Lords Sitting of 9 December 1819

MISDEMEANORS BILL.
The Earl of Shaftesburyreported the bill, intitled "An act to prevent delay in the administration of justice in cases of misdemeanor."
The Lord Chancellorproposed several verbal amendments, which were made on the report being brought up. One related to the granting of copies of indictments to defendants. In certain cases defendants were already allowed copies before appearance; he therefore proposed to insert the word, "after," in order that they might be granted after appearance.
Lord Hollanddid not rise to oppose any of the alterations suggested. He was glad to find that the noble and learned lord was so readily disposed to amend the bill. He now rose to move an amendment to the effect, that in cases of information ex-officio, filed by the attorney-general, if the defendants were not brought to trial within eighteen months, such information: should cease to be of any effect, unless there should be an order issued by the court for further delay. He moved this as a clause in the present bill, because he thought it of importance that in a bill, the object of which was to hasten trials for misdemeanor, by taking away the privilege enjoyed by defendants of traversing a disposition should also be shown to prevent delays through the conduct of the prosecutor, particularly in the case of ex-officio informations, which might be kept interminably hanging over the heads of individuals to the destruction of their peace of mind, and perhaps of their property, without any means, at present existing, of compelling the attorney general to proceed with them.
The Lord Chancelloradmitted the importance of the considerations urged by the noble lord. It was, he believed, true, that there were no means of forcing the attorney-general on to trial. In other cases, the defendants might carry down, the record by proviso, but where the attorney-general was prosecutor, the defendant could not carry down the record without a warrant from that officer; He admitted it was of importance to consider whether any means could be adopted of shielding a defendant, under such circumstances, from the effects of unnecessary delay; but he thought that to do it effectually, and with a due regard to all the
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considerations involved, required more machinery (if he might use the expression) than the clause of the noble lord afforded. In crown cases, where there was what was called a private prosecutor, the defendant, though entitled to carry down the record if the prosecutor did not proceed, yet he must tender himself for trial and abide by the consequences. The noble lord's clause contained nothing on this point, but merely went to enact that the information should cease to be of any effect. In one case in the court of King's Bench, where a motion was made to force the attorney general on to trial, it was suggested by one of the judges, that the object might be attained by moving for a trial at bar, which, if the court granted, they would fix the day for the trial. He did not, however, mean to say that the subjects of this country ought to be in that state in which, in cases of prosecution by the attorney-general, they, could only force that officer on to trial by moving for a trial at bar. If the noble lord would with draw his motion, he would endeavour by the third reading to frame some clause that might meet the object in view, or else he would state, what he conscientiously felt upon the subject. It was frequently not the fault of attorneys-general that the panties they prosecuted were not brought to trial.
Lord Hollandwas glad to hear what had, fallen from the noble and learned lord. The subject, however, was not new to the House. Five or six years ago he had called the attention of their lordships to it; and two years ago, it had again been brought under the consideration of parliament. His mind was made up on the subject; but if the noble and learned lord would himself introduce a bill to remedy the evil, in case it should not be convenient for him to consider the matter fully before the third reading, he would not press the clause. As the noble and learned lord was of opinion, that to make some alteration in the present practice was a subject worthy the attention of the legislature, he hoped that either by a clause on the third reading, or by the introduction of a new bill, the necessary amendment would be made. Perhaps, by the time the bill was read a third time, the' noble and learned lord would be able to come prepared for the consideration of the subject.
The Lord Chancellorobserved, that the measures which the noble lord had alluded

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to as having been already before the House, differed from the present proposition. He understood that it was intended to move the third reading of the bill to-morrow. Whether a matter of such importance as that suggested by the noble lord could or could not be by that time arranged in his mind, in a state fit to be introduced as a clause, he could not tell; but if no provision should be made on the subject in the present bill, he should certainly think it his duty to give all the assistance in his power to any measure which might be brought forward on this subject if he thought it proper, or conscientiously to oppose it if he thought it wrong; for until he fully considered the proposition which might be made, he would not pledge himself.
The Marquis of Lansdowneexpressed a hope that the noble lords opposite would agree to postpone the third reading of the bill till Monday. Their lordships would not, he trusted, allow the inconvenience arising from a short delay to stand in the way of justice. It was of great importance, when, upon grounds some of which he would admit were strong, it was proposed to deprive the subject of valuable privileges, that their lordships should endeavour to redress any grievance which might be discovered in the administration of the law. The noble and learned lord had on this, as on other occasions, evinced his readiness to consider any proposition of that description. It had, with respect to this bill, erroneously gone forth, that the noble and learned lord had laid down the law in the case of the Seven Bishops as the foundation of the measure; whereas he had done no such thing, but in adverting to that case, had observed, that the defendants had a right to imparle, and were hardly dealt with when that right was refused. If it appeared that the subject suffered injury by the delay of prosecutions at the suit of the Crown, that injury could only be removed by obliging the attorney-general to bring on the trial within a limited period. It was but justice to furnish the subject with some facilities in return for the privileges which were taken away; and a provision, which would prevent prosecutions from hanging interminably over the head of defendants, was one to which their lordships' attention should be seriously applied. If, by delaying the third reading of this bill far two or three days, the noble and learned lord should have time to make up his mind on
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the subject, a considerable advantage would be gained; for the provision would form a very appropriate clause in the present bill, and would be better so introduced than if made the subject of a separate measure.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that if his noble and learned friend could be prepared to propose a clause by Monday or Tuesday, he would have no difficulty in postponing the third reading.
The Lord Chancellorexpressed his willingness to give the subject every consideration in his power, but still thought it would be better to make it the subject of a separate bill.
The report was then agreed to, and the bill was ordered to be read a third time on Monday.

BLASPHEMOUS LIBEL BILL.
Their lordships proceeded to the consideration of the report of the committee on this bill.
Lord Hollandobjected to the bill generally, but thought it right to propose some amendments, with the view of confining its operation to that offence, the prevention of which those who supported the measure professed to have in view. The alterations which he had in view, would apply chiefly to the fixing what was to be understood by seditious libel. As to blasphemous libel, its nature was well understood; and with regard to it, nothing, he thought, had occurred to justify any alteration in the law. The number of publications of that description had been greatly exaggerated; but if they had been as numerous as they were described to be, exceeding every thing known in former times, their lordships ought to recollect, that, in like manner, there had been an increase of publications of every description. It was not, then, the number of blasphemous libels which their lordships ought to to take into consideration, but their proportion to other publications. At the same time, whatever the number was, it had not been shown to their lordships, that the existing law had been enforced against them. As the definition of blasphemy was well known, he should not offer any amendment in reference to it. With regard to sedition, it had been declared by the supporters of the bill, that it was their wish to confine it merely to seditious libels. Now, what a seditious libel was, had never been settled. He conceived that those who said they wished to confine the ope-

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ration of the bill to seditious libels, meant thereby libels exciting to a change in the government of the state. They could therefore have no objection to what he meant to propose. Their lordships must be aware, that very different ideas prevailed in the minds of individuals as to what constituted a seditious libel, and therefore they must see the necessity of removing the uncertainty which existed on the subject. This was the more necessary, when they considered that by a merely accidental connexion with some publications, persons having an interest in them were liable to be punished for the acts of others. It was, indeed, in many cases held, that the master was responsible for the acts of the servant; but whatever objection there might be to this as a general principle, it was not now his intention to bring the law on that subject under consideration. He presumed that it was the wish of those who supported the bill to reach the real offenders, and that they did not intend the punishments it inflicted to apply to any persons except those who wrote libels which had for their object the subversion of the state. The first amendment he should propose would be in the preamble, by introducing into it the words "knowingly, wilfully, and maliciously publishing." In the first clause, which refers to cases in which any verdict or judgment by default shall be had against any person for composing, printing, or publishing any blasphemous or seditious libel, and provides for the seizure of the copies, he proposed to introduce the words "knowingly, and maliciously composing, &c, with intent to excite his majesty's subjects to subvert by violence the government as by law established;" If any other words could be proposed which would better define the nature of a seditious libel, he would gladly agree to substitute them for those he suggested. But their lordships would consider how necessary it was to have some precise idea on this subject; for, in the vague state of the law there was scarcely any political libel which might not be called seditious. There was another part of the bill to which he wished to apply an amendment. When he observed the introduction of a new punishment for libel, and one which was unknown for that offence in any other part of Europe, he must say, that such a circumstance was calculated to excite no small degree of suspicion. In the conversation which had recently passed, the ne-
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cessity of considering what effect any alteration of the law in certain cases might have, had been Strongly urged. Had their lordships ascertained what effect this punishment of banishment would have upon the property or even the life of defendants? Were their lordships prepared to place subjects of this country under the arbitrary authority of foreign powers, for such offences as that contemplated by the present bill? It was proper they should look well at the policy of a measure which proposed to punish so unequally the same offence; for the severity or leniency of the punishment would depend greatly upon the disposition of the sovereigns to whose dominions the individuals might be banished. In going to Holland, France, or Italy, the fate of the exile might be better than in some other countries; but if the libel should be of a nature to give offence to foreign powers, the author might be denied an asylum. This ought to be a matter of consideration, more especially in the present state of the continent. The person banished might be consigned to the mercy of those who would be disposed to aggravate his sufferings; and when discussions on government and the state of the liberty of the press in other countries were going on, was there not reason to suspect that this measure might have such an effect? He had somewhere read in an old book, though his present recollection did not enable him to refer to it, that much praise was due to the law of England for not having introduced into it the punishment of banishment. The reason assigned, if he recollected right, was, that the English government and laws were peculiarly; jealous of foreign influence, and that therefore the punishment of banishment was avoided. In this view he agreed. If men of active spirits were engaged, as was asserted, in designs hostile to the public peace, was it wise or prudent to teach such persons to look to foreign powers for a mitigation of their lot? In this way effects might arise front the introduction of this new punishment, which it would be well for their lordships to consider. If they referred to history, they would find that no free state (he did not allude to the states of. antiquity) had adopted the punishment of banishment for political offences. It formed part of the law of Scotland, but only for felonies of the lowest description. This general disinclination to the punishment of banishment was to be attributed to the wish which

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every country had to prevent foreigners from interfering in their domestic concerns. How far the spirit of vengeance might lead to interference with the concerns of this country, if such a punishment became common, was well worthy of their lord, ships consideration. But it seemed hard that the onus probandi should always be thrown on those on his side of the House who objected to measures, and not on the ministers who proposed them. How different was the case when any measure was brought forward from the sides of the House on which he stood! If an humble individual like himself proposed any thing favourable to the rights of the people, was he not invariably called upon to show the grounds, and the consequences of adopting the measure? Were he or his friends in such cases ever permitted to throw the onus probandi on the noble lords on the other side? A bill had been brought in last session relative to this very punishment of banishment in the law of Scotland. Gentlemen of the law, it appeared, were often condemned to be sent from that country to this. Some Scotch lawyer, however, thought the punishment of banishment not sufficient, and a bill was introduced into the other House to authorize the sending of the banished Scots who might be found in England, out of his majesty's dominions; His noble friend Bear him (lord Lauderdale), when the bill came before their lordships, moved that it be rejected. That motion was agreed to, and he had a right to infer that it was adopted upon the principle, that the law of banishment being unknown to England, it was not proper to interfere with its execution in regard to Scotland.—He had stated considerations which ought to induce their lordships to hesitate respecting this part of the bill; and until the questions arising out of these considerations were answered, he could not agree to the clause inflicting banishment. Their lordships surely would not consent to render that punishment a permanent part of the code of this country, until they clearly saw what were likely to be the effects of such a change in the law. He would, therefore, move, to strike out the word banishment from the first clause in which it occurred, and if that motion were agreed to, he would make similar alterations in other parts of the bill. Supposing his first amendment agreed to, he would next propose an alteration in the clause respecting the certificate to be
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given of conviction of a former libel. The clause enacts, that the clerk having the custody of the records of the court where a person has been convicted, shall, on the request of the prosecutor for the king of a new libel, make out a certificate, containing the effect and substance only of the former indictment and conviction, and that this certificate shall be proof of the conviction. He would wish to omit the whole of this clause, and leave the proof to the usual course of law. If any convenience was to be gained by the government, by this brief description of proof, then grant the same advantage to others. Either hold by the ancient principles of the law, or if innovation be determined on, let the change be fair and equal to all. The next clause to which he objected was that which limited the period of bringing actions against magistrates or others for what might be done by them under this bill, to three months. There was already an act on the subject of bringing actions against magistrates—he believed the 24th of George 2nd—and he saw no reason for deviating from that general law. He should therefore move to reject that law. These were the amendments he should submit to the consideration of their lordships. He concluded with moving the first amendment.
The Earl of Harrowbyrose to express his objection to the amendments of the noble baron. The first amendment attempted to define a seditious libel. The noble baron, however, had at the same time complained, that it could not be accurately defined, and that it was unjust to affix a severe penalty to an undefinable offence. He had maintained, that the offence might be so slight as to require only a slight punishment, and that an heinous punishment ought only to be awarded to a heinous crime. Now, this was precisely the course taken by the law as it now stood: the bill supposed different degrees of guilt, and left it to the discretion of the court to apportion the punishment accordingly, either fine separately, or imprisonment separately, or the two together; or, in case of second conviction, fine and imprisonment, or banishment, or transportation. If, therefore, the words of the clause should stand exactly as they did at present, no injurious consequences, would follow. It was obvious, too, that in cases which the law called seditious, where there was any room for a reasonable doubt, juries

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were extremely cautious in finding a verdict of guilty; and this caution would of course be increased, when a second conviction was sought; so that the probability was very small, that a man would be convicted on any vague and indefinite grounds. Yet, if it was the opinion of the House that it would be better to make some attempt at a definition of a seditious libel, he would not object, notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of making such definition. Their lordships were not left entirely without a precedent for such an attempt; for in 1796, in a statute passed for the purpose of preserving his majesty's person and government, a description was given of a seditious libeller in the following words:—"Any person who shall maliciously and advisedly, by writing, &c. express or publish words or sentences to excite or stir up the people to hatred or contempt of the person of his majesty, or of the government and constitution of this realm, as by law established." Some such words might, if their lordships pleased, be introduced into the bill, and would probably answer the object of the noble baron. As to the other amendment, which went to omit the penalty of banishment on the ground that it was unknown to the law of England, he could show from the same act, that "a person on a second conviction may be adjudged, at the discretion of the court, either to suffer such punishment as is inflicted in cases of high misdemeanor, or be banished the realm, or transported." It was true, that the act in question was not a permanent one that, however, had nothing to do with the objection, which was, that the punishment was unknown: whereas, this statute showed that it had been the law of the land, and had so continued for three years. But, even if it had not been so, it was still competent for parliament to affix to any offence any punishment which it might think most fitting tinder the particular case. No man could deny, that if such an atrocious libel as he had described should be published, it ought to be visited with severe punishment; but as the law now stood, the offence might be repeated, so that the life of man could not be sufficient for the punishment which the multiplied guilt might require. And could their lordships figure to themselves any set of men whom it was more fitting to get rid of than those who earned a livelihood by the daily issue of blas-
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phemous and seditious writings? The inequality of which the noble baron complained applied to all descriptions of punishment. Parliament could only look to the nature of the offence, and not to the particular persons committing it. It was true, that to individuals in a certain class of life, transportation might be no terror at all, while to another it might be a source of very great terror indeed. The same inequality belonged to the punishment of imprisonment; so that there was no reason that banishment should be condemned on that ground. It was most necessary that a description of persons such as he had described should not be suffered to prey on the public weal; and it was right that they should be treated like bad humours, which ought always to be removed before they grew sufficiently strong to destroy the constitution.
Lord Ellenboroughcould not conceive how a man could write a blasphemous or Seditious libel ignorantly, or publish one accidentally: but he rose chiefly to state what had occurred to him as a definition of a seditious libel. It was, he would suggest, one calculated to bring his majesty's person, or the government and constitution, or either House of Parliament, into hatred or contempt, or calculated to excite his majesty's subjects to attempt any alteration of any matter in church or state as by law established, otherwise than by lawful means.
The Earl of Liverpoolobserved across the table, that he had no objection to this amendment, with the addition of the words—"or the person of the Prince Regent.
Lord Erskine, though he felt the utmost abhorrence at the disgusting blasphemies circulated among the lower classes, did not think any additional punishment necessary for their suppression. It was true, that transportation, properly applied, was a useful punishment: impurities, which if suffered to remain, might lead to contagion arid death, should be put forth; so should persons dangerously injurious to the country; but was it right to send them forth to a new colony, to poison the hearts and understandings of an infant state? Besides, as far as the offenders themselves were concerned, a greater punishment might be inflicted under the existing law; he might be imprisoned for each fresh offence, and cut off from the

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comforts of social intercourse, rejected and despised; whereas, if sent abroad, he might find congenial minds to console him, and might do infinite mischief among those growing colonists who were perhaps destined to be a blessing to the mother country.—The noble lord next proceeded to another branch of the subject, relative to the punishment of the publisher under circumstances of ignorance or absence: he stated a case which had occurred in the early part of his own practice, where a printer of a newspaper had been convicted of a libel on an ambassador, and was condemned to the pillory, though he had been in the country and in a state of delirium at the time the libel Was published by his agent in London. The punishment, however, was remitted on the production of a proper affidavit. Certainly, if a man maliciously and knowingly published a libel, he was as fit a subject for punishment as the author; but he ought always to be allowed to show circumstances of absence or ignorance to deliver him from the penalties proper only to wilful guilt. He objected particularly to that part of the definition of libel as proposed, which, included the mention of either House of Parliament. If any man, feeling a fair objection to any law passed by either House, should proceed, in the heat of argument, to express his disapprobation in strong and nervous language, the law might call him a libeller, and this bill might send him to Botany Bay. To the first part of the definition he must therefore object: to the latter part, which described a libel as a writing calculated to excite the people to alter the constitution in church and state except by lawful means, he had no objection; but if the last clause was adopted, the first was unnecessary. He thought, therefore, that the first part should be struck out; for he had felt convinced through life, and he did not recollect any instance where he had ever expressed a contrary opinion, that the people had a right to discuss in the fullest manner every matter in church and state, provided they wrote nothing tending to revolt or rebellion. But if the present definition stood entire, it would be extremely difficult for any man especially of an ardent mind, to write so as not to incur great risk; and the chance of acquittal by one jury was not so great as not to be counterbalanced by the chance of a conviction by another, With regard
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to banishment, which was mentioned in this bill, he believed that such a punishment had never been inflicted. Had any man been banished under the act of James 2nd? He believed not. By the present bill, a man for having committed a second offence in publishing a seditious libel, might be driven from his own country, and pursued from state to state with unrelenting vengeance. Banishment was only a mode of punishment by the Scotch laws. His lordship stated, that he him-self had been banished into England, exactly; 51 years and a few days [A laugh]. Before their lordships proceeded to this new enactment, he would entreat them to consider two points: 1st, Whether the existing, laws had been duly enforced and found inefficient. Now there had been only two prosecutions as an experiment of their strength. Why not try more before new laws were demanded? 2ndly, They ought to consider that the penalties in the present bill were so excessive, that it could not be acted upon, nor convictions obtained under it.
Earl Bathurstcontended that the existing law had been found inefficient, as there were instances of repetitions of the same offence after repeated convictions, which could not have happened had the punishment been severe enough to excite sufficient alarm in the mind of the offenders. The noble and learned lord's observations might be arranged under two heads, namely—those that related to blasphemous publications, and those that had a reference to seditious libels. The noble and learned lord objected to the punishment of transportation as applied to the authors or publishers of the former, not on account of its severity, but because the persons so convicted, if sent to the colony of New South Wales, might there commence their blasphemous trade, and corrupt the community into which they were sent. The noble and learned lord added, that robbers and thieves had not the same facilities of repeating the crimes for which they were transported. Now, in his opinion, there was little cause for this apprehension, as publications either of a blasphemous or seditious description were the least likely of all offences that could be committed at Botany Bay. The noble and learned lord had said, that imprisonment for life, which might be awarded by the existing laws, was a more severe punishment than transportation for seven years, and, therefore, that there was no

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necessity for any change. This might be a very good objection to the bill, provided it fixed upon that punishment alone for every offence. But what did it do?—It left the penalty of fine and imprisonment as before, and superadded that of transportation, at the discretion of the court. But when the noble lord said, that imprisonment by the present law was a more severe penalty than transportation, he destroyed his own argument against the bill; for, in another part of his speech, he had argued, that transportation was so severe a punishment that it would banish every respectable man from the press, and put an end to all free discussion. The second set of libels to which the new punishment of transportation was to apply were seditious libels; and here a noble lord had said, that if a man from ardour of mind were to write a first libel, believing he was doing his country a Service, he might be urged by the same ardour to repeat his offence, and thus expose himself to transportation; Now, the libeller here described must be the most unlucky of mankind to write so ardently in the face of what a jury would pronounce a transportable offence. Considering the mischief resulting from publishing either sedition or blasphemous works, he could see no undue severity in punishing a second offence with transportation.
Lord Hollandproposed an amendment inserting the words. "knowingly and maliciously," before the words, "composing, printing, or publishing any blasphemous or seditious libel;" which was negatived without a division. He then, adverting to the definition of a Seditious libel proposed to be inserted in the bill as an amendment of lord Ellenborough immediately after the first time it is mentioned in the first enacting clause, said, he had no objection to the definition, provided the word "and" was used instead of "or," before the words "excite to any alteration," &c. The first part of the definition was of a very different character from the latter. To publish "any thing tending to bring into contempt either House of Parliament, was very different from that of exciting to unlawful resistance or violence. If he said, that a sedition prevailed in France, or any other country, it would be immediately understood that he referred to some acts of violence, and not to any attempt to bring the government into hatred and contempt. The same distinction was to be drawn between
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a direct incitement to rebellion, and a discussion which might tend to bring into hatred and contempt either House of Parliament." He could not be supposed by any who knew him to be partial to annual parliaments, and no one would suspect him of yielding too easily the recognized privileges of property to new claims; and yet he would allow, that persons who advocated annual elections and universal suffrage, and who, by showing the superiority of a House of Commons elected every year, and by the votes of every individual in the nation, over that House as now constituted, used expression which tended to bring into hatred and contempt the other House of Parliament, might not be guilty of a seditious libel deserving of transportation. A noble relative of his (the duke of Richmond); a man who loved his country, and deserved as well of it as any man, had not only entertained the doctrines of a reform founded on annual elections and universal suffrage, but had brought a bill into parliament to carry it into effect, and had written pamphlets in its support. Yet, to urge the necessity of universal suffrage and annual parliaments was to bring into hatred and contempt the House of Commons, which was constituted on different principles. The publication of any thing tending to bring into hatred and contempt either House of Parliament, if this reasoning was just, could not be a direct incitement to violence, and therefore did not deserve to be included in the definition of libel along with the latter part of the noble lord's amendment. He could assure the noble lord that he thought the first words of his definition extended rather than narrowed the original meaning of the phrase—a seditious libel. Any one, by saying that a House of Commons ought to be dissolved for doing such and such things, would use language calculated to bring it into hatred and contempt; while, at the same time, nothing violent or unlawful was recommended. If a pleader of equal eloquence with that of the extraordinary man who sat beside him (lord Erskine) should again rise to grace the English bar, who could say, that he would not convince twelve honest men that this was a libel against the House of Commons? An excitement to change any thing in church or state, as by law established, by unlawful means, or a pub-

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lication tending to lead to violence or unlawful resistance, was a description of offence that might come within the meaning of a seditious libel. The noble lord who had spoken last had sneered at the idea of a man being impelled to a seditious libel, by an ardent mind; but his sneer would have applied to Burke, to Pope, to Addison, and to other great men. He could read passages from Burke's works, which, according to the present definition of a libel, would come within it. With the latter part of the noble lord's definition he perfectly concurred.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he had no objection to the definition, if the words "seditious libel" were so vague and general as to requite any definition. It could never be said, that any thing written against the ministers individually, or against the administration, could be construed into a seditious libel. He was anxious that the public mind should be instructed on this subject. A libel on himself, or on any of his noble friends around him in the administration, was merely a personal libel, and had no reference to sedition. The noble lord had proposed a definition to limit the meaning of the term, of which he approved. There could be no doubt, that if a book was published containing any thing tending to bring into hatred or contempt either House of Parliament, it would be a seditious libel. The only question, therefore, was, not whether the definition included too much, but whether it included all. He was at first willing that the expression "seditious libel" should stand without any definition, because this bill enacted no new law of libel, but merely an additional punishment for suppressing it. The question before them was, whether, if any person was guilty of a seditious libel, the court was to be limited to the old penalties of fine and imprisonment, but should be enabled to superadd that of banishment or transportation. The use of the amendment was to remove that part of the objection against the bill which rested upon the indefinite nature of the offence which it punished.
The Earl of Lauderdaleobjected to the definition. Many things might be mentioned tending to bring into hatred and contempt either House of Parliament without being a seditious libel. It might be said, for instance, that the House of Commons was obliged to proceed through
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its business without deliberation, when for one day there stood 54 orders, and when it heaped the floor of the House of Lords with ill-digested bills. The definition appeared to him rather to extend and render more vague than to limit the meaning of the expression.
Lord Hollandsaid, that when he supported the amendment of the noble lord, he did it on the idea that this severity of punishment was only to be applied to an aggravated offence. He had no idea that the present bill swept into itself all the opinions of lawyers, all the contradictory decisions of juries, and in fact, all the inconsistencies of libel-law; but he thought it was to be applied only to publications inciting the people to violence or resistance; and with that view he supported the latter part of the amendment. If every offence of libel, whether malignant or not, was to be included, he had been arguing in vain, and the time spent in debate had been lost.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, that his amendment was intended to include libels of superior malignity; but he saw he could not give a definition which should include any direct incitement to violence, without omitting what might be equally dangerous; for a libeller might exhort to peace and obedience in various parts of his book, while the tendency was, to bring into hatred and contempt the government and constitution of the country.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that general words must be used; otherwise every thing could not be included which ought to be included. If they specified what was to be a seditious libel and left out the first part of the definition, it might then be said, that every thing that was before a libel was now a libel, save and except what tended to bring into hatred and contempt either House of Parliament. Adverting to what lord Holland had said about the duke of Richmond, he said, he would tell what was the opinion of an eminent judge concerning him during the state trials in 1794. He remembered when his noble and learned friend (lord Erskine) had done himself so much credit on that occasion, and had become so great a favourite, that the horses were taken from his noble and learned friend's carriage, and he was drawn home in triumph—without, however, he believed, ever seeing his horses again [A laugh]. On that occasion, when the work of the duke of Richmond was offered in evidence,

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as a justification of the projects of the prisoners, the chief-justice said, "Can I receive as a justification what appears little less than high-treason?" If that work (continued lord Eldon) was not a libel, he knew not what a libel was. He had forgotten who was the attorney-general of that day, but if he had been then in that situation, he would have brought the highest peer in the realm before a court of justice for it.
Lord Hollandsaid, it appeared then, that this severe and disgraceful punishment was intended for, or would affect, such men as the duke of Richmond and Mr. Burke, the latter of whom had certainly uttered what would be called in the present day, a seditious libel, when he said, in introducing his plan of economical reform that "kings are naturally fond of low company." He would ask whether these words had not a direct tendency to bring into hatred and contempt the person of his majesty. But these were not the only expressions in his works which might be construed into seditious libel. He could find them in almost every page.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he would have been at first satisfied with the Words "seditious libel," as they originally stood in the bill, but as it might go abroad and influence the mind of juries to believe that certain things which were seditious libels were not so, if this amendment were rejected, he would persist in supporting that amendment.
A conversation then ensued, in which lords Darnley, Harrowby; Holland, and Ellenborough, took a part, when the definition in the shape of the amendment proposed by the latter was carried without a division.
Lord Holland, after some verbal amendments, objected to the penalty of banishment, as inconsistent with the laws of England. The earl of Carnarvon moved as an amendment, to limit the period of banishment to any time not exceeding seven years at the discretion of the judge. This amendment was negatived.
The report was received, and the bill ordered to be read a third time to-morrow.

PROTESTS AGAINST THE BLASPHEMOUS LIBEL BILL.
The following Protests were entered on the Journals:—It was moved to insert, "with intent to excite his majesty's subjects to subvert by vio-
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lence the government by law established." It was resolved in the negative.
"Dissentient,
"1st. Because the crime of publishing unlawful libels has, according to the practice of English law, embraced various offences, differing in their nature, as well as their degrees of criminality, from the wilful and predetermined guilt of the actual writer and publisher, to the negligence; and sometimes even to the inevitable ignorance of the party who has been deemed guilty by construction, in respect of his pecuniary interest in the publication, or his mere civil relation to the actual publisher; and it therefore seems just and necessary, that where a discretionary punishment of increased seventy is to be enacted, it should be confined to that species of libel, which, both in its natural tendency, and in the motive of the publisher, exhibits the highest degree of malignity.
"2dly. Because the most effectual, if not the only mode of accomplishing this object, is to introduce into the statute, and consequently into the indictment or informations proceeding upon it, a precise definition of the crime which it is intended to prevent by the extension and alteration of the punishment.—By such means alone can juries, in the first instance, be apprized of the particular character of the offence imputed to the defendant, or can the judge have a certain rule to distinguish the cases in which his discretionary power is to be exercised.
3dly. Because without such exact definition as has been rejected, it is possible that judges as well as juries, may, upon different occasions differ very widely as to the meaning of the word seditious, and thereby introduce into the administration of a penal law an uncertainty which is at all times an evil, but which is particularly mischievous when the law is very severe.
(Signed)

VASSALL HOLLAND

COWPER

ERSKINE

ROSSLYN

CARNARVON

GROSVENOR

KING

LAUDERDALE

BEDFORD

THANET

JERSEY

AUCKLAND"

It was moved to leave out the word "banished." It was resolved in the negative.
"Dissentient,
"1st. Because the introduction of ba-

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nishment in the present bill seems to us a wanton and dangerous experiment. That punishment has been hitherto unknown to the law of England, and on the present occasion there has been no proof shown of its necessity, nor due examination had of its consequences. So material an innovation on a system of usages, statutes, and maxims, established without reference to any such punishment, may, by analogies and inferences of law, affect the rights of the exiles and their descendants in a manner not foreseen by the authors of the bill, nor in the contemplation of the legislature that enacts it.
"2dly. Because; banishment, from its very nature a punishment of unequal severity in different cases, may be rendered doubly so by the favour or enmity of the sovereigns, to whose dominions the exiles would most naturally resort. We doubt the justice of subjecting an Englishman, even when convicted of a political offence against the rulers of his own country, to the capricious will or arbitrary laws of a foreign government; and we question the policy of teaching men of active spirits and turbulent designs, to look to foreign favour for the mitigation of their lot, on the miscarriage of their enterprises at home. Observation of what is going on around us—reflection on what has taken place in past times—strengthen these considerations. The present situation of Europe affords us no assurance that the power of one sovereign may not be rendered subservient to the vengeance of another; and the history of free states, modern as well as ancient, admonishes us that nothing has a more direct tendency to introduce foreign influence and foreign interference in the internal affairs of a country than the banishment of state delinquents.
(Signed)

VASSALL HOLLAND

ROSSLYN

ERSKINE

COWPER

KING

LAUDERDALE

BEDFORD

THANET

JERSEY

GROSVENOR."

STATE OF THE DISTURBED DISTRICTS.
The Earl of Strathmore, in the absence of a noble earl (Grey), had to state, that a letter had been received from the north of England, from the hon. and rev. brother of that noble earl, in answer to some statements which he had himself felt it his duty to make upon a former occasion. The letter stated, that
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the hon. and rev. gentleman was now in his own house in the proper discharge of his duty, and that he had written to prevent any misconstruction or misconception; he was at his post, and had no intention of removing from it. The noble earl said, he had certainly stated that there had been a considerable alarm in the county of Durham, and had mentioned that two magistrates of that county had removed to the town of Newcastle; and he believed he had made use of the term "refugees." This was correspondent to the statement he had received, that they had gone to Newcastle for the sake of taking refuge. The noble earl read a letter from one of the magistrates alluded to, which stated, that understanding what was the impression upon the public mind, he trusted justice would be done him by stating, that he was at home in the discharge of his proper duty, and that be had no thoughts of leaving home. The circumstance of his being at Newcastle for a single day had perhaps given rise to the report that, on the apprehension of danger, he had thought it right to provide for the safety of his family; but he was not easily driven from his home, nor would easily forsake his public duty. The noble lord then read another letter from the hon. and rev. Mr. Grey, which stated briefly to a friend what he had detailed to his noble brother. It was dated Savillerow, Newcastle, December 7, 1819, and desired the person to whom it was written to inform him (lord Strathmore) that he had returned that day to Wickham, with Mrs. Grey and his children, under no apprehension whatever of the safety of himself or his flock, and that it was nothing but his having engaged lodgings, that had induced him to keep his family at New-castle. The noble earl then observed, that he would make no comments, but would congratulate the parish upon the return of their worthy pastor, who, he hoped, would acquire fresh confidence, and find the alarm unfounded. He would address to their lordships a few words with regard to the statement he had made concerning the population of this district, which was supposed to be disaffected. He understood that a letter had been written to the mayor of Newcastle by an hon. baronet, inquiring whether the statement which he had made to their lordships was correct. The mayor of Newcastle had returned for answer, that his statement was not exaggerated. He was

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happy to say, that the disaffection was confined to the persons engaged in the Iron-manufactories and the collieries, which, however, composed the great mass of the population. He certainly had said nothing against the agricultural part of the community, for he believed the greater part of the agricultural classes were perfectly well-affected. From all the information he had been enabled to procure, he could take upon himself to say, that the statement he had formerly made, was rather underrated than exaggerated.