Lords Sitting of 30 June 1817

ABOLITION AND COMPENSATION OFFICES BILLS.
The order of the day being read,
The Earl of Liverpoolproceeded to state the general ground upon which these bills rested. Their lordships would observe, that these bills, including the compensation bill, were to be considered as one measure. A bill of a nature somewhat similar, he was aware, had come to that House before; and if a bill were to come now in such a shape, he would undoubtedly oppose it. He did not mean to say that there were not in that bill some valuable regulations; but that bill consolidated all sinecures, judicial and political, and went to abolish some most efficient offices. It adopted one of the most extravagant principles of compensation that could be conceived. It classed the office of clerk of the pells with that of the lord privy seal, and was full of absurdities from beginning to end. The principle upon which he recommended these bills to their lordships attention was this—that whatever regulation of this kind might be adopted, there was a necessity for reserving to the Crown the means of rewarding public services; and he certainly would not have

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voted for these bills if that had not been attended to. His opinion was, that if the Crown were deprived of the means of rewarding public services, the democratic part of the constitution would be chiefly injured. The principal offices in the state would then be confined to a few persons; and men of talents and honourable ambition, without fortune, would be excluded. If they looked at those who had, for the most part, held the principal offices, and discharged the duties of those offices with the greatest advantage to the country, they would find that they were men of the latter description; he would say nothing as to the living; he would mention only the dead—Pelham, Grenville, the two Pitts, the ancestors of two noble barons not now in the House, and the late Mr. Perceval, whose memory he should ever honour and venerate both as a minister and a man. It would appear the more important that such means of rewarding political services should be reserved to the Crown, when they considered the inadequacy of the salaries of the highest offices in the state. He appealed to noble lords on both sides of the House for the correctness of the assertion, when he said that the salaries of the highest offices were not more than half sufficient to meet the expenses attending them, with whatever moderation a person holding such office chose to live. He did not, however, mean to say, that it was expedient to augment the salaries of these offices; for it they were to be augmented, they must be so for men of large fortune as well as for those without fortune; and the result was this—that the best arrangement, even with a view to economy, was to reserve to the Crown the means of rewarding political services.—Having thus explained the first principle upon which he supported this measure, he now proceeded to the second, which was, that the rewarding of public services ought generally to rest with the Crown, instead of being left to parliament. For a period of 50 years past it had not been the general practice of parliament to reward political services during the life of any individual who might be thought deserving of such a reward. In some cases parliament had granted money to pay the debts of meritorious persons of this description after their death; and, in the particular cases of lord Chatham and Mr. Burke, had departed from its general practice of not rewarding political services during the lives of the individuals. But if it
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were the general practice of parliament to reward political services by grants of money during the lives of the individuals, to what abuses would such a practice not be liable? If some partiality in these cases appeared on the part of the Crown, that objection would apply in a much greater degree to parliamentary grants. A certain number of offices had been before at the disposal of the Crown, and they knew the precise extent to which the Crown could go. Under these bills they would have the same advantage, as the amount of pensions was limited: but the public would have no such security if the matter were left to parliament. Suppose any abuse of the power to exist on the part of the Crown, the extent of the power and of the abuse was limited; but it was otherwise with parliament. From what he himself had seen, the last thing he would propose would be to intrust the consideration in this view of particular cases to large bodies. Any one who had been but half the time in parliament that he had sat there, could not but agree with him in this. The best arrangement, therefore, was, to give the Crown the power of rewarding political services, to be exercised on the responsibility of ministers; and then, supposing the power to be in some cases abused, they would know the full extent to which abuse could be carried. Upon these two principles, therefore, 1st, that the means of rewarding public services should still be reserved, and 2dly, that these means should be at the disposal of the Crown, he ventured to recommend these bills to the consideration of their lordships.—As to the offices of auditor and teller of the exchequer, they were not sinecures, but important parts of the administration of the court of exchequer. He did not know whether, in the original formation of this court, these offices could or could not have been with propriety omitted; but he knew that no one had ever ventured to bring forward a bill for their abolition, and that they had been acknowledged to be useful through a series of successive acts of parliament; but he would freely say, that the very circumstance of their not being sinecures afforded a reason for not considering them as political offices, and for placing them exactly on the footing of other offices of public account: he meant, that those who held them should be entirely disconnected with politics, and should be obliged to attend to their duties in person. Several

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instances, illustrating the propriety of such a change, must occur to their lordships, and one was too recent, to have escaped the observation of any of them. He alluded to the case of a noble baron (Grenville) who, after having for several years formerly usefully served the Crown, was rewarded with the office of auditor of the exchequer. No man was ever more properly rewarded; and yet what an awkwardness resulted from this very reward, when the same noble baron was afterwards made first lord of the treasury, an awkwardness which would not have existed if his services had been rewarded by a pension. The offices of tellers of the exchequer had already been regulated by law, as far as their profits went; and one noble lord had acted most handsomely in coming forward, voluntarily, and anticipating the future effect of the law. The great, and, in some intances, immense profits accruing to the possessors of these offices, rendered them peculiarly unfit to be the rewards of political services; and that, because they had become, and were liable to be at all times, great sources of political discontent.—A kind of objection had been raised, that the holders of these offices would be less independent under the new act than under the former practice, because they would no longer hold under the Crown, but of the administration. The contrary was the fact; for these offices had never been given by the Crown, but were in the patronage of the chancellor of the exchequer. As to the sinecures-bill, it was fit that they should be given up; and on two grounds, first, that the Crown should have the power of rewarding services by direct, instead of indirect, compensation; secondly, because the abolition would do away a great deal of the unreasonable prejudice and discontent existing on this point. The compensation-bill stood on a better footing than a measure formerly brought forward with similar views; for that plan would have lodged in the Crown an unlimited power of granting pensions, whereas the present bill would confine that power within reasonable limits. There would always be considerable doubt as to the claims of public men, and therefore that would be the least objectionable scale of remuneration, which should require a certain definite period of service, in addition to the faithful discharge of that service; especially when this plan would be the least burthensome to the country. That this would be
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the case appeared from this—that the first class of the pensions would not consist of more than seven persons of 3,000 l. per year each; and the second class, though comprehending more pensioners, would not at the utmost cost more than 43,000 l. and on the average not more than 30,000 l., The saving to the country thus effected, would be about 100,000 l. a year; but this was but an incidental advantage compared, to the principle of the thing, which was the more excellent, inasmuch as it left the prerogative untouched, while it would tend to exalt the character of public men and would thus be a great benefit both to the Crown and people. In the course of his own possession of the office which he now held, he had given away but one of these large sinecures, and that was to the son of the late Mr. Perceval, a gift which, he trusted, must have afforded general satisfaction; but it was seldom that a case so generally approved of could arise. For his own part, he would be the last person to bring such a measure before the House, unless he felt convinced that it would leave unimpaired the dignity of the Crown, that it would elevate public men in public opinion, and that in fact, it was doing away with that which, however sanctioned by time and experience, ought to have been done away long ago.
The Earl of Lauderdalerose to oppose all the measures before the House. When he recollected the discussions and decisions that had taken place in 1812 and 1813 on the same subject as that now under consideration, he could not for a moment doubt what would now be the determination of their lordships on this question. The noble earl had laboured to show that the bills on the table were very different from the measure formerly proposed, but he saw no reason for so considering them. Indeed, the only ground on which their lordships were called to agree to these bills; the only information they had before them whereby to form an opinion—namely, the report of the other House of parliament—sat out with declaring, that the subject was by no means new; that the measures proposed were entirely the same as those of 1812 and 1813. The noble earl had stated, that these offices were such as ought not to be applied to the reward of political services; but this was not the noble earl's opinion on the former discussions, and he should be glad to know how these offices, which the noble earl held to be perfectly fit, as political

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recompenses in 1812, should have become unfit for that purpose now. The noble earl had alluded to what had occurred respecting the office of auditor of the exchequer; but that circumstance had taken place so far back as 1807; yet in 1813, when the abolition bill was discussed by their lordships, the noble earl never said a word on the subject of that office. How came he to overlook it then, and to consider it so very important a topic now? But the noble earl does not say that inconvenience had arisen from this office being held by a person who became first lord of the treasury; he only supposes that some may occur. The truth, however, was, that no inconvenience could arise. In 1807 an attempt was made by those who sought popularity, to make a run against the minister on this subject, but it completely failed.—Another reason the noble lord had assigned for supporting these bills was, that the emoluments of some of the offices had proved much greater than was originally intended. But this circumstance existed more strongly in 1812, and was equally well known to the noble earl then as now; but at that time he did not think it any reason for agreeing to the abolition bill. The noble earl had spoken of a noble marquis who had given up some of the emoluments of his office. He thought, however, that that noble marquis was by no means called upon so to act. The office was given as a reward for the meritorious services of the noble earl's father, and he was justly entitled to all it produced; but it was curious enough, that the noble secretary of state should be anxious for doing away such offices in proportion as their income was diminished. In 1812, when the emoluments were great, he was for preserving them. In 1817, when the emoluments are reduced, he thinks they ought to be abolished. He knew that, at the assemblies in Spa-fields, and other meetings which had greatly alarmed some of their lordships, the offices of lord Camden, and a noble lord on the cross bench (Arden), had been made important topics of acclamation. Was it that sort of popular clamour which had induced the noble secretary of state to change his opinion? Reverting to the grounds on which this measure was proposed, he must insist that it was most frivolous and inconclusive. The committee, it appeared, was appointed to consider of the revenue and expenditure of the country; and, on reading the recommendation given
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to the committee, no person would suppose that the proposing a measure of this kind could have been the result of their labours. At a time when it was admitted that the annual deficiency in the revenue amounted to fifteen millions, it was perfectly ridiculous to talk of the paltry saving which would be produced by the abolition of the offices in question. Their lordships would recollect, that they had already refused to abolish the offices of chief justice in Eyre: these offices, however, the committee of the House of Commons had proposed to abolish, without assigning any new ground whatever. If the report had mentioned any abuse with respect to the appointment to these offices, something like a ground for a change of opinion would have been laid; but all that the committee of the other House says is, that "they have taken a view that these places ought to be abolished." To which their lordships might answer, that in 1812 they also took a view that the same places ought to be continued. But it was curious enough, that this view taken by the committee, was not only a reason for abolishing these two offices, but several others; for, because they have taken a view of the offices of chief justices in Eyre, north and south of Trent, they come to the conclusion, that the offices of clerk of the pells, the four tellers of the exchequer, the auditor of the exchequer, the warden of the cinque-ports, and the governor of the Isle of Wight should be abolished. Unless their lordships were supposed to be idiots, they could not be expected to be convinced by such reasoning as this. The noble earl had stated that such of these offices as required duties to be executed should be regarded as offices connected with the management of the public accounts and in no way political. In this opinion the noble earl concurs with the committee, but he seemed to have forgotten, that some of these offices were places of great trust and responsibility, and ought therefore to be held by persons of high station and rank. Those who supported the present question must do it either upon the supposition that these abolitions would diminish an improper influence of the Crown, or that they would be advantageous in the way of economy. Much had been done in the present reign, in the way of diminishing the influence of the Crown in parliament, without having produced any beneficial effect to the public. No less than 72 offices had been abolished and 39 re-

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gulated. In early life he had acted conscientiously with Mr. Burke, in the bills he brought in on this subject; but he had since had reason to think that he then acted on erroneous views. He had on a former occasion shown, that during the administration of sir Robert Walpole there were 118 more placemen in the House of Commons than at present, and yet public liberty was more secure at that time than it was now. The taking away these offices was with him a cause of alarm, when he considered the power of the Crown over the administration of an enormous revenue, in creating peers in that House, and in making peace and war. With all these powers undiminished, the influence of the Crown must necessarily be exercised in a manner much more disadvantageous to the public interest than it was during the existence of the numerous offices which had been abolished. These offices were the channels through which the influence of the Crown was formerly exercised. Since their abolition, ministers had sought for agents of another description, and to that was, in a great degree, to be attributed the enormous war expenditures which the country had sustained. Were the emoluments of these places to be in any degree compared with the debt contracted in one year of war? And was it prudent to place men in circumstances in which they must be exposed to such a temptation? In sir R. Walpole's time, the country had sustained no injury from the House of Commons being crowded with placemen; but let their lordships look at the present situation of this and the other House, and recollect the numerous expensive wars that have been undertaken, and then ask themselves what benefit was likely to arise from the abolition of places? He opposed the measure, because he was convinced its effect would be to increase the influence of the Crown in its most baneful direction. He was sensible that it was dangerous to increase the influence of the Crown, but there was a salutary influence of which it ought never to be deprived. Much had been said on the necessity of keeping the other House of parliament free of any influence, and their lordships House also free, and each House independent of the other. All this was very fine in theory; but if reduced to practice, it would make the British constitution the worst that ever existed. It was absolutely necessary that the three branches of our government should have an intimate connexion with,
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and dependence on, each other. In the best times of the constitution, the influence of the Crown had been greater than at present. It was remarkable, that the economical reformers, with whom measures of this sort originated, never seemed to think of the evil consequences of the influence possessed by the Crown in the management and collection of an immense revenue: they wished to abridge that influence which was exercised through the medium of rank and property, and increase it in the most pernicious way in which the influence of a government can exist. He could not but deeply deprecate measures which forced ministers to go to the middling and lower classes to exercise directly among them that influence which formerly used to be obtained indirectly, through the medium of persons of fortune and distinction. The influence was now applied to persons in the most dependent situations, who looked to it for the means of existence, and who were of course incapable of resisting official temptations. On this subject it was necessary to speak out. Before the alteration in our system was produced by the abolition of places, ministers never, except on occasions of great importance, found any difficulty in carrying on the public business in the House of Commons. Now, on the contrary, there were always abundance of gentlemen ready for opposition on every question, to the great inconvenience of the government, and very seldom in any degree to the advantage of the country. The consequence of this practice was, that the men who were responsible for their conduct were constantly obliged to regulate themselves by the proceedings of those who were in no way responsible for what they said or did. For these reasons he was induced to give his opposition to the motion.
The Earl of Harrowbycould not agree with the inference of the noble earl, that because his noble friend had voted against the abolitions proposed in 1812, he ought to vote against those now under consideration. In the present case, the measure had assumed a very different shape: formerly, all that was to be done was proposed in one bill; now, the measures were brought distinctly forward, and could be considered separately. The nature of the compensation was also different. The noble earl had stated, that the reason why sir Robert Walpole had no wars was because the influence of the Crown was in his time great and that the reason there had been

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many wars since was, because that influence was diminished. This was a proposition which, in his opinion, required only to be stated to show its absurdity. The noble earl's argument went to show that the influence of the Crown ought to be exercised through other channels than those in which it was at present directed; but he ought to consider, that a complete change of opinion had taken place in the country as to the manner in which that influence ought to operate. Within the last 30 years there had certainly been about 30 offices taken away; but they were either offices in which no business was done, or such as had been greatly overpaid. The real difference therefore was, that while those offices in which no business was done were abolished, those of actual business were increased. It was absurd to say that they should all continue to exist. The clamour of the Spa-fields meetings, or of any assemblages of that description, was not to be regarded; but he believed that the measure now before their lordships had the approbation of all the loyal and well-disposed part of the community.
Lord Redesdalesaw nothing in this new measure to induce him to alter the opinion he had formerly expressed on the subject of sinecures: he thought the principle destructive even of a part of the constitution, and rendered the king the only person in his realm who was incapable of conferring a personal favour. The principal objection urged in 1812 and 1813 was, that the House was not sufficiently informed upon the question; that objection had prevailed; and what new lights had since been procured to lead to any other conclusion? With regard to sinecures, he admitted, that the important duties formerly connected with the offices had not of late years been executed, but at any future period the individuals holding those places might be called upon to fulfil them. Some of them had high judicial functions annexed to them; and would the House consent that they should be assigned over, on the sudden, and without investigation, to the department of the woods and forests, which itself had been much misrepresented? Never had a more unjust cry been raised against any thing than against the forest-laws of this country, which were peculiarly favourable to liberty, when rightly understood. The office of chief-justice in eyre fell under the same consideration as other places mentioned with it. One of the principal provisions
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of the bill was the abolition of the offices of teller and auditor of the Exchequer, which had been originally instituted for the control of the Treasury; yet now, by a singular perversion of the system, the deputies (who in future were to discharge all the functions) were to be made subject and subservient to the lords of the Treasury. His lordship concluded by warning the House not to yield to popular clamour. It was the duty of parliament to listen to the wishes of the people, calmly and soberly expressed; but it was equally its duty to submit to nothing that bore the appearance of intimidation.
Earl Grosvenorsaid, that the question had been frequently discussed, both on principle and in detail; but at present the House was not prepared to enter minutely into the particulars of the measure. He rejoiced that the bill now came forward under more favourable auspices; not indeed that any praise was due to ministers, or to himself and those who had persevered in calling the attention of parliament to the subject; the credit belonged to the nation, who, with one voice, now claimed that sinecures should be abolished. The House was not indebted for the measure to popular clamour, which one noble lord had censured, but to the good sense of the country, expressed in every petition laid upon the table for a redress of grievances. He objected to the clause of compensation, which he saw in the bill before the House. The pension list at present amounted to 230,000 l. and he did not see any reason for casting new burdens upon the people. One noble earl had argued, that this measure rather increased than diminished the influence of the Crown; but, at least, it diminished, on the whole, the weight which the nation had to sustain. The influence of the Crown had, indeed, of late years, most lamentably spread into all the employments of life—no place was free from its visitation, and that chiefly from the immense enlargement of the revenue;—it
"Lives thro' all life, extends thro' all extent,
"Spreads undivided, operates unspent."
Yet even allowing that the bill augmented the influence for the present, that influence could only be of short duration; it would not be hereditary, as was now not unfrequently the case.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that if the noble earl supposed that the present bill was at all like that of 1812 and 1813, he was most egregiously mistaken,—there was

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not the slightest similarity. He had preserved the bill of 1812 and 1813 as one of the greatest legislative curiosities ever exposed in a house of parliament; and he would venture to assert, that in the course of 50 centuries, so much absolute nonsense would not be brought forward. Such a parade of miserable jargon never before defaced parliamentary parchment. Some noble lords had referred to the authorities of sir M. Hale and lord Coke; but he wished the noble earl who spoke last to consider what those two great men would have said upon certain grants of land and valuable leases, whether they were not in reality the greatest sinecures in the country.
Lord Erskinewarned the House against the augmenting power and weight in the balance of the constitution which the other House of parliament was acquiring, and which was exemplified by the fact, that it had the power of removing any minister the Crown thought I fit to appoint. Above all, their lordships ought to take care that it did not improperly yield, because the other House, session after session, besieged it with the same bills, or at least with bills having the same principle. It was necessary first to inquire who made the demand that sine-cures should be abolished, and next, what was the precise nature and object of that demand? If both these were examined, it would be found that there was no pretence for the measure now submitted. There was a wide difference between complying with the wishes of the people in reasonable matters, and suddenly consenting to such an alteration of the fixed constitution as deprived the king of a power he had hitherto at all times possessed. He called the attention of the House to the distinction between mere pensions, and offices of high dignity for the reward of distinguished services; and compared the latter to architectural ornaments, which, while they increased the beauty, in fact also added to the strength and solidity of the edifice. He argued that, if sinecures were abolished the people would not in fact be gainers, as the fees of the offices would not be diminished. Considering the power the House of Commons possessed, it was necessary that the Crown should possess a certain degree of influence and weight among the leading individuals of the realm.
Lord Ardenwas sorry he could not concur in the principle of the bill. He considered sinecures as a means vested in
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the Crown for repairing the misfortunes of noble families, torn and destroyed by the injuries of time. The present bill went entirely to deprive the Crown of those means, and to substitute nothing for them. He had no doubt his noble friends were actuated by honourable motives; but in this instance the interest of ministers was in direct opposition to that of the Crown. Viewing the bill as operating a great change in the condition of the Crown, he could not conceive how the House could accede to such a measure, and he thought that they had not shown the throne due respect in countenancing it so far.
Earl Bathurst, in reply to the objection that this bill went to take offices out of the gift of the Crown, observed, that it was unconstitutional to suppose that the Crown would dispose of any office without an accompanying responsibility; but the offices of auditor of the Exchequer and clerk of the pells were not in the gift of the Crown, but in that of the Treasury. As to the objection, that pensions, being a matter of right, would call for no gratitude from the objects of such bounty, this might have been so under the former bill; but at present the number of pensions being limited, the Crown would exercise a selection, and the objects of such selection must always be beholden for the preference.
The House then divided on the question, that the bill be committed:—Contents, 27; Not-contents, 7. The bill then passed through the committee.