HL Deb 18 February 1813 vol 24 cc575-89

The order of the day being read for taking into consideration the papers relative to the War with America,

Earl Bathurst

rose and observed, that the correspondence on the table with the United States of America was very voluminous, but he had the satisfaction to state that he should not have to trouble the House at any length upon it. To enter at length into the correspondence was indeed wholly unnecessary. There might be differences of opinion on many points occurring in the course of the correspondence; there might be a difference of opinion as to the policy of the Orders in Council, or the policy of repealing them, but he was satisfied there could be but one opinion in that House, approving of the conduct of government in rejecting the propositions of the government of the United States, or of the necessity of the vigorous prosecution of the war. The Address which he should have the honour to move, was confined to these points, and did not enter into any matter which was likely to lead to a difference of opinion. It became necessary to enter into some detail, which he would do very briefly. Early in May last, there being reason to apprehend that it was the object of the American government to instigate our croizers to acts of hostility, in order, by means of them, to incite the people of the United States to call for a war with this country, instructions were sent out to our commanders on that station cautiously to abstain from any act of aggression. Instructions were also sent, that if war was declared by the American States, our commanders should immediately consider the war as commenced and act accordingly, and that they should blockade de facto the Chesapeake and the Delaware. The difference between a blockade de facto and a blockade by notification was, that in the former case vessels could only be captured by the actual force employed, but in a blockade by notification all vessels going to or coming from the port blockaded, were liable, after warning, to capture. It was incumbent on the government, in this case, to resort to no other than a legitimate blockade, and that he did not consider a legitimate blockade, where the belligerent carried on trade with the port blockaded. That a blockade by notification was not therefore earlier resorted to arose from these circumstances; that there was a contract for the supply of flour to the peninsula from the American ports, great part of which flour remained in these ports; that our West India islands also looked to the American ports for supplies which they wanted; and that subsequently, in August, manufactured goods from this country, to the amount of 5,000,000l. were exported to America. To have resorted, therefore, to a blockade by notification, would have interrupted the supply of flour to the peninsula; the supply of our own West India islands, before they could make other arrangements, and the passage of our own manufactures. After the repeal of the Orders in Council, about which he should not now give any opinion, instructions were sent to Mr. Foster, founded upon that event; and upon intelligence reaching this country of the declaration of war by the United States, it was thought better to send instructions to sir John Borlase Warren, to propose an armistice, in order that fresh causes of war might not arise out of the prosecution of the war, and in the expectation that a pacific result would be thus more advantageously brought about. The propositions made on the part of the American government, would be seen in the correspondence; and it would be observed, that there was in truth no difference between the propositions made by Mr. Russell here, and by Mr. Secretary Monroe in America. In each case we were called upon to suspend the exercise of the right of impressment, in order that some regulations might be suggested that should be an effectual substitute for it; but if they could not, then what was to follow? War was to follow; and then we were called upon to give up our ancient and undoubted right of impressment—a right hitherto exercised without dispute, and of the most essential importance to our maritime superiority, or we were told we could not be at peace with America. This was the substance of both propositions. There was no assignable reason why the war should have been commenced by the government of the United States at the precise moment they chose (the grounds alleged for it being the same that had been urged for three months before,) except as a matter of convenience, and for the purpose of obtaining an expected immediate advantage. This advantage which they hoped for, was in intercepting our homeward bound fleet from the West Indies, and for this purpose commodore Rodgers sailed immediately upon the declaration of war. By the judicious management of bur force in that quarter, our fleet was protected, and commodore Rodgers returned disappointed to port. It was this disappointment which probably rendered the tone of the propositions made by Mr. Secretary Monroe more conciliatory than that adopted here by Mr. Russell; but still the propositions were in substance the same. We were called upon, therefore, to surrender our right of impressment; for that was the fact. If any regulation could have been resorted to, to serve as an adequate substitute for the exercise of that right, surely in the course of the last ten years, something might have been done. But during the whole course of that period nothing had been suggested by the American government that could in any way be equivalent to us to our right of impressment. On the contrary that government had shown a disposition, on various occasions, to obstruct, in every way, our recovery of our own seamen who had deserted. In the case of the Chesapeake, undoubtedly, blame was imputable to us; but how stood the case in its circumstances? Several of our men had deserted; the desertion being accompanied by acts of mutiny, they were demanded from the Chesapeake, and it was solemnly denied that any such persons were on board. Application was made to the American government, and after some time, the government denied that any such men were in the service. Application was again made to the officer commanding the Chesapeake, who declared, upon his honour as an officer, that no such men were on board. Yet, when the Chesapeake was boarded by the Leopard, these very men were found on board, and taken away by force, they having assumed different names, by order of the commander of the vessel, and no disapprobation of any part of the conduct of this officer in this transaction had ever been expressed by the American government. Upon another application to the American government they had declined to interfere, alleging as a reason our conduct with regard to the desertion of a man from the ship Constitution at Spithead. Yet how stood the case with regard to this man? It appeared from his statement that he was a native of Ireland, that he had been for several years in the British merchant service, that whilst belonging to a British merchant vessel, and being on shore, he was made drunk and carried on board the American vessel Wasp; that he stated himself to be a British seaman, and desired to be released; but this was refused, and he was, on repeating the demand, actually put in irons. He was afterwards removed on board the Constitution and kept in irons for some time; he contrived, however, to make his escape, but was pursued to a considerable distance, brought back, and tried by a court martial, and although shewing himself to be a British seaman, sentenced to be flogged for desertion, He afterwards made his escape from the Constitution when that ship was at Spithead. Yet this was the case that the American government chose to set up as an apology for not doing justice in cases where a legitimate complaint was made on our part, for the encouragement given to seamen deserting from our vessels. These facts shewed the disposition of the American government to be really hostile to this country, whilst their never having been able to explain or suggest what regulations could effectually stand in the place of our right of impressment, proved the impracticability of any such regulations. The government of the United States, besides, claimed a right hitherto unheard of in any other country, that of cancelling the allegiance of subjects of other states. It would be at once seen that he alluded to their practice of granting letters of naturalization. To obtain letters of naturalization in the United States, all that was requisite was the proof of five years residence there, whether possessed of any property or not, for which purpose proofs might readily be fabricated, and no contrary interest existed in the courts to investigate them. Two persons also stating themselves to be citizens of the United States, and vouching for a third to be a citizen before any magistrate, in any part of the United States, obtained him a certificate of citizenship. These practices were of the utmost importance in considering this question; because it was clear, from an examination of the papers, that in their objections to the right of impressment, the government of the United States made no distinction between American citizens born, and citizens there made by letters of naturalization and certificates of citizenship. It became therefore a question involving the dearest rights and interests of this country. Upon the right of impressment depended our maritime greatness and superiority, and still more when we were at war with other states. This, our undoubted right, the American government now disputed, and offered to us nothing but an unconditional surrender of that right, or war. War with them, therefore, we must have, and he trusted the unanimous vote of that House would serve to convince the people of the United States, that what was held out to them by their government, of a great division of opinion in this country upon the subject, was utterly fallacious. Let us shew that we were not base enough to sacrifice to trade the honour and the interests of the country. Let us shew that we were not improvident enough to sacrifice to commerce that maritime superiority which could alone enable us to carry on commerce with advantage. The noble earl concluded with moving,

"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to acquaint his Royal Highness that we have taken into our consideration the Papers laid before us by his Royal Highness's command, relative to the late Discussions with the Government of the United States of America:

"That, whilst we deeply regret the failure of the endeavours of his Royal Highness to preserve the relations of peace and amity between this country and the United States, we entirely approve of the resistance which has been opposed by his Royal Highness to the unjustifiable pretensions of the American government, being satisfied that those pretensions could not be admitted without surrendering some of the most ancient, undoubted, and important rights of the British empire:

"That, impressed as we are with these sentiments, and fully convinced of the justice of the war in which his Majesty has been compelled to engage, his Royal Highness may rely on our most zealous and cordial support in every measure which may be necessary for prosecuting the war with vigour, and for bringing it to a safe and honourable termination."

The Marquis of Lansdowne

rose to express his satisfaction at the course which the noble secretary of state had adopted, in confining the Address merely to the approval of the rejection of the propositions made by America, with respect to the right of taking our own seamen. Much as he lamented many of the past transactions between this country and America, especially the mode in which the Orders in Council had been recalled; yet he admitted that it was not at all necessary to advert to these topics, in order to judge of the propriety of the present Address. The question now was, whether, when the Orders in Council had been at last revoked, America had met us with a corresponding disposition to come to an amicable arrangement? for though the Orders in Council were not the sole ground of complaint with America, yet he did not find that there appeared any other bar to a friendly accommodation. He had, therefore, certainly expected, that when this was removed, America would have returned to such a pacific disposition as would have paved the way for the adjustment of other differences. Adverting to the impressment of our own seamen, he stated that he could not perceive that there was any difference in regard to the principle, the dispute was about certain abuses which were alleged to exist in the practice. The principle might be admitted, that we had a right to the allegiance of our own subjects; but it would be justly added, that we ought not to extend that in practice so far as to press American seamen into our service: and there could be no doubt but we ought to endeavour, as much as possible, to prevent any such abuses. In a question, then, involving so much national prejudice, it was essential that the parties should meet with a disposition mutually to conciliate. He could not yet abandon the hope that means might still be found for the restoration of peace, and for placing that peace upon a permanent footing; and he was glad to find some manifestation of such a disposition to enter into discussion for that purpose, both in the proposition of Mr. Monroe to sir John Borlase Warren, and in the Declaration of the Prince Regent; though he admitted that the proposition of Mr. Monroe was not such as could with propriety have been accepted. But he was pleased to find, that no unwillingness had been expressed on our part to consider and discuss any proposition for the object which America had in view, and which it was certainly incumbent on the American government to propose, and state distinctly, before they called upon us to abandon our present mode of exercising an undoubted right.—He had heard much of the hostile disposition of the American government towards this country; and he was sorry to see, in these papers, some ground for the charge. He regretted also, that such an advantage had been given to the government of dragging the popular opinion along with it, in that hostile disposition. If the Orders in Council had been sooner recalled, he was convinced that this war would never have taken place; for it appeared from these papers, that it would have been impossible for the government of America to have got the people to second its views. When we talked of the hostile disposition of the American government, we ought to consider what was then nature of that government. If there was any country in the world where public opinion had an immediate operation on the government, it was America. If, then, twenty years ago, the disposition of America was known to be highly favourable to this country, we ought to review our own conduct and policy, in order to ascertain whether there was any thing in that conduct, to give just occasion for the hostile disposition which was now said to exist. In all our transactions with foreign countries, and especially with America, we ought to study the temper, disposition, and even prejudices not only of the governments, but of the people; not, however, with a view to surrender our own rights, but to conciliate, as far as was consistent with the interests and honour of our own country, the good opinion both of the rulers and the subjects of other countries.—But while he recommended a mild, temperate, and conciliating conduct, in time of peace, he was far from recommending a slow and dilatory mode of carrying on war. When war had once commenced, there was no resource, but a vigorous and determined prosecution of it, in order to bring it to a speedy and favourable conclusion. The want of this proper vigour in the prosecution of the war was palpable, and deeply to be lamented; for if there was any thing more calculated to generate contempt and confidence in an enemy, it was the union of lofty pretension with insufficient means and dilatory execution. Some time ago it was imagined on all hands that in the event of a war with America, the first operation would be the destruction of her navy. What the fact had turned out to be, he was almost ashamed to mention. If any one were asked, what had been the success of our navy in this war, he would unfortunately find some difficulty in giving an answer. Yet, if ever there was a contest where we ought to have been well prepared, where we had every advantage in regard to naval means, it was this contest with America,—a contest commencing at a time when our navy was almost liberated from every other occupation—when there could have been no difficulty, surely, in sending out a force capable of coping with the American squadron—a navy so inferior, so inexperienced, and so perfectly known in all its parts. But after the experience of a year, we were at last tardily preparing fleets, when we might on the first declaration of war have so well taught the Americans of the disadvantages under which they must labour in the prosecution of hostilities. On that head he had much to regret, but he admitted that this was not necessarily connected with the present proposition. He agreed that our own government was well justified in calling for a distinct statement of any proposition which America had to propose for discussion, and that therefore the proposal made by Mr. Monroe was not satisfactory. He could, not, then, refuse his assent to the present Address: but at the same time he hoped the government would evince every disposition, without sacrificing the honour of the country, which he was disposed to rate as highly as any man, to come to some amicable arrangement in regard to the practice of impressing our seamen from American ships, without abandoning the principle.

Viscount Melville

defended the conduct of the Admiralty, contending, that an amply sufficient force was on the American station at the time of the breaking out of the war, and that at that time no additional force could have been spared from other services. Would the noble lords have had the American ports blockaded before a declaration of war? A sufficient force was stationed there for all the purposes of protection, and when the intelligence of the war arrived, every exertion was made to send a reinforcement, since which a large reinforcement had been sent. If it was meant to be urged that our force should prevent any squadron from sailing from an enemy's port, it was evidently asking what was in itself impossible. The utmost that could be done was, to render it a matter of extreme difficulty for an enemy's squadron to get out of port. Once out they might do us a temporary mischief; but the utmost that could be done, was to protect our convoys with such a force as to render the attacking them nearly a hopeless task. He was satisfied whenever the detail was entered into, that it was capable of the best proof that the force on the American station, at the time of the breaking out of the war, was amply sufficient for all the purposes required of it; and he most positively asserted, that at that period no additional force could be spared from other quarters. The only quarter to which he could imagine the noble marquis to allude was the Baltic, and from thence, unquestionably, at that time no force could be spared.

He, therefore, maintained that every exertion had been made by the Admiralty of which the force of the country was capable.

Marquis Wellesley

said, he most cordially and sincerely concurred in the objects of the Address, which he thought Wisely and judiciously drawn up; first, that the war was a most just war; secondly, that the objects of the war were of the utmost importance to the rights and interests of this country; and thirdly, that it ought to be prosecuted with vigour and ability. There might be some differences of opinion as to the points connected with the progress of the negociation, but to those he would not now advert. His chief object was to look for the vigorous and able conduct of the war, but where was he to find the proofs of that ability which was so essentially necessary? The noble viscount had asked, would you have blockaded the ports of the United States before a declaration of war? Certainly not; but was there not reason to believe, from the disposition of the American government, that war might be suddenly, as it had been, most hastily and inconsiderately, declared; and would not men of wisdom and ability, or even of mere common sense, have taken care to provide a force on the station in the vicinity of the United States, in order that it might be ready to act upon any emergency. It had been said, that instructions had been sent to our admiral to dispose his force to act with effect in the event of a declaration of war; but where was the wisdom of sending instructions to act, without the means of acting with effect. An inadequate force was stationed there, and then a parade was made of sending instructions to the admiral to adopt active measures of hostility in the event of a declaration of war, whilst the means of carrying into effect those measures were not placed at his disposal. He trusted a time would come, and that very shortly, for an enquiry into the mode of conducting this war. He trusted also, that it would be carried on with a vigour and ability commensurate to the importance of the objects at stake, and not upon the principles propounded by the first lord of the Admiralty.

The Earl of Liverpool

could not help expressing his satisfaction at what had been conceded that night, namely, that the war on the part of America had been a war of passion, of party spirit, and not a war of policy, of interest, or necessity. Without entering into details, there was one observation which he must make on the subject of impressing seamen, which had been made the chief ground of complaint. The right claimed by us on that head was undoubted, yet it was at the same time liable to abuse. But if the war had proceeded from the abuse of that right, should we not see those parts of America calling for war which must in that case have been most aggrieved by the unjust exercise of that right; whereas we found, that from the sea-ports of America, from all the eastern states, there came a loud and general cry against the war. No: the declaration for war, the strong passion for it, the settled aversion to peace, the determined hostility to this country originated in those states who could have no possible feeling of interest on the subject of impressing seamen. With their knowledge of the disposition of America to this country, his Majesty's ministers, though still desirous of peace, had thought it right to be prepared for war, and they had made such preparations for it, they bad assumed such an attitude as was consistent with the other interests of the country, and the other arduous contests in which we were engaged. The noble marquis had brought forward a charge that some of the enemy's ships had escaped. For his own part, it was matter of surprise and wonder to him, not that ships now and then escaped the vigilance of our commanders, but how they were taken. If we looked to the great naval light of this country (he need hardly mention the name of lord Nelson), if we recalled the most brilliant period of her annals, to what accidents must we not attribute it, that the French fleet twice escaped the vigilance of his pursuit, and landed an army of 40,000 men in Egypt., In the commencement of the present war, the combined fleets of the enemy had escaped from the Straits of Gibraltar, had proceeded to India, and on their return, coming out from the bay of Trafalgar, had furnished the occasion for that victory which stamped immortality on the name of the hero who achieved it. He mentioned these circumstances to do away the imputation of imbecility which had been thrown out. He would only at present detain their lordships with one reflection more. It was true that neutral states were liable to certain inconveniences, but they also possessed great advantages over others. America owed her advancement in population, in agriculture, in arts, and prosperity, to the security and protection afforded her by Great Britain, to the dominion of this country over that vast element which separated her from European power and jealousy. Although, therefore, she might have had wrongs, although she might have had grounds of complaint, although she might have had pressing provocations, yet she ought to have looked to this country as the guardian power to which she was indebted, not only for her comforts, not only for her rank in the scale of civilization, but for her very existence. From the papers now laid before the House, from every page and line of those papers, it would appear that she had constantly shewn the strongest partiality towards France. It was important that this fact should be known; for it must eventually have the effect of opening the eyes of the inhabitants of both countries to the conduct and motives of the American government.

Marquis Wellesley

said, it was far from his intention to ground a charge of misconduct against ministers on the escape of certain ships: his objection had gone distinctly to the mode of stationing our naval force on the American coast, and to the limited extent of that force so employed.

Lord Holland

found himself compelled to break through that unanimity which had been so anxiously desired that night, and also to state, very briefly, the grounds on which he should withhold his assent from the Address. He admitted that the war on the part of America was a war of passion, and not of necessity: but be regretted that the Address had been so worded as to imply that the American government had peremptorily insisted on our surrender of the right of impressing seamen, and to this he could not agree on the face of the evidence. A proposal to explain and adjust, was not a proposal to surrender. From the statement of Mr. Monroe, it appeared that the shades of difference on the subject were so nice, that he himself was not without hopes that they might still be done away. The noble Secretary of State was, he conceived, not correct in stating, that no country had ever claimed authority over naturalized subjects. A statute of the 2d of queen Anne was then lying on their table, which extended the protection of this country to any person in any state of Europe taking the oath of allegiance to the British government. If the sentiments of the American government were not greatly altered since he had the honour of negotiating with them, they were very ready to make concessions in this point. Had any member of Congress, of equal eloquence with the noble lord, drawn such a picture of the sufferings of the friends and parents of the seamen detained by this country, as the noble lord had presented on the other side, he should have thought it would have produced a spirit in that country, the reverse of a disposition to peace or concilialion. He could not vote for the Address, but he should not move to leave out the words which formed the ground of his objection, because such an amendment might be improperly construed into a disapprobation of the claim itself, which was the subject of controversy.

The Earl of Harrowby

, after the declaration of the noble lord who had just sat down, that the hostility of America originated in passion, and not in reason, felt himself at a loss to conjecture to what part of the Address the noble lord's objections could apply. He was ready to attribute those objections rather to a microscopic eye, too fond of seeking after minute shades of difference, than to a jaundiced mind, taking a tincture from its own prejudices, and discolouring the object of its contemplation. The right of impressing, which was of such infinite importance to the vital interests of this country, had been required to be surrendered on certain conditions, not as the price of peace, but as the price of an armistice. No longer ago than June 1811, Mr. Foster had expressly declared that the American government could make no distinction between native and naturalized subjects. If the American government were determined to act up to the spirit of this declaration, in other words, to assert their right to make every subject of this realm a deserter and a traitor, it was impossible that peace should ever return—war must be eternal.

Lord Holland

explained. He said that one great point had been entirely lost sight of, which was, that there were rights on the part of America, and rights belonging to this country. What the Americans demanded was, that we should enter into a negociation to adjust and fix the boundaries of those rights. By consenting to suspend the exercise of a right for a certain period, we did not agree to surrender it. He had declared that the Americans appeared to him to have been hurried into acts of intemperance and passion, but we ought to make a correct statement of what those acts were; we were not to bring general charges against them of which there was no evidence.

Lord Erskine

disapproved of the Address. It had been said that this was a war of passion with the American people. It might be so; but to whom was that passion to be originally attributed, by whose conduct was it excited? A war between nations might be compared to a quarrel between individuals. It was not enough to know the degree of passion or irritation which had been produced, in order to judge of the merits of the quarrel, unless we at the same time knew the aggravating circumstances, the insult or injury by which it had been produced. The noble lord could not consider the war as the consequence of the question of the right of impressing. It originated in the former irritations between this country and America previous to the Orders in Council. This shewed that neither this country nor America was sincere in placing the grounds of the war solely on that question. There were other causes which stood in the way of conciliation, and no good understanding could take place between the two countries till these were removed. It had been said that this war, if the Americans persisted in their claims, must be eternal. If so, our prospects were disheartening. America was a growing country—increasing every day in numbers—in strength—in resources of every kind. In a lengthened contest, all the advantages were on her side, and against this country.

The Lord Chancellor

was of opinion that the last topic on which the noble lord had insisted, was the only justification which government could offer for having delayed the war with America so long. It was their sense of the great and many disadvantages necessarily attending the contest, which had made them so reluctant to enter into it; and in the same spirit of forbearance, they should be always ready to avail themselves of every opportunity of returning to a state of peace. The right, the temporary surrender of which at least was made the sine qua non of negociation by the American government, was one which was necessary to the existence of this country, and if it was ever more necessary to it at one time than another, this was the period. There was no question in the whole course of his political life on which he had been called to judge, where he had given his opinion more reluctantly or more decidedly. If the claim of naturalization, insisted on by the Americans, were allowed, why should it not be made by other countries? If a residence of five years established the right, why should not a residence of one month? It would thus be easy, by the offer of impunity, and by the temptation of greater pay, to seduce our seamen into the service of foreign states. Unless America should think proper to alter her tone, he did not see how the national differences could be settled: surely never, if the condition of conciliation was to be the concession of that claim which was the life of our navy, and through that, the life and protection of the country. Was it not, he would ask, a surprise on the nation, to find at length that the war with America did not arise out of the Orders in Council, but from a cause which had never been dragged into the discussion while there was any thing else to talk about,—from a cause now introduced merely for the purpose of irritation, and as a pledge of their hostile intentions? As an adviser of the crown, he would never consent to an armistice on the condition of appearing to hesitate about a right so vitally affecting the nation, that its ruin might ensue in a month from its concession.

The Address was then carried without a division.