Lords Sitting of 5 July 1820

ALIEN BILL.
Lord Hollandsaid, he had a petition to present relative to an act of parliament, which, having now ceased, he might without scruple describe as most unconstitutional. There were points contained in this petition to which he wished to direct their lordships' most serious attention. Besides stating broad constitutional grounds against the measure, the petitioners urged particular reasons for not passing the act at the present moment—reasons which showed how often it happens, that when governments deviate from the strict line of constitutional principle, they were very apt to involve themselves in embarrassment and difficulty. He therefore trusted that their lordships would not pass the bill at all if it came before them; but if they did proceed with it, he hoped they would introduce a clause to secure against its operation all persons called as witnesses on either side in the important proceeding upon which they were about to enter. This he should think would be but just and fair at any time or in any case; but how much more so when the proceedings in which their lordships were about to be engaged were of a judicial nature, and had for their object acts alleged to have been committed abroad? The petitioners stated, that the act, if passed would put it in the power of ministers to send out of the kingdom all foreigners who might be able to give evidence, or whom they might suppose to be able to give evidence, in favour of her majesty, and to give protection to all who might now be disposed to give evidence against her, or hereafter be brought forward for that purpose. He thought the particular objection highly important, and the constitutional ground on which the petitioners prayed that the bill might not pass would surely obtain their lordships' most anxious consideration. It was necessary that all ground of suspicion of partiality should be removed. Hostile as he was to the act, he was most desirous that it should be rejected; but if it were entertained by their lordships, he thought

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it would not be possible for them to pass it without introducing some clause to protect the witnesses alluded to in the petition from any authority which might otherwise have the power of molesting them.—The petition, which was from certain inhabitants of Westminster, was then read, and laid on the table.

PETITION FROM THE QUEEN.
Lord Dacresaid, he held in his hand a petition from her majesty. Her majesty expressed her surprise at the nature of the document on their lordships table. She also stated, that she had a variety of weighty matters to urge for their lordships consideration, and that it was most important that she should be hoard in this stage by counsel. He should merely remark, that when her majesty stated that it was necessary for her defence that she should be heard at this period, he did not think it would be becoming in their lordships to refuse her prayer. He would add, that he had been assured from a quarter, the authority of which he could not doubt, that to allow her majesty to be now heard by counsel, instead of delaying, would greatly tend to expedite the proceedings in this very lamentable case. He moved that the petition be read. It was as follows:—
"CAROLINE R.
"The Queen observing that a most extraordinary report has been presented to the House of Lords by their lordships secret committee, and now lies upon the table of the House, represents to the House that she is prepared at this moment to defend herself against it as far as she can understand its import; and has also Various weighty matters to urge to their lordships touching the same, and which it is absolutely necessary for her future defence to have stated at the present stage of these proceedings;—The Queen therefore desires that she may this day be heard on the subject matter thereof, by her counsel."
The Earl of Liverpoolcould see no ground for such an application as that which was now made, merely on a notice for the introduction of a bill. It really appeared to him, that the advice which must in this instance have been given to the illustrious petitioner was of a most extraordinary nature. She applied to be heard in the present stage by counsel; but their lordships were as yet in no stage whatever of the proceeding. A commit-
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tee, appointed by their lordships, had made a report. On that report an individual member of the House had given notice that he would present a bill. This was all that had been done, and he could not understand on what principle this could be considered an occasion for hearing counsel. If the noble lord waited until the bill was introduced and read a first time, it would be competent to him to renew his application, on the propriety of which their lordships would then decide; but at present it appeared totally irrelevant. If he was permitted to lay the bill on the table, a copy would be sent to her majesty, and then would be the time to state any objection which it might be thought fit to make to the measure.
Lord Dacrewas aware that he was placed in a difficult situation when he offered the petition to their lordships; for, as he was not acquainted with the circumstances on which the application was founded, it was not in his power to state particular grounds for inducing their lordships to grant the prayer of the petition. He was, therefore, obliged to confine himself to general reasons, or to suppositions. The noble earl had made it an objection to the application, that her majesty had no regular means of being acquainted with their lordships' proceedings. Now, though no regular communication had been made, was it not a sufficient ground for presenting a petition, when an individual of high station, like her majesty, heard of such a step being intended as the bill of which the noble earl had given notice? If her majesty thought it necessary to make some statements which she believed it would be important to her interests should now be heard, would their lordships refuse her prayer? He had stated that he was not acquainted with the reasons of her majesty's application; but he would put a case hypothetically. He I would suspose—but he begged to be understood that he had no information whatever on the subject—that her majesty wished to submit to their lordships, by counsel, reasons why the proceeding against her should not be by bill The noble lord had argued that the period for considering her majesty's application would be when the bill was on the table.; but if the ground of the application was what he supposed, the proper time would then be passed. Her majesty might have strong grounds for preferring a judicial to a legislative proceeding. Considering,

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then, the high station of the illustrious petitioner—considering the delicate situation in which she was placed—and considering also the interest which these proceedings had excited from one end of the country to the other, he trusted their lordships would pause before they excluded her majesty from making any statement important to her honour and character—perhaps even to her life
Lord Ellenboroughcould not admit that the situation or rank of the petitioner afforded any reason for their lordships departing from their usual course. Whether a petition came from a princess, or from one of the lowest subjects in the kingdom, their lordships were bound to act according to the principles of equal justice. He therefore thought that the House would best perform its duty by refusing to extend any facility in the present case, which they would not be inclined to grant to another person under similar circumstances. He would vote against the petition for this reason—that it asked that which, if prayed for by any other individual in the country, would not be granted.
Earl Greyadmitted that the question under consideration was one of some difficulty, but he reminded their lordships that that difficulty arose out of the extraordinary course of proceeding which they had thought fit to sanction on this unhappy occasion. In the sentiment expressed by the noble lord who spoke last, that it was the duty of that House to administer impartial. and equal justice to all persons, whether high or low, he most sincerely concurred; but at the same time he must observe, that the present was a case so peculiar in its circumstances, that ordinary rules did not apply to it. Her majesty was arraigned by a committee appointed by their lordships on charges unheard of in modern times. He must ask, then, whether the particular circumstances of such a case did not require particular attention on the part of their lordships? At the same time he was far from proposing that an undue advantage should be extended to her majesty. All that he desired was, that she should not come before them under any disadvantage from the course of proceeding they had adopted. And here let him ask, in what situation her majesty stood? Their lordships were not informed of the particular object of the bill which the noble earl was about to introduce; but he would suppose that it wight be a bill for the dissolution of the
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marriage of her majesty with the king, Then how different would be the situation of her majesty from that of every other individual against whom a proceeding of divorce is instituted! No case of the kind could ever come before their lordships, unless previous proceedings had been gone through in the ecclesiastical court, and some one of the courts below. The effect of this course was, to give the party accused full possession of all the particulars of the charge, and the details of the evidence to be brought against her. Of that advantage her majesty was deprived; but she was placed under the great disadvantage of their lordships' committee having reported, that evidence, supported by the testimony of various persons, charged her with an adulterous connexion of the worst description, and with a long course of licentious conduct. He would ask, then, whether, under this peculiarity of situation, it was not natural that her majesty should wish to have the opportunity of counteracting the impression which such a report might make on the public, if not on their lordships? The noble lord opposite had observed, that her majesty could have regularly no knowledge of the proceeding which had taken place in the House. This objection had been already answered by his noble friend who presented the petition; but he must take the liberty farther to remind their lordships, that this was nut the first petition which had been presented from her majesty. One had been laid on the table, and counsel heard on it, before the committee proceeded to their inquiry. It was not then stated, that her majesty could have no knowledge of the appointment of the committee, though of that appointment she certainly could have no more regular knowledge than of the report. He confessed that he felt that there was, to say the least, much inconvenience in the proceeding then adopted. He was not satisfied in his own mind of the propriety of allowing counsel to be heard against the appointment of the committee. He was, however, unwilling to object to the proceeding, lest the result should have conveyed the appearance of the House being disposed to prevent a course which was thought necessary to her majesty's defence. On that account he acquiesced in the motion. But as their lordships did not object to hearing counsel on that occasion, he must observe, that on comparison her majesty's claim to be heard at

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present was much stronger. The noble lord objected to counsel being heard, because this was no stage of the proceeding. He would be glad to know in what stage their lordships were when they heard counsel before? The question was not whether the report could come regularly to her majesty's knowledge or not: it appeared to him that a sufficient ground for her application was laid, when she stated that she had weighty matters to submit which it was important that their lordships should hear at this time. Considering the deep sympathy taken in her majesty's situation—considering the agitation into which the public mind was thrown by the proceedings—though it would be far from his inclination to advise their lordships to yield to any popular clamour, he did think that, when such a claim on their justice as that which now came from her majesty was made, it could not be either for the public interest or the honour of the House to stand too much upon precedents. It had indeed been repeatedly stated, on all sides, that this was a case without precedent. It therefore was one in which their lordships could not be bound by the rules applicable to common cases. Without venturing to give any positive opinion, he had thus stated the grounds on which the inclination of his mind led him to conclude that the prayer of the petition ought to be granted.
The Lord Chancellordeclared, that he entered on this question, as he would on every other connected with the present proceedings, with an impartiality which could not be affected by any thing that might have occurred in the late investigation. He had heard a great deal on that and former occasions of objection to the inquiry by a secret committee. On this subject it was not his intention to say a word more than this—that he did not think their lordships could have acted rightly without adopting that measure, and that ministers would have violated their duty had they not proposed it. With regard to the present question, he would be glad to know where, in the history of parliament, it was to be found that counsel were ever admitted to be heard against a measure of some kind or other not yet submitted to their lordships, but which some noble lord was expected to propose. Would their lordships consider for a moment what would be the consequence of such a practice? He did not go the length of saying that a bill must on every
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occasion be received on its being offered to their lordships' consideration; but their practice differed thus much from that of the other House of Parliament—that when a noble lord had to present a bill, he did not ask leave to bring it in. Now, let the subject who petitioned be high or low, he would ask their lordships whether they were prepared to hear counsel against the privilege of a peer to present a bill? [No, no, from the opposition side.] He thought, however, that was in effect the object of the petition. He was anxious that, in all their lordships proceedings, impartiality should be observed. He should be ashamed of himself as a peer of parliament, if he did not know, when he came to decide on a case, how to dismiss from his mind every thing that passed in a preliminary inquiry. There were cases in which juries would, in the same manner, have to pay no attention to preceding evidence. Suppose an accessary to a crime admitted an evidence, and, confessing his guilt before a jury, did not tell all he knew, and should therefore be put on trial himself before the same jury that had heard his confession;—that jury, would not be warranted in finding him guilty unless the charge was supported by other evidence. Their lordships ought to take care that rights which they possessed for the benefit of all the community were not infringed on account of a particular case. Was it ever before imagined that counsel could be heard against the right of a noble lord to present a bill? This appeared to him one of the most extraordinary and inadmissible propositions ever made to the House.
The Marquis of Lansdownemaintained, that all the inconvenience which had been felt, and the threatened injustice which was now complained of, had arisen from the extraordinary course of proceeding proposed by the ministers of the Crown, and acceded to by their lordships. Every word uttered by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, against the agreeing to the prayer of this petition, applied with much greater force to a proceeding already adopted, namely, the hearing of counsel on a former occasion, in consequence of an application from her majesty. For what was the nature of that application, and what was its tendency? The noble and learned lord had maintained, that the present petition had a tendency to intercept the course of their proceedings. Now, if there ever was an

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application which tended more than another to intercept their proceedings, it was the queen's former message. The application, then, was intended not directly to oppose the adoption of a measure against her majesty, but to prevent the House from making itself acquainted with the king's message, which it had appointed a committee to investigate. The House alone was the fit judge to decide whether it would make itself acquainted with the contents of the papers submitted to it by the Crown; and yet, on the allegation that the queen might be affected by the result of its inquiry, her majesty's counsel were heard against entertaining that inquiry. How did the case stand now? The proceeding of their lordships at present assumed a distinct character of charge and accusation against the queen. The question was not now, whether the secret committee should meet and examine documents affecting her interest and character. They had examined those papers, and had embodied the charges contained in them in the report on the table. Against that report the application of her majesty was directed; and when it was stated by the noble lord that her majesty had no means of knowing, without a breach of privilege, what was going on in their lordships' House, he would call their lordships' attention to the introductory sentence of the message which they had received from her majesty a few days ago:—"The Queen," it said, "having been informed that proceedings are about to be instituted against her in the House of Lords, feels it necessary to approach your lordships as a petitioner and a fellow-subject." The noble lord then acquiesced in the propriety of her possessing that information, the knowledge of which now was declared irregular, and was to be made the ground for resisting the application which proceeded from it. The noble and learned lord on the woolsack had not only denied that her majesty could be cognizant of the proceedings of the House, but had gone further, and had said the petition could not be complied with, because it was directed against a bill not yet submitted to their lordships, and consequently not known to be in existence. When he heard the noble and learned lord making use of this language, he could scarcely believe his ears. The expression of being heard against a bill was not to be found in the whole of the petition. Her ma-
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jesty made no mention of a bill, or of any intention to introduce one. She stated, that she had been informed that a report was presented to their lordships from a committee to whom certain papers were submitted, and prayed that she might be heard by her counsel to answer the allegations of that report, on which future proceedings were recommended, and to state certain facts necessary for her future defence. He, in perfect ignorance of the reasons which her majesty might allege by her counsel at the bar—in perfect ignorance of the nature or the importance of the information which she offered to communicate—in perfect ignorance of all that she wished or intended to state, was compelled to admit the possibility of her being able to bring forward sufficient objections against the mode of proceeding in contemplation, to prevent its adoption. Feeling, therefore, that this might be the case—feeling that important explanations might be given—feeling that sufficient reasons might be adduced for abandoning the intended measure, or materially altering its nature—feeling that the rule which their lordships were now urged to enforce had been broken through in an instance much less connected with public justice—and being convinced that, though some inconvenience might result from departing from their accustomed forms, or establishing a new precedent, their course, in complying with the prayer of the petition, would be conformable with that justice which they were anxious to administer, and evince that impartiality which they were desirous to exhibit; he would vote for granting the prayer of the petition.
Lord Redesdaleapprehended that there was a great difference between the circumstances in which the last application had been received, and those which attended the present. In the former case, there was a proceeding before the House which her majesty prayed might be abandoned—in the present, there was none. But what was the prayer of the petition? It was that the queen might be heard by counsel, to state certain facts necessary for her future defence. It was not for her present defence that she was to make these statements, nor did they relate to any proceeding on a specific charge. If, then, their lordships should agree to hear counsel on an application so indefinite, how could their lordships limit their arguments? They might go on to any length—they might talk of every thing or any

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thing that they might think necessary for her majesty's future defence. The proceeding appeared to him of an extraordinary nature, and, though shown to be analogous to one previously adopted, was not therefore justifiable. Because their lordships might have acted wrong once, that was no reason why they should act wrong a second time.
Lord Hollandsaid, that the noble and learned lord who had just sat down had quite mistaken the objects of the petition. They were twofold. The petition prayed, first, that her majesty might be heard by counsel against certain allegations in a report before their lordships; and secondly, that she might be allowed to communicate certain weighty matters connected with her future defence. He admitted that this was an extraordinary proceeding, and that a compliance with the petition would be a departure from the usual forms of their lordships' House; but when this was stated was it to be forgotten that their forms had recently, in this case, been violated? The noble earl opposite had said, that the report on the table could not properly be known beyond the walls of the House; but was this an answer to her majesty, who, having been informed of its nature, prayed to be heard by her counsel against its allegations? He knew that, strictly speaking, nothing could be known or taken notice of out of parliament which took place within it; but was this rule always or even generally, observed? When an impeachment was brought against any noble lord before the other House of Parliament, the party was allowed, on application, to be heard in his defence; and it was never pleaded, in bar of his being so heard, that he must necessarily be ignorant of the existence of the charge. There was here a charge against her majesty in the report of a secret committee. If the House were to follow the strict rule in one case, they ought to do it in all; and he would engage to show precedent for granting the prayer of this petition, if the noble lords opposite would show him a charge of criminality on the report of a secret committee. The whole course of proceeding in this case, was of an anomalous and unprecedented nature; and when rules were violated to the prejudice of her majesty, it was not asking too much to require the same indulgence for her defence. A noble lord had said, that justice should be administered with an
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impartial hand to all ranks; and that he would not grant more to the illustrious petitioner in this case than he would to the meanest subject. But if she could claim no advantage above her fellow-subjects, ought she to be subject to any additional inconvenience? and did the noble lord mean to say that the lowest subject of the land would be exposed to the imputations of a green bag report, without an opportunity of refuting or contradicting them? The whole proceedings were at variance with justice and precedent, and precedent was only pleaded as a bar to justice. From the beginning to the end of them there had been no rule, no form, no precedent, no regularity. Looking at the case, and taking into view the whole of what their lordships had done, he would say, that it was one to which the forms of law could not apply, and therefore their lordships had fallen into so many anomalies; but if there had been a departure from form and precedent in the prosecution, was it right that the illustrious personage affected by these irregularities should, in making her defence, be fettered down to the strict forms of law? It was wrong to attend to forms, when, by adhering to them, substantial injustice would be done. All forms that broke through the laws of substantial justice should be disregarded; and parliament, especially in a case which was confessedly without precedent, should not enforce the observance of forms which would take away from an accused party any means of defence. He could not but observe on one remark that had fallen from the learned lord on the woolsack. The learned lord had said, in speaking of the report on the table, that their lordships who had made it could dismiss from their minds as judges, the impressions which they had received as members of the committee; and he had illustrated his observation by referring to the case of a jury, before whom a person who had been heard, as a witness, confessing his guilt, should afterwards be tried as a criminal denying it. Now, he would say, that the cases might be parallel, if the latter were true; but he apprehended that the same jury could not try the two cases, and that the criminal would bring a valid objection against any juryman in the second case, by saying that he had sat in the box when the first was tried. In saying this he did not mean to assert that all the noble lords who composed the committee must ne-

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cessarily be prejudiced; but he would maintain, that by the analogies of law, they had disqualified themselves from sitting as judges by reporting as a committee. The whole of the proceedings had, indeed, been most irregular and unprecedented. A report had been made on documentary evidence—evidence not known to be received, legally speaking, under the sanction of an oath. Against that report her majesty prayed to be heard by her counsel. It was perfectly true that the petition was unusual, as it was directed, not against any known act of their lordships, but against a prospective measure, and offering information necessary for a future defence; but if this proceeding was extraordinary, it arose out of a course of extraordinary proceedings, which constituted its justification. A learned lord had said, that though their lordships might have acted wrong formerly, that was no reason why they should act wrong again. But strong objections existed against the former petition which did not now exist If they compared this case to an impeachment, the analogy would be in favour of her majesty's counsel being heard. She would have been heard in such circumstances in the House of Commons. The report against which she prayed to be heard recommended a legislative proceeding. Now the facts which she might communicate, or the defence that she might make in this stage of the business, might tend either to quash proceedings entirely, or show the propriety of adopting a measure different from that contemplated. A crime was alleged—a form of proceeding was in consequence recommended; and her majesty stated, that she had a contradictory statement to make to the charge, and weighty matters to bring forward regarding her future defence. It might not be regular to hear her defence, if the precedents of common bills were followed; but no fixed precedents for bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties existed. They had been often passed, but they were always considered anomalous. There had been many observations made about them lately, but it had never been said that the common rules followed in passing other bills were to be observed. He did feel this petition to be irregular, if common forms were to be adhered to—he did feel it an intrusion—he did think it an extraordinary step; but as their lordships had themselves departed from precedent in the way of bringing accusa-
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tion, they should now allow a departure in the line of indulgence, and extend that privilege in defence which they had exercised in the charge.
The Marquis of Buckinghamconcurred with his noble friend, that the House had placed itself in a situation of some difficulty, by agreeing, in the former instance, to hear counsel at the bar. But there was this difference between the present case, and that in which the petition was assented to; that then there was a proceeding pending, whereas now there was none. In the former instance their lordships had appointed a secret committee, they had suspended the sitting of that committee, and in the interval her majesty had applied to be heard by counsel, against the proceeding. It was possible that their lordships might, after the arguments of counsel, have prevented the meeting of the secret committee, and voted that they should proceed no further. But what was their situation now? The committee had made their report, and the noble earl had given notice of a bill founded on that report: in the interval there was no proceeding. Suppose, then, that the counsel were permitted to plead, on what proceeding could the House divide, after having heard the arguments? They would not determine that the noble lord should not bring in his bill. What then could they do the moment after counsel had withdrawn, which they could not have done without hearing one word of the argument? Her majesty did not pray to be heard against the proceeding. There was none before the House. When the proceeding was instituted, then was the time to make any application connected with her defence, and God forbid that he, or any one, should object to grant any thing, which might be necessary to her defence, or, if possible her justification.
The Earl of Darnleycontended, that the report of the committee was a proceeding of the most serious nature, on which her majesty had a right to present a petition. The situation in which they stood was one in which they had no analogy to guide them, and they were placed in that situation by a series of measures which appeared to him objectionable in many respects. But how did they stand at present? After referring the case of the queen to a secret committee, her majesty had petitioned to be heard by counsel. He knew nothing of the facts; he wished much that it was

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possible for him to know no more; but if they refused the request of the queen in the present instance, it would seem as if they had not granted her all the advantages which her defence required. He trusted, therefore, that the House would not refuse the application.
Lord Dacreagain stated the two objects of the petition, namely, first, to repel the charge in the report; and, 2dly, to state certain weighty matters necessary for the future defence of her majesty. Thinking that her majesty's counsel ought now to be heard in support of these points, he would move that they be now called in.
The question was put and negatived.

BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES AGAINST HER MAJESTY.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that in rising to propose the bill founded on the report of the secret committee, he thought it unnecessary to enter into any statements for the purpose of impressing on their lordships the importance of the measure. The preamble of the bill spoke for itself; and it would undoubtedly be for those who would be employed officially in conducting the prosecution to prove at their lordships' bar the truth of the allegations contained in that bill. Under these circumstances, he should most deeply regret if, in this stage of the proceeding, any thing should take place in that House to create more prejudice in the public mind, or in the minds of their lordships, than must unavoidably arise from the nature of the accusation. With respect to the course of proceeding which had been adopted, he certainly did not feel disposed to revive former discussions; but he must say, after having consulted his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, and after having given the best consideration to the question, that if he had now to retrace the steps he had taken, he knew not how he could move in any other course than that which had been decided on. He knew it had been thrown out that the course of impeachment was open to their lordships. He had then stated what difficulties he conceived to lie in the way of such a proceeding; and, without going over his argument again, it appeared to him to be a matter of grave doubt whether a constitutional impeachment could lie, if he might use the expression, on account of the commission of a crime not recognised by the common law of this country. He thought he said enough to justify government in adopting the course
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that had been taken, when the propriety of proceeding by impeachment rested only on a doubtful opinion. Some of the highest law authorities in that House entertained the opinion that they could not proceed by impeachment. This doctrine was held by his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, by another noble and learned lord (Erskine) who had filled that situation, and by a third who had borne a distinguished part in the administration of the criminal law of the country. On a question of this kind it was necessary to proceed on safe grounds, no matter what feeling might be attached to it. Here a point of doubt was raised, and it was to be considered, whether, in consequence of that doubt, any proceeding in the nature of impeachment might not have failed, not on account of the substantive merits of the case, but wholly in consequence of pursuing a wrong course in the first instance. Therefore he must contend, that a bill, in the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, was the most proper measure to be tendered to their lordships. Indeed, it was the only measure that was fairly open to parliament on this occasion. Their lordships were all aware, that this was not a subject on which proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts, or the courts of common law, could be taken. If therefore, proceedings could not be instituted there and if they could not institute an impeachment, justice could only be obtained through the means of some legislative proceedings to be pursued in parliament. This had already been stated in the House, and the only question then for consideration was, in which House of parliament the proceedings should most properly commence. He had stated, that by the law and constitution of the country it was competent for either House of parliament to take this step; but he had also stated, at the same time, that it was more particularly fitting that the proceeding should commence in the House of Lords. From the fairness of the mode of trial in that House, and the power their lordships had to examine evidence on oath at their bar, he conceived there was a greater chance that substantial justice would be done between the parties there than in the House of Commons. He might state farther, that though this could not be considered a bill of divorce, in the common and ordinary sense of the word, still its effect would be the same. The king and the queen did not come be-

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fore them as individuals; it was a question between the accused party, in her capacity of queen, and the state itself. Yet as it must necessarily relate, in some degree, to the marriage contract between the king and the queen, it was on that ground more consistent with the dignity of the parties that it should come there, than be brought in the first instance before the other House of parliament. The only question that remained was, whether this bill should have been brought in originally under the responsibility of the executive government, or whether it was not more proper to submit the documents in the first instance to a secret committee. He had reconsidered this question: he had reconsidered it with reference to principle and to precedent; and he had no hesitation in saying that, with reference to either, he thought the course adopted by their lordships was the just one. He would venture to say, that there could be found no instance where measures of this kind were adopted without previous inquiry. When he said this, let it not be supposed that ministers wished to shrink from responsibility. The precedents which they had followed would not weaken that responsibility; their wish in calling for a committee was, not to bring forward any measure on the mere ipse dixit of the ministers of the day, but to have some intermediate inquiry, which might prove that there was a proper ground for the present proceeding. He had already said, that a thousand reasons might so operate on the minds of a committee as to induce them not to make such a report as had been made, and which could not be considered as judicially sufficient. But, if such were likely to be the case, what would be the danger of a disclosure of the evidence which must, in the first instance, have accompanied a proceeding by ministers? They had carefully abstained from any disclosure of that nature before the measure was actually brought in, because they wished as far as possible to avoid prejudicing the case of the accused party. He was, however, free to say, that the bill on their lordships' table, founded on the allegations contained in the report, did tend to create some degree of prejudice: he was ready to admit that fact: it was an unavoidable consequence; for there was nothing in the form of justice, though it went to protect an individual who was accused, that did not tend to excite some prejudice. Even where a person was taken into
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custody, and brought before a magistrate on oath, though the administration of the oath was meant to assist the individual accused, still it went, to a certain extent, to raise a prejudice against him: it was a circumstance that arose out of the very nature of justice itself. It was, in such cases, necessary to consider the two branches of the question, and to decide whether the advantage to the individual accused, and for whose protection the law was intended, was not greater than any temporary prejudice to which its administration might expose him. The present question was, however, one of a most extensive nature: it was one in which great state considerations interfered, as well as others of a more private and delicate character. Therefore it was that he conceived the course now about to be pursued was the best: it combined the sound and substantial principles of justice with a proper view of the practical end that was sought to be obtained.—He would now state to their lordships what the nature of the bill was. It was a bill of pains and penalties, and its preamble would point out with as much particularity as was ever displayed in any criminal case, and as much as the nature of the circumstances required, the offences charged against the accused party. Assuming that the allegations in the preamble were proved, it proceeded to deprive her majesty of the title, prerogatives, rights, privileges, and exemptions of queen-consort of this realm, and it also went to dissolve the marriage between his majesty and the queen. This was the nature of the bill, which enacted no penal consequences over and above those he had stated. It had been endeavoured to frame the bill in a manner that should not bear more severely on the illustrious personage accused than the safety of the state and the ends of substantial justice required. With respect to any question relative to a provision for the illustrious personage, their lordships must be aware that it could not originate in that House. The allegations of guilt were to be found in the preamble of the bill, and for the proof of those allegations he would propose that it should go to the second reading. He trusted their lordships would endeavour to discharge this duty, as they had discharged every other judicial duty in which they had been engaged, in such a fair and impartial manner as would entitle them to the respect and confidence of the country—that re-

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spect and confidence which they had always deserved. As to the more immediate proceedings, he wished a copy of the bill to be forwarded in the most respectful manner to the illustrious individual concerned. The next question would be whether their lordships would fix a period for the second reading now, or postpone the determination on that point for two or three days, in order to learn what the wishes of the illustrious individual on the subject were. If he were called on to name a day, he would propose the second reading for that day fortnight, as a proper and reasonable time for a measure of this description; and during that period their lordships would have an opportunity of considering what their future course of proceeding should be. He trusted that the administration would be found to act on this occasion with the utmost calmness and deliberation. It was a most important question, and called for dispassionate inquiry. It would be his endeavour, and he was sure it would be the endeavour of all their lordships, to discharge their duty firmly, but with all due lenity and mildness towards the illustrious person whose conduct had been brought under consideration. It was most satisfactory to reflect that the country had no precedents of a case similar to the present, during a period of 200 years, except in the instance of one individual, who never came over to this country. There had not been a queen in this country during that time against whom even a whisper of shame had been raised to affect her character or sully her reputation. It was a matter of deep satisfaction to reflect, that for the last sixty years this country had derived the greatest benefits from the example of the illustrious individual who, during that long period, had shared the throne of England, and who bad by that example contributed most essentially to the moral character and moral feeling of the country. The individual to whom he had before referred was unknown to this country as its queen; and he had hoped that their lordships and the country would in this, as in that instance, have been spared the shame and scandal that must arise from an investigation of this nature, whatever its result might be. He felt that he, in common with their lordships, was placed in a situation in which they had no alternative: the question now was, if those allegations were proved to be true, whether impunity should be extend-
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ed to guilt, or justice should be suffered to triumph? Nothing now remained for their lordships to do, but to pursue a clear and straight-forward course—to perform their duty boldly—determined, whatever public clamours might exist, to take care that public justice was satisfied.
The Bill, of which the following is a Copy, was then read by the Clerk:

COPY OF THE BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES AGAINST HER MAJESTY.
"An Act to deprive her Majesty Queen Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, of the Title, Prerogatives, Rights, Privileges and Exemptions, of Queen-Consort of this Realm, and to dissolve the Marriage between his Majesty and the said Caroline Amelia Elizabeth.
"Whereas, in the year 1814, her majesty, Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, then Princess of Wales, and now Queen Consort of this realm, being at Milan, in Italy, engaged in her service, in a menial situation, one Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, a foreigner of low station, who had before served in a similar capacity:
"And whereas, after the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, had so entered the service of her Royal Highness the said Princess of Wales, a most unbecoming and disgusting intimacy commenced between her Royal Highness and the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami;
"And whereas her Royal Highness not only advanced the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, to a high situation in her Royal Highness's household, and received him into her service, and that in high and confidential si-tuations about her Royal Highness's person, but bestowed upon him other great and extraordinary marks of favour and distinction, obtained for him Orders of Knighthood and Titles of Honour, and conferred upon him a pretended Order of Knighthood, which her Royal Highness had taken upon herself to institute without any just or lawful authority:
"And whereas her said Royal Highness, whilst the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, was in her said service, farther unmindful of her exalted rank and station, and of her duty to your Majesty, and wholly regardless of her own honour and character, conducted herself towards the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, and in other respects, both in public and private, in the various places and countries which her Royal Highness visited, with indecent and offensive familiarity and freedom, and carried on a licentious, disgraceful, and adulterous intercourse with the said Bartolomo Pergami, otherwise Bartolomo Bergami, which continued for a lung period of time during her Royal Highness's residence abroad, by which conduct of her said Royal Highness, great scandal and dishonour have been brought upon your Majesty's family and this kingdom.
"Therefore, to manifest our deep sense of such scandalous, disgraceful and vicious conduct on the part of her said Majesty, by which she has violated the duty she owed to your Majesty, and has rendered herself unworthy of the exalted rank and station of Queen Consort of this Realm, and to evince our just regard for the dignity of the Crown and the honour of this nation, we, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons in parliament assembled, do hereby entreat your Majesty that it may be enacted;
"And be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that her said Majesty Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, from and after the passing of this Act, shall be and is hereby deprived of the title of Queen, and of all the prerogatives, rights, privileges, and exemptions appertaining to her as Queen Consort of this Realm; and that her said Majesty shall, from and after the passing of this Act, for ever be dis-
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abled and rendered incapable of using, exercising, and enjoying the same, or any of them; and moreover, that the marriage between his Majesty and the said Caroline Amelia Elizabeth be, and the same is hereby from henceforth for ever wholly dissolved, annulled, and made void to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever."
After the bill had been read a first time, the Earl of Liverpool moved, that copies should be sent to her majesty, and her majesty's attorney general, and also to the king's attorney-general, which was agreed to.
Earl Greyobserved, that the more he considered the objections against the mode in which they were proceeding, the more he was confirmed in those objections. The bill, he thought, instead of stating generally the criminality imputed to her majesty, should specify the particulars of time and place, in order that she might be enabled to meet the allegations. The preamble, however, did no such thing, and therefore was wanting in that certainty of description which her defence required to be stated. He therefore wished to know, whether the noble earl intended to adopt any other mode of proceeding subsequently, with a view to supply that defect, he wished also to ask, whether any course was in contemplation for supplying her majesty with the names of the witnesses about to be produced against her?
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the second reading of the bill would be the proper time to enter into the discussion. He had no difficulty however in stating, that the specification in the preamble was as particular as any other to which they could refer, and was in all respects sufficient to guide her majesty's defence. With regard to the names of the witnesses, it was unprecedented in the history of parliamentary proceedings to furnish them, while a bill of Pains and Penalties was depending. It was unusual in all proceedings, exept in trials for high treason; but as her majesty had claims to the utmost indulgence, sufficient lime would be allowed her to select her evidence, and this would do away the only plausible ground that existed for demanding a list of the witnesses.
Lord Dacre Lord Dacre moved, that her majesty's counsel should now be called to the bar, in order to state points which were neces-

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sary to her defence. He did this upon information which he had received recently.
The Earl of Liverpoolsuggested that the noble lord might obtain his object, without resorting to a course which was contrary to the whole analogy of their proceedings, and promised that if a petition was presented to-morrow, the bill being in progress he would not then object to it.
Lord Dacreassented, and did not press the motion.
Earl Greythought, that whatever course was taken under the present proceeding, it must be attended with great disadvantage to her majesty. The commencement of a prosecution, grounded upon evidence which could not be met for a considerable time after the evidence had produced its impression, was unfavourable to the end of justice. It would be more conducive to that end if the whole could be postponed until there was an opportunity for proceeding with the accusation and defence together. In all Divorce bills the accused party had the advantage of the knowledge to be derived from previous proceedings. The noble earl had alluded to the management of the case at the bar; but he wished to know by what authority, or at whose direction, any person could appear at that bar to conduct the prosecution?
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the attorney-general might be called upon by the authority of the House either to appear himself, or to provide some person to conduct it.
Earl Greyobserved, that from the noble lord's statement it would appear as if the House itself had assumed the character of a prosecutor in a case which it was about to try.
The Earl of Liverpoolstated, that the House had actually appointed counsel in other cases, and there could be no doubt that they would see justice done between the parties.
Earl Greysaid, he was aware that the House had appointed counsel in other cases, in that for instance of the Berkeley case, but here was a case of prosecution for which he had not heard any precedent. He was as far as the noble lord from suspecting the justice of the House; but, it was not only necessary that they should be just, but that they should appear above suspicion.
The Lord Chancellordefended the pro-
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ceeding by a bill of Pains and Penalties originating in that House, and justified the interposition of a secret committee. The attorney-general was one of the legal assistants of that House, in which capacity he was liable to be called on to conduct the proceeding.
Lord Hollandremarked, that the attorney-general was a member of another House, and might therefore be objected to as the manager of a prosecution in the House of Lords, upon which he would have to pronounce hereafter in the House of Commons.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that though the order was given to the attorney-general, he would not be obliged to appear personally, but might send some other person, as had occurred in many cases.