MALT AND PENSIONS DUTIES BILL. (Hansard, 28 February 1817)

§ Lord Redesdale
rose, pursuant to notice, to propose an amendment. The bill he said, contained a clause of a very peculiar description, stating, that whereas his royal highness the Prince Regent, and many persons holding public offices, were desirous of contributing a certain proportion of the incomes derived from these offices, towards the public service, it was enacted, that it should be lawful to give the proper instructions to the officers of the exchequer to receive such contributions, &c.^* The clause purported to legalize the receiving of voluntary contributions from persons holding offices and pensions, &c^* The words were extensive, and not so precise as If this were an enactment on which it might be necessary to issue exchequer process. The contributions were to be voluntary; but then they would be voluntary only in the sense in which the contribution for beer-money was formerly raised among their lordships servants. If any one refused he was hooted, and it was by this process of hooting that the present tax was to be levied. If there had been no other objection but that which he had just mentioned to this partial tax, he would oppose it. For his own part, when it was proposed to continue the property-tax he had voted for its continuance, and would cheerfully have paid his proportion; but he would not be taxed in this way out of a part of his income— he would not be hooted out of his money: and he trusted that others would not be induced to be taxed in this way under pretence of a voluntary contribution, The description would include those who had pensions for the most meritorious services—the Marlboroughs, Nelsons, and St. Vincents. Were these to be held out as ill-disposed persons in case they did not choose to contribute to this forced loan? The description would extend to many others. Mr. Palmer, for instance, had an ^* See the Clause at p. 441. 776 allowance for services in the post office, and was he to be thus taxed? If the words were to be taken in their fullest sense, they would include every sort of emolument derived from the public. They would extend to the fundholder, to the loan-contractor, and every other description of public contractor. It was neither more nor less than a partial property-tax. A general property-tax he had supported; but he would resist this tax, and would not yield to the only way in which it could be enforced. It might be said, that the words were to be understood more strictly; but though this were admitted they who were clearly comprehended were most unjustly dealt by. What were these salaries?—the property of the holders: and why should those who were employed in the public service be taxed more than others? A cotton manufacturer, devoting his exertions to his own individual advantage, might perhaps realize a property to the extent of a million, while the person who held the situation of first minister of the country could not save a shilling. Had the duke of Newcastle, who had for some time served the public, whether well or ill was not the question, realized a fortune. by such service? He had, on the contrary, sacrificed, or materially injured, a princely fortune. Did lord Chatham make a fortune by his public services? Did lord North save money while in office? He happened to know something of lord North's private circumstances, and knew that he had injured his fortune. The late Mr. Pitt, when he accepted office, was rising in the law. He (lord Redesdale) remonstrated with him on that occasion, and advised him not to abandon his profession, in which he was sure to realize as much as would make him perfectly independent. His answer was, that the advice was too late. He accepted office, ruined himself, and died a beggar, and all that the public gave him was a public funeral. He had himself been in laborious offices for thirteen years, and had rather lost money than gained by his services. A noble lord (Erskine) not now in his place, had given up a very lucrative practice, and accepted the chancellorship, and held the office for twelve months, and then retired upon an annuity not equal to one-half of the sum which he derived from his practice; and yet this annuity was to be taxed in this way. But then it might be said that the tax was voluntary. Be it so; still this was a method of putting persons in this situation under a difficulty to 777 which they ought not to be subjected. The public expectation would require a contribution, and this was altogether the most abominable tax that ever was imposed. Why should masters in chancery, why should his noble friend on the woolsack, be taxed more than others who had a large property in the country? As for the emoluments of the chancellorship, he would not hold the office, if he could do it, one minute on that account; and he was persuaded, that nothing but a sense of duty, under particular circumstances, induced his noble friend to continue in the office. The sum which the public would gain by this measure was not worth consideration. In another place it had been said, that this was a measure produced by clamour; but if they yielded to clamour, was not that the first step towards confiscation? It was precisely the course pursued in another country. They began by voluntary contributions: then went on to compulsory measures; and, from one thing to another, till all Crown grants of every description were resumed. One man stated, that the estate derived from the Crown had been in his family four hundred years, upon which they told him that they ought to take the more from him on that account. It appeared from the proceedings in another place, as stated in the public papers, that a noble marquess (Camden) had generously given up the greater part of his public salary. But what said the Palace-yard orators to that? They said, that so much was given up from fear, and that the sacrifice was not sufficient, for that the whole ought to be given up. That was not all: these orators were worse than the French Convention, for the Convention was satisfied with taking thee state, but the Palace-yard orators insisted that the noble marquess should not only give up the salary, but that he should "disgorge," or give up all that he had received. He disapproved of the whole of the clause; but their lordships might perhaps wish to legalize voluntary contributions. He should first therefore, propose an amendment, legalizing the receiving of voluntary contributions generally, without confining the measure to any particular description of persons, and then he should move, that the clause be left out altogether. His reason for not moving, first, that the clause be omitted was, that in case that should be carried against him he could not afterwards qualify the clause.

The Earl of Liverpool
would say nothing as to the general question, whether 778 efficient officers were or were not sufficiently paid. They would have another opportunity for that, when the whole subject should be brought before them. His noble friend objected to the principle of this measure, and in some instances and in ordinary circumstances, it might be objectionable. This, however, was no new principle, but one which had been recognized, and acted upon, in almost all critical circumstances since the Revolution. In the war which existed at the time of the rebellion in 1745, the principle was recognized as constitutional, and acted on under a judicial opinion as to its legality given by lord Hardwicke. In the seven years war a tax of 5 per cent, was imposed on these offices and pensions, which was a stronger measure than that of a voluntary contribution. In the American war, and even at one period of the last war, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, the receiving such contributions was legalized. The measure, therefore, was new, neither in principle nor in practice. It was one of the most valuable qualities in these general principles, applicable to ordinary circumstances, that they admitted of qualification or exceptions in particular circumstances. He certainly was not able to contend with his noble friend in the construction of the particular terms of an act of parliament; but, with all due deference to him, he conceived that in no sense could the words extend to the funds. There was no intention, certainly, to include property of that description; and, with respect to those persons who were included, they were left to act under the permission as they might think proper. But the Prince Regent had voluntarily given up a large sum out of that part of the civil list particularly applicable to his personal expenses; and it was within his perfect knowledge, that his royal highness had, in giving up the sum in question, made a very great personal sacrifice. He thought that this sacrifice, under the particular circumstances of the country, was properly made; he believed it was gratefully accepted by the public; and it was desirable that others should have the opportunity of making similar sacrifices. He admitted, that the relief to the country would be inconsiderable: but it was a manifestation of the feelings of public officers which it was very proper to make in the special circumstances of the country.

Lord Holland
said, it was true that this measure was not new in principle; but this 779 clause was a foolish application of the principle, and might be mischievous as well as foolish. Contributions from those who were efficient servants of the public were not wanted, unless their services were overpaid. But what was wanted was, the reduction and regulation of those salaries which were given for no services at all; unless such salaries were actual property. He could not agree with the noble lord opposite that economy was the first step to confiscation. But the present measure was a delusion upon the public. The proper mode of proceeding was, not to accept contributions from the salaries of efficient offices, unless they were over-paid, which in some instances might be the case; but to do away those salaries which were given for no services at all, by a compulsory clause, instead of adopting this mode of voluntary contribution, and rendering those odious who did not contribute. When he spoke of useless places, he did not mean sinecures, which would come afterwards under consideration, but such places as many of those in the household, and at court. The contribution, as applied to such places, was too small; as applied to efficient offices it was too large. The places to which he alluded had been described thirty years ago in terms so uncourtly, that he would not mention them at present; and many arguments had been then urged for their continuance: but they were arguments which applied to the continuation of the places, and not of the salaries. When his royal highness, before he became regent, laboured under a temporary embarrassment several of his officers served without salary; and he maintained, that such officers in the court as held the places to which he alluded, ought to serve without salary until the revenue of the country was equal to its expenditure. But as to the efficient officers of the country it was unworthy of the country to pay them first, and then to go with this begging-box to solicit a part of the pay back again in the shape of alms. The proper plan was, to pay the efficient offices justly and frugally, and to put an end to the salaries of those from whom the public derived no service in return. The noble lord had said, that the relief to the public would be trifling, and in that he agreed. But then the question was not, what the saving would be, but what was the public feeling; and unquestionably it must be extremely galling to the public to see that, in the general distress of the country, those who held places 780 which were not necessary for the public service, were receiving the same salaries as they drew in seasons of prosperity, it had been the fashion to talk of the sacred-ness of this description of property: but there was no property so sacred as to exempt it from taxation. The owner of salt had as sacred a property in that salt as the holders of these places had in their offices. There were a number of places, of which the salaries ought to be done away entirely, or greatly reduced, and this ought to be done by a compulsory clause: but to hold out this begging-box to receive contributions or alms from efficient offices, was consistent neither with policy nor justice. He should therefore, though on different principles from those stated by the noble lord, vote for both his amendments.