Lords Sitting of 30 November 1812

THE PRINCE REGENT'S SPEECH ON OPENING THE SESSION.
Their lordships began to assemble about twelve o'clock. Peeresses and ladies, with peers orders, were admitted into the body of the House; who, together with a numerous attendance of peers, in their robes, made an appearance seldom, if ever, equalled for its elegance and splendour. At two his royal highness the Prince Regent entered the House, and took his seat on the throne. A Message was immediately conveyed, by the Usher of the Black Rod, to the House of Commons, requiring their attendance, to receive his Royal Highness's communication. Accordingly, the Speaker,
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accompanied by a great number of members, appeared at their lordships' bar.
His Royal Highness then delivered the following most gracious Speech:
"My Lords and Gentlemen,
"It is with the deepest concern that I am obliged to announce to you, at the opening of this parliament, the continuance of his Majesty's lamented indisposition, and the diminution of the hopes which I have most anxiously entertained of his recovery.
"The situation of Public Affairs has induced me to take the earliest opportunity of meeting you after the late Elections. I am persuaded you will cordially participate in the satisfaction which I derive from the improvement of our prospects during the course of the present year.
"The valour and intrepidity displayed by his Majesty's Forces and those of his Allies in the peninsula, on so many occasions during this campaign, and the consummate skill and judgment with which the operations have been conducted by General the Marquis of Wellington, have led to consequences of the utmost importance to the common cause.
"By transferring the War into the interior of Spain, and by the glorious and ever memorable Victory obtained at Salamanca, he has compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Cadiz; and the southern provinces of that kingdom have been delivered from the power and arms of France.
"Although I cannot but regret that the efforts of the enemy, combined with a view to one great operation, have rendered it necessary to withdraw from the Siege of Burgos, and to evacuate Madrid, for the purpose of concentrating the main body of the allied forces; these efforts of the enemy have nevertheless, been attended with important sacrifices on their part, which must materially contribute to extend the resources and facilitate the exertions of the Spanish nation.
"I am confident I may rely on your determination to continue to afford every aid in support of a contest which has first given to the continent of Europe the example of persevering and successful resistance to the power of France, and on which not only the independence of the nations of the peninsula, but the best interests of his Majesty's dominions essentially depend.
"I have great pleasure in communicating

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to you, that the relations of peace and friendship have been restored between his Majesty and the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm.
"I have directed copies of the Treaties to be laid before you.
"In a contest for his own Sovereign Rights, and for the independence of his dominions, the emperor of Russia has had to oppose a large proportion of the military power of the French government, assisted by its allies, and by the tributary states dependent upon it.
"The resistance which he has opposed to so formidable a combination, cannot fail to excite sentiments of lasting admiration.
"By his own magnanimity and perseverance, by the zeal and disinterestedness of all ranks of his subjects, and by the gallantry, firmness, and intrepidity of his forces, the presumptuous expectations of the enemy have been signally disappointed.
"The enthusiasm of the Russian nation has increased with the difficulties of the contest, and with the dangers with which they were surrounded. They have submitted to sacrifices of which there are few examples in the history of the world; and I indulge the confident hope, that the determined perseverance of his Imperial Majesty will be crowned with ultimate success; and that this contest, in its result, will have the effect of establishing, upon a foundation never to be shaken, the security and independence of the Russian empire.
"The proof of confidence which I have received from his Imperial Majesty, in the measure which he has adopted of sending his Fleets to the ports of this country, is in the highest degree gratifying to me; and his Imperial Majesty may most fully rely on my fixed determination to afford him the most cordial support in the great contest in which he is engaged.
"I have the satisfaction further to acquaint you, that I have concluded a Treaty with his Sicilian Majesty, supplementary to the Treaties of 1808 and 1809.
"As soon as the ratifications shall have been exchanged, I will direct a copy of this Treaty to be laid before you.
"My object has been to provide for the more extensive application of the military force of the Sicilian government to offensive operations; a measure which, combined with the liberal and enlightened principles which happily prevail in the
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councils of his Sicilian Majesty, is calculated, I trust, to augment his power and resources, and, at the same time, to render them essentially serviceable to the common cause.
"The Declaration of War by the government of the United States of America, was made under circumstances which might have afforded a reasonable expectation that the amicable relations between the two nations would not long be interrupted. It is with sincere regret that I am obliged to acquaint you, that the conduct and pretensions of that government have hitherto prevented the conclusion of any pacific arrangement.
"Their measures of hostility have been principally directed against the adjoining British Provinces, and every effort has been made to seduce the inhabitants of them from their allegiance to his Majesty.
"The proofs, however, which I have received of loyalty and attachment from his Majesty's subjects in North America are highly satisfactory.
"The attempts of the enemy to invade Upper Canada have not only proved abortive, but, by the judicious arrangements of the Governor-General, and by the skill and decision with which the military operations have been conducted, the forces of the enemy assembled for that purpose in one quarter, have been compelled to capitulate, and in another have been completely defeated.
"My best efforts are not wanting for the restoration of the relations of peace and amity between the two countries; but until this object can be attained, without sacrificing the maritime rights of Great Britain, I shall rely upon your cordial support in a vigorous prosecution of the war.
"Gentlemen of the House of Commons,
"I have directed the Estimates for the services of the ensuing year to be laid before you, and I entertain no doubt of your readiness to furnish such supplies as may enable me to provide for the great interests committed to my charge, and afford the best prospect of bringing the contest in which his Majesty is engaged to a successful termination.
"My Lords and Gentlemen,
"The approaching expiration of the Charter of the East India Company renders it necessary that I should call your early attention to the propriety of providing effectually for the future government of the provinces of India.
"In considering the variety of interests which are connected with this important subject, I rely on your wisdom for making such an arrangement as may best promote the prosperity of the British possessions in that quarter, and at the same time secure the greatest advantages to the commerce and revenue of his Majesty's dominions.
"I have derived great satisfaction from the success of the measures which have been adopted for suppressing the spirit of outrage and insubordination which had appeared in some parts of the country, and from the disposition which has been manifested to take advantage of the indemnity held out to the deluded by the wisdom and benevolence of parliament.
"I trust I shall never have occasion to lament the recurrence of atrocities so repugnant to the British character; and that all his Majesty's subjects will be impressed with the conviction, that the happiness of individuals, and the welfare of the state, equally depend upon a strict obedience to the laws, and an attachment to our excellent constitution.
"In the loyalty of his Majesty's people, and in the wisdom of parliament, I have reason to place the fullest confidence. The same firmness and perseverance which have been manifested on so many and such trying occasions, will not, I am persuaded, be wanting at a time when the eyes of all Europe, and of the world, are fixed upon you. I can assure you, that in the exercise of the great trust reposed in me, I have no sentiment so near my heart as the desire to promote, by every means in my power, the real prosperity and lasting happiness of his Majesty's subjects."
The Commons having withdrawn from the bar, his Royal Highness presently rose, and departed from the House. After his Royal Highness's departure, their lordships adjourned for the purpose of unrobing.
About five o'clock the Lord Chancellor took his seat on the woolsack, and the House was resumed. The earl of Liverpool, according to custom, previously to the commencement of public business, presented a Bill for the better regulation of Select Vestries, which was ordered to be read the first time.
His Royal Highness's Speech having been read by the Lord Chancellor, and afterwards by the clerk,
The Earl of Longfordsaid, that in rising
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to claim the attention of their lordships, it might be expected that he should apologise for the course he was about to pursue; but, he thought, he could not do better than to pourtray the leading features of the Speech, just delivered from the throne, and then to make those observations which he might deem appropriate and just in support of the Address, with moving which it was his intention to conclude. Such a course would be correspondent with the usual mode on such occasions; and, in his estimation, it would be wrong to depart from so good a precedent. As to the Speech, it must have been most grateful to all who heard it; for it dwelt on those events which had been materially advantageous to the country, and were calculated to be much more so; inasmuch as they were of a nature to increase those great difficulties with which the common enemy had now to contend. But, however prosperous might have been our efforts, however glorious might have been our struggles, and however splendid might have been the results, it became us rather to increase than to relax in our exertions, not for the mere advantage of England only, but for the salvation of Europe. Past successes were pledges for the future; the triumphs that had attended our arms, were assurances that perseverance would avail. There were those who had foreboded a dismal issue to our contest in the peninsula; and though those forebodings had been disappointed by events, yet they would say, there still remained much to be done. Their lordships could not forget so manifest a truth, and that remembrance would now stimulate them to greater and nobler exertions. To carry on such a war as the one in which this country was now engaged, great sacrifices must be made; and no one could more sensibly deplore than he did the burdens under which the country at present laboured. But they must bear much more before it could be hoped that final success would crown our efforts. When it was seen that the ruler of France deemed no sacrifices too great to promote the dearest object of his ambition—the ruin of this country, could any privation be considered too much to avert and counteract that object? Our sacrifices, he knew, were great; but could any sacrifices be too great that had for their object the salvation of the country? The sacrifices of other countries were great, even were they visited only

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by a friendly army; but how much greater would be their woe, how much heavier their afflictions, when an enemy's arms prevailed? From such visitations this country had hitherto been free; and no price could be too high to enable it to continue unvisited by such accumulated miseries. To describe those miseries, the miseries that other countries had been, and still were, subjected to—would be a task too painful for him, even were it necessary to enable their lordships to judge properly of our present situation. But, he could not avoid saying, how light must any burdens be, that could avert that ruin which was levelled against us! That it would be averted, he could not for an instant doubt; and, even if any one were inclined to entertain any thing like doubt, the recent and noble exertions of our brave countrymen in arms could not but dispel it. In speaking of their glorious exertions, he could not proceed without noticing that glorious individual who had so nobly led them on to repeated successes. There could scarcely be an individual in the country who did not feel warmed and elated by the laurels that bound that noble general's brow; and how much more elated must they feel, who were related to him by the ties of blood! He had the happiness of being amongst those who were related to that gallant lord. If there were any thing like difference of opinion respecting that brave general's merits, related as he was, he would not trust himself to speak where friendship and partiality might overstep the bounds of justice. If he thought it possible even for the affection of the dearest friends to overrate his merits, in the fondness and zeal of their partiality, he would have remained silent. But years of painful labour in the field had earned for the name of Wellington, that glory and renown which were now attached to it. In the field he had triumphed over and over again, beating the most consummate generals of the enemy's army, and driving them from their strong holds. Such were the feats he had achieved, besides overcoming all those difficulties attendant upon a warfare like the one in which he was engaged: but that great and valuable man was rewarded. The public voice united in expressing admiration of the man and of the warrior, and he could not refrain from mingling his with the general voice. In tracing the course of his successful career, no one could fail to call to mind
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Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, or Salamanca—successes that had demonstrated the vigilance, the skill, the rapidity, and the decision which had produced such admirable results. They were results that had raised the military character of the country. The skill which had planned those successes was seen in a variety of forms; but in no instance was it more remarkable than in having compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Cadiz, before which they had been for two years. That glorious event had only failed in bringing about the probable result by an actual and direct disobedience of orders—a disobedience that had since been punished by the prompt proceeding of the government of Spain. That was an unfortunate event: and, at this moment, it was impossible to see of what advantages it had deprived us. That it had materially promoted the failure before Burgos, he had little reason to doubt; but, however mortifying that event might be, still they had no reason to despond. The effects of such a disappointment, and of such a failure, might soon be retrieved by that commanding genius which had already done so much for Spain. Even the present condition of the enemy afforded much ground for exultation. He had been compelled to collect his forces, and, when it was recollected with what difficulty they had been before supplied, how much greater must those difficulties be now that they formed one collected mass. There was no occasion for him to recapitulate the circumstances that had attended the raising of the siege of Cadiz, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajoz, and of Salamanca; but no one would deny that they were highly advantageous to the general cause.—But fortunately the influence of this brilliant campaign was not confined to the peninsula: it had been felt in the remotest corners of the world: In Russia they had seen what might be done by constancy and perseverance; for in Spain this country had evinced, by an actual and successful course, what might be done by perseverance; and the lesson had not been lost on the emperor of Russia. In Russia too was already seen what might be achieved by a determined resistance to the presumptuous pretensions of an unprincipled and ambitious foe. The emperor of Russia had given great hopes to enslaved Europe. In the field he had given proofs of firmness and decision; and by entrusting this country with

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the Russian fleet, he had given a proof of his implicit faith in England.—The new treaty with the Sicilians was very favourable, their troops being thereby made more efficient to the general cause. Thus was the aspect of European affairs highly favourable. Not long since they had seen the whole continent of Europe arrayed under the despotic dominion of Buonaparté; but they now saw efforts making to throw off that odious dominion, that gave the fairest and most flattering promise. They already saw the difficulties by which Buonaparté was surrounded. He not only met with obstructions to his efforts to recruit his army, but appeared actually unable to supply the army which was already opposed to Russia. It might be hence fairly concluded, that the military despotism of our foe had received a deadly shock, if it were not now trembling to its very base. All these advantages were to be traced to the conduct of this country, to its undaunted efforts in the peninsula; and from what had passed, their lordships might fairly place a confidence in the future. Europe had now an opportunity of arousing from her lethargy, and there was reason to hope that the opportunity would not be lost.—As to the war with America, that event was much to be lamented; and it being the belief in this country, that it could not continue, was the cause of our not having more vigorously prosecuted it hitherto. In Canada, however, honourable and glorious proofs bad been given of the fidelity and loyalty of that portion of his Majesty's subjects. As to the triumphs of the Americans at sea, and triumphs, no doubt, they called them, they owed them to the very general belief amongst us, that the war could not continue. The war might be injurious to us, but he confidently hoped, that its continuance would not be for any very extended period.—The East India question was one of great interest, and would deservedly have the serious attention of parliament. The appearance of domestic affairs, as set forth in the Speech, was highly gratifying, and it could not fail to make a pleasing impression on their lordships to ascertain, that order had been restored in those districts that had been somewhat disturbed. The noble earl then concluded with moving, that an Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, which, as usual, was an echo of the Speech.
Lord Rollerose to second the motion,
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and observed, that with regard to the first paragraph of the Speech from the throne, which related to the continuance of his Majesty's lamented indisposition, no one could possibly feel more real concern than himself. It was not his intention, nor did he feel it necessary, after the able exposition their lordships had heard, to enter into any detailed view of the important topics in question. The spirited and judicious conduct of his Majesty's government, under circumstances the most trying and arduous, had his warmest approbation, and called for that of the country; nor should, he thought, the prudent, affectionate, and kind manner in which his Royal Highness acted on a trying and important occasion, go without its merited applause. The system adopted by his Majesty's government was productive of consequences which, he agreed with the noble earl in thinking, would lead to the deliverance of Europe from the tyranny and oppression under which it groaned. But, in this view, he could not avoid noticing the effectual resistance which the emperor of Russia, so greatly to his own honour, had offered to the destructive progress of the enemy. Nor were his subjects less entitled to praise for their patriotic efforts in defence of their lawful sovereign and national independence. He trusted that the conduct of his Majesty's government, with respect to the United States of America, would have its due effect, and that the maritime rights of the country, upon which so much depended, would be asserted and upheld.—These were the prominent points to which the noble lord directed the attention of the House, and concluded by expressing his cordial approbation of the Address.
Marquis Wellesleysaid, he could not have approved either of the Speech, or of the Address proposed, had they, with respect to the great contest in the peninsula, or the cause in which the emperor of Russia was now engaged with all the efforts of his people, assumed in any degree a lower tone than that which pervaded them. Nothing less was demanded by the great interests of the country, by a proper zeal for our honour or our welfare, or by a true regard to the interests of our allies embarked in the same mighty cause with ourselves. In all those points he not only applauded the spirit of the Speech which their lordships had just heard delivered, but he almost entirely approved of the general spirit of the Address

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consequent upon it, moved and seconded by his noble friends.—Of all the parts of the Speech, however, none struck him more forcibly, none made a stronger impression upon his mind, than that which anticipated the same wisdom in parliament, the same firmness, and the same prudence, on the present trying occasion, when the eyes of all Europe, nay, of the whole world, were fixed upon us. There was nothing novel, he admitted, either in the subjects, or in the expressions:—the novelty was rather in the application of them. Yes! he had, no doubt, the parliament would exercise the same wisdom, it would evince the same perseverance, it would display the same firmness, especially on the great question of the war in the peninsula, as it had hitherto shewn. It was to that country in particular he wished for a few moments to direct their lordships' attention: its situation was to be considered in various respects; but in no respect would any man venture to say, that the triumphs which had been achieved there, were of such a description as to be totally unqualified; admit of unbounded triumph; or cause unmixed congratulation; no man could say that victory had so predominated, that its career was unchecked by a single reverse. But, as it was certainly the highest part of the character of wisdom to persevere with reasonable grounds of hope, in the face of danger, difficulty and discomfiture, so it was the highest character of firmness to meet the tide of success without intoxication, to look it steadily in the face, to analyze the grounds upon which it stood, and from that analysis, carefully and cautiously pursued, to deduce one general and consistent ground of public action. Even if our success had been broad, general, splendid and unqualified, he would say to those who represented a wise and enlightened nation, to those who were prepared and anxious to do their duty—be not led away by this success—be not intoxicated with it—let not its lustre so dazzle your faculties that you perceive neither whence it originated, how it may be rendered permanent, nor to what ultimate objects it may be applied. And this be would say, not for the purpose of disparaging that success, nor to raise any spirit of discontent, but for the sole purpose of producing a due tone of reflection, from which might spring one consistent, one general line of public conduct on a measure of policy so important and
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vitally interwoven with the best interests of the British nation. We had, indeed, done much in Spain: he was most willing to admit it; but, he would ask, what still remained to be done? And that question naturally led him to a review of the events which had taken place there since no very distant period: he would limit himself to the time when lord Wellington was before Badajoz. It had always appeared to him, from the very commencement of the struggle in the peninsula, that the only solid ground of success, the only reasonable hope of ultimate victory, the only practical system of resistance which could be adopted, was to awaken in the people of Spain, a spirit of hostility to France, and to succour and aid that hostility upon a broad and extensive scale of operations. With our force and resources properly directed in that way great advantages might be expected, and final triumph be safely calculated upon. It was, indeed, perfectly clear, that the measureless ambition of the leader of France never would desist from its object, till some strong and energetic force should check its progress on the one side or other. If the Spanish nation could once bring themselves to feel that there was no evil, no human evil, scarcely indeed an evil beyond the verge of humanity, to be put in competition for a moment with that of submission to the government of France; that loss of property, loss of relations, loss of all that was dear to them, loss of life itself, was small and insignificant, compared to that tremendous and overwhelming calamity—submission to France; if they could be brought to this pitch of patriotism and resistance, every thing might then be hoped from the contest. It was true, indeed, that the perseverance he had described was a species of which philosophy afforded no definition, nor history any record; but it was by that spirit alone that any thing great could be achieved in the struggle between Spain and France. Our assistance co-operating with this general feeling, might have been productive of the utmost benefits. The great person who now ruled over the destinies of France (for great he could not hesitate to call him) would, it might be presumed, were such a system pursued, find himself, by the success of our arms, reduced to the necessity of abandoning the cause, or, his ambition, leading to the exertion of all his means and energies in this one quarter, would open the way for other enemies in

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other parts of Europe, who would be eager to seize the opportunity of his reverses in Spain, to shake off the yoke of his subjugation; he would be compelled to divide his forces, and thus present a prospect of more easy success to our combined efforts in the peninsula.
Such was the view he had always taken of the contest in Spain; and with regard to the spirit of universal hostility in the people, which he deemed so essential, he would assert, without fear of contradiction, that it had been produced in its fullest extent in the course of last year. He was not speaking of any thing which it might be thought he had no liberty to express: he was not alluding to any thing which had come to his knowledge merely through an official channel: he asserted only what every one might know, who had directed his attention to what had occurred in the peninsula during that period. He also knew it as a fact which no one would venture to deny, that the success of the British arms in Spain had been felt and considered in Russia, as the salvation of that country, and if it had not been for our triumphs there, the leader of France would have been able to direct a military force against Russia, so vast and overwhelming as to preclude the hope of that power's resisting it with any prospect of success.
But, was not all this foreseen, and was not this the very basis on which the system to be pursued in our present situation should be founded: What then followed from the fact? The moment it was known that such effects were taking place; the moment it was known that the desired action was commencing on the one side, ought we not to have pushed every effort on the other side, ought we not to have strained all the resources of the country, he would say to their very utmost: and, if we were honest in our exertions in behalf of the cause, ought we not to have seized this momentous crisis as it occurred, to strike one grand and decisive blow?
In these preliminary views of the question, which he had ventured to offer to their lordships, his great purpose was to inquire, and to instigate their lordships to inquire, whether the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles, whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed; and whether, upon the whole, the result had been such as the nation had
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a right to expect, from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He could wish also that it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like a definite and precise object as to the issue of the contest in the peninsula. His own idea as to the only true and legitimate object of that contest was, that it involved the expulsion of the French armies from Spain: this he considered as the plain and practical object: it was intelligible to all, and he would detain their lordships only a few moments, while he inquired what had been done in the course of the present year, towards its accomplishment, compared to what might have been done if our resources had been properly, wisely, and efficiently employed.
His own opinion decidedly was, that the war in the peninsula had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result which he had stated as the only true and practical one of the contest. He would carry his inquiries back (and with as much brevity as possible) to the period a little before the reduction of Badajoz, somewhere about the beginning of April last. At that time the great general who commanded our armies in Spain having reduced that important fortress, his next step, it was natural to suppose, especially at that season of the year, would be to expel the French from the south of Spain. But why did he not do so? Because his means were deficient; because he was under the necessity of abandoning his object, that of marching against Soult, and raising the siege of Cadiz, from inadequate resources; and he was under the necessity of marching northward with his army, because in the North of Spain he had no force which he could leave sufficient to check and resist the progress of Marmont. To the north he accordingly did proceed, and there he was, from an operation of the same causes, compelled to remain on the frontiers of Spain till the 13th of June, and by that time Marmont's army was in such a state from the accession of reinforcements that it became doubtful whether the British commander could advance or not. But why did he remain so long? Because his means of advancing were insufficient; because he wanted money and supplies of every sort; because he had not the common means of transport to convey his artillery. These were stubborn facts which he defied any one to contradict. At last,

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however, lord Wellington advanced Without a battering train, not because he thought it unnecessary for the success of his military operations, but because he literally had not the means of transporting it. But then, after lord Wellington did advance, what state was he in? He found Marmont's army much stronger than he expected: and he also discovered another circumstance—his object in advancing (and here he begged leave distinctly to assert that he spoke from no other knowledge of lord Wellington's plans than what any person might acquire who had attentively watched the whole course of the proceedings in Spain—for not one syllable concerning them did he derive from any communication with that great general on the subject)—his object in advancing was, he maintained, in expectation of a powerful co-operation on the other side of the peninsula, and which co-operation had been concerted with him even at the time he was before Badajoz. He, therefore, must have expected the assistance of this force at the time of his advance into Spain; for, had he not so expected it, he would venture to say that his advance into that country would have been unjustifiable, even though success had ultimately attended his progress. It was certain, however, that he remained a considerable time on the frontier, waiting for intelligence of the looked for arrival of this co-operating force, but waiting in vain; he then proceeded forward, still confident in his hope that it would arrive sufficiently early to make a strong diversion in his favour, and found, as their lordships were already informed, the army of Marmorn much greater than he expected. Nor was that all he found: he found that Suchet had detached a corps to unite with Joseph's army, and which made his force efficient to co-operate with Marmont's army. What was the consequence? On the 17th of July, five days before the battle of Salamanca, lord Wellington commenced, not a feigned, but a real retreat, and this retreat he continued during the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and till late in the day of the 22d. But why did he retreat? Why did this great general retreat? Because, again, his means were inadequate. He had no money: he was so low in money that he had not 20,000 dollars in his military chest. The richest brigade in the army did not possess more than 3,000 dollars: and what were the only means left to this deserted general to recruit his
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finances? Forty thousand dollars had been sent to Cadiz, for the use of the Spaniards: these he was forced to intercept, and apply to the exigencies of the British army. Upon a fair comparison of his force with that of Marmont, and taking into calculation the reinforcement of Joseph's army by the detachment from Suchet, which detachment he would have been unable to spare, if the Sicilian expedition had arrived in due time on the eastern coast of Spain, as it would have fully occupied his whole army, lord Wellington deemed it most prudent to retreat, and he accordingly did so. Here he would request their lordships to pause for a moment. Here was a proof of lord Wellington's inadequacy of means. He retreated; and in ascribing that retreat to a want of resources, he was borrowing nothing from his imagination. The cause and effect were plain before them; and he might reason upon the subject, either from the cause to the effect, or from the effect to the cause. He might shew that his means were inadequate, and therefore he was compelled to retreat, or he might argue from the fact of the retreat, that he wanted the power to pursue his operations: and this deficiency of power arose chiefly, if not entirely, from the tardy and inefficient co-operation of the Sicilian expedition.
The next step in tracing the progress of lord Wellington, brought him to a period full of glory and renown; he meant the battle of Salamanca. But from what circumstances did that battle arise? Did it arise out of his efficiency, or out of his necessity? It arose from the magnificence, the splendour, the greatness of his talents. He struck the enemy with his spear the moment he saw an opening. But were we to hope for that again—was that a ground to build upon? His talents, indeed, were a firm and secure rock on which any hopes, any expectations, however great, however exalted, might be founded; but it ill became statesmen to calculate upon chances and occasions presenting themselves, for success in operations upon the prosperous issue of which so much depended. Did the ministry mean to say that their system was raised solely upon the resplendent abilities of a consummate general, and upon the errors of the enemy? Did they mean to affirm that all their plans amounted only to that? The battle of Salamanca was certainly productive of great events; the evacuation of the South of

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Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the occupation of Madrid by our troops. But did it secure those advantages? Did they remain permanent? Was lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont? No. He was not able to do that, which so obviously he ought to have done, because Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, was hanging on his flank, and afterwards on his rear. It was necessary to disperse that army. He did so, and entered Madrid. Could he then march southward to pursue the career of his conquests? No. He found that the corps which he had so lately defeated, the army over which he had so recently triumphed, was strong again, and he was compelled to direct his course to the north once more, to meet them. Then followed the siege of Burgos, and all he should say upon that subject was, that so far from considering as a disappointment the failure of lord Wellington in his attempt to reduce that fortress—it was madness to suppose that a fortress of such a description could be reduced by a few guns. He could not conceive, indeed, how any calculations founded upon success could be entertained, when lord Wellington's means were confessedly inadequate according to all the established rules of war.
Again, when it was understood, so far back as the month of June last, that lord Wellington was advancing into Spain, was it possible not to see that France, being engaged in a war with Russia, must necessarily detach a great part of her force to that quarter of Europe, and that then was the moment, not only in reference to that event, but also to the temper of the Spanish nation, to send out sufficient reinforcements to enable lord Wellington to proceed upon a large and effective scale of operations? Without such reinforcements it was manifestly imprudent to advance into Spain. He (marquis Wellesley) at that period holding the seals of office, had repeatedly urged in his dispatches that it would be highly dangerous to advance into Spain without such a commanding force, and such co-operation as would almost secure success; under any other circumstances it was not only disadvantageous to the cause, but it was perilous to the parties. Now, how was lord Wellington reinforced? On the 21st of October he thought it necessary to retire from Burgos: on the 25th he saw the French army, and we knew from his dispatches that they were greatly superior to his own
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force, especially in cavalry, the most dreadful of all species of superiority in that country. He (marquis Wellesley) had a right therefore to assume, that on the 25th of October, that army which lord Wellington had conquered on the plains of Salamanca, that army which he had driven before him on that memorable day, with a grandeur of military achievement which the language of history or poetry could never equal, which imagination herself could not decorate with a splendor beyond the colouring of truth, and which ranked him among the most renowned generals of this or any other age, he had a right to infer that that army bad received strong and efficient reinforcements since the battle of Salamanca. Now, where was lord Wellington's reinforcements during the same period? Scattered every where: some in port at home, some on the ocean, and some landed at too great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen hundred men reached him on the 24th, four days after he had begun his retreat. Where were the others? One regiment advanced as far as Benevento, and were forced to retreat again to the frontiers. Two regiments were landed at Corunna, and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where they arrived just in time, probably, to reach lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign, certainly not much sooner.
Such was the state of the war in the peninsula—such the manner in which it had been conducted—and he would ask their lordships whether, if the same exertions had been used by the ministers in this country as were employed by the enemy, might not lord Wellington have been able to prosecute to their full extent his operations against Burgos? He would now, however, call their attention for a few moments to the Sicilian expedition, as it had been denominated. He had stated that the plan of that expedition had been concerted with lord Wellington when he was before Badajoz. In consequence of the improved fortune of our affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part of our force might be spared to co-operate with our armies in Spain: and, if it had arrived at the proper season on the southeast coast of that country, at the time when lord Wellington fully expected it, Suchet would have been utterly unable to detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: Joseph must rather have hastened to assist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would

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have been a real service: but like all the rest of the system, it was imperfect exactly at that moment when it was most required to be perfect; something was done, but not all; and what was done was of no use. The first division arrived in the course of June, but it was so small that it could effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, wrote to Joseph that he could not proceed with his whole corps, but that he sent him a reinforcement, and which reinforcement, it afterwards proved, had the effect of subverting every great object of the campaign. Suchet had nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian expedition in the force to which it at that period amounted. Some time afterwards, however—about the end of July—arrived the remainder. They appeared on the coast of Catalonia, and he was very much afraid, though he was far from intending to impute blame to any of the commanders concerned in that expedition, that all they did was to excite the Catalonians to a demonstration of attachment to the British and Spanish cause, which led, in the result, to dreadful executions among them. It had left also, on the minds of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspicion, alienation, and hatred, which it would be difficult, he apprehended, to eradicate. It was thought advisable, that this expedition should operate either at Barcelona or Tarragona, or some part intermediate: but at last they arrived where no human being could have anticipated their presence, and then became utterly extinct as to any efficient purpose to the prosecution of the war. He had been told there were various ways of accounting for this indecision: at one time it was thought this place would be the best at which to disembark; and then another, till at last the very worst place of all was adopted. He had often heard that it was the greatest trial of a powerful mind, to decide between two conflicting difficulties: he was sure it was the test of a weak mind, to be placed between two advantages, and not know which to choose. The feature of the present case, however, was, that both the advantages were lost, and only this disadvantage gained, that a warlike and lofty province of Spain had been, as far as it was possible such true Spanish patriots could be, alienated from the Spanish cause by the vacillation and indecision of their allies. And what had been the ultimate result of all those proceedings? They had been told in the Speech, Indeed, that the result was nothing more
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than the consequence of the concentration of the French armies, as if lord Wellington's retreat was merely a military manœuvre: and then followed the monstrous proposition, that it was favourable to the interests and resources of the Spanish nation. He hoped some explanation would be given of that assertion; for it was most injurious both to this country and to Spain. Before he could subscribe to it he must learn to think in direct contradiction to every sentiment he had ever felt, and to every principle he had ever known, either from reading or experience. Had the south of Spain been delivered? Did the minister mean to say that, in point of fact, the south of Spain was not now under the dominion of France? He was perfectly satisfied that his noble friend, than whom he knew no man more sincerely honest, had never seen a Spanish army, as it had been his (the marquis's) misfortune to do. If he had, he would have known that the army of Ballasteros was utterly incapable of making any stand against two such armies as those of Soult and Suchet; and that Ballasteros, instead of resigning his command, would have found the materials of it vanished in an instant, when opposed to the troops of the two French generals already mentioned.
In moving from Burgos, lord Wellington found himself pursued by a force much superior to that under his command, and without meaning to make any desponding statements, he would ask, this being the end of the campaign, what real progress had been made towards the great object of the contest? With regard to what was to be the object of the war in Spain, three schemes had been successively devised; two were only talked of, and the third was practised. The first was grounded on an idea that it would be imprudent to embark as a principal in the contest, unless some other power, by its co-operation, diverted the forces of France from being all concentrated towards that one point, the subjugation of Spain. From that policy he had always differed upon principle—but this fact was at least deducible from it, that our resources were considered by those who maintained the opinion to be insufficient to carry on the war as principals upon an adequate scale, and that we must therefore await a more favourable opportunity. His view of it had been, that we should engage as principals, and that in order to afford a chance of diversion

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in other parts of Europe, it was necessary to urge the Spanish war with our utmost vigour and with the greatest effect. The second plan was, that it would be prudent and highly expedient to make exertions upon a large scale, adequate to the destruction of the French power in Spain. Both these plans were different in their principles, and yet both were consistent upon their own principles. If our resources were really inadequate, then the first plan was very just and proper: but if, as he held, they were adequate to extensive operations, then the second plan was obviously the fittest to adopt. But the plan of all others, which all mankind must reprobate and reject, was that plan of employing the resources, of exposing the sinews of our strength, to hourly danger; bearing hard upon our finances, yet accomplishing neither object, but falling dead, as it were, between both. Such a plan as this every one must concur in condemning. It was essentially hostile to the principle of economy; it was expence without fruit; and yet that was the system which had been pursued during the last and during the preceding campaign. A vast expence of blood and treasure had been lavished, and our resources enfeebled, without accomplishing any one definite or precise object. When it was to end he knew not; but it would be invidious to call upon him or any one, to say how closely calamity might tread upon the footsteps of error. When France was meditating fresh wars in the north of Europe, and when we saw Russia prepared to resist her ambitious designs to the last extremity, what more vigorous or effectual assistance could we have given to Russia than by prosecuting the war in Spain? The best succour we could give to that country, the most essential aid that we could bestow, was by carrying on the war in the peninsula upon a broad and extensive scale of operations; but it was not so carried on, and he charged upon that system, therefore, in the first instance a defection from the cause of Russia. He did not, indeed, mean to dispute that the events of the last campaign had not been beneficial to Spain, but his objection was that those benefits were imperfectly secured, and that they could not be expected to be permanent. On all these grounds considering ministers as culpable in withholding needful supplies, before he could agree to that part of the Speech which spoke of the exertions of the Spanish nation,
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he must be informed where the benefits arising out of these exertions were to be found.
The noble marquis, next, dismissing the topic of the peninsular war, adverted to the hopes held out of a diversion from Sweden, in favour of the operations of Russia. He could not conceive any thing more erroneous in policy or in co-operation than the line of conduct pursued with regard to this power. As it appeared to his mind, a more extraordinary act of diplomacy had never occurred than the Treaty which our ministers had concluded with the government of Sweden. It was a treaty which promised every advantage to Sweden without guaranteeing any to England. It was, in fact, a treaty in which, as it had been once whimsically observed upon a similar contract, the reciprocity was all on one side; for we had engaged to afford Sweden all the assistance in our power, in her operations against the enemy, or for her own protection, while nothing appeared likely to be done for us or for our allies on her part. An expedition was, indeed, projected and expected to sail from Sweden, with a view to co-operate with Russia; but that object was soon abandoned; no expedition ever did sail; and in consequence of that abandonment general Victor, who, with his force, waited in Swedish Pomerania, to meet the apprehended diversion, was enabled to withdraw, and his division actually formed a part of the army with which Buonaparté made his way to Moscow. Such was the important effect of the inactivity of Sweden, and for that inactivity, so injurious to the objects of the war, it was for ministers, in their diplomatic management with Sweden, to account. This account, indeed, they were bound, for their own justification, to produce. At a meeting which had taken place at Abo about the end of July, between the emperor Alexander, lord Cathcart, and the crown prince of Sweden, it was understood to have been arranged, that the expedition already alluded to, was to have been dispatched from Sweden; and so cordially it seemed did ministers enter into the project—so promptly did they determine to forward its progress, with a view to impede the army of France, that transports for the conveyance of the Swedish expedition were ordered to sail from Sheerness on the 19th of September, and Buonaparté entered Moscow on the 14th of the same month! So fared this grand and much

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talked of expedition. What sort of explanation ministers had it in their power to give upon this subject, he could not pretend to conjecture; but it appeared most extraordinary, that after the meeting and discussion he had just mentioned, ministers should not have been enabled to judge of the real disposition of the crown prince of Sweden, or that they should not have taken measures to ascertain whether any change had taken place in that disposition before the useless dispatch of the transports.—With respect to Russia, while he was fully disposed to concur in the panegyric pronounced upon the magnanimity displayed by that power, he would ask, what assistance had our ministers afforded to encourage the display or to aid the operation of that magnanimity? This he was at a loss to know, except the sending the Russians about 50,000 arms, with lords Cathcart and Walpole, who were no doubt important instruments to aid a great empire in extricating itself from its difficulties and repelling a formidable foe, were to be viewed in this light.
Upon the subject of America he thought it necessary to say a few words; and first he had no hesitation in asserting, that a more unjust attack was never made upon the peace of any nation than that of the American government upon this country, nor could any cause be imagined more completely just than that which this country had to oppose to America. But he must confess that he heard with surprise the passage in the Speech from the throne, which sanctioned the opinion that ministers still hoped for pacification with America in consequence of something done previous to their declaration of war; he meant with surprise, in consequence of the grounds upon which this hope was understood to rest. Nothing appeared more preposterous than the calculation that the repeal of the Orders in Council would serve to pacify America; for these orders were never in fact the point at issue. Of the conduct of this government throughout its discussions with that of America, he was pretty accurately informed, and he was fully prepared to defend it, especially that part of the discussion in which he was personally concerned. But he would maintain, as he had uniformly slated, that the dispute with America did not originate or rest upon the Orders in Council, but referred to higher questions, to topics deeply affecting our great maritime rights, to points, indeed, of such importance, that
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according to his fullest conviction, the British government could not concede to the pretensions of America without throwing into her hands the trident of the main. It would not avail ministers to repeat the assertions of those who expressed such sanguine opinions as to the probable result of the repeal of the Orders in Council, for these assertions furnished no answer to his view of the subject. They might indeed be adduced in reference to some noble lords near him, from whom ministers borrowed this measure of repeal. Yes, they abandoned their own opinion upon that question, and adopted that of their adversaries, which no doubt furnished a strong proof of their vigour, firmness, and perseverance. But even with reference to those adversaries, ministers could not now rest upon formerly expressed opinions or predictions as to the consequence to be expected from a repeal of the Orders in Council; because, although they agreed to the measure upon the advice of their adversaries, they acted upon it in an opposite spirit. They were dilatory, and apparently reluctant in the adoption of this measure of repeal, and they ought, upon various grounds, to have seen its utter inefficiency to pacify America. They ought, in fact, to have expected and been fully prepared for war with America; they ought, as statesmen, to have known that the American government had been long infected with a deadly hatred towards this country, and (if he might be allowed an unusual application of a word) with a deadly affection towards France. It was absurd to suppose that governments were not as likely as individuals to be influenced by passion—that they were not more apt to act from the impulse of their own vices or corruptions than from a consideration of the interest of those over whom they presided. Therefore no statesman should or would conclude, that because it was contrary to the interest of the American people to engage in war with this country, the American government would shrink from such a measure. Indeed, in this instance no such conclusion could be deemed in the slightest degree excusable, for the disposition of the American government was quite evident, and therefore common policy should have urged ministers to prepare fully for the event, and they should have made adequate exertion either to pacify, to intimidate, or to punish America. No means should have been unprovided effectually

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to repel the audacious attack which the American government had ventured to make upon us. Nothing of this kind, however, had been done, and America had been suffered to commence, and, for a time, to carry on hostilities, even un-threatened with danger to herself. That attack would yet, he trusted, be completely avenged; that the most extensive exertions would be made to convince the American government of its folly and desperation, and he had no doubt that the best hope of peace with that government would rest upon the manly and vigorous employment of our resources to make it feel sensibly the consequences of war.
The only remaining topic in the Speech to which he had to refer, was that with respect to India, in which he felt a peculiar interest. And here he would repeat the wish which he took occasion to express last session, that the affairs of our Indian empire should be fully investigated by their lordships before any system for its future government was finally determined upon. He meant that the whole question should be brought before their lordships, not in the shape of a bill for legislation, as it was proposed last session, but in a distinct and separate form for deliberate inquiry, in order that it might be examined in all its details. He was happy to learn that his noble friend at the head of the Board of Controul, was diligently employed in considering this subject, and he trusted that the result of his intelligent deliberation would be the suggestion of a course of measures, creditable to himself, honourable to this nation, advantageous to the interests of the whole empire, but above all, calculated to promote the interest and happiness of the great mass of population subject to our dominion in India. He again expressed his hope that the concerns of India would be fully discussed before an attempt was made to pass any law upon the subject.
Having thus observed at considerable length upon all the topics embraced in the Speech, he would now proceed very briefly to mention an omission of great importance to the country, and which he regretted exceedingly; he meant, the Catholic Question. Before he concluded, he felt particularly called upon to advert to this omission, which he could not help noticing with surprize and sorrow. He was certainly surprised and sorry to perceive, that after all that had passed upon this subject—after all that had occurred
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in discussion, and been excited in hope, no disposition whatever was expressed to conciliate the Catholics, or to adjust their claims. It was in the recollection of their lordships what had taken place at the close of the last session, both in that and the other House of Parliament. That in the latter, indeed, a distinct pledge had been entered into, fully to consider the Catholic Question, with a view to an ultimate and satisfactory arrangement. Was it now resolved to relinquish this pledge, to set aside all that had been done? There were too many grounds of suspicion upon this subject. Recollecting the expression of the noble earl opposite, and now at the head of his Majesty's government, (Liverpool), at the close of the last session, that he would oppose no barrier to the fair discussion of the Catholic claims, he could not doubt his candour, but yet he had heard of several proceedings, both in this country and in Ireland, where, to use an old phrase of lord Camden, the hand and fingers of government were "very visible." Indeed, so anxious was government considered in its hostility to the cause of the Catholics, that one cause of the dissolution of parliament was said to be in order to get rid of the pledge of the other House upon the subject; and if the rumours afloat were founded, that statement would appear not improbable. For according to this rumour it was the intention of ministers, after the Houses had sat for a few days, to adjust some matters immediately necessary to their own objects, to propose an adjournment for two months. If so, the practical effect of such an adjournment would be to evade the pledge for taking the Catholic Question into early consideration, which, combined with the omission in the Speech, was a bad omen for the Catholics. He did not mean at present to discuss the proposed conduct of ministers, or to cast any blame upon them, but merely to ask, and he should be glad to know precisely their intention, what was the state of the question, namely, whether all that had passed was to be regarded as gone et nil, and that the question was to be returned to again as a res integer?—There were some words, he observed, at the conclusion of the Speech not, he presumed as a matter of course, in praise of the constitution. Indeed there was a report that ministers bad it in contemplation to propose an extension of the duration of parliament upon the demise of the crown; but this praise

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of the constitution, combined with the opinion he entertained of the principles of his noble friend at the head of the administration, destroyed all belief in the rumour. He could not suppose it possible that his noble friend would for one moment entertain an opinion so fraught with alarm, and so incapable of excuse upon any pretence of utility or convenience. No, he was sure his noble friend had too much reverence for the ancient monarchical parliamentary constitution of the country, to meditate such an innovation as might lead to the most perilous consequences—to consequences, indeed, which, from the recently disturbed state of the public mind, he could not, he must confess, contemplate without dismay.—But to return to the panegyric which the Speech contained upon the constitution, they might hope that it did not imply any hostile reference to the Catholic cause.—The noble marquis finally recapitulated the several heads of his argument with regard to the war in Spain, the Swedish diversion, the co-operation with Russia, the rupture with America, the calm and deliberate discussion necessary previous to the decision of the East India question, and the adjustment of the Catholic claims, and concluded with expressing his opinion, that increased exertion must be made to strengthen our army in the peninsula, or it would be cruel towards ourselves, and our allies to continue the contest—to persevere in an useless effusion of blood and expenditure of money. For without additional strength, he was persuaded that the object of the war could not be attained, and that the continuance of the struggle, instead of being advantageous to this country, to Spain, or to the continent, would have a directly different operation. Having expressed these opinions, it was not his intention to propose any amendment; but he trusted that such attention would be paid to the suggestions he had thrown out as their validity might demand from his Majesty's ministers, whose system if longer pursued it would be impossible to endure.
The Earl of Liverpoolrose in reply to the statements and reasoning of the noble marquis, from whom he differed in some as he agreed with him in other of the opinions he had just expressed. In none did he more cordially concur than in that which went to the situation of the country, which ought to be fairly, plainly, and clearly before parliament.
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He vindicated the conduct of ministers, who were ready to submit the whole of their proceedings and policy to the strictest scrutiny, whether referring to the civil or military government of the country—whether referring to disaster or to triumph—whether furnishing matter for congratulation, or events to deplore. With respect to the conduct of the war, he had read enough of the history of wars to enable him to pronounce, that those who therein looked for unmixed success and exemption from every species of reverse or exemption from misfortune, built, indeed, upon an unstable foundation, and rested on hopes which must turn out to be chimerical. But he trusted that where misfortune occurred, the mind of parliament and the public was too considerate and just, not to distinguish between that which was attributable to the contingencies of war and which resulted from inevitable circumstances, and that for which ministers or their agents might be deemed fairly responsible. The war in the peninsula,—he repeated the opinion which he expressed at the outset—the war in Spain he regarded as a new era in the history of modern wars, because in that case the people were most active in repelling their invaders. Unlike the people of Germany and Italy, who were passive spectators of the conflict produced by French invasion, the Spaniards were most forward to contend for the independence and old establishments of their country, therefore their cause held out an encouraging prospect and a good example, which the people of Russia were now so nobly emulating. It was this exhibition of a high national spirit which originally induced him to become an advocate for those measures of assistance which the Spaniards had received from this country. Indeed if this country had not afforded that aid, it would, in his judgment, have betrayed an indifference, not only to every high sentiment of liberty, but every, even the most common notions of policy. But while his object was to assist Spain, to afford to the Spanish people and to Europe the means of profiting by the circumstances which appeared so promising, he was certainly not so sanguine as many others who concurred with him as to the policy of granting the assistance. Whatever the result might be he thought it the duty of England to make an attempt in favour of Spain. The real question therefore was, whether the exertions of Britain were

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commensurate with her means and resources, as well as with the importance of the object the attainment of which was in view. This was the true question. With regard then to the quantum or amount in the aid to be afforded, and also whether the aid were equal to the end, he could say, as to the first, that the utmost had been done for Spain which, consistently with a due attention to other objects, it was possible for government to accomplish. It was for those who maintained the contrary to shew how and where more might have been done, and he was astonished at the different manner in which the noble marquis had treated the subject. He bad examined it with the eye of a statesman; for the exertions of a country must depend on the means which that country possessed. It might be said that in all contests great exertions had been made; but instead of this general assertion, he wished the noble marquis had shewn or would shew him how in the present instance greater efforts could have been made than had actually been made by the British government. As to the equality of our means to the end in view, our gallant commander in the peninsula had never been deceived by government with respect to the means in its power to afford, nor bad any aid that officer required ever been refused. It would, indeed, have been an injustice to him, to our ally and to the country, to have deceived him on such points. Then considering the subject in all its bearings, how could any blame be imputable to ministers? He admitted, that at the period when the French army were so engaged with Russia, the opportunity might be more favourable for a distinguished effort in the peninsula; but considering the uncertainty of war, and the responsibility of government for the perpetual protection and safety of the empire, he would ask, whether it would be consistent with its duty, for one extraordinary effort, to throw away the means of future exertion; that knowing the most brilliant campaign has often no decisive influence upon the fate of war, whether a wise government should cast all on one die—should hazard the main power, the heart's blood of a country, merely to make a flourish—to risk perpetual strength for the peculiar triumph of one year? A government intrusted with the management of the resources of a great empire were bound to recollect that their cases were not momentary but everlasting; not
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partial but entire; and that they had to provide for the future as well as the present, and look to the safety of the whole, not to the display of some brilliant exploit upon a part. The country ought to know what exertions had actually been made, and it would be convinced of their sufficiency. But when the assertion was made that more ought to have been done for the peninsula; to refute this argument he would beg the House to consider and compare, and, for the purpose of comparison, to look to the proudest periods of our history—to the periods of king William and queen Anne, when the great duke of Marlborough wielded the energies of the nation with so much glory and success. Let all the relative circumstances be fairly taken into view, (the increase of population being admitted) and he would challenge the comparison. Our means had augmented in a surprising ratio; and within two or three years the increased strength of the military force of the country was prodigious beyond conception. For what was the actual state of our force in that quarter, which the noble marquis had said was so inadequately supplied? Why, that we had, on the 25th of June last, in the peninsula and the Mediterranean, an army of no less than 127,000 men in our pay; that was 91,000 British, including foreign or German troops, with 36,000 Portuguese. Such was our force, independently of Spanish auxiliaries, which received from us all the assistance in our power, in formation, equipment, and pecuniary supply. Nay, the British army alone, under the command of lord Wellington, at the period alluded to, amounted to 58,000. Now, he would appeal to their lordships whether the exertion which had collected such an army deserved to be characterised in such terms as the House had heard from the noble marquis; but more he would ask, whether three years ago any man in England Could have been so sanguine as to imagine the collection of such an army practicable? Yet such had been the exertions of that government, which had also to provide for the protection of India, of our numerous colonies in the west, and for our home defence. Then, as to our supplies since that period, which the noble marquis professed to think that ministers had left almost wholly unprepared; the fact was, that from the 25th of December last to the present, no less than 20,000 men, with 7,000 horses, had been sent to that

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quarter. As to deficiency of equipment among our army, Buonaparté, who did not hesitate to take by force the means of equipping his soldiery, wherever he found them, had often felt such deficiency, while with us, who paid liberally for all articles, there was rarely any such complaints But that our soldiers should be quite secure from privations, that they should at all times be completely equipped, it would be too much to expect in the ordinary vicissitudes of war. Where, however, such privations occurred—where they were reported by our illustrious commander, his requisitions were immediately attended to—indeed they were always complied with. This could and would, no doubt, be confirmed promptly by that distinguished commander himself, for it was a striking feature in his character, that he was as just to these who served him, as he was bold to those who opposed him—and it was another striking feature in his character, that be was never extravagant in his expectations or demands—indeed he was never likely to make such demands, because ministers took care that he should be always accurately informed as to the means of supply. That some inconvenience might have been felt from the state of the military chest, he was not prepared to deny; as the supply of specie at present must depend upon so great a variety of circumstances, out of the power of any ministers to controul; upon the means of obtaining money for bills upon the continent, and other causes, particularly the state of the Spanish colonies in America, which naturally interfered with the importation of bullion. But here again no blame could attach to government, for nothing practicable was left undone by them. There was, however, a limit to their means, as there was a limit to the means of any nation; by that limit alone government was confined in the struggles to assist these operations which the noble marquis called upon them to extend. But whether they could so extend them, he would be ready, at any time, to discuss with the noble marquis, with whom the onus would lie to shew where the resources for such extended operation could be found.—As to the Sicilian expedition, he had to state that it was prepared to sail early in March, and conducted throughout in concert with lord Wellington, who communicated regularly with the commander of that force. The appearance of this expedition off Catalonia,
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was, he was assured, of great utility, as it prevented Suchet from sending reinforcements to Joseph Buonaparté, who in consequence evacuated Madrid, and the arrival of this expedition at Valencia, instead of being a mistake, as asserted, was the result of plan and orders. That the late campaign had eminently succeeded, he was also prepared to prove. For what way the plan of the campaign—why, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz—the expulsion of the French from the south of Spain, and the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and all these objects had been attained; and would not that man have been deemed very sanguine, who at the outset would have predicted the attainment of such important objects, particularly the liberation of the Spanish government, by the raising of the siege of Cadiz? In stating that the objects of the campaign had been accomplished he would not deny, that many of the hopes excited by the victory of Salamanca, had been disappointed. But that disappointment was not attributable to any want of energy on the part of his Majesty's government; nor was the conduct or scarcity of artillery at Burgos, so much dwelt upon by the noble marquis, any imputation upon government: for the fact was, there were three battering trains on the continent; and, besides these, one was sent last March to Lisbon, to be kept afloat, subject to the order of lord Wellington. According to the opinion, however, of the noble lord himself, Burgos must have been taken, if at all, without delay, and before any artillery could be brought to him. But the failure of our gallant commander's calculation, and the consequent re-capture of Madrid, was owing to the refusal of Ballasteros to obey his commands; which refusal facilitated the movements of the French force, and disconcerted lord Wellington's plan of operations.—Upon the subject of Sweden he could not, from considerations of state delicacy, say much in reply to the noble marquis, but thus much he could state, that the most perfect confidence prevailed between the governments of Russia, Sweden, and this country, and that nothing dissatisfactory had taken place in the transaction alluded to by the noble marquis. As to the story about the transports, he could only assure the House that be never heard of such a matter before this evening, and the affair was altogether new to him.—Adverting to America, he begged

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the noble marquis, before he again affirmed the insignificance of a repeal of the Orders in Council, in the estimation of the American government, to recollect the dispatches of the government, and his own dispatches when in office also, which he seemed to forget, and which clearly demonstrated that these very Orders in Council were the great stumbling block in the way of an amicable arrangement tween the countries. He begged of him to recollect that not only the act of the government but also the acts of congress expressly declared the repeal of the retaliatory measure, the Non-importation act, depended upon the rescinding of these Orders. As soon as that very measure should be adopted, which the noble marquis now insists the Americans regarded as insignificant, the American government proclaimed that their counter policy should cease to be enforced. When, however, the noble marquis asserted that we were unprepared for the American war, he would ask him to point out where and how we were unprepared? Were we unprepared in Canada, or was there any neglect at the Admiralty? He was prepared to discuss this question with the noble marquis; and upon this subject, as well as with respect to Spain, he would beg the noble marquis to come to close quarters—to state facts—to bring something specific, and abandon that style of loose and general accusation, of which the House had heard so much in the course of this discussion.—"Now, as to the concluding topic of the noble marquis's speech, I have not," said the noble earl, "made use of any expression with respect to the Catholic question, to which I do not adhere. My opinion I have always publicly proclaimed upon this subject. I have resisted, and I will resist, the proposition for entering into the consideration of the Catholic claims, because I cannot see my way to any adjustment of those claims, likely to satisfy the Catholics. I therefore think it more consistent to oppose the proposition at once, than to seek to defeat it by what are called guards or securities. I meet the Catholics openly and publicly, and will never attempt to disappoint wishes by any little underhand opposition—by any schemes or subterfuge. My system of opposition I feel to be more fair and candid, and therefore I will continue to pursue it. In stating this to be my intention, I declare merely my individual opinion, without meaning to sway the judgment of any of my friends.
Lord Grenvillerose in reply to the noble earl, and declared he would not shrink from the opinion he had originally expressed on the subject of the war in Spain. He complimented his noble friend (marquis Wellesley) on the admirable manner in which he had developed his sentiments on the general state of affairs, and particularly on the foreign policy pursued by the ministers of the crown, and characterised the answer, which the noble earl had made to the speech of his noble friend, as feeble, inconclusive and foolish. His noble friend's views were justified both by the Speech from the throne, and still more fully by the noble earl's reply. His lordship then proceeded to state, that he did not deny, or disavow, some words attributed to him by the noble earl. These words he had used on former occasions: but, so far was he from believing them wrong, that he thought he was, this night, fully justified in the use of them, by what had been spoken on both sides of the House. He could not but condemn the replies in general terms resorted to by the noble earl at the head of the administration, a species of discussion in which he was so fond of dealing upon most occasions; whilst the speech of the noble marquis, in which be pointed out the definitive object we ought to have in view in the campaign in the peninsula, whilst it abounded, like every thing that fell from his noble friend, in statesmanlike principles and details, met with his highest commendation. That one ultimate object, stated by his noble friend, deserved, and had his approbation. Whilst the noble earl's comment on the subject of that definitive object, was general, imperfect and desultory. When we engaged first in the peninsular war, the question was not then what it was at present. It was not then, as at present, a question in which all Europe was concerned and engaged; for now all the armies of Europe were or had been lately engaged against this country. Before ministers embarked in the contest, therefore, as had been justly stated by the noble marquis, they ought to have asked themselves what was the definite object they had in view, and what were their means of attaining it. Only one object was professed, and that was the total exclusion of the French from the peninsula, and without being a priori assured of adequate means to effect that purpose, it was cruel and base to embark the population of a country in so hopeless a cause, merely

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for the sake of a little temporary advantage. But France had originally military possession of the country, and was it reasonable or at all feasible to expect at the outset that her vast power could be overmastered by the single efforts of the military means and resources of this country? He therefore contended that when the war commenced he was justified in holding the opinion that there was no chance of any favourable result from the intervention of the arms of Great Britain or any aid we could afford the Spanish nation. At no period could our means be considered adequate in the contemplation of such an enterprize. How, then, could they have been reckoned sufficient when France possessed the whole resources of the continent and wielded the arms of Europe in alliance with her own? Whatever, therefore, chance might since have produced, he contended that the deliverance of Spain in the view of a statesman was originally beyond the utmost means of this country, and that this position had been since established by experience. The allusions made by the noble earl to the periods of king William and queen Anne were without analogy and inconclusive. As to his own former observations and reasonings, they had reference to a different state of France, in which she had not such a union of all Europe to support her. He was of opinion, that it was only when we saw a powerful embodied army on the continent belonging to our allies, that we ought to put forth our exertions; and that we ought to assist our continental allies only as auxiliaries, not as principals. No diversion had been made in concert with lord Wellington, where it ought to have been made, unless we could call that one which was made in the fens of Walcheren. His noble friend had well stated that the ministry had not as yet advanced one step in their accomplishment of their object in the Spanish war: why, then, should he be ashamed to avow his former opinion, when this third advance into the interior of Spain had, by its failure, proved the correctness of the data on which that opinion was founded? Nor must the noble earl think, that he had answered his noble friend when he stated the number of our troops on the continent, or when he made a boast of having delivered Andalusia from the French. This was an empty boast; for no one believed that the release was more than temporary, and that the French army could not re-occupy the
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province whenever they pleased. The spirit of the Spanish peasantry was good, but there was none in the Spanish nobility. The reasons assigned by the noble marquis for the failure of the campaign were the true ones: not those stated by the noble earl, who confessed that he always expected co-operation from the Spaniards. It was the want of means; the failure of supplies and resources; and not disappointment in expected co-operation on the part of the Spaniards (a hope and expectation now cherished for the fiftieth time and as often proved abortive) which had led to the improductive result of all these exertions. The blame did not lie with the Spaniards, but with those who encouraged hopes which they had no right to entertain. The truth was, the Spaniards were not possessed of the materials for this co-operation, and the fault was with the noble earl and his friends the English ministers, who in their ignorance overrated the condition of Spain, and anticipated more from her than she was or could by possibility be able to perform. Were he in the noble earl's situation, he would rather confess the inadequacy of his policy, than come forward and say, at the end of the year,—'O dear; we expected such things, but we have been disappointed.' If they had, as they boasted, 130,000 men on the continent, why was there so little done, when the expence was so great? or why were 20,000 British troops kept idle in Sicily? Had the measures of his noble friend (earl Grey) on leaving office in 1807 been adopted, that would have prevented the necessity of locking up such a force in Sicily. But their non-adoption could not create surprize; as it was now pretty well understood, that an epigram caused these men to be kept in Sicily, when they ought to have been in Spain. This was another of the effects of that fashion among the present ministers which affected to despise every thing coming from those who preceded them, but if instead of this folly they had followed the good counsel left them, they would have placed these men at the immediate disposal of lord Wellington, and thereby, in all probability, decided at once the fate of the peninsula. But, with regard to Spain, ministers were always too late; and the noble earl was obliged to recur to his last and usual defence—the abuse of his agent, whom he charges with the failure of the co-operation from Sicily, which was expected by lord

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Wellington. As usual they sent the force when too late to be of any service.—There was another point on which he expected some explanation. He expected to be informed why ministers, with a revenue of one hundred and five millions or more by estimate, extorted by means most grinding and oppressive upon a suffering people, were yet in a situation to confess their inability to supply the military chest of lord Wellington. The difficulty, however, did not arise from the deficient resources of the country, much as they had been drained, but must be traced to the noble earl's real inefficiency, and to that of his colleagues. They might diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country, with as little effect, or prospect of ultimate success, as bad attended them in those plans and speculations which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency in paper and in coin throughout the nation; when such had been its effects, why not then rather stop at this moment the contest in Spain? His lordship again paid a tribute of applause to the speech of the noble marquis, who did not, like the noble earl, condescend to deal in loose principles, vague analogies, or in general assertions, but went on reasoning, point by point, as full of facts as he was of sound theoretical principles, and of practical political wisdom. As his Majesty's ministers had not made sufficient disclosures, he did not wish to press them at present with respect to our connections with Sweden. But he must say, that in his opinion much might have been done there, although very little had been effected.—With regard to America the ministers evinced their folly in expecting that the repeal of the Orders in Council, when that took place, could have produced conciliation in the government of that country. But there was a time when it would have carried that effect. The noble earl it seemed bad yet, in common with politicians of his stamp, to learn, that concessions made too late would always produce irritation. It was so with regard to Ireland as well as to America, The details brought to light relative to the condition of our manufacturers, ought to have convinced ministers, that the repeal of the Orders in Council, when it took place, could not have produced a spirit of pacification in America—although twelve months before it might have had that effect. The American government were always hostile, but had not the means of shewing their hostility
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sooner. But now they displayed their spirit, when our government had put the means in their power; particularly by the disclosure of the condition of our manufacturers; for this it was that had given spirit to America. Had government no other reasons for such a measure, they ought to have conciliated America sooner, for the purpose of making more vigorous exertions in Spain. They were as yet, however, ignorant of the circumstances which led to the American war, for this matter was still kept a secret: and he could not but blame the omission of this cause in the Speech from the throne. He knew that there were perverse irritations on both sides, and though he wished for peace with America, it was only on such terms as would be consistent with the preservation of our maritime rights, without which he would prefer the continuance of the war with that country.—His lordship then concluded with avowing his confirm" ed opinion of the expediency of throwing the constitution open to the Catholic subjects of the state; a measure which justice, wisdom and policy alike recommended as necessary and advantageous to the dearest interests of the country.
Earl Bathurstvindicated the conduct of ministers with respect to the war in the peninsula, more especially in regard to the degree and nature of the reinforcements to be forwarded to the marquis of Wellington. He observed, that his noble relative opposite well knew the entire confidence ministers placed in that illustrious person, and adverted particularly to the point of lord Wellington's not deeming it advisable to send new regiments to Spain; so particularly careful was that excellent officer of the health of his troops.—With respect to the force from Sicily, the fact was, that lord William Bentinck had instructions to send such a number of troops as was consistent with the other objects to which he had to look. The objection, that by the force sent thence not remaining in Catalonia, the baron D'Erolles was disgusted, had no force, inasmuch as, since that period, (as had appeared by the Gazette) our naval force had been in active co-operation with the baron D'Erolles. As for the charge of not sending reinforcements to the marquis of Wellington, the fact was, that in the month of June lord Wellington sent a dispatch requesting, unless some extraordinary circumstances occurred, that no new corps might be sent out to him, because they were more likely

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to be affected by the heats of summer. It was, therefore, that no new corps were sent, until intelligence had been received of the battle of Salamanca, which was considered an extraordinary circumstance as to require reinforcements to be sent. With regard to the United States of America, he contended that the conduct of ministers had been throughout consistent. The papers relative to the correspondence and intercourse between the governments were not on their lordships' table, because his Majesty's ministers had not yet received the final answer to a proposition made to the United States through sir John Borlase Warren; in the mean time, he took leave to say, that the Orders in Council were not now the only grounds of demurrer on the part of that government.
Marquis Wellesley, conceiving that some points urged by noble lords opposite were personally applied to him, shortly explained, that he thought nothing which fell from him warranted a personal allusion on their parts. He warmly remarked, that during the whole period to which he spoke, he had considered the system of the war in the peninsula inadequate to its object; an opinion which he had uniformly declared, and in adherence to which he had resigned his office as secretary of state. He could not particularise objections without the permission of his sovereign or his representative; but if he was allowed an opportunity, he should be ready to meet the noble lords, point by point, upon that subject, either in public or private, and before any tribunal to which he might be summoned.
Viscount Melvilledefended the conduct of the Admiralty with respect to the American and West India stations, observing, that on the Halifax station alone, long before the commencement of hostilities, the squadron was double the strength of the whole American navy. This he enumerated, as well as the force in the West Indian seas; and stated the American navy to consist of five frigates, and a few sloops of war. It was impossible to guard against such casualties as were alluded to by noble lords opposite, (the capture of the Guerriere frigate); but care was taken to render such attempts an extreme risk on the part of the enemy.
Lord Grenvillesaid, he did not think so badly of ministers as to charge them with neglecting to provide a naval force superior to the American navy, which only consisted of five frigates. His charge
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was, that they did not send sufficient reinforcements of troops, and that our military force in Canada was, in consequence, inferior to that of the assailants.
The question was then put, and the Address agreed to without a division.
The Earl of Liverpoolmoved, that lord Walsingham be constituted chairman of all the committees of that House during the present session of parliament; a motion, the propriety of which, he was confident every noble lord would acquiesce in.
The Lord Chancellorobserved, that if the House could secure the services of the noble lord, they would be a blessing.
Lord Walsinghamshortly expressed his grateful sense of what had fallen from the noble lords.
The question was put, and ordered accordingly, nem. diss.