Lords Sitting of 6 July 1820

PETITION FROM HER MAJESTY TO BE HEARD BY HER COUNSEL.
Lord Dacrepresented the following petition from her Majesty:—
"CAROLINE REGINA:
"The Queen has heard, with inexpressible astonishment, that a bill, conveying charges, and intended to degrade her and to dissolve her marriage with the King, has been brought by the first minister of the King into the House of Lords, where her Majesty has no counsel or other officer to assert her rights. The only alleged foundation for the bill is the report of a secret committee, proceeding solely on papers submitted to them, and before whom no single witness was examined. The Queen has been further informed, that her counsel last night were refused a hearing at the bar of the House of Lords, at that stage of the proceeding when it was most material that they should be heard, and that a list of the witnesses, whose names are known to her accusers, is to be refused to her. Under such circumstances, the Queen doubts, whether any other course is left to her, but to protest in the most solemn manner against the whole of the proceeding; but she is anxious to make one more effort to obtain justice, and therefore desires that her counsel may be admitted to state her claims at the bar of the House of Lords."
Lord Dacre Lord Dacre moved, that the counsel be called in.
The Lord Chancellorobserved, that it was a matter of infinite importance that the practice of their lordships' House should be regulated by strict and invariable principles. The petition did not explain on what points her majesty wished to be heard by counsel. The ordinary course was, for counsel to be heard upon the second reading of a bill, and when the evidence to be brought forward was explained; but he believed this was the first time that ever it was proposed that counsel should address their lordships upon circumstances not specified, and when there was no evidence before them. If counsel were to he heard, he thought that they must be required to explain what were the points to which their address was intended to apply. If they were not so limited, their address might apply to matters of fact which could have no concern with the defence. The question was not, therefore, whether counsel should be called in, but whether they should not be confined by an instruction of the House if they were called in.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, the proper course would be, either immediately to agree to instruct the counsel, or otherwise to order them to be called in, and asked on what points they meant to address the House. If they meant to argue that the preamble of the bill was not sufficiently detailed, that would be an intelligible ground; if they meant to contend that a list of witnesses ought to be furnished to her majesty, that would be an intelligible ground; if they meant to propose to expedite the proceedings, or to delay them, all these would be intelligible grounds: but he could not consent to their being called in without some limitation. The hearing counsel at all at the present stage was quite unprecedented. If therefore their lordships, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, agreed to hear them, it must be after calling on them to fix precisely the points on which they were to address the House. As the noble baron had moved that they be called, he should therefore move that they be asked what points they meant to urge.
The motion was agreed to, and the counsel were called to the bar.
The Lord Chancellorthen stated, that he was desired by the House to ask upon what points the counsel intended to address their lordships, and, after they
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had answered, then to direct them to withdraw.
Mr. Broughamobserved, that he was commanded by her majesty to appear at their lordships bar, in consequence of the proceeding instituted against her, and that he had several points to urge in behalf of his royal client. Her majesty had last night been served by the gentleman usher of the black rod with a copy of a bill, presented to their lordships, which contained charges of the gravest nature, and her majesty could not suffer the shortest interval to elapse without stating her objections to the whole proceeding thus instituted by bill. Their lordships, he hoped, would also suffer him to add his regret that the request made by her majesty yesterday to be heard against this proceeding was not complied with. It was also the wish of her majesty's counsel to object to the course of proceeding on account of the relative situation in which their lordships and her majesty stood with respect to proceedings which it might still be necessary to adopt. They were also directed to address some observations to their lordships, touching the mode of proceeding, and to the time; touching any delay, also, which might be proposed, as to whether that delay should take place at the present, or be interposed in some subsequent period of the proceeding. It was also their wish to declare certain matters on the part of her majesty, which they thought calculated to have an important effect on the proceedings before their lordships; and he had to add, that the present was the stage of the proceedings in which it was proper for them to state to their lordships those matters to which he had thus generally adverted. They begged further to observe, that it was matter of very serious detriment to her majesty that their lordships should have rejected the prayer of her petition of yesterday, and refused to hear her counsel before the bill to which her petition of this day referred had been brought in and read a first time. This appeared to her majesty the more extraordinary when the ground of that refusal was considered. It was said that a report on which a bill was to be founded, had been made in a certain place; but that of the existence of any such proceeding her majesty could have no knowledge. Her majesty and her counsel were held to be quite ignorant of this proceeding, though every body in the metropolis but themselves

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was well acquainted with it. In fact, the report was by this time in the possession of every man, woman, and child, within the range of the circulation of the newspapers. It was stated by these newspapers, that their lordships had ordered the report to be printed, and every one of them had published copies of it. These statements might, perhaps, be fabrications—they were perhaps gross libels on the secret committee which their lordships had appointed, and on their lordships House: but as they were given in a very consistent form, and as those who had dared to circulate assertions apparently so calumnious had not been judicially visited for their presumption, her majesty's counsel began to be afraid that there was some foundation for them, and that the report, of which they and her majesty could know nothing, might in fact be in existence. But that report, if it did exist, went farther than the bill, with a copy of which they had been furnished. There was matter in the report which had not found its way into the bill; and that was a point upon which her majesty's counsel were also most desirous of being heard.
The counsel was ordered to withdraw.
The Lord Chancellorthought it quite impossible for their lordships to permit counsel to address them in the way proposed. It was his most anxious desire that strict justice should be done, in this as in every other case; but if certain matters were to be stated at the bar, to show why this proceeding could not be adopted, they must either be matters of fact or matters of law; if matters of fact, as the circumstances of the evidence were not yet known, they might be irrelevant; and if they were points of law, they might have nothing to do with the defence which was to be made against the bill.
Earl Greywas sensible of the necessity of adhering to precedent and analogy in their lordships proceedings, but it ought to be recollected, that this was a case for which there was no precedent, and he hoped that it would never form a precedent for any future one. If they were to be guided by precedent, it was impossible for them to find any. Their lordships object ought to be to do substantial justice. The learned lord proposed, in the first place, to limit the hearing of the counsel to the mode of proceeding on the bill; but it should be recollected that the petition objected to proceeding by bill at
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all. He understood the counsel to state that he had several facts and circumstances to urge; but he did not state whether those facts and circumstances related to the defence, or to the manner in which their lordships were proceeding. He wished their lordships seriously to consider whether they would not be acting too hastily, if they, from a mere regard to form, excluded the counsel from stating any facts which might be of importance to the case of his client.
The Earl of Liverpooldid not understand what possible limit there could be to the statement of counsel, if they were allowed to proceed in the way they proposed. To allow them to speak on matters not connected with the defence would be to allow them to speak on every possible subject. He thought the course proposed by his learned friend afforded as great a latitude as could be allowed.
The Lord Chancellorobserved, that after a bill of this description was read a first time, the nature of the evidence on which it was founded must be explained before any noble lord could propose its second reading. Every person who was interested in opposing it would then be entitled to be heard against it; but if counsel were allowed to be heard now in the way proposed, such a proceeding would be neither more nor less than a surrender of all their lordships functions. He therefore put the motion, that the counsel be called in, and instructed to confine their argument to the mode of the proceeding on the bill, and to the time of such proceeding.
The Marquis of Lansdownobserved, that the real question was, not whether their lordships should hear counsel on the mode of proceeding with regard to the bill, but whether they would hear arguments to induce them to abandon the bill altogether, in order to adopt some other course.
Earl Grosvenorregretted that counsel had not been heard before the bill was introduced. That certainly was the time at which their lordships ought to have taken the objection into consideration. He, however, thought that the hearing should now be granted.
The Earl of Lauderdalecould not conceive how their lordships could be asked to hear counsel against the proceeding by bill at this period. When they came to the second reading, counsel might very properly be heard on that point; and if it

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could then be shown that they ought to abandon that course—that the measure ought not to be a legislative one—the bill would be given up. In the mean time it appeared to him that it would be most improper to hear counsel.
The Lord Chancellor, as a peer of parliament, gave it as his opinion that counsel could be heard on nothing but the mode of' proceeding to be had on the bill, and the time at which the proceedings should take place. When, however, he stated that their lordships ought so to confine the counsel, it was to be understood that he meant the limitation to be without prejudice to any argument which might be urged against the course adopted by bill. Surely, according to every parliamentary principle, their lordships must reject any attempt to tell them what they ought to do in this stage.
Lord Hollandreminded their lordships, that the great point on which her majesty's counsel desired to be heard, was to show that the proceeding by bill was a hardship to his client. If he understood what was likely to be done in the progress of the bill, all the witnesses for the prosecution would be heard at a stage long before any defence could be made. If this was so, the question of proceeding by bill had best be discussed now, because, if there were any hardship in the case, that hardship would occur before the counsel could have an opportunity of stating any thing against it.
Earl Greyagain insisted on the propriety of hearing counsel now against going on with the bill. When they came to the second reading, if it should be shown that the course adopted was wrong, time and labour would be lost, as well as evil done. If counsel were to be heard against the bill at all, this was, on every principle of justice and propriety, the proper time for hearing them. Undoubtedly their lordships could not suffer counsel to obtrude themselves, and to dictate the course of proceedings to be adopted by the House; but that did not prevent their lordships from seriously weighing the reasons which might now be offered against the bill.
The Lord Chancellorrepeated the reasons on which he thought the counsel ought not to be heard. Were he in a situation to consult his feelings as a man, he would not object to the application which had been made; but, in his situation as a peer of the realm he was bound
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to resist it. His lordship then put the question on the motion for limiting the counsel, which was carried.
The counsel being then called in, the Lord Chancellor stated, that he was commanded to inform them, that in what they should represent to the House they were to confine themselves to the mode and manner of proceeding to be had on the bill, and to the time when those proceedings should take place.
Mr. Brougham, her Majesty's Attorney General, then proceeded to address their lordships to the following effect:—His learned friend and himself were totally ignorant of what had occurred in their absence, and therefore their lordships would naturally suppose that they were at a loss to comprehend the exact points to which as they had been told, their argument was to be limited, and the manner in which they were to be tied down in entering upon the important task which they were then called upon to perform. In making the effort which he was then making, with all good faith to comprehend the command which their lordships had just imposed upon him, he should trust to the indulgence of their lordships for his pardon, if, in the discharge of his duty, he happened to misinterpret the order which they had issued, and he therefore begged of their lordships, if he was guilty of any such misinterpretation, to impute it to accident, or rather to misfortune, that he had not caught in its right sense their lordships meaning, and not to any intention on his part (which before God he disclaimed) of offering any observation to their lordships which should in the slightest degree disobey the instructions which they had given him. He gathered from what had been intimated to him, that those instructions commanded him to confine whatever he had himself to urge, or whatever her majesty had commanded him to urge on her behalf, to the manner of proceeding with respect to or upon the bill which had been served upon her majesty last night by the ordinary officer of their lordships; and assuming it to be right to proceed by bill—
The Lord Chancellor.—" By this bill."
Mr. Brougham.—By this bill? He would take it so; because by that admission their lordships would decide two points in his favour:—first of all, they would determine that the proceedings by bill (to which many heavy and grievous objections might be made, if permission

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were granted to enter into that question) were the proceedings which their lordships had adopted; and, secondly, they would determine, in so inflexible a manner that it would be in vain to offer resistance to it, that they would proceed by bill in no other manner than the bill then before their lordships warranted them in doing. He should therefore presume that that bill was unalterable at present, and irrevocable till some future opportunity, and should argue for his illustrious client under the idea that he was confined to the manner of the proceedings, and the time or times in which those proceedings were to take place. If he rightly understood the instructions of their lordships with respect to the mode of proceeding, there was no occasion for him to say a word upon it; the only mode of proceeding which their lordships could now adopt was to propose the second reading of the bill; and therefore, as he was not prepared to propose that the third reading of the bill should precede the second, or indeed to suggest any other fanciful mode of legislation, he felt that, when they called upon him to argue on the mode of proceeding which was instituted against his illustrious client, they knew that they were not subjecting themselves to a long argument, as it was impossible for him to urge any argument at all upon such a subject. He could understand the instruction which had been given to him with regard to the time of proceeding, but he declared his incapacity to comprehend the instruction which had been given him relative to the mode or manner in which it was to be conducted.
Having stated thus much to their lordships, he should now confine his argument to the time of proceeding only; but he had been led to suppose that there were two points to which their lordships had wished to direct his attention, because they had first addressed him upon the manner of proceeding, and had afterwards limited him to the time or tunes of such proceeding. He now found that he had been mistaken; for if he were to go into the argument whether evidence ought to be received before the second reading of the bill, which the rules of their lordships' House (for which he entertained the highest respect) precluded, he should labour entirely in vain, and would be met by the obvious remark, that counsel ought not to be allowed to dictate to their lordships the mode in which they were to proceed,
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and also that they ought not to be heard in detail against the bill until its second time of reading. The question of time was, therefore, one of the utmost importance, not only as regarded their lordships, but also with respect to the illustrious party whom he represented; for if he could satisfy their lordships that the nature and tendency of the present bill was such as suspended absolute destruction over the head of her majesty—if he could succeed in showing that the interests of justice demanded that it ought to be speedily discussed, and that her majesty the queen had, inconsequence, commanded her legal advisers to inform their lordships, as he on their behalf now did inform them, that she did not call for any delay; that she was ready to proceed forthwith in her defence against the report of the secret committee, and also against the charges in the preamble to the celebrated bill now before their lordships; that she desired their lordships to prove that evening, if they could, or else tomorrow, all the accusations which were contained in that unparalleled preamble to a bill as unparalleled and unprecedented as the preamble itself.
If he could succeed in the argument which he had urged, partly from the indulgence extended to him by their lordships, and partly in the delivery of the strong, impetuous, and even clamorous desire of her majesty to have the accusations, now brought, proved against her, if either their lordships, or the attorney-general, or any other of the king's counsel, could prove them; then he trusted that he should have made out a case, even in confining himself strictly to the question, which would induce their lordships to throw out the present bill now upon its first time of reading. The suggestion of throwing it out, even in its first stage, was one which arose naturally out of the argument which he had been allowed to employ upon the time of the proceeding; for it was his duty to protest against all delay, and to satisfy their lordships, that the only just and consistent measure which they could pursue—indeed, the only measure which did not militate against the safety of his illustrious client—was, either by throwing out the bill in its present stage, or else by proceeding immediately to read it a second tin:e.—The learned gentleman then proceeded to state, that it would not be a difficult matter to deal with the instruction of their lordships, if

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it were distinctly stated that he and his learned friend were not to be heard against the bill until its second reading, because such instruction would be consistent and intelligible. But, from the obscurity of the present instruction, he was at a loss to know the exact path on which he ought to walk; and he was afraid that, if he veered but a single hair's breadth, and but for a single moment, from the straight line upon which be was suffered to tread, even though it were for the mere purpose of gaining a purchase, in order to get on better in that straight line, he should be accused of not showing the deference which was due, and which he was particularly anxious to pay, to the expressed wishes of their lordships. He trusted that their lordships would consider the advantage with which he should be able to address them, if he could throw off the advocate, and address them as an individual upon this question. The relief he should gain by such a change would be incalculable; as he should then only have to answer for his opinions as an individual, and not for those which he might have to propound as an advocate. Feeling, however, that he was now standing at their lordships bar in the character of an advocate, he felt obliged to fling himself upon the compassionate consideration of their lordships, and to implore them to consider any thing offensive which he might utter, as forced by necessity from the advocate, and not from the individual, who addressed them.
He now felt it to be his duty to state that it had reached her majesty—and these were times, and her's was a situation, in which the ear was open to every report—but it had reached her majesty, that it had been argued (and he had himself seen the argument in the public newspapers, and therefore, aware, as he was, that it could not at all influence their lordships decision, he was still bound, on behalf of his illustrious client, to guard against any popular impression reaching the minds and perverting the judgments of those who were her judges, who he trusted would treat it with the contempt it deserved) that she was to be dealt with as if she was the lowest and not the highest subject in the realm. In opposition to that argument he would say, "God grant that she were in the same situation with the lowest subject in the realm! God grant that she had never risen to a higher rank than the humblest indivi-
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dual who owed allegiance to his majesty!" For, if she had not, she would not have had occasion to complain of a single day's delay in obtaining relief from the load of calumny which had been cast upon her by the present anomalous proceeding. If she had been the meanest instead of the most exalted personage in the country, she would have had no proceeding served upon her, such as he held a copy of in his hand; she would, on the contrary, have been fenced round by the triple fence whereby the law of England guards the life and honour of the poorest female. For what, he would ask, was the nature of the proceeding now instituted against her majesty? A bill of Divorce, not founded upon any evidence of adultery—a bill of Pains and Penalties, not founded upon any previous proceedings, either in the courts of common or civil law. Before such a bill could have been introduced against any other individual, there must have been a sentence in the consistory court—there must have been the verdict of a jury, who might have sympathised with her feelings—who, being taken from the same rank in life as herself, and knowing that the evidence produced against her might, under similar circumstances, be produced against their wives and daughters the next, would have been influenced by a desire to guard against a common danger. There would then have been among her judges none who were the servants of her husband, for her counsel would have had the right of challenging all such—none who were hired during his pleasure—none who were placed in a situation to feel gratitude for the past, or expectation for the future favours which he had it in his power to bestow. She would have been tried by twelve honest, impartial, and disinterested Englishmen, at whose doors the influence which would act upon her present judges might agitate for years, before it would make the slightest impression either upon the hopes or the fears which it was calculated to excite. She had, therefore, good cause to lament that she was not the lowest subject of his majesty; and he could assure their lordships, that she would willingly sacrifice every thing, excepting her honour, which was dearer to her than her life, to obtain the poorest cottage which had ever sheltered an Englishwoman from injustice.
Upon such grounds was founded his reason for making as short as possible

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(for he was still observing upon the time of the proceeding) the interval which would elapse between the present evening and the discussion on the second reading of the bill. He had many other reasons of a similar nature, all pointing in a similar direction, all tending to the same point—he meant the granting of her majesty's prayer for the immediate commencement of the investigation—which he was prevented from urging by the limits to which their lordships had confined him. He could not, however, refrain from railing the attention of their lordships to the situation in which they might hereafter be placed, and to the anomalous condition to which they might be reduced, if they did not get rid of the present bill as suddenly as possible, and indeed altogether. Their lordships would observe, that there was nothing in the allegations of the preamble which precluded their lordships from becoming judges in a criminal proceeding, upon charges arising out of the very evidence which they were called upon to examine as legislators in support of those allegations. He took it for granted—indeed, his respect for their lordships compelled him to suppose it impossible that they could have done otherwise—that they had well perpended whether the whole charge which had been brought against his illustrious client might not amount to an impeachable offence. He took this point, he repeated it, for granted; because, if an impeachment were not an impossibility they would never have taken into their consideration a bill which by probability, might render them masters of the evidence on which they might afterwards be called upon to give sentence as judges. He took it also for granted that it was equally certain that they must have also decided another point; he meant this— that where there was no indictable offence which could be punished by the common law, there also was then no impeachment which could be sustained; though, for his own part, he must confess that he did not know any principle of law, or any course of practice, upon which that doctrine could be defended. Indeed, he had always understood that an impeachment was never instituted except where an indictment could not lie; but their lordships, from the peculiar constitution of their House having had the opportunity of learning the opinion of the twelve judges, appear-
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ed to have come, upon long and mature deliberation, to a conclusion diametrically opposite to that which he had, no doubt very erroneously, supposed to be the true one. Still, though he conceded all these points to their lordships there arose out of the bill itself a point, which no respect to their lordships could induce him, as an advocate, to give up for a single moment. Granted that no high-treason had been committed under the statute of Edward the 3rd, because the adultery—or he ought rather to have said, the alleged adultery—had been committed with a foreigner, and abroad; yet he would ask, was Malta no part of the king's dominions?—Was Gibraltar not included in the possessions of his majesty?— How could he, or their lordships, tell that his illustrious client might not have touched at Malta, where he believed she actually did touch, during her voyage for a-year and a half up and down the Mediterranean, with the very individual with whom this adulterous intercourse was said to have been carried on?—How could they tell whether it might not have been carried on at other places intra prœsidia? —If such adultery had been committed in such places, were their lordships prepared to admit that an impeachment could not be founded upon it in another quarter?—Supposing that they were inclined to make that admission, he would then ask them—or rather he would take it for granted that their lordships had applied also to the court of Admiralty, and had decided another point against him by the authority of the civil courts of the country. That point was, that nothing done on board of a king's ship could be construed into—
The Lord Chancellorhere interrupted Mr. Brougham by observing to their lordships, that he thought the learned counsel was transgressing the rules of the House in alluding to what their lordships might be supposed to have done or left undone. He was likewise of opinion, that, in pursuing that line of argument, the learned counsel had not complied with the instructions which had been notified to him as the commands of their lordships. If their lordships thought fit to allow such a-latitude of argument, they certainly had the power to do so; bur, as a peer of parliament, he must say, that he would not sit upon the woolsack to listen to it.
Mr. Broughamthen continued.—He would persist in making the attempt to

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pursue that line of argument until he was silenced by the authority of their lordships. In doing so he was only performing a sacred duty which he owed to his illustrious client, and which his conscience informed him that no difficulty or danger ought to induce him to neglect. If prevented from performing it, he must certainly bend before their lordships' power. Their lordships, however were used to be just.
The Lord Chancellor.—Their lordships were just, and had made their present order for the purpose of continuing so.
Mr. Brougham.—As he was not allowed to proceed in the course which he had intended, he should now proceed to show the immediate connexion which existed, between the topics on which he had just been speaking and the point of time to which he had been limited by their lordships. His argument was to prove, that this bill ought to be sent out of doors immediately, and that it could not lie 24 hours upon the table without producing great and imminent danger to the safety of his client. Indeed; he would assert that, unless that bill was discarded by their lordships, no justice could be done to his illustrious client. The line of argument which he was then adopting was perfectly consistent with the instructions of their lordships; for, the more clearly he could show the bill itself to be pregnant with mischief and danger, the more did his argument apply to the time in which this proceeding was to be carried on. As he had been instructed to confine his argument as to the time, he could not help observing, that the light in which he had endeavoured to put this question was one which had struck upon his mind most forcibly; and he therefore felt himself bound to present it to their lordships until he was silenced by their authority. All that he had now to add was, that her majesty desired no delay; that she was most anxious to have the evidence who were to substantiate, or rather to endeavour to substantiate, those foul and false charges against her honour, called without delay to their lordships' bar. He ought perhaps to apologize for applying such language to the 'preamble of a bill which their lordships had allowed to be read a first time; but still his sense of duty informed him that he ought to be allowed to say that those charges were foul, false, and most malignant, since they originated from a report, which, having
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been made in the first instance upon written documents, and without the examination of witnesses, and having been backed in the second by the approbation, of their lordships, had propagated many circumstances to the great and manifest detriment of her majesty.
The learned gentleman then proceeded to say that the queen was not only desirous that the proceedings now instituted against her should meet with no obstacle on her part to a speedy investigation, but was even desirous that the proceedings, after they bad once commenced, should continue de die in diem. He was not certain whether in making that observation he was conforming strictly to the line which their lordships had chalked out for him; but what he wished to urge was, that their lordships, after they had once commenced the proceedings, ought not to allow them to meet with any suspension; for could there be a more crying injustice towards her majesty, than to go on with the accusations which had been preferred against her, to hear part of them supported by evidence; then to discontinue the examination of them, in order to allow that evidence to be collected, sorted, and patched up, so as to tally even with those parts of it which made most materially in her majesty's favour? The first demand, therefore, which he had to make of their lordships, was an immediate, the next was, a continued proceeding. That this would not occasion any difficulty or inconvenience to those who had preferred these accusations, he conceived that he bad a full right to assume; for was it to be imagined, that between the period when the Milan commission was first established and the present hour, they had not had time sufficient to bring over the evidence requisite to substantiate them? Was it to be presumed that any of the parties (he begged pardon—there was only one party—his illustrious client) was unprepared? He said there was only one party of which he could at present take notice, for he had no right to call their lordships, who were to be the judges, a party to this prosecution. Still, when he saw that the attorney-general, or some person appointed by him, was to appear at a future day by order of their lordships, he could not help surmising that there must be another party. He would assume that the party opposed to her majesty was an abstract or an allegorical personage, called Public

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Justice. Still he would say, that if public justice had collected charges in March, 1819, it might have been prepared to support them by July, 1820. But then he supposed, it would be said that this proposition would take the accusing party by surprise. It might be so; but when he saw that there were persons high in office, and ministers of the Crown, ordering the counsel for the Crown to attend on behalf of the prosecution, he thought he had a right to assume (though he knew nothing of it officially) that they had something to do with it. But if the ministers should say that they were taken unawares, and without preparation, then he would apply himself to their lordships not only as a branch of the legislature, but also as a court of justice, not to allow further time to those individuals, who, in this case, were his antagonists, and of whom it would be improper and highly derogatory from their lordships, to suppose that they could be among the judges of his client. From such a plea, if made, he would draw two conclusions—either that they were ready with their witnesses, and able to go on with their charges (which he deemed to be a false conclusion); or, what he believed to be the true conclusion, that the king's servants believed every iota of the charges in the preamble to the bill to form part of a tissue of the most gross falsehood and the most rank imposture. It was impossible for a moment to suppose that the king's ministers believed the queen guilty. Had they really thought that there was the slightest foundation for any one of the charges in the preamble to the bill, they would not have ventured to offer her 50,000 l. a-year, with the privilege of residing in a foreign court with the rank and dignity of a queen.
The Bishop of Exeter.—My lords, I move that the counsel be ordered to withdraw. [Counsel having withdrawn] I ask the House, whether the counsel has or has not attended to the directions of the House?
Lord Hollandsaid, that he had never heard a more extraordinary appeal. The counsel had been directed to confine themselves to certain limits, and they proceeded accordingly; but in the midst of the speech a reverend lord had thought fit to rise in his place, and ask, as a matter of information, whether the counsel were obeying the direction of the House? If the reverend lord had formed any opinion
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of his own in the negative, it became him with the great knowledge and acuteness he possessed, to point out in what way the counsel had deviated. It was strange, indeed, that he should call upon the whole body of the House to decide the point, merely for his personal satisfaction. After what had occurred, it would be even stranger still if the reverend lord did not undertake to go through the whole argument of the learned counsel, and prove in what way he had deviated from the line the House had directed him to follow-This would afford the House a singular advantage, especially as the counsel had himself stated that he had great difficulty in understanding the precise points to which he was to direct his observations.
Mr. Brougham, having again taken his station at the bar, proceeded:—In adverting to the question of time, he had called upon the House to proceed without delay, and one answer he had anticipated was, that the supporters of the bill would say that they were not yet prepared with their evidence. To this he was endeavouring to reply when he had been interrupted: he was attempting to show that the confidential servants of the Crown were placed in this dilemma—either that they were satisfied that there was some ground, some colour for the accusation, which might be a sufficient reason for not proceeding immediately; or, on the other hand, that they were not ready to go on, because they had been taken by surprise, because the bill had been forced upon them, and because they themselves, utterly disbelieving every tittle of charge against the queen, could not be prepared with testimony to support the preamble. He had ventured humbly, and out of respect to the ministers of the Crown, to assert, that if they had believed, he did not say any material part of the allegations, but any part, however insignificant, they never would have pursued that line of conduct which was now notorious; they never would have consented that her majesty should remain abroad unmolested, without any measure of degradation or divorce, exposing the dignity and honour of the Crown, and the morals of the country where she resided—the first to be lowered, and the last to be contaminated. They had offered her a splendid, a royal revenue; she was to live where she chose, to be announced at foreign courts as the lawful and rightful queen of England; and, above all, the ministers of the Crown

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were themselves to move addresses to her in parliament. Was it to be credited that they would have acquiesced in all this, if they had given a moment's belief to any part of the statements in the preamble of the bill?
Having dealt with this topic, so far at least as to bring it within the notice of their lordships, he begged once again to be allowed to implore the House to mark the painful situation in which her majesty was placed. He said nothing of the condition in which her counsel stood; they must do their duty, and had no right to complain; but the situation of the queen was hard indeed. Before any step had been taken against her—before her title had been disputed—before even men's minds were made up that any thing should be done, various measures had been adopted to stigmatize and degrade her. If those who hitherto had prosecuted this business were indeed aware of the full weight of the evidence—if they relied upon it—if they knew that it must in the end lead to a conviction of enormous guilt, they still had happily contrived that the bitterest stigma, the basest degradation, should precede even that conviction. How unspeakably more severe was the lot of the queen, how infinitely more unjust the treatment she had experienced, since it appeared that the very first step taken to ensure her a fair and an impartial trial was previously to sentence her —or rather to pass over the form of sentence, as they passed over the evidence —and to inflict a punishment that had never been awarded, arising out of a trial that had been never had; and all this for the purpose, forsooth, of securing her afterwards a calm and an unprejudiced hearing. Of this the queen now complained: she could not complain before, because till now she never knew that she was to be put upon her trial. Under these circumstances she had a right to remonstrate that the first step towards bringing her to her trial was not only to deprive her of the presumption of law (falsely called merciful, because it was only just), that until the accused were convicted she should be deemed innocent; but to deprive her of it, not by general expressions and vague insinuations, but by affixing a stain upon her forehead, which compelled every man who resorted to his church to see in the very service of God that a crying injustice had been done to his fellow-subject. From all such persons
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as had inflicted this odious stigma—from all such authorities—from every species of extrajudicial proceeding—from every cast, colour, and shade of party feeling—from every kind of oppression and indignity, her majesty appealed to this House. She came before their lordships as the highest branch of the legislature, the supreme court of judicature—she claimed protection from those who were now trying her by bill, and who hereafter might be called upon to try her by impeachment—who were now legislating, when they might at some future period be required to sit in judgment; but, whether acting in the one capacity or in the other, with the confidence of injured innocence she flung herself upon the House, and trusted that no mixture of party—no presence of interested persons—no adventitious influence exercised out of doors—no supposed want of sympathy with the feelings of the country—no alleged, though falsely alleged, tendency on the part of their lordships to truckle to royal favour, would stand between the queen and justice, or prevent her case from receiving a fair, impartial, and an unprejudiced decision. She appealed to their lordships with the more confidence, because she knew that the House was composed of the most illustrious peers, spiritual as well as temporal, that any nation of the world could boast.
Mr. Denmanimmediately followed on the same side. In submitting to their lordships those prayers not contained in her majesty's petition, he said, he was placed in a singularly difficult situation between the instructions he had that morning received from his royal client and the directions of the House. It would immediately occur to every man, that when a charge of this weighty nature had received the sanction of a bill—when that bill, which had been once read, imported not only degradation from rank, but the dissolution of an existing marriage—considerations of a very different kind must have thronged into the mind of the party accused from any questions as to the mere mode and time of such a proceeding. He would not conceal from their lordships that he and his learned friend had received from their illustrious-client one especially delegated duty, namely, to press upon the House the absolute necessity, if justice were to be done, that this most extraordinary, most anomalous, and most unprecedented proceeding should be brought to the spcedi-

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est possible conclusion. Therefore, by the instruction of the House as to the manner, he had not been so much taken by surprise, though her majesty did not presume to prescribe what course their lordships ought to pursue; but the question of time was of the last importance, because, unquestionably, if these heavy charges were to remain a rankling poison in the public mind, afflicting even that judicature which might ultimately be called upon to pronounce as to the queen's guilt or innocence, he should despair of a just decision from the united wisdom of the world. On a former occasion, her majesty had submitted an application, that the secret committee, which she was informed had been instructed to report, should not enter upon the inquiry until she were provided with the means of defence; that petition, like the request of yesterday, was rejected. He alluded to this fact, because he was anxious, in the first instance, to show that there was no inconsistency in then requiring delay, and now most earnestly entreating the House that the bill just introduced should be allowed to take its unobstructed course, that the whole might arrive at the most speedy termination. It was not to be supposed that an accused female, and that female a queen, would willingly allow an imputation of this kind to rest upon her without asserting her innocence, and defying her adversaries to the proof of her guilt. If any delay occurred, it was impossible not to see that the public sympathy, so powerfully excited on this occasion, for the injured sufferer, might be perverted and polluted by such charges going forth to the world in the authoritative shape of a bill. However imperfect, then, her means of defence; however deprived of the instruments to repel so deadly an attack upon her honour, the queen was anxious to meet her accusers face to face—if possible at this very instant, but, at farthest, after the lapse of only twenty-four hours. No injustice could be done by such a course—there was nothing to prevent the production of all the evidence against her because that evidence had already been submitted to a secret committee: the whole case, on the part of the Crown, had been heard by a body which had felt itself warranted, in the character of a grand jury, to pronounce upon the accusation, and to call upon the queen to reply to it. He was aware that that committee sat to examine the contents of a scaled bag—he
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was aware, also, that a second bag was submitted to its consideration; but he presumed that its deliberations took a wider range. Speaking as an English subject of a committee of the higher House of the English parliament, he was confident that it could not have proceeded upon written documents alone: acting as a grand jury on charges of the most atrocious description, it could not have decided without the examination of a single witness, or without seeing a single person from whose conduct and deportment it could judge of the truth or falsehood of the fearful accusations. The same evidence produced before the secret committee last week might be brought before the whole House to-morrow; the queen would then have an opportunity of confronting her foul calumniators, and of convincing the world that the verdict of the grand jury committee, if not false, because it was founded upon testimony of some kind however disgraceful, was at least erroneous and mistaken. In all our courts of justice such was the ordinary and established course; the grand jury itself was composed of persons wholly indifferent; they were summoned by a compulsory process and by a sworn officer; and if he were in any way connected with the parties, by an old statute the bills found by the grand jury he had summoned were null and void: the witnesses examined were all sworn in open court; and lastly, the true bill, by being filed, commenced its first stage of proceeding. If the same course had been pursued in this case, where would be the injustice of pressing it forward immediately? On a charge of high treason, the prosecutor and the accused were by law entitled to delay; but this case was different, and the royal lady for whom he appeared demanded immediate inquiry, and called upon her accusers to prove their case, that she might have an opportunity of vindicating her slandered fame, and covering them with shame and ignominy.
In looking at the analogies of common law, and in mentioning the words of "jury" and "courts of justice," he was well aware how inferior those institutions were to the illustrious body he was now addressing. Yet, though their lordships had adopted many of the principles by which they were guided, it was somewhat strange to observe how complete a contrast the whole of this proceeding formed to the ordinary and regular trial of a Bri-

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tish subject. As a British subject, the queen now stood before their lordships; as a British subject she claimed not to be excluded from rights which the meanest individual in her kingdom enjoyed. She asked for no privilege—for no favour—for no advantage; justice, and strict justice only, constituted the whole of her demand. It was difficult to separate the question as to time from the nature of the offence and the character of the proceeding: in this respect he might, therefore, be guilty of some unintentional infringement of the directions of the House; but so essential was the urging of those points to the interests of his illustrious client, that he should venture to proceed with them until interrupted by the House. In the first place, this was a bill of degradation and divorce, without the intervention of a jury or the sentence of a spiritual court; and he need not remind the House that in a case between two subjects those wholesome forms could not have been avoided. In the case of the king, such a mode of proceeding, it was true, could not be adopted; but he was not aware that the objection applied to the prince of Wales, even though acting in the capacity of Regent; and in the bill it was charged that the misconduct of the queen had continued for six years. He had a right to presume, therefore, that until lately no sufficient ground had existed, or the ordinary course would have been pursued. Did it follow, however, that every thing was to be taken for granted in the same way as if the usual forms had been strictly observed? On the contrary, if the mode of defence furnished by the intervention of a jury were denied, it seemed to follow from these premises, that no divorce could now be obtained. The royal character of both parties to this suit were here laid aside, and, in considering in what respects the conjugal contract had been violated, and the consequences that ought to result, it would be fit that the House should strictly examine what had been the conduct of both the exalted individuals concerned. It would be its duty to examine, whether the wife had had no reason to complain—whether any circumstances of recrimination could be advanced—and whether the abandonment and destitution of the wife, if it had not cleared her of moral guilt, had not at least deprived the husband of his remedy. In all he was now advancing he did not for a moment concede that it was possible for her majesty
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to have been guilty of the foul charges against her; but if the House should for a time be persuaded by some infamous witnesses to believe that there was the shadow of truth in them—even if he admitted, for the sake of argument, that a degree of criminality did attach to the queen on these accusations, which nothing but the most infernal malignity could have invented—still she might be able, by the circumstances of recrimination to which he had alluded, to defend herself sufficiently against the operation of this bill. Was it, then, too much to ask that one moment's needless delay should not occur, that the queen might know her accusers, see the witnesses, prove their infamy, and establish her own purity?
As to the mode of proceeding, it was her majesty's pleasure that her counsel should urge, as indispensable, that she should be furnished with a list of the witnesses against her; it was, in fact, so obviously necessary, that he could conceive nothing more alarming than that any one who might sit in judgment upon her should for one instant doubt its propriety. It had been doubted, whether this was not a case of high-treason, and, if it had been, the law of the land would have given the accused a right to such a list; and, because the proceeding was separated by such nice and merely technical differences, was it fit that it should be withheld? In every case, indeed, where a grand jury intervened, the names of the witnesses were of course endorsed upon the bill, and a full opportunity was afforded long before the trial, of impeaching their character or their principles. Did the House mean, with such dreadful charges impending over the head of the queen of England, to say that hers was the only case to be excepted—that a right granted to the meanest subject was to be denied her? If so, it would become the counsel of the queen to consider well whether it would not be their duty, not only to their ill—fated and illustrious client, but to the world, to abandon her defence, and to leave her accusers, who thus pursued her in defiance of the protections of the law, and the dictates of common justice, to the indignation and vengeance of posterity.
In addition to her claim for a list of the witnesses, her majesty expected that the rest of this grave proceeding should not form a striking contrast to the ordinary course of law. From the days of

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Henry 8th to the present moment no precedent could be found to guide a parliamentary decision; this was the first attempt of the kind since the reign of the arbitrary sovereign to whom he had alluded; in the interval, the mild principles of English law, which protected the weak from the vindictive vengeance of the strong, had prevailed, and cases of this kind had been left to the ordinary tribunals. Though bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties had been passed, they were in general matters of regret to constitutional minds; but they had always received one sweeping apology—state necessity. Could it be pretended that this apology existed in the present case, when six years of misconduct had elapsed, without trial, complaint, or remonstrance—when it was known that a commission had been laboriously employed abroad in sifting rubbish for evidence which was afterwards embodied into a report, and when that report had been long in the hands of the advisers of the Crown without any proceeding being founded upon it.
All pretence of state necessity then being wanting, as far as dispatch was concerned, would it be said that it existed on the ground of danger arising from spurious issue? Where was the proof of any connexion to produce a foreign offspring to claim succession to the Crown? Admitting, however, this plea of state necessity, it was the desire, the claim of her majesty, that it should be immediately carried into execution.
He wished to offer another consideration to their lordships; and whether it fell strictly within the order they had issued, he would not determine; but it was the desire of the queen that this application should be made to the House. She had heard of witnesses by scores, by hundreds—and, if by thousands, considering the quarter from whence these charges proceeded, she would not have been surprised; her humble request, therefore, was, that all the evidence contained in the green bags should be communicated to her majesty and the public. She wished to shelter herself under no concealment—the more the case was sifted, the more her own innocence and the guilt of her enemies would be apparent. She wished for every thing to be conducted openly, fairly, and without reserve. She feared nothing from inquiry, or from the utmost publicity; on the contrary she in-
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vited and courted it, and therefore was most anxious that the whole of the evidence should be disclosed that the full means of investigation as to the nature and character of the testimony might be afforded to her.
He had already stated more than once, that he had no guide in an anomalous case like the present, but in the principles of the common law of England: that common law knew of no secret committees—no tribunals where the most illustrious persons might be accused and condemned without a hearing; and he only entreated, that the same forms and modes pursued in the lower courts should be adopted here, by which the queen would enjoy the fullest opportunity of vindication at the earliest possible moment: she would then be placed in a situation where she might examine how far the conjugal relation had been preserved on both sides—whether it had not been at least first violated by her accuser in almost every particular in which a queen could have a right to complain of her royal husband. Whether, after the proof of such allegations, the House would think fit to proceed at all, and to pass the bill upon the table, it was not for him to state; but if injustice must be done, he trusted it would not be forgotten, that the parties were thus far upon equal terms; they were man and wife, and if, in the course of what he or his learned friend had said, any thing had dropped which might be thought to bear hard upon the stronger party, he trusted it would be attributed to the zeal they felt in advocating the cause of the weaker. It had been said, that this was a bill of divorce, not of pains and penalties; he knew not what heavier pains, what severer penalties could be devised or inflicted, than hurling an individual from the highest rank in station, and the loftiest point in character, to the lowest level and the basest degradation, and that by the proceeding of a secret tribunal, by the constitution of which all vindication was precluded, while it lent a too ready ear to the vilest aspersions. Was there no pain, no penalty, in being degraded from the rank of queen of England, and for a supposed crime, the commission of which would cover the individual with never-dying infamy? If there ever was a bill of pains and penalties in the strictest sense of the word, it was the measure now upon the table. If however, pains and penalties meant only temporal

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punishment, fine, imprisonment, and corporal infliction, then he insisted, that this bill contained no protection of the queen from those pains and penalties. After the degradation of character which this bill would inflict, she would still be subject to impeachment—still exposed to the penal consequences of this imputed crime. He was aware that in pleading thus weakly, though zealously, he had done great injustice to the cause he was employed to advocate: it might have been better had he remained silent, and left unimpaired on the minds of their lordships the effect of the speech of his learned friend. He entreated the House to give the full affect to all the arguments his learned coadjutor had so forcibly advanced, and he was sure that the deep impression they had made could not be easily obliterated, and he concluded by expressing his fervent hope, that the House would still do the queen that justice, which, from the extraordinary course of proceeding hitherto adopted, there was but too little reason to expect.
Counsel were then ordered to withdraw.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that some delay would be requisite to make the necessary arrangements for proceeding with the bill. The regular interval between the first and second reading of bills of this kind was a fortnight. He wished that as little delay as possible, consistent with the interests of justice, and the usual course of their lordships proceedings, should intervene in the present case; but some time must be required for making the necessary arrangements, for securing a numerous attendance of their lordships, and the presence of the learned judges. He would propose to fix Monday next as the day on which he would be able to state to their lordships when he thought it would be convenient to read the bill a second time.
Lord Hollandcould not help making an observation or two on what had fallen from the noble earl. After he had submitted certain papers to their lordships—after he had moved for a committee to examine these papers—after that committee had finished their labours and made their report, and after the noble earl, in consequence of that report, had brought in a bill, which had been read a first time, the illustrious individual whose interests and character were affected by these proceedings applied for an immediate trial,
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and the noble earl proposed delay. On what grounds was this delay proposed? The noble earl said it was usual to allow a fortnight to intervene between the first and second reading of bills of this kind. What did the noble earl mean by this comparison? Was this a bill like those common bills introduced for relief at the instance of any other individual, and not a bill of pains and penalties? During the whole of this discussion their lordships had heard much of precedent; but what was the precedent on which it was now proposed to act? These bills of pains and penalties were exceptions to all principle, to all rule, form, and precedent. The noble earl had given his bill a double character, that of a bill of divorce and of pains and penalties; but as it was not a common bill of divorce, he was not entitled to follow the rules which governed their lordships in such cases, but ought to proceed as was usual with bills of the latter description, where they immediately went to trial. He did not say but that reasons for delay might be given. He admitted the force of one of those stated by the noble earl, namely, the absence of the learned judges, but he could not see the force of the other. The analogies of common law could not here be followed. He called upon the noble earl, therefore, to state what were his other grounds of delay, and what he meant by necessary arrangements? Under that term did he include the necessity for farther evidence? Were they to understand that the evidence submitted to the committee was insufficient to support the charges? And was it necessary to wait until more were received from abroad? The proceedings against her majesty had been going on for a year. His majesty's government had been collecting depositions for so long a time. The noble earl must have considered deeply, what course of proceeding it was proper for him to pursue; and yet he was not now prepared to state when he would be ready to go on with the trial.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he would allow that this was a bill of pains and penalties conveying with it the consequences of a divorce. It was not a bill of divorce; for a bill of divorce was an application of one person to be relieved on account of adultery from the matrimonial ties con-traded with another. This was not a bill for the relief of one individual from another, but for the relief of the state, which was supposed to be aggrieved by the acts of

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an individual. He saw no reason for altering the notice which he proposed for Monday. To say that their lordships ought to proceed to-morrow, at 7 o'clock, because counsel required them to commence within 24 hours was absurd. The last time the learned counsel addressed their lordships they asked for a delay of nine or ten weeks. He did not mention this for the purpose of insinuating anything against the learned counsel. He was aware that different circumstances might render the two requests consistent. Three weeks intervened between the first and second reading of Atterbury's bill, and yet that was considered a proceeding forthwith. He delayed his motion till Monday, that he might be able to ascertain when a full attendance of their lordships, and the presence of the judges, could be obtained.
The Marquis of Lansdownsaid, that although he was not prepared to accede to the request of her majesty, that their lordships would proceed in 24 hours with the trial, yet he was convinced that their lordships ought not to let more than 24 hours pass without considering when they were to proceed. The interests of justice, and the requests of her majesty, demanded of them, that they should not allow four days to intervene without considering when and how they were to begin the trial. He could scarcely believe that the noble earl, in possession of all the facts, and accustomed, as he must be, to reflect deeply on the measure before the House—having moved for a secret committee, and having submitted papers to them on which they had reported—having had the good fortune to obtain the concurrence of their lordships in all the various changes of proceeding, should now be unable to point out the course which he meant to pursue, and should ask four days' delay to consider of it. He thought 24 hours quite sufficient for preparation.
The Earl of Carnarvoncontended, that the noble earl ought to give his notice for to-morrow. How would the illustrious person accused feel, if, after bringing forward such charges as were contained in the bill on the table, ministers, by asking delay, declared that they were unprepared to carry their projects into effect? If they had any reasons for delay they should be connected with great and important interests. Nothing secret, nothing that could not be revealed, should prevent the immediate commencement and steady ter-
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mination of proceedings which so completely occupied the public mind. Ministers ought not, on the present occasion, to insult the nation with a show, which, in the lamentable circumstances of the royal family, would call down upon them nothing but general execration. They ought not to exhibit their sovereign as an actor in a gaudy pageant, while his consort was subject to proceedings which might degrade her to the lowest abasement. Let them do their duty, in advising their royal master to concur with the wish of every sensible man in the country, and postpone the coronation to a future period, though he would now make no specific motion on the subject, yet, if ministers, whom he implored to consider the matter, still persisted in their design, he would bring forward a proposition on a future day for an address to the Crown, or some other parliamentary proceeding, to postpone the coronation.
Earl Greysincerely wished that the observations of his noble friend would receive from ministers that attention which they deserved, and that, under the present painful circumstances, the coronation would be deferred. In saying this, he was sure he uttered the wish of every feeling man in the country. With regard to the point immediately before them, he concurred with his noble friends in raising his voice in support of the proposition against delay. Considering that the noble earl must have been long in possession of all the facts and circumstances, and considering the intervals of delay that had already occurred, it was not too much to expect that he should be prepared to state immediately his views and proposed mode of proceeding. If it was unreasonable to expect that be should immediately do it, surely to-morrow was the most distant day to which he ought to postpone his notice. The necessary arrangements could only be, of three sorts—either for the production of witnesses, or for obtaining a full attendance of their lordships, or securing the presence of judicial advice. Now, which of those arrangements rendered delay necessary? With respect to the production of witnesses, the evidence which they could give must have been months ago collected. It was impossible therefore, to conceive why the noble earl, if be had done his duty, should not be ready within twenty-four hours to state bow he meant to proceed with regard to it. The arrangements for securing a full at-

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tendance of their lordships could not occasion any delay; for, painful as it was at this season of the year for their lordships to begin a proceeding which might occupy so much of their time, he was sure that no personal consideration would prevent them from executing their duty. But, with respect to the judges, was it indispensable to have their presence? If it was, he was afraid that the proceeding must be much farther postponed, for by Monday they would have departed for their several circuits. He would therefore propose that their lordships be summoned for to-morrow.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that it could make no difference ultimately, whether he stated his plan to-morrow or on Monday; for, with regard to the judges, they would not all go on the circuits, and the presence of those who were going could be as little commanded in the one case as in the other. The presence of all the judges of course, would not be necessary.
The Earl of Darnleydeprecated all delay, and could not avoid lifting his feeble voice, in accordance with what had been so well said by the noble lords who had spoken on his side of the House. On many accounts he wished the ceremony of the coronation to be postponed, and on none more than the agitated state of the public mind.
The original question, that their lordships be summoned for Monday, was then put, and the House divided—Contents, 56; Non-contents, 19: Majority, 37.