Lords Sitting of 6 April 1815

PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RELATING TO THE EVENTS IN FRANCE.
The Earl of Liverpoolpresented a Message from his royal highness the Prince Regent, relative to the proceedings adopted by his Majesty's Government, in consequence of the events that have recently taken place in France. [For a copy of the Message, see the proceedings of the Commons of this day.] The Message having been read, it was ordered, on the motion of the earl of Liverpool, to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
Earl Greyasked, what part of the engagements entered into with the allied Powers at Paris had been violated, and were referred to in the Message as having been violated?
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the events which had recently occurred had, as he should explain to-morrow, violated all the engagements concluded at the time alluded to, as well the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 31st of May, as that concluded at Fontainbleau on the 11th of April.
Earl Greysaid, that no communication had been made to the House of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Some articles certainly had been communicated, but they were not such of the articles as could be conceived to have been violated by the recent occurrences. If, therefore, it was complained that any of the articles of the

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Treaty of Fontainbleau had been violated, it was necessary that they should be produced before the House could come to any opinion on the subject. No one lamented more sincerely than he did the necessity which had called for a communication from the Crown; and no one, he could assure the House, was more sensible than he was of the danger threatened by the events alluded to in the Message. Those events were most ruinous, and placed the country in a situation in which the greatest precautions were necessary; and looking at the two points contained in the Message simply and by themselves, they would meet with his approbation. As he understood the terms of the Address, in consequence of the recent events in France, the Prince Regent had been advised to augment his forces by sea and land. No one, he thought, could doubt that such a step was most advisable under all the circumstances of the present crisis. It was stated, in the next place, that his Royal Highness had taken measures to produce the most intimate concert with his allies, the object of which was to be the permanent security of Europe. A good object, undoubtedly, and the means, too, were such as could alone produce such an end. Of these two measures mentioned in the Message, very different opinions might be expressed, according to the views taken of them. He approved of them on a defensive principle merely, and as the means of preserving peace, supposing peace might be preserved, consistently with good faith to our Allies. If that good faith could be preserved while we remained at peace; a war, he thought, should not be resorted to. That, however, was not the time to press that opinion upon their lordships: he should leave that point for the discussion of to-morrow, and he would consent to leave it for discussion at some future time, when they might be in possession of all the necessary information, provided the Address did not pledge the House to any opinion, that the two steps which had been taken, (viz. the augmentation of forces, and the taking measures to produce concert in the alliance) were proper, with a view to a declaration of war against the present ruler of France. With this inclination to a pacific policy, he was most unwilling that the House should be pressed to give any opinion as to the propriety of war or peace. Those who might be inclined to an opposite policy had, he thought, still stronger
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reasons for avoiding such an expression of opinion on the part of the House; but his Majesty's ministers, of all men, should be the most desirous not to come to any premature declaration, and to avoid provoking discussion, in which conflicting opinions might be expressed, which could not fail to be detrimental to whatever line of policy it might be found expedient to pursue. Before any opinion was given on this subject, it was most material that they should have information, which it was impossible they could now possess. The time had been too short, the accounts too contradictory, the narrators too deeply interested, to enable their lordships to form a correct idea of the internal state of France. Before they expressed an opinion which might place the nation in a state of war, it was most important to be acquainted with the feeling of our Allies on the subject. Now, there had been no opportunity for us to receive accounts from Vienna, of a date subsequent to the time when intelligence was first received of the events which had put the present ruler of France in possession of the supreme authority in the capital of that country. He should not at that time express his feelings respecting the paper which purported to be a Declaration of the allied Powers, lest he might throw an obstacle, by premature discussion, in the way of any explanation which might hereafter be given of this document. But it was impossible that the feelings of the Allies, under the present circumstances, could have been yet ascertained; and it was most necessary that they should be ascertained, before a question of such importance as that of peace or war should be decided upon. The measures which were communicated in the Message, left that question entirely open; and if the Address went to approve simply of those measures, and no farther, he should not oppose it. If, however, contrary to his just expectations, and his ardent wishes, the Address which was to be proposed, should commit their lordships to a declaration of hostilities, if the Allies were found willing to consent to such a course, he should feel it his duty to dissent from it. He had thought it right to trespass thus far upon their lordships' attention, wishing to come to an early understanding on the subject, and not with any view to premature discussion; and he earnestly hoped that it would be unnecessary for him to offer any opposition to the Address.
Earl Stanhopeagreed, that their lordships ought to be very cautious how they proceeded, when the question might at length come to be, peace or war; war which found every thing before it like the garden of Eden, and left every thing behind it a desolate wilderness. It was, therefore, his intention, when the motion before the House was disposed of, to move for the Declaration of the allied Powers at Vienna, of the 13th of March last, because, contrary to his expectation, it bad not been laid on the table. This Declaration was important, as an indication of the course the Allies meant to pursue, but still more so from the extraordinary proposition on which they founded their Declaration, viz. "that they will be ready to give to the King of France and to the French nation, or to any other Government that shall be attacked, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make common cause against all those who shall attempt to compromise it." In what sense this was to be understood he knew not; but if it was to be taken according to its natural import in the English language, it was most horrible. The very family on our throne, was seated there by the constitutional power of Parliament, which had deposed the late king James 2. By the constitution of this country, no foreign troops could land in it without the consent of Parliament; yet the Allies engaged, that when the Government of any country was attacked, they would, if called upon, send their troops thither. This Declaration was, therefore, an attack upon the liberties and constitution of the people of this country. Not to mention the case of France—there was existing at present in Spain a government which conducted itself on most extraordinary principles, civil, political, and religious. Were the English troops, under the Declaration in question, to be poured into Spain in the event of any disturbances there, to support the King against the Cortes, the Parliament of Spain, and the people of that country? What had made Ferdinand king of Spain, but the power of the Cortes? His father, who had been king of Spain, was still living; so that unless the supreme power of the people and Cortes was acknowledged, Ferdinand could not be a lawful Sovereign. He was anxious to know, as well as the noble earl, whether the Address would merely express satisfaction at the measures taken by the Prince Regent, or whether it would pledge the
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House to support a war? For his own part, he had rattier die in the most horrid torture, than agree to the declaration of war on such principles.
The Marquis of Lansdownesaid, that a report having gone abroad that there was a secret article in the Treaty of Paris, by which this country became bound to support Louis 18, in case of insurrection, he wished the noble earl opposite to state, whether there was any such article. He put the question, not as believing that there was any such secret article without the knowledge of Parliament, but merely for the purpose of having the rumour contradicted.
The Earl of Liverpoolhad no objection to say, that the rumour of any such secret article was entirely without foundation. He said, he should agree to produce both the Treaty of Fontainbleau and the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th ult. He said, that to-morrow he should explain more fully the sentiments of his Majesty's Government; but be should observe that it was intended to echo the Message in the opinion that the recent events were in violation of the Treaty of Paris. The rest of the Address would merely be an approbation of the measures of armament and those taken for producing concert among the Allies for the purpose of general security. He believed he could not more fully explain the nature of it, unless he communicated to the noble earl (Grey) a copy of the proposed Address.
Lord Grenvillesaid, he should reserve the full expression of his opinions till the night of discussion arrived; but he should even then state his entire approbation of the two measures mentioned in the communication from the Throne. The situation in which this country was placed, was most arduous, and one in which active and vigorous measures were necessary. But whatever might by the course which might be taken, the best hope of Europe was in the intimate concert between the members of the great alliance. These two sentiments were the only sentiments which the Message conveyed—the only sentiments which the Address should express, because the present was not the time for a decision on the ulterior question of peace or war. Neither should he prematurely state his own opinion as to the course which this country should pursue, but await the time when that great and dreadful alternative might be presented for their consideration.
The Message was then ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
Earl Stanhopethen moved for a copy of the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th of March, which was accordingly ordered to be produced.