Lords Sitting of 12 June 1815

OFFICES IN REVERSION.
Earl Grosvenorstated, that considering the advanced period of the session, it was necessary that the Reversion Bill should be brought to a second reading without delay. He had been desirous to wait till a time when he could be assured that the noble and learned

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lord who usually sat on the woolsack could be in the House, and he hoped that the noble lord would be able to attend before Friday; but he did not at any rate think it would be proper to postpone the second reading beyond Friday, and therefore he gave notice that he would make the motion on that day.
Lord Ellenboroughadverted to the circumstance that the opinion of the House had been lately taken three times on this subject, and that the noble and learned lord alluded to had taken a large share in the discussions which took place on those occasions. He therefore suggested that the second reading, according to the usual courtesy shown by their lordships to each other, ought not to be proposed at a time when the noble and learned lord might not be able to attend. There were strong hopes that he would very soon be able to attend in his place; but in case he should not be there on Friday, he trusted the noble lord would not then press the second reading.
Earl Grosvenoragreed to name Monday instead of Friday, but stated, that considering the time of the session, he could not accede to any further delay.—The Lords were ordered to be summoned for Monday.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS—RUSSIAN DEBT.
Lord St. John, after adverting to the Convention between Great Britain and the United Netherlands, which had the other day been laid on the table, stated, that there appeared in that document a stipulation, with respect to which it was desirable that their lordships and the country should have some explanation. He alluded to that part of the Convention by which we agreed, in conjunction with the King of the United Netherlands, to take upon ourselves a part of the capital and interest of a loan contracted by Russia with certain Dutch merchants. A very general impression prevailed in the country, that part of this loan was contracted by Russia for the carrying on of that war which ended in the cession of Oczakow to that Power; a measure which this country, out of its anxiety to preserve the balance of Europe, had opposed. Another part of that loan was said to have been contracted for the purpose of carrying on those operations which terminated in the subversion of the constitution of Poland. Could the noble earl opposite give the House
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any explanation on this point? He should be sorry, indeed, if this country were to be called upon to take upon itself the payment of debts contracted for any such purposes as those which he had mentioned; and, therefore, he was most anxious to hear from the noble earl some explanation on the subject, which would at least relieve the country from so severe a mortification. If the noble earl would have the goodness to state to the House the dates of the periods at which the loans were contracted, the House and the country would be enabled to form some judgment as to the objects for which the money was raised.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that he was disposed to give the noble lord and the House all the explanation on the subject which he could give; but he really did not know what were the dates of the periods at which these loans were contracted, nor with what views the debt had been originally incurred, nor did he conceive that these matters had any thing whatever to do with the merits of the question in the shape in which it at present came before their lordships. He did not mean, at this moment, to enter into any detailed discussion of that question: but the state of the case was exactly this:—The great exertions which Russia had lately made in the common cause, and the distressed state of the finances of that empire, were both well known to all Europe. An application had, under these circumstances, been made to Great Britain, to take upon itself the payment of a part of a certain debt which Russia had contracted; and from a consideration of the vast exertions which Russia had made in the cause of Europe, and the distressed state of her finances, it had been thought that the proposition was entitled to some favourable attention. On this account the ministers of the Government had thought themselves justified in taking upon themselves to recommend to the British Parliament to enable the Prince Regent to become bound for the payment of a part of the Russian debt. This might be wise policy, or it might not. He should not now enter into that question, though he was perfectly prepared to argue the paint when the proper time came: but the object was merely to relieve Russia from a part of this pressure, for the reasons which he had stated, without reference to the cause for which the debt had been originally incurred, or the period when it was con-

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tracted. These were considerations which, in the view taken of the case by the British Government, had nothing whatever to do with the present question: but considering the prodigious exertions which had been made by Russia in the late campaign for the great cause in which the Allies were engaged, he did maintain, and would be ready to argue at length when the proper occasion arose, that this circumstance, combined with the actual pressure on the Russian finances, did afford a strong ground for receiving the proposition with the most favourable attention.
Earl Greysaid, that he was very far, indeed, from being satisfied with the explanation which the noble earl had given on a subject which, under the present circumstances or the country, must be regarded as one of the greatest importance. He did not mean at this period of the session, and with the sort of attendance which he should be likely to procure, to bring forward any formal motion on the subject; but he could not suffer this opportunity to pass, the last which he should probably have for the present, without making some observations upon this lavish expenditure of the public money, and the careless indifference which appeared in this as well as in other instances, about heaping the most enormous burthens on the oppressed and deluded people of this country. His noble friend had stated the general impression which prevailed that this debt, for the payment of part of which this country was to become bound, had been contracted for the purpose of carrying on the operations which ended in the cession of Oczakow to Russia, and he had very properly asked, whether it was possible that this nation was at last to be called upon to pay the debt incurred by that loan, which had enabled Russia to carry those measures into execution which Great Britain had opposed, on the ground of their tendency to subvert the balance of Europe. This, in his opinion, was a most material question, and one which well deserved their lordships most serious attention. But the noble earl had said, that this consideration had nothing to do with the question; and defended the stipulation on the ground of the great exertions made by Russia, and the pressure upon the finances of that country. The exertions of Russia, however, were made in a cause common to all; in a cause in which Russia was no less interested than the rest of the confederates.
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In the course of this long war, (for it might be considered as one continued war from 1793 down to this moment,) had the exertions of this country been inferior to those of Russia, or any other Power of Europe? This nation had made its proportion of exertion, and had suffered its full share of the burthen; and why, in a cause common to all, should it be called upon to take upon itself an additional burthen which did not properly belong to it? Look at the expenditure of the present year: it was absolutely frightful. If any credit was due to the rumours that prevailed out of doors, the loan for the present year would amount to no less a sum than 36 millions sterling. Besides this, there had been issued 18 millions of Exchequer-bills, and to all this was to be added a vote of credit of 6 millions, making in all 60 millions sterling. Let it be recollected, that this enormous sum was to be raised at a time when taxes unknown to our ancestors had been resorted to in order to raise a large proportion of the sums necessary for the expenditure of the year, and that, too, for the very purpose of keeping down the capital of the national debt; but at a time when twenty millions of war taxes were collected, a sum three times that amount was raised in the manner he had stated, making an addition to the capital of the national debt of about one hundred millions. It was absolutely impossible they could go on in this manner without speedy and irretrievable ruin. At the commencement of the revolutionary war, if he was not mistaken, the whole capital of the national debt was about 240 millions; and now, after the unparalleled burthens to which the country had been exposed in this war which had lasted ever since 1793—for during the whole period we never had really enjoyed the blessings of peace—an amount of capital was in a single year to be added to the debt, nearly equal to one half of the whole of it at the commencement of the revolutionary war? Yet under these circumstances the country was to be called upon to take upon itself additional burthens, which no consideration of justice or sound policy required that it should bear. Never were burthens imposed with less reason upon an oppressed and deluded people; and the result of such a lavish and inconsiderate expenditure must at last, he repeated, be irretrievable ruin. Besides this payment on account of Russia, there was another sum of two millions, and possibly of five

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millions to be paid to Holland for augmenting and improving the defences of the Low Countries; and this, too, deserved the most serious attention of their lordships. This expenditure he considered as entirety useless. If the arrangements made at Vienna had been brought under consideration, he would have contended, that the incorporation of the Low Countries with Holland was a most impolitic measure. He should have preferred infinitely to leave her colonies with Holland, and give up the Netherlands to some third power capable of defending them. But as for those sums employed in the repair of the fortresses on the frontiers, he considered them as entirely thrown away. As a measure of defence, or for any other good purpose, he considered it as perfectly nugatory. As to the advances to Holland in lieu of her colonies, be protested that if those colonies had been offered to him gratuitously he would have declined accepting them; for, instead of being an advantage to this country, he was convinced they would be only another burthen added to those with which the nation was already so heavily loaded. He did not, as he had before stated, mean to go at length into the subject; but as this opportunity had presented itself, it was impossible for him to allow it to pass without thus stating to their lordships the impression made on his mind by the papers now laid on their lordships' table, and the state in which the country was placed under these circumstances of enormous and lavish expenditure.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, it was not his intention to go at large into this subject now; but after what had just fallen from the noble earl who spoke last, it was impossible for him not to say a few words. He had before said, and he still maintained, that the prodigious exertions made by Russia in the common cause, and the distressed state of her finances, entitled the proposition to take upon us a part of this debt to our favourable consideration. True, the exertions of Russia were made in a common cause; but let it be recollected that the exertions of Russia had gone much beyond what was necessary for her own security. After the enemy had been driven from her own territory, and at a time when she might have made peace with much less danger than any other power in Europe, she still continued, in spite of the deranged state of her finances, to make exertions chiefly in
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favour of the rest of Europe, such as had never been surpassed by any nation in the world. True, this country, too, had made its exertions, and had endured its burthens. No one could be more sensible than he was how much this was the case. The situation which he held necessarily gave him the means of being peculiarly able to appreciate the burthens and privations to which the nation was exposed; but it ought never to be forgotten, that during; the whole of this eventful struggle this favoured country had never been the scene of foreign invasion. It had at least escaped that dreadful devastation—those tremendous calamities—with which the progress of the invader must have been attended; and when we looked at the exertions and sacrifices of Russia as compared with our own, let us consider what would have been, the situation of this country if a great part of it had been occupied by the enemy; if our territory had been ravaged, and London had been laid in ashes! He was well aware of the efforts which this country had made—of the burthens which it had endured—of the privations which it had suffered during the period which the noble earl had mentioned: but it was a most erroneous view of the subject to look at it in that light merely. This country had, indeed, made exertions, and suffered much and severe privations; but let the effect of these exertions and privations be also taken into account. To what did we owe our present state of comparative security and prosperity—to what did we owe the preservation even of our existence? When we looked, therefore, at our burthens, let it not be forgotten that to our patient endurance of those burthens, to our persevering exertions, we owed the comparative security and prosperity, probably the salvation of our country. Considering, then, the vast exertions of Russia beyond, her own territory, the great advantage which we derived from those exertions, and the slate of the Russian finances, he would confidently submit to their lordships and the country, that the engagement of ministers was fully justified by the soundest views of policy and expediency. He admitted that it was not a claim of strict and rigid justice, but an appeal to the liberality of this country; but he trusted their lordships and the nation at large would concur with the Government in thinking, that it was an appeal which, under the circumstances, merited the most favourable attention and consideration. With respect

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to the sums to be advanced to Holland, their lordships would observe that only two millions were to be paid at present.—The noble earl had said, that the money expended on the frontier fortresses was thrown away: but in that respect his opinion was widely different from that of the most eminent military characters; and on a former occasion it had been urged with considerable force, that this was by far the cheapest mode in which the great interests which this country had in the protection of the Netherlands could be secured. The expense of one campaign to repair the mischief that might result from the want of these fortresses would be greater than that which would be required to put the whole of the frontier in a complete state of defence. This, therefore, was an expense which was warranted by every consideration of sound policy, and even of an enlightened economy. With regard to the colonies, they were in many respects of great importance to this country, but particularly so in this view—that they were in a great measure cultivated by British capital. Without going further into the subject at present, he trusted their lordships would be of opinion that the ministers of Government had not departed from the line of their duty, but had, upon a sound view of the whole circumstances of the case, acted in the manner best calculated to promote the permanent interests of the country.
Earl Greyconceived the security of which the noble earl boasted, to be good for nothing, and to be just so much money thrown away. It would have been better to have left the Sovereign of Holland his colonies, and to have given the Netherlands to some third Power, capable of defending them.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the opinion of the noble earl on this subject was at variance with the opinion of the first military authorities.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY.
The Earl of Darnleyrose and said:
My lords; Under the most favourable circumstances—with public attention perfectly alive to the subject, and with all the charms of novelty to recommend it—I am not vain enough to imagine that any thing brought forward by me can have much claim to the attention of the House; but when I consider the many and unusual disadvantages under which I labour on the present occasion, I am under the necessity
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of soliciting a more than usual portion of your lordships' indulgence. Nothing, indeed, but a sense of duty, and the desire to appear consistent, would have induced me, at this late period of the session, with, other objects of more immediate interest, and of greater importance than this (however important I may still think it) pressing upon your attention, to attempt to divert it for a moment, to the mass of papers on your table, for which I have moved in order to prove the assertions I have heretofore made, on the conduct of the late War with America, and more especially the Naval Administration of the Country. I certainly could have wished that the task of calling your attention to this subject had originally fallen into other and better hands. I am fully aware of the difficulty of doing justice to so extensive and complicated a subject; and think I have some reason to complain that, among near a thousand members, of which the two Houses of Parliament are collectively composed, there should be found no one, but the humble individual who has now the honour of addressing your lordships, to call for an inquiry into those repeated naval disasters, which more than two years since first impelled me irresistibly to bring forward that most interesting subject.
On that occasion, your lordships, it is true, thought fit to reject my motion for inquiry; but I have the satisfaction to reflect, that your time was not altogether thrown away. I flatter myself that my attempt to direct the attention of Government more particularly to the causes of the disasters of which I complained did not altogether fail. Certain it is, that, from whatever cause, about that time they began to equip and construct a larger description of frigates, of which there are at present, as appears by one of the papers on the table, twelve in commission, whereas at that time there was not one; the Endymion, the only one in existence, not having then been fitted out. The manning, however, of ships, is of far more consequence than their construction. For I will venture to assert that the difference of a few more guns is comparatively of little importance, provided the two ships opposed to each other are upon something like an equality in the number and description of their crew. I believe, if the ships had been tolerably well manned, the three successive disasters of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java, would not have taken place. The last of these was

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the immediate cause of my having originally brought the subject before the House; and I cannot but recollect that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty on that occasion stated, that at least the Java was adequately manned. In point of numbers she certainly was; but injustice to the memory of her gallant and lamented commander, I must now state, what I have lately learnt from the best authority, that the crew of the Java was of the worst possible description, composed, in the first place, of a small and weak crew of a frigate, paid off in the river, and sent to Portsmouth just before the ship sailed, and made up to the number wanted by that of a sloop of war sent home from the West Indies, for having shown symptoms of mutiny, and disinclination to fight against the Americans. Captain Lambert was so well aware of the nature of his ship's complement, that nothing but a sense of duty, paramount to every other consideration, would have induced him to go to sea with them; and he was heard to declare, that in the event of falling in with an American frigate he must inevitably be taken. Yet notwithstanding the disadvantage of such a crew, which he had not any time to discipline or arrange, in the well-fought action, which terminated in the destruction of himself and his ship, by a foe in every respect so much superior, he not only did not decline the contest, but was uniformly the assailant. Since the destruction of the Java, no disaster of the same nature has happened in the case of frigates; but many circumstances have taken place equally disastrous in the capture and destruction of sloops of war. The minutes of the courts-martial in two of these cases are on the table, in consequence of motions made by me; and your lordships will see, by referring to these documents, that in point of size and guns, and still more in the inadequacy of their crews, the British vessels had no chance whatever of success, in these unequal, though well-fought contests. In the case of the Epervier it appears that, in addition to these disadvantages, by some strange and most culpable neglect in fitting her out, the guns of this ship were so badly secured, that at the first broadside, five out of nine became unserviceable; and by referring to the Sentence of the court-martial, you will find the Court agreed, that the cause of the capture of his Majesty's late sloop Epervier, was the very superior force of the
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enemy, the insecure manner in which the fighting bolts of the Epervier were fitted, and the breeching bolts drawing from being badly clinched, and the inefficiency of the crew." With respect to the last, it consisted of 103 men (proved in the evidence to have been of the worst description) and 15 boys; whereas the crew of her opponent, the Peacock, consisted of 182 picked men, and only 3 boys. The other case of the Wasp and Avon terminated in the destruction of the latter, with the loss of 40 killed and wounded, out of an equally weak crew, while the American lost only 1 killed, and 2 wounded, and was apparently unhurt by the effects of the action.
These, and other disasters of the same nature, we must conclude, at length induced the Admiralty to turn their attention to providing a better and stronger description of sloops of war to cope with, those powerful and well-appointed vessels of that class belonging to the United States, as they had before in the case of the frigates; but in doing so, they appear to have exceeded all the bungling and ignorance which have at all times more or less prevailed in this branch of our naval service. To prove that this has been the case, I will quote an authority to which the noble viscount must pay the greatest deference—I mean the Report of the Commissioners of Naval Revision. In their third Report they state that, "Where we have built exactly after the form of the best French ships that we have taken, thus adding our dexterity in building to their knowledge in theory, the ships, it is generally allowed, have proved the best in our navy: but whenever our builders have been so far misled by their little attainments in the science of naval architecture, as to depart from the model before them in any material degree, and attempt improvements, the true principles upon which ships ought to be constructed being imperfectly known to them, have been mistaken or counteracted, and the alterations, according to the information given to us, have in many cases done harm. From the same cause there has been infinite variety in the alterations made, and in the forms which have been adopted. The alterations being on no certain principles, no similarity in the form of the ships could be expected, and they have the appearance of having been constructed on the chance, that in the multitude of trials made, some one might

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be found of superior excellence. While, therefore, our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents and most extensive acquirements to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping only in the dark in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in cur way. Nothing certainly can be more surprising, than that in a nation so enlightened as this is, and whose power, importance, and even safety, depend on its naval superioity, matters so essential to the preservation of that superiority should so long have been neglected."—[Signed, Fordyce, Curtis, Domett, Serle.]
This Report was made, I think, in the year 1806; and, to prove that no amendment has yet taken place, in the construction of the two large ships, the Newcastle and the Leander, the Navy-board having procured a plan for the former ship, which they were themselves unable to furnish, and which by all accounts has perfectly answered in the construction of the latter, have, as usual, made some alteration which has spoilt the symmetry and perfection of the model. But the most curious instance of ignorance and misconduct in the construction of ships of war, that ever appeared, is probably to be found in the papers on the table; and to which I must beg the attention of the House. It seems, that before the war with America, as long ago indeed as the beginning of the year 1810, the Board of Admiralty gave directions for the building of a sloop of war to be called the Hermes, after the model of the Bonne Citoyenne, which had formerly been taken from the French, and was found to possess excellent qualities as a vessel of this class, far superior indeed to any sloops of war originally of British construction. Not having any model of our own to work from, or any men of sufficient science to furnish a plan equally good, I do not blame the adoption of this measure. But how was it carried into execution? The Hermes, when fit for sea, was placed under the command of an officer of great merit and abilities, whose case has lately been brought before your lordships by a noble earl (Egremont); and in consequence the Admiralty have restored him to his rank, of which he appears to have been deprived, without sufficient reason, by the sentence of a court-martial; and are about, I trust, by employing him again, to make him farther amends for the injury he has sustained. It ap-
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pears by the correspondence between captain Browne and the Admiralty and Navy Boards, that as usual the model was altered and spoilt. The Navy Board at first assert positively, as appears by the Report on the table (see Letters of the 4th of October, 1811,) that the new ship is built by the lines of the old one, and precisely similar; but afterwards, when pressed on the subject, they confess, that they had given her greater width in the after-part, at the wing transom; the consequence of which was, that although when light, the Hermes sailed well (for then the lines of the Bonne Citoyenne took effect), as soon as the increased width touched the water, she could not sad at all; and in other respects her construction was so faulty, that nothing but the skill and exertions of her commander could have rendered her an effective man of war: that, however, she became, notwithstanding her faulty construction, and was one of the very few in the British navy, in any way likely to be capable of contending on equal terms with the American ships of the same class. Another ship was then ordered to be built after the same model, to be called the Myrmidon, whose captain informs us in a letter on the table, of a recent date, that though intended to resemble the Bonne Citoyenne, she is unlike her in every respect. It appears, also, that among the alterations suggested by captain Browne in the Hermes, one was to lower the deck forward, or to raise it abaft. In the Myrmidon the surveyors of the navy did both, and thereby equally spoilt the ship.
We come now to the remaining fourteen ordered to be built on the same lines, but of reduced dimensions. The credit of these precious vessels belongs, as I have been told, rather to the Admiralty than to the Navy Board; but, be that as it may, it appears clearly that they never have been, and never can be, with all the bungling expedients and alterations that have been resorted to, efficient men of war, so that their cost (which, exclusive of alterations, amounts to between two and three hundred thousand pounds) has been absolutely thrown away. But that is not the worst; for the attempt to use these vessels, puts in perpetual danger the lives of our brave officers and men, and the honour of the British flag. If your lordships will take the trouble of reading these papers, you will find that some captains complain of one thing, some of an-

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other. In general they think them overmasted. One officer is of a contrary opinion, and wants larger masts and yards. But one thing, of which frequent notice is taken, appears quite sufficient to account for their bad qualities. The size of these vessels was considerably reduced, and yet they are fitted with the same guns and weight of metal as the larger vessels. At first, indeed, the Board ordered them to carry two guns more; till one of the officers commanding represented that with only 20 ports he could not mount 22 guns. But it is obvious, that if a certain weight of ordnance was just sufficient for a ship of 500 tons, it would be too much for one of 450; and that, in this case, as in all others, the ignorant attempt of partial alteration had destroyed the symmetry of the machine, and utterly spoilt it. One of these ships, the Lee, was in March last nearly lost, and with difficulty escaped, by throwing over-board her guns in a gale of wind; and after this severe trial her captain earnestly recommends that she should be armed with 24 instead of 32 pound cannonades, which he deems "far too heavy for her;" and although this suggestion of the captain was supported by the recommendation of the Navy Board, the captain is threatened to be superseded if he does not choose to go to sea in the ship—or, in other words, for doing his duty by stating that these wretched craft were unequal to their weight of guns. In short, whoever will take the trouble of looking into the details which the papers furnish on the subject of these vessels, will find that a stronger case of mismanagement and waste of public money never was presented to Parliament. This miserable attempt to provide a number of vessels of adequate qualities to cope with the powerful American sloops of war, has utterly failed; and at this moment, after all the experience and warning we have had, there are not more than two or three vessels of that description in the British navy. For I repeat what I have before asserted, that a very large proportion of the smaller vessels of war, which by the accounts on the table appear to have been in commission at the close of the contest with America, were utterly useless for any purpose except that of patronage. The list of sloops of war amounts to 173. The best of these were, in point of force, and still more from the inefficiency of their crews, unequal to the adversaries they had to encounter, as has
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been abundantly proved by the minutes of the courts-martial on the table, as welt as by other instances. But 72 of this number being of a small size under 16 guns, could, as ships of war, be of no use whatever; and served only to occupy 4,000 seamen, exclusive of officers; which, if they had been judiciously distributed, to strengthen the more effective ships, would, in all probability, have prevented those disasters of which the country has so much reason to complain.
On the subject of the warfare in the lakes of Canada, I must beg the House to recollect, that, on the first day of the session, the noble viscount boldly asserted, that it would be found on inquiry, that every thing necessary to carry on those naval operations with vigour and effect, was not only supplied, but amply supplied by the Government at home, and generally (I think he added) in a twofold degree. But how does the correspondence on the table substantiate this assertion, imperfect as I believe it to be, and without those earnest and repeated applications which I understand were made by sir James Yeo, for men, and supplies of every description? But this correspondence between the Government in Canada and his Majesty's ministers, abundantly proves that the frequent disasters were occasioned by the want of adequate means. At the commencement of the war (August 26 1812) sir George Prevost informs you, that the British force was decidedly superior on all the lakes. In less than a year (on the 24th of July, 1813) he tells you, "the United States have acquired a decided superiority on Lake Ontario;" and an equally decided superiority on Lake Erie was too fatally proved by the disaster of the gallant and unfortunate captain Barclay. The details of this transaction are in the papers before the House; and every part of them prove most decidedly the total want of every thing necessary to constitute an adequate naval force. The whole squadron had not more than 50 British seamen, while that opposed to it appears to have been perfectly well manned and equipped, and superior in sailing and efficiency of every description.
Amongst the attempts made by Government to remedy the want of an adequate force to cope with the Americans on the lakes, the building of two frigates and two sloops at Chatham,—to be again taken to pieces, sent across the Atlantic, landed

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at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and taken up the rapids to Lake Ontario, to be built there a second time,—is not the least curious. It appears by the papers on the table, that on the spot the plan was at once deemed impracticable; and although, by the zeal and exertions of an individual, one of the ships was actually conveyed to its place of destination, and there altered and launched, the three others were disposed of—we are not informed how; nor are we told what the expense of this senseless project has been to the nation.
Just at the close of the war we recovered, it is true, our superiority on Lake Ontario, by the equipment of a three-decker. But how was this effected? Not by any forethought or provision made by the Government at home, but by the accidental arrival of some men of war on the coast of America, with part of the Duke of Wellington's army, after the conclusion of the war with France, which furnished their stores just in time to enable sir James Yeo to fit out the large ship, which, but for this accidental supply, could not have been brought forward before the winter. Some of these ships furnished anchors and cables and other necessary stores, and the Centaur her lower-deck guns; without which the new ship could not have been effective; and her being rendered so, in the opinion of sir James Yeo, as I have been informed, saved the province of Upper Canada.
On the subject of the military operations in the late war with America, I shall say little; and it is but justice to acknowledge that our gallant army, on every occasion, maintained its high reputation; even in that concluding scene, in the ill-judged and ill-fated expedition to New Orleans. On this subject I must observe, that no disaster in the history of this country ever called more loudly for inquiry into the conduct of the authors and projectors of the plan. It seems to have been originally undertaken without, any object but that of plunder; and it is difficult to imagine what national advantage could have arisen, or how the great objects of the war could have been materially promoted by complete success. Its complete failure was calamitous indeed, attended by a heavy loss of the gallant and victorious followers, and of the companion and brother of the illustrious Wellington himself. And yet such was the total absence of all public feeling
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or attention, even when the intelligence first arrived, that, I am ashamed to say, I really believe, the paltry occurrence of the breaking of my windows, and those of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, which happened about the same time, occasioned a greater sensation. How then can I, at this distance of time, hope to call the attention of this House and the public to this fatal and disgraceful transaction? But it was impossible altogether to pass over what appears to me to form a most prominent feature in the misconduct of the late war.
But, my lords, to return to the conduct of the Naval Administration, which is my principal, object,—it appears to me, that however you may be disposed to forget the late war with America, and to think all retrospective inquiry inexpedient and unavailing, you cannot shut your eyes to the importance of considering, whether the naval service of the country is well or ill conducted. On the subject of the construction of our men of war, I have endeavoured to call your attention to a very flagrant case of misconduct, detailed in the papers on your table. But this is by no means the only case of a similar nature. In the naval administration of the noble earl now at the head of the ordnance (earl Mulgrave), a great number of 74-gun ships were built, which, as I hear, are familiarly known in the navy by the name of the Forty Thieves. The plan and construction of these ships were faulty in the extreme; and they never could have been good men of war, if they had been composed of good materials; but the execution was, if possible, worse than the plan, and many of them showed immediate symptoms of premature decay, and the necessity of great and expensive repairs before they had been many months at sea. The original cost to the nation of these 40 ships cannot have been so little as four millions; and I fear very few of them would be found at this moment in any respect effective men of war.
The Queen Charlotte, a first rate, is well known to have been found in so defective a state, as soon as she was launched, that it became necessary, before she could be sent to sea, to repair her, or rather, it may be said, to build her over again at an expense (as I have been informed) of 70,000 l.
With these and many such facts before us, can it be stated, that the faulty consrtuction and premature decay of our men

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of war is not a fit object of the most serious inquiry? On the important subject of the preservation of timber for naval purposes, I have heretofore troubled your lordships. In the last session I presented a petition from captain Layman on the subject of a discovery, which he states has been made by him, of a method to increase the strength and duration of timber. Captain Layman is a very intelligent and well-informed man; and as an officer, he has the highest testimony, that of the illustrious Nelson, in his favour. But whatever his personal claims to attention may be, his alleged discovery must be admitted to be of the utmost importance, and well deserving the consideration of Parliament. There are many other topics connected with this subject of the navy, on which neither the patience of the House, nor the present state of my health (which almost incapacitates Die from addressing your lordships at all) will permit me to enlarge. I cannot, however, sit down without briefly adverting to some of them. Perhaps the most injurious consequence of the naval disasters we have experienced in our late contest with the United States, has been the moral effect produced by them on the minds of our seamen. Doomed as they have been, in so many instances, to certain defeat, it is impossible that their minds should not have been alienated from the service, and disgusted by the manner in which their, lives have, been sacrificed in unavailing contests with such superior force. I have, indeed, heard that great disinclination to serve in these inefficient sloops of war has been manifested, and frequent desertions have been the consequence.
Amongst other reforms, which it appears to me the naval service requires, the constitution of courts-martial ought not to be forgotten. It certainly should seem by some late instances that have come before the public, that the sentence, is sometimes at variance with the evidence and the law of the case. That to which I have before alluded, appears to have been unwarrantably severe; and the conduct of the Admiralty, in restoring to his rank the officer condemned, shows they were of the same opinion. But I have seen lately another case of a contrary description, where too much lenity appears to have been shown; where the evidence established proofs of the most deliberate and cruel murder. I forbear to particu-
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larize; but the noble viscount knows the case to which I allude, and I think it of the utmost importance that British seamen should be well assured that they can never be ill-treated with impunity; but that the most strict and impartial justice should punish every case of cruelty or oppression. These cases, I will admit, are extremely rare. There is perhaps no body of men equally numerous so free, from blame, in this respect, as the officers of the navy. They are, for the most part, as humane as they are brave; but there will be always amongst a great number of human beings, some of a contrary description; and these should be restrained by the strong and impartial arm of the law, and the certainty of punishment.
Although I am ready to admit that Government has not been regardless of the just claims of the navy, and has shown a disposition to improve the condition both, of officers and men, on this head much still remains to be done; and I think the navy have a right to expect that no less favour should be shown to them than to the army, which in several points is not the case. For instance, the widow of a naval officer, when she applies for her pension, is obliged to swear, that she derives no emolument from any other source whatever; whereas the widow of an officer of the army proves only, that she receives no other emolument from Government.
My lords; it appears to me too much the practice of the present, day to strain every nerve to make this country a great military power; which, in my judgment, it can never become, advantageously to any great degree; but must mainly depend for its security and greatness on its naval strength. This is the natural foundation of the power and glory of the British empire; and on this basis our principal security must ultimately rest. It is true, the contest in which we are unfortunately engaged, assumes at present almost exclusively a military character; but if it should be protracted (and even the most sanguine cannot deny the possibility of such an event), we shall have to contend not only with the naval power of France, but, in all probability, with that of America also. A state of war in Europe can scarcely fail to bring forward again those questions of neutral rights and blockade which have not been decided by the peace; and their successes in the late war will tend greatly to encourage the

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Americans to renew the contest. In this point of view an inquiry into the state of our naval affairs must be deemed an object of the highest importance; but, for the reasons I have before stated, it is not my, intention at present to urge it.
I am fully aware of the very imperfect manner in which I have discharged the duty I had imposed on myself of bringing the subject before your lordships; and nothing but a paramount sense of duty, and a desire not to appear to act with levity or inconsistency, in leaving the documents for which I had moved under more promising circumstances unnoticed on your table, would have induced me at this time to trespass on the patience of the House. The noble earl concluded with moving, That the House do now adjourn.
Viscount Melvillesaid, he should leave it to the House to decide whether the noble lord had made out a grave case against the naval administration of the country, and should content himself with noticing only a few of the most prominent topics of the speech they had just heard. The first charge brought against the Admiralty was, that of neglect in not fitting out a class of vessels able to cope with those of America. With regard to this he would observe, that it had always been the system of the British Admiralty to adapt our ships to the nature of those with which they had to contend; but it could not be supposed that the whole system of our navy could at once be changed in order to meet a few American frigates of a larger size than any vessels that had ever gone under that name. The fact was, that the Admiralty had fitted out two or three vessels of this class, but it was impossible to cover the seas with them, so as to meet the American vessels wherever they were to be found. With regard to the noble lord's statement, as to the deficiency of the Java's complement, it was the first time he had ever heard of it, and he believed it to be totally unfounded. With regard to the capture of that frigate, he thought it no disgrace in a ship of inferior force being obliged to yield to another that was greatly its superior. The same general observation was applicable to the capture of some of our sloops of war. The Americans had three or four heavy vessels of this class, and it so happened that they fell in with some British sloops of inferior size, when the result of the contest was unfortunate. But the noble lord had not adverted to the captures of American
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merchantmen and men of war by the British navy, by which their commerce had been almost annihilated, and by which the honour of the British flag had been upheld. The noble lord complained, that adequate attention had not been paid to skill in ship-building by the British Admiralty. It might be said, however, that this country had become the first naval power in the world, and that no nation could send to sea and keep at sea the same number of valuable and useful ships. From the number of our distant settlements, it was absolutely necessary that we should have large and roomy ships, capable of great stowage, and of keeping the sea for a long time; we could not, therefore, generally imitate the light American schooners, that were calculated rather for expedition than for those purposes to which our navy must generally be applied. Measures had been adopted to remedy that deficiency in ship-building skill which had been complained of, and he trusted that they would soon remove all ground of complaint. The noble viscount next adverted to the complaints of the inadequate protection of our trade, which he contended to be without foundation. They had heard of American privateers infesting our coasts, and committing depredations even in our creeks and harbours. He would assert, that the complaints on this head were grossly exaggerated; and when the merchants who made them were asked for their authority, they could assign no other but that of newspaper reports. He would repeat what he had stated on a former occasion, that it appeared from the books at Lloyd's, that the number of captures last year in the European seas as far as the Canaries, amounted to 172. Of these the whole number of coasters captured was 13, while of running ships, and those that deserted convoy, the number was 94. The fact was, that many captains of merchantmen, on hearing of the termination of hostilities with France, ventured a run without convoy. This was peculiarly the case with those from the Mediterranean; and off Cape St. Vincent's they were exposed to American privateers. He could add, that the report of several captures, which, appeared in the newspapers, was totally unfounded. Of this description was that of a vessel said to be taken in Dublin bay, and also the reported capture of the Blazer gun-brig off the coast of Ireland.—The next topic to which he should briefly advert,

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was the conduct of the war on the lakes of America. The noble lord asserted, that our disasters there arose from inadequate supplies: but perhaps there was no one circumstance more surprising than the extent of the naval exertions that were made in that quarter. For every seaman, shipwright, cable, and every article of military equipment, sent out from this country, the Americans could with facility supply double the number; and yet the war ended with an acknowledged superiority on our part on the principal lake—a superiority so decided, that the enemy durst not venture to come out to meet us. The noble lord had insinuated that desertion had latterly increased in the British navy, from the moral effects of American success. He would utterly deny the assertion; for the fact was, that desertion had greatly decreased; and it was a circumstance most honourable to the character of British seamen, that it was almost unknown on the lakes, where they were engaged in a species of service the most laborious and anxious, without hope of prize-money, and where strong encouragements to desertion had been held out by the enemy. If any one circumstance had more than another engaged the attention of the Board of Admiralty for years past, it was that the seamen should have no just ground of complaint as to their treatment; and he would venture to say, that there was not a seaman in the navy that was worth his victuals, who would assert the contrary. The noble viscount next proceeded to make a variety of observations on the state of the dockyards, in the course of which he said, that there was now a constant supply of well-seasoned timber for the purpose of shipbuilding, and that no necessity now existed for resorting to the merchants' yards. He concluded by opposing his negative to the present motion.
Lord Rollerose to express his opinion that a weaker case had never been brought before the House, particularly as contrasted with the voluminous mass of papers that had been moved for in support of it. He could assure the noble mover, that he would never vote for his being made first lord of the Admiralty.
The Earl of Darnley replied; after which his motion was put, and negatived. The Bills on the table were then passed through their various stages, and the House adjourned.