PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RERPECTING THE INVASION OF RUSSIA. (Hansard, 18 December 1812)

The Earl of Liverpool

said, that in rising to move an Address in answer to his Royal Highness's most gracious Message, he should perhaps have thought it only necessary to move the Address, leaving to that feeling which he was satisfied actuated the great majority of that House and the country, to express a concurrence in an object, which embodied so many sentiments congenial with, and characteristic of genuine British feeling. Understanding, however, that elsewhere some sentiment had been expressed hostile to the purpose of the Message, he felt it necessary to draw the attention of the House to the circumstances which gave rise to it. A greater exertion had been made by the ruler of France against Russia, than he had put forth against any other power. He had entered Russia with a force of not less than 360,000 men, including 60,000 cavalry, and this at a time when, from various circumstances, not now to be entered 320 into, one of which, however, was the delay which arose in making peace with the Turks, which detained a large portion of the Russian force in a remote part of the empire, the Russian army was numerically inferior to the invading army of France. Under these circumstances, the advice was followed which had been given from various quarters, but particularly by the gallant commander of our armies in the peninsula, to act upon a defensive system. In conformity with this system, the Russian troops retreated, but in a manner that gave birth to the most sanguine hope of the events which ultimately followed. During the course of the retreat not a corps was cut off nor a detachment made prisoners, except in partial conflicts. At length the opportunity arrived for offensive operations, and the events that followed were already before the public. To give effect to this offensive system, the greatest sacrifices had been made. There was no example in modern warfare of so great and magnanimous a sacrifice as that of the burning of Moscow. Look at a population of 200,000 persons, voluntarily quitting their homes, and sacrificing their houses and their property, in order that Moscow might not afford quarters and become a place of arms for the enemy. It was not merely, however, at Moscow, that these sacrifices were made, but hundreds of villages were destroyed, upon the approach of the enemy, by the inhabitants, who, after making this sacrifice, in numerous instances, retired into the adjoining woods, and returned with whatever arms they could procure to encounter the invaders of their country. In every other instance of an invasion by the French arms, except in the peninsula, the people had stood for nothing; in Russia they had stood for every thing—actuated by an universal spirit of patriotism, they had voluntarily made the greatest sacrifices, they had offered up every selfish consideration, every sentiment of mere personal enjoyment, every private object, at the shrine of their country. In these sacrifices, and in such a contest, it was evident, that much individual misery must have been endured. To contribute in some degree to the alleviation of that misery the generosity of Britons was called upon—a generosity which was characteristic of British feeling in all its warmest impulses, where no other consideration intervened. But here, to the feelings of generosity, every consideration of interest was added. Why did 321 France invade Russia? not for the sake of invading Russia, but because Russia would not adhere to the continental system; because the government of Russia would not consent to exclude from her ports the produce of our industry. Great Britain was, therefore, attacked through the medium of Russia, and to look at the question merely in a mercantile point of view, the greatest benefit had already accrued to our commercial interests from the Russian successes. Was it nothing to have the market of 36,000,000 of people? Already had our commercial interests been materially benefited. The great interests connected with our colonies, had experienced the advantage flowing from the rise in the price of all colonial produce; our I manufacturing interests had been benefited by the increased demand for the produce of their industry. Every channel of commerce had received fresh life and vigour, through the successes of the Russians. Looking at the question, therefore, in the narrowest point of view, the proposed aid was eminently called for—but in how much greater a degree, from other causes, and other feelings? Had it been merely a check to that torrent of ambition which had deluged so many other countries, still he would have contended for the grant; but here, where British interests were concerned in the contest—where British interests were so materially benefited by the result—how much more was such an aid called for? Let it not be supposed 'that he was insensible to the privations and the sufferings of the people of this country; but let it be recollected that here we were exempt from the actual calamities of war. The sending out fleets and armies on foreign expeditions, or the taxation consequent upon war, were as nothing, compared with those calamities which arose from a country being made the actual theatre of war. From these horrors we were exempted, but let us look with an eye of generosity to those who were suffering all the horrors of such a calamity. Was it not of importance to shew a disposition to aid the suffering people of Russia, and thereby cement the union of the two powers? The French in their invasion of Russia, by the cruelties they had committed, and by the sacrilegious destruction of their sacred edifices, had inspired the Russians with a detestation which would not only be felt by those now in existence, but by generations still unborn. Was it not of importance then, by the aid af- 322 forded by this country, to fix the sentiments of the Russian nation in unison with our own, and thus cement the union of the two governments? The noble earl concluded by moving an Address of concurrence, and mentioning that the sum proposed to be granted was 200,000l. The higher ranks in Russia had begun a contribution which this sum was intended to aid.

Lord Holland

never felt himself more embarrassed than upon the present occacasion, and had it not been an established rule with him, never to shrink from his parliamentary duty, he would have preferred being absent. His embarrassment arose from this, that he thought the proposition impolitic, but at the same time that it would be unwise and unsafe to reject it. He perfectly agreed with the noble earl in his praise of the patriotism of the Russian nation, and this praise was more particularly applicable to the peasantry, who in sacrificing the produce of their earnings, had not the consolation of those feelings which were inseparable from the soldier, but were actuated solely by motives of pure patriotism. He could not, however, agree in the propriety of the mode proposed, nor did he see that the aid could consistently be afforded, if such a sum was disposable for this purpose, why had it not been applied to replenish lord Wellington's military chest; and might not the emperor of Russia say, if this money had been applied in time to replenish lord Wellington's military chest, it would have been of greater advantage to my cause than sending it now to me? The only argument that could induce him to accede to the proposition, was that used by the noble lord, of shewing a disposition to aid the Russian nation. He agreed that this was of importance, and he trusted, at the same time, that in the alliance of the courts of Peters burgh and London, there was a perfect understanding as to their objects, not only as to carrying on the war, but as to the means of bringing about a secure peace. Whether the emperor of France should escape or not, he trusted that the events that had happened would clear the way for that situation of affairs, which might render a peace upon secure grounds, less difficult of attainment; and that upon this point there was a thorough understanding between the courts of Peters burgh and London. For such an object, so highly to be desired, he anxiously looked to the effects 323 of this alliance, nor would he for a moment suppose, that any intention existed of endeavouring to force any other government upon France; which could only have the effect of rousing against us the yet remaining considerable resources of that power. With respect to the proposition now made, it must rest upon the responsibility of ministers. He did not think enough had been laid before the House to shew the propriety of the grant, but he was willing to believe that ministers had in their possession information to warrant the proposition. If any hint had been given to ministers that such a grant would be acceptable to the Russian government, or the Russian nation, then he should not hesitate a moment in agreeing to it. Under this impression, he would not withhold his vote from the proposition.