ferdinand overturned a constitution to which he was a party, Austria did not interfere. What, then, is to be the colour or complexion of the change which these potentates mean to acknowledge? Will they silently see a state replaced in slavery and thraldom, if such be the will of a monarch; and are the subjects of an independent state to be for ever debarred from political regeneration—unless it be the will of a sovereign that they shall be free?—He came now to the second part of his consideration, which was the effect that must attend these proceedings, either in the failure or the success of Austria. If she fail in her attempt upon the present government of Naples, the principles of liberty upon which the Neapolitans have lately acted will acquire additional force: in that event, if Naples have the power she might exercise the right of retaliation. If, however, that contingency should arise which he anticipated, and Austria should succeed in her attack, by what means was the Austrian authority at Naples to be maintained? Whether the Neapolitans ultimately accede to the terms held out by Austria, or, resisting them, still continue a sullen opposition when overpowered by open force at the onset, in either event Austria must fortify her authority by the

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power of her troops. See, then, what must be the attitude of Austria in Europe. Her possessions will extend on the one side considerably south of the Po to Venice, and she will have fortified herself oh the other in Naples. Was this new state of things likely to be permanent? Was it likely to tend to the tranquillity of the world? Was it probable that a new Order of things, never attempted to be established before, could now be reared and permanently established? If such a state of things in Europe had heretofore been attempted, would Holland have obtained what she had achieved? Would Switzerland? Would the United States? Would Spain or Portugal? They never could have changed their situations had the principles of this alliance of sovereigns been heretofore promulgated. It were in vain to hope that such principles could be now established in the political state of Europe. How was it possible, in the present advanced state of political knowledge, that principles like these could have a permanent acquiescence Was there any probability that a system which attempted to place a barrier to the growth of human intelligence, and to circumscribe it within bounds which were never before laid down, could possibly succeed? Such a system if it for a moment were forced upon a people by superior strength, could only obtain a transitory duration; and must ultimately fall to the ground and bring down disgrace and discomfiture upon its authors and undertakers. Recently as this new and dangerous system had been agitated, its effects were already apparent. In Spain, it had given activity to the republican spirit which was growing up in that country to an extent that never before was thought of, and which, in its consequences, was likely to introduce agitation into the progress of a revolution, that otherwise would have been tranquilly conducted to its close. In France, were not its effects also sensibly felt? Were not the hopes of a party actually excited there; a party sometimes called by the name of Liberates, and at other times Jacobins? It was against such a system that England had repeatedly acted both in ancient and modern times, so late as at the breaking out of the war when Buonaparté was first consul. In front of the battle which England was about to wage, was placed the unjustifiable attack made by France upon the right of Switzerland to choose her own
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government. At that time reasons were not wanting for France to have said of Switzerland as Austria now did of Naples, that her proceedings were calculated to inflame contiguous states. But no such plea was thought of by England; the act of France was justly complained of, because it was an act inconsistent with the independence of nations, and particularly in that most essential part, the right of a free people to choose their own form of government. In former times Great Britain had acquired deserved glory by the policy she adopted, as the fosterer of every nascent spark of liberty which was struck out of any of the nations in the world. The moment that spark arose, it was considered by England, as an acquisition to be cherished, not extinguished. The greatest man who had ever written upon the policy of an empire, or who had enlightened any age by his wisdom, the great lord Bacon, when justly praising the principles that governed the counsels of queen Elizabeth in her intercourse with foreign states, after reviewing the various merits which he justly ascribed to that policy, fixed for the highest theme of his panegyric upon that part of Elizabeth's conduct, where, to use his own words, she cultivated and encouraged the liberties of other nations on the continent of Europe." Lord Bacon, also instances "her support of the low countries, a people recommended to her by their counsels so liberal, and their fortunes so happy." The circumstances in the late change at Naples which had armed Austria against the people were, that the revolution had been effected by a sect, aided by the revolt of an army. Exactly in the same way had the revolution in the Netherlands been conducted, and yet no objection was then made to the form of the proceeding. There ought to be no such objection. That jealousy was too fastidious, which found fault with a revolution prepared and consummated by the mode best adapted to the general means of the people. Rather than cavil in this manner at the steps pursued by a struggling people to obtain independent rights, they ought apply to their efforts the maxim applied in another case by one of the greatest statesmen and orators who had ever adorned that House lord Chatham. That great man, when speaking of America, then struggling against oppression, implored that, when reviewing the acts of their colonies, they would—

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"Be to their faults a little blind,
Be to their virtues very kind,
And clap the padlock on the mind."
These lines were equally applicable to the course which it became a nation like England to pursue to a state like Naples. He knew it had been said, that all interference would be now useless; that the die was cast, and it was now too late to interfere in the hope of promoting any practical good. He was not of that opinion; he did not despair, even now, if England properly interposed. But even were he satisfied that the people of Naples were over-run by their assailants, and every foot of land there in the firm occupation of German soldiers, still he should say it was not too late for that House to disclaim the principle upon which the congress at Troppau were now acting, and to save Europe from the eventual calamities which such a principle was but too well calculated to produce. The parliament of a country like England was bound at such a crisis to put on record its solemn disclaimer of the act in which Austria was engaged, and of the principle which governed the counsels at Troppau and Laybach from which that act had emanated. It was to enable England to set herself right with the world that he meant to submit for their lordships' adoption the following address:
"To thank his majesty for having been graciously pleased to lay before this House a copy of the despatch to his majesty's missions at foreign courts, on the circular communication addressed by the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to their several missions, relating to the recent transactions in the kingdom of Naples: to express the satisfaction which we feel that his majesty has declined becoming a party to the measure in question, considering them to be no less repugnant to the fundamental principles of the British constitution, than destructive of the established law of nations: and to express an earnest hope that his majesty will exert all his influence with the allied powers, if not too late, to prevent or to repair the consequences of measures which may eventually disturb the general tranquillity of Europe; and which, especially when considered in combination with the doctrines that have been advanced in their justification, are of most dangerous example to the independence of sovereigns and the security of nations."
Earl Bathurstsaid, that the whole ar-
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gument of the noble marquis went to show, that Great Britain ought not to adopt a system of neutrality between the contending parties. In other words, that England ought at once to abandon the system which she had avowed to the parties, and upon which she had professed her fixed determination to adhere. The course which this government had laid down for its guidance during the pending struggle was plain, and its meaning perfectly well understood The proposed address was quite of a different character: its policy was neither plain nor intelligible; for while it called upon this country to abandon its declared neutrality, it laid down no other system to govern its future conduct towards the allied powers. The first question which they had then to determine was, whether or not they ought to abandon their present system of neutrality? Suppose they did abandon it, what other course would the noble marquis recommend for their adoption? Suppose the revolution which led to the agitation of this question had appeared to England to be such as to endanger her interests in another quarter of the globe, but that the emperors of Russia and Austria should say, "we see no manner of danger in this revolution, and we forbid you to interfere in its progress."—would not England reply, "If you do not see any danger to your interests, you are certainly not called upon to interfere; but if we see danger, we are justified on the broad principle of self-defence." And upon that principle they would certainly have a right to interfere. What was the case in Naples? A revolution had been established, to which a large portion of the people were no party. He did not mean to canvass the conduct of Austria in interfering, for he had not sufficient information upon that subject before him. All he was anxious to show was, that England had taken the proper course in observing a strict neutrality. The noble earl then pronounced a panegyric upon the character of the king of Naples, and the estimation in which he was held by the Neapolitans; and added that, notwithstanding this loyalty, so great was the power of the party who had conducted the revolution, that they refused to allow the king eight days to prepare a constitution. Sicily took no part in this revolution, and was only compelled to submit to it by fraud and violence. So that, if Great Britain, as had been recom-

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mended, had received M. Cimittelli as the ambassador from Naples, she must be considered as sanctioning the application of the epithet of rebels to the Sicilians, who resisted the introduction of the new state of things among them. The whole of the recent arrangements had been managed at Naples by the Carbonari, whose aim was not a reformation of the Neapolitan government, but to promote general insurrection throughout Italy; their object was not a settled government, but an unsettled one, by which they might profit in the confusion. Was there any thing, then, in the character of the parties, engaged in this revolution to entitle them to the support of England. The noble marquis had severely animadverted upon the Austrian manifesto. But it should be recollected, that Austria grounded the necessity of her present interference with Naples, upon the dangers to which her contiguous states were exposed by the recent events, This would not be all. Supposing the knowledge of the presentation of this address to his majesty to reach Naples, whilst the Austrian army was on its march, it would have the effect of prolonging the contest, by inspiring new hopes in the breasts of the Neapolitans; and thus many would, on the advance of the Austrians, retreat to the hills, instead of acceding to the proposition of the allied sovereigns, and casting their eyes towards the ocean, in expectation of succours from England, would at last fall victims to their own credulity. To prevent the occurrence of these and similar misfortunes, he felt himself bound to oppose the address.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, that his noble friend's objection applied merely to the latter part of the address. The first part stated the satisfaction felt by the House, that his majesty had declined becoming a party to measures of which ministers had expressed their disapprobation. If ministers were right in expressing their disapprobation of the principles of the allies; it could not be wrong for their lordships to record their approbation of the conduct of ministers. He thought such a proceeding necessary, because it would give weight and authority to the remonstrance of the British government. The address did not go to recommend a war with Austria. It called upon ministers to do that, which, if they declined to do, they would deserve to be impeached, namely—to endeavour, by all the means
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in their power, to prevent the consequence of a movement on the part of the allies which might eventually disturb the tranquillity of Europe. If his noble friend would look at the situation of Austria; if he would recollect that she stood insulated among powers hostile to her, both from position and from prejudice; if he would consider that her defence rested on her moveable mass of military force drawn indeed from the subjects of her hereditary dominions, but paid by the treasures wrung from her Italian and Polish provinces; he would see that no movement could be more false or more fatal than that which Austria had just made upon Naples. Considering that movement by itself, and without any connexion with other circumstances, he would say that it was one which, in the relative situation in which Austria and England were placed, it was the imperious duty of ministers to arrest. Looking, however, at the present state of Italy; taking a full view of the change which had been effected in the manners, habits, and feelings of its inhabitants whilst under French domination; recollecting that French domination, whatever mischiefs it had inflicted, had united into one great state the small principalities into which it had been previously severed, and, by so doing had eradicated the prejudices which the inhabitants of them had felt against each other; remembering that the French had changed the effeminate Italian into the hardy soldier, and had inspired him with ideas of glory that would not have disgraced his remote progenitors; remembering that they had given thought and mind to the people of Italy upon all political questions, that they had imposed upon them a new system of laws which had been destroyed in all parts of it since the restoration of the old governments, and that the annulling of that part of it which enacted the equal partition of a man's property among his children at his decease, had rendered the younger sons of every family foes to the existing establishments; not forgetting that no man was allowed to be in power or property, who had held office in any part of the twenty-five years during which the French had been in possession of that country; reflecting, in addition to that, that the provinces which had received great commercial advantages by their union had lost them all, by being split again into several small states—that in those small

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states all the bigoted prejudices of Custom-houses and imposts had been regularly renewed, and that industry had thus been completely paralyzed—considering all these circumstances with the mind of a statesman, he must say, that a more imprudent, impolitic and dangerous measure, could not have been adopted by Austria than the invasion of Naples. He thought as poorly as any noble lord of the Neapolitan troops; neither did he expect that they would be successful in resisting the Austrians; but could any man who recollected what had occurred in Spain expect that an Austrian army would remain secure in that country? Supposing it, however, to remain secure, would the occupation of Naples for five or six years, as was proposed in the Austrian manifesto, be a circumstance calculated to promote the peace of Europe? What would be the effect of it in France? Could there be a more dangerous spectacle held up to the French people, or one more calculated to urge them to successful rebellion, and to seek revenge for past disgrace than this. To support Austria in such measures, therefore, would be to support her against every noble and generous principle. In the last war our character had beer, our strength: by that we had rendered our alliance an object of desire to every state in Europe: by that, and by that alone, we had conquered. What would be our situation, however, now? Looking, as he did, at the situation of the country, still he must say, that under no circumstances should he be afraid of a war undertaken with the concurrence of the people: but he should view with the utmost despair the commencement of a war, in which the feelings of the people of England were against the counsels of the government, and the hearts of foreign nations not with them—His noble friend had said, that to adopt this address would be to advise a change of the whole foreign policy of the country. He denied the truth of the position. All that was proposed in the address was, that such measures should be taken as would prevent any evil consequences arising from the movement on Naples; that was, ministers were called upon to take a large and liberal view of the affairs of Italy, were desired to use their influence and the influence of their country in counteracting those measures which all men viewed with apprehension, and were implored to preserve peace under all the circumstances that
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can render peace valuable. When his noble friend asked him, whether he supposed that the Austrian army would withdraw upon our making a remonstrance, he felt no hesitation in answering that it would not: but it was evident that circumstances must soon arise, in which the interposition of England would be as earnestly desired by the Austrians as by the Neapolitans, and that in consequence of our connexion with Sicily. He could not forget that connexion; nor the circumstances under which a constitution had been established in that island; nor the pledge which we had given to its inhabitants on leaving it. We had promised them that they should not be left in a worse situation than that in which we found them. And yet the king of Naples, who had no more right to unite Naples and Sicily than the king of England had to unite England and Hanover, had annulled the constitution we had guaranteed, and which he had himself sworn to observe; had annulled the constitution which existed previously to that, and which he had sworn by his viceroy to preserve inviolate; had, in violation of both constitutions, united Sicily to Naples; Not only the pledge which we had given, and which we ought to have redeemed in 1816, but the combined interests of Austria and England called upon us to declare, and to support that declaration by arms, if necessary, that no constitution should be established in Sicily to which the Sicilians had not consented in their ancient parliaments. That constitution had been violated by the present government, as well as by the king, and we therefore ought not to decline advocating the cause of injured Sicily. He knew, from his own personal observation, the attachment of the Sicilians to England; it had originated in the hour of common danger, and had been cemented in the field of victory. Would they not then have a powerful means of negotiating with Austria and Naples, when they had Sicily at their back? But they would have a greater advantage than this. If the sect of the Carbonari was so dangerous as was represented, and they wished to put it down effectually—how could their purpose be better accomplished than by taking from them a part of the people among whom they disseminated their principles? By agreeing to the address, they would show themselves alive to the true interests of Italy, of England, and the rest of Europe they would show that, notwithstanding the

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present dangers which surrounded this great question, they had dared to take a statesman-like view of its most remote and distant dangers: they would show that they had determined to support ministers in giving full effect to any negotiation which they might institute for the preservation of tranquillity; and by so doing they would confer credit on their country and themselves.
The Earl of Westmorelandsaid, that notwithstanding the temporary distress under which this country was labouring, he had no doubt of its possessing abundant resources for any war in which justice or honour might require it to engage; but, in the present instance, he contended, that both justice and policy demanded that we should maintain a strict neutrality. He denied, both on the general principle, and with reference to the particular instance of Naples, that we had any right to interfere in such a case as the present; and, with respect to the address proposed by the noble marquis, it would be altogether inefficient and nugatory, unless accompanied by an address to his majesty to prepare an armament to enforce it.
The Earl of Darnleymaintained, that his noble friend's proposition was in no way calculated to break in upon the neutrality which his majesty's government were disposed to preserve. But he thought it due from that House to make a declaration on the subject, conformably to the principles of their ancestors. England was peculiarly entitled to remonstrate against the recent movements of Austria. For how did Austria pay her army? With English money. To this country she was indebted at least seventeen millions.
Lord Calthorpesupported the motion, on the ground that it was highly important there should be no possible misunderstanding of the opinion of this country on a subject in which the rights and liberties of an independent people were so deeply involved. We owed it to Austria herself, to exert over her all the moral influence that we possessed, and to show her how full of danger her present course was, even if it should prove successful; and how destructive, if the result should be disastrous. In the latter case, how would the Austrian government, with a diminished army, an exhausted treasury, and a dishonoured name, be able to meet the demands made upon it by its own people, who might perhaps require a constitution less monarchical even than that which they were now endeavouring to destroy?
The Earl of Aberdeendeprecated the adoption of the address, in the absence of all satisfactory information, with respect to the real state of the case between Austria and Naples. For his own part, he was not ashamed to confess, that he placed great confidence in the good faith of the declaration which had been issued by the allied sovereigns. This confidence was confirmed by the former conduct of Austria, who, when put in possession of the fortified places of Naples, evacuated them, even before the period prescribed by the treaty which put them into her hands. In saying this, however, he begged to be by no means understood as expressing any approbation of the principle of what was called the Holy Alliance. Although he sincerely believed, that the motives of the sovereigns by whom it was formed were pure, yet it was a system liable to so much abuse, that he could not too strongly reprobate it. At the same time, he was convinced that the present invasion of Naples was not considered in a just light by those who attributed it to the Holy Alliance. This was not candid. The interests of Austria were alone concerned in the affair. Unquestionably no roan could contemplate the attempt of a military despotism to beat down the infant independence of any state without emotion. In a contest between a strong and a weak power, a generous mind naturally sympathised with the latter. There was also something extremely captivating in the very name of liberty. But it was not absolutely necessary that the weaker power, in any contest, must therefore hare justice on its side. It was not absolutely necessary that what was called liberty must therefore really be so. With respect to the conduct of Austria towards Naples, he was not prepared positively to pronounce that that conduct was justifiable; neither did the transactions which had occurred at Naples warrant any one in pronouncing that the conduct of Austria was unjustifiable. The revolution in Naples was incontestably the work of the Carbonari. The principles of that sect were not confined to the assertion of constitutional liberty in opposition to despotic government, but directly aimed at the destruction of every standing government. No doubt could be entertained of the despotic influence of that sect over the parliament at Naples, and that there was not a single; movement of the government now existing there, which was not controlled by

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that irresponsible sect. It would be premature in this country to interfere between Austria and Naples, until it was shown that the former had not a justifiable cause for the conduct she had adopted towards the latter.
Lord Hollandsaid, that the noble earl who spoke second in the debate, had objected, that the motion of the noble marquis was indistinct and unintelligible, whereas it appeared to him that the noble earl had himself misunderstood that which was distinct, and misrepresented that which was intelligible. The noble earl commenced by observing, that the noble mover had mistaken the manifesto of the allied sovereigns; and to prove this, he referred to the circular note of lord Castlereagh, and not to the manifesto itself. His noble friend, in consequence of the language and conduct of Austria, called upon the House to vindicate the honour of the country; he did not then enter into the question, whether such a vindication of our honour was likely to end in hostilities or not. And why was this done? Because the allied powers—because Austria itself—had misrepresented to the world the principles upon which this government acted, or at least professed to act. It was said in the declaration of the allied sovereigns, that Great Britain fully coincided in the general principle upon which they acted, but that considerations of state prevented that power from co-operating with them in the prosecution of their plans. This appeared upon the face of that monstrous, disgusting, and hypocritical paper which had been put forth by the amiable and pacific congress of Laybach. The noble lords on the other side said, that the interference with the affairs of Naples was in support of the cause of Austria: but Austria said no—that their sole object was, the peace and safety of the whole of Europe, which were threatened by those proceedings. The noble lord, after quoting some passages from the declaration of the allied sovereigns, asked the noble lord opposite (Liverpool), to stand up and say whether his majesty's ministers coincided in the principles and feelings by which the allied sovereigns were actuated? The noble earl who had just sat down said he believed Austria to be sincere in her professions. Did the noble earl, or did his majesty's ministers believe her sincere, when she, in that odious and disgusting document, declared the government of this
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country to coincide in the views and principles upon which the allied sovereigns acted, but that we were prevented by proper and weighty considerations, from taking an active part on the occasion?—He would shortly inform them what those considerations were; but before he did so, he must call upon them to mark the nature of this transaction. Five powers had confederated together for the express purpose of guaranteeing every government, good or bad, against the resentment of the people. Certain events occurred in Spain, and up started Russia calling upon the confederates to take part against the Spanish people. What the answer of this government was to that application he did not know; but it was evidently of such a nature as to stop all proceedings against Spain. Next came the case of Naples; and then proper and weighty considerations prevent the only two countries where the force of popular opinion was felt, from acceding to the principles of the alliance. He would tell the House what those proper and weighty considerations were: they were the House of Commons and the people of England; they were the Deputies and Chamber of Peers in France; they were the press of England and, he wished he could add, the press of France. These, and these alone, were the obstacles to the diabolical attack meditated by the allied powers on the general freedom and independence of nations. When the noble earl said that the object of the address was, to assist Naples, he would reply, that it was to assert the national honor, by vindicating the national neutrality; for there were in the acts of the British government, and in the writings of that part of the press which was more particularly under its control, strong reasons for believing that cur neutrality was not a positive one, but a leaning towards Austria. For instance, one of the objections made to the present motion was, that it was calculated to excite the Neapolitans to resist the Austrians; but, at the same time that the ministers made this objection, they sent to Austria, upon the first hearing of the Neapolitan revolution, a disapprobation of the means by which it was effected. Was that no encouragement to Austria? If neutrality was the object of our government, then they should repel the insinuation that they were a party to the contract of the allied sovereigns. Such an insinuation was not only an in-

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suit to this country, but enabled the oppressors of Naples the better to carry their plans into execution. Another instance of neutrality was to be found in the conduct of the papal government. The pope's nuncio at Laybach declared, that the holy father had determined to maintain a neutrality similar to that of the English government. Now, was this neutrality maintained? The holy father had caused strict orders to be given that the foreign regular troops, on entering and passing through the pontifical dominions, shall be regarded as friends, and not opposed in their passage, but that any of the evil-disposed class who may dare to violate the pontifical territory, shall be vigorously resisted; and for this purpose his holiness had ordered the fortresses of his dominions to be put in a state of defence." He did not mean now to say whether the pope had done right or wrong in this, but "when he professed to act upon the English neutrality, there appeared little doubt that he understood what the nature of that neutrality was to be. The House would see that we were acting the Comedy of Errors from beginning to end. It was, in fact, impossible clearly to understand the situation in which we stood. The noble earl opposite had objected that his noble friend had mistaken the subject. Now one thing was clear. According to the noble earl's statement—either Austria had misunderstood the government of this country, or else she had publicly stated that which she knew to be false with respect to our intentions [Hear, hear!]. He defied the noble earl to get out of this dilemma. A noble earl had stated, that he believed Austria to be sincere. He knew not in what part of the history of the continent the noble lord could find matter on which to ground such an opinion; but, to be sure, there was no accounting for men's belief. That noble earl went on to say, that the natural feelings of all men were favourable to Naples. If this were so, he could only say, that the noble lords over the way had got their artificial feelings wound up to a very high pitch in favour of Austria and against Naples. What was their boasted neutrality—what were the whole of the speeches against this and a former motion—but apologies for Austria and condemnations for Naples? Austria said, and it appeared truly, that the heart and soul of the English government were with the allied powers, though
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they were prevented by circumstances from co-operating openly with them. The noble lord who spoke early in the debate had spoken out; he did not, it was true, say that Austria was in the right, but he took care to say that the other party was in the wrong. Then came the old story of a revolution brought about by the army, and of the operations of the Carbonari. A noble lord had said, that the Carbonari were bound by an oath not to obey God or man. Now, with all due deference to that noble lord, he presumed he did not belong to the Carbonari, and therefore they could not have revealed their oath to him. But, where did these Carbonari originate? They were set at work and their operations fomented by the British government for the purpose of stirring up the Italians to make war against France, and were used as instruments to drive the French out of Italy. This brought him to another part of the question. It was objected against the Neapolitans, the they had adopted the Spanish constitution, and yet that there were not five persons in Naples who had read that constitution. He had seen more than five Neapolitans who had read and who understood the Spanish constitution; so that he himself was a witness in contradiction to that assertion. The noble lord here read to the House an extract from lord William Bentinck's proclamation to the Italians in 1814, in which he pointed out the great work performed by the Spaniards, in driving the French out of their territories, and thus establishing their liberty. But how did they establish their liberties? By adopting that constitution which was now sought for by the Neapolitans, and which was charged against them as a crime? Was it to be wondered that the Neapolitans should wish to establish a free constitution? Was it to be wondered at that they should wish for the enjoyment of liberty? It was engraven on their monuments—it was written in their books and in their hearts, and could not be effaced from their memories. "Aliis occasio, aliis animus, nemini voluntas deficit." But we who fomented their wishes, who encouraged their hopes, who favoured their exertions, were we, when those hopes were about to be realised, to dash them at once to the ground? It was hard, very hard, that we, who had taught them to believe us their friends, should at such a crisis not only desert, but oppress them. It was argued against

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the Neapolitans, that they had refused their king eight days within which to form a constitution. Now, he considered such a period much too long; for if such events were not brought about quickly, they could not be brought about at all. By the Spanish constitution, the succession of the king of Naples to the crown of Spain was acknowledged. The king of Naples bad congratulated his cousin the king of Spain, on the establishment of the constitution. What then were the Neapolitans to do? They saw a constitution fostered by England, approved of by their king, and from which every advantage was to be derived—was there any thing more natural than that they should say, "We cannot do better than adopt this constitution." But what was the objection to this? It was urged that the Spanish constitution was foreign, and not suited to the Neapolitans. It came with an ill grace from Austria, after having opposed the introduction of the Spanish constitution into Naples, to propose for their adoption the constitution of England. As if those Neapolitans, who were unable to translate the Spanish constitution into Italian, should be all at once fully conversant with Blackstone, and the other great law authorities of this country! Suppose for a moment that the Neapolitans were about to adopt the English constitution, and were to write over to this country to make the necessary inquiries as to its nature; suppose that they, in the first instance applied to the learned lord on the woolsack, for a definition of the British constitution. Why, the very first observation of the learned lord would be, that the British constitution was "essentially Protestant" [A laugh]. It certainly would move any one to laugh, to hear such coxcombs talk of establishing a constitution, were it not for the reflection that those coxcombs were backed with bayonets to enforce any doctrine, however absurd or ridiculous, A noble lord said, he believed the allied sovereigns sincere. He (lord Holland) could scarcely imagine how their proceedings could be argued upon with temper or moderation. After reading an extract from the declaration, in which the allied powers declared their only object to be "the preservation of peace and tranquillity in interior states," he observed, that if any thing could add to the atrocity of such conduct, it was the detestable hypocrisy under which it was masked. They the lovers of
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peace and tranquility! Why then did they keep up so large a military establishment? They came forward and talked of tranquillity and peace, who sent hordes of barbarians from the remotest quarter of Europe to spread war and desolation over its fairest portion! "Et nomen pacis dulce est, et ipsa res salutaris; sed inter pacem et servitutem plurimum interest. Pax est tranquilla libertas; servitus malorum omnium postremum, non modo hello, sed morte etiam repellendum." These were the sentiments of a great man, and he hoped and trusted that similar sentiments would inspire the people of Naples with that courage which alone could preserve their freedom. He rejoiced to say, that the eloquent language of the noble baron near him (Ellenborough) had raised in his mind some faint hope that they would be able to defend themselves with success. He confessed that he felt warm on this occasion, and that it ruffled his temper to see a smile on the countenances of noble lords, when he and his noble friends spoke of inquiry on these subjects; for it induced him to think, that there were persons who wished in their hearts that Naples might not succeed in her opposition to the invasion by Austria. He rejoiced to think that the history of the modern world recorded examples of successful resistance, under circumstances which rendered resistance as hopeless. Switzerland had successfully resisted. Holland had successfully resisted. So had America and Spain; and he hoped that Naples too would succeed. It was with great satisfaction he had heard the noble baron say, that even if the invasion by Austria should, in the first instance be successful, still Naples might be ultimately triumphant. He begged leave to add one word on the subject of war. It had been said, that those who talked of the distress of the country were now the advocates for involving it in a war, which must necessarily increase that distress; but he affirmed, on the contrary, that a compliance with the present motion was the most likely way to avoid a war. If there was one individual in that House who abhorred war more than another, it was the person who now had the honour of addressing them: he believed there had only been one war since the accession of the Brunswick family, of which he approved. But, deeply rooted as was his abhorrence of war, he would never say that the state of the country, or

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the embarrassment of our finances, was a reason for abstaining from it when it was necessary for the honour of the nation. The question, however, was not at present one of peace or war, but whether government were not called on to state the reasons of their conduct, which had been misrepresented by Austria. If such an explanation should lead to a war, he would lament the circumstances; but, from the fear of such an event he would not abstain from vindicating the honour of the country.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that a great part of the noble lord's speech had been occupied with eloquent declamation against the interference of the allied powers with Naples; and he could not help remarking, that when they had seen other independent states attacked in a similar manner, they had heard no eloquent declamation from the noble lords opposite. The noble lords on those occasions had, on the contrary inculcated the necessity of peace, and the impolicy of interfering. The only exception was, in the case of the invasion of Spain, against which his noble friend opposite had certainly expressed an opinion. The present motion he believed to be without precedent. The constitution invested the Crown with the power of making war or peace, and of negotiating with other states. The right of parliament to refuse the supplies, he believed to be equal to the right of the Crown to declare war; and he was not prepared to deny that parliament might advise the king to resort to war. It was an admonition improperly applied, and if fit to be applied, improperly expressed. There were two modes in which a great nation could interfere. Its influence might be exercised in private by its accredited agents; but, when its sentiments were recorded by a public declaration, they must make up their minds to enforce their declaration by arms, if it should be disregarded. If there was any doubt, whether this motion was a motion of war, the speech of his noble friend had removed all doubt. The noble baron avowed that he looked to war; he hoped, perhaps, that war might not be necessary: the noble baron should have credit for those hopes, but war was at one alternative on which he relied. But if this was the sentiment of the supporters of the motion, they should say so distinctly, and give advice to the king accordingly. The question which the
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House really had to consider was divided into two branches:—1. Whether in the present situation of Europe, neutrality was the desirable policy for England? and 2. Whether the present conduct of this government was fair neutrality? He agreed with the noble baron, that, however desirable peace might be to this country, as its general policy or at this particular time, there was no time when this country should not dare to undertake a war which was necessary for its safety or honour. But however abundant the resources of the country might be, he saw in the circumstances of Europe, in the declaration of the allies, in the speeches of the noble lord, ample reasons for saying that neutrality was the true policy of this country. As to the general principles laid down in the declaration of the allies, no one regretted them more than he did. No one, who looked at the affairs of Europe dispassionately could avoid seeing that there were two conflicting principles in the world. Never did Russia, Austria, and Prussia do a more ill-advised act, than when they put forth that declaration. Till then it might be doubted whether there were two extreme principles in action. But that declaration fully set forth one extreme principle, the disposition to crush all revolutions, without reference to time, to circumstances, to causes, or to the situation of the nations in which they arose. The other extreme principle, which he was sorry to see manifested in the noble lords opposite was to uphold all revolutions, not looking to their causes or justifications. Revolutions seemed to them to be certain good—the name cheered up their hearts. Let I their lordships look, then, to the constitution of Great Britain, which they boasted to be as far removed from despotism on the one hand, as from wild revolutionary principles on the other. They would see that the policy which the constitution demanded between two such principles was neutrality. Neutrality was our policy: neutrality would command the respect of all the nations, and of all the temperate and moral men of Europe, But were we in a state of fair neutrality? The noble lord had referred to the manifesto of Austria. If the manifesto bore the sense attributed to it by the noble lord, it stated that which was not correct, but he did not think the manifesto could fairly bear the interpretation which the noble lord had put upon it. He was convinced that

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by "the allied powers" were meant Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and that Great Britain was not alluded to. These were in fact the only parties assembled at Troppau; For though we had a representative at that place, he was no party either to the conferences or to the protocols. He came now to the second question. Was this country in a fair state of neutrality? If he was not misinformed, his majesty's minister residing at Naples had made a declaration of the neutrality of this country, which had been deemed perfectly satisfactory by the Neapolitans, and had removed all doubt whatever respecting the disposition of Great Britain. He had further the satisfaction of knowing the sentiments entertained throughout Europe of the paper now upon their lordships table. He knew that all the states on the continent were gratified by it, and were convinced, from the principles it contained, of the neutrality of this country. He was convinced that Ferdinand of Spain had provoked the revolution in that country, but he had no case before him to show that the king of Naples had done the same. At the same time he wished to give no opinion whether circumstances might not exist to justify the revolution which had taken place at Naples. The opinion of the noble lords opposite seemed to be, that this country ought to interfere with every great event that occurred in Europe: but what had hitherto been the uniform policy of Great Britain? Had any motion been made in parliament against the partition of Poland? Had not noble lords raised their voices against that act of spoliation, and given it as their opinion that this country should go to war in defence of the Poles? It might be said, that this motion only called on government to state the reasons of their conduct; but let it be recollected, that if they once remonstrated, they must be prepared for the consequences. The country must not put itself into the situation of having made a vain remonstrance, which it had not the courage or the means to enforce. This was a case in which parliament could not interfere without either making themselves a laughing stock to all Europe, or resolving to hazard the consequences of a refusal.
After a short reply from the marquis of Lansdown, the House divided: Contents, 23; Proxies 14–37. Not-Con-'tents 42; Proxies 42–84. Majority against the motion 47.