PORTUGUESE SUBSIDY. (Hansard, 16 March 1812)

The Earl of Liverpool

rose and said; I certainly, my lords, feel it unnecessary to take up your time, under the circumstances in which the present subject comes before us, at any length in discussing its merits. What the message of his royal highness the Prince Regent refers to, is a proposed continuance of that support and assistance that was afforded by parliament and the Prince Regent to Portugal in the last year. On such an occasion, my lords, I think there can be but one feeling in this House, which is, that as what has been so given to our faithful allies, who have stood so honourably and steadily by us, under the most arduous and difficult circumstances, was an aid not given in vain, but, on the contrary, has answered every purpose that was expected from it, we owe it to them and to ourselves to continue that assistance. On former occasions, your lordships may recollect, that the discussions of this subject principally turned on one point, namely, the practicability of the object for which the aid was afforded. No man, however, who looks to the state of the peninsula, and to the engagements of this country, but must be aware, that nothing is of more importance, or more affecting 1295 (save the immediate defence of this country itself) to the vital interests of the British empire, than the defence of Portugal; I mean, more important for continental objects, provided it were practicable to act upon it. The question always must come, as to the practicability, or chance of the practicability of the object which we contend for. We now, my lords, have ample experience on this subject, and that experience leads to this conclusion—that the defence of Portugal, under lord Wellington, acting upon the principles of that great and distinguished officer, and supporting him in his great and various exertions, is an object practicable to the arms of this country. The next question refers to the subsidies, or support given that way for the maintenance of her forces, and the improvement of her military system, and the extent to which that object has been obtained, in creating the military assistance afforded by Portugal independent of the British armies—And, upon this second object, I likewise say there can be no difference of sentiment. About two years ago, opinions were entertained in parliament, and even by officers who had served in that country, that it was impracticable to produce a Portuguese force capable of co-operating with a British power in the way we see it has done. To their own honour, some of the officers, to whom I allude, have been magnanimous enough to allow their mistake in that respect. But what, my lords, I ask, has been the result? Most fortunate for this country, most fortunate for Portugal, and most fortunate for all continental Europe, if her nations can be induced to awake from their stupor.—We have seen a Portuguese force established under the general direction of British officers; but I must accompany this by remarking, that much may be attributed in this respect to the exertions of Portuguese officers. We have seen a Portuguese force thus constituted, arise capable of meeting in action the most distinguished battalions of the French army, under its most able and veteran commanders, and under the most critical and trying circumstances. I speak upon the authority of the most able and intelligent officers. When these troops formerly signalised themselves in the defence of positions, the country was told that they might be very useful in such situations, but that if tried in the field they would deceive the expectations that had been formed of them. They have been 1296 tried in the field—and they have distinguished themselves. We have seen them at Barrosa intrepidly attacking a formidable force of the enemy, most advantageously posted, and defeating the flanks of that enemy. Upon that occasion, and upon every other, the Portuguese military proved itself equal to combating the proudest troops of France. I refer, my lords, to these leading considerations generally, feeling it would be a waste of your time to enter upon any particular details. These results, however, are established, that the defence of the kingdom of Portugal is practicable, and that the Portuguese government has aided most essentially in that defence. Under these circumstances, I cannot believe there exists a doubt in the mind of any man, that we are doing too much for an ancient ally—an ally always remarkable for the fidelity of her adherence to her engagements with Great Britain, and who, by her conduct under the particular circumstances of the case, presents an additional claim to our assistance and consideration. Your lordships are aware, that soon after the necessary retirement of the prince of that country, it was occupied by the French armies, and it may easily be conceived in what a state it must have been left with regard to its civil, military, and financial concerns after the French troops had withdrawn. It cannot be a matter of surprise that under such circumstances, the advantages since obtained, could not be achieved at once, but have been the result of perseverance and attention to the most minute details, and by strictly adhering to the system which circumstances rendered it necessary to introduce. However, I am rejoiced to say, that the exertions which had been made have been most effectual, and have been attended by results truly beneficial—so much so, that if the House think the subsidy of last year, and that which will be proposed in the present, are sufficient to cover even the military expenditure of Portugal, they are much mistaken. Independent of the 2,000,000l. which were voted last year, a sum of not less than 1,800,000l. has been furnished by the people of that country to support their military establishments—and, therefore, it must evidently be seen, that Great Britain is not affording resources to a people who are doing nothing for themselves. I will not detain the House longer than to move an Address in answer to the gracious Message of the Prince Regent. The 1297 Address, as usual, was an echo of the Message.

Earl Grosvenor

said, that there were one or two points of the noble Secretary's speech with respect to which he wished to say a few words. If he did not oppose the present motion, it was not because he was satisfied with the mode in which the war had been conducted in Spain by the disjointed and distracted government which had ruled this country for these five years past. He could not, however, but join in the praise which had been bestowed upon the military characters who had been employed in that war, and by whose meritorious exertions, an heroic spirit had been diffused throughout the whole army, and even among the Portuguese troops. But in what situation was the peninsula? What had been done after all the hopes that had been held out to this country? We were in possession of Portugal, after the Convention of Cintra, when sir John Moore was ordered to advance into Spain with so very inadequate a force; and still we had hardly done any thing more than keep possession of it. France was still in possession of the capital of Spain, and of the best part of the country, in a military point of view. With an army of 100,000 men, British and Portuguese troops, as good as any in the world, led by a most skilful commander, what had been done? Would the country, under these circumstances be satisfied with the capture of a fortress, however gallant and important that exploit might be? The country, he was persuaded, would not be satisfied, looking to the magnitude of the force composed of British and Portuguese regular troops, aided by the guerillas, unless a great and powerful exertion was made, in order, if possible, at once to terminate the war, and destroy the power of Buonaparté in the peninsula. We had expended enormous sums in this contest; and though France had lost a great number of men, it was not. to be concealed that we lost a considerable number also; and however obscure the situation of these men, they had still relations and friends to feel for their sufferings, and lament their fate. It was proper, then, in his opinion, if the war was to be continued, that some great effort should be made. With regard to the amount of the sum to be given, he could not help observing, that the Portuguese sufferers might have been relieved out of these two millions, or at least, that a sum should be retained out 1298 of it, equal to that which had been already subscribed for the Portuguese, in order to relieve the distresses of our manufacturers at home, who were almost reduced to despair by the obstinate perseverance of ministers in the absurd and ruinous policy of the Orders in Council. This might be the more readily done, too, since Portugal was now able, as the noble Secretary alleged, to do so much for herself. Upon the whole, considering the engagements by which the country was bound, and how far We Were embarked, he did not think that our armies ought to be withdrawn from the peninsula; but, on the contrary, that the war there ought to be prosecuted with the utmost vigour, provided there appeared any rational chance of ultimate success. If, as had been alleged, the universal Spanish nation was with us, much might yet be done. If they wished for our aid, and would cordially co-operate for their own defence, the most favourable results might be expected. But if they did not wish for our aid,—if they would not co-operate, but were prepared to submit and give up the contest in despair,—if they were ready to bow their necks to the yoke of the conqueror, it was useless for us to expect success. It ought to be observed, also, that if France should have to employ her armies elsewhere, an opportunity would be afforded for making a great effort which ought not to be neglected.