Lords Sitting of 21 March 1817

SEDITIOUS MEETINGS BILL.
The House went into a Committee on this bill. On the clause declaring a meeting of fifty persons or upwards, without previous notice by public advertisement, signed by seven householders, or a similar notice given to the clerk of the peace, to be an
*See 22 Howell's State Trials, 494.

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unlawful meeting, which might be dispersed after proclamation made by one or more justices, and enacting the punishment of death on these persons, to the number of twelve or more, who should remain after such proclamation made.
Lord Grenvillerecommended a new wording of some parts of the clause, in order to render it more clear, it being at present a matter of doubt whether the penalty of death might not apply to persons who formed no part of the original meeting, but who merely happened to be present at the expiration of the hour. He therefore wished words to be used, applying the penalty specifically to such persons having been present at the meeting who remained at the expiration of an hour; and to this offence, it being a direct resistance of the lawful authorities of the realm, he agreed that it was not improper to apply the punishment of death.
Lord Hollandthought that the penalty of death was by far too heavy a punishment to be inflicted under the circumstances described in the bill. This part of the clause was, he was aware, copied from the not act; but it should be recollected, that to constitute the offence described in that act, there must be, on the part of the persons assembled, some riotous acts. Under the present bill, there was no such qualification, as, for any thing that appeared on the face of it, persons merely remaining on the ground where the meeting was held, to the number of twelve or more, perhaps conversing about it, or ignorant of the law, might be subjected to the punishment of death. Considering this as by far too heavy a penalty for such an offence, he should move to substitute a lesser punishment.
Lord St. Johnobserved, that as the words at present stood, if the clerk of the peace, having received a notice of an intended meeting, signed by seven householders, neglected to communicate it to three magistrates, such meeting might be deemed an unlawful meeting under this bill, although the parties calling it had complied in every respect with the enactments of this clause, and the persons remaining as described might be subjected to the punishment of death. He objected also to giving power to one magistrate (whose mind might possibly be warped by passion or prejudice) to place persons assembled at a public meeting in a situation which might subject them to the punishment of death; and this too, perhaps
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under the circumstances he had described, where the meeting was actually legally assembled. Two magistrates were required to remove a pauper, and the whole magistracy of a county, sitting with all the judicial forms of a court, could not subject any individual to the punishment of death. Still less, he thought, ought it to be allowed to one magistrate to place persons at his discretion in such a situation that they might be liable to the penalty of death.
The Lord Chancellormaintained, that the clause never could be construed to mean that a meeting legally assembled, in consequence of a notice given by seven householders to the clerk of the peace, could be rendered illegal by the mere circumstance of the clerk of the peace not having communicated the notice to three magistrates. The clerk of the peace might be indictable for a neglect of his duty; but his not performing that duty could not render the meeting, of which due notice had been given to him, illegal. With regard to the punishment of death, he could only say, it was matter of notoriety that meetings had been lately held greatly endangering the public tranquillity, and those noble lords who thought that such meetings ought to be effectually put down, would, of course, vote for the punishment of death, whilst those who considered that such meetings only constituted a minor offence, would vote for a lesser punishment.
Lord St. Johnstill contended, that under the words of the clause, as it stood, the construction might be as he had stated it.
The Earl of Rosslyncertainly did not believe that any court of justice would sentence an individual to death, on account of the omission on the part of another person to do a certain act; but he contended, that the clause ought to be made more clear.
Lord Ellenboroughthought the clause quite clear as it stood, the persons attending the meetings not being responsible for any omission of duty on the part of the clerk of the peace, but he had no objection to any alteration that would make it more clear.
The Earl of Lauderdalesaid, there was no doubt that the words "in such case" used in the clause, would apply both to the notice given to the clerk of the peace, and the communication to be made of that notice by the clerk of the peace to

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three magistrates, and that thus a meeting might be declared unlawful, which was legally summoned.
The Lord Chancellorhad no doubt that a meeting legally summoned by a notice could not given to the clerk of the peace be rendered unlawful by the clerk of the peace neglecting to communicate that notice to three magistrates. He, however, would not object to an amendment that might render the clause more clear.
It was at length agreed to leave out the words "in such case."
Lord Holland Lord Holland moved, that the words "imposing the punishment of death" should be left out.
Lord Grenvillesaid, that if the act, in respect of which the punishment of death was imposed, had been the mere circumstance of going to an unlawful meeting, as his noble friend seemed to imagine, he admitted, that the punishment would be too severe; but it was not the going to the meeting, but the refusing to disperse, when commanded, that rendered the persons so disobeying liable to the punishment of death.
Lord Hollandwas perfectly aware that the act by which the penalty was incurred, was the sot dispersing, when commanded; but he repeated, that the punishment was infinitely too severe for the mere act of peaceably remaining. In the case of the not act, the penalty was incurred, not by the mere act of remaining, but by that of remaining riotously and tumultuously. He thought the punishment of death too severe for any of the offences described in these clauses; but here it was glaringly disproportionate to the crime. It was not analogous to the punishments imposed in other cases. A smuggler unarmed might, without incurring this penalty, do acts which, if done by an armed smuggler would render him liable to this punishment.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, there was a distinction certainly between an unlawful assembly and a riotous or routous assembly; but, under the present circumstances, the punishment of death ought to be here retained.
The amendment was negatived.
Lord Erskinerose on the clause relative to the holding of any meeting, the notice for which should purport that any matter or thing by law established may be altered otherwise than by the authority of King, Lords, and Commons, in parliament assembled; or tend to incite or stir up the people to hatred or contempt of his majes-
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ty, his heirs, or successors, or of the government and constitution of the realm, as by law established. He considered this clause as involving two offences of different descriptions. The first which was contained in the notice was punishable as libel on its publication; and with respect to both, to give any justice of the peace the power of determining what is or is not libel, was a greater power than was given to any judge. It was true, also, with regard to the second branch of the clause, that whatever had a tendency to excite hatred and contempt of his majesty, his heirs or successors, was a libel, and punishable by law: but to say when words spoken, or a paper published, may or may not have that tendency, was not left to his noble friend who presided in the court of King's-Bench. It was indeed his duty to state his opinion, as to their being a libel or not; but it was for the jury finally to decide. If at a meeting it was proposed to alter any thing, otherwise than by the consent of the King, Lords, and Commons, that was a matter of fact of which any magistrate could judge; and the sooner such a meeting was dispersed the better; but whether certain words might have a tendency to incite to hatred and contempt, was matter of opinion; and as the final decision on questions of opinion was not left to judges, it would thus be in the power of a single justice to construe words which might relate merely to the defects in the representation of the other House of parliament into libel, and to exercise an arbitrary power of punishment. Under such authority no meetings could be safely held, except Quaker meetings. No man reprobated more than he did those violent attacks which had been made in certain assemblies on the character of parliament. He condemned them, both on account of their violence, and of their tendency to place at fearful distance all due consideration of that most serious and important question, reform. With regard to the wording of the clause, it was absurd to suppose that such a notice could be given for a meeting as to alter any thing otherwise than by the consent of King, Lords, and Commons. Did any person ever hear of such a notice? That where there was disease it was right to apply a cure he was ready to admit; but here the cure was unnecessary, as a remedy was already provided by the due course of law.
Lord Hollandobjected to the clause on the ground of its inconsistency. It was a

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libel on the government of the country to suppose that crimes went unpunished; which it was to be presumed was the case from the wording of this clause. If such a notice as that contemplated in the clause were given, it would be the duty of his majesty's government to order a prosecution. Another very serious consideration was, that persons might assemble under a notice, which having passed through all the regular forms required by the law, might appear to them legal, yet those persons thus assembled would be liable to the same punishment as those who framed the notice.
Lord Grenvillecould not but admit that two very distinct things were mixed up in this clause; but he by no means thought the giving of a notice of the description in question so very improbable a case as his noble friends had supposed. If he was not deceived, he had in his time seen a convention sitting in this country under a notice which had for its object to alter things established by law, otherwise than by the consent of King, Lords, and Commons. He therefore, thought that means should be adopted to counteract notices of the kind referred to in the clause. At the same time he thought it right, that an assembly, which might be so called together, should not be misled as to their situation. With a view to the precautionary purposes of the bill before their lordships, it was a fair question whether it might not be proper to legalize notices, which would otherwise be illegal: but, then, it would be proper to provide, that the persons giving such notice should still be liable to be proceeded against by due course of law. On the other hand, the situation of persons who might be misled under the sanction which the law gave, ought not to be overlooked; and it were to be wished that some mode should be devised of cautioning people against attending such illegal assemblies. He had considered this subject, but had not discovered any mode of attaining the object he had stated which was satisfactory to his own mind.
Lord Ellenboroughwas of opinion that the authority given to a single justice of the peace was not of the nature his noble and learned friend had described it to be. It did not constitute the magistrate a judge of libel, nor invest him with a power of punishment. It only gave him the power of dispersing the meeting: whether what had been spoken or published was libellous, was a ques-
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tion to be afterwards determined. Under the circumstances of the case some power must be given; and what less power could be given in a crisis of urgency and probable mischief, than that of dispersing a meeting from which danger might be apprehended?
The Earl of Lauderdaleobjected to the clause. It implied, on the face of it, that the existing laws were not executed; and if the bill passed in its present form, it would amount to a declaration, that the legislature suspected that the magistrates of the country did not do their duty.
The Lord Chancellordid not conceive the clause to be liable to the objections which had been urged against it. If, however, any words could be suggested to make it clearer, or to remove the scruples of noble lords, either by a provision for making the persons who issued the notice liable to be prosecuted by a due course at law, which they certainly were as the clause now stood; or for preventing persons from being so far misled, as to assemble under the notice, or for both of those objects, such alteration might be made by way of rider, on the third reading of the bill. With respect to the possibility of a notice of the nature referred to in the clause, he agreed that it was not so very improbable an occurrence as some noble lords had supposed. Indeed, he had seen a notice for a meeting, in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, previous to the 2d of December, which was of a highly blameable nature. It was true, as his noble and learned friend had said, that the notice might be made the subject of prosecution on its being issued, and the persons signing it brought to punishment: but in the mean time the meeting would be held. Before even instructions could be given to an attorney to proceed, all the mischief, which it was the object of the clause to prevent, might be completed. No more power, then, was given than was absolutely necessary at a time like the present, when wicked and artful men were seeking, by speeches and publications, to undermine the principles of the people; because they knew that, unless they first succeeded in shaking the morality and religion of the country, and banishing the best feelings which glowed in British hearts, they could not hope to overthrow the constitution. With regard to the act for the suspension of the Ha-

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beas Corpus, which a noble lord opposite had considered as aggravating the enactments of the present bill, he must observe, that that act did not deprive persons of the right of being bailed, except in cases of committal on charges of high treason and treasonable practices. In the present state of things, no precautionary measures had been adopted beyond what was absolutely necessary. If a system was acted upon in the country, tending to make public meetings a means of overturning the government, the persons having such object in view, would laugh at the punishment of their notices by the usual course of law. No feeble measures would do. If their lordships thought it right, that the religion and morality of the country should be destroyed, and the government disrespected, they would leave the law as it now stood. If, on the contrary, they wished to secure the inestimable blessings the country enjoyed, they would not hesitate to invest the magistrates with the stronger powers proposed to be given by the bill, in so doing, they would only imitate what had often been done by their ancestors, namely, to suspend their liberties for a short time, in order to have the full enjoyment of them for ever after.
Lord Hollanddid not see how the particular powers given by this clause, and defended by the learned lord, were necessary. He entirely dissented from the clause which gave one magistrate, merely upon his own discretion, authority to disperse a meeting.
Lord Erskinewas of the same opinion. When a notice was altogether unexceptionable, the meeting that assembled in the terms of it ought not to be dispersed merely because a magistrate, in his zeal or ignorance, might think that it entered into discussions which to him might appear dangerous.
The Earl of Lauderdalesuggested, that some alteration should be made in the clause that related to the giving of lectures. By the bill as it stood, any person giving lectures on philosophical subjects, without licence, would be liable to a penalty of 20 l., and this licence might be refused by the magistrates. In Edinburgh, where the magistrates were patrons of the university, and where they might be supposed to view with some jealousy any rival institution for instruction, they might refuse a licence to a lecturer; and, if he proceeded to discuss philosophical sub-
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jects afterwards, to give lectures on anatomy, on chemistry, or any other science, both he and his pupils would be subject to the penalties of the act.
Lord Sidmouthanswered, that the penalties would not apply.
The House resumed, and the report was ordered to be received on Monday.