Lords Sitting of 8 November 1820

Preamble
The House having resolved itself into a committee on the Bill, the debate on the Divorce clause was resumed.
The Archbishop of Tuamsaid:—My Lords; It is with pain that I offer myself to the notice of your lordships, which I should not have done, had it not been for the very direct manner in which the body, of which I form a part, were called upon yesterday. My lords, I will refer you to the 32nd verse of the 5th chapter of St. Matthew. My mind has long been made up to vote against the Divorce clause from that very verse; but, if I can show that this illustrious lady has been put away by her husband; if I also show from the Holy Scriptures a solemn denunciation against such putting away, then shall I show sufficient ground to induce me to vote against the Divorce clause, which would release the King from the marriage contract, and leave him at liberty to marry again. That such a putting away of the wife did take place is abundantly evident from the letter of the husband. The denunciation to which I have alluded is in the 2nd chapter of Malachi, when, for literally putting away a wife, the face of the Lord was turned away from the people, and he regarded not their offerings. The temples resounded with the lamentations of the women; and the Prophet established his charge against them as a crying sin, by reminding them of the first institution of marriage. The God of Israel hath said, "he hateth all putting away." My lords, I stand here a most unwilling judge in this cause, and I will candidly confess that nothing but the heavy penalties attached to absence, would have compelled me to attend this distressing investigation. I have been brought here, from the most important duties, which no one but myself could be called upon to perform, and which have been suspended three months in consequence of my absence. I have paid every attention to the whole of the evidence on both sides—to the able arguments of counsel and to the eloquent speeches of noble lords. I have attended every day, every hour, and, I may almost say, every minute; and I have voted for the second reading of this bill, because no other measure was before the House, in which I could declare that a clear, satisfactory, and irresistible case had been made out of the guilt of the

1719
Queen. But as to this Divorce clause, I can never reconcile myself to give it my sanction.
The Bishop of Peterboroughsaid, that it had ever been his desire, that, if possible, the clause should be omitted, not that he had felt any doubt as to its legality, for he was sure that in cases of adultery, divorce was sanctioned as well by the laws of God as by those of man; and he was compelled to acknowledge, that in this case the adultery had been clearly proved. But there were in his mind objections to the manner in which it had been introduced. He thought a Divorce clause ought not to be made a part of a bill of Pains and Penalties. He could not see how the Queen could be placed in a state of degradation, and yet at the same time remain the wife of the King. The wife of the King was, to all intents and purposes, Queen-Consort. He, therefore, desired to know, remaining in this situation, by what possible enactment she could be deprived of the title of Queen. The Divorce clause made the bill intelligible, its object being to degrade; but without that, or some clause in its place, it would not be distinctly expressed in what the degradation of her majesty was to consist. Instead of agreeing to the Divorce clause, could not a clause be introduced less powerful in its operation, yet, at the same time sufficient to give effect to the sentence of degradation, though free from the objections which applied to the Divorce clause? The objections to the Divorce clause were chiefly of a religious nature; but as matrimony, though unquestionably a religious institution, was also a civil contract, and gave civil rights, he would ask if those civil rights could not be annulled, leaving the religious part of the contract untouched by this bill? Any clause that might be offered to effect this, should have his support.
Lord Redesdalesaid, he admitted that marriage was a civil contract and also a religious contract; but it was also in the nature of a religious vow, and from that vow no human power could relieve the parties. The only question was, whether by the adultery of the wife that vow was not discharged as to the husband? But as marriage was a civil contract, it affected other parties besides those who contracted; for instance, the children born of the wife: a divorce was to regulate the civil rights, and so far only did any
1720
divorce clause in any bill properly extend. He therefore thought the objections to this clause arose chiefly from a misconception of the nature of a Divorce bill. If marriage were merely a common contract, the two parties might discharge it of themselves; but the contract of marriage was one in which other parties were affected, and even the whole state. He wished to know how they could substitute any thing instead of the present clause, which would not in effect be a Divorce clause? He thought it manifestly improper that a person in the degraded state in which it was proposed to place her majesty should remain wife of the King. The Queen-Consort was a public character, and it was due to the public that a person so degraded should not continue in that situation.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that with respect to the declaration which had been made upon this clause at the beginning of the discussions upon this subject by his noble friend near him (the earl of Liverpool), he begged to be understood as a party to it now, though he had not so expressed himself at the time. His noble friend on the former occasion had said, that this clause should not be pressed, if it was found objectionable to the religious' part of the community. If such were the general impression, he also thought it advisable that the clause should not be pressed, though he himself thought it would be more wise to retain the clause. Having thus stated the impression of his own judgment, he was most ready to pay that deference to the religious opinions of others, which, as a public man, he felt he was bound to do. He could not, however, say, that he concurred in the opinion of marriage being more a religious vow than a religious contract. He thought that the civil contract arose out of its being a religious one. But he thought it was quite obvious that, if the Divorce clause were omitted, the bill could not be suffered to stand with the first enactment, and without some explanatory one respecting the object of the bill. It was due to both parties that the first enactment should not stand unaccompanied by another to: make the bill fully intelligible. If a majority of the House should be of opinion that this clause should stand, then there I would be an end of the necessity of any j further proposition upon the subject. If, however, they dismissed the Divorce

1721
clause, then they were bound to supply its place with another clause, so as to enable lawyers and judges to understand the intention of the legislature in framing the enactment. The House must in terms explain the object they had in view. Those who were induced to vote for the bill, upon the painful proof of the fact that adultery had been committed, were bound to accompany the clause of a degradation with a measure of effectual separation for the parties. Still some means might be devised to leave the religious contract unaffected, and yet to annul the consequences which grew out of the civil contract. The separation è mensa et thoro had, in fact, long existed, though the arrangement had not dissolved the parties è vinculo matrimonii. He thought a clause might be framed so as to give full legal effect to the separation previously arranged between the parties.
The Marquis of Lansdownsaid, he felt it his duty to protest against the doctrine, that there might exist a woman the wife of the King and not the Queen-Consort of these realms. He felt all the objections to the admissions of the clause before them, but he felt still more the difficulty of admitting a character directly irreconcilable to the constitution—a person being the wife of the King, but fulfilling no one purpose, answering no one end which the country expected, and had a right to expect, from the wife of the Sovereign. Their lordships, after admitting the clause, reading it a second time with the bill, and then rejecting it in the committee, would proclaim to the world that the Queen had been an adulteress; but that, entertaining that opinion, they thought it fit that she should continue the wife of the King. Disguise it as they would, this was the effect of their declaration. Was it a matter of indifference to proclaim this, when the whole course of history and the whole tenor of the laws, asserted the principle that the marriage of the King was contracted to answer, not individual purposes, but great public objects, and when parliament had legislated with that view? Admitting that the Queen might be degraded, and yet remain the wife of the King, they incapacitated her, and also the King himself from rendering those public services by means of marriage, which parliament always had considered that the marriage was contracted to answer. He did not say that he approved of the clause in itself,
1722
because he did not approve of the bill at all; but he besought them to look whether it was not a necessary deduction from the other clauses. If they left it out, they would only add one more to all the other anomalies of this extraordinary measure. They then would have a person against whom it was alleged, that when in the situation of princess of Wales, she had committed adultery; who continued princess of Wales for years after that adultery was alleged to be committed; who becoming the Queen, and having committed no adultery as Queen, was degraded by their enactment, on account of that previous alleged adultery; who ceased to be Queen, but yet continued to be the wife of the King, and was recorded, though an adulteress, as a person who might succeed to the throne of these realms. Neither would this be just to the Queen. They would have stripped her of all the attributes, but would leave her subject to all the disabilities arising out of her contract. Her majesty would have a right to complain that she was to remain subject to the authority when she was deprived of the protection of a husband. This divorce of course was only justifiable on the ground of adultery, which he did not think was proved; but he should not have quitted his conscience if he had not declared his conviction that this clause was an inherent part of the bill, and that the bill must be passed in toto, or that one other anomaly must be added to this anomalous measure.
Lord Kingsaid, he was anxious to see the enactments of the bill less absurd than the preamble was unjust; for he considered there was an utter want of evidence, and that the noble lords had been influenced by reports. He would confess that he, for one, had not been able, though he endeavoured to divest his mind of them. He had heard, for instance, in support of the assertion, that the Queen had been guilty of indecent familiarities with Bergami, that she had been guilty of indecent familiarities of the same nature with the earl of Liver-pool, at Blackheath, videlicet, playing at blindman's-buff; and also with the chancellor of the exchequer. The time when this happened he had not heard; perhaps it was when he was out of office, and trying to get in again ["No, I assure the noble lord," from lord Liverpool]. Perhaps,

1723
then it was just before the Regency ["Never, I assure the noble lord," from lord Liverpool].
Earl Greysaid, that in his opinion, the separation of the Divorce clause from that which enacted degradation was utterly incompatible with that sense of duty towards the Crown which the Crown had a right to expect from the supporters of this bill. He felt considerable difficulty in voting for this clause, as it assumed that that had been made out which he thought had not been established. He had formed the intention of giving no vote; but he now made up his mind to vote for retaining this clause, believing that it would place the House in such a situation that they must reject the bill altogether, and thus confer upon the country the greatest service that it was in their power to confer.
Lord Ellenboroughentreated of their lordships to consider what they were in effect declaring to the country, by enacting, that a person unfit for being the Queen of this country, must remain the wife of the King. It was, in fact, passing a seditious libel against the King.
Lord Somerscould not reconcile it to his mind to vote that a person declared guilty of adultery should remain a millstone about the King's neck.
The Earl of Limericksaid, he had voted for the second reading from the clearest conviction of the Queen's guilt; but if this clause were omitted, the bill would degrade, not only the Queen, but the King, and the nation, by leaving as the wife of the possessor of the throne a woman whom they had declared to be guilty of adultery.
The Earl of Essexthought he could reconcile to himself the inconsistency of voting for the Divorce clause, even after the perfect conviction that not one atom of the preamble of the bill had been proved. He never had a doubt, that at no distant period, this foul conspiracy would come to light, and that the plots of the Grimms and the Omptedas would be developed. He felt it his duty to state, in justice to this illustrious princess, that in 1819 he had the honour of waiting upon her at Lyons, where there existed no mystery whatever, and where the conduct of Bergami was of the most respectful description.
Lord Ansonsaid, he would vote for the Divorce clause, in order to give the greatest possible chance of throwing out
1724
a bill which imputed guile to an innocent Queen.
The Earl of Thanetdeclared his entire conviction of the innocence of the Queen; in the hope of saving whom from the foul confederacy which sought her destruction, he should vote for the Divorce clause.
The Earl of Carnarvonbegged their lordships to consider what the consequence would be of passing a bill of degradation without Divorce. They were all aware of a statute which made it high treason to violate the wife of the sovereign. They proposed to pass a bill of degradation in order to protect the morality of the country. Her majesty might still remain in the kingdom and might continue to indulge in that vice which they assumed to be proved. Would any noble lord say that her prosecutors could come to that House for a second bill of Pains and Penalties against her majesty? If this were purely a bill of divorce, no ground whatever could be assumed for degradation but the ground of divorce on account of adultery. Were their lordships to declare, by their vote, that a person not fit to be the associate of the meanest individual in the land, was yet a fit individual to be the associate of the King? He, for one, would never concur in such a wanton insult on the King.
Lord Hollandsaid, that in his view the objection to the bill was ten times stronger than it could be in his noble friend's view. If they rejected the divorce, the Queen would still be the companion of the King, and whoever should violate her, would be guilty of high treason. He would vote for the clause, in order to throw out the bill.
The Marquis of Buckinghamsaid, he had been anxious to hear the opinions of the reverend bench of bishops on this subject; and the result of their opinions had confirmed those which he had before entertained, that, by the law of God, there was no impediment to divorce in cases of adultery. He differed in opinion from a learned lord, who had said, that if the divorce clause was rejected, the Queen would only remain wife of the King as to her religious rights, but that all her civil rights would be forfeited. Finding nothing in the law of God to prevent divorce for adultery; and, believing the adultery in the present case to have been proved, he would not consent, that a woman, who had been deemed unfit to retain the rank and situation of Queen

1725
should still be declared fit to be the wife of the King. This would be, to give the Queen a licence for adultery. They had heard one of the counsel for the Queen conclude a speech—the eloquence of which had been seldom equalled—with the words of Scripture, "Go, and sin no more." But if they excluded, the divorce, they would say, "Go and sin, for no punishment shall follow."
The Earl of Glasgowsaid, that from the evidence an irresistible conviction having been impressed on his mind that adultery was committed, he voted for the second reading of the bill. No consideration on earth could have induced him to vote as he had done, but a thorough belief that the charge was completely made out. He could enter into no compromise with adultery, and must therefore support the clause.
Earl Manverssaid, that the bill had his most entire and unqualified approbation, and that he would never consent to the exclusion of the only important enactment, and one which necessarily followed the preamble of the bill. A noble viscount had yesterday declared it as his conscientious opinion, that the Queen was the victim of a foul and base conspiracy. He trusted it would not be thought too presumptuous in him, if (after having given the evidence and arguments on both sides the most anxious attention) he declared, from an equally conscientious conviction, that instead of being the victim of a foul conspiracy, her conduct had been most degrading and scandalous—most adulterous and infamous.
Lord Hampdensaid, he must vote for divorcing one whose name was covered with shame, disgrace, and dishonour.
Lord Falmouthsaid, that a noble marquis had stated, that it was a monstrous anomaly to strip the Queen of her rights and privileges, and still suffer her to remain the wife of the King; but, was there a single woman in the country who had no civil, no private rights? One of those rights, and it was the right of every married woman, was her husband's protection. If their lordships were of a different opinion, he should regret having suffered the bill to reach its present stage, without having declared his sentiments against it. A right reverend prelate had reminded them of the principle, that the King could do no wrong. This might be a good principle in Jaw; and he knew that it was in some senses correct; but, if taken ac-
1726
cording to the letter, his reason rejected it; he would yield to no one in his attachment to his sovereign; but he would neither be doing his duty to that sovereign, nor to himself, if he did not also admit, that the King had private rights and duties to perform, within his own family in particular, as well as the meanest of his subjects.
The Earl of Darnleysaid, he was under the painful necessity, however, of differing with his friends, so far as to think that the divorce clause ought not to stand part of the bill. The argument of the right reverend prelate had not been answered. Feeling irresistibly the force of it, he could not consent to give a vote for the divorce of the Queen, but he would give no vote on the other side.
The committee then divided on the question, "That the divorce clause stand part of the bill." Contents, 129; Not-Contents, 62: Majority for the divorce clause, 67.

List of the Minority.

Duke of Clarence.

Earls Courtoun

Archbishops York

Mount Cashel

Tuam

Romney

Dukes Wellington

Stamford

Portland

Brownlow

Beaufort

Fitzwilliam

Marquis Cornwallis

Viscounts Melville

Earls Stanhope

Sidmouth

Balcarras

Falmouth

Dartmouth

Lords Hill

Aylesford

Rodney

Verulam

Yarborough

Morton

Saltoun

Portsmouth

Bayning

Caledon

Kenyon

Lauderdale

Hopetown

St. Germains

Suffield

Aylesbury

Eldon, Ch.

Bathurst

Calthorpe

Harrowby

Combermere

Liverpool

Sydney

Mulgrave

Curzon

Westmoreland

Gambier

Macclesfield

Bishops Chester

Lonsdale

Cork

Mount Edgcumbe

Peterborough

Gloucester

Farnham

St. Asaph

Pomfret

St. David's

Whitworth

Ely

Mayo

Worcester

Winchelsea

Lord King said, that he should submit to their lordships a clause, the insertion of which in the bill seemed a matter of course, considering that the Queen was not remotely placed in the illustrious line

1727
of succession to the Crown of these realms. He therefore would move this clause—"And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that in case the Crown of these realms shall at any time descend to her said majesty Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, then, and in such case, this present act shall become void and of no effect, and the whole of the preamble thereof shall be deemed and taken to be false, calumnious, and scandalous, upon the same evidence on which it hath now been held to be sufficiently proved." The clause was negatived; and the House resumed.