HL Deb 02 May 1815 vol 31 cc4-24

The order of the day upon which their lordships were summoned, being read,

Earl Grey

said, that in pursuance of the notice which he had some days ago given, it had been his intention this day to have submitted to their lordships a motion for an Address to the Prince Regent, praying that he would be pleased to lay on the table copies of the negociations carried on between the Government of this country and the present Government of Naples, with a view to bring before their lordships and the public the engagements which had been entered into with respect to that power, and the justice or injustice of our proceedings with regard to it. He had also intended to have made a statement to their lordships for the purpose of showing them the grounds upon which it appeared to him that such a motion was called for. It had been contended, that it was much better to wait till the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna could be produced entire before their lordships, in order that the various subjects which had been matter of arrangement at the Congress might be discussed all together, when their lordships would be enabled to see the nature and bearings of each of the parts, both as considered separately, and as viewed in connexion with the rest. Admitting that such was, generally speaking, the most desirable course, both he and others had contended, that there were particular cases of such a description that the general rule with respect to them ought to be departed from. Of that description appeared to him to be the case of Naples; and it was for that reason that he intended to have brought that question before their lordships without further delay. Since he had come down to the house, however, he had been informed that it was not the intention of ministers to refuse the information for which be proposed to have called on the subject of our relations with Naples. To that particular point his motion was to have been confined; and as this was conceded to him, and as he was at all times desirous of abstaining from wasting their lordships time in unnecessary discussion, he should not now enter into that statement, which, under other circumstances, it would have been his duty to have made. Their lordships, he believed, would concur with him, that the most convenient and proper time for discussion would be after the desired information should have been laid on their lordships table, and for that reason he abstained from any thing that could provoke discussion at this moment. Whether any further, and what information might be requisite to bring this question fairly before the House and the public, would be best determined when such information as the noble earl opposite thought it consistent with his public duty at present to produce should be laid before them. He had now, then, only to request the noble earl to state the manner and form in which it was his intention to produce the information, which he understood it to be his inclination to grant. He trusted the noble earl would not say that the form of production ought to be in consequence of any motion of his (earl Grey), because this appeared to him to be a case in which it ought to come down to their lordships in the shape of a message from the Prince Regent. It was often attended with very great inconvenience when the information came in any other manner; and generally speaking, unless information of this kind could be so produced, it ought not to be produced at all. An instance had lately taken place which might serve as an illustration of that inconvenience. He alluded to the Treaty of the 25th of March. The noble earl had stated the general principle, that no treaty ought to be laid before Parliament until it had been regularly ratified: and yet the substance of that Treaty had been produced on the motion of an individual peer of that House. To that Treaty, however, a declaration had been added on the part of this country after it had been received from abroad, which possibly,—he was not now speak- ing of probabilities,—but which might possibly induce the Allies to make some material alteration in that Treaty; and the inconvenience of producing it under such circumstances was this, that Parliament might perhaps be discussing it when of a very different nature and complexion from what it might ultimately turn out to be. Information of that kind ought, therefore, to be brought down by message from the Crown, or from the person by whom the powers of the Crown were administered; and unless it could be so produced, it ought not to be produced at all. Now this was precisely a case of that description, with respect to which the information ought to be brought down by message from the Crown, and the circumstances were such as, in his opinion, authorized that mode of proceeding. He did not mean to enter into any discussion as to the nature of the situation in which this country had stood with regard to Naples for this some time past; only desiring their lordships to attend to the tact, that though that was called an armistice, it was in substance, and in the contemplation of the parties and the world, a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which was fully expected soon to be made definitive: and it was impossible for him not so to consider it, when he recollected that in the Speech of the Prince Regent at the opening of Parliament, America was stated to be the only power with which we were then at war; importing, that with all the European powers we were substantially in a state of peace: and also when he considered that the commercial relation between the two countries had been renewed. This, therefore, was not like the rupture of a common armistice, but rather like the commencement of a new war; an occasion on which a communication to Parliament from the Crown was always made. But then it might be said, that there was no precedent for such a message from the Crown to Parliament on the rupture of an armistice. He could not say that there was an exact precedent, because he did not recollect any case exactly similar to the present in all its circumstances: but in point of principle there were numerous precedents—and be might, as he believed with confidence that their lordships would concur with him, say, that it was the ordinary course of proceeding between the Executive Government and Parliament. For instance, during the late war with Prance, many attempts were made to bring about a peace between the two countries, and negociations were entered into with that view, but which had unfortunately failed in securing that desirable object. On these occasions, when the negociations were broken off, a communication was always made to Parliament by message from the Crown, of the principles upon which each negotiation had been conducted, and the reasons why it had been broken off. It was true, that in these instances the negociations did not proceed under the circumstances of a suspension of hostilities; but he asked their lordships, whether it ought to make any difference in this respect, that no armistice existed,—or whether the circumstance of an armistice having existed during the negociation now in question, and especially an armistice of such a nature and long continuance as the present, was not rather favourable to the proposition which he maintained, that the information ought to be given have message from the Crown. Having said thus much, he would not take up their lordships time any longer respecting what he had said before, that the discussion of this subject would come with much more convenience and utility when the papers were produced, and particularly with more convenience if they should be produced in the form which he recommended.

The Earl of Liverpool

said, that there could be no objection as to the production of the information asked for by the noble earl in the fullest extent, namely, a communication of the negociations which had taken place between his Majesty's Government and the Government of Naples respecting the armistice concluded between them, and since the conclusion of that armistice. He was not aware that in any case of the rupture of an armistice, which had not been communicated to Parliament, there had ever been any communication respecting the circumstances which had led to such rupture. The noble lord had said that there was no analogous case, and he was not aware that there was any case exactly analogous. As the subject of Naples had been irregularly brought before Parliament at a time when that country was under the consideration of the Congress of Vienna, and as considerable misrepresentations had gone abroad respecting the conduct of the British Government, it was desirable that the question of Naples should be separately considered. He had stated last night, that though he could not say that hosti- lities had taken place, yet the commander of his Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean had given notice to the person exercising the sovereign authority at Naples, that he considered the armistice at an end, in consequence of his hostile aggressions against the Allies of his Majesty; and that we might consider ourselves, if not in a state of actual hostility, at least in a state when hostilities were about to take place. So much with regard to hostilities. He had no authority from his royal highness the Prince Regent to make any communication to the House, of the circumstances which had led to a rupture of the armistice; but at the same time he had no hesitation in stating, that he should have no difficulty in acceding to any motion for the production of the necessary information; and if the noble earl would not bring forward a motion, he should do so himself, for the production of the correspondence, and other papers, relative to this question. It was not strictly necessary that he should say more on the subject at present; and he professed himself as averse as the noble lord to give rise to a premature discussion; but he hoped that he should be excused for taking the present opportunity of saying a few words, with a view to remove some of the prejudices which existed on the subject of this question. Indeed, after the statement of the noble lord, he would not be discharging his duty if he did not endeavour to remove those prejudices, and to state the nature of the information which the papers to be communicated would be found to contain. The ground on which the noble lord had given notice of his motion, was, that after having made an armistice, which though on the face of it appeared merely an armistice, was yet connected with other transactions, and was in fact to be considered as a species of preliminary treaty of peace—the question ought not to be considered with reference to an armistice only; that his Majesty's Government having approved of the Treaty of Peace concluded between Austria and Naples, had held out expectations of a similar treaty with this country, and not having fulfilled such expectations, they had virtually broken the engagement which they had contracted with the ruler of Naples. Without going into any minute particulars, he would shortly state to the House the light in which he viewed these transactions. Their lordships were aware of the previous engagements with the King of Sicily; and though this country had guaranteed Sicily to his Sicilian Majesty, yet, however desirable such an event might be, we had come under no engagement to procure the restoration of Naples to his Sicilian Majesty. In the course of the events which preceded, for some time, the conclusion of the last war, a disposition had been shown by the present ruler of Naples to enter into a negociation with this country; and at one time a negociation was actually commenced, though nothing grew out of that negociation. In September or October 1813, another negociation was opened with the same person, but this negociation was terminated by his junction with Buonaparté on the Elbe; and he continued to assist Buonaparté till after the battle of Leipsic. After this event further overtures of negociation were made by him; and the most anxious desire was expressed by the Austrian Government to conclude a peace with the de facto Government of Naples, which they represented as indispensable to the success of the operations then going on. He allowed, that the Allied Powers acquiesced in this proposal; and he had no difficulty in saying, that the peace between Austria and Naples, though nominally between those countries only, was not concluded without the consent of all the other Allied Powers, and among others Great Britain. But two conditions were always coupled with this peace: first, That a compensation for Naples should be given to the King of Sicily; and, secondly, That marshal Murat should cordially co-operate with the Allies in the general cause. He did not wish to rest the matter, therefore, on the mere armistice; he would admit, that provided a compensation should be given to the King of Sicily, and that a cordial co-operation should be afforded, this country was bound to follow up the armistice with a peace. It became essential, then, to inquire particularly into this point—whether, on his part, he had actually afforded a cordial co-operation in the cause of the Allies. Very soon after the conclusion of the Treaty, there were reasons for suspecting, from a variety of sources of information, that he was actually at times, not cordially co-operating, but playing a double part, waiting to see which of the two great parties were likely to have the advantage, and then declaring himself for the most powerful. When this information, such as he had stated it, was received, he had viewed it with a considerable degree of jealousy, because, whether true or false, it was natural to suppose that endeavours would be used, in such a case, to give a strained construction to the facts of it. But when his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) arrived at Paris in the month of May, he received information from a quarter on which the utmost reliance could be placed, and which gave him and the Allied Sovereigns a moral conviction that a communication was all the time kept up between the military government of France and marshal Murat. He would not at present disclose the source of the information, though no doubt was left as to the fact. He had already stated that marshal Murat could only expect the armistice could be durable in proportion to his cordial and honest co-operation. Upon the assembling of Congress at Vienna, the same communication was made to them, and this having come to the knowledge of the Sovereign of Naples, or his ministers at the Congress, a long memoir was given in by the duke de Campochiaro, justifying the whole of Murat's conduct, from the beginning to the end of the campaign. This Memoir was referred to a person in every respect the best judge of the conduct, of marshal Murat, the officer commanding the Austrian army, with whom he had co-operated. To a more respectable individual an appeal could not have been made. General Nugent made a long Report on the Memoir laid before him, on the conduct of Murat during the campaign, giving his most decided opinion—not a loose opinion, but an opinion founded on facts, which he brought forward, that not only had Murat not co-operated cordially, but he had even violated the substance of the engagement. On the receipt of this report, lord Castlereagh felt it to be his duty to ascertain this matter further, and he sent the Memoir of Campochiaro, and general Nugent's Report on it, to the second best authority, lord William Bentinck, who had concluded the armistice with Murat, and also co-operated with him. Lord William Bentinck's Report, which would be laid before the House, confirmed the opinion of general Nugent by an enumeration of similar facts, and contained a distinct opinion, that not only the engagement entered into had not been fulfilled, but that no doubt remained on his mind of his acting in direct violation of it. Very little doubt was on his mind as to what was the notion of the co-operation under the engagement; but other papers would also be laid before them, which would show what the sentiments of the French authorities were en this subject. They would learn the sentiments of the person who was at present the head officer of Police in France, of the present Ruler of that country, of the commandant of Ancona, and of the viceroy Eugene Beauharnois. They would see that no part of the engagement of the Allies had been acted on; but that, on the contrary, there was the most deliberate treachery on the part of marshal Murat. He hoped that this short statement, which was not intended to provoke discussion, would do away the imputation that this country, always noted for its good faith, had, on any quibble or neglect of form, or from the engagement being expressed in a dispatch and not a treaty, availed itself of any such circumstances to avoid keeping an engagement which if the other party performed honestly their part, it would be bound to fulfil. The Treaty must have depended on the honest, fair, and cordial co-operation of Murat. Till the late events had occurred, no decision of Congress was pronounced. This was one of the questions which was not brought forward at an early period of the negociation, and it was not settled till after the landing had taken place which had led to the renewal of hostilities. He could not allow this occasion to pass by without stating what were the grounds on which his Majesty's Government had proceeded. He admitted that he would not have been justified in making this statement, if he was not at the same time prepared to follow it up by the production of the whole of the documents. The noble earl concluded with moving an Address for the production of the papers in question.

Earl Grey

said, that the noble earl had not followed the example which he had set him of abstaining from all discussion till after the House were in possession of the requisite information. Even now, however, notwithstanding all that had been said, he would not go into much discussion, though on some points he could not avoid stating a few words. The noble earl had stated the nature of our previous engagement with Sicily—an engagement solemnly entered into, and since confirmed and strengthened by a coincidence of circumstances. In consequence of the alliance with us, Sicily had been involved in war with France, and had thereby lost the kingdom of Naples. The noble earl had certainly stated this engagement with, the King of Sicily in too low a tone, when he said that it did not bind us to a restoration of his ancient dominions. If the engagement did not bring us to this in express terms, it certainly went very near it; for in the Treaty of July, 1804, there was an express provision, that Sicily should enter into no peace with France in which England was not included; and therefore, if Sicily could make no peace with France, were we not bound to take the utmost care of the interests of his Sicilian Majesty? It did not bind us in express terms to a restriction of his ancient dominions; but it formed a ground for inquiry, whether the pressure of the war was such as to force us to relinquish the accomplishing such an object for that monarch. He did not say that circumstances of necessity might not arise when that decision, however painful, became necessary; but nothing except an over-ruling necessity ought to have compelled us to depart from such an object. He would not at present enter into the question, whether Austria ought to have been relieved from the pressure of the person who held the government of Naples, at the expense of the good faith and honour of this country, pledged to the King of Sicily. All he now wanted was, the establishing that a decision had been taken for relinquishing the engagement with Sicily, and becoming parties to the Treaty between Austria and Naples, in which the kingdom of Naples was guaranteed to the present sovereign against all attack. This important treaty was concluded on the 11th of January, and acceded to by the Allies. In consequence of letters written by lord Castlereagh, from Basle, an armistice was concluded between Great Britain and Naples, on the 3d of February consisting of four articles—not a mere suspension of hostilities, but more in the nature of a Treaty of peace and alliance. He stipulated, 1st. That there should be a cessation of hostilities by sea and land. 2d, That there should be a free commerce in articles not prohibited, and that all ports occupied by the British arms should be open to the Neapolitan flag, which was a renewal of commercial relations. 3dly, That a notice of three months should be given of the intention to break the armistice; and the 4th article related to a convention for a plan of combined operations. This was a convention for military co-operation, which, in point of fact, actually took place. It did, in point of fact, confirm the Austrian Treaty, guaranteeing to Murat the full and entire sovereignty of Naples. On the 15th of February the convention of Troyes was entered into, of which the 3d article awarded to the King of Sicily a liberal indemnity in Italy, according to the scale of his losses, and the means at the disposal of the Allied Powers. But this Treaty did not consist only of ostensible and public articles, for there were two secret articles, in which it was stipulated, not only that the Sovereign of Naples should be maintained in possession of his sovereignty, but also that he should receive an accession of territory for his claims on the kingdom of Sicily; and in that article the noble secretary and the Allies then began the new mode of calculation, by which the inhabitants of a country were numbered like so many cattle—the King of Naples to receive an accession of territory comprehending not less than 400,000 souls. The noble earl then proceeded to notice the confirmation of the Convention in the conferences at Chatillon, and the letter of lord Castlereagh to lord William Bentinck, of the 3d of April, respecting the proceedings of the King of Sicily; and he inferred, from all he had stated, that the engagement amounted to a preliminary treaty of alliance, to the fulfilment of which the King of Naples had a right, if such right was not forfeited by some proceeding of his own.—He now came to the two considerations on which the fulfilment was stated to depend. The first of these was the indemnity to Sicily, and the second a co-operation;—no; not a co-operation, but a cordial co-operation between Murat and the Allies. With respect to the indemnity, it was not to be taken from Murat's dominions, but from the disposable fund possessed by the Allies; and except he endeavoured to defeat or oppose such indemnity, nothing on this point could be laid to his charge. In entering on the subject of the co-operation, he entreated their lordships to believe, that he was not disposed to be the apologist of that person; but it was certain, that the military co-operation which was wished for, and which had relieved Austria from the pressure which prevented her from directing her efforts with vigour against France, was actually obtained. Marshal Murat, after the Treaty of the 11th of January, first occupied Tuscany and the Roman states, took Ancona after a siege of eight days, and arrived at last on the Po. The great benefit derived from this was evident from the proclamation of general Bellegarde. The viceroy was obliged to take a defensive position behind the Mincio, and prevented from any thing more than defensive operations. To his army of 45,000 men, stated to be of the most excellent description, and on which such stress was laid in defending the Treaty of Fontainbleau, General Bellegarde had only 30,000 to oppose. If Murat had added his force to that of the viceroy, general Bellegarde would have been compelled to go behind the Tagliamento, and from the easy access to Vienna from that quarter, Austria would no longer have been able to continue her efforts for the cause of the alliance; and as it was by the most narrow accident in the world that it succeeded at last, they owed to the co-operation of Murat that success in all probability. It was too late to come forward now and say, that he did not act with all the cordiality which might have been wished. He wished to defer saying any thing however on this subject, till he should see the reports of general Nugent and lord William Bentinck, and of the latter more especially, knowing, as he did, that he not only possessed the highest degree of truth and honour, but a clear and excellent understanding, and that he was not likely to have an undue bias either on one side or another. He was not the apologist of Murat; but he contended that we had had the benefit of the co-operation of Murat, though not probably to the extent which was expected. We owed to it, however, the success of the campaign, and we ought to be very cautious, therefore, how we set aside an engagement in virtue of which we had derived so many advantages. If the noble earl were to examine accurately into the subject, he would find, perhaps, that without any treachery or bad faith on the part of Murat, his co-operation might not have been so active as they expected. Had those charges of bad faith and treachery been made openly? If not, the circumstances were still more suspicious. They might be true; but if so, they ought to have been made openly, and followed up by assisting the King of Sicily to recover his ancient dominions. This would have been sound policy as well as strict justice, for if the character of marshal Murat was such as the noble earl had represented it to be, considering the state of Europe, considering the situation of Italy (declared by every one to be in the greatest danger), having such a case against marshal Murat, it was the height of impolicy to suffer a man who had exhibited such treachery and perfidy, to wait until an opportunity offered to set fire to the magazine of combustibles which had been accumulated. This was primâ facie a strong case against his Majesty's ministers. But, in the mean time, what had been done? Their lordships had all seen the letter from the prince of Benevento to lord Casllereagh* (and he * Copy of a LETTER from the Prince De Talleyrand to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, dated Vienna, Dec. 15, 1814. My lord;—You desire me to make known to you in what manner I conceive the affair of Naples ought to be settled in Congress; for as there is a necessity of settling it, it is a point upon which there ought not to be one moment of uncertainty in a mind like yours. It would be for ever a subject of reproach, and I will say, even an eternal subject of shame, if the right of sovereignty over an ancient and fine kingdom, like that of Naples, being contested, Europe united for the first time (and probably for the last) in general congress, should leave undecided a question of this nature, and, sanctioning in some degree usurpation by its silence, should give ground for the opinion, that the only source of right is force. I have not at the same time to convince your excellency of the rights of Ferdinand 4. England has never ceased to recognise them. In the war in which he lost Naples, England was his ally. She has been since, and is so still. Never has she recognised the title that the person who now governs at Naples assumes, nor the right which this title supposes: therefore, in concurring to assure the rights of king Ferdinand, England has only one plain thing to do—which is to declare in Congress what she has always recognised, that Ferdinand 4. is the legitimate sovereign of the kingdom of Naples. Perhaps England, heretofore the ally of Ferdinand 4, desires still to be so. Perhaps she may believe her honour demands that she should assist, if need be, with her forces, for his regaining the crown of which he has been recognized was persuaded that most of them had felt the deepest shame on its perusal); a letter which proved, that though we were not disposed to any manly and vigorous operations, we were quite ready to adopt all kinds of secret and underhand proceedings. I repeat, continued lord Grey, that no doubt all your lordships have seen this extraordinary letter, and have seen it with feelings of resentment for the injured honour, for the humiliation and shame of the remaining character of this country, so deeply involved, and so much more so if it were written not merely on the writer's own notion, but as the reply to some preceding communication from the British minister. I trust, my lords, that the sovereign; but this is not an obligation that can flow from a pure and simple acknowledgment of the rights of this prince, because the recognition of a right does not naturally carry with it any other obligation, than that of doing nothing that may be contrary to such right, and of not supporting any pretension that may be set up against it. It does not carry with it the obligation of fighting in his defence. It may be that I deceive myself, but it appears to me infinitely probable, that a frank and unanimous declaration of the Powers of Europe, and the certitude of the person who now governs at Naples, that he would not be supported by any one, would render useless the employment of force; but if the contrary should happen, those only of the allies of King Ferdinand would be necessary, who should think proper to lend him their support. Is it feared that, in this case, the war should spread beyond the limits of the kingdom of Naples, and that the tranquillity of Italy should again be interrupted? Is it feared that foreign troops should again traverse Italy? These fears may be obviated by stipulating that the kingdom of Naples should not be attacked by the Italian continent. Austria appears to be engaged towards him, who governs at Naples, to guarantee him from all attack on this side; and if, as we are assured, Austria has only engaged herself for this (how can it be supposed that the Emperor has given his guarantee against the rights of a prince, at once his uncle and his father-in-law, to the possession of a kingdom which he lost in making common cause with Austria), she cannot be embarrassed in reconciling with justice that was not the case. I trust that that letter is attributable only to the master-hand that is skilled in such productions; for, in the worst transaction of the worst period of the worst government that ever existed—in the vilest deceit, the most infamous perfidy, the foulest crime that ever occurred—in the blackest record of fraud and imposture that is to be met with in the annals of the world, nothing can be found more flagrant and heinous—nothing more hateful for its treachery—nothing more contemptible for its baseness. Still in that paper not a word was said of the King of Naples having forfeited his sovereignty by his conduct. All that was said was, that although he could not be attacked through Italy, he was assailable by sea; and the writer, with a degree of insult to his correspondent which it was difficult to conceive how a British minister could bear, concluded that lord Castlereagh had authority from his Court to assent to the proposed measure, and, if not, requested that he would obtain it. He would abstain from saying any thing further on the subject at present. All that he now stated was, that it required a very strong case to exempt the Allies from the engagements into which they and with the natural sentiments of affection, the engagements into which extraordinary circumstances made her enter. It appears to me, therefore, that we may at one and the same time satisfy all our duties, and all our interests, and all our engagements, by an article such as the following:— 'Europe, united in Congress, recognises his Majesty Ferdinand 4, as King of Naples. All the Powers engage to one another not to favour, nor to support directly or indirectly any pretensions opposite to the rights which appertain to him in this title; but the troops which the Powers foreign to Italy, and the allies of his said Majesty, may march to the support of his cause, cannot traverse Italy.' I persuade myself, my lord, that your excellency is sufficiently authorized to subscribe such a clause, and that you have no need of a more special authorization; but if you should think otherwise, I shall request of you to require this authority without delay, as you have been good enough to permit me so to do (ainsi qu'elle a bien voulu me le permettre). "Agree, &c. &c. (Signed) "Le Prince de TALLEYRAND. had entered with marshal Murat, the more especially as they had experienced important co-operation from him under circumstances of a very critical nature. The question would be fully open to discussion when their lordships should come to the consideration of the papers to be produced by the noble earl. He should wait to see those documents; and if they appeared to him to be defective, he had no doubt that the noble earl would have the candour to supply the deficiency. He repeated, that in his opinion this was a case which demanded that a communication should have been made to their lordships from the Crown; that all the papers should have been laid on their lordships table by command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, accompanied by an explanatory statement on the part of his Majesty's ministers.

The Earl of Liverpool

did not rise to prolong the discussion, but to say that he so far agreed with the noble earl, that if the papers which he would produce should not be considered satisfactory, it would be perfectly just to supply any deficiency which might exist in them. He must, however, beg leave to offer to their lordships a few words in explanation of his former statement. No specific obligation, had ever been entered into to restore the kingdom of Naples to the King of Sicily. It was clear that cases might occur in which the interests of the King of Sicily might be distinct from the restoration of Naples to him. His Majesty's Government was bound, in consequence of the Treaty between the Courts of Vienna and Naples, to secure to his Sicilian Majesty an adequate remuneration for the loss which he would sustain. It was distinctly notified to Austria, to Naples, and to all the other Powers concerned, that the condition on which we agreed to the peace with marshal Murat, was, that an adequate compensation should be afforded to his Sicilian Majesty. He perfectly agreed with the noble earl, that we were bound to follow up the Treaty between Austria and Naples by a peace with the latter power. The question which it would be for their lordships to discuss when the papers should be before them would be, whether there had been that kind of cooperation on the part of marshal Murat which every body must have understood was the condition of the arrangements made by the Allies with him. The noble earl had asserted that the cause of the Allies had derived great advantage from his co-operation. The papers would, however, show, that persons of very high authority were of a different opinion. Lord William Bentinck (of whose character the noble earl had spoken with such just respect) entertained considerable doubts whether, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the transaction, more good or more evil had resulted from marshal Murat's co-operation; and whether, had the Allies refused to conclude the armistice, they would not have obtained greater advantages in Italy than with his co-operation, so conducted as it had been. If that was the fact, combined with suspicions, and still more, combined with evidence of his treachery, the Allies were unquestionably justified in considering themselves absolved from their engagements. He should be perfectly prepared, on the production of the documents, to defend and justify every part of the transaction on the soundest views of policy and on the strictest principles of justice.

Lord Grenville

did not know how he could regularly oppose the production of papers, which his Majesty's Secretary of State thought it was fit, both in time and manner, to produce. It appeared to him highly proper to adhere, on such occasions as the present, to the established principles of parliamentary usage; and having been told by the noble earl that we were in actual hostility with the person who was, de facto, King of Naples, there could be no doubt that a communication of that fact ought to be made by the Crown, calling upon Parliament for that support, which had never been refused, in a case in which the honour of the Crown, the maintenance of good faith with our Allies, or the just rights and interests of the country were involved. The noble earl had stated that there was no precedent of such a communication on the rupture of an armistice; but there were many such precedents of communication, on the rupture of negociations, of the pacific issue of which much less hope had been entertained than of that of the armistice in question. This was not merely a matter of form. There were few of our forms in which there was not essential substance; and if he were called on to point out one, an adherence to which was more essential to the preservation of the constitutional principles of Parliament than another, he would declare that it was that which, in the present instance, was unreservedly violated. He had witnessed with great concern, and, if he might take the liberty to say so, with much disapprobation, another most essential departure from ancient usage, in the way in which a treaty, not ratified, but of the highest importance, had been laid before Parliament, as the substance of an engagement not concluded, and of the precise stipulations of which, therefore, it was impossible that Parliament could be in possession. For substantial reasons it was the established usage that the engagements of ministers on the question of peace or war, however those ministers were invested with the fullest powers of negotiation, were never considered as binding on their respective sovereigns until they had been brought under their immediate view, and had received their ratification. Then, and not till then, ought a treaty to be laid before Parliament. In the present instance, the Treaty had not even been ratified by his royal highness the Prince Regent, but with the accompaniment of an explanatory declaration. The probability was, that this declaration would occasion a counter-declaration, without of course by possibility knowing the nature of which, the Treaty had been laid on the table, and had become subject to the discussion of Parliament. With respect to the papers now moved for, one of two propositions must be true. Either the transactions to which they referred had arrived at a stage which rendered it fit that they should be communicated to Parliament, or they had not. If they had not, the noble earl was leading their lordships into an error in proposing an address for their production. If they had, what could relieve his Majesty's ministers from the sacred duty of advising his royal highness the Prince Regent, on this renewal, or rather on this commencement of a war, to lay before Parliament all the information necessary to enable them to form a judgment on the merits of the case? By assenting to the motion the duties of ministers would be transferred to Parliament, who would take on themselves the responsibility which ought to attach alone to the servants of the Crown: and Parliament would thus relieve the Executive Government from their responsibility, with the inconvenience on their part of not knowing to what exact point to frame their Address, while, if the information were contained in a spontaneous message from the Crown, it would be communicated with the distinct pur- pose of enabling Parliament to determine how far the conduct of the Power with whom we had commenced war justified hostility on our part. In conclusion, his lordship expressed a hope that the noble earl would withdraw his motion, and, when the proper time came, that he would advise the Crown to lay the papers before Parliament.

Earl Bathurst

said, it had been asserted, that the Address was moved for the purpose of explaining the grounds of the commencement of hostilities. But that was not the ground of the motion. Ministers had been charged with breach of faith and gross misconduct, and the House was summoned this day to hear that charge made good, or to vote for papers which should prove that charge. It had not been thought proper to make the charge; but his noble friend had deemed it essential to the honour of his Majesty' Government to put the House in possession of those papers, in order to vindicate that honour. The House would understand, therefore, that the papers were not produced to explain the grounds of the commencement of hostilities, but to vindicate the conduct of ministers from the charge of the noble lord opposite. As to the assertion of his noble friend, that it was contrary to all precedent that there should be no communication from the Crown on this subject, he could assure him that there was no instance of a communication from the Crown upon the rupture of an armistice. But then the noble lord had identified an armistice with a negociation, to which it was not at all similar. There never was any formal notification of the existence of an armistice; and negociations were often broken off without any notice being given to the House. With respect to the Treaty of Vienna, it had been moved for by a noble lord, who usually voted with the Opposition, and was not laid upon the table by ministers without the consent of the House. All the objectionable circumstances were known when it was moved, for it was known to be a treaty not ratified, and with a declaration affixed to it; and the House, with the knowledge of all this, had consented to the motion, in consequence of which its substance was laid before them. As to the disrespect which ministers were charged with having shown the House, all they did was to advise the King to produce the substance of the Treaty in consequence of the vote of the House. If it was objectionable to produce the substance of a treaty before its ratification, as he agreed it was, his Majesty's ministers were innocent of the offence.

Lord Grenville

protested against being considered as a participator in every measure consented to by his Majesty's ministers which he did not directly oppose. He could assure the noble earl, that it was one of many motions, some brought forward by individuals with whom he generally acted, and others introduced by the noble earl and his colleagues, which he did not approve of, although he did not formally object to them. What the noble earl had stated, proved the inconvenience of granting imperfect documents. Ministers ought to know what papers it was proper or improper to grant, since they alone were informed of their contents. If ministers would discharge their duty in making communications from the Crown to the House, the responsibility of producing those papers would fall on them alone: but when they resorted to the inconvenient mode of an address to produce papers, they reserved to themselves the power of saying, such production is not the act of his Majesty's Government, but only the dutiful compliance of ministers with the address of the House.

Earl Grey

denied, that he had made any long speech, with reference to the war in Italy, which contained charges against his Majesty's ministers. He had staled to the House, on a former night, the existence of a war between the Neapolitans and Austrians. The circumstance appeared to him of such a nature, as called for the early attention of Parliament, and he, therefore, desired an answer from the noble lord opposite, as to the state in which this country was placed with respect to our relations with Naples. The answer of the noble lord was, that the only relation was the existence of an armistice, which, in consequence of events that had recently occurred, would probably be put an end to. Not conceiving this to be a sufficient answer, he alluded to the existence of a treaty, to which he understood this country was pledged, and gave notice, that he would bring the subject under the consideration of the House. In this course, he was determined to persist; but, when he came down to the House this day, he learned that the noble earl intended to grant the papers; and, therefore he did not think it necessary to institute a discussion where the object was conceded. He abstained from discussion, feeling what was so forcibly pressed by his noble friend, that a communication should have been made from the Throne, fully detailing the circumstances of the case. The information he considered very material; but it ought to have been granted in a different manner. The words of the motion were very general; but what he understood was, that Government would produce all the negociations that had taken place between the present King of Naples and our minister, prior to the armistice—the armistice itself—and all communications that had been made after it was agreed to. He thought that the House should also be put in possession of two Reports—the one from general Nugent, the other from lord William Bentinck, and any answers made to the charges contained therein. He conceived it would also be material, that there should be laid before the House any representations made on the conduct of marshal Murat, either by marshal Bellegarde, who was commander of the Austrian forces in Italy, or by sir Robert Wilson, who was our military resident with the army. He was convinced there must have been representations made by those individuals, and, if they were not laid before the House, he should move for them at some future day.

The Earl of Liverpool

said, that all communications between this Government and that of Naples, respecting the armistice, would be laid before the House. If other documents were wanted, it would be necessary to move for them.

Earl Grey

said, he mentioned the different documents now, in order to save time. The Reports of general Nugent and lord William Bentinck, as well as the representations of marshal Bellegarde and sir Robert Wilson, ought to be laid on the table.

The Earl of Liverpool

was not aware of any reports, of the description alluded to, being in his office. If there were any such, Government would feel no wish to withhold them. They would lay before the House every thing they deemed essential; and the noble earl might afterwards, if he pleased, move for any other documents he thought necessary.

Earl Grey

apprehended, as the duty of a military resident was to send home communications relative to the transactions of a campaign, that it was impossible but sir Robert Wilson had transmitted dispatches on the subject. The papers in the noble lord's office might, therefore, be examined, and extracts made from such of them as related to marshal Murat.

The motion was then put and carried, nem. con.