Lords Sitting of 12 May 1820

PETITION OF THE REV. MR. JONES—ATHANASIAN CREED.
Lord Hollandroseto present to their lordships a petition from the Rev. Pike Jones, curate of North Boney in the county of Devon. Before entering on the principal subject to which he had to call their lordships attention, he felt it necessary to say a few words on two other points connected therewith. The first related to the time at which the petition in question was brought before their lordships; the second to the mode of redress adopted by the petitioner. With respect to the first their lordships might, unless some explanation were offered, justly inquire why they were now, for the first time, called on to consider and afford relief for an injury alleged to be committed a considerable time since. The transaction to which the petition related took place in September last; and he felt it due to the petitioner, as well as to himself, to account for the delay of which he might otherwise be accused. The fact was, that in November the petition was put into the hands of a noble lord, whose love of liberty and the constitution was only equalled by the ability and eloquence he displayed in their support—he meant his noble friend earl Grey. Before some inquiries which were considered indispensable were complete, that noble lord's indisposition unfortunately took place. The business was then referred to him (lord Holland), but the short duration of the session, and he having been also subject to indisposition, rendered it impossible to bring the subject sooner before their lordships. He stated these things merely that the delay might be accounted for, and that the time at which the petition was presented might not operate to the prejudice of the petitioner. As to the second point the petitioner was driven to bring his case under the consideration of the House, because he had understood from persons well-informed on the subject that he had no remedy at law. With respect to the course he was about to pursue, he confessed it would certainly have been more consistent with the usual practice if he had merely introduced it, moved that it be laid on the table, and afterwards have founded some motion on it. But he
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had thought it more fair and candid to adopt the course he was following. In doing so he was acting entirely according to the wishes of the petitioner, who had shown the utmost desire to proceed in the most fair, candid, temperate and upright manner, and had so conducted himself in relation to the reverend prelates whose proceedings were canvassed in the petition. The ordinary course would now be to state merely the purport of the petition; but, in doing so, he would make such observations as the circumstances suggested. The petitioner was a clergyman in the diocese of Exeter, and attended on the day specified in the petition a county meeting called to consider the claims of the Catholics, and having been charitably inclined towards that body of Christians, had answered the speech of a reverend brother, who was adverse to any further concessions to the Catholics. Soon after this meeting, through the kindness of a friend, he was presented with two livings, one in the diocese of Peterborough, the other in that of Lincoln—in order to be instituted to which, it was necessary, according to custom, for him to obtain testimonials as to his character and moral conduct from three clergymen who knew him, and to have those testimonials counter-signed by the bishop of the diocese in which he resided. The petitioner obtained testimonials of a perfectly satisfactory nature from three beneficed clergymen of his neighbourhood who stated that he had for the three preceding years led a moral, orderly, pious life, and had not, during that space of time, or before, so far as they knew, held, professed, or taught any religious opinions contrary to the doctrines of the church of England. He presented these testimonials to his bishop who refused to countersign them. The petitioner on this refusal wrote to the two reverend and very respectable prelates who presided over the dioceses in which the livings lay, to know whether they were willing to institute him without the counter-signature. One of these reverend prelates, not now in that House (the bishop of Peterborough) answered that he could not grant institution on such testimonials. The other reverend prelate the bishop of Lincoln also declined to grant institution, except on the production of testimonials signed by three clergymen, and counter-signed by the bishop of the diocese to which the applicant belonged; observing in his

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answer that it was always a rule with him not to accept the testimonials unless they were so counter-signed. In consequence of these refusals, the petitioner solicited, and having obtained an interview with his diocesan, requested that reverend prelate to inform him of the reasons which induced him to withhold his signature from the testimonials It is stated that the reverend prelate while assuming that he was not bound to give any explanation, still thought it more fair and manly to declare the reasons of his refusal. They did not apply to want of competency in the petitioner to fulfil the duties of a clergyman, or to any immoral conduct, but to one single act connected with the exercise of his political rights. The objection was, to words which the petitioner was said to have spoken at the meeting already referred to. What the words were alleged to be would presently be seen, whether they were ever spoken, and what the effect of them would be, if they had been spoken. The petitioner offered to show that he had never uttered the words attributed to him, and wished to know who his accusers were; but their names were not communicated to him. At last he was obliged to surrender the presentations to the two livings to the patron from whom he received them. He thus sustained a loss of 500 l. a year, and all his professional prospects were destroyed,. without his having been allowed an opportunity of disproving the facts stated against him. His only hope of remedy was grounded on their lordships consideration of the petition, as he was instructed that the law afforded none. That petition contained statements and evidence which in the present stage of the proceeding must doubtless be considered as ex parte; but he must say for the petitioner, that, in all the communications he had had with him, he not only appeared most anxious to state nothing but facts, but also to suggest every thing which might serve to explain, or to justify the conduct of his diocesan. He therefore set forth that his diocesan had most candidly, at his request, informed the two other prelates that he had no objection whatever to him on the score of moral character; he had even gone a step further than he had desired, and described to those learned and reverend individuals, the reasons of his withholding his counter-signature. The result however was, that the petitioner now remained a marked and stigmatised
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person, enjoying his curacy only at the will of his diocesan: and here his lordship could not help observing that this appeared very extraordinary; for if the reverend prelate thought the petitioner unfit to be instituted to the livings to which he had been presented, he surely ought to remove him, for the same reasons, from his curacy. If his conduct at public meetings had rendered him an improper person for one situation, it equally unfitted him for the other. Having said so much on the allegations of the petition, he should observe, that a clergyman being a warm politician might be an objection with some, but it never was supposed that a clergyman should be deprived of his rights, or subjected to a loss of property for exercising them. The inquiries he had made into the life and conversation of this individual, had proved most creditable to him. He had learned that shortly after being ordained in the year 1814, he had been appointed to a curacy in the county of Devon, the duties of which he had most exemplarily performed; he had never been absent a day from his duty. He had not long filled the situation when he received, a letter from the wife of the rector, who; was disabled by illness from writing himself, stating her husband's satisfaction at having procured a curate so diligent and conscientious in the performance of the duties devolved on him. And some time after when the rector died, the parishioners united in a memorial to the patron of the living praying that the petitioner might be appointed to the vacant benefice. But it was needless to dwell on these circumstances, as the bishop of the diocese had no objection to the petitioner's moral conduct. He now came to consider the justice of the right claimed by the reverend prelate. The power claimed and exercised on this occasion would have, if allowed, the preposterous effect of enabling a bishop to prevent preferment in another diocese, in a way he could not in his own. Every bishop, it was true, had power to refuse institution to a living in his own diocese, but then he can be compelled by law to state his reasons for I the refusal; and if those reasons do not appear sufficient to the tribunal which has to decide the case, an order will issue to compel the induction. But he was told; that there was no superintending jurisdiction in case of a refusal of counter-signature, and even supposing that it was conscientiously and justly executed, yet this

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was an enormous and arbitrary discretionary power. It may be said on the part of the bishop, would you have me sign a certificate contrary to my conscience? Would you have me record a good opinion of a person when I entertain quite a contrary opinion? His answer would be in the affirmative. He would say that the bishop ought to sign, or that no disadvantage should be sustained by the applicant in consequence of his refusal, or at least that the reasons of the refusal should be stated before a tribunal competent to decide on their validity. If this power were to continue it should be considered what injury without means of prevention or redress might in that way be done, not only to a great number of respectable individuals, but to the rights of their lordships own property in livings, as patrons. For I of the petitioner, though Mr. Jones honourably surrendered the presentations to the patron, yet the law did not oblige him, and if he had perseveringly insisted on the right with which he had been invested, the patron having had no opportunity to present anew, the livings would have lapsed to the bishops eventually. But he could not refrain from expressing other observations to which the petition gave rise. The discretion had been harshly and injudiciously executed; the reason alleged for its exertion was, the delivery of words to this effect by the petitioner in a speech at a county meeting. Nine-tenths of the clergymen of the Church of England, in signing the eighth article of that church which contains an approbation of the Athanasian creed, and its damnable clauses, signed what they did not believe. It was also stated that he had asserted there was nothing more damnatory in the Catholic system; but it appeared clear from the tencr of the petitioner's argument, that his word shad Been imperfectly reported to the bishop. With regard to the word damnable, it was much more probable that the word damnatory was used, which, in fact more strictly applied, than the word damnable. It appeared that, in replying to what had been said by a preceding speaker, he had contended that the argument urged against the Catholic church on account of the creeds which Catholics subscribed, * might, by a parity of reasoning, be stated against the Church of England. To prove that this was the nature of his argument, the petitioner referred to these three important points: he said, look at The newspapers in which the speech was
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reported at the time, and you will find no such thing—Look to the evidence of persons who were present, and they will say that they did not hear the words.—Look also to the whole tenor of the argument, and you will find that this will not arise out of it. But it would be said that several persons had stated that they heard the words uttered. These persons were, however, unknown, and several were, on the contrary, ready to declare that the words were not used, and a great cause of complaint, was, that the petitioner had not been allowed to explain the expressions he had actually used, nor had the names of the parties been given to him who gave the information to the bishop. The noble lord then referred to the statements of three gentlemen as bearing out the denial one of whom had sat next him at the meeting; the second was colonel Pell who had attended it; and the third was a near relative of sir Vicary Gibbs. He stated his impressions of Mr. Jones's conduct in a letter, and appeared to be rather against the Catholics than for them; the account he gave of the words was far from supporting a proceeding which completely stopped a man in his career to the distinction and emoluments which his profession afforded. That gentleman blamed the manner of Mr. Jones, but exculpated him from the tendency attributed to his speech. This and other evidence was offered to the bishop, but it did not produce the desired effect of inducing the reverend prelate to countersign the testimonials, nor procure for Mr. Jones the names of the persons who had accused him. But it was proper that the argument of the petitioner should be stated more entire than had yet been done. A gentleman in the course of the proceedings at the meeting, had made a charge against the Catholics, that they signed intolerant creeds, and had observed, that he would believe what they signed, and not what they professed. This, by-the-by was a mode of proceeding which the bishop did not follow with regard to Mr. Jones; for the reverend prelate would not believe that gentleman on what he had signed, for he had subscribed the 39 articles, which he was charged with den3r-ing. In answer, however, to the argument of the Catholics, Mr. Jones would not admit that they all signed intolerant creeds, but contended that if they did, he had no right to draw from speculative points in their creed a conclusion con-

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trary to what they professed, because, if that were admitted a fair argument, it might be turned against the churches of the United Kingdom. In particular it might be urged against the members of the Church of England that they signed the 39 articles, and the eighth article contained an affirmance of the doctrines of the Athanasian creed; and yet, were the subscribers to be asked whether they believed that those who refused to acknowledge some of those articles must be damned, nine-tenths of them, he was sure, would answer that they did not. This appeared to have been the course of the argument. Here the noble lord begged leave to remind the House of the maxim of the church of Scotland nilla extra ecclesiam salus. He did not wish to enter into the details of controversy, or he could easily show that the argument used by the petitioner at a public meeting was nothing more than what had been said over and over again by some of the brightest ornaments of the Church of England. It was surely hardly fair towards Mr. Jones to deprive him of all means of advancement in his profession for a disputed expression respecting the Athanasian creed, when men of high eminence in the church had been so little tender of that creed. It was well known that in the scheme of comprehension in 1691, it was proposed to give up that creed; that Tillotson and Tennison were little disposed to support it, the former having observed, in a letter which had been published, "it were well if we were well rid of it," meaning the Athanasian creed. There was also bishop Burnett, who, towards the conclusion of the History of his Own Times, had not scrupled to say, that sixty out of every hundred of the clergy subscribed the 39 articles, who did not believe them, and the rest because they must. Does the reverend prelate mean to say, that had he been then living he would have prevented that great man from filling the see of Salisbury? Archdeacon Paley had in his works, repeatedly expressed disapprobation of the Athanasian creed. On one occasion he states that he is persuaded the great body of the clergy disbelieve the damnatory, clauses; and yet he was prompted after he had made that declaration. the. was instituted by a reverend prelate of high character after the publication of his sentiments on this subject. If he did not wish to avoid every thing which might
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have the appearance of a taunt, he could easily show that the damnatory clauses had been condemned by many reverend prelates on the opposite bench. Mr. Jones did not say that he disbelieved the Athanasian creed, but that nine-tenths of the clergymen who subscribed it did not believe in it, or at least believed it in a sense different from that commonly received. But he could not help asking the right reverend prelate who had refused to countersign the testimonials for Mr. Jones on the report of words attributed to him, how he would like if that House were to proceed to pass a vote against himself on the report of language stated to have come from him? He held in his hand an address by a clergyman of the reverend prelate's diocese, published last year. He wished he could read the whole of it, for it applied to all parties in the House. It began, it was true, with his side, but the fire was speedily directed to the other, and finally settled on the Woolsack. The author observed, that it was little known to what danger the church had been exposed by an administration who were dismissed for openly advocating idolatry [Laughter]. But their lordships must hear what was said of the other side. He and his friends were rebels; but the noble lords opposite were traitors. The author stated that the successors of that administration had taken care so to frame the oath of the regent that it should present no bar to the Catholic claims. It was to be hoped that the noble lord opposite would take warning by this, and satisfy these gentlemen in framing the coronation oath [Laughter], But the author continued, and asserted that the regent had authorized the clerk of the closet to state to him, that if both Houses of Parliament should pass a bill to emancipate the Catholics, he would refuse to give it his assent. It was certainly not a little extraordinary that a dignitary of the church should gravely consider himself authorized to declare, on the authority of the first magistrate of the state, that a negative would be put on a certain measure, if passed by the two Houses of parliament. The assertion he did not believe, if he did, he should feel it his duty to make a complaint against the reverend and learned prelate for a high breach of privilege. But what would the reverend prelate say were that House to act upon it as he had done with respect to Mr. Jones, and pass a vote without allowing

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any opportunity for vindication? The spirit of Mr. Jones's argument merely was, that he did not impute bad intentions to the Catholics from what they signed, because, by a parity of reasoning, the same argument might be applied to the Church of England. If in that House explanation was allowed to settle the meaning of words used in debate, ought not a similar opportunity to have been afforded to Mr. Jones with regard to words which had passed in the confusion of a public meeting? Here he could not help recollecting words which had fallen from a reverend prelate of great learning and ability, who once sat on the bench opposite, and who never had been suspected of heterodoxy. He alluded to bishop Horsley. He remembered that learned prelate once standing up in his place, and speaking on a question relative to a minor, a female ward of the Court of Chancery, who was in the custody of Catholic relatives. The learned and venerable prelate said, that he did not believe she even entered into the distinctions of transubstantiation, consubstantiation, or any of these conundrums. Had that distinguished prelate lived, it was not unlikely that it might have been proposed to promote him to the see of York when it became vacant. Now, suppose that, on such a vacancy, some members of that House, who had access to his majesty, had gone to him, and secretly advised him against the promotion, on the ground that the reverend prelate treated the most sacred ordinances of the church as rebuses and conundrums; but had this been done, in what would the transaction have differed from the conduct of the clergy of Exeter against the petitioner? He came now to the last point in the petition—the remedy which the petitioner had in law, and without applying to this House. And here he must observe, that if, by the exercise of a power conferred by the legislature, an individual received an injury, and if a whole class of men were liable to the same injury, he did not think that he would place the defence of the whole class on that individual. But in addition to this, great difficulties were started on the point of law, which any individual might be ruined in contending with. In his (lord Holland's) opinion, the counter-signature of the diocesan to a certificate of character signed by the three clergymen merely attested the identity of the clergyman who demanded institution,
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and gave no additional attestation to his character. He believed this was the principle on which the counter-signature was required. The practice which prevailed, of not following invariably the rule of refusing institution without a counter-signature, countenanced the idea that it was a mere form to attest the identity of the clergyman to whose character the certificate referred. Accordingly, he believed, that where the three attesting clergymen resided in the diocese where the reverend person to whose character they bore testimony was to be instituted, is was not necessary that their certificate should be counter-signed by their diocesan. The counter-signature was merely, he believed, ministerial, and attested not the character of the clergyman requiring institution, but the credibility and identity of the clergymen, who signed the certificate. By the ancient canon law, bishops were not only empowered to demand certificates, but required to do so. A remnant of this practice only now existed; but this state of the Jaw would create a great deal of difficulty in trying the question before the inferior courts. A suit must be instituted of quare impedit? To that a special plea must be given in, and, after many tedious and expensive proceedings, a decision might be obtained on which the court of King's-bench might be moved for a mandamus calling upon the bishop to countersign the certificate, or to institute the petitioner. He (lord Holland) did not know what might be the success of such a course, nor could he undertake to say what could, or could not, be done by law; but this he could say, that it would afford no relief to the petitioner. By advising him to follow this course their lordships would say to him, "You must not come here—you must go to the courts below. You may procure a writ of quare impedit, and, after special pleas and demurrers, you may be able to obtain a mandamus from the court of King's-bench, and then you may be instituted into your benefice;" but this was no remedy at law, because before the petitioner obtained it, he must be ruined. The course recommended was, that he should go to law with the bench of bishop3y and after he had laid them on. their backs, obtain his remedy. He had heard of directions given to children to catch birds by laying salt on their tails, but this was to put salt on the lion's tail and to secure him A poor curate could

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not defray law expenses to establish his rights. To refuse him, therefore, the counter-signature necessary for his institution was to blast all his prospects. In the present case it was particularly hard on the petitioner. By refusing the necessary form, his diocesan said to him: "You have chosen a profession of which you can never divest yourself, and which disqualifies you from entering on some others: you have spent a great part of your life in acquiring its requisite qualifications, and performing its peculiar duties, but, in consequence of some unguarded words which you have uttered at a public meeting, your advancement in the line of your profession is for ever barred—your prospects are blasted, and you are left to want, neglect, and despair." He (lord Holland) allowed that the reverend and learned prelate did not refuse his counter-signature to the petitioner's certificate on the ground of a difference between them on the Catholic question, but he had taken care to state that difference, and what might be the consequence of such a refusal, coupled with the declaration of such a difference, on the minds of the other clergy of the diocese? When church-promotion would become the subject of discussion at the breakfast tables, or in the domestic circles of the clergy, would not their friends and relatives warn them, as they valued their hopes of preferment, or provision for their families, not to interfere to obtain additional privileges to our fellow christians, and would they not cite with great effect the example and fate of Mr. Jones?—When the extraordinary powers of the higher orders of the Church over their inferiors was under discussion, he had pointed out some consequences like the present. If these extraordinary powers were not necessary, they ought to be abolished or regulated; and if, unfortunately, they could not be dispensed with, their exercise should be watched, and their abuse prevented. [Hear, hear!] After a few more observations, which were listened to with great attention, and frequently cheered, the noble lord concluded by moving the reading of the petition, adding that, after it was read and received, he would move that it be referred to a committee to inquire into the allegations of the petition, and the state of the ecclesiastical law affecting it, and to report thereupon to the House.
The petition was then read by the clerk, and the noble lord made his motion accordingly. It was as follows;
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"That your petitioner has been regularly educated at the university of Cam bridge, was admitted into holy orders by the hon. and right rev. Dr. Pelham, bishop of Exeter, in 1814, and has ever since performed the duties of his profession in a manner that has afforded general satisfaction, and your petitioner has never been accused of having committed any clerical offence whatever.
"That T. H. Hayes, esq., high sheriff of Devon shire, in consequence of a requisition, signed by nearly one hundred gentlemen, clergy, free holders, and inhabitants of the county of Devon, convened a county meeting at the castle of Exeter, on the 23rd April, 1819, for the purpose of petitioning his royal highness the Prince Regent and both Houses of Parliament, against the concessions proposed to be made to the Roman Catholics.
"That your petitioner attended this meeting, and delivered his sentiments in favour of the Catholics, and moreover answered several objections which were made to the admission of their claims. Your petitioner has a perfect recollection of the tenour of his speech, and is certain that he said nothing on the occasion which could be construed into any disrespect towards the doctrines or discipline of the Church of England.
"That your petitioner a few months since was presented to two livings in the dioceses of Lincoln and of Peterborough, and having procured a testimonial, signed by three beneficed clergymen of his neighbourhood, he presented it to the bishop of Exeter to be counter-signed: his lordship refused to sign this testimonial, and stated that he had no objection to the moral character of your petitioner, and that the sole cause of his refusal was the speech your petitioner delivered at the county meeting in favour of the Catholic claims, his lordship having been informed that some sentiments were at that time advanced, at variance with the doctrines of the Church of England. In consequence of this refusal the bishops of Lincoln and of Peterborough refused to institute your petitioner to the livings to which he had been presented, and your petitioner has of course sustained a very serious injury, for which he has no remedy at law.
"Your petitioner humbly represents to your right hon. House that at the time when the bishop of Exeter refused to sign the testimonial in question, many respectable and honourable gentlemen, members

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of the Established Church, who were present at the county meeting, informed his lordship that the information he had received respecting your petitioner's speech was perfectly erroneous, and that the arguments used on the occasion must have been misrepresented; that no opinions were advanced but such as were called forth by the nature of the debate, and which could not give any reasonable offence to any members of the Established Church. These explanations, however, proved of no avail.
"Your petitioner begs leave to represent that the injury he has sustained is most fatal to his future prospects, for not being aware that the delivery of his sentiments on a political question, at a county meeting regularly convened, was an offence cognizable by his diocesan, he could not possibly have been guilty of a premeditated crime, and the offence not being of a canonical nature, he did not conceive that he was liable to a punishment so disproportionate and severe, more particularly as he produced the most unquestionable evidence in his favour—evidence which would have been admitted in any court of justice. Nor has your petitioner been confronted, or even brought acquainted with the name of any one of his accusers. Moreover in consequence of the refusal of the bishop of Exeter to sign the testimonial, your petitioner's future advancement in the church is completely arrested and being in priest's orders, he is debarred from following any other profession.
"Your petitioner is most willing to submit to any canonical punishment, if it can be proved that he has committed any canonical offence, but no charge has been made against him; he has even been permitted to retain his curacy, though deprived of two livings, whereby he is suffered to perform the least profitable functions of his office, but he is prevented from enjoying those honours and emoluments which are considered to be the reward of useful and active services.
"Your petitioner likewise finds that by some recent acts of Parliament, an almost absolute power is granted to the bishops over the inferior clergy, and the bishop of Exeter has informed your petitioner that he had a power of refusing his signature to the testimonial, without being obliged to make any inquiries on the subject.
"Your petitioner, therefore, finding that he has no remedy for the unmerited injury he has sustained, ventures to throw him-
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self on the sympathy of your right hon. House, and humbly prays that the premises may be taken into consideration, and that your right hon. House will afford such relief to your petitioner, as to it in its wisdom shall seem fit. And your petitioner &c. &c. &c. (Signed)
JOHN PIKE JONES.
The Bishop of Exetersaid, he should not enter into the detailed part of the noble lord's speech, as he felt himself only called upon to enter into the allegations of the petition as they referred personally to himself. It was unpleasant for him to occupy their lordships attention as he must do, but he trusted they would afford him that indulgence which they were always pleased to bestow upon any one who had never before addressed them. He admitted the facts of the ordination, and the calling of the public meeting, though he was surprised to hear it stated, that he had refused to make any inquiry into the case. He could not, however, but animadvert on the allegation of the petitioner countenanced by the noble mover, that he {the bishop of Exeter) had refused to countersign the certificate, because the petitioner had made a speech at a county meeting in favour of additional privileges to the Roman Catholics. This he (the rev. prelate) unequivocally denied. The circumstances of the case were the following:—The petitioner having, as stated in his petition, been presented to two livings, which by the by, were only to be held for seven years, applied to him to countersign his certificate, of character. This practice of applying to the diocesan for such signature was very ancient and he believed never departed from. When the petitioner applied, and presented his certificate, he (the bishop of Exeter) had some conversation with him. He told him that he knew his opinions, respecting the Catholic question; and that he believed them to be sincere; their opinions differed widely on that subject; but he desired him particularly to understand that this difference had nothing to do with the refusal to sign his certificate. At the same time he expressed a hope that he might meet with the same indulgence from him, which he was certainly most willing to extend towards him. And here he could not avoid alluding to that part of the noble lord's speech, in which he supposed that the line of conduct which he felt it his duty to adopt would have the effect of preventing the clergy from exercising their

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own free-will on that particular subject.—He had presided in the same diocese thirteen years, and he would appeal to the clergy, as the best answer to such a supposition, whether he had ever attempted to control them. He had distinctly disclaimed acting on any such ground to the rev. gentleman himself. And he disclaimed it again before their lordships. He came now to the alleged cause of refusing the certificate. He had stated at the time that the delivery of the speech at the county meeting had no influence on his decision. Though he was thus explicit in giving a negative to an unfounded allegation, he was not bound to state the reason why he refused. He acted on a discretionary power, with which his office was invested. He felt his judgment was weak, but he acted to the best of his knowledge and discretion; and if he erred, his error was an error of the head, but not of the heart. He investigated the case with diligence—he weighed the circumstances with scrupulous care—he made the most anxious inquiries into facts—he received written letters denying the words attributed to the petitioner—he had received oral information of a contrary description from those with whom he was in habits of intercourse—not among the clergy but the laity—and he had that information since confirmed by letters—and it was a remarkable fact, that the three clergymen who had signed the testimonials, assured him afterwards that they had no knowledge of the matter when they affixed their signatures, and that they were now desirous to withdraw them; so that the testimonials would have fallen to the ground at any rate. And here he must controvert an opinion of the noble mover, that the counter-signature of the diocesan was only a security for the credibility of those who signed the certificate. In his I (the bishop of Exeter's) opinion the countersignature of the diocesan did not vouch for the general credibility of the attesting clergymen, but for their particular knowledge of the rev. person to whose character they bore testimony. When the diocesan signed the testimonial, he became a party to it. With that impression he (the rev. prelate) refused to countersign the certificate of Mr. Jones, and, until he was otherwise convinced, he would still refuse. If the petitioner, as he had stated, had suffered an injury by this refusal, he might have his remedy in the courts below. He begged leave to say, and he
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might be corrected if he was wrong, that redress was not debarred him in due course of law, if he was unjustly aggrieved; but even though the petitioner had no remedy, if he (the rev. prelate) thought it wrong to sign his certificate, he would still refuse his signature. The petitioner went on to state, that after exercising this extreme degree of harshness, he (the rev. prelate) still allowed him to retain his cure. He did so; and it was from a mere matter of feeling. The rev. prelate then distinctly denied that he had said to the petitioner he might refuse the counter-signature without inquiry. He never made the assertion, because he never meant to act upon it. On the contrary, he had entered into the most anxious inquiries, and therefore would not have been so absurd as to have contradicted his own practice. He was engaged no less than three weeks in the investigation, and had obtained evidence sufficient to justify him in what he had done.
Lord Erskinegave credit to the right reverend lord for the purity of his intentions, though he thought his conduct in the present instance was properly brought under the view of the House. He had seen many testimonials, and never saw one differ from another, and contended that the testimonials were only required to be signed by those who knew the clergyman, and it was not necessary that the clergyman himself should be known to the diocesan. The manner in which those testimonials were conducted was familiar to all. He believed no one would contradict him, when he stated that they were of this kind. They generally ran in the following words:—"We the undersigned do testify that we personally know for the last three years, that we believe him to be a person of moral conduct, and that he does not maintain any doctrines contrary to those of the Church of England." What had fallen from the rev. prelate was correct, that the testimonial was not to the effect of giving the person in whose favour it was signed general credit, but it went to that credit which ought to entitle him to that presentation he sought. It frequently happened that a clergyman was promoted, who did not know three clergymen in the diocese. A son of his had been in that situation, but the signature of one being procured, the archbishop of Canterbury signified that he was worthy of credit; the bishop of Chichester did the same, though they knew nothing of his

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son, and thus the difficulty was got over. He would admit, that if a right reverend prelate knew any thing disadvantageous to the personal character of the individual, he was not only justified in not signing the testimonial, but bound not to sign it. Every man had a right so to conduct himself in this world, as to preserve his general character, and if he lost it, he must take the consequence. Such was the rule of law. If a person was examined as a witness, and that another swore he did not believe his oath, because he was a man of bad character, the court could not go into the inquiry. But if, as in the present case, an inquiry was set on foot, not as to the general character, but a particular fact, such as the one before them, and that on the ground of that fact, the bishop should refuse to sign, he would take the liberty to say, that such conduct must prove unsatisfactory to the House. He would ask, why did not the rev. prelate go into the spiritual court, where the petitioner would have had an opportunity of defending himself [Hear!]. Would the rev. prelate undertake to say, that those from whom he derived his information were present during the whole of the speech, for nothing could be more unfair than to judge from having heard a part only? In his opinion, it was the duty of the right rev. prelate to have countersigned the testimonial. No man he trusted would suspect him of being an enemy to religion; he had always venerated it from his youth upwards, and he believed the liturgy of the Church of England to be the best and purest in the world. But was it advantageous to have it go abroad, that 3iere, in England, where every man had a right to be tried by his peers, the case of an individual should be prejudged [Hear!]. The bishops of England had always acted in a manner which reflected dignity on their characters, and nothing could be more painful to him than that it should go forth to the world, that a bishop had refused to sign a testimonial, not on the ground of general character, but on a recent fact which did not implicate that character. It was contrary to the principles of justice. Something, he thought, might be done by their lordships in this case; for he agreed with his noble friend that the idea of going to law with the bench of bishops was not within the humble means of a curate—Hear!].
The Lord Chancellorwho spoke in
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so low a tone of voice as to be scarcely audible below the bar, defended the power of the right rev. prelate to act as he had done. It had been stated that be must sign the testimonials; if so, there must be a power to compel him, but he could not find it in the canon law. He apprehended that it was a most serious duty incumbent on the clergy and the bishops to inquire into the character of the person whose testimonials they were required to sign, and maintained that the bishops ought not to be satisfied with the signatures of the clergy, to the exclusion of their own judgment and opinions. Whatever might be the consequences to an individual to whom the counter-signature of a bishop was denied on sufficient grounds, could their lordships lay it down as a rule of parliament, that because that individual could have no recourse to law, an application ought to be made to parliament in his behalf? If the objection of his noble friends was against the law as it stood, they should proceed by bringing in a bill which the House would have an opportunity of discussing; but even in that case he would beg of them before they consented to any enactment to consider what was the duty of clergymen and bishops in signing and countersigning testimonials. For these reasons he was induced to think that they had not enough before them to justify the adoption of any measure by parliament, for whatever some noble lords might think of the particular case, it was not a single case that could justify them in adopting any change in the ecclesiastical constitution of the country.
The Earl of Carnarvonwished their lordships to consider this question, not as one of a personal nature, but as involving a principle of great and general importance. It was with much pain, that he had heard a question of so great practical importance passed over in so superficial a manner, and the speech of his noble friend (lord Holland) answered in the manner it had been by the learned prelate who was the object of the present motion. The learned prelate had assigned no reason for having refused to countersign the testimonials of the petitioner, and for having consequently destroyed his character, ruined his fortune, and blasted his hopes of professional honour and preferment. The right rev. prelate had moreover told them what he thought no man would have dared tell their lordships, that

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he held a discretionary power, affecting the fortunes and the characters of clergymen, and the rights of patrons, and yet that he was not bound to assign any reason whatever for exercising that discretion in the severest manner [Hear!]. Without intending any personal disrespect, he would give the broadest contradiction to that assertion. While he had a seat in that House he would assert the contrary, and would say, that the right rev. prelate was not a functionary of such high and absolute authority as to exercise a discretionary power over the characters and professions of individuals without assigning any reason for his conduct. The learned prelate had told them that in this transaction he had acted on the authority of persons whom he well knew. Their lordships should recollect, however, that this question arose out of a public subject, a subject on which the minds of many men were heated, on which perhaps the mind of the noble prelate himself had been heated. He could have wished, indeed, that the noble prelate had given their lordships the satisfaction of denying what had been reported, but what he (lord Carnarvon) was convinced was false, that the noble prelate was personally mixed up with the subject; but with regard to the offensive expression, they had it on the statement of the petitioner, uncontradicted by the learned prelate, and therefore he thought admitted by him, that the petitioner denied having made use of the words imputed to him, and referred to several witnesses who were present, and whom he wished to be examined. The learned prelate, however, who said he was to dispose of the characters of persons as he pleased, would not say that he had examined these witnesses. Did he judge from a comparison of evidence? No: he proceeded like an inquisitor to take evidence in the dark, and by his own selection, and refused even a hearing to the accused [Hear, hear!]. The House, in fact, knew nothing as yet of the merits of the question. All they had heard from the learned prelate was, that he had exercised his own discretion. The House was called on, not with reference to this particular case, but for the sake of all clergymen and all patrons, to examine what powers had been exercised on this occasion, and to consider the propriety of passing some law to restrain in future the exercise of that discretion. The learned prelate had assigned no reasons
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for the course he had adopted, but had stated, that on his afterwards communicating to the testifying clergymen the facts which had come to his knowledge, one or two of them [the bishop of Exeter, "All, all"]—well all of them, were disposed to withdraw their signatures. But at the time the learned prelate refused his countersignature, these clergymen had not withdrawn their signatures [Hear, hear!]. The statement of the learned prelate only amounted to this, that subsequently to his fixing that mark of disgrace on the petitioner, these clergymen withdrew their names from the testimonials which they had formerly signed. It was a hard case that the petitioner should first be condemned, without knowing on what grounds, and then, in consequence of the sentence be looked on as a man unworthy of a certificate of character. The learned prelate had, however, informed their lordships en what grounds the signatures had been withdrawn: he had told them that it had been done when these testifying clergymen learned that the petitioner had said, nine-tenths of the clergymen of the church of England disapproved of the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed. Was it then the opinion of the learned bishop, and of those reverend gentlemen who had withdrawn their signatures on this account, that more than one-tenth of the clergy approved of these clauses? [Hear]. He had not heard the right reverend prelate say, and the ordinary courtesy of the House would not allow him to put the question, whether he himself approved of these clauses. If the noble prelate did approve of them, he would say, that he might be a good member of the church of England, but that he was not a christian [Hear!]. It did so happen that one of the light reverend bishops (the bishop of Lincoln) by whom institution had been refused to this individual, and necessarily refused, because he had not been able to obtain the requisite certificate; it happened that this very bishop who was certainly one of the most worth) as well as one of the most orthodox on the bench, had expressed his disapprobation of these clauses in the most unequivocal language. That right rev. prelate had said, that the Athanasian creed denounced damnation on all who did not believe that the catholic faith was the only true faith, and had expressed his regret that such language should have been used in any hu-

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man composition. In another place be had said, that though he believed all the doctrines contained in that creed, he could not but think it too much to denounce damnation against all who did not keep them entire. And so this individual was to be sacrificed for saying that nine-tenths of the clergy, and he did not even say that he himself was one of them, held opinions in common with the bishop, who was to have given him institution [Hear!]]. He should not trespass on their lordships attention by pointing out all the mischief, all the difficulties, and the incalculable evils which the present case, if allowed to become a precedent, would produce both to the church and to patrons, affecting as it did, in the most alarming manner, the independence of the clergy* Even if he had not had the pleasure of listening to the luminous Speech of his noble friend (lord Holland), if he had heard nothing but the answer of the learned prelate opposite, he should have thought that there were sufficient grounds for inquiry.
The Marquis of Lansdownesaid, that after what their lordships had heard and in the absence of any explanation of his extraordinary conduct, as stated by the learned prelate himself, he thought that no doubt could remain on their minds as to the necessity of some farther investigation. He would briefly call the attention of the House to-the authority claimed by the learned prelate over the clergy of his diocese, and to the manner in which he had exercised that jurisdiction. The learned prelate contended that he was authorised to receive accounts respecting an individual within his jurisdiction, not from persons residing in the same quarter with that individual, nor respecting the manner in which he discharged his professional duties, but from persons in distant parts, and relative to matters of fact and words, said to be used, perhaps inadvertently, by that individual; and, on this testimony, collected from persons not acquainted with the general habits of the individual in question, and not impeaching his general conduct or his moral character, the learned prelate thought himself warranted to inflict a punishment, which must inevitably be attended with ruin of character and fortune. Persons in the exalted situation of the right rev. prelate might overlook all views of further promotion [Hear, hear!]; for they were to suppose that he, as a bishop, did not look for or expect further church prefer-
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ment; still he might find an apology in the weakness of human nature, for an unfortunate curate who might look forward to some advancement in his humble and obscure situation. But the contrary was manifested by his conduct. He had used his discretion to blast those prospects, merely because he had exercised his free privilege as a Briton. The right rev. prelate must not wonder at the complaints of the petitioner, when, from an unfortunate expression hastily uttered, he; found himself, without any allegation: against him [Hear, hear!], without any I opportunity afforded him of establishing the contrary of the fact [Hear, hear!], on; the allegation of which his character was to be ruined, and he was to be debarred from all promotion in his profession. But the most remarkable part of the learned prelate's speech was that in which he accounted for not having stated to the petitioner the grounds on which he felt himself bound to refuse his signature, for he would give the learned prelate the credit of supposing that nothing but an imperious sense of duty could have led to a transaction so painful as depriving a brother of present employment and future honour. When asked why he had not given Mr. Jones an opportunity of vindicating his conduct in a spiritual court, especially as the learned prelate had the means of preventing that individual from misinforming or misleading the court, the fight rev. prelate told them that his good nature prevented him [the bishop of Exeter—"I said it was a matter of feeling."] Had the learned prelate then wasted his feelings in the previous part of the transaction? The learned prelate had, conscious of the duty which he owed to his country and to the people of Peterborough, refused to admit a person who was unfit to teach them, and yet, with regard to his own diocese, with regard to the people of North Boney, he permits him to preach what he likes. He indulged in a curate of 80 l. a year that which he would not tolerate in the incumbent of a living of 500 l. a year, as if the importance of his belief depended upon the amount of his income. The parish where he had 80 l. a year, for aught their lordships knew, might have contained a much greater number of inhabitants than that in which was the living of 500 l. a year: for as their lordships knew, the amount of the living did not always depend upon the number of the inhabitants. In the

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former they might have believed as they pleased, for aught the right rev. prelate seemed to care; but in the latter particular anxiety was evinced in preserving them from the influence of certain opinions. In looking at the whole of the case then, it appeared to him that one of two conclusions must be inferred—either the petitioner was most cruelly and barbarously used, or that the right rev. prelate had not discharged that duty which he was bound to do towards those committed to his care; for, if he had just cause to refuse the counter-signing of the petitioner's certificate, on the ground of his religious opinion, the same reason should have operated in preventing him from disseminating the same doctrines in another place. The question was not so much whether this individual had suffered or not, as whether the right rev. prelate had discharged his duty; and, having at all found it necessary to act in the manner he had done, whether he had done all he ought to have done. He would not go into the question of what legal remedy remained to the individual; for on that subject he did not possess sufficient information; and indeed he had gained but little on that point from the speech of the noble and learned lord (the lord chancellor); but this he would say, that whether there was a legal remedy or not, the House were bound to pay particular attention to the situation of the inferior classes of the clergy in the country. They were placed by the constitution without any representatives in that House. He did not wish for any alteration of the constitution in this respect. It was not the effect of any particular law, but the work of time. But, so circumstanced, he thought they were a class of persons who ought to be most particularly attended to in that House. They were subject to great discretional, he would not say arbitrary, control of their superiors; and he therefore thought their lordships should always feel disposed to listen with attention to their complaints. Setting all that had been stated by the rev. gentleman (the petitioner) aside, but taking the statement of the right rev. prelate himself, he conceived the conduct of that right rev. prelate was: not strictly justifiable in having refused to sign the testimonials for this gentleman, and afterwards committing to his cave a parish where he must have known that he would disseminate those very doctrines, whose unsoundness he had himself alleged
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as the cause of his refusal so to sign. Under these circumstances he thought that this question ought to be taken into the consideration of their lordships, and he could not but feel indebted to his noble friend for having brought the subject before the House [Hear!].
The Bishop of Landaff(Dr. Van Mildert) said, that giving credit to the feelings of the noble lords opposite upon this subject, he could not yet be insensible to the arduous task of those who had the care and government of ecclesiastical districts. From all he had heard, he did not think that any case of misgovernment was made out against the right rev. prelate. What he had done appeared to him to be only in the strict discharge of his duty. He complained that little attention had been paid either to the feelings of the right rev. prelate, or to the painful nature of the duty he had to perform. With respect to the alleged opinions of the clergy on the subject alluded to, he had passed through all ranks, and he thought it a gross libel to say that nine-tenths of the clergy did not believe the Athanasian creed, although they signed the articles. The right rev. prelate might inadvertently or unwittingly countersign testimonials; but if before he had so done, any circumstances came to his knowledge respecting the character or opinions of the individual, he was bound to act upon them [The conclusion of the right rev. I prelate's speech was wholly inaudible below the bar].
The Earl of Carnarvon,in explanation, stated, that he had not charged the right rev. prelate with a disbelief of the damnatory articles of the Athanasian creed; but the right rev. prelate had not himself expressed any opinion on the subject. Another right rev, prelate had, in his writings, thrown more than a doubt on the necessity of their belief. Indeed he (lord Carnarvon) had never heard any prelate say, that he believed them; and all that he should add was, that they who did believe them could not be Christians.
The Bishop of Exeterwas proceeding, we suppose, to comment upon what had fallen from the noble earl, when.
Lord Hollandrose to order. His lordship observed, that, according to the standing rules and constant practice of their lordships, if any noble lord, in explanation, disavowed particular words, no noble lord had a right afterwards to impute those words to him. The question;

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was then put, and
their lordships divided, when there appeared—Contents, 18; Non-Contents, 35; Majority, 17.