HL Deb 19 August 1820 vol 2 cc710-40

In pursuance of the notice he had given yesterday,

Lord King

rose. He said, that the counsel on both sides having yesterday closed their arguments, this, it appeared to him, was the only opportunity that remained for a member of their lordships' House to endeavour by some means or other to avert those evils and difficulties, which he, in common with many of their lordships, and with the great body of the public, felt most strongly to be intimately connected with the course they were pursuing—evils and difficulties, the peculiar nature of which it was not necessary for him to state. Nothing which he had heard in the course of the argument submitted to their lordships by the learned counsel who appeared in support of this measure, had tended in the smallest degree to shake the full conviction which he previously entertained, that bills of pains and penalties ought only to be resorted to on great public occasions, when the safety of the state was involved, when the stability of the government was endangered, and when, from their adoption, some extraordinary benefit was likely to be derived. He would ask, as had been most properly asked by a noble lord (Carnarvon) on the preceding day, whether any individual, either in that House or out of it, entertained a serious apprehension that mischief would ensue if this bill were not proceeded with? Not one of their lordships had said that he entertained any degree of fear on that head; and no person whatsoever would, he believed, be found, to declare that he entertained a rational fear of danger if the progress of the measure were stopped. The dread of danger to the royal succession was the only circumstance that could justify this bill; and the circumstances of the case must preclude any such apprehension.

If, then, there was no reason for introducing such a measure on that account—if no great state necessity could be shown for bringing it forward—they were at once reduced to the question of the expediency, the policy, the wisdom of the proceeding. The bill asserted, in the preamble, that great impropriety and indecency of conduct had been manifested by the Queen, and that great scandal was thereby brought on the royal family and on the country. It was highly important, he was aware, that the purity of all the members of the royal family should be preserved unsullied; and that object was stated in the preamble of the bill, in order to justify it. This alleged scandal referred to her majesty's conduct while abroad; and he called on their lordships, before they proceeded further, to see how the case really stood. They all knew that, if her majesty had remained abroad, no proceeding of this kind would have taken place. Then, he demanded, how was this bill necessary to vindicate the honour of the nation and of the royal family, when, if her majesty had pleased, the government would have permitted her to remain abroad, and to have pursued those courses which were so much condemned? No stipulation was made for the individual who was mentioned in the bill to quit her service—no condition of that sort was resorted to. How, then, would the honour of this nation have been vindicated, if the original proposition had been agreed to, and her majesty had been allowed by the government to continue in that situation, and amidst those scenes, where it was said, the crime imputed to her was committed? That was a most extraordinary way indeed to vindicate the insulted honour of the country! This reference to the honour of the nation appeared to him to be a mere pretence. It was completely false to say the bill was necessary to vindicate the honour of the country, when ministers would themselves have allowed those licentious scenes to be continued, in the country where they were said to have been carried on, without molestation; but the moment her majesty arrived in England, where they could not be continued, then this bill was brought in. If there were any doubt as to the real object of this bill, the terms offered to her majesty cleared away that difficulty. As long as an opportunity occurred for the continuance of the crime, ministers would allow it to continue; they would grant the means of its perpetuation—they offered impunity to those who committed it, while the offence could be committed: but the moment it ceased, the moment it became impossible to perpetrate it, then they thought of investigation and punishment. They knew that when her majesty came to England it was impossible that the offence could be continued. They were aware that the person with whom the crime was said to have been committed was a foreigner, and, under the Alien act, might be refused the privilege of remaining in England.

From all these circumstances he drew this conclusion, which appeared to be a correct one—that government would have suffered the crime to be continued with impunity, while it was possible to carry it into practice; but the moment it ceased, then they deemed it necessary to resort to punishment. It was said, that her majesty's conduct was marked by gross indecency, which tended to scandalize the country, and that therefore she was not worthy of the situation of queen of these realms. He wished to know whether it was necessary to proceed in this manner on account of any moral feeling that had been outraged. He should be glad to know whether it would be proper to pass this bill on account of those alleged indecencies of conduct? They ought to pause and inquire whether such conduct demanded, or could justify, a bill of this nature. It might be said that the necessity arose from the moral feeling of the country being wounded. He asked of their lordships to open their eyes and look around the country, and then to say whether this moral feeling was not more likely to be wounded by proceeding with this measure? It was that which would give the great shock to the moral sense and feeling of the country. Nothing could have a more injurious effect on the public morals than their persevering in pressing forward this bill, and giving to the world a statement of all those disgusting scenes from which it was said to have arisen. One of the prominent parts of this bill was that which set forth that an offensive freedom and familiarity had taken place between her majesty and a foreigner—a menial servant. This was an extraordinary accusation. He did not imagine that familiarity with a domestic would have been charged against her majesty as a crime. He recollected that Mr. Burke, in his speech on "Economical Reform", asserted, "that kings are naturally lovers of low company." This he laid down as a rule. And he further stated, that this was the reason why the most dignified and honourable persons in that House ought to be placed about the court, not, he observed, because those individuals would become better by being placed there, but that the court would be improved by their presence. Had the Queen, he demanded, the advantage of having persons of high rank and character placed about her? Was her improvement studied by placing individuals of exalted dignity and virtue about her person? No; she had not been placed in such a situation. She was deprived of those advantages—she was thrown amongst persons of a low rank—she was left to choose her companions as she could, and, therefore, she was liable to be approached by those vices and temptations which were prevalent in such a state of society. But, at all events, he would maintain, that indecencies and irregularities of conduct afforded no reason for passing an ex post facto law—first creating the crime, and then inflicting the punishment.

The learned counsel who was heard yesterday at the bar in support of the bill argued, that when great crimes were found to exist, without any known punishment being attached by law to their perpetration, then their lordships were bound to proceed by bills of pains and penalties, and he threw all manner of difficulties in the way of any other proceeding. He seemed to think that impeachment was a most objectionable course. That would have been very good advice for him to give to his employers: he might, with much propriety, have stated to them what measure he considered good, and what objectionable; but it was not quite so well for him to come down and tell this to their lordships, who were to be both jurors and judges. Such a proceeding took away all the security which an accused pen-on would derive from the forms of justice. A bill of pains and penalties dispensed with all those forms which were found so useful in other cases; and it was not sufficient, when those forms were taken away, to tell him that the substance of justice was preserved. On this occasion, he believed, it was always pretended that the substance of justice would be secured while its forms were set aside. This, however, was by no means a true statement of the case. Why had not lord Stratford been proceeded against by impeachment? Because it was found that if such a course were adopted no punishment could reach him. Therefore a bill of pains and penalties was introduced, which, he would maintain, was the foulest blot in the history of those times. He believed that the self-same motive which induced the parliament of that day to proceed by a bill of pains and penalties, now operated on the confidential advisers of the Crown to proceed against the Queen in the same manner. They were asked, allowing the latitude which fairly belonged to the parliament, how they could proceed by impeachment, when the only punishment in that case, if guilt were proved, must be the punishment of death? but those who argued thus had strangely omitted the punishment of incapacity, which frequently followed impeachment; and they had also put out of sight disgrace and degradation, which must be considered a very severe punishment. When the learned counsel stated, that impeachment went to the infliction of imprisonment or death, he would say that degradation and incapacity were as completely within its scope, and formed a punishment which would naturally follow from conviction. He could wish, when their lordships were discussing the expediency and propriety of a bill of pains and penalties, that, sitting there as lords of parliament, they would look anxiously to the situation in which they might chance to be placed. In this instance, he conceived, their practice very much exceeded that of the House of Commons, in paying attention to the true principles of justice, with respect to evidence which their lordships had an opportunity of examining on oath. This was a peculiar distinction of their lordships' house. When they had a bill of pains and penalties before them, they called witnesses to their bar, whose testimony was given under the sanction of an oath; and thus it was the pride and glory of that House to pay a strict attention to the principles of justice on that point. Now, suppose they sent down a bill of pains and penalties to the House of Commons, after grave and mature deliberation, let their lordships consider the mortifying predicament in which they would be placed, if the other House rejected it; for, after all the anxious attention their lordships might have paid to the evidence, the other House might be led not to attend so much to that evidence as to the instructions of their constituents. In the other House the measure might be bandied and tossed about, and ultimately they might come to a different decision.

The learned counsel had observed, that their lordships would do their duty, at whatsoever risk it might be performed. He had no doubt that every noble lord would wish to do his duty in carrying the existing laws into execution, be the risk what it might: but did they not perceive the wide distinction there was between carrying the laws of the land into execution, and that which might be incurred by making an entirely new law, on the spur of the occasion? When they were told that it was necessary to have recourse to a bill of pains and penalties, because no other mode, applicable to the case, was known, he would answer, that the matter should be considered with a view to the public benefit and the public safety only. Had any individual then, argued, that, under the present circumstances, they Ought to incur every possible risk, in order to form a new Jaw—an ex post facto law? No, as he had said before, quite a contrary feeling prevailed. It appeared to him to be a little short of insanity to carry a new species of law into execution, when the formation of that law had nothing to do with the public safety—when it was not called for by any apprehension of public danger. He was convinced that the public good and the public utility would be much better consulted by putting a stop to the proceeding at once, rather than blindly going on with it; and he did confidently ask of every man, who thought with him that there was more danger and disadvantage in proceeding—who believed that the public interest was more likely to suffer by going on with the bill than by stopping its progress—to vote with him on this occasion. There was no discredit in retracing their steps when they perceived they were in error; he saw no point of honour so false as that which impelled men, when they had once taken a particular path, to proceed in it, however improper it might be. He knew of no folly so great as persevering in a course which was plainly detrimental to the public interest. With these feelings he begged leave to move, That it is not necessary for the public safety, or the security of the government, that the bill intituled 'An act to deprive Her Majesty,' &c. should pass into a law."

The Earl of Liverpool

said, he rose at that early hour, as he was anxious to state the reasons which induced him to differ entirely from the noble lord, and why he should propose, as an amendment, that the counsel be directed to be called in. In stating the arguments which he had to offer on this subject he would endeavour to abstain from any observation of an inflammatory nature, for he was extremely desirous to treat this question in every stage of it, even in the present, as a purely judicial question. He would now, as briefly and as clearly as he was able, lay down the grounds on which he differed from the noble lord, and show to the House that, under the circumstances in which they were placed, it was their lordships' duty to proceed with the bill. The motion of the noble lord might naturally be considered on two grounds, quite distinct in themselves:—first, whether there was any necessity or public utility in pursuing any measure against her majesty; and, secondly, if public utility required it, whether the present was the most proper course. These were the two considerations to which their minds would be directed in the present stage of the business, and he thought it the most proper and convenient to begin with the last. He would inquire, assuming that they were called on to proceed with some measure, whether this was the most expedient one, or whether it was of such a nature that it should be got rid of altogether. He was ready to admit the principle relative to bills of pains and penalties, as he understood it to have been laid down by the noble lord. The noble lord would, he conceived, agree with him, that extraordinary occasions might exist where bills of pains and penalties were absolutely necessary. Though the cases to which he alluded were of an extraordinary nature, still bills of pains and penalties, by which alone they could be met, must be looked upon as a part of the constitution of the country. Perhaps he might say, that such measures were exceptions to the general principles of the constitution; but, being rendered necessary by circumstances, they were recognised by it. He was quite willing to allow, that when a bill of this kind was brought forward, it was necessary for those who proposed it to show some special grounds on which it stood, and to prove that any other course was liable to strong objections.

Now, assuming the alleged crime to have been committed, he would inquire, what other course their lordships or the government could have adopted, save that which was now under consideration? From the opinion which had been delivered by the learned judges, it was quite clear that her majesty could not be indicted for high treason. He had no difficulty in saying (and there were those about him who knew his sentiments on the subject), that if indictment for high treason had been open to the government, that was the course, and the only course, that he would have recommended for adoption; and it was only in consequence of the opinions, most numerous and most respectable—opinions, which had been stated over and over again—that he was induced to pursue the course on the propriety of which they were now to decide. But the question as to indictment for high treason had been completely set at rest. Whatever doubt had before existed, had been put an end to by the opinion of the judges. What other course, save that which they were now considering, could be resorted to after that solemn decision? There was but one other, that of impeachment; and he wished to call their lordships' attention to the view which he took of that course. He thought that, if impeachment, taking all the bearings of the case into consideration, was not impracticable, that it was yet liable to so many serious objections as rendered it a very inexpedient mode of proceeding. In his mind, all the objections which could be urged against a special law might with equal justice be applied to impeachment. The argument of the learned counsel, who had been heard against the bill, came to this—that every offence might be made the subject of impeachment. If that statement were good, de jure, as well as practically—if a proceeding by impeachment were open in every case where a public grievance existed, why was an exception made in favour of bills of pains and penalties, and bills of attainder? The reason of such an exception was obvious. It was simply this—because cases did occasionally arise, to which impeachment would not apply. That was the ground on which bills of pains and penalties, and of attainder, must either stand or fall. Then, assuming this crime to have been committed, it was evidently not high treason under the statute of Edward 3rd; and, in the next place, it was not a crime by the common law of this country, generally speaking. This he conceived to be a great defect in our laws. He saw a noble lord, who, he believed, when a member of the House of Commons, had given notice of a motion to amend the law of England on this point; and a noble friend had entertained the same intention, although he had not carried it into effect. It was a most extraordinary thing in the law of England, that that which was one of the greatest offences against the law of God, and one of the greatest crimes against the well- being of society, was looked upon as a great civil injury, but was not cognizable by the criminal law of the land.

This was the state of the law at present. But it would be said that the offence in question was a sort of moral abuse, which, like all others contra bonos mores, might be made the subject of impeachment; and it was farther argued, that if cases of this nature could not be visited by the way of impeachment, it would go to narrow the rights and privileges of the two Houses of Parliament. No man was more inclined than he was to protect them in the exercise of their rights to the fullest possible extent, but he knew not how they could make that a subject of impeachment, which, by the law of England, was not a crime. He had heard it said, suppose any minister or public functionary whatsoever, at home or abroad, abused his trust, would not that be matter of impeachment? Most unquestionably it would; but would not such a functionary have been guilty of a crime? If any minister at home, or ambassador abroad, acted contrary to his duty, it was, by the law of England, a crime not only subject to impeachment, but to indictment. There were many cases in which indictment would not be the proper course of proceeding, on account of the difficulty of knowing how to-lay it; and in those cases impeachment was the only mode that could be successfully pursued. Therefore it was, that, in general, impeachment was the proper course by which political offences were punished. Those cases, however, differed entirely from the present, because the offence committed was clearly cognizable by the law. But in what situation would the high court of parliament be placed if the Commons came before them with an impeachment; and the question, whether, if adultery in this instance did not amount to high treason, could it be considered a. crime by the common law, were answered by those learned individuals in the negative? In such a case, even though they thought the proof was sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty, they would be obliged to forego any further proceedings. Even allowing the argument on the other side; to be good, they could not make a proceeding by impeachment applicable to the present case. They might draw a distinction, and say. It is true, adultery in any ordinary woman is not criminal by the law of England; but the Queen is to be considered in a different light—she is a public character, and has public duties to perform; therefore it may be a crime in her, though it would not be a crime in another woman. On this subject he should refer to the statute of Edward 3rd, and to the policy which governed the enactments of this country. Those enactments had declared, that adultery was an offence in the Queen, and certain other individuals; but in doing this they had made it a specific crime; they had made it high treason, and subjected the offender to all the penalties as well as advantages of the law of high treason. It was clear, then, that the legislature had decided this question. It was not a questio omissa; it was not that the case of the Queen had not been contemplated. The case of the Queen was distinctly pointed out, and a legislative authority was given for a particular mode of proceeding. Adultery on the part of the Queen was, under particular circumstances, made high treason; but in the absence of those circumstances, by the law of the land it was no crime at all. It was, however, said, that the privileges and prerogatives of the Queen placed her in a situation different from that of other females; but it should be observed, that the whole of the acts alleged in the preamble of the bill were done when her majesty was not Queen—when she was invested with no public character, and had no public duties to perform. The acts which were brought within the scope of this bill were done when she was princess of Wales, and not Queen; and therefore a new law was the more necessary. Supposing the Queen was impeached; supposing the case was made out, and that she was found guilty; how then were their lordships to deal with her? They could not go beyond the limits which belonged to the House in cases of impeachment. They might fine, imprison, banish, or degrade; but still he would state it as a matter of great doubt whether they could deprive her majesty of all her rights and privileges as Queen without a special act of parliament. They might banish or imprison her; but, looking to all the precedents, he did not think they could deprive her of her rights as Queen-consort.

If this argument were true, they would finally be brought back to all the objections that had been urged against bills of pains and penalties, and ex post facto laws; since they would be obliged to form a new measure, even in that case, which would be exposed to all the objections alleged against such bills and such laws. The advantages of the present proceeding were evidently greater than any that could be derived from impeachment. See how the case stood. Information had been sent down by his majesty regarding the conduct of his Queen; it was referred to a secret committee, and that committee had reported in favour of a legislative proceeding. He admitted that this report was not binding, but it formed an ingredient in the case; but he had subsequently introduced the bill; it was read a first time, an order was made for the second reading, and counsel had been ordered to attend. How happened it, then, that this idea had never occurred before Many and great objections were taken; the appointment of the secret committee was resisted; and it was contended, that, whether the proceeding were by bill or by impeachment, it ought to be only on the responsibility of ministers. The bill having been read a first time, and the second stage fixed for the 17th of August, surely the House would require that it should be shown to be absolutely wrong, and some other course absolutely right, before it abandoned the course already adopted. Impeachment could commence only in the House of Commons; and if, six weeks ago, it had been found that that branch of the legislature was considering the propriety of impeaching, some reason might then have existed for the suggestion now made. At present, however, the House of Commons had shown a sort of acquiescence in this mode of proceeding; for, finding, on searching the Journals, that a bill was before the House of Lords, they had adjourned for a certain period. Yet now the House was advised to step out of its course for a new mode of proceeding, which it could not originate, and which the House of Commons had shown that it did not intend to commence. He maintained, therefore, that there were the greatest objections to impeachment: even if it were a balanced case, after all that had been done here and in the other House of Parliament, it was his conscientious opinion, that this House had but one line of conduct to pursue—to go on with the inquiry commenced with so much solemnity, and to bring the facts of the preamble to the test of proof. If not, the House could do nothing but at once declare that the investigation should be dropped altogether; for that must be the practical issue of the question. It might be fit and proper to put a complete end to the proceeding, but he was quite certain that it ought not to be altered: he believed it was originally right, and he was sure that it was not so wrong as to make a change desirable.

He now came, then, to what in order of time ought, perhaps, first to have been considered—the expediency of supending this proceeding altogether. He had some time since stated the views of the king's government on this point: he had said that it was his opinion and theirs, that whatever difficulties attended the subject, as long as her majesty continued to reside abroad—not that there was no inconvenience in avoiding all proceedings, but that—comparing the advantages with the disadvantages, the inconvenience of taking any steps against her majesty far more than counterbalanced any good that could arise from them. The noble earl (Grey) certainly then seemed to entertain a different opinion: he had said, that assuming the matter of the report to be true, whether at home or abroad, it was the duty of the executive government to have brought the conduct of the Queen directly under the view of parliament. Such he had understood to be the opinion expressed by the noble earl.

Earl Grey

rose to set the noble earl right. He had certainly said, that if the noble lords opposite were in possession of proofs against her majesty such as they declared that they had, and that no considerations of public expediency operated in a contrary direction, they ought, whether the Queen were at home or abroad, to have made up their minds to proceed. He had mentioned both propositions— the decisive nature of the evidence, and the question of public expediency—which might militate against its production. Ministers ought to have acted promptly in the first instance, either by bringing forward the charges, or by dropping them altogether.

The Earl of Liverpool

had not so understood the opinion to be qualified; but in its present shape it much more met with his concurrence. Taking it for granted that what the noble earl now stated was correct, the noble earl would not dispute that he had followed it up by saying, that the accusation having been made, he did not see how it was possible to do otherwise than bring it to the test of proof. The noble earl asked, where was the difference between her majesty's being abroad and at home? He (lord Liverpool) thought that there was all the difference in the world. While abroad she was not held forth to the people of the country as their Queen: she would not receive their homage, or enjoy all the privileges of royalty; while abroad matters might be overlooked, but when the Queen set foot in this country, there was no alternative; or rather there was but one alternative—to give her all respect, homage, and reverence as Queen, or to bring forward the accusation. He knew that in the other House of Parliament, and in a degree in this, and in the country at large, a strong desire was felt and expressed to avert the investigation: ministers had lent themselves to this desire, but always upon the principle, that if the inquiry were dropped her majesty's residence abroad was a sine qua non of all negotiation. Even if it were a common case of adultery, but much more if it were a case of the grossest kind, where the party accused had committed the offence in the face of the whole world, and appeared proud and anxious to manifest it in all parts of her conduct—he put it to every man of sense and feeling whether ministers could consent that a person so circumstanced should fill the high station of Queen, and enjoy all the rights and privileges belonging to her rank. He did not mean to say that suffering her to remain abroad, so circumstanced, was not a great evil, but it was an evil that might be submitted to; but if she had lived at home, having set at defiance all regard for morality, and the common decencies of life, it was an evil that, for the sake of the community at large, could not be endured.—Something had been said by the counsel at the bar on the subject of adultery committed by a man and by a woman. Undoubtedly in the eyes of God the crime was in both cases the same, bat their effects upon society and upon public decency were widely different; and this had not only been the opinion of mankind at all times, but their lordships, in their legislative capacity, always acted upon it. Divorce bills were constantly passed on the petition of a man, but never, excepting under especial circumstances, on the application of a woman. Yet adultery in men was by fur the most frequent: for one case of the commission of the crime in a woman, he believed nine instances existed of its commission by a man; and why was not the same remedy applied? Merely because all were aware that there was no comparison as to the ill effects upon society in the one case and in the other. If there were one thing which more than another distinguished modern from ancient times, it was the different degree of reverence and respect paid to females, and this was mainly produced by the superior purity and virtue of the sex: those, therefore, who had established the doctrine regarding marriage and divorce now universally prevailing, instead of being the enemies of females, were, in truth, their best friends, patrons, and protectors, and most contributed to support that chastity which added so much to the attraction of personal charms.

If, then, the case against the Queen could be proved to be such as he had stated it, notwithstanding all clamour, which he did not despise—notwithstanding all difficulties, which he did not underrate—it was the duty of the House to go straight-forward to the conclusion of the course it had begun. He asserted, and he felt it strongly, that nothing that had passed, that no attempts to intimidate individual members, no attempts to overawe the whole legislature, no attempts to crush this great and momentous proceeding, ought to prevent the House from performing what it owed to the virtuous, the respectable, and the peaceable portion of the community. Those attempts, he knew, must have their indirect influence on the minds of men; but it was an influence they ought to expel, and to be governed only by a fearless sense of high and indispensable duty. Let him put the case in another point of view. The question was not now whether the ministers of the Crown, knowing all the facts, ought to bring them forward—not whether the accusation should be made: it had been made; it stood indelibly upon the preamble of the bill: nothing could blot it out—nothing prevent it from descending to posterity. Was it fitting, then, for her majesty's sake, that such a preamble should remain on the proceedings of parliament, without bringing it to the severe test of proof? Supposing the charge were at this moment dropped, he put it to their lordships, as men of feeling and honour, whether they could here after pay the Queen their homage and respect, with this uncontradicted preamble staring them in the face? Nothing could satisfy the House—nothing could satisfy the public mind—nothing ought to satisfy the Queen but the production of the evidence, and the completion of the whole inquiry in an honest, straight forward, course.

One topic more, and he had done. Of course the counsel at the bar were bound to discharge what they thought their duty to their client, and to smother all subordinate considerations; and if, in the course of the speeches they had delivered, he had felt pain—not to say disgust—at some of the matter they had urged, he believed it was in common with the great majority of the House. They had adverted to the conduct of an illustrious personage (the duke of York) and they seemed to have thought that allusion necessary for the interests of their client; but if he (lord Liverpool) had been asked whether it was for the interest of their client to drag forward that long-forgot ten and unfortunate subject, he should have answered that the interest of their client was directly the reverse, (much cheering). He should say no more than this—they acted on their own discretion, they had an arduous task to execute, and what fell from them should be heard with every possible indulgence. They had also asserted, that the whole object of this bill was, that the illustrious personage filling the throne might be able to get rid of his wife, and marry again. He declared most solemnly before their lordships, that he believed that no such feeling had entered into the mind of his majesty. For himself, and for those who acted with him, he could assure the House, that that provision was a part of the bill to which the least value was attached. Undoubtedly it followed as a corollary to the rest of the measure—it was a fair and ordinary conclusion; but it was the least important part of it, and was very far from being its chief object and intention. The part to which he did attach importance was that which enacted that if a case were proved against the Queen she should no longer enjoy the rights and privileges of her station. He wished her not to be visited harshly—he wished the measure of punishment even to be as light as possible, and there were a thousand considerations which rendered it desirable that the facts should never be disclosed; but if what was charged against her was true, he never could reconcile to his mind that she should be his Queen. Having stated thus much with earnestness, but he hoped with temper and moderation, he should move, as an amendment, "That the counsel be called in."

Earl Grey

began by complimenting the noble earl who had just set down on his most fair and candid statement, and at the same time most powerful and eloquent appeal to the judgment and feelings of the House. He rose under all the impressions which a speech of such effect must naturally produce, and consequently with a disposition, before he entered upon topics where he wa3 unfortunately obliged to differ, to take advantage of those on which he could express his concurrence. He should set out, therefore, with stating, that if this bill were to pass into a law, and were ultimately to be considered the fit mode of proceeding on this great and unfortunate question, he agreed with the noble earl in thinking that the clause relating to the divorce was by far the least important part of it; he was also ready to receive the assurance that it was not deemed a main object in the illustrious quarter to which reference had been made. He thought, likewise, that if in consequence of the clear proof of the charges, it were necessary to proceed to the degradation of the Queen, the clause of divorce would follow, not as a measure of release to the King, but as a measure which the public interest made necessary to preserve the character and dignity of the throne. He could not reconcile it with any principle of propriety or justice, that if the Queen were degraded for such crimes, she should be left the wife of the king of Great Britain. He no less agreed with the noble earl (and he was anxious to state his concurrence) in the regret he had expressed, at the mention of topics by the counsel at the bar, who doubtless had felt the most painful necessity of introducing them. The object, no doubt, was, that they might operate favourably for their client; but, giving them full credit for their motives (as from his knowledge of them he was bound to do), he could not help thinking that they had been governed by a mistaken discretion, and that they would not only have better consulted their own feelings, but the advantage of the case they advocated, if they had abstained. To the illustrious person the object of their remarks he must pay that tribute which even the counsel could not withhold, and which the noble earl had repeated—a tribute to the high and meritorious services he had performed for the public, and which established an undoubted claim to the affection and confidence of the people.

Having disposed of these matters, he would now address himself to the bill upon the table. On its original introduction, and the motives leading to it, he wished on the present occasion to say as little as possible: on a previous occasion he had stated, some might think with too much asperity, his opinion on the conduct of ministers. Debating now a question which assumed a judicial character, he was desirous of abstaining from every thing that could awaken angry or party feelings, that the great subject might be discussed with that temper and calmness which alone could lead to a conclusion satisfactory to the public. He would only, therefore, in justice to himself restate that, in his original objection to the conduct of ministers, he had taken both views of the question—not only the magnitude of the offence imputed, but the expediency of bringing it forward. It was the duty of ministers to have made up their minds, and to have acted firmly and definitively; and, without reviving topics already dismissed, he must say, that he could not yet see the distinction drawn by the noble earl between the residence of the Queen abroad or at home. If he looked back to the matters connected with this point, he must recur to that act of real degradation, not more unfortunate than unjust, which operated as an infliction of punishment without charge or investigation—the leaving of her majesty's name out of the Liturgy. Let it be recollected that that unhappy circumstance had led to the return of the Queen, and the impossibility of repairing that fatal error occasioned the failure of the negotiation. When she arrived, he had admitted that the noble earl was placed under the necessity of making his choice between a complete acknowledgment of the Queen, with all her rights and privileges, or the institution of a charge to justify him in refusing it. He could not concede to the noble earl the distinction he had taken, nor think that the interests of the people of England were consulted in the offer to enable her majesty to continue her licentious course upon a more splendid scale, and to make herself a degrading exhibition in the eyes of the whole continent of Europe. When the noble earl, therefore, talked of a choice of evils, surely that evil would have been as great as the insertion of her name in the Liturgy-, the omission of which had reduced the House to its present extremity.

He now came to that consideration—undoubtedly at the present moment most important to be decided,—namely, whether a charge having been preferred, the present mode of substantiating and proceeding upon it was the only one which ought to be pursued, or whether any other course were open for which the bill upon the table ought to be abandoned? That, in fact, was the real question now before the House; and in the outset he must state, that he was well aware that any thing he should propose must be liable to great objections. But the House was unfortunately placed in a situation where no mode of proceeding could be pointed out that was unattended with most serious difficulties and embarrassments. The learned counsel at the bar had exhibited a power of reasoning and eloquence never surpassed; and though they had not perhaps suggested to his mind any points absolutely new, yet they had presented the difficulties with such accumulated force, that he had felt almost overpowered by it; all led to the practical result, that it was better to get rid of this proceeding, so pregnant with many evils. He was not prepared to adopt that recommendation, or to suggest that the House should resign its high character and station in the country as a deliberative body by yielding to popular clamour. The vote he had given two days ago had cost him much pain—a degree of pain he had never perhaps experienced before; it was apparently in favour of this measure, and in opposition to the opinions of many persons to whom he was politically united, as well as engaged by the nearest ties of perfect confidence and unrestrained friendship. But he had been placed in a situation where he was determined to do his duty, at the expense of all personal feelings; he felt that he had no option, and acted accordingly. What had then been proposed?—To rescind a course of proceeding after a Letter had been published of such a nature as to warrant the supposition, if the House decided in the affirmative, that it was yielding to the threat of open and public violence. That letter was not the immediate subject of discussion; but he must say, that whoever advised her majesty to write or to set her hand to that letter, and to make that appeal to the worst passions of the people against the decision of this the highest court of the empire, advised her to take a step raising a presumption by no means favourable to her innocence, and ill-calculated to produce any advantageous effect on the councils or determination of the House of Lords [Great cheering]. Under those circumstances he had given the vote to which he referred, and he had besides interposed a motion for putting a question to the judges as to the quality of the offence under the statute of Edward the 3rd. He agreed that the opinion of those learned individuals had so far settled that question. It was admitted on all hands that the law was clear as to the offence committed in England; but he had been fully justified in the course he had taken, and in procuring the final decision of the judges, because the House had previously been told by the highest legal authority it possessed, that he had considerable doubts upon the subject. He was rather inclined to wish that he had put his questions separately to the judges; for their separate and distinct answers would have been given, and the points would each have been settled in all times to come, and the decision perhaps have led the way to some new law upon the subject. Hitherto the difficulty had never arisen since the passing of the statute; one construction had uniformly been put upon it, and it still remained the same, with this difference, that the authorities he had named had given their construction of one particular part of it.

It was quite clear, then; according to the opinion of the judges, that an offence of this kind committed abroad with a foreigner owing no allegiance to the Crown of Great-Britain could not be prosecuted as high-treason. He had, of course, not the presumption to set his judgment in opposition to that of the bench of judges; but conviction was not a matter in a man's own power, and he was not yet satisfied that the view he had taken of one part of the subject was completely erroneous. One doubt that still remained in his mind was this—whether, supposing the offence had been committed in England with a person not responsible to the law—with a lunatic, for instance—on the principle of that decision it would be an offence within the statute of Edward the 3rd; but, passing over this question, it next came to be considered, whether, as treason was out of the question, this bill of Pains and Penalties was the only remaining mode of proceeding. He contended that a bill of pains and penalties was an exception to the general rule of the constitution giving parliament extraordinary powers; which powers, however, it ought to possess for the public safety in cases of emergency, and where a special necessity was clearly established. He had been supposed to have stated this point too strongly before; but the more he had read and reflected upon it, the more convinced was he, even while he admitted their necessity and expediency at particular times, that all the recorded instances of their adoption showed that they were rather beacons to be shunned than examples to be followed. Such a measure could only have his acquiescence on distinct proof of the necessity, and that proof extending even to the establishment that no other mode could be discovered. The only other mode that had been mentioned was by impeachment, which the noble earl had contended was inapplicable to this case; he had gone the whole length of asserting, that an impeachment by the House of Commons would not reach this case. He (earl Grey) had attended with all possible diligence to the arguments of counsel upon this question, and in the opinion he had previously held he was not more confirmed by the powerful arguments of the advocates for the Queen, than by the admissions and doubts of the attorney and solicitor-general. He was satisfied that an impeachment would lie, and must therefore totally dissent from some of the principles laid down by the noble earl in reference to it. He could not concur that impeachment could only be resorted to for crimes known to the law, or for the misconduct of some high public functionary. The reverse, in his judgment, was the fact. He could by no means admit that the impeachment must relate to some crime already made punishable by statute, nor that, if otherwise, it must be confined to some officer engaged in the public service. Those conditions were not necessary; and many cases of impeachment might be stated, where the crimes charged were not known to the law of England. Many political offences must necessarily be unknown to the law; and though, in the proceedings on the treaty of Utrecht, many matters of accusation would have come within the known laws of the realm, yet there were other articles showing that parliament proceeded against the parties for what did not come within any known law, written or understood. There were some instances of a remarkable nature connected with the transactions of that time, and one in particular, the case of lord Haversham, in 1701. He was proceeded against, not for any offence known to the law, but committed in parliament; he was impeached "for words spoken this day at a free conference; and that the Lords be desired" (such were the words of the resolution) "to proceed in justice against the said lord, and to inflict the punishment so high an offence deserves." The Lords also came to a resolution upon it in these terms:—"Resolved, that unless the said charge shall be prosecuted against the said lord Haversham with effect by the Commons before the end of this session of parliament, the Lords will declare and adjudge him wholly innocent of the said charge." Their lordships had therefore, upon their books, a case which proved that the House of Lords recognised the right of the House of Commons to impeach for such an offence. Therefore the principle contended for by the noble earl, and which he would extend to the present case, could not be sustained. The noble earl had proceeded to refer to a case which occurred in Ireland; but of this, as his memory did not exactly retain it at present, he would suspend the consideration to a future opportunity. Another case was a proceeding against the bishop of Exeter; and he should therefore say, that both precedent and authority tended to prove that the principle of impeachment was so extensive as to reach offences which were no offences at common law, and crimes which were not known either to the state or to the common law, and that would not come under the description even of moral offences, as affecting society; but which, as affecting public interests, and the protection of the general welfare, parliament had asserted to be within its peculiar cognisance and power, for the benefit of those whom it was its highest duty to protect against all wrong.

But supposing the principle which had been stated by the noble earl to be established, he denied that it would serve him upon the present occasion. Did he understand that noble earl to say, that the offence of the Queen, if proved, was no crime against the laws of England? Did be understand him to maintain that adultery was no crime by those laws? If the noble earl had said so, his lordship and himself were completely at issue on the subject; for he must contend that it was such a crime. It was a crime at civil law, which constituted a part of the law of England, and it might be proceeded for in a spiritual court. Mr. Justice Black-stone defined it to he a public crime, that must be so proceeded for; because being a public crime, there was therefore no action for damages. Not only in the preamble of this bill was adultery charged, which, as he had observed, was a crime by the laws of England—(and he would ask the noble lord on the woolsack whether he agreed with the noble earl in thinking otherwise?) not only was adultery direclly charged, but it went on to allege against her majesty's scandalous and licentious conduct. Now he would ask his noble friend behind him (lord Erskine), he would ask the noble lord on the woolsack, and other lords, and he would put the same question to the learned judges, whether gross, infamous, and scandalous conduct, was not a crime also by the English laws, and subject to the penalty of fine and imprisonment? He said, then, that adultery was a crime of this description—that, in the first place, it was known to our laws, and punishable by a proceeding in the spiritual courts, independent of a suit for separation a mensa el thoro: and, in the second place, he maintained, that conduct highly immoral and grossly licentious was a crime also known to those laws, and which might be punished by fine and imprisonment. He assumed, therefore, that they were crimes of which the laws of this kingdom were cognizant. But then the noble earl took this distinction—"they were not (in this instance) committed in it." Why this was the very 'case, then, that should bring them within the jurisdiction of parliament. Would he (earl of Liverpool), who maintained that this was not a proper case for any proceeding which might be appealed to parliament, contend, that if a public functionary for instance, or other person, had committed some crime abroad, the commission of which incurred this consequence, that it produced great scandal and dishonour to his majesty's throne and kingdom—(and because the crime had been committed abroad, it not being possible to prosecute such public functionary at home by any ordinary course of law)—would he contend that his crime would not come within the scope of parliamentary impeachment, and be that upon which their lordships would be called on to decide? Why this, he thought, was a case which could not admit of any doubt or hesitation, and impeachments of this sort had occurred. Their lordships would remember that that of Mr. Warren Hastings for the Mahratta war went upon the same principle; he was proceeded against as a public functionary. The rule universally was, that if a public functionary committed a crime, which, however, was not against the common laws, although against the public interests, parliament was charged with the protection of those public interests; parliament was vested with the power to protect them; and, when they were called into question, parliament had a right to protect them. Lord Coke had been yesterday quoted for the purpose of showing the extent of the powers of parliament; and it was affirmed by Blackstone in his Commentaries, that its great power was expressly given to it, in order to carry into effect the due punishment of offences which ordinary magistrates dared not, or could not, punish. He (earl Grey) said, that this was an offence which ordinary magistrates dared not, and could not, punish: but being an offence and a crime deeply injurious in its consequences to the public interests, it was within the power of parliament, and just within those cases in which its power of impeachment could be properly exerted, and for which it was expressly given by the constitution of the country.

He contended that this was a case in which an impeachment would lie: but the noble earl took another distinction. He admitted that the Queen, invested with the rights and privileges of her exalted station, was to be considered as a public functionary, and that an offence committed by her was, in that point of view, cognizable by impeachment; but, said the noble earl, "this offence was committed before she was Queen." To this, his first answer he had already given—that this being a crime known to the laws, it was of no public consequence whether she were to be considered in the light of a public functionary or not; she might be proceeded against by impeachment: and as to its having been committed when she was only Princess of Wales, the power of impeachment should in this case be exercised upon the principles he had already stated. When the noble earl said, that this could not be done because the offence occurred before she was Queen, that was rather an unfair observation, because at one time this offence was adverted to by the noble earl, in connexion with the high station which her majesty occupied as Queen of England, and upon another he agreed on it because it had been committed when she was not Queen.

He came now to consider what would be the consequence of their lordships adopting the measure of an impeachment. The noble earl had observed, that even were they to proceed by impeachment, there were no means of punishment applicable to the case; it would afford none that their lordships would consider to be applicable; and he had proceeded to infer from the case of lord Strangford, which he had quoted, that "degradation" was not within the power of the House of Lords, as a judicial assembly.

The Earl of Liverpool

explained. He doubted whether a sentence of the House would have that effect, except it were followed by some special act of parliament.

Earl Grey

, in continuation, said, that the noble earl had enumerated a variety of cases in which degradation had been decreed by that House; and that their abridgment was almost enough for the case of his (earl Grey's) argument. His lordship had referred to the case of lord Strangford expressly to show, as he understood it, that upon an occasion when the House of Lords wished to inflict degradation, the House of Lords in Ireland found it necessary to resort to a bill of pains and penalties, and not to an impeachment. But he thought he could show the noble earl, that they had other reasons for that course, and did not think that a sentence of degradation could only be effected by a bill of pains and penalties. In that particular case, their lordships would recollect that the offence charged was committed by him in the House of Lords, in his capacity of a peer of parliament. Now he did not know, in such an instance, how evidence could well be given before the House of Commons: such offence having been committed by him as a peer of parliament, and in the exercise of his parliamentary duties, it was fair to suppose that an argument might arise' in the House of Commons upon the inquiry, the result of which might not be a bill of Pains and Penalties. As to what the noble earl had inferred from lord Strangford's case, surely he must recollect that the great lord Bacon, under a sentence of that House, after his impeachment, was incapacitated from sitting or voting there, or coming within its verge. His crime was the same as that charged upon lord Strangford: and the noble earl must also remember, that Cranfield, earl of Middlesex, was subjected to the same sort of degradation. On these grounds he maintained that the object of the bill before them might be attained under a judicial sentence of their House, and in a far better way.

The noble earl then went on to express his conviction that the course he recommended would be liable to infinitely less-objection than that upon which their lordships were called on to engage, and be much more satisfactory to the public: it would be far better, after they had entered upon a solemn judicial inquiry, such as would ensue upon an impeachment—after they had heard the evidence produced, and examined witnesses on both sides according to the forms of that House—to bring in a bill founded upon such regular and solemn proceedings, than to go on with that which was now submitted to them. When he spoke of public satisfaction, he must again urge them to resist, and to be unmoved by popular clamour, but they must guard themselves-against being deceived upon one important point; it might be productive of the hightest evil to the country, if their lordships allowed themselves to think that the feeling which prevailed among men, against the bill upon their lordships table, was limited to the lower orders of the population. So far from it, he spoke advisedly when he said, that the feeling against the bill of Pains and Penalties, in this business, was one almost as universal as the air. It was not confined to the lower orders, but it was the common and equal sentiment of almost every family and every individual of the community. Let them never give way to popular clamour, but let their lordships endeavour to retain that hold upon the affections of the people which it was absolutely necessary for them to do, in order to discharge those high and sacred duties with which they were intrusted. This bill of Pains and Penalties he considered to be so objectionable upon public principles —and even the noble earl himself admitted it to be so objectionable upon many weighty grounds of difficulty—that it was not a proceeding proper to be resorted to. But a parliamentary impeachment would lie upon this occasion. That question having been determined, and proceeded in, the consequence would be, that their lordships might then determine upon the other—whether or no, under all the circumstances of the case, her majesty should be admitted to all those dignities, rights, and privileges, applying to the consort of the Crown of England? The noble earl again had stated, that even should they proceed by impeachment, that would be a course fraught with great inconvenience. Inconveniences, he must admit, there might be in it; but that consideration would not, he hoped, under the circumstances he had mentioned, deter their lordships from the proceeding. There were strong motives for it, upon principles of public policy and political justice. He had already told them that the general feeling of the public was eager, vehement, and universal against the mode proposed by the noble earl: and that it was a mode in every way liable to great objections. He would wish their lordships to consider, whether, instead of persevering in one so viewed by the public—one, of which they themselves had a distrust even at the very moment of acting upon it—it would not be better to abandon it, and to adopt some measure less liable to objection, and not surrounded by all those dangers that were to be apprehended from this proceeding under present circumstances? He would desire noble lords to consider what must be the consequences of the course which they were pursuing; and he would represent to them that the consequences of the House of Commons refusing to adopt an impeachment, such as he would recommend to them, would be of infinitely less importance and danger than those which he feared would follow from their persevering in the present measure. The noble earl had said, that whatever the errors might be which had been committed—whatever the mistakes or misconceptions of those who had framed the bill: yet that there their lordships were now, with the charge recorded upon their Journals, and there it must remain recorded to all posterity as a charge against the Queen, which, if proved, must make her an object of punishment and degradation. All this he admitted; but he had before admitted that there was no course which was not subject to inconvenience. If the House of Commons should refuse the impeachment, and this recorded bill should still remain, then they would be placed under a most peculiar difficulty, indeed, in considering what should be done with the Queen, against whom this charge had been so recorded, and against whom the House of Commons refused to proceed in the way he had been proposing, and which he considered the only proper one. That would certainly be a great inconvenience; it was one which they could not look at but with great pain; but it was one, also, which could not be avoided. But he wished the noble earl to consider the other side of his proposition. The noble earl had been betrayed, perhaps, into some little latitude as they were all likely to be, upon a subject of this kind, in what he had stated with respect to the proceedings in this matter in the House of Commons. Though it might be true that the House of Commons had abandoned their mode of proceeding in consequence of the adoption of a bill of pains and penalties in that House, he did not think the inference which the noble earl drew from this fact to be a correct one—namely, that the impeachment of the Queen was considered unadvisable, or that from its not having been adopted in the House of Commons, it was not a course which might be adopted by their lordships. If he knew any thing of the history of those proceedings, the noble lord who proposed their suspension in another place, expressly declared, that he wished them to stand so, in order to see what course the House of Lords might take in the business: in order, that if their lordships did not proceed, the House of Commons might, or might not, by virtue of the powers which it possessed. Why then might not the House of Commons eventually adopt that which he maintained to be the most proper and constitutional course—namely, a proceeding by impeachment? That it was the most constitutional course could not be doubted. In that case the House of Commons would be in the place of a grand jury, which a secret committee of their lordships had been most falsely and erroneously defined to be. The House of Commons, as the most popular branch of the legislature, was vested with powers to put certain matters in a train of judicial inquiry before that House, which was the highest court of judicature in the kingdom. Supposing that the House of Commons, as grand jurors of the kingdom, should find a bill against the Queen, and present it at that bar.—Their lordships would then have to act in their judicial capacity, which her majesty's able counsel had stated they should infinitely prefer; but no proceeding, he thought, wherein their lordships acted partly in their judicial, and partly in their legislative capacity, could have the same desirable effect, or be equally satisfactory, with one wherein they should sit as judges in a court of judicature. But supposing that the proceeding were to come there from the other House, and as a motion of impeachment. What inconvenience in the case of their lordships refusal to concur with it, would follow? No more than every day day arose upon the findings of grand juries. Grand juries every day, found bills upon ex parte evidence, their determinations upon which were reversed by the courts of justice, who had an opportunity of proceeding upon better grounds, and investigating the whole evidence. All the information which belonged to those courts, besides that submitted to the jury which has found, and the power of examining upon oath, continually produced a contrary verdict or finding to that of a grand jury. The same might be the case here: and if so, what prejudice ensued? None. The House of Peers having this superior power of examining upon oath—having upon its benches persons of the highest legal knowledge, and being assisted by the learned judges themselves—would be enabled to form a more correct judgment on the case, and to take a view of it which the more limited forms of the House of Commons, and even its very constitution, did not admit of. But supposing that their lordships confirmed the decision of the other House; then, he asked, whether a proceeding so coming there, and being fully investigated, with all the forms and solemnities which belonged to their lordships proceedings, would not be infinitely more satisfactory to the public, than that which they were now called upon to support?

He had now stated the advantages of proceeding in the way he proposed. He admitted, at the same time, the inconvenience to be feared in the possibility (on the other hand) of the House of Commons refusing to proceed with the charge against the Queen. But let their lord- ships seriously contrast that inconvenience, with the appalling inconvenience which might result (and who would say that such a result was not possible?) if, after their lordships sitting there, examining witnesses upon oath, hearing counsel and observing (while acting, as he had said, both in their judicial and their legislative capacity) all the solemnities of that high court of judicature, they should pass a bill of degradation against the Queen; and that afterwards, being under the influence perhaps of popular clamour, or actuated by different motives, the House of Commons should throw out the bill What, then, would be the difficulty in which they would be involved? Every one would be alarmed and terrified at the charge against the Queen, thus recorded in a bill which had never passed. Not only would not that charge be further proceeded in, but the case would be, that after that solemn charge and condemnation had passed their lordships, and been sent down to the House of Commons, that bill would remain recorded, which, after charging the Queen with all these crimes, and expressing the opinion of the House of Lords that a sentence of degradation should pass against her, had been thrown out of the House of Commons. Could their lordships tell him, in such a case, what they would do? Could they tell him, in this tremendous difficulty, how they would act? He had urged to them what was the public opinion, and what the universal feeling upon the bill on their table. Their lordships were judges in the last resort, and they were going to make themselves judges in the first. They were about to meet that fearful difficulty which he had been supposing. He deeply lamented that the proceeding had ever been originally proposed in this manner. And here he must state (and that in a manner which might give offence to some) what would be the character of that House with the country, in consequence of its having adopted the measure of a secret committee, after the House of Commons bad refused to do so. He was afraid that the prediction which he had formerly ventured to make, as to the character of their lordships House, would be too speedily verified. Their path was strewed with difficulties upon whatever spot they put their feet. But let them, if possible, avert the calamitous consequences of entering upon a measure the dangers of which were inevitable. After the motion of the noble lord had been disposed of, and the question upon the motion of the noble earl should have been put, "That counsel be called in," against which he should certainly vote, he hoped that their lord, ships would allow him to submit for their consideration another motion, which he trusted might lead to another and much better course of proceeding. If it should afterwards appear, that there was a refusal on the part of the House of Commons, to adopt such a measure, his proposition, he thought would entail upon their lordships much less danger and inconvenience than that which would arise from persevering in the present proceeding. He should therefore move, after the motion of the noble earl had been disposed of, That the bill entitled a bill of Pains and Penalties for the purpose for degrading her majesty the Queen, does not afford the most advisable mode for prosecuting the charges which have been brought against her majesty; and that it is not under the present circumstances, necessary or expedient to proceed further in the same for that purpose."

The Lord Chancellor proceeded to put the original question, and then the amendment of lord Liverpool, "that counsel be called in;" upon which latter their lordships finally divided: Contents, 181; Not Contents, 65: Majority, 116. On our re-admission into the House,

Lord Calthorpe

was speaking against the motion for calling in counsel. He begged their lordships to reflect how responsible parliament was for allowing a person of her Majesty's high rank to go abroad. By this step they removed the influence of public opinion, which was a great check on female conduct; and their lordships, by acquiescing in her leaving the country, submitted to the necessity of proving such charges as the present by the testimony of foreigners. He did not consider this a bar to all proceedings, for, after the report which the secret committee had submitted to the House, he thought the moral welfare of the state imperiously called for an inquiry; but he thought it advisable, that some expedient should be adopted that would put a stop to this particular bill, and at the same time pledge the House to pursue any other course of proceeding that the circumstances of the case might demand. Another point was, the difficulty that might arise from the other House of parliament rejecting the bill in its present form. If, therefore, there was any inconsistency in now stopping the bill, it ought to be submitted to in order to avoid the more serious dilemma in which they would be placed if the bill, after being passed in its present form by their lordships, should be rejected by the House of Commons. In proposing some further bar to the present proceeding, their lordships were not to suppose that he was influenced by popular clamours, for his opinion was, that they should act as if those clamours did not exist. He could not sit down without expressing his sincere regret that her majesty, before the report of the committee was made, had not been advised to accept those terms which were offered by his majesty's government in the course of the negotiations; and also that she had been advised to repel the wishes of a large majority of the House of Commons; because he was convinced, that those resolutions expressed the wishes of the well-disposed and well-affected in the country. He concluded by imploring the House to pause at this last stage at which a pause was practicable, and to consider whether it was not possible to suggest some other course, either by impeachment or otherwise, that should supersede the present mode of proceeding, and be more conformable to those institutes of justice by which their lordships' judicial conduct was usually regulated.

The Lord Chancellor now called upon earl Grey for his resolution, which the noble earl handed in. It was as follows: "That it appears that the bill now before the House does not afford the most advisable mode for prosecuting the charges against her majesty, and that therefore, under the present circumstances, it is not necessary or expedient to proceed farther with it." This resolution was put as an amendment to the motion of the earl of Liverpool, "That counsel be called in," and was negatived by a division, as follows: Contents, 64; Not-contents, 179: Majority, 115.

List of the Minority on the first Divison.
Duke of Glocester Marq. Lansdown
Somerset Downshire
Grafton Earl of Derby
St. Alban's Suffolk
Bedford Denbigh
Devonshire Thanet
Portland Essex
Hamilton Albemarle
Argyll Jersey
Leinster. Oxford
Cowper Duncan
Stanhope Clifden
Fitzwilliam Downe
Hardwicke Lord Dacre
Darlington Save &c Sele
Ilchester King
Waldegrave Sondes
Grosvenor Holland
Fortescue Ducie
Carnarvon Hawke
Rosslyn Foley
Romney Sherborne
Grey Kenyon
Minto Auckland
Breadalbane Dundas
Rosebery Yarborough
Besborough Calthorpe
Darnley Gwydir
Blesinton Alvanley
Visc. Bolingbroke Erskine
Torrington Prudhoe
Hood Belhaven
Anson

On the second division, upon earl Grey's amendment, the earl of Guilford voted for it; lord Calthorpe voted against it.