Lords Sitting of 20 December 1813

DECLARATION OF THE ALLIED POWERS.
Lord Hollandobserved, that a paper had appeared in all the public prints, purporting to be a Declaration of the Allied Powers, published at Frankfort; in which it was said, "the first use which their imperial and royal majesties have made of victory, has been, to offer peace to his majesty the emperor of the French." He wished, therefore, to ask of the noble lord opposite, in the first place, of course, whether this paper was an authentic document; if so, whether this government was a party to it; and whether an overture of peace
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had been made to the emperor of the French and rejected; or whether any overture had been made, that was likely to lead to a negociation?
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he had no difficulty in stating, that the paper purporting to be a Declaration of the Allied Powers was an authentic document. With respect to the question, whether this government was a party to it, the allies were undoubtedly in full possession of our sentiments; but he had no hesitation in saying, that the Declaration itself was issued at Frankfort without any previous concert with his Majesty's government, as to the publication of such a document. With regard to the questions, as to whether any overture had been made to France? he must, consistently with his public duty, decline giving any answer.
The Earl of Darnleyobserved, that his noble friend's questions appeared to have been in some degree misunderstood by the noble earl. The Declaration of the Allied Powers stated, that an overture had been made to the emperor of the French; and the object was, to ascertain whether such an overture had been made and rejected.
The Earl of Liverpoolrepeated, that the Declaration had been published at Frankfort, without a previous concert with this government as to its publication.
Lord Hollandobserved that it was of considerable importance to know, whether an overture had been made to the emperor of the French, and rejected; and upon this point he thought his questions had been in some degree misunderstood.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, his answers had referred distinctly to the points, that the Declaration was an authentic document; that the allies were in full possession of the sentiments of his Majesty's government; but that the Declaration, so far as it went, was published at Frankfort, without any previous concert with this government as to such publication.

ADJOURNMENT OF PARLIAMENT.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, on moving the adjournment of the House till the 1st of March, that, as it was for a longer period than usual, he thought it right to state the grounds on which he brought forward the motion. Parliament, it would be, recollected, met as early as the 4th of November; and it had now sat a greater number of days than it would have done between the usual period of its meeting and the 1st of march. A great portion

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of the important part of the public business had been gone through; and neither in regard to that nor to private or judicial business was he aware that any inconvenience would arise from an adjournment to the 1st of March; whilst, on the other hand, he did not wish to conceal, that with respect to most important business, considerable advantage would be derived from such an adjournment. As to private and judicial business, more days had been devoted to it, than could have been between the customary period of the meeting of parliament and the 1st of March, and no inconvenience could arise from the proposed adjournment. With respect to financial business, the money that had been placed at the disposal of ministers was sufficient for the public purposes during the interval proposed; and, although his Majesty's government had entered into no pledge not to require more during that period, yet at all events it would not be expedient to call for more till the month of May. Under every view of circumstances, therefore, no inconvenience could arise from an adjournment to the period proposed; and he should therefore conclude by moving, "that the House do adjourn till Thursday the 1st of Match, 1814."
The Earl of Darnleyfelt it incumbent upon him, in the exercise of his duty as a peer of parliament, to resist the unusually long adjournment now proposed. Under the circumstances of the dazzling successes obtained by our allies, and the hope that they would lead to a safe and honourable peace, the utmost confidence had been reposed in ministers by parliament; no opposition whatever had been given to them; their measures had been carried as it were by acclamation; and, surely, gratitude for this confidence and support ought to have dictated to them not to dismiss parliament in the way they now proposed. They had carried their measures, and obtained the money they wanted, and now they wished to get rid of the parliament, as being for some time of no further use to them; but surely there were other duties required of parliament, than granting money to ministers; and passing turnpike Bills. There were several points to which it was likely the attention of parliament might be called during the interval over which it was now proposed to adjourn. The glories that had beamed upon us in the east seemed to have drawn away our attention from the events in the west, where, unfortunately, an horizon much
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less brilliant appeared. He had on a former occasion alluded to the state of the war in that quarter; and he lamented, that what he then anticipated had nearly occurred. A large force had been placed under the command of sir John Warren, but yet comparatively nothing had been done; whilst on one of the largest lakes our naval force had been destroyed, and on the other lake sir James Yeo had been unable to obtain any superiority, if he had not already been compelled to retreat. He was afraid also, that the communication between Upper and Lower Canada was interrupted; and he much feared, that in a short period little of his Majesty's dominions in that quarter would be left, except the fortress of Quebec. He did not pledge himself to bring forward any motion upon the subject after the recess; but if parliament were sitting, it was probable that its attention would be called to it during the interval. Another topic was also of some importance; namely, the assumption of a new title of sovereignty by the Prince of Orange, and as to how far it tended to diminish or otherwise the hopes entertained in consequence of the late glorious events upon the continent. Another subject also was of the greatest importance; he alluded to the importation of foreign corn. After the late abundant harvest, and in consequence of the present low price of corn, it was of peculiar importance that the British farmer should have full possession of the market. It might be an unpopular doctrine, but he was satisfied, that it was owing to the high price of grain that this country had been enabled to make the great exertions it had and that we were indebted to that for the prosperity we had enjoyed. It was the high price of grain in the English markets that had contributed so much to the prosperity of Ireland, by increasing her agricultural produce, and which had caused the investment of so much additional capital in agriculture. He was the last man who would advocate an interference with the markets; but nothing was more injurious to agriculture than a sudden fluctuation in the necessaries of life; and unless means were taken to give the British farmer full possession of the market, the present low price of corn, however paradoxical it might appear, might lead to consequences highly to be deplored. Another circumstance deserving of serious consideration was, the effect which so long an adjournment would have with reference to

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the Irish members, to whom it would be most inconvenient to attend parliament after the recess. From all these considerations, he felt himself called upon to oppose so long an adjournment; and he should therefore move as an Amendment, to substitute the 1st of February for the 1st of March.
Lord Hollandspoke in substance as follows:—
Under every consideration, I am disposed to prefer the amendment proposed by my noble friend, to the motion of the noble earl; because that amendment appears to my judgment much more wise in a general view, while it is obviously more efficient for the objects to which it is the province of parliament to attend. From the document respecting which a question has been put to the noble earl in the course of this evening, and to which the noble earl declined to return any decisive answer, it appears fair to infer, that some overture for negotiation had been made by the allies to the French government. I do not mean to quarrel with the noble earl for declining to state whether any such overture was actually made to the enemy or not, or whether it was likely to lead to negociation. No doubt, he has good reasons for such conduct. But I maintain, that if such an overture has been made, and rejected by the enemy, it is the duty and best policy of the noble earl, previous to any adjournment, to bring down to this House a communication of that fact, with a statement of the grounds upon which the rejection took place; in order to satisfy the mind, and secure the cordial approbation of the country, by shewing that the continuation of the war was rendered necessary through the injustice and exorbitant pretensions of France. If, on the contrary, the overture has been accepted by the enemy, and is likely to lead to a negociation, then I should see many more reasons against the adjournment, and particularly from the manner in which it is brought forward, and the period to which it is proposed to extend it. For, in the event of negociation, the noble lord should wait a little, to see whether it was likely to be brought to a successful termination, or the contrary, in order to ascertain whether it might not be necessary to have recourse to the advice of parliament. But, on the present occasion, the noble lord should at least have introduced his proposition by a message from the crown,
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which would have thrown the responsibility of the measure upon himself and his colleagues. The course of proceeding taken by ministers in this instance, I really cannot, help thinking very ungracious towards parliament; particularly from a consideration of the manner in which parliament has acted towards them. They have experienced from parliament the most unlimited confidence, and have received the utmost support they required—they have had all the money and subsidies they desired; and the principle of our old constitutional force (the militia) has been broken down to supply them with men; the confidence, indeed, reposed in them, has been such, that no examination of any part of their conduct has been even attempted—no proposition whatever, or motion, has been brought forward, that could serve in any degree to embarrass their proceedings, or to divert the attention of the executive government from devising and directing all the means in their power to advance the great cause of the confederacy. Is it then becoming—is it commonly gracious, on the part of ministers, after such proofs of confidence, after such contributions of liberal aid, to propose such an extraordinary adjournment of parliament, without even taking the responsibility of the measure upon themselves? When I speak of the confidence thus granted to ministers, I do not by any means propose to censure that grant; on the contrary, they have had my hearty, although comparatively silent approbation; and that approbation I do not mean to retract. Indeed, if the confidence of an individual be of any value, and, according to the opinion of a noble friend of mine, the aggregate of individual opinions constitutes value, ministers have the full value of my confidence. They have obtained my confidence from the manner in which they have contributed to improve the general state of Europe, and from the language and conduct they have maintained in this country. There are, no doubt, many who can more eloquently describe the important change which has recently taken place in the state of Europe; but I feel confident that no one can derive more cordial satisfaction than I do from that most auspicious event; for I have been bred in a school of politics, that deprecates every encroachment upon national independence and the just liberty of mankind. Therefore, if I rejoiced, and I certainly did rejoice, in the retreat of the duke of Brunswick, and the results of the

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battle of Jemappe, my joy must be still more pure upon the results of Deanewitz and Lipie, upon the release of a great part of Europe from oppression, by the assistance of British arms. A noble lord had well observed, that the war was no longer that of courts and governments; but the war of a whole people against oppression, and proportionably energetic. However, although a great part of the happy results of this war may be justly attributed to a powerful popular impulse, and that infatuation on the part of the enemy, which, thank God, always attends the long abuse of power, yet it must be felt that a great deal of the merit is to be attributed to the conduct of this country. If the sentiments of an individual are of consequence enough to arrest your attention, it must be in your lordships' recollection, that I always approved of the interposition and perseverance of ministers in the cause of Spain. Whether that policy be attributable to a noble marquis, whom I do not see in his place (Wellesley, as we understood), or to others, I cannot pretend to determine; but the merit of such policy appears, and ever has appeared, to my judgment, quite indisputable. The merit of it must now, indeed, be universally admitted; for, aided by the uncommon genius of lord Wellington, that policy has produced the most important results. It has driven the enemy from that country which he had so long and so unremittingly oppressed. But this was not the only advantage which the pursuit of this policy has produced. It presented a most encouraging and impressive example to Europe, of what a people excited by oppression were capable of achieving. It served, indeed, to change the whole character of the war, by rendering it that which the noble lord to whom I have before referred so fairly described it; namely, a war of the people. But a still farther advantage has arisen out of this policy. Through some extraordinary circumstances, a most atrocious calumny had become current in Europe, that the government of this country was always ready to distribute its subsidies with a view to embroil the nations of the continent, while it kept its own people aloof from the contest. I do not myself believe, that any British government would employ money to induce the people of other nations to squander their blood merely to spare its own subjects; but still, from the lavish, improvident, senseless manner in which subsidies have been
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occasionally sent from this country, one cannot much wonder at the existence of such a calumny as that which I have stated. No such impression can ever again prevail in Europe. The calumny has been effectually refuted by the policy we have pursued with respect to Spain; for there we have not only given our money but our men—there we have given our money, not to excite the people, but to enable them to act; and we have seconded their exertion by a powerful army.—From old habits, I am, I confess, inclined to view any extension of the principle of subsidies with distrust and doubt; and that distrust has been too much justified by my observation. It has not been in general duly considered, how foreign cabinets or nations might distinguish between a boon and a bribe. If a subsidy should be regarded as the latter, it must, I think, fail in its effect; and, instead of concurrence or co-operation, must produce jealousy, and distrust; while if received as a boon, if could not fail to give rise to that cordial understanding, and to support that vigorous exertion, which distinguishes the present confederacy. The language of ministers, in repudiating that policy which went about knocking at every door in Europe, to ask who would accept money to fight against France, and which policy led to the formation of such a confederacy as that overthrown at Austerlitz, is peculiarly wise and praise-worthy. Ministers, in thus declining prematurely to excite any nation to act, have adopted the policy of the administration of 1806, which was so-often reprobated; namely by husbanding the resources of the country, and waiting until a nation was disposed and ready for action, and when any pecuniary assistance that it received must be regarded as a boon. Hence the subsidies distributed by ministers have been judiciously applied, and eminently contributive to the great end in view. Ministers have, indeed, adopted the policy which is best calculated for the attainment of that end. Their language has been moderate, and their conduct has corresponded with that language. But this is the language and conduct which they will feel it most for their advantage to pursue. They have indeed felt the advantage of such policy already; for it is to the moderation of their language that the confederates are indebted for the accession of Austria. But the advantage of using such language as was addressed to this House by Re-

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gent on the first day of the session, is incalculable. It is to the policy which that language expresses that we must attribute the dazzling view, which, as my noble friend observed the continent of Europe now exhibits; and what an extraordinary change!—the emperor who little more than twelve months ago had triumphant possession of Moscow, while one of his lieutenants was blockading Cadiz, is now driven from all the scenes of his triumph, is now expelled from Spain and Holland. Such is the effect, not so much, it must be admitted, of the power with which he had to contend, as of the ambition and extravagance of the French Ruler himself. What an impressive lesson, then, does his fate offer as to the consequence of indulging the intoxication which victory too often serves to excite. But the conduct of ministers furnishes a striking contrast to that of the enemy; and let us hope they will follow up their system of making a moderate and proper use of victory.
When I approve of any general system of measures, I do not like to dwell upon any exceptionable points of minor importance. It is known, that I have always felt a great partiality and predilection for Spain; and that partiality and predilection have been considerably heightened, by observing of late the anxious desire of the Spanish people to widen rather than to narrow the basis upon which their government stands. Such is the true policy of every country; and I am therefore sincerely sorry to witness a different disposition in Holland. In alluding to this point, I am aware of the assertion, that ministers had nothing to do with the conduct of the Dutch respecting their government. The Dutch, upon the old maxim of "the sovereignty of the people," so much talked of, had, no doubt, a right to arrange their own government; and ministers, no doubt from a consideration of that right, left a blank in the credentials of lord Clancarty, until it was ascertained what sort of government the Dutch might create. Ministers might say, "It was no business of ours to interfere with the Dutch in the establishment of their own government; for the right of settling that establishment rests with them alone." I do not dispute the principle; but I hope that the principle upon which ministers thus act towards their friends, will be extended to their enemies; and that they will acknowledge the just right of any people to frame a government for
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themselves. But who can rationally dispute the sacred truth, that a government is not made for its own interest, but for that of the governed; and that it is contrary to the laws of God and; nature for any power to interfere with the arrangements which a people may think proper to make for their own government. The utmost, therefore, which any foreigner can legitimately do as to such arrangements, is to offer advice or to express regret; and I cannot help repeating my regret; that the Dutch, in the late change, have manifested a disposition rather to narrow than to widen the basis of their government. In adverting to this change, I would not be understood to cast the slightest imputation upon the character of the prince whose rank has been advanced by it; for I fully believe that he feels the most lively solicitude for the interest and happiness of the people of Holland. Therefore, in alluding to this extraordinary alteration, God forbid, that I should be supposed (although his conduct differs from that of his predecessor, William the 3rd) to intend any thing disrespectful to the patriotic and accomplished prince, upon whose qualities so much panegyric has been heard, and which panegyric I have found fully justified on those occasions in which I have had the honour to approach his person. The change may have been altogether the voluntary movement of the persons at Amsterdam, by whom it was originally announced: but from whatever quarter it may have proceeded, I cannot forbear from expressing my disapprobation of it, and my apprehension also that it may lead to considerable mischief. Such a step forms indeed a striking contrast to the conduct of Spain, which has followed the policy that should direct every people; namely, that it is wiser to enlarge than to contract the basis of their government.
In declaring my approbation of ministers in consequence of their moderate language and conduct, that approbation is, of course, founded upon a hope and confidence, that the very different language which appears in certain publications has in no degree their sanction or countenance; for these publications are such as I think it impossible for any man of proper feeling to read without disgust. Sounding a violent and barbarous war whoop through the country, abounding in coarse, vulgar, virulent epithets—in such language, indeed, as would have been de-

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grading to the worst parts of the Jacobin clubs, these publications completed their abominable character by excitements to assassination. Although the French ruler has rendered himself so odious by his conduct, yet it must be admitted that he is a great military commander, still at the head of a great nation; and is it fitting that the press of this country should become the means of advising the assassination of such a man? nay, of exhorting to the deed; and what else can be meant by the repeated declaration, that no peace can be concluded while this individual lives? The French ruler is, no doubt, ambitious, inordinately ambitious; but if it were resolved, that no peace should be made with France while it was under the government of an ambitious man, when, I would ask, could peace be expected? The meaning, however, of all the publications I have referred to may be, to recommend the restoration of the ancient Bourbon family; but the attempt at such a measure would be totally inconsistent with the professed moderation and policy of ministers. The restoration might be good; but it would be preposterous to look for the success of such an object through the intervention of foreign arms; and it would, I repeat, be opposite to the policy and principle of ministers to engage in any such undertaking.
A noble friend of mine, who is not now present (lord Grenville, as we understood), and who is always eloquent upon any subject be discusses, very justly observed, that one of the great advantages resulting from the recent changes on the continent is, the opportunity it affords for the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. But I must be allowed to say, that the re-establishment and maintenance of that balance can never consist in, depend upon, particular divisions of territory, so much upon the existence of a general feeling among the European states, that it is the interest of each to preserve the independence of each and all. Such is the feeling which gave birth and cement to the present confederacy; and therefore I wish that such a confederacy may continue to exist, in peace as well as in war. I esteem the principle of this confederacy, because it appears solicitous to preserve the interest of all without gratifying the peculiar interest of any one; and upon that principle I would rather leave France with such possessions as should make her feel an interest in the common object of
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the confederacy, than transfer from her to any other state, any possession which might be likely to withdraw that state from the general feeling which it is the interest of peace and Europe to improve and strengthen.
The noble earl's proposition of adjournment is, I repeat, open to many serious objections; and it is the more objectionable, as it has not been introduced by a message from the throne, which would have rendered the noble earl and his colleagues responsible for the measure. The convenience of the members of either House of Parliament, as to the time of attendance on parliamentary duty, seems of no material account in the mind of the noble earl; for the noble earl declared, that he would never admit the principle, that members were not bound to attend whenever the King issues his writs. This, no doubt, was a grand and pompous declaration of right; but it is equally clear, that we should be bound to attend the King's writs, if summoned to meet in Scotland, at Johnny Groat's house. If, however, parliament were summoned to meet at Belfast, or at any extremity of the empire, would not some complaints be heard on the ground of inconvenience, especially from England members? No doubt there would; and ministers would feel it expedient to attend to such complaint. So that, although the right of summons was indisputable, there must be some discretion to regulate its existence; and why should not that discretion take into account the circumstances of the Irish members; who really would be so situated, in consequence of an adjournment of this nature, as to be reduced to the alternatives, either of sacrificing their own private business, or deserving their parliamentary duty; and the effect might be actually to deprive Ireland of her share in the representation. The nature of the business which is likely to detain Irish members in Ireland at a particular part of the year has been already stated by my noble friend, and this statement strengthens my objections to the noble earl's motion. But there are other important considerations which render this motion objectionable. From the noble earl's statements as to the grounds of his motion, it would really seem as if the whole province and occupation of parliament consisted in the grant of men and money, in the raising of armies and the imposition of taxes. But it should be recollected, that the first duty

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of parliament is to enquire into and to redress grievances; and will it be pretended, that no case does exist, in Ireland or elsewhere, or that no case may arise before the expiration of such a prolonged recess, that is likely to call for the exercise of that sacred duty? If not, then why should parliament be thus adjourned? Is it not, I ask again, a very ungracious return for the conduct of parliament towards ministers? Is it not tantamount to saying, "You (the parliament) have granted us (the ministers) every thing we required from you. You have reposed in us unlimited confidence, and you have never embarrassed us with any motion or any debate. You have voted us abundance of men and money—you have violated the old militia establishment to supply us with the one, and you have augmented the public burthens to furnish us with the other—you have, in fact, done every thing we wished, but tempus abire tili est—you have done your job, and may go about your business?" This, which I conceive to be the meaning of ministers, involves something rather ungrateful and even disrespectful to the parliament by which they have been so served. But what is likely to be the conclusion of foreign powers as to this extraordinary adjournment? May they not conclude, either that parliament, which has heretofore sanctioned all the minister's policy, is changing, or likely to change its opinion; or that the minister is about to change his policy, and apprehensive of meeting the disapprobation of parliament? Certainly, such a measure, which cannot escape observation, is too likely to lead to disadvantageous inferences on the continent. Your lordships must recollect the various observations which were made in our own and the foreign journals, upon the order for postponing the assemblage of the legislative body of the France, which I shall not of course compare with this assembly. But, from those observations, your lordships may conclude as to the probability of considerable animadversion upon the measure proposed by the noble earl.
Another reason against the noble earl's proposition is suggested by the state of the Act with regard to the volunteering of the militia; for I understood, that if the number of men originally required by ministers from the militia be actually necessary, the Act to which I allude must be altered. Why then adjourn? Are ministers afraid of thing harassed by any motions? I
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hope and trust that they will not provoke any motions by forfeiting the confidence they have obtained. If they mean to be consistent in their policy, and rely upon the consistency of parliament, why, I repeat, should they propose this extraordinary adjournment?
The inconveniencies likely to result from the noble earl's proposed adjournment are so multifarious with respect to private Bills, that they can harshly be detailed. The noble earl, although he seldom argues to convince me, does, I confess, generally endeavour to argue fairly; but really what he has stated upon this subject has very much the complexion of special pleading; for, although the noble earl has dwelt upon the number of days which parliament will have sat notwithstanding the adoption of his motion, he must know, that, practically private business is for the most part done in February, and that month is wholly excluded by his motion. Another evil to be calculated upon from acquiescing in the noble earl's motion, is that parliament must either continue sitting to a more advanced period of the year, when the attendance is usually very thin; or prorogue, leaving a deal of business undone. Thus an evil already much complained of will be aggravated. Indeed, since I have been in parliament, I remember only two sessions in which the sitting to a late period in the summer was not a pretty general complaint. Why then should a long recess be unnecessarily created at the usual period of sitting, which recess must expose parliament to the inconvenience of sitting at an advanced period of the summer? But the noble earl himself had offered the strongest argument against his motion, by shewing that it was unnecessary; and why go beyond the necessity? For the noble earl has asked, could not parliament adjourn from time to time, if it thought proper?—Thus the noble earl put the question, but he made no answer, leaving that, perhaps from liberality, to be stated by his opponents. But I would ask the noble earl and your lordships, as parliament may adjourn for a fortnight or a month, and repeat the adjournment if it thought proper without any obstacle; why not then adjourn rather for a short period, in order that, should any important circumstances occur to require parliamentary consideration, parliament should be in a situation more promptly to discuss them. I am aware, that I may be told of the existence

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of an Act which enables the throne to provide against the inconvenience of a long adjournment. But this statute was enacted in extraordinary times, and has never yet been acted upon. Besides, I do not see why, without any necessity whatever, we should put ourselves in such a situation as to be unprepared to meet any extraordinary emergency. Such a long adjournment as that proposed by the noble earl is calculated to put us in that situation, and therefore I oppose it.
Now, with respect to peace, although the mention of that word has been at times deemed as great a profanation in this country, as in other countries of Europe it has been considered indecent to mention the word republic; yet I am, and have always been, a decided advocate for that great blessing. But in my anxiety for peace, God forbid that I should wish for any that was not completely honourable; and any peace which did not embrace the interests of all the powers in alliance with us I should deem dishonourable. Yes! so dishonourable, that rather than assent to the conclusion of such a peace, I would even look in the face of national bankruptcy. But while I am desirous to have the interests of all the states at present in confederacy with us carefully consulted and fully secured, in any peace that may be concluded, I would by no means consent to the prolongation of the war, with any view to bring other states into the circle of that confederacy.
One word more, and I have done. I hope and trust, that should your lordships agree to the proposition of the minister, he will, upon our re-assemblage, either have to call for our congratulations to the Prince Regent, upon the conclusion of a solid peace; or, if his efforts to attain it fail, that he will be prepared to lay before this House some satisfactory documents to shew that the failure was attributable to the exorbitant pretensions of France.
After a few words from the duke of Norfolk and lord Liverpool, the noble earl's motion was agreed to; and the House stood adjourned to the 1st of March.