HL Deb 06 December 1819 vol 41 cc706-47
Lord Sidmouth

rose to move the second reading of the bill for the more effectual prevention and punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels. He observed, that the title of the bill sufficiently expressed its object, and their lordships, he was confident, could not entertain a doubt of the propriety of checking, as far as possible, libels of the description against which the provisions of the bill were directed. The object of the bill was proposed to be accomplished merely by giving to the court the power of increasing the severity of the punishment which was now applied in cases of conviction for libel on a repetition of the offence. It was not proposed that any additional punishment should attach in the first instance to a conviction for libel, but that a defendant should, on conviction for a second libel, be liable, according to the judgment of the court, to the punishment of banishment or transportation. Having, on a former occasion, fully stated the nature of this bill, and the other measures connected with it, he should not trouble their, lordships with any farther details at present; but should be ready in the course of the debate, to give any explanation which might appear necessary. He would only say, that whatever measures their lordships in their wisdom might think fit to adopt in the present situation of the country, they would all prove ineffectual unless means were found to check the licentiousness of the press. That licentiousness was the great source of the evil with which they had to contend, and if, after adopting the other measures, they did not agree to this, the remedy would be incomplete. The objects of the other measures, important us they were, could not be attained without this; for if it were not adopted, their lord-ships would still have in all its strength, that destructive virus, the pernicious effects of which, if allowed to operate, were certain and irremediable. He concluded by moving, that the bill be now read, a second time.

Lord Erskine

said, that public necessity, from the state of the country, had been assumed as the justification of this bill as it regarded alike blasphemous and seditious publications; but no such thing was stated in its preamble. It was most important that circumstances which were here after to justify, as a precedent, so extraordinary a change in the law, should be distinctly set forth and recorded; but the preamble was nevertheless quite silent as to any facts which ought to have induced the House to assent to any measure whatsoever upon the subject. It merely asserts that "it is expedient to make more effectual provision for the punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels." But why expedient? Had it been shown that the existing laws were insufficient to suppress them? The bill also applied alike to blasphemy and sedition—objects so very different, that nothing could be more absurd than to associate them, and to legislate on them as one, subjecting them to the same punishments. The controversies of the numerous sects of Christians, however widely differing from the doctrines of the national church, were completely and rightly tolerated. Nothing in such discussions were considered to be blasphemous; but as to direct and indecent attacks on the truths of the Christian religion, on which the whole constitution of the slate was founded, they were severely and justly punishable by the law as it stood, and ought to be most rigorously enforced. The poor man surrounded by his children crying for bread when he had none to give them, would have no other consolation than by looking forward to the hope which Christianity afforded. How cruel, then, how intolerably wicked, to disturb such pious faith, and to disqualify the people for the performance of their duty to the state. He would support, nay go before his majesty's ministers in putting down such pernicious publications: nor was there the smallest difficulty in accomplishing it. But a totally different question presented itself when new laws were demanded. The law officers of the crown had already the amplest means in their hands for the suppression of all injurious publications. This was most clearly proved in the total suppression of another species of libel formerly most destructively prevalent, and equally injurious to morals as blasphemy itself. When he came first to the bar, obscene publications, ruinous to youth of both sexes, were as openly exposed to sale in London as at the Palais Royal in Paris; but a private society, without even the aid of the great re- sources of the Crown, or of any new law like the present, completely succeeded in putting down this odious nuisance. The existing law he himself had found triumphant against them when he represented that body in the court of King's-bench, and they were now never seen, and scarcely ever heard of. How happened it, then, that the attorney-general, with the public purse at his command, could not accomplish what a few private individuals had benevolently undertaken and succeeded in? The reason was manifest: ministers had never properly put the law in action against them. They had contented themselves with prosecuting a few parodies published by Mr. Hone, which, however improper and irreverend, were not aimed at the religion of the country, but at his majesty's ministers and parliament; yet they failed in the prosecution from not addressing the charge and the argument to the jury upon the real, and in his opinion palpable ground of offence. They had no count in the first information charging a seditions libel, and in that which succeeded it they passed it by. In one passage, if I recollect right, it was said, "Oh contemptible Boroughmongering House of Commons, have mercy upon us your would-be constituents.'' Now, without meaning to approve the present construction of the House of Commons, he was confident that the juries of London would not have sanctioned that publication under the ordinary laws, and with their minds not disturbed by the suspension of public liberty. He would have reminded them that the very same House of Commons so constituted and so calumniated, had been the parent of public liberty, now suspended; that the same House of Commons so constituted and so calumniated, had passed the Habeas Corpus act, even the suspension of which was so justly alarming. That the same House of Commons so constituted and so calumniated, had passed the libel bill which gave them the very privilege which they were to exercise as a trust for the great body of the people. Why, then, were new laws to be made because government misdirected their charge? His excellent friend, the late attorney-general, had no other, course to pursue. To raise a cry for the present bills, blasphemy was made the pretext in parliament, and it was to be followed up in the courts. The Age of Reason had then long been in the most extensive circulation, but never was pro- secuted or adverted to, nor any other blasphemy, fill they wore blasphemer themselves in Hone's parody, and then it was too late to take the matter op upon their own account, and this was a faithful history of their defeat. Me knew juries too well to believe that they would not have faithfully protected the institutions of the country however they might think that they were defective—but when public liberty was suspended, public justice was in a manner suspended also. He came now to a second description of libels against which the bill was directed, but without a shadow of justification. Of a blasphemous libel there could be but one feeling and one judgment; but publications might be and often had been charged to be seditious, which were virtuous, public spirited, and useful^—writings which noble lords opposite might well think offensive, but which disinterested, honest, men, ought to approve. Such publications, forsooth, even before final judgment, were to be seized by the crown and suppressed. By this bill, a verdict was a warrant for seizure and suppression, though the judgment might be afterwards annulled. The verdict against the dean of St. Asaph was in August, and under this law could not therefore have been afterwards circulated, but under the penalty of transportation. Yet he had shown the court of King's-bench in November, that taking even the verdict to have been justifiable, it was impossible to sustain any judgment on it, and he had not been ever heard in reply when the judgment was arrested. But even if this bill could nevertheless in that respect be supported, it would do mischief instead of good; the libel could only be seized in the hands of the party prosecuted, or his agent, and where they might be lying as lumber unsold, but the judgment of seizure would produce whilst in the hands of others, an extensive circulation. So much for making unnecessary laws instead of trusting to them that were of old times. There were many cases in which a subject had a perfect right to complain of proceedings of the executive government, and even of parliament itself. He had successfully defended Mr. Stockdale on that very ground, for publishing an attack upon the House of Commons, for circulating their own charge against Mr. Hastings long before the hour of trial, and yet prohibiting all answers to it; and it was a noble act of the jury, never to be forgot- ten, that even before the libel bill, they took upon themselves to acquit him. Had they done otherwise, that virtuous work of Dr. Logan's could not have been sold but under the pains of felony under this pernicious bill before them. The House ought to beware how they inflamed the spirit and temper of the people against the government by new and odious at- tempts to punish them without measure or mercy. The people of England were not to be so subdued. They were accused of cherishing plans of innovation—but if the accusation was just, why was parliament to become an innovator? Instead of new and unexampled severities, it would be wiser to consider before it was too late of temperate and practicable reforms which would satisfy the well-intentioned and moderate, and induce the partisans of wild schemes to relinquish them. Nothing was wanting to put down blasphemy and sedition but the execution of the laws. The novelty of seizure was once well exposed, and he would refer them for example to the conduct of Cromwell when Harrington's Oceana was seized before the liberty of the press was established by law. Harrington, who, republican as he was, continued faithful to the unhappy Charles, and fainted on his scaffold when he was executed, had this work nevertheless seized as a libel upon all government. Harrington sent his daughter to the daughter of the protector to ask her mediation, and seeing her child in her arms, seized it and ran away, and when she was called upon to return it, she complied, saying at the same time, "Your father had seized my father's child—give me back that as I have restored your's." This intercession was successful, Cromwell saying to her, "If my government be made to stand, it has nothing to fear from a paper shot;" and he afterwards consented to accept of a dedication. Depend on it (concluded lord E.) this new system will only increase the evils you complain of. Give satisfaction to the people, and then, instead of passing new laws on the subject of sedition, you might soon dispense with the execution of the old ones. As to blasphemy, crush it at any hour with my assent, so as the laws for the general protection of public freedom are not annulled and violated.

The Earl of Harrowby

said, he had listened with much attention to the noble and learned lord who had just sat down, because he knew him to possess great practical knowledge on the subject under consideration; but after having carefully attended to all that had fallen from him, he could not see how his statements warranted the conclusion he bad drawn. The noble and learned lord began by making a distinction between blasphemous and seditious libels, the just-ness of which no man would deny; but although every blasphemous and seditious libel, was, as such, subject to punishment by law, their lordships must have been very inattentive to what was passing if they had not observed the great difference between the libels of the present day and those of former times. He readily admitted, that there were, greater shades of distinction in seditious than were to be found in blasphemous libels, which difference would require the consideration of those who executed the laws. It was certainly too much to argue, that a second libel must necessarily be punished by the severest penalty of the law. The answer to such an argument was, that the punishment was by the bill left to the discretion of the court. The noble and learned lord had contended, that the judges had at present the power of increasing the punishment on a second libel; but the subject of complaint was, that by the existing law they had not power in many cases to render the punishment commensurate with the offence. The noble lord had inferred that the law at present must be adequate to check seditious and blasphemous libels, because a society had succeeded in putting down obscene publications. It was contended, that if the attorney-general had been as attentive j as that society, he would have succeeded in crushing sedition and blasphemy. This argument was, however, singularly in- consistent with another part of the noble and learned lord's speech, in which he represented the effect of prosecution to be to encourage libels. At least this was a fair inference from the argument, that the sale would be more extensive. The noble and learned lord had supposed that great injury might arise to the property of a bookseller from a seisure which might afterwards be reversed on an arrest of judgment; and, if he understood him rightly, there was little danger of this injury occurring, since the great sale which the prosecution would cause must, according to the noble and learned lord's supposition, leave very little of the property to be seized. But the fact was, that the no- ble and learned lord had urged no serious objection to the bill. The ground on which the measure was recommended to their lordships' adoption was, that the species and circulation of the libels of the present day differed in description and extent from all former publications. It was impossible for any constitution to escape from the evil effects of the moral taint which such publications diffused. It was argued, that the courts could now punish sufficiently; but the only penalties that at present attached to libel were fine and imprisonment. But, were these sufficient at a time when such extraordinary means were taken to circulate blasphemy and sedition through every corner of the country—when the labourer could not drink his cup of tea or coffee without at the same time partaking of the deleterious poison? Was it, then, too much to say, that a different punishment should be inflicted, when an offence so iniquitous was aggravated by repetition? Did, then, any other punishment but banishment and transportation remain to be applied? Those who gave their support to these laws were the sincere friends of the press They well knew that the liberty of England and the liberty of the press were inseparably connected. It was because they loved the freedom of the press, that they wished to guard against the evils to which its misdirection gave rise. The freedom of discussion which belonged to the constitution of this country, those who recommended these bills were most anxious to preserve. They were not the enemies, but the well-wishers of the press, who endeavoured to correct its abuses. They were desirous of that correction, in order to render the advantages which this country derived from the liberty of the press eternal. But no free government could exist, if those (he knew not what to call them) reptiles, that at present swarmed in every direction, were permitted to gnaw the timbers of the vessel of the state until her preservation became impossible. He was convinced, that their lordships, in spite of all that had been said, would perceive that the present measure, instead of injuring, would strengthen public liberty, and that they would therefore sanction it by their adoption.

The Marquis of Lansdowne

wished to offer a few observations, with regard to that state of vicious abuse of the liberty of the press, which had been so much dwelt upon by noble lords, and with regard to its proposed cure. If all that was required of their lordships on the present occasion, was a declaration that a more vigorous administration of the existing law was necessary he, for one, would join in sanctioning such a principle. But was that stated in the preamble of the bill? Was it affirmed that the law ought to be more strenuously administered? No: it was stated, that the law itself did not afford sufficient means of suppressing the evil. Upon what foundation did this statement rest? Where was the information to warrant the assertion? How and where had it been shown that the law, though duly enforced, had been inefficient to put down the mischief?— Without any such grounds of proceeding, without any explanation whatever, their lordships were called upon to pass an enactment which would alter the old, long-established law of the land, and to apply the punishment of felony to cases of misdemeanor; of misdemeanor, too, not precise and definite, but so variable that scarcely any two could agree as to the character of any specific charge.— Their lordships would certainly not be led away by any argument from those persons out of doors who seemed to think that any punishment was unfit for any evil, except what might happen to suit their own views. Their lordships would recognize no such reasoning; they felt that it was frequently one of the most important and essential, as it was one of the most delicate, questions which could occupy, a legislative body, to discuss and apportion the peculiar sort of punishment due to each particular offence. But in all such cases, it was fitting that the most ample details should be laid before parliament, in order to induce it to alter or modify the laws. Whereas, their lordships were called upon to pass the present bill without any information of the inefficiency of the existing law; nay, on the contrary, the documents laid on the table proved, that not merely no extraordinary energy, but that not even common steps had been taken to check the shocking licentiousness that had tainted the press; and that it was till December 1818, that any steps had been taken at all. Yet, in the face of these circumstances, their lordships were called upon to stamp a character on the offence of libel such as it had never borne before, and to visit it with penalties unheard of in the history of this country, and only to be paralleled by the worst precedents in Roman legislation. The praise, therefore, hitherto appropriate, which Mr. Justice Blackstone had bestowed on our law in this respect, would no longer apply: for if the bill were passed, no man could say, "that our law of libel corresponds rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence, when liberty, learning, and humanity, were in their full vigour, than with the cruel edicts that were established in the dark and tyrannical ages of the ancient decemviri, or the later emperors."—He was certainly prepared to contend, that the present bill did not propose an alteration in the amount, but in the nature of punishment, by substituting for the well-known penalties a penalty of a quality totally different: one too (he alluded to the transportation to Botany-Bay), which was the very reverse of what was fit for the offence. It was even at present an objection justly urged against the punishment of transportation to Botany-Bay, that it was extremely unequal and more detrimental to one individual than another, though those affected by it were for the most part taken from one class of society; but what would be said of it, if it should be applied to offences which might be committed by men in all classes of society; frequently, too, by men of the most exemplary and praiseworthy characters in all other respects, and who, by their talents and their virtues, might be capable of making ample compensation to their country for any injury which they might have inflicted through the press? To apply such a punishment to such persons, would not merely argue an inhuman want of caution in their lordships, but a great want of policy; for he was convinced that the provision to increase the punishment of the libeller, would in fact decrease it, and be his most effectual protection. This was a view well worthy of their lordship's consideration, they should pause and see whether in fact they would not make it more difficult than ever to procure a conviction for a libel. When any complaint was now made of the few prosecutions instituted for libel, their lordships were told of the unwillingness of juries to bring in a very dict of guilty. But could their lordships hope to cure that unwillingness, by substituting for the present punishment one that would be revolting to sense and humanity; one that would disgust every man in the kingdom, and of course every juryman who might be called to pass his judgment in such a case? Their lordships had already seen the difficulty of procuring verdicts in cases of clear and specified crime, and when there could be no hesitation as to the nature of the offence; and juries had not unfrequently (he would not say, that they had acted rightly—all must feel that they had acted naturally), arbitrarily altered by their verdict even the value of a one pound note, in order to ward off what they considered a cruel and exorbitant punishment. If this was the case where the law had defined with absolute certainty the character of the offence, what would be the result where the offence imputed was indefinite and vague? The most eminent judges had been able to give no clearer definition of a seditious libel, than that it comprehended whatever was calculated to bring the government into hatred and contempt. Such a description, it was obvious, would be thought to apply or not to any particular writing, according to the different views and various reasonings of various minds: and where such various judgments might be formed, it was evident that jurymen would exercise their judgments, and modify their sentence by a reference to the consequences which would attach to it. He would ask their lordships to look at what had been the conduct of a great master in legislation on this very subject. He supposed that none of their lordships could feel a greater desire to put down libels than the extraordinary man lately at the Lead of the French government. Indeed, his extreme anxiety on that point was (if he might be allowed so to speak) one of the defects of his understanding; and certainly, it was not possible for any man to use greater energy and perseverance than he did, to repress what he considered as the evil most formidable to his government. Yet the code of France, even under these circumstances, contained no such unjust and cruel provision as that of transportation for any offence relative to the press. It might, indeed, be said, that transportation was not a penalty known to the French law; but deportation was; yet no such punishment, nor any in the least degree analogous, had been applied; and the punishment of fine and imprisonment was considered to be the most efficacious to repress the evil. Yet the British par- liament was called upon to pass a law which was thought too severe even under the late rigid government of France, and which was the reverse of all that was just and humane. And what, he would repeat, would be its practical effect? He was convinced that any man once convicted, would go into court a second time under peculiar advantages, which would greatly tend to weaken the due execution of the law, and thereby the respect due to its administration. That public opinion would set itself against such a severity of punishment in this country, there could be no doubt. Juries would infallibly take into consideration the consequences of their verdicts, mixed up with the consideration of the offence charged, and their verdicts would, as they were now, be guided by the feelings arising out of those united considerations. Take the case, for instance, of an hon. baronet, the member for Westminster, who was now under prosecution on a charge of seditious libel. Suppose that hon. baronet to be found guilty, and to be subsequently charged with a similar offence, could it be believed for a moment, that a jury would by their verdict consign him to Botany Bay, or that they would not give a very different verdict under the same circumstances, with the knowledge, that the finding him guilty might send him to Botany Bay, than they would with the knowledge, that a verdict of guilty could only lead to fine and imprisonment? It was with these feelings, find under these impressions, that he felt it his duty to oppose this bill: let the existing laws be carried into effect, and either they would be found sufficient, or it might be satisfactorily proved that they had failed; but when enactments like the present were brought forward of great additional security, it became their lordships to pause before they agreed to them, and to consider well, whether by these enactments they would not be in effect weakening the cause the enactments were intended to support; whether, if they were attempted to be carried into operation, it would not be much more difficult to obtain a conviction than under the present laws? and thus their whole object be defeated. There was one other part of the bill, respecting which he wished to have some explanation; the term within which actions must be commenced against magistrates, was in this bill fixed at three months, in other bills it had been six months, no reason had been assigned for this alteration; and as it appeared that three months would be scarcely sufficient for the purposes of justice, he was more anxious to have it explained, why in this instance the usual term had been departed from, no cause being assigned for the alteration on the face of the bill?

Lord Ellenborough

said, that when he considered that the present bill was intended to annex a new and higher quantity of punishment to the offences against which it was directed, he should be disposed to join in the apprehensions expressed by the noble marquis, as to the difficulty of obtaining a verdict in the second case, if the blasphemous and libellous publications alluded to had extended more generally than he believed they did. But the offences, it should be considered, were those of seditious and blasphemous libels—seditious libels intended to overthrow the constitution, and blasphemous libels to subvert the religion of the country. He still trusted that the efforts of the press, industrious as they were, had not succeeded to that extent which was sufficient to alienate the minds of jurymen from the religion in which they were educated, and from that respect for the laws which it was their duty to maintain. Seditious libels were not the offspring of party views, nor connected with party politics: they were attempts to overturn the constitution, by extinguishing those feelings of attachment towards it, which he hoped still prevailed among his majesty's subjects. The noble marquis had objected that the punishment was new. It was upon that very ground that he (lord Ellenborough) supported it; for believing as he did, that the object of the persons concerned in those publications was base lucre, and their chief agent a vile malignity, he could not help thinking that some new quality of punishment was necessary to meet and suppress their efforts. He was further confirmed in this opinion, from observing that the prosecution and conviction of libellers under the existing law produced frequently the effect which the libeller himself had chiefly in view—that of extending the sale of his work, and thereby putting lucre in. his pocket. He was sure when they considered what the author of a blasphemous libel attempted; that he attempted, as had been eloquently expressed by a noble lord who had pre- ceded him, to deprive the poor man of his only hope and consolation; when they considered this, he would ask, what greater crime could be committed? What more atrocious offence could an individual be guilty of, than that of endeavouring to destroy the foundation upon which all society existed? The consolations which arose from religion, and particularly to a poor man, were the most grateful; and yet it was among this class that those pernicious libels were most generally circulated. He looked with little less horror upon those who were charged with publishing seditious libels, their object being to shake the affections of the people towards those to whom the preservation of the constitution had been entrusted, and to produce a change in that constitution, which, if it were effected, must prove utterly destructive of their happiness. Notwithstanding all these mischievous efforts, however, he trusted the constitution would still remain the envy of nations. When they considered the alterations which had taken place in the state of society for the last twenty years, he could not but think that some new regulations were absolutely necessary for the purpose of repressing the licentiousness of the press. In these observations he meant particularly to allude to the progressive increase of education. When they gave knowledge they did not give the power of exercising a proper judgment, although they might hope that power would be inculcated. He believed that where the power of reading and writing had been given, without a strong foundation of morality, instead of producing that benefit which every good man had a right to anticipate, and which all had endeavoured to accomplish, it had been enlisted into the cause of blasphemous and seditious libellers, and had thus become an instrument of real mischief. Upon all these grounds he was strongly of opinion, that some additional strength ought to be given to the laws; and he trusted, notwithstanding the apprehensions which had been expressed by the noble marquis, that we should still be the happiest and the most prosperous nations on the face of the globe.

Lord Holland

said, that of all the hideous codes which had ever come under his observation, he must confess, he had never witnessed one more obnoxious than that which was then under the considers- tion of the House; and as he considered it part of a system of policy which was about to be entered upon, he certainly thought himself justified on this occasion, as well as upon all other occasions in which these bills were likely to come before them, to take into his view the state of the danger to which it was said the country was exposed, and to advert to the circumstances upon which the noble viscount on the other side of the House, had recommended these measures to their adoption. He wished, however, on the present occasion, to confine himself entirely to the bill under the consideration of the House. In order to do this it was necessary to look to the grounds upon which the bill had been recommended to their lordships. But where were those grounds to be found, unless in the speech of the noble viscount, and in the preamble of the bill itself, except, indeed, in the speech which had just been delivered, and in which only a rational ground of defence had been stated? All that could be collected from the noble viscount, and from the preamble of the bill, was, that it was expedient to make more effectual provision for the punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels. Was that alone enough to justify an alteration in the laws of the country? Was it upon this ground alone that an alteration was recommended, which would have all the effects, all the advantages, which had been explained by the noble lord at the head of his majesty's council? Was their no other reason for at once destroying the liberty of the press? It was, indeed, of a piece with the ordinary description of parliamentary logic. When the minister came to take the money from their purses, he always told them what a value he sat upon their property: when he offered to invade the constitution, and the law, he told them how he loved the laws and the constitution of their country and now, when he came to tell them that he who published, perhaps inadvertently; perhaps without the opportunity of control a seditious or a blasphemous libel was to be transported for life, he told them how he loved the liberty of the press! But let them consider what were the grounds which had been stated by the noble lord for the adoption of this extraordinary measure. The principal ground was the great increase of these blasphemous and seditious libels. In the first place it became their duty to inquire to what that great increase was to be attributed, and whether it was not to be ascribed to the malicious connivance of ministers themselves? Of this he could form no direct judgment; but he was satisfied that these disgusting publications did not add to the state of the country any additional danger. If, however, any danger did result to the religion of the people, from the prevalence of these disgusting plasphemous publications, he asserted that it was wholly to be attributed to the conduct of his majesty's government, and was connected with those evil designs towards the liberty of the country, which had been since the meeting of that House, so clearly developed. He submitted, however, that the people of England were a religious people, and he would be party to no man, whether king, prince, or demagogue, who would allege that they could be made proselytes to infidelity, or that any additional laws were necessary to the maintenance of their faith. If they looked to the history of the country they would find that the people, and not those in high situations alone, had always rested themselves on the foundation of religion; and he verily believed that much more might be done, if a change were to be effected upon the old and approved method of Oliver Cromwell, than by those doctrines of which the noble lord had said so much. But this opinion and observation upon the disposition and temper of the people of England was not only his. They had the opinion of the noble viscount precisely to the same effect. They were told, not above five or six years ago, that there was such a disposition in the people of this country to preach the word of God,— that persons of the lowest situation in life had become teachers of Christianity, and collected immense- congregations—they were told that Christianity was preached not alone by the elevated and the learned, but by individuals of the most humble class; and such was the spirit which then existed, that their floor was covered with petitions from those persons, praying for opportunities to pursue that course of religious worship which they conceived best suited to their spiritual welfare. He would ask, what had since taken place to produce so awful a change in the morals of the people as they had heard described? He recollected, in travelling through the country at that period, that scarce a village came under his notice, in which he did not see some new place of religious worship. These erections he had always seen with pleasure; and knowing the principles upon which they had obtained existence, he could not help listening with regret to the alterations which were stated to have taken place, within a few short years. He did not believe, however, that there was any foundation for this charge; and could not help viewing with horror and indignation, the attempts which were made upon so fallacious an argument to alter the constitution. For these reasons he doubted the first proposition, that it was necessary to recommend the measures which had been proposed to the House. He meant that he doubted the extent of these blasphemous publications; and he also doubted the extent of any danger which had or could result from them. Having expressed these doubts, the next came to another important branch of the question, and that was, how the laws as they existed with reference to this subject had been enforced? It was incumbent on his majesty's ministers before they came to require an alteration of the laws, to prove in a satisfactory manner that those laws were inadequate to the purposes for which they were formed They should prove not only the existence of the evil, but they were bound also to prove, that that evil had not arisen from misconduct of their own, and that they had not the means in their hands of putting it down. He knew not how this would be answered. If blasphemous publications had been extensively and numerously circulated, where were the prosecutions? or what course had been taken to suppress them? It had been said that juries would not do their duty in cases of blasphemous publications. It was indeed a strange perversion of human intellect, that a person, at the moment he was recommending additional restraints upon the crime of libel, should himself be pronouncing the grossest of libels upon one of the most sacred institutions of the country! It was not less strange to hear it urged that juries who would not convict, as the punishment at present stood, would be more likely to convict if that punishment was increased. But let their lordships come to the bill itself. To what did it refer? They were told by the noble lord who spoke last that he approved of the bill, because it extended the punishment with regard to seditious and blasphemous libels. This, certainly, was a clear and substantial around for Approval; but did the bill itself make any such distinction? Did it not—and it was on that ground that he thought it mainly objectionable—extend the punishment of transportation to crimes which were indefinite in their nature, and which were open to different constructions in the different courts of justice in this country? In this bill, too, there existed an anomaly, directly contrary to the principles of crime and punishment—he alluded to that of making the master criminally responsible for the act of his servant. It had been held in crimes of this character, not merely that it was sufficient to give prima facie evidence of the crime of the master, but it had been explained on the highest authority, and had several times been acted upon, but he hoped would be acted upon no longer, that he should not be allowed to enter into any explanation or exculpation of his conduct whatever, although he might know nothing of the writing of the libel or of the publishing of the libel; and although at the moment the publication took place, he might have been actually serving his majesty in putting down a riot. He was sure it could not be the intention of any man, and more especially so candid and ingenuous a person as the noble lord who spoke last, that a person so situated should be subject for the second offence of which he was so found guilty to the punishment of transportation for seven years. But then it was said that this punishment was in the discretion of the court! This was indeed a monstrous proposition, and one to which he would never willingly accede. He would never consent to have the constitution and the liberties of the country placed at the discretion of any man, however elevated or however virtuous. He wished also to state other objections, which he thought equally conclusive. The bill increased the punishment of a crime which he already described to be indefinite. This was a solecism in law, because according to the practice of the courts, there was no malus animus. It was also to be remarked, that it destroyed all the right of evidence on the part of the accused. Another point deserving particular attention was that which applied to the evidence to be received as indicative of the first conviction. By this bill it was not the record, or even the copy of the record, that was brought forward; out it was enacted that it should be sufficient for the clerk of the peace to write a certificate of the sub- stance and effect of the record. Substance and effect of the record! Why, he would ask, was this provision so made; why not in these as well as in other cases have the record itself? It might be said, that it was too expensive; but no expense could be too great where the clue administration of justice was at stake. He also found in this measure a new term in legislation— he meant the word "banished." He did not know, nor had he ever heard of banishment as any part of the laws of this country. Why it had been introduced on the present occasion he was at a loss to imagine.—He now called upon the House to look at the practical effect of this measure arising out of the difficulty of the definition of a libel. There was scarcely a man in the two Houses of parliament for the last 150 years who might not have been in a situation to be tried under this act. Let them look, too, to the effect which was likely to accrue to all public men, whether literary or otherwise. In speaking of men who had been considered as men of great talent and high station in this country, let them take in my lord Somers, during the years from 1679 to 1683, a time of great oppression in the courts of justice, and when the judges were extremely subservient to the administration in power. During that time, what would have been the effect of such a measure as this? Would not many passages of his speeches, dictated by integrity and' sound worth, have been pronounced libels, and punished accordingly? From the time of lord Somers down to that of Mr. Burke, taking the acts of their public life might not many men have written or spoke some opinion which would come within the definition of libel? And when they considered the fluctuation of parties, to what consequences might not those persons be exposed? Let the House consider the situation in which men would be placed who were altogether innocent; or who, if guilty, could only be accused of a venial offence. Let them consider too, that these persons were to exposed to the punishment inflicted upon criminals of the lowest cast. Let them see also what would be the effect upon literary men, both with respect to seditious and blasphemous publications. What would have become of Milton? What would have become of Dryden, if those against whom his pen had been so effectively wielded, had come into power? Would they not have punished him for those libels, in defiance of his talent? What, too would have become of Pope and Addison, and above all, of sir Richard Steele, the author of the Christian Hero— the eloquent advocate of Christianity. Could he find Security; would not Christianity itself be deprived of its warmest friend, if such a man were sent to Botany-bay? Look to the effect of this law upon men who had, in the change of parties, lost the protection of power. Would they not, amidst the animosities of political hostility, be exposed to the most dreadful consequences? Would not, in fact, such a measure be made the instrument of vengeance, instead of power?—But he considered this bill not merely in the circumstances which he had described-there were other points of view equally important. There was another class of persons equally exposed to punishment, not merely the writer, the man of ability and the man of education, but the poor vender of newspapers, who awoke them in the morning with the sound of his horn, and was alike indifferent to what he sold, whether the loyal address of a university, or the contemptible discussions of a radical meeting. Knowing nothing of the contents or the publication, and perhaps incapable of judging of those contents if he did know them, he, too, was subject to the consequences of this bill; at least to the discretion of his majesty's judges. And he here repeated that, however high he held the character of the judges of this kingdom, and there was no period at which they deserved more praise, yet he never would place in their discretion the degree of punishment which such an offender was to receive. He now came to another consideration, and that was, how-far the proposed increase of punishment was likely to operate upon the crimes which it was meant to suppress? He would suppose sir Samuel Shepherd addressing the jury in the prosecution of Mr. Hone, and by-the-by he could not help remarking, that the selection of the libel for which that individual was tried was rather unfortunate; he said he would suppose sir Samuel addressing the jury, and after he had closed his case he were to say, "I have now said all I think necessary on this libel, I have proved that it has been printed and published by the prisoner at the bar, and now I beg leave to observe, that if you bring him in guilty, if ever he does any thing of the same sort again, he will be liable to be transported for seven years." Did the House think that this argument would have the effect of convincing the jury that they ought to return a verdict of guilty, instead of not guilty? If there was any force in the reasoning of the noble lord, they must suppose that this monstrous and incoherent proposition was tenable, namely, that an increase of punishment would render the conviction of crime more likely than it was before. It had often been urged in that House, that those who inflicted punishment were more likely to suffer than those by whom it was received; and if it was true, in general, that severity of punishment operated more powerfully on the humane mind, than punishment of a lenient character, was it likely that the punishment of transportation was better calculated to ensure conviction in cases of libel, than if the law remained as it was? The only argument like reason which he had heard, was from the noble lord near him (Ellenborough): he alluded to the observation, "that the present punishment was insufficient." He would not say whether this proposition met his views or not; but he considered that persons willing to endure imprisonment for the sake of gain, would not be induced from the fear of transportation to desist from their criminal practices. On the contrary he thought they would endeavour to increase those gains, in order that on being sent to Botany-bay they might be enabled to enjoy the fruits of their nefarious practices; and, therefore, the new mode of punishment, in his opinion, would not diminish the disposition to offend. [Here a noble lord on the ministerial bench was observed to smile.] The noble lord smiled—and he could trace the source of his smile—he meant to insinuate that he could not take the argument both ways; but he contended that he could, and submitted that both arguments formed a still stronger objection to this bill. His argument went to prove, that during quiet times this bill was not sufficient to suppress the crime to which it was applicable; and that in times of deep agitation it was likely to furnish a weapon of all-powerful persecution, and to turn the sword of justice into the dagger of the assassin. During peaceable times the bill would have no effect at all; while in turbulent times, it might be converted into an instrument for the persecution of innocent persons. These were his reasons for opposing this bill; but he objected to it still more, because he considered it one of those long catalogue of measures which had been introduced to the House for the purpose of invading and destroying the constitution of the country. The effects of these measures collectively, he would on some future occasion submit to their lordships: at present he should content himself with stating, that he considered that the reasons which had been assigned for altering the law of the land were insufficient. Persons guilty of a smaller crime were to be subject to the dreadful punishment of persons guilty of a greater. A new punishment, in fact, was enacted in the laws of England; and this, too, at a time when ministers themselves said, that malicious and designing men went about the country representing to the people, that they could no longer place confidence in the justice of parliament. Whether at such, a season it was wise to introduce such a measure, common sense would best point out. He considered the measure altogether objectionable, and entreated the House not to give it their sanction. He hoped, when he saw the bill go into a committee, that their lord ships would strike out those parts to which he had particularly alluded, and that they would save that House from the reflections which their adoption of such a bill would naturally produce.

The Lord Chancellor

said, that he conceived the measures upon which his noble friend who had just sat down had commented with so much severity, essentially necessary to the preservation of the free constitution of this country; and after the manner in which that noble lord had thought proper to speak of them, it was impossible for him to remain silent. The noble lord had spoken that night in a manner calculated to disgrace the judges of this country. But he would ask the, noble lord if he was acquainted with the whole law of libel? At this very moment the punishment of libellers was at the discretion of the judges, and it was at their option to fine, to imprison, or both. There had been, however, a vast change in the Jaw on this subject within a few years past. When he had the honour of holding the office of attorney general, he was effectually opposed in his prosecutions by the noble and learned lord who had addressed them early that night (lord Erskine)—an opposition which he could not help thinking added weight in the cases in which he was himself subsequently engaged. Was it then thought of calling in question the discretion of the judges which was now so much repudiated? What then appeared to be the perfection of the constitution was, that the punishment was in the discretion of the judges, not so, according to the doctrines which had now been promulgated. But to the question as the law stood. If a man, between the time of his prosecution and his judgment, thought proper, day by day, and hour by hour, to repeat his offence, by means of his servant, his wife, or some authorized person, there was nothing to prevent him. Until a great lawyer in another place and a great reformer of laws (Mr. M. A. Taylor) had thought proper to take away the punishment of the pillory, there was some check to this species of pertinacity; but now the court could only imprison and fine, and often the fine was imposed where it could not be paid. The learned lord then alluded to the repetition of the publication of the infamous blasphemies from "The Temple of Reason,'' after the conviction of Carlile. It was true, he said, that each of these publications might form a subject for a distinct prosecution; but if they extended to the number of 500, or 1,000, or 1,500, was it possible for the duration of human life to afford a sufficient space for a punishment equal to the incalculable mischief which their circulation would effect? His lordship then commented upon the pernicious consequences which had resulted to society from the publication of seditious and blasphemous libels, which were dispersed throughout the country in waggon loads, at the expense of those who felt an interest in their dissemination. The act now before the House would have the effect at once of preventing this evil; for the man who sold, who gave, who lent, or who distributed in any way, one of these libels, would be guilty of a misdemeanor. He should be extremely glad to know how, by any other means, this object could be effected. The law as it existed gave no power of this description, and therefore that House was called upon to remedy the evil; and the bill before their lordships he considered in all respects conducive to that important end. He did not think because the law was made stronger, that juries would be the less inclined to do their duty; on the contrary, he had a firm persuasion that they would do their duty, as became honest and conscientious members of society. He did not mean to say that there were not particular cases in which juries might miscarry. No: one of the greatest beauties of the English constitution was, that all persons might miscarry in performing their duties; or in other words, that a great latitude was allowed them; that no power was employed to compel them to act in a particular manner. He found all the juries with whom he had had to deal anxious to do their duty. He stated this with great truth, and also with great seriousness, for this reason—because it could not long be stated with truth, if they allowed blasphemous publications to be promulgated until they produced an evil effect on the minds of jurymen. As long as their minds were influenced by the religion of the country, by the principles of that religion which their lordships professed, so long would they act conscientiously. There might be miscarriages; but when the law was explained to them, it was their bounden duty to put it in force, and he was quite sure that there would be no disinclination on their part to do so. But, suppose there was a change that they would not act correctly; was he, therefore, if he thought the constitution in danger, if he thought the law, in its present situation, was unable to support and sustain the constitution, for the benefit of juries themselves, as well as of all, the King's subjects; was he therefore, he asked, to abstain from the performance of his duty, and to declare, that he would not be a party to those legislative provisions, in the passing of which, he hoped to have their lordships concurrence? Not with standing all he had heard of the general disinclination of juries to administer the law, he was not one of those who believed that such a disinclination existed. In cases of a criminal nature, to which it was his painful duty to attend, he saw no ground to excite a suspicion that such a disinclination prevailed. They were told that there were several clauses in this bill which were highly objectionable. It would be proper to debate those clauses when they came regularly under consideration; but, as he took it, the question they had to dispose of this night was, whether they were not satisfied, not of the expediency of passing this law, but of the necessity of suppressing seditious and blasphemous libels; and that, therefore, they should enact some measure? What they were to enact was another questions. If their lordships though the existing laws were sufficient for the suppression of such publications, let them say so: but if they did not, then he conjured them, by the gratitude they owed for the blessings they themselves enjoyed, as subjects of this free country, to exert their best powers to hand them down unimpaired to their posterity, if they conceived they could be preserved by wise and vigorous measures. When attempts were made to undermine religion, morals, law, property, in short every thing held most dear, he trusted they would not withhold their concurrence from this bill, which was intended to support them. The great question was, could they, or could they not, take upon themselves to say, that the present state of the law was equal to meet and to correct those evils? He thought it was not, and on that ground he should vote for the measure. His learned friend had stated to the House how he would have carried on the prosecution against Mr. Hone; how he would have addressed the jury; and how great would have been the probability of his succeeding. He was well acquainted with his learned friend's fascinating manner of addressing a jury; but, after being informed by his learned friend of the course he would have taken, he doubted much whether he would' have succeeded. His learned friend cried Heat, hear." He also would cry "Hear, hear." while he stated, that, in his opinion, sir Samuel Shepherd took a correct course. What he did in that case was, to ask a jury of the country, whether a parody, libelling a part of the religion of the country, ought not to be punished? He did not condescend to call on them to look at it as a libel on the various person's therein named. With respect to the law of libel, it was introduced after many gross offences had been committed; it was part of the law of the land, and he hoped it would never be destroyed. This he would venture to say—that it would be wisely, used, if exercised to support the constitution of the country; but it would be greatly abused if exercised to destroy that constitution. In this case he was confident it would not be so made use of; and he had no doubt in his mind but that the juries of the country would fearlessly carry into effect the law of the country.

Earl Grey

said, he would not stop to inquire whether the prosecution, which he thought had been most injudiciously directed against Mr. Hone, might or might not have been better conducted. At the same time the noble and learned lord would allow him to say, that, if it had been carried on by his learned friend near him, to no hands could it have been intrusted with a greater hope of success. Feeling as sincerely as any man in that House the indecency and impropriety of reviling or scoffing at religion, still he was of opinion, that that prosecution was most injudiciously taken up, and that the verdict of the jury was perfectly right; because he was convinced, from the evidence and the arguments adduced (and the jury seemed to be convinced of the same thing), that it was not the wish or intention of the defendant to do that with which he was charged, namely, to defame and hold up to contempt the litany and religion of the country, any more than it was the intention of other persons who had published parodies on Shakspeare or other great poets to degrade or vilify them or their works. The learned lord had a little misapprehended what his noble friend had said on the subject. In stating how this prosecution might have been conducted, his noble friend's argument went, he thought, to show, that there would have been a better chance of succeeding in. convicting the defendant of publishing a seditious than of disseminating a blasphemous libel. This, however, had little to do with the subject then under discussion, on which, as a matter of much greater importance, he should proceed to deliver his sentiments, and endeavour to answer, if he could, some of the observations of the noble and learned lord who had just sat down. He was afraid that he could not do that justice to the question which he wished; but that circumstance was the less to be regretted, because his noble friend near him had left, him little to say in the way of argument. His arguments would, no doubt, be subjected to that sort of taunt which had been thrown out against those advanced by his noble and learned friend behind him. He would be told that they were weak and feeble. His opposition, he admitted, was generally feeble — much too feeble for what the importance of the case required, but feeble only from the defective powers of the person arguing, and not because the individual now delivering his sentiments did not think that this hideous code, as his noble friend had well described it, called not for the most earnest, the most anxious, and the most determined opposition of every man who wished well to the constitution of his country.— Part of the arguments of the noble and learned lord, he confessed, he did not well understand. He argued, first, on the position advanced by his noble friend (lord Holland), a position—which had been unanswerably stated by him—that it was a great and serious evil to be subject to the discretion of any individual. With respect to this position, the noble and learned lord proceeded to show that the judges were at present necessarily vested with a very extensive discretion. But, was the noble and learned lord prepared to state, that such a discretion was not an evil? was it not, on the contrary, the policy; of the law, and the spirit of the constitution of this country, to confine that discretion, where it could not be altogether removed, within the narrowest limits possible? If he could not prove the reverse of this position—and it appeared to him that the noble and learned lord could not dispute its correctness— what then was his argument good for? Would the noble and learned lord tell them, that the judges having at present a discretionary power to punish, in cases of blasphemous or seditious libels, with fine or imprisonment, or both; or that until an hon. and learned friend of his had had the punishment of the pillory repealed (a measure of which he highly approved), the judges, having, at their discretion, the right to inflict fine, imprisonment, or pillory, or all three, on persons guilty of publishing blasphemous or seditious libels—would the noble and learned lord tell them, that these were light and trivial matters, and, therefore, that it was necessary to grant a more extensive discretion, and to subject an individual offending to perpetual banishment from the united kingdom? that he should j for a civil offence suffer transportation, as if he were a common felon? that he should be chained with common felons in the hold of a transport-ship, and in that situation, be sent to a remote quarter of the globe? This was a fearful, appalling discretion to be placed in the hands of any judge—The noble lord who sat near him (lord Ellenborough), and who gave as much promise of ability as he had ever witnessed in a first, or, indeed, in any speech in that House, had observed, that blasphemy and sedition were the greatest crimes that could be committed against society, and called for, what every man of sound principles in the country must admit such offence merited, a just and sufficient punishment. No man could doubt the correctness of this sentiment. But the noble lord spoke as if sedition were so definite and precise a crime, that it could not be mistaken. He now called on the noble lord to define to him that which no act of parliament, no lawyer, no judge, had ever yet defined what was the exact nature of a seditious libel. In his opinion, the great evil of this bill was, that, for a crime the most indefinite that was known to the law of England, a discretion was given to the judges of inflicting a punishment which was heretofore only attached to offences of a felonious character. That, it should be observed, which might at one time, be considered seditious, at another period might be looked on as a laudable act; and, therefore, in legislating with reference to the offence, they could not guard, with too many securities, against the possibility of the law being made an instrument of oppression. A seditious libel, in the common acceptation of the word, was, as the noble lord had stated, a publication which tended to disturb the constitution of the country. Now, how many publications would bear that construction, in the minds of some persons, which would not be viewed in the same light by others? That which, at one time might be considered a laudable and just endeavour to stimulate the people to uphold the rights which they claimed under the constitution, by a vigorous defence of those rights from encroachment, might, at another, be stigmatised as a seditious attempt to disturb the legitimate course of the powers of government. Those publications would operate, and would be viewed, with reference to places, to times, and to circumstances. It was not uncommon to confound the interests of the constitution and the government of the country, with the interests of an administration; and in some parts of the country, remarkable for the warmth of their zeal, libels against his majesty's ministers might be considered an attempt to disturb the frame of government. In that case, a person twice convicted of such libels, would be subjected to this horrible punishment—transportation, perhaps for life, perhaps for a shorter term. This was a great, a serious evil, and ought not to be incurred, without the most decided proof of its absolute necessity. The country, it was said, was inundated with blasphemous and seditious libels. He could draw a very great distinction between the two offences. Blasphemous libels he looked upon as considerably more mischievous than those of a seditious character; but he did not think the danger to be apprehended from either was so great as had been represented. Let no person imagine that he wished to defend the circulation of such libels. He had no such object. In saying this, he meant to make no strong profession on the subject. He was merely desirous of claiming that degree of credit which every man's character and conduct in life entitled him to. Disapproving, as he did, of those publications—thinking, as he undoubtedly did, that they deserved punishment—still he was not one of those who believed, notwithstanding all the pains taken to circulate them, that they really were circulated to the extent that had been asserted. He did not think they had spread that foul taint over the morals of the country which the lord president of the council had ascribed to them. He believed, with his noble friend (lord Holland), that the people of England were a moral people, and that those who wished to obtain their confidence and favour by the dissemination of blasphemous libels would find themselves miserably deceived. He believed that, if any man entertained the desperate idea of proceeding in the object of a criminal ambition, he would effect his purpose sooner by exhibiting a fanatic and over-religious zeal, than by acting as an atheist and an unbeliever. Had their lordships no evidence on the subject? Let them examine the conduct of those persons whose designs were the most dreaded, and who stood most decidedly opposed to the government of this country. What was their conduct? What did their lordships see? Were those persons employed in actively defending those obnoxious publications? On the contrary, had they not, at public meetings, within these three days, disclaimed any connexion with those irreligious principles? Did they not feel it necessary to justify themselves, by disclaiming not only any participation in the sentiments of Paine (the recent disgusting proceedings respecting the remains of whom he would not even mention), but any knowledge of them, as they had not even read his work? If there were publications against the constitution and the government, the question was, whether the law now in being was not sufficiently strong to meet them, unless there was something in the conduct of government itself that weakened the effect of that law. He had listened with great attention to what the noble and learned lord had said on this part of the subject; He was a great authority in the law—possessing all its learning, most conversant in its practice, and capable, if ever man was, of informing and instructing others in its subtilties. And what did the noble and learned lord say? He told their lordships that he was quite confident in the correct and upright conduct of juries. Now, who believed that they had not done, and would not do, their duty? He went on to observe, that as the law now stood, every publication of a libel might be made the ground of a prosecution; and the punishment, by imprisonment on each conviction, pushed to such an extent, as to exceed the duration of any man's life-. Was not that power sufficient, if the law were prudently and vigorously administered, to put down the evil? A noble lord had observed, that the desire of amassing vile lucre was the great cause of those publications; Perhaps, the baser the motive in such; cases, the more worthy of punishment was the offender. But, if vile lucre was-the object of those who published blasphemous and seditious libels, could they be more severely punished than by mulcting them of the sum they had amassed? But the noble and learned lord, although he admitted that imprisonment might' be visited on persons convicted, to an extent beyond the duration of human life, declared that the law was insufficient. Had it, he demanded, been found insufficient? Had libels of this nature never been published before? Had prosecutions of this nature never occurred at any former period? Had no man, prior to this time, ever published libels, in which a wish to change the constitution was apparent? From the period of the Revolution downwards, when more zeal and more ability were manifested in the mode of conducting the press than perhaps it could boast at present, when the government was not firmly established, when those extraordinary aids which were now called for might have been demanded with a greater show of reason, then their ancestors relied on the existing laws, and, with their assistance, preserved that free constitution which the noble and learned lord had so highly praised—praises which he did not hear with pleasure, because they were too certain precursors of the inflic- tion of some wound on that constitution, the blessings of which were described in such warm language. With respect to Carlile, how long had he been allowed at his "Temple of Reason" to disseminate the poison of which the noble and learned lord had spoken? Why, he had been allowed to do so for years. But when a prosecution, properly conducted, was instituted against him, it ended in his. conviction; and such a punishment was. inflicted on him as must effectually ruin the man for ever. In the case of Mr. Hone, a subscription was entered into; and, God forbid that those persons who subscribed should be considered the less religious on that account! They subscribed, because they thought, as he did that Mr. Hope was the subject of an unjust prosecution, The case was not the same with respect to Carlile. He could not procure bail before judgment was pronounced on him; and ever since he had been found guilty he remained in prison. A heavy fine had also been imposed on him; and if he could not raise it, he would remain in prison for life. Besides, he was bound over to keep the peace, in very heavy penalties. It was highly probable that he would not be able to procure, the necessary securities, and until they, were forth coming, he must continue a prisoner. Was that alight power that could award such a sentenced were punishments of this nature light and trivial? He would maintain, that if the law. was duly administered, it, would render completely unnecessary such an enactment as that which was now before, their lordships. Let the House suppose an individual, whose anxious wish was to perform his duty to his country, and to enlighten his fellow subjects, but who, in doing so, excited a strong feeling against the measures of government—would it be a light matter to such a man, or could any person imagine that he could exercise the right which the British constitution gave him, of canvassing great public measures, if, on a second conviction for an undefined crime, it was in the discretion of a judge to cast him amongst felons in the hold of a transportship, and send him for seven years to Botany Bay? Those who argued in favour of this severe measure admitted that the liberty of the press was the main stay and support of the constitution; and yet, in their horror of its licentiousness, they were ready to destroy it altogether. At the commencement of the last century, under the government of king William, this country was exposed to infinitely greater danger than any which now threatened it. Was it not known, at that time, that a most active party was willing to support the claims of the exiled family? Was it not understood, that, assisted by the French, they were preparing for rebellion? Were not plots of assassination against king William constantly spoken of? It the present ministers had then been in power, what would they have said? They would have declared that those treasonous machinations that threatened the life of the monarch demanded new and extraordinary guards. "We must," they would have said, "no longer leave the life of the monarch—exposed to such dangers, nor must we leave the government open to the inroads which threaten it. It is necessary that we should alter the law of treason, and: give greater powers to the crown." Was that the plan of the ministers of that period? No; in that very year, when the assassination of the monarch was agreed on, the act relative to constructive treason was passed—that valuable act which gave additional security to the subject, but which, if ministers proceeded in their present course, acting on those new and extraordinary lights that appeared to have broken in upon them, they would, perhaps, in a short time, be called on to do away. The danger of legislating in this manner was self-evident. He asked of their lordships what was likely to be the consequence of the course in which they were now proceeding? He demanded, whether, for some years back, on every new occasion, when any passing danger seemed to threaten the country, the course had not been to grant new powers to the crown and government, whilst nothing whatever was done for the people—nothing to preserve their privileges—nothing to afford additional securities for the protection of their rights and liberties? Instead of that, some additional power was regularly given to the Crown, to coerce the people, and to keep them down more effectually. What could lead more to the corruption of the law, and the utter subversion of the constitution, than so unjust a line of conduct? This was the course that had been adopted for some time past, and which might be traced in the whole code of measures sanctioned and supported by his majesty's ministers—measures brought forward, not to put down the evil of the day, but to inflame and irritate the peo- ple, and ultimately to destroy those popular rights and privileges which were once the boast of this country.—He maintained, that the measure now proposed would not check or repress the evil; on the other hand, he conceived that it would very much inflame and increase it. It was impossible it could be otherwise. The fact might be demonstrated from what took place in the course of the last summer. They could judge from the papers on their table, whether the inflammation that existed in the north of England, prior to the 16th of August, was not greatly increased after the events of that day. Mr. Spooner, in his letter, stated that the evil had greatly subsided, that the people would not hear those inflammatory speeches which they had previously attended to, and that no apprehension of a rising need be entertained. Lord Fitzwilliam, in his letter, stated that the meetings were very much on the decrease. But it was notorious, that after the 16th of August, the meetings increased exceedingly, and the spirit by which the people were actuated became much worse. The same effect would be produced by those laws which they were unwisely and ineffectually pressing forward, and against which he would most earnestly, most sincerely, and most zealously raise his voice. He felt how strongly the tide of the House set against him; he knew that it was impossible for him to stem it but still he would perform his duty. He would not trouble the House much farther: he knew the bills must pass, in spite of all that he and his friends could do; and when that event had taken place, he felt that in future theirs must be a fruitless and unavailing opposition. He hoped the event would prove, that he had adopted a mistaken view of the subject. He trusted those measures would be found as the noble president of the council had stated they would, the best support of the constitution; and that discontent would be succeeded by returning affection, the zealous approbation, and the willing obedience of the people. This was his sincere desire, for he cherished no wish, public or private, except an anxious wish for the peace and prosperity of his country. But, conscientiously feeling that these measures were of a different character; that they had been unadvisedly brought forward by his majesty's government; and that the evils which they were meant to correct would, in fact, be increased by them, he felt it to be his sacred duty to raise his humble voice in opposition to them.

The Earl of Liverpool

said, that the noble earl who had just sat down had taken a view of this question which, if he could make it good, would cause this, and most of the other measures that had been proposed for their lordships consideration, to fall at once to the ground. The noble earl seemed to think, not only that the apprehensions entertained on that side of the House (indeed, he might say, on both sides of the House, with little exception) were unfounded, but he likewise appeared to consider that the special and particular danger which this bill was intended to provide against, might either be effectually met by the existing law, or might be looked on as an evil of which they need not entertain any serious apprehension. However different the opinions of the noble earl might be with respect to the present situation of the country from those held by the great majority of parliament and of the nation, he could venture to affirm, as far as his observation went, that there was no point on which his (the noble earl's) sentiments were so much at variance with public opinion, as on that which referred to blasphemous publications. He could safely assert, that amongst no rank of society, either the higher, the middle, or that part of the lower class who reflected on the subject— amongst no persons of any religious sect or persuasion, had he found a difference of opinion as to the danger of such publications, and the necessity and propriety of arresting those principles and putting down such works, if it were possible. The noble earl and other noble lords said, that he did not apprehend any danger from the dissemination of those blasphemous publications, because the people of England were a religious and a moral people. He was ready to admit that they were a religious people; but the question was, how long the lower orders would continue so, if those publications were allowed to go on? He and the noble earl saw this whole question through a very different medium; for, when he contemplated the whole subject of libel, under existing circumstances, and compared it with the state of libel at any former period in this country, he felt justified in saying, that such an evil never existed before. He admitted that, in all parts of their history, instances might be found of scandalous libels having been published by individuals. But two or three questions were connected with this subject. They must look not only to the nature of the libel which the libeller wrote, but they must also consider the effect it had, or was likely to have, on those to whom it was addressed. Of late years, circumstances, which tended to raise the country to the height of prosperity, and glory had occurred; but those circumstances, though highly beneficial, had also brought certain evils along with them. A greater extension of liberty than was ever before known in any part of the world, had, grown with the increase of knowledge. Let the House consider what was the state of parliament fifty or sixty years ago. It might not, perhaps, be exactly regular to notice the circumstance then, but perhaps he would be permitted to observe, as it formed a very strong ground of argument, that at the period he alluded to, the doors of parliament were shut against the people, and the public did not know what was passing within, their walls. What was the case now? The public were every day made acquainted with what parliament was doing, and their deliberations were made the subject of open comment—to such a degree,, and to such an extent, as in some measure to influence those deliberations. Let them look to the state of the press at the remote period to which he had referred. He was now speaking practically; and he believed it would be admitted, that the great means of acquiring information and knowledge, amongst the mass of the people, were to be found in periodical publications, which were produced daily, weekly, or monthly. On a former day, when this question was under discussion, he had said, "that, for aught he knew, there might be libels in Gibbons' History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" but that, if there were, no danger was to be apprehended from them." The case was, however, very different with respect to those periodical publications. Let the House compare their Increase at the present day with their number fifty, forty, thirty twenty, or even ten years ago, and they would discover that it was most enormous. When he saw cheap tracts circulated for half-pence and farthings, throughout the country, applying themselves to the worst and most dangerous passions of the people; when he remarked the decidedly licentious conduct of the press, and saw the number of libels which it daily sent forth, he could not help thinking that no fair comparison could be drawn between the state of things now, and what it was thirty or forty years ago. When he looked to this important subject—when he dissected and examined it in all its bearings, he considered the prosecution of libels, at the period he had mentioned, to have been almost unnecessary, for the evil at that time must be considered as nothing when compared with the state of things which at present existed, under the circumstances that he had detailed. But the noble earl seemed to imagine because the people of this country were a religious people, they could never be polluted by such publications. He was not ready to con-cede that point. They had witnessed the French revolution, and had seen the evil effect which irreligious publications had had in that country. But, said the noble earl, no public man, looking for popular favour, would attain his object by the dissemination of blasphemous publications. That might be the case now, but how long would it remain so, if they allowed such an unnatural state of things to continue? It was not on the mere narrow view of liberty or slavery that he considered this question; but this he would say, that if he was asked what was the most likely thing to introduce despotism into England, he would answer, the success of the machinations of those who disseminated these publications." What, he asked, would be their effect? That effect had been well described by the noble lord (the son of a man for whom he had ever entertained the greatest respect) to be, the taking away from all men, dignity and morality in life, and depriving them of hope and consolation in death. Such a system went to brutalize the human mind. Why were the men who made the most conspicuous figure during the reign of terror in the French revolution, worse than, those who appeared in the civil war in this country? Because amongst the latter there was ever a sense of religion; at all events, if they did not cherish it in their hearts, they were obliged to feign a respect for it. That would in any shape, or at any time, be some check on the actions of men. But the French revolution was produced by men who had no religion, and who proudly boasted that they had none— men who blasphemed their God and reviled every thing that was sacred. This was all attributed to the expansion of universal benevolence. But what was the effect of this horrible system? It brutalized the minds of the French nation— it deluged their country in blood—and produced scenes that filled the soul with horror. He, therefore, was not one of those who looked to these preservative measures—for so he would call them,—as calculated to lead to despotism. He would again assert, that, if ever this country arrived at such a melancholy situation, it would be effected by; brutalizing the feelings of the people, by driving from their minds all those principles of morality and religion by which the state was upheld, and the absence of which must produce disorders and tumults that would inevitably end in the ruin of all that was dear to them as men and christians. He therefore thought that the whole question, both with respect to this and the other bills, turned on this point—whether the description of the disorders which prevailed in the country was false. If it was the remedy of those imaginary evils must fall to the ground; but if it was true, then no man could contemplate it without feeling a strong desire for the enactment of measures that might correct so alarming a state of things.—He now came to the question of the principle of the bill before the House, as this was the stage to consider its principle. The bill, then, proceeded on an idea that the law as it at present stood was not sufficient of itself to repress blasphemous and seditious libels, and it therefore enacted more severe penalties. It introduced a new kind of punishment for the offence, by subjecting the offender, on a second conviction, to banishment or transportation at the discretion of the judge. The noble earl had strongly objected to the discretionary power to judges; and he concurred with, him so far as to admit, that when possible law ought to be so precise as to allow no discretion in the court by which it was administered. But in the case of libel this discretion had always existed. His noble and learned friend on the woolsack had shown that the judges always exercised in such cases a discretionary power, and that not long ago that discretion was more extensive than it would be made by the present bill. It had been said by the noble ear], that a seditious libel was an indefinite offence. He agreed that it was, and on that description founded the justification of the discretionary power intrusted to the judges. But the noble earl had mistaken his noble and learned friend on the woolsack. His noble and learned friend had not contended for larger discretionary powers in courts of justice; he had only mentioned that formerly, before the abolition of the ignominious punishment of the pillory in cases of misdemeanor, the punishment to which seditious libels were subjected was more revolting than that now proposed. A judge could at that time award fine to any amount, imprisonment to any duration, and, in addition to both, the punishment of the pillory. The latter was abolished by a bill introduced into the other House by an hon. and learned gentleman; and when it was brought to this House, he (lord Liverpool) concurred in its provisions, with an amendment which he proposed, and which was carried, still continuing the punishment of the pillory in cases of convictions for perjury. In that state it passed the House, and became a law. But how stood the case of a man convicted of libel before this bill was passed? He might not only be fined and imprisoned, but, in addition, be put in the pillory, and that not only for a seditious and blasphemous libel, but for any libel, and that, top, for the first offence; yet, when such a Revere law existed, there were no complaints uttered that the liberty of the press was destroyed—that no freedom of publication existed. In his idea, the pillory was a very unappropriate punishment for libel; but was it on this account never inflicted? Yes, it was. He had himself seen a person punished with pillory for a libel. The law therefore awarded a more degrading punishment at that time than was proposed by the present bill, whose severity was so much complained of. The noble earl had adverted to former times, and had said that in those times, even when the country was in the greatest danger of civil commotion, laws were passed, not contracting but extending the liberty of the subject. The noble earl had particularly referred to the reign of William 3rd. Did the noble earl recollect how frequently the Habeas Corpus act was suspended in that reign. He (lord Liverpool) allowed that a very important statute respecting treason had been adopted in that reign by the legislature. He would not enter into any detailed investigation of the circumstances which led to that proceeding. But it was well known that the complicated and intricate occurrences of those days, rendered it very intelligible why the different parties into which the kingdom was divided, were desirous that such a favourable law should pass. The fact was, that every age had its own dangers, and that every age must meet them with its own remedy. Whatever might be the dangers in the time of William, they were very different from those at present existing. At that period, the contest related to a sovereign with a disputed title to the throne; at present, the contest was of a very different character and principle. But he had already stated to their lordships in what he considered the present danger to exist; and he left it to them to determine whether the measure under their consideration was not indispensable to avert it. —In the course of the debate much had been said of the way in which it was probable the bill would operate on juries. He assured the House that he was always disposed to speak with great caution and reserve and respect, of the decisions of juries; at the same time, he could not admit that, of the decisions of the juries, which he was not prepared to admit, of the decisions of their lordships, or of the House of Commons. He could not admit that they were infallible: twelve men, however honest, might possibly be influenced by prejudice or passion; and he could not admit, that if in the fair estimate of an honourable man's mind, he came to a decision different from that of a jury, that he was precluded from saying so. He would not enter into the circumstances of the acquittal which had that night been alluded to: he would not pronounce it to be right or wrong. But this he would say—that, whether right or wrong, it materially aggravated the existing evil. That evil, however, would not have been so great as it proved to be, had it not been followed up by subscriptions, to which, he was sorry to say, some very respectable persons were induced (by motives, which he could not pretend to fathom) to contribute. To him this appeared to be a seriously unwarrantable transaction,—To revert, however, to the subject immediately before their lordships. His opinion was, that if the proposed bill was adopted by the legislature, it would have a great effect—not in preventing people from writing or publishing libels—for a much severer punishment than that which the bill contemplated, would not have that effect—but in making persons feel that a second offence might subject them to a severe punishment, and by rendering them consequently cautious.—When noble lords talked of their apprehension of arbitrary power, they should consider how much of late years the constituted authorities of the country had lost in respect. By some this had been attributed to what was called the corruption of the House of Commons. But could those who said so seriously consider such a cause as adequate to the production of such an effect? Let their lordships look at the bench of justice. All parties united in admiration of the conduct of the judges. From the accession of the present family to the throne, the judges, with perhaps not a single exception, had all proved themselves to be men of honourable and independent minds. So they were universally held to be at present. But did not their lordships observe the anti-judicial spirit that prevailed? Did they not observe, not only in the person brought before the highest tribunals for the most dangerous crimes, but in the audience, a special defiance of the jurisdiction of the country? Was that to be ascribed to the corruption of the House of Commons? Had that its root in the misconduct of ministers? Did it even proceed from compassion to the individual, in whose conduct no circumstance of aggravation was wanting Who could observe that species of defiance of law and authority, and not say, that over that law and that authority it was the duty of parliament to throw a shield? Under all these circumstances, he was persuaded that, although discretion should be avoided if unnecessary, it was in the case of such a serious offence as that in question, but fair, just, equitable and expedient to vest a certain discretion in the courts of justice;—a discretion which there could be no apprehension would be abused; and which might enable those courts, in particular instances, to adopt proceedings eminently conducive to the public good.

The Earl of Carnarvon

said, that the whole system of measures now proposed to parliament, appeared to him uncalled for and unjustifiable in the present state of their lordships information. The ministers of the Crown, had told the Houses that distress was the cause of the present danger, and that they expected that that distress would be merely temporary; but they were to meet that temporary danger and distress, by permanent restrictions upon liberty. His objection to them was, that the ministers of the Crown did not meet the difficulties of the country with appropriate remedies. When they called for new powers, they ought to have shown that they required them to answer the emergency. If they had dreaded to disclose their information, they might have said so, and called for the temporary confidence of parliament. If they had come down to that House, and stated upon their honour, that they had information which made measures of safety necessary, without being able fully to disclose that information, he would have been the first to grant them those powers; but he would not agree to alter permanently the constitution of the country on such facts and allegations as appeared in the papers on the table. To the present bill, as a permanent measure, he could not give his sanction, and he would move in the committee, that it be restricted to a short period. The law of libel was indefinite; any thing might be considered a seditious libel which included a censure, hot legal; on the character and conduct of the servants of the Crown; and every such censure was not legal, except when uttered in his place by a member of either House. A letter put into the post-office, reflecting upon the conduct of ministers, and given up to the public prosecutor, might be considered a seditious libel; and, on a second conviction for a similar letter, the author would render himself liable to transportation. Was this a punishment suitable to such an offence or such an offender? Did not this law, therefore destroy a great portion of our liberties, and, if rendered permanent, would their lordships not be accused of delivering the constitution impaired to their posterity? Nay, even a speech spoken in parliament, and reported to the world, might be construed into a libel, and the publisher, on conviction for a second offence, might be transported to Botany Bay. Would not this stop all discussion on the conduct of government, and prevent any strictures on the characters or measures of ministers, both in and out of parliament? For several years government had allowed seditious and blasphemous libels to pass with impunity. They had not put in force the existing law against them; and, having been guilty of this remissness, they suddenly called upon parliament to furnish the means of punishing libels with tenfold severity. He must Vote against the present bill, although he was not, in principle, opposed to all the insures that had been introduced, some of which, at least, if enacted for a time, might be very expedient But, affecting, as this measure did, that most valuable privilege, the liberty of the press, it should meet with his decided opposition.

The Earl of Blessington

said, that before minister visited seditious libels with such severity, they should define what seditious libels were. A noble lord had said, that any person who gave an opinion against the conduct of ministers, lent his weight to the disaffected. A peer of parliament, according to this doctrine, in discharging his duty, and fairly stating his, sentiments, might, by the present bill render himself liable to transportation. Until, therefore, he heard that it was not intended to be a permanent measure, it must have his decided opposition; and, until he heard from the noble secretary of state proposition's for conciliating the people as well as coercing them, he must oppose all the measures that had been recommended by government. Anxious as he was to see the Prince Regent enthroned, as he deserved to be, in the. hearts of the subject, he must again and again vote for an inquiry into the state of the country; in the hope, that at last, parliament would show the country, not only that they would protect the just rights of his majesty's peaceable subjects, but that by soothing 'measures (which alone ought in his opinion, to be adopted) they would silence the general expression of discontent.

The Duke of Sussex

begged to be allowed to make a few observations, in consequence of what had fallen from a noble earl on the subject of the education of the lower orders of society. He was quite sure that the noble earl did not mean any personal imputation. But being so much concerned as he was with others, in the superintendence of the education of the poor, he felt himself called upon to defend the system of schools which had been assailed—namely, the Lancasterian system. It was a system founded on the strictest principle of religion and morality. He could vouch for one particular fact, namely, that although children of different sects were admitted into the Lancasterian schools, every Monday morning they were examined to ascertain whether or not they had been to some place of worship or other; and when it was found that that had been neglected three times, the child was dis- missed. There could be no doubt that these institutions led to the increase of knowledge; and that, in fact, knowledge among the lover orders was increasing ten-fold, aye, a hundred-fold, every year. He had already told his majesty's ministers that he agreed to a part of their propositions. As to that under their lord-ships consideration, he protested against it in toto. He would tell them openly, candidly, and manfully, why. On an examination of the papers on the table, he saw that ministers were not ignorant of the state of the country, when parliament was prorogued in July last. If so, be put it to their lordships, whether it was consistent with the public tranquillity to allow them to separate? Referring also, to the various public libels which for so many years had remained unprosecuted, he maintained that ministers had not proved that they had made any one attempt to punish a libeller which had not succeeded. Until he was convinced that they had undertaken all they might have undertaken, he would resist additional powers. If the present grievance was attributable to the neglect of government, in the use of the powers already in their possession, he was the last man who would encourage neglect by granting an increase of power. He had stated his opinion on the present as he had done on other questions, with deference, and he trusted with the courtesy which was due from one nobleman to another.

The bill was then read a second time.