HL Deb 27 April 1815 vol 30 cc0-890
Marquis Wellesley

rose and said:—

My Lords; I rise for the purpose of moving that the Order of the Day for our taking into consideration to-morrow the conduct observed by Congress towards Saxony be discharged. It is some time since I distinctly stated to your lordships, that in my opinion the best course to be pursued with respect to this subject, was for his Majesty's ministers to give to Parliament a full and detailed explanation of the whole of the transactions which have taken place at Vienna, instead of waiting until partial intelligence should be extracted from them by any such motion as that which it was my intention to make tomorrow. Finding, however, that his Majesty's ministers did not think proper to adopt this suggestion, and conceiving that the particular treatment of Saxony demanded early and serious attention, I gave that notice of a motion which I am now desirous for the present to withdraw. I am desirous to withdraw it, my lords, in the first place, because, from the tendency of a paper which has been laid on your lordships' table, I am inclined to hope that at no very distant period his Majesty's ministers will be induced to afford Parliament spontaneous information on the subject. In that expectation, I am led to postpone my motion for a few days, in order to ascertain whether that will or will not be the case. But, my lords, I am rendered still more desirous to withdraw my motion for the present, by the very serious reflections which have occurred to me, and which must have occurred to every one of your lordships, on the perusal of the document which has recently been laid before Parliament—I mean the Treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March;—a document, on the fundamental principle of which, I will abstain from making many observations, but which is so obscure in itself, and yet is of such enormous magnitude in point of importance, that the consideration of it has wholly occupied my mind ever since its production, with a view to endeavour to discover its meaning, and the precise nature of the objects which it has in contemplation. I do hope, my lords, that his Majesty's ministers will explain to us the principle on which this instrument proceeds. For my own part, I think it a point which presses so imperatively for immediate and active consideration, that I should not conceive that I was acting with due respect to your lordships, or with due regard to the interests of the country, were I to attempt to divert the attention of Parliament to any other topic until this has been disposed of.

My Lords, when we voted the Address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, on the 7th of April, I concurred in that vote, because I understood, from the terms of the Address itself, from the explanations of the noble lords opposite, and from the general turn of the debate on that occasion, that the only question for our decision was, whether or not Great Britain was placed in such a situation, by the return to France of the present Ruler of that country, as to render it necessary or advisable for us to arm ourselves by sea and land, and to be thus prepared to act in concert with our Allies for the security of the tranquillity of Europe. The question of war or peace was expressly reserved by the noble earl opposite. My lords, I have too much regard for the noble earl, and too much respect for your lordships, to indulge in language that might be deemed too strong upon this subject; but without violating truth and sincerity, it is impossible to abstain from declaring that good faith was not observed towards your lordships in the transactions of that evening. What other feeling can we entertain, when we understand that, two days prior to the vote of the 7th of April, his Majesty's ministers were in possession of the Treaty of Vienna, and had actually resolved on a war, the arrangements of which were even completed? I know, my lords, that the noble earl told us on a recent evening, that circumstances had occurred in France between the signature of the Treaty at Vienna and the motion for the Address in this House, which might have occasioned a change of sentiment on the part of the Allies. But, with regard to ourselves, were we not aware of all that had passed in France—were we not aware of all that had passed at Naples—and yet had not his Majesty's ministers acceded to the Treaty of Vienna? It ever, therefore, my lords, there was a case in which his Majesty's ministers violated their good faith towards Parliament, by calling upon Parliament to vote under circumstances which they omitted explicitly to state, it was this case. I have thrown out this observation, because the neglect on the part of his Majesty's ministers to communicate information on that occasion, is one of the reasons which induce roe at present not to intrude upon your lordships my motion respecting Saxony. But this is not all. As I have before stated, I am mainly influenced in this determination by the contemplation of the Treaty, the substance of which is before your lordships.

My lords, I repeat, that this Treaty is so obscure as to be almost unintelligible. When that which I considered, and which I shall ever consider as a great public calamity, the return to France of the present Ruler of that country took place, there were two modes in which the occurrence might have been treated by his Majesty's Government and their Allies. They might have treated it as a revolt against the legitimate government of France, involving in it consequences menacing in the highest degree the tranquillity and independence of Europe. On the policy of such a course of proceeding I will not touch; but at least it would have been intelligible. The other mode in which the subject might have been treated, would have been by divesting themselves of all passion, by avoiding the appearance of being scared or terrified, and by calmly and deliberately looking at the state of the world in order to place this question before themselves for determination. Whether, with a full comprehension of the evils which were threatened by the return of Napoleon Buonaparté to power, it was nevertheless not practicable to put Eurpope in such a situation as to render impotent any aggressive attempt by France on her tranquillity. My lords, I refrain from arguing the policy of either of these modes of proceeding. Neither has been adopted. The middle course has been pursued. This country and the Allies have preferred what, I presume, they think the line of management. They have carefully avoided all the advantages which might have been derived from either of the proceedings which I have described, and they have welcomed all the evils which could bare resulted from both.

I will now trespass upon your lordships attention by a few, and only a few remarks on the nature of the Treaty. In the first article of that Treaty, the contracting parties "engage, in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March last, to direct, in common and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against Napoleon Buonaparté, and against all those who should already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it." As this article of the Treaty pledges the contracting parties to conduct the war "in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March," it becomes necessary to refer to that Declaration; and by so doing, your lordships will find that in that document, the four Allied Powers declare, "that Napoleon Buonaparté has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations; and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance." By the Treaty itself, this ban is extended to Buonaparté's adherents,—to his faction. My lords, how is this to be understood? The present Ruler of France evidently re-entered that country with the concurrence of a great portion of the population, and of the whole of the Soldiery. Most of the different political parties of France espouse his cause, and particularly the Constitutional party, the individual at the head of whom, I mean M. Constant, is at present in Buonaparté's councils. Are all these persons included in the proscription of the Treaty? By the London prints of this day, we find that the French people are soon to be called upon to pronounce upon a constitution which has been drawn up for them, a principal article of which establishes on the throne of France the person who now sits there. Suppose the majority of the French people should accept this constitution, and thereby confirm the assumption of that throne by Napoleon Buonaparté—are they to be held as "deprived of the protection of the law, placed without the pale of civil and social relations, and rendered liable to public vengeance," according to the dreadful words of the Declaration of the Allies? By the Declaration also, in the spirit of which the Treaty professes to proceed, the Allied Powers pledge themselves to the maintenance of Louis the 18th on the throne of France. [Lord Liverpool shook his head.] I shall be happy to hear the noble earl's explanation on this point. Let it be observed also, my lords, that by the Treaty of the 25th of March, the Allied Powers bind themselves "to maintain the order of things so happily established, by which the rights, the liberty, and the independence of the nations of Europe have been recently secured;" so that by your vote on the 7th of April, you virtually confirmed all the arrangements of Congress, including those by which "the liberty and independence" of Genoa and Saxony were destroyed.

My lords, in referring to those proceedings, it is impossible not to be reminded of the saying ascribed to a great French statesman (prince Talleyrand), who is reported to have told the Congress, that "while they warred against the person of Buonaparté, they adopted his principles." But there is another point on which I wish for explanation from the noble earl. In the event of the overthrow of the Government of the individual now possessed of the supreme authority in France, is it meant to proceed further? Should the French place Lucien Buonaparté, or Ney, or Massena, or Carnot, at the head of affairs, are we to consider our work as concluded? The article of the Treaty, as it now stands, adverts only to the destruction of the Government of Buonaparté. For my own part, my lords, I have distinctly stated to your lordships, on a former occasion, that I thought there were points in the character of the present Ruler of France which would naturally precipitate him into measures self-destructive and destructive of the existing political system of France; and I cannot, therefore, but be of opinion, that his removal from power, under the present circumstances, would increase rather than diminish the danger to be apprehended from that system. This is a topic which requires explanation. As the whole Treaty now stands, it is the most incomprehensible production ever submitted to the judgment of man. And here, my lords, I must request your attention to the Memorandum from the Foreign Office, appended to the substance of the Treaty as laid on your lordships table. That Memorandum announces the directions of his royal highness the Prince Regent to ratify the Treaty under a certain explanatory Declaration, namely, "that the 8th article of the said Treaty, wherein his Most Christian Majesty is invited to accede, under certain stipulations, is to be understood as binding the Contracting Parties, upon principles of mutual security, to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Buonaparté, in pursuance of the 3d article of the said Treaty; but it is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government. That, however solicitous the Prince Regent must be to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his Allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this declaration, on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his Most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British Government has invariably regulated its conduct." Why, my lords, can any thing be so contradictory and inconsistent as all this? In the first place you, in the Treaty, threaten the supporters of the existing Government in France with vengeance; and then, in this Declaration, you attempt to impress France with an opinion of your moderation, by professing your disinclination to impose any particular government upon her! "In consideration of what is due to his Most Christian. Majesty's interests!" Nothing can be more injurious to those interests than this most impolitic Declaration. Nothing can tend so effectually to annihilate the hopes of the Bourbons in France, and to arm with tenfold power the individual whom we wish to destroy.

My lords, these are, as shortly as I have been able to state them, the reasons which induce me to postpone my, motion, which stood for to-morrow. I request the noble earl, either at present, or soon, to answer the inquiries which I have made. I wish him first to tell us, why be withheld from us the knowledge of the Treaty of Vienna, at the time when he called upon us to vote the Address of the 7th of April, and what are the different circumstances under which he has consented to its production. I wish him next to explain, what is the object of the war as resulting from the Treaty of Vienna. Is it the expulsion of Buonaparté exclusively? Is it the expulsion and punishment of Buonaparté and all those who have adhered and may adhere to him? I wish him lastly to inform us, whether there is any reason to hope that the circumstance of the return of this person to supreme authority in France, and the consequences which may naturally be expected from that event, may lead to a re-consideration by the Allied Powers of the objectionable parts of their previous arrangements in the Congress; and thus to present to Buonaparté a front the most dreadful to such an individual—contented Europe—united Europe.—The present situation of Italy—of Saxony, ought irresistibly to urge, to such a revision. At this moment the king of Prussia is compelled to suppress by military force an insurrection at Dresden favourable to Buonaparté. I ask the noble earl if there are no hopes that the order of things to which such an occurrence is attributable, may not yet be ameliorated?—My lords, I move to discharge the order for to-morrow, intending to bring the question forward some day next week, should the information which may render it unnecessary not be afforded.

The Earl of Liverpool said

—With respect, my lords, to the first topic adverted to in the noble marquis's speech, his intended motion on the subject of Saxony, all that I can say is, that it is for the noble marquis to determine for himself, as to the period at which he may think it convenient to bring it forward. It is one of those questions on which his Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty not to communicate information to Parliament at the present period, incomplete as are the transactions in which it was comprehended, and no treaty haying been concluded with relation to it. Whenever the noble marquis may choose to make his motion, I am prepared to defend the conduct of his Majesty's Government, on the grounds which are already before the public. I wish, however, my lords, to reply to some of the subsequent statements and questions of the noble marquis. The noble marquis accuses me of not having produced the Treaty of Vienna, when I moved the Address on the 7th of April. Now, what was the extent of that Address? To vote the increase of our land and sea forces, and the expediency of acting in, concert with our Allies. I distinctly declared on that occasion, that I wished carefully to abstain from touching on the policy of war or peace. Your lordships, however you might entertain different opinions with respect to ulterior proceedings, were unanimous in your approbation of that armament, and that concert, which war or peace alike demanded. To that the House and the country are pledged, and not an iota beyond. At the period of the dis- cussion of the Address, the Treaty in question could not with propriety be laid before Parliament, being an unratified document. But, my lords, besides this general reason, there were special reasons which, as I stated to your lordships the other evening, rendered it an imperative duty on the part of his Majesty's Government, not, on the 7th of April, to communicate to Parliament their knowledge of the Treaty. As was said both by myself and by a noble friend of mine, in the debate on the Address, the question is an European question, and not a British one; and it is therefore indispensable that in every step which we may take respecting it, we should steadily contemplate the disposition and objects of the Allied Powers generally. We were bound to acquiesce in the general determination. If by the whole of the Allied Powers war were considered expedient, or peace deemed practicable, on whichever side of the alternative the general opinion prevailed, to that we must prepare ourselves to conform. The great reason, my lords, which induced his Majesty's ministers to withhold from Parliament on the 7th of April, their knowledge of the Treaty of Vienna, was, that we felt that the circumstances which existed when the Treaty was signed, were very different from the existing circumstances when it was received in this country. I by no means say, that that change of circumstances was such as to induce us to think that it would actually lead to a change of policy on the part of the Allies: but still we felt that it might do so. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, it was scarcely known at Vienna that Buonaparté had reached Paris. The Allied Powers believed, at that time, that the King of France was still in that country, that he had an apparent party in his favour, and that he had expressed his determination not to quit France while he was able to maintain himself there. Under these circumstances, I put it to your lordships—I put it to the noble marquis himself, whether it would have been fair to the Allied Powers to publish their un-ratified Treaty, contemplating as we did the possibility, although not the probability, of a change being effected in their policy by the change of circumstances; and in that event entitling them to say to us, "Affairs have completely altered since we sent our Treaty to you for your approbation. You ought to have been aware of this, and to have given us an opportunity of re-considering our decision; instead of which you have placed us in an inconvenient dilemma by the publication of the Treaty, and you have done this without any necessity on your part for taking so premature a step." It was on these grounds, my lords, that we did not lay the Treaty before Parliament; and when the noble marquis asks me, why I have now consented to its production, I will tell him, that it is only the substance of the Treaty which, in compliance with the motion of a noble earl, has been produced; and that his Majesty's ministers consented to its production because it had been published in the Berlin and Vienna Gazettes—because a copy, materially incorrect, had found its way into the London newspapers,—and because his Majesty's Government knew the subsequent opinion of the Allied Powers on the subject.

My lords, it is not my intention to go into any discussion, at the present moment, on the merits of this Treaty. When the subject shall be hereafter under your lordships consideration, I pledge myself to sustain its expediency; but it is necessary for me to say a few words in reply to the noble marquis's questions. The noble marquis, in commenting on the first article of the Treaty, contended that, as it referred to the Declaration of the 13th of March, it proclaimed not only Napoleon Buonaparté as "out of the protection of the law," but all those persons who had joined, or who might join him. My lords, I know how difficult it is so to word any public instrument as to preclude the possibility of cavil. But I am prepared distinctly and unequivocally to state on the part of the British Government and of our Allies, that they never considered the words used in the Treaty to be liable to the interpretation put upon them by the noble marquis. Those words only applied to the manner and to the circumstances of the invasion of France by Baonaparté, in violation of existing engagements; and their only import in the Treaty is that of hostility against the parties, such as that maintained by one belligerent against another. The noble marquis asserted, that the Treaty pledged the Allied Powers to the restoration of Louis the 18th. It conveys no such meaning. One of the principal inaccuracies in the copy of the Treaty published in the London newspapers, was the passage which related to the re-establishment of the Bourbons. My lords, it never was in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government—it never was in the contem- plation of the Allied Powers—to consider the passage in the Treaty alluded to by the noble marquis as involving a necessary obligation on them to maintain war on that ground. The noble marquis certainly has characterised the Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent, appended to the Memorandum from the Foreign Office, laid on your lordships table with the substance of the Treaty, as inconsistent with the Treaty itself. I confess, my lords, I was never more astonished in my life than at the arguments built by the noble marquis on this declaration. Never, in my humble opinion, were words chosen so completely to express the sentiments entertained in common with myself during the whole of the late war by the noble marquis, and by a noble baron (lord Grenville) not now in his place. The whole of the case, as it stands at present, may be resolved into three propositions:—first, that we consider the present Government of France as an evil that must be got rid of; secondly, that we deem it highly desirable to restore the legitimate monarchy of France, and will contribute our efforts to that restoration; and thirdly, that we do not, however, consider that restoration as a sine quâ non, and disclaim any intention of imposing a government on the French people. If therefore, my lords, we go into France, we go to destroy the pernicious Government that exists, but by no means to impose any government in its stead. The noble marquis asks, in the event of the destruction of Buonaparté's government, whether we shall think our work completed? I reply, that we have already declared our wishes under these circumstances; but as it is impossible to foresee what may happen, his Majesty's Government will not fetter their determinations by pledging themselves to any particular course of conduct. The question with respect to the future, must be left open to be decided by the occurrences of the future. The Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent, I confess, I should have thought was in strict conformity to the sentiments of the noble marquis; I know that it is in conformity to the sentiments of our Allies; and I believe it to be in conformity to the sentiments of the illustrious monarch to whom it chiefly refers. This Declaration, my lords, was founded on the third and on the eighth articles of the Treaty. In the third article, the contracting parties reciprocally engage not to lay down their arms but by common consent; in the eighth article, Louis the 18th is especially invited to accede to the Treaty. Now his Majesty's Government thought that if no explanation attended the ratification of the Treaty by Great Britain, we might be placed in this dilemma—that although we were not bound by the Treaty to carry on the war until the restoration of Louis the 18th, we should not be able to make peace without his consent. We knew that this was a mere inadvertence on the part of the Allies, but we thought it but fair and candid towards them, to accompany the ratification of Great Britain with a declaration explanatory of our understanding of that which might otherwise be misapprehended.

Earl Grey said

—My lords, I will not follow all the arguments advanced by the noble earl, in reply to the observations of my noble friend. All I wish to state is, that when I voted for the Address of the 7th of April, in assurance and on the admission of the noble earl, that that vote would not pledge Parliament to war, I did it also on the further persuasion, that at that moment his Majesty's ministers had taken no step by which the country was actually committed on the subject. If, at that time, I had understood from his Majesty's ministers that their policy was conducted on offensive, and not on defensive views, I should have felt it incumbent on me not to object to the Address (for under the existing circumstances, the measures of preparation to which the Address pledged Parliament, were indispensable), but to offer to your lordships an amendment, distinctly marking my sense of the question before us. Whether or not it was consistent with the noble earl's duty to communicate to this House at the time the Address was proposed, so much of the Treaty of Vienna as would have given us an insight of the policy of the Allied Powers, I will not take upon me to determine; but I repeat, that my intentions in voting for the Address were to enable his Majesty's ministers to adopt measures of preparation in a very different spirit from that by which I now find they were animated. With regard to the exposition of the Treaty which we have just heard from the noble earl, all I can say is, that I think the communication of the Treaty itself ought to have been accompanied by a Message from the Throne, comprehending the reasons which had induced his royal high- ness the Prince Regent to agree to it; and that we should not have been exposed to the inconvenience of endeavouring to collect the object of that acquiescence. I agree, my lords, with the noble earl, that this is not a fit opportunity to discuss the merits of the Treaty. No notice was given, and no expectation was entertained of such a discussion; and I should be more particularly reluctant to enter into it in the absence of a noble friend of mine (lord Grenville), whose absence is, I have no doubt, occasioned by his not anticipating that your lordships would this evening engage in the examination of any great public question. Nevertheless, there have been one or two observations made by the noble earl, which I cannot allow to pass without remark. The noble earl says, that the Treaty does not pledge us or our Allies to prosecute the war on the principle of the Declaration of the 13th of March. I wish, my lords, that this explanation rested on something more than on the passing words of the noble earl in this House. I regret that it was not attached to the Declaration with which his royal highness the Prince Regent has accompanied his directions for the ratification of the Treaty. The noble earl declares, that now that Buonaparté is on the throne of France, and that the King of France is expelled, the general sentiment of the country appearing to be adverse to him, it was not intended to prosecute the war against the French Ruler, in any other spirit than that of ordinary hostility against an enemy. The Treaty, however, binds his Majesty's Government and the Allies to prosecute the war in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March, and to direct in common and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against him and against all those who should have already joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it. Now, my lords, what is the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March? That Declaration states, "that Napoleon Buonaparté had destroyed the only legal title on which his existence depended," that (in a phrase of an almost incomprehensible nature) "he had placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and a disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he had rendered himself liable to public vengeance." Why, my lords, this can point only to the personal extermination of the man. It suspends all the rules of ordinary warfare for that purpose. It not only raises the sword of public vengeance against his life, but it arms the assassin for the same object. Certainly this, which is the only natural, is the most atrocious construction of the passage in the Declaration of the Allies, and I am heartily glad to hear it disclaimed by the noble earl. But, surely, my lords, something more than a speech in this House is demanded, in order to explain the matter to the country, to our friends, and I will add, even to the enemy. It is, however, a consolation to hear the noble earl's solitary voice proclaim that the Declaration is not held to bear the construction to which it seems liable, and to find that the parties to this shameful instrument blush at their own conduct, and hasten to disavow it. There was one part of the noble earl's speech which, I confess, I heard with considerable alarm. The noble earl asserted that the principle which the explanatory Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent actually involved was one which he had maintained for many years, in common with my noble friend near me (marquis Wellesley), and a noble friend of mine who is not in his place (lord Grenville)—I mean the principle of putting an end to the existing Government of France. Three propositions were stated by the noble earl, as those which were comprehended in that Declaration; the first that the sine quâ non of peace was the destruction of the existing Government of France; the second, that it was desirable to restore what he called the legitimate monarchy of that country; the third, that the restoration of that monarchy would, however, by no means be considered as a sine quâ non. And first, my lords, with respect to the principle on which we are to go to war, that of the destruction of the existing Government of France, I maintain that the noble lord's assertion, that during the late war it was for many years avowed and acted upon, is unfounded. Avowed I know it was not, and if acted upon, then were Parliament and the public most scandalously deceived on the subject. I recollect, myself, before I had the honour to sit among your lordships, making a motion in the other House of Parliament to bring this question to an issue, by a declaration that the nature of the existing Government of France did not preclude a negociation for peace. Was my motion negatived? No, my lords. Mr. Pitt would not venture to meet it in that way. He would not venture to assert the principle which the noble earl now says has been long avowed and acted upon, because he knew that with all his great powers, he should be unable to justify it in the face of the country. No such principle has, in fact, ever been before recognized. Your lordships are now told, for the first time, that we are about to make war for the extermination of the Government of France, as a government; and that until that be effected, we are not to expect peace. Against that determination, my lords, I protest. I think it most unjust and most unwise. I think that in its consequences it threatens the interest, the safety, nay, the existence of this country. I would wish by every possible means to avert such an evil. The noble earl, it is true, declares his readiness to meet any discussion which may be instituted on this side of the House, of the merits of the Treaty; but I maintain that neither I nor any of my noble friends near me should be placed in the situation of being compelled to make a motion on the subject. We have a right to expect that his Majesty's ministers should bring the question before your lordships, that they should explain the principle on which they have proceeded, and originate the investigation of the principle of a measure to which they have been parties.

Marquis Wellesley

said:—I beg, my lords, to be allowed to say a few words, in consequence of what has fallen from my noble friend, as to the inconvenience of discussing this subject at the present moment. It was never my intention to debate the general policy of the Treaty this evening. My sole object was to procure that which I have obtained—the explanation given by the noble earl on the two points touched upon by my noble friend. With respect to the first of these points which my noble friend thought with myself bore a most odious construction, I am satisfied to find, by the explanation of the noble earl, that it is not in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government, or of the Allied Powers, to proceed in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March; although I am much surprised at the strange contradiction which that statement conveys. As to the other point, it will come more fitly before your lordships whenever the general discussion shall take place. But I may be permitted to go so far as to disclaim ever having been a party to a prosecution of the late war against France on the principle proclaimed by the noble earl. Whenever the day of investigation arrives, I shall be prepared to meet the noble earl on this ground; and to maintain that the principle to which he alludes was never avowed, and never acted upon during the whole of the war with revolutionary France.

Earl Darnley

declared, that he should not have voted for the Address of the 7th of April, had he been aware of the existence of a Treaty which pledged this country and our Allies to an offensive war against France. If his Majesty's ministers did not choose to bring the subject under their lordships consideration, he thought it would be the duty of some of his noble friends near him, to ascertain by motion, the opinion of their lordships on the principle upon which the noble earl had avowed that it was the intention of his Majesty's Government to prosecute the war.

The order was then discharged.