WRITS SUSPENSION BILL. (Hansard, 25 February 1820)

The Earl of Caernarvon
said, it had been the practice of the House of Commons for a long series of years to suspend the issue of new writs to boroughs charged with corruption, until, the, case, of such boroughs 1638 could be thoroughly investigated. This was all that was asked by the present bill. The writs that had been suspended for many months, it was now only asked further to suspend, during the short interval between the dissolution of the present parliament and the calling of the new one. If they did not do this there was little, hope that any permanent measure would be agreed to, as by allowing these four boroughs to return eight members their cases might become so complicated by new circumstances as to render it impossible to come, to any decision respecting their original guilt. He was one of those who had always opposed general systems of parliamentary reform, but such a reform as was likely to arise from the proceedings recommended in the House of Commons with regard to those boroughs, was one to which their lordships ought to lend their zealous co-operation. He would ask them to consider what the feelings of the country would be, if, when they saw that a bill was brought into the other House, to annihilate altogether the rights of one of these boroughs on the ground of corruption, if when they saw that the motion was made by a young nobleman, a descendant of that family, who had made the name of Russell dear to the hearts of Englishmen, and that the leading minister in that House had declared his cordial assent to that species of reform, they found at the same time the ministers in their lordships House prepared to interpose their chilling negative to the hopes and expectations of the people. The revival of the same corruption, of the same immorality and perjury, at the next general election, was an evil that ought to be avoided. It had been stated that it was a great hardship to take away the rights of these boroughs even for a day, but all they were asked to do, was that which the House of Commons itself could have done by its own authority, if it had not been for the dissolution. The situation of the boroughs in the passing of this bill, would be precisely that of an individual who was committed for want of bail, and whose rights were therefore suspended until his case could be tried. All he contended for was, that while the question was at issue between the petitioners and the country, that House should not decide against the country, for if the, writs were issued, and members were again returned for those boroughs, without, any proof that they 1639 were elected by corrupt means, there was no way that he knew of to prevent such members from sitting in parliament. A case occurred in 1779, which appeared to him completely in point. Proceedings were adopted at that period against the borough of Shaftesbury. A bill was introduced shortly after into the House, empowering the Speaker to issue writs in cases of death during the prorogation, and in that bill a clause was introduced, suspending the operation of the act with respect to the borough of Shaftesbury during the period of the next prorogation. In that measure the House of Lords concurred. It could not be contended that the bill alluded to was a boon, from which an exception might be made; for the moment a law was passed, it was as much the law of the land as if it had existed for ages. Another objection to the bill was, that it commanded the sheriffs not to obey the king's writs. But what was the meaning of this objection? Did they mean to say it was disrespectful to the king, to pass a measure which could not be carried into effect without his own sanction and assent? It was absurd to suppose it. The learned lord on the woolsack had contended, on a former night, that when a public measure was passing, every body or individual, who felt themselves aggrieved, had a right to be heard by counsel, and their lordships had no discretion to refuse the exercise of that right. The present was not a private bill, it was a temporary measure to prevent a great inquiry from being prejudiced, and the greatest mischief might arise from the adoption of the general principle, that public measures might be delayed by the arguments of counsel, and the examination of witnesses at the bar. But was this principle adhered to, in cases, where the standing orders were suspended to pass bills in one day, and was it too much to request, in the present case, that a measuse of such importance to the public interests should not be lost for ever? His lordship concluded by moving, that the order for the hearing of counsel at the bar on that day, should be discharged.

The Earl of Liverpool
said he had no wish that the present bill should be disposed of by any thing like a side wind; for though it was true that upon public measures it was not the practice to hear counsel, yet in that case the interests of Parties so directly affected, that it 1640 would be hard to refuse to hear them by counsel at the bar. He was one of them who thought that if a case of corruption could be fairly made out, a bill to disfranchise the borough so offending, was a measure fit to be entertained by parliament. But it was one thing to say that the borough should be disfranchised, when the case was made out, and another thing to say, that before the case was made out, the rights of such boroughs should be suspended, until, they were proved to have forfeited them by evidence at the bar. He did not hesitate to say, that the power exercised by the House of Commons, of suspending the writs of boroughs, not disfranchised, was a very strong power. If the possession of that power was at this moment a new question, he would be disposed to doubt much the propriety of investing it in either House of Parliament. The House of Commons, however, had, undoubtedly exercised the right, and it was not expedient to try it now. In the case of Shaftesbury, the House of Commons had exercised that right, and all that parliament did; by the clause alluded to in the new bill, was, to leave the case of Shaftesbury in the same state as it would have been in if the bill had not passed. It bore no reference to the present measure, which amounted to this—whether when parliament had no existence, they would say, without having any evidence before them, that the rights of the Crown should not be exercised, nor those of the persons concerned, who were not yet proved to have been guilty. It was possible that their lordships might differ from the House of Commons; they had done so upon other occasions; and the very act of hearing evidence was in itself a presumption that they might differ. The measure was, in fact, a serious innovation upon the principles of the constitution, to which there was nothing analogous. It was said to be a serious inconvenience to proceed to elect members for the boroughs named in the bill; but the noble lord had seemed to forget, that four members out of the eight were now sitting. Nor was it true that the question as to the corrupt practices must drop; for if a sufficient case could be made out they would go to the question as if nothing had since happened. The alternative for their lordships to consider was this—whether it would be better to run the risk of having eight members returned by undue influence, or to adopt the strong measure of depriving the people 1641 of their rights for a time upon a principle supported by no analogy, or if by any analogy, by a remote one, founded on a practice of a very doubtful nature?

The Earl of Darnley
declared his intention of voting for the bill.

The Lord Chancellor
did not conceive that any argument which might be urged by counsel could at all change the opinion which he entertained on the subject. A noble earl had talked of the necessity of consulting the feelings and interest of the public. It was the conviction of his mind, resulting from long experience, that the only effectual mode of consulting the feelings and interest of the public was, by doing justice Let parliament invariably do justice, and justice would eventually be done to them. Now, in the present instance, he contended it would be the height of injustice to agree to the bill, and. thereby suspend the rights of a portion of the people, without any ground which would render such a proceeding warrantable. It was impossible that their lordships could be satisfied to take such a step without any evidence to show its expediency. Under existing circumstances, any attempt to obtain such evidence, at their own bar, would be futile; and, with all possible respect for the House of Commons, no noble lord, he presumed, would argue that their lordships should proceed on the evidence taken before a committee of that House. Even if that evidence were admissible by their lordships, it did not at all go to the question of the expediency of disfranchising the boroughs in question, but merely established the corruption of a part of the electors. The fact, that the House of Commons permitted four of the members for those boroughs to retain their seats, was a conclusive proof of this.

The Marquis of Lansdowne
supported the bill. He was quite aware that a certain apparent inequality in the representation was desirable, as producing a greater real equality of representation than any theoretical system proceeding on a different principle. But he maintained, that when this was carried to excess, it ought to be corrected. He admitted, that individuals and bodies of individuals ought to be protected in their rights; but it should never be forgotten, that they possessed those rights, and ought to exercise them, not for selfish purposes, but for the general benefit. All that the bill tended to do was, to suspend the exercise of the 1642 elective franchise in the boroughs in question during the interval which the expected dissolution would occasion, thereby leaving the question for the determination of the new parliament precisely in the state in which it was at present.

Earl Grosvenor
farther explained the misapprehension which had taken place with respect to what had fallen from him at an earlier period of the evening, and expressed his conviction that no noble lord could for a moment suppose him capable of palliating the dreadful atrocity recently contemplated. On the question immediately before their lordships, he entirely concurred in the opinion of his noble friend who had just sat down.